1. Hessler 1
Arielle Hessler
Professor Eric Beverley
History 301.2
14 December 2011
Power, Economics, and Diplomacy in the Vijayanagara Horse Trade
The medieval kingdom of Vijayanagara united the different cultural and ethnic regions of
South India to become a great military empire and economic entity in the fourteenth and fifteenth
century. The formation of this great empire became possible when the founders of the
Vijayanagara Empire began repelling the advances of the Muslim sultanates from North India, a
feat which had never before been accomplished. Modern historians believe the unprecedented
success of the Vijayanagara army against the invading northern kingdoms was due largely to its
adoption of the superior Muslim cavalry techniques of their enemies. ​ ​This primarily involved 1
training and expanding a better cavalry to match that of the invading Muslims. Once the 2
Muslim invaders were repelled, Vijayanagara was able to use these new war tactics to expand its
borders and encompass all of South India from the natural northern border of the Tungabhadra
River down to the island of Sri Lanka.
The new found military prowess of Vijayanagara and its eventual absorption of the
Malabar and Coromandel coasts in its borders enabled it to become an important contributor to
1
Catherine B Asher and Cynthia Talbot, "Southern India, 1350­1550," in ​India Before Europe,​ (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 56
2
Asher and Talbot, "Southern India, 1350­1550," 59

2. Hessler 2
the international trade between Europe and Asia, which in turn gave Vijayanagara kings access
to the quality Persian and Arabian warhorses needed for the kingdom's new, successful cavalry.
The need for these war animals caused Vijayanagara kings to encourage foreign trade so their
empire could continue to exist as a powerful militaristic state. However, this dependence on
foreign trade to maintain a strong military was a fault in the very foundation of the empire. The
horses that enabled the Vijayanagara cavalry to grow to rival the Muslim invaders to the north
were not easily accessible to South India except through overseas trade, which made the
kingdom dependent on the whims of foreign traders. This fault grows even larger when
considering the lack of direct control Vijayanagara kings were able to exert over their own port
cities along the Malabar and Coromandel coasts. By studying the military history, political
identity, and economic situation of Vijayanagara from before its founding in 1336 to the loss of
its capital at the Battle of Talikoa in 1565, it becomes apparent that the very thing that enabled
Vijayanagara to break free and become a powerful medieval empire in South India was also
detrimental to its power and stability.
The military history of the conflicts between South India and their Northern enemies
creates a better understanding when studying the rise of Vijayanagara, and how the adoption of
Muslim cavalry methods played an important role in the success of the empire. Before the rise
of Vijayanagara in the early fourteenth century, South Indian armies were usually overpowered
by Northern invaders. Pre­Vijayanagara, there were many different kingdoms in South India that
were based on geographic and ethnic regions. When the Muslim Ghurids began invading from
the north, the different kings of South India tried to repel their advances, and almost always, the
Indian kings would fail. Historians used to believe this was due to a lack of unity in South India.

3. Hessler 3
The existence of kingdoms historically based on differences in ethnicity, language, and culture
made this theory seem reasonable, as well as the fact that Hinduism itself was not a unifying
philosophy at the time, although this is a modern misconception . In reality, different local 3
villages tended to have their own religious philosophies and personal gods and goddesses they
would worship, which would be unknown and seem alien to other regions. With this in mind,
historians now believe that the victories of the Muslim invaders in South India were due to their
superior cavalry. Later, Vijayanagara rulers bridged the gap with advances in military 4
technology, weaponry, and strategy, theoretically erasing the disadvantage South India had
previously had against invaders.
The Muslim sultanates that spread into India had a superior cavalry than that of the South
Indian kingdoms which gave them a greater advantage in battle. This can be seen through an
analysis of the war techniques employed by the Ghurid dynasty that invaded India
pre­Vijayanagara, between 1148 and 1215 CE. The Ghurids had a superior cavalry than that of 5
Indian kings, “both in terms of supply of horses and of trained manpower.” This is not to say 6
that Indian kings did not have cavalry units. In some recorded cases, they had as many horsemen
engaged in battle as that of the invaders. However, the Ghurids had a superior cavalry in part 7
because South Indian kings lacked a steady, reliable supply of quality war­horses, advanced
equipment such as better stirrups and saddles with which to control the horses, and had inferior
3
​Catherine B. Asher and Cynthia Talbot, "The Expansion of Turkic Power, 1180­1350," in ​India Before Europe,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 27­28
4
Asher and Talbot, "The Expansion of Turkic Power, 1180­1350," 27­28
5
Asher and Talbot, "The Expansion of Turkic Power, 1180­1350," 25­26
6
​Asher and Talbot, "The Expansion of Turkic Power, 1180­1350," 28
7
​Peter Jackson, "The Zenith of the Sultanate: An Age of Conquest," in ​The Delhi Sultanate: A Political and
Military History​, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 215

