1) The soundtracks of James Bond movies like "Live and Let Die" and "Skyfall" provide useful insights into the relationship between Egypt's military and the Muslim Brotherhood government. 2) General Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi has adopted a "live and let die" strategy of allowing the Muslim Brotherhood government to decline on its own while promoting the military's prestige and neutrality. 3) As political and economic crises intensify in Egypt, tensions between the military and President Morsi's government have increased, calling into question the durability of the civilian government's control over the powerful military establishment.

1. James Bond movie soundtracks have inspired generations. Now they may prove helpful in
analysing current relations between Egypt's military and Muslim Brotherhood
Mona El-Kouedi , Monday 18 Feb 2013
The soundtracks of 007 movies 'Live and Let Die' and 'Skyfall' had been particularly useful in understanding the
relations between Egypt's minister of defence General Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi and the Muslim Brothers’ President
Morsi, which is significant to grasp the country’s deepening political and economic crisis.
The on-going clashes that are taking place in Egypt since the commemoration of the second anniversary of the
Egyptian revolution in 25 January 2013, have unveiled the basis of the military’s strategy towards the Muslim
Brothers. For political analysts the position of the military establishment in Egypt and its relation to President
Morsi had been a perplexing matter, especially after his removal of the long serving minister of defence Field
Marshal Tantawi in August 2012.
Some have argued that for the first time in Egypt’s history, the military establishment has subordinated to a
civilian president that is democratically elected, regardless of his affiliation to the Muslim Brothers. As time
passes, and as the political crisis intensifies, the disparity between the military and the presidency becomes
evident and harder to ignore.
While the presidency struggles to survive, the military watches the Muslim Brothers’ decline with amusement.
General Al-Sisi, a religiously pious military leader deeply respected within the officer corps, has tailored the
military’s strategy towards President Morsi and the Muslim Brothers. Such strategy is perfectly manifested in Sir
Paul McCartney’s James Bond song ‘Live and Let Die’.
Al-Sisi’s strategy is informed by the SCAF’s daunting experience in power for a year and half, where it had been
harshly criticised for its inability to handle the transitional period. Egypt’s new defence minister made the
restoration of the military’s ‘prestige’ and appealing image his prime goal. He appointed an army spokesperson,
who became responsible for answering media inquiries and reflecting the army’s professionalism and discipline.
Through his Facebook page that has almost 100K subscribers, the army spokesperson publishes news, pictures
and videos of the army’s achievements in enhancing Egypt’s security and stability, with almost no mention of
President Morsi, reflecting the military’s indifference towards the political leadership.
The Muslim Brotherhood, however, has contributed to the development of the military’s ‘live and let die’
strategy that although was appealing at the beginning, turned into the President worst nightmare. The Muslim
Brothers’ constant fear and distrust towards the military had made them suspicious of military leaders’ actions.
This was evident when clashes erupted in front of the presidential palace last December, in the aftermath of mass
protests against Morsi’s constitutional decree that granted him unlimited powers. General Al-Sisi called all
political forces for a dialogue to solve the political deadlock that the country was suffering from. The presidency
was outraged with the military’s intervention in the political process and pressed the ministry of defence to
withdraw its initiative.
On the day of the proposed gathering, the ministry of defence had to call off the meeting. While the presidency
celebrated its power over the military establishment, pushing it to withdraw its invitation, the army chief
remained silent, waiting to reap the rewards of thepresidency’s floundering. The Muslim Brothers sought to
appease the military by granting it more privileges in the new constitution in order to guarantee its neutrality.
According to the new constitution, the minister of defence should be a military officer, the military budget
remains practically unchecked by civilians, and more shockingly, military tribunals for civilians became

