This research evolved out of an understanding that in low-income and post-conflict areas, and particularly rural areas, citizens pay a wide range of “taxes” that often differ substantially than what may be statutorily mandated. These non-statutory payments, whether paid to state or non-state actors, are referred to here as informal taxes. Informal state taxes can take a range of forms, including bribes, extortions and goodwill payments. Informal non-state taxes are generally conceived as being either coercive or voluntary in nature, or existing somewhere along coercive-quasi-voluntary spectrum. On the quasi-voluntary end of this spectrum, informal taxes can take the form of community levies, with payments made to community groups, self-help groups, traditional or chiefly institutions or other autonomous governing structures with the aim of providing public services. On the coercive end of the spectrum, informal taxes may take more obviously exploitative forms, including payments made to insurgent groups, warlords or vigilante groups in exchange for security or “protection.” While we differentiate between these different types of payments, we have intentionally left the definition of informal tax broad enough in order to fully capture the range of taxes and payments made by citizens, which will help us to better understand the basis of post-conflict taxation, service delivery, and governance in these areas. These informal taxes, while often making up a substantial proportion of the taxes paid by individuals and households, are frequently overlooked in policy and academic analyses of taxation and public service delivery. We see this as problematic. Focusing only on “formal” taxation can lead to misunderstanding of effective local tax burdens, and their impact on livelihoods and the fairness of distribution, as well as of public goods provision and local governance more broadly. Accordingly, at its most basic level, our research aims simply to capture the prevalence of both formal and informal taxes in these post-conflict areas, and how they’re perceived by citizen-taxpayers. In so doing, we aim to capture the real, rather than idealized, systems of tax and governance that define post-conflict service delivery, and that are deeply linked to distributive justice and equality in post-conflict areas. The three primary objective