4. Hessler 4
training methods for their horses and riders. The Ghurids, and all Muslim sultanates of the early 8
medieval period, had these advances. The Ghurids had access to high quality war­horses from
Arabia and Persia due to their power base to the northwest of India, mainly in Afghanistan. 9
They utilized quality Arabian warhorses prized throughout Eurasia in their cavalry. The horses
indigenous to India, however, were of “poor quality” and were ill­suited to war. It was difficult 10
for South Indian kings to get warhorses of similar quality, because their enemies controlled the
land between India and other countries. The Ghurids also had better riding equipment, such as
stronger stirrups, better harnesses, saddles with higher pommels, and nailed horseshoes. The 11
stronger stirrups and harnesses enabled their horsemen to control their horses much better, while
the higher pommels helped a rider keep his seat in battle. The nailed horseshoes improved the
endurance and fighting abilities of the war­horses as well. These innovations all allowed for less
time taken in controlling a mount, and for more time for fighting. This type of technology had
not yet reached South India. Finally, the Ghurids, with other Muslim sultans in North India, had
better trained horsemen than the South Indian kings. This gave their cavalry better
maneuverability, and the advantage of mounted archers. The Indian armies, in comparison, did
not have many riders who were able to shoot while controlling their mounts. 12
Military tactics were important as well. The Ghurids, and later the Delhi sultan kings
who continually fought against Vijayanagara, employed nomadic tactics from Central Asia and
used their horsemen as ‘light’ cavalry. Their mounted archers would quickly ride out and flank 13
8
Jackson, “The Zenith of the Sultanate,” 213­214
9
​Asher and Talbot, "The Expansion of Turkic Power, 1180­1350," 27
10
S. K. Bhakari, “Cavalry,” in ​Indian Warfare​, (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1981), 56
11
Asher and Talbot, “Southern India, 1350­1550,” 59
12
​Asher and Talbot, "The Expansion of Turkic Power, 1180­1350," 28
13
Asher and Talbot, "The Expansion of Turkic Power, 1180­1350," 28­29

5. Hessler 5
the marching Indian armies of elephants, war­horses, and infantry, and fire arrows into the
oncoming enemy. This would fell many of the advancing troops, because the arrows would be
shot into the front lines, as well as the left and right flanks. Yet once the Indian armies closed in
on the Muslim cavalry, the mounted archers would nimbly retreat to a safe distance. This style
of fighting was almost impossible for the Indians to fight against, for their military strength lay
largely in their infantry and war­elephants. They did not have a cavalry that could match the 14
Muslim mounted archers. War elephants were excellent for blunt, strong frontal assaults such as
when facing an army that could not evade them so easily on the battlefield, or for sieges. This
made them an indispensable force when Indian rulers fought rival kingdoms in India, for
elephants could heavily damage the large amounts of infantry which represented the main
strength of medieval South Indian armies. However, Indian war­elephants were not fast enough
to catch and damage the mounted Muslim archers, and the sheer size of the elephants caused
them to become a danger to their own side if they panicked from enemy arrows. Eventually,
most of the South Indian kingdoms fell to the invading armies of the Deccan sultanate in the
thirteenth century. While seemingly a minor facet of an army, the disadvantages the South 15
Indian kingdoms faced with their inferior cavalry was in reality a large contributor to their losses
at the hands of Northern invaders.
The fall of the Deccan sultanate in North India in the beginning of the fourteenth century
caused a brief period of political confusion for South India that allowed for the rise of the
Vijayanagara Empire. With the fall of the dynasty at Decca, the Muslim sultanate was unable to
maintain power in South India. The region began to segregate into the regional and ethnic
14
Asher and Talbot, “The Expansion of Turkic Power, 1180­1350,” 28
15
​Asher and Talbot, "The Expansion of Turkic Power, 1180­1350," 28