2. constitutional. Enough guarantees not only to keep the military out of politics but also to win the military on the
President’s side in situations of crisis? Not really.
The relations between the presidency and the military came into question only few weeks after the constitution
was ratified. While fierce clashes took place in Cairo and many other governorates to commemorate the
revolution second anniversary, Suez Canal cities (Suez, Portsaid and Ismailia) witnessed bloody clashes,
especially after a football violence verdict, leading to the death of more than 50 and the injury of 1000.
Given the police inability to handle the situation, along with the strategic importance of the Suez Canal where
clashes were only meters away, the President decided to deploy the army in Suez Canal cities and called for an
urgent meeting with the National Defence Council (NDC), composed of key military and police leaders
including ministers of defence and interior and headed by the President.
The NDC released a statement according to which it has granted itself the right to declare a state of emergency
and called for national dialogue. More importantly, however, was that the statement reflected nothing but the
weakness of the presidency vis-à-vis the military. The statement included a clause in which the NDC, headed by
the President, stresses that ‘the army belongs to the people’ and that it will always stay neutral. One cannot help
but remember a similar statement made by SCAF after its first meeting without Mubarak, only few days after the
eruption of the revolution in 2011.
While it is true that it was Mubarak’s absence from the SCAF that gave the statement its weight, Morsi’s
presence in the NDC meeting, however, is what precisely undermined the presidency and revealed its inability to
block such unnecessary statement from being published.
As the situation deteriorated, Morsi declared state of emergency and curfew in the Suez Canal three cities for 30
days. Morsi’s declaration came in a televised speech where he appeared nervous and threatened of fiercer
measures in case of non-compliance. No better opportunity for the military to watch Morsi’s decay than this one.
The Muslim Brothers do not seem to learn from their predecessors. In 1977, the military imposed a curfew
during the ‘food riots’ only after Sadat agreed to withdraw all economic decisions that increased prices. Without
concessions from Morsi’s side, it was impossible for the military to intervene. As a matter of fact, Egyptians
mocked Morsi’s curfew and organised demonstrations that start with the curfew hours. Youth in Suez and
Ismailia organised football tournaments in celebration of the curfew. Street weddings and fireworks were also
reported in Port Said to defy Morsi’s decision.
It is not surprising that the military enjoyed public defiance of the curfew. The commanders of the second and
third field armies stationed in Suez and Ismailia declared that they would not shoot protestors and will only ‘try’
and implement the curfew through ‘dialogue’. The truth is, they have never tried.
Pictures of protestors marching the streets during the curfew surrounded by smiling army soldiers were
spreading in social media. More interestingly, the circulation of a video showing army officers playing football
with protestors during the curfew was just another blow to Morsi’s authority. To add to the embarrassment of
Morsi and the Muslim Brothers, the army spokesperson posted numerous pictures of the commanders of the
second and third field armies while visiting injured protesters, who were allegedly shot by the President’s police.
The generals showed their support to injured courageous protestors and have even given them gifts on behalf of
General Al-Sisi, who has also given his orders to treat some of them in military hospitals. No wonder that the
President, Muslim Brothers officials or ministers were unable to compete with the military in this occasion.
While General Al-Sisi’s winning card ‘live and let die’ seems successful in keeping the military theoretically out
of the political struggle while exposing the decline of the Muslim Brothers, the General did warn from a
‘SkyFall’. In a recent statement by the defence minister, considered the strongest since his appointment, he
warned that the political struggle between the various political forces might lead to the ‘collapse of the Egyptian
state’.
It seems that General Al-Sisi is actually warning the Muslim Brothers from using the damaging card of ‘die and
let die’. As the relations between the Muslim Brothers and the military is turning into a zero-sum game, the
Muslim Brothers can never play with Al-Sisi’s ‘live and let die’ card, for that Egypt may survive the perishing of
the Muslim Brothers but not of the military.

3. The Muslim Brothers might have thought of playing the ‘die and let die’ card only to gain some time to
reorganise itself and reframe its relations with the military. Probably the Muslim Brothers’ winning bid would be
to develop a ‘live and let live’ strategy, which would mean that they may have to get rid of Morsi and/or offer a
number of concessions to the various political forces as well as to the military.
While Egypt has a chance of surviving the ‘Skyfall scenario’ if the ‘live and let live’ card is played, it seems,
however, that the only cards on the table at the moment are those of ‘live and let die’ and ‘die and let die’.
*Mona El-Kouedi has recently submitted her PhD thesis at the Department of War Studies, King’s College
London. She is currently a Research Fellow at the NATO Defence College in Rome. The opinions expressed in
this article are her own, and must not be attributed to the NATO Defence College or to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.