6. Hessler 6
fragments that had existed before the conquest its conquest from the North. However, Harihara 16
Raya I and his brother Bukka Raya I, the founders of Vijayanagara, were able to form an army
strong enough to carve out a kingdom based on the southern banks of the Tungabhadra River c.
1336 CE. From here, the subsequent rulers of Vijayanagara expanded south and east to 17
encompass the rest of peninsular India. Historians attribute the success of Vijayanagara's 18
expansion to the fact that rulers Harihara Raya I, Bukka Raya I, and Deva Raya II set the
precedent for incorporating Muslim cavalry training, technology, and tactics within their armies.
The previous occupation by the Muslims had exposed South India to these superior cavalry 19
methods. ​ ​ Vijayanagara rulers hired Muslim mercenaries to train their horsemen in Muslim 20
light cavalry methods, and the new equipment that had tricked down to South India from the
northwest enabled Vijayanagara to have a cavalry that finally matched that of their enemies. 21
These advancements began to erase the large disadvantages the kings of pre­Vijayanagara South
India had faced against the Northern Sultanates. Once the Vijayanagara cavalry was at the same
level as their rivals, the kingdom was able to grow into a large empire.
The emphasis on military conquest as a means of achieving freedom and expansion
heavily influenced the identity of Vijayanagara and the power structure of its elites. Kings
validated their power through their abilities as warriors. This is exemplified in many different 22
16
Carla M. Sinopoli, “From the Lion Throne: Political and Social Dynamics of the Vijayanagara Empire,” in
Journal of
the Economic and Social History of the Orient​, 43:3 (Brill, 2000), 364­369
17
Sinopoli, “From the Lion Throne,” 370
18
Sinopoli, “From the Lion Throne,” 370
19
Asher and Talbot, “Southern India, 1350­1550,” 56
20
Burton Stein, “Political Economy and Society,” in​ The New Cambridge History of India: Vijayanagara​,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 22
21
Asher and Talbot, “Southern India, 1350­1550,” 59
22
John M. Fritz, “Vijayanagara: Authority and Meaning of a South Indian Imperial Capital,” in ​American
Anthropologist​, 88:1 (Blackwell Publishing, 1986), 47

7. Hessler 7
artistic paintings and carvings found within the ruins of the capital city Vijayanagara at the
modern­day village of Hampi in India. These carvings often depicted foreign supplicates 23
paying tribute to rulers, or infantry and cavalry proceeding up to the throne. Large parts of 24
architecture, such as columns at main entrance ways, were shaped in the form of mounted
warriors atop a trained war­horse rearing its hooves. The main steps into the palace at 25
Vijayanagara had a giant horse from the cavalry carved into each outside panel of the stairs. 26
These everyday examples of art and architecture show that war­horses were considered symbols
of power. They were placed at entrances to places of royal authority, and were imposing in size.
This shows how important horses were to the king’s armies, as well as how important the cavalry
was to the Vijayanagara rulers. The fact that they used war animals as symbols of power
illustrates how focused Vijayanagara was on their military strength. It also depicts the
Vijayanagara militaristic philosophy that their strength and right to rule lay in their military
victories. Because these victories were possible due to the improvements and enlargement of the
South Indian cavalry, this translates into a heavy reliance on quality horses as a mean to stay
powerful.
The ​History of Medieval India ​states that “Vijayanagara rulers’ capacity for gaining
victory over their enemies was contingent on ensuring a constant supply of horses.” By 27
expanding and improving their cavalry, Vijayanagara created a need for a large, steady supply of
quality war­horses for their troops. Unfortunately, the geography in India could not support the
23
Carla M. Sinopoli and Kathleen D. Morrison, “Dimensions of Imperial Control: The Vijayanagara Capital,” in
American Anthropologist, ​97:1 (Blackwell Publishing, 1995), 90
24
Fritz, “Vijayanagara: Authority and Meaning,” 47
25
John M. Fritz and George Michell, ​New Light on Hampi: Recent Research at Vijayanagara​, (Mumbai: Marg
Publications, 2001)
26
Fritz and Michell, ​New Light on Hampi
27
Arun Metha, “ Kingdoms and Empires,” in ​History of Medieval India​, (Jaipur: ABD Publishers, 2004), 125

8. Hessler 8
breeding of quality war­horses or keep imported steeds in good health. The lands were too 28
marshy, mountainous, or arid to have the grassy plains necessary to feed and exercise the horses.
This made it even more difficult for Vijayanagara kings to have a reliable supply of the horses 29
they needed, for they could not even breed the horses they imported from Arabia and Persia.
The horses Vijayanagara needed were instead accessed through overseas trade. To do this,
Vijayanagara kings encouraged foreign trade in their port cities. This would theoretically allow 30
them to obtain a supply of quality war­horses to keep their cavalry consistent in quality and
quantity while at the same time providing for the empire's economy.
Unfortunately, Vijayanagara kings could not control sea trade very well, which impacted
their ability to maintain a steady influx of war­horses. The Western and Eastern Ghats physically
separated the central area of South India, where the capital and elites resided, from the Malabar
and Coromandel Coasts. Historically, there were more people and cultures on the coasts of India
due to the fact that it received more predictable, regular rainfall in comparison to the arid central
region of the Deccan plateau. It was only with the Vijayanagara Empire that an increase was 31
seen in the “cultivation in the dry zones” of the Deccan Plateau and a rise in its the political
power. The Vijayanagara kings based themselves there, and made the surrounding land a 32
center for the resources needed by the capital. However, this placed the economic center of 33
Vijayanagara, the coasts, far away across the Ghats on both sides of the capital. Because of the
28
Bhakari, “Cavalry,” 56
29
Asher and Talbot, "The Expansion of Turkic Power, 1180­1350," 28
30
William Jackson, “Conclusion: Bad Blood – Wounded Pride and Retaliations,” in ​Vijayanagara Voices​,
(Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2005), 214
31
Kathleen D. Morrison and Carla M. Sinopoli, “Economic Diversity and Integration in a Pre­Colonial Indian
Empire,”
in ​World Archeology, ​23:3, (Taylor and Francis Ltd., 1992), 341
32
Morrison and Sinopoli, “Economic Diversity and Integration,” 341
33
Sinopoli and Morrison, “Dimensions of Imperial Control,” 84­85

9. Hessler 9
geographic and climate differences between the coastal and central regions of India, the coasts
were more developed and had different cultures and perceptions on the right to rule within a
region than the newer set of 'elites' in Central South India. Historically, the long established 34
chieftains along the Indian coastlines were largely left alone. The trade they conducted with
foreigners strengthened the economy and brought wealth into South India. If there was a
particularly strong power in Central India, the minor lords and chiefs of the coast would
occasionally pay tribute as a recognition of sovereignty. They were too far away and too 35
important for foreign trade to risk offending with a show of brute force. Because of this,
Vijayanagara dealt with these chieftains mostly through treaties and tributes after their initial
conquest by Deva Raya II. They did not receive revenue from any taxes on the imports and 36
exports that occurred in the Malabar and Coromandel coastal cities. Vijayanagara kings could
only encourage foreign trade with their interest in war­horses and luxury goods to make the trade
of these items a beneficial relationship for all the parties involved. While this system worked for
the the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in Vijayanagara, the arrival of the Portuguese in 1505
CE posed a threat to the continuance of reliable international trade.
Vijayanagara's need for horses became a flaw to be exploited in the eyes of the
Portuguese traders who came to Goa, India in 1505 CE. Prior to the Portuguese establishing
themselves at Goa, trade along the Malabar coast of India had been controlled largely by Arabian
traders from as early as the eighth century CE. The Arabian traders settled along the coast and 37
gradually melted into the countryside, becoming part of the people South Indian kingdoms. The
34
Morrison and Sinopoli, “Economic Diversity and Integration,” 341­343
35
Morrison and Sinopoli, “Economic Diversity and Integration,” 341­343
36
Morrison and Sinopoli, “Economic Diversity and Integration,” 342­343
37
Jackson, “Conclusion: Bad Blood,” 212

10. Hessler 10
relationship between South Indian kings and Arabian traders had always been mutually
beneficial, and largely free of any ulterior motives outside of economics. In contrast, the
Portuguese established themselves as a political entity, and had their own agenda to adhere to in
India.
Historian Carla Sinopoli notes that Vijayanagara kings were known by Portuguese traders
to pay “premium prices for war horses, which they paid even when the animals did not survive
the sea voyage to South India.” The Portuguese used this knowledge to their advantage, 38
realizing that the horse trade was second in importance to the spice trade in India. Spaniard
Martin Fernandez de Figueroa, who visited Portuguese India in the early 1500s, described the
contemporary king of Vijayanagara as he was seen through European eyes: “The King of
Narsinga is one of the most powerful lords in India. He has sixty great kings as vassals. In his 39
stable there are more than fifteen hundred horses.” This quote emphasizes both how the 40
Portuguese saw Vijayanagara as well as the importance horses were to that region in trade at the
time. First, Figueroa acknowledged he was very powerful, ruled a great amount of land, and had
many vassal kings ('nobles') at his command. This shows that there was at least some amount of
respect, or at least acknowledgment, of the greatness of Vijayanagara at the time among the
Portuguese and other foreign traders. Secondly, the only other fact Figueroa mentioned about
King Narsinga was the large number of horses he was believed to have owned. In choosing to
mention horses instead of gold, riches, spices, or other luxuries, Figueroa showed how important
38
Sinopoli, “From the Lion Throne,” 380
39
Translator James B. McKenna notes that Narsinga was the name of the king of Vijayanagara at the time of this
narrative (r. 1505­1509). The Europeans confused the name of the empire with the name of its current king, not
realizing their mistake.
40
Martin Fernandez de Figueroa and James B. McKenna, ​A Spaniard in the Portuguese Indies: The Narrative of
Martin Fernandez de Figueroa, ​(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 66­67

11. Hessler 11
the supply of horses was to Indian kingdoms during his time. The Portuguese recognized this
need and tried to take the control of the horse trade away from the Arabian traders. After the
seizure of Goa, the Portuguese grew in numbers to rival that of the Arabs, and began taking
violent action against them. By the time of the loss of the Vijayanagara capital in 1565 CE at 41
the Battle of Talikoa, the horse trade had fallen entirely into the hands of the Portuguese. 42
Historian William J. Jackson accounts for this to be a contributing factor to the fall of the
Vijayanagara Empire. He discusses that a consequence of the Portuguese monopoly was the 43
decline in the amount of war­horses being imported to Vijayanagara. Whereas in the past, as
many as 13,000 horses or more had been imported into Vijayanagara every year to refresh the
army's cavalry, Jackson asserts that these numbers had dropped drastically by the Battle of
Talikoa. This was done largely from fear of the power of the Vijayanagara Empire. The
Portuguese had tried to neutralize Vijayanagara as a threat by attempting to undermine the power
of its military. The Portuguese had succeeded in exploiting the weakness of the very thing that
helped make Vijayanagara a strong, militant power in South India – its war­horses.
The Portuguese monopoly of the horse trade, and the limitations they placed on it,
illustrated that the Vijayanagara Empire’s reliance on foreign trade and peoples for war animals
was a fault that grew to become a contributing factor in the loss of its capital. While
Vijayanagara had been able to use Muslim cavalry techniques to become the “most militarized of
the non­Muslim states of South India,” it was a military technique that could not be
self­sustained. Eventually, the cavalry, which was the greatest strength of the Vijayanagara 44
41
Jackson, “Conclusion: Bad Blood,” 212­213
42
Jackson, “Conclusion: Bad Blood,” 213
43
Jackson, “Conclusion: Bad Blood,” 213
44
Asher and Talbot, “Southern India, 1350­1550,” 59

12. Hessler 12
army, became its biggest weakness as well. It forced Vijayanagara to rely too heavily on a
branch of their army that could only be maintained through foreign means. Inferior cavalry in
South India reared its head again at the Battle of Talikoa, which spelled the beginning of the end
for the largest empire in South Indian History.

13. Hessler 13
Bibliography
Asher, Catherine B. and Talbot, Cynthia. "Southern India, 1350­1550." ​India Before Europe.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Asher, Catherine B. and Talbot, Cynthia. "The Expansion of Turkic Power, 1180­1350." ​India
Before
Europe. Cambridge​: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Bhakari, S. K. “Cavalry.” ​Indian Warfare.​ New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt.
Ltd.,
1981.
de Figueroa, Martin Fernandez and McKenna, James B. ​A Spaniard in the Portuguese Indies:
The
Narrative of Martin Fernandez de Figueroa. ​Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1967.
Fritz, John M. “Vijayanagara: Authority and Meaning of a South Indian Imperial Capital.”
American
Anthropologist,​ 88:1. Blackwell Publishing, 1986. 44­55.
Metha, Arun. “ Kingdoms and Empires.” ​History of Medieval India. ​Jaipur: ABD Publishers,
2004.
Morrison, Kathleen D. and Sinopoli, Carla M. “Economic Diversity and Integration in a
Pre­Colonial
Indian Empire.” ​World Archeology, ​23:3. Taylor and Francis Ltd., 1992.
Sinopoli, Carla M. “From the Lion Throne: Political and Social Dynamics of the Vijayanagara
Empire.”
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient​, 43:3. Brill, 2000. 364­398.
Sinopoli, Carla M. and Morrison, Kathleen D. “Dimensions of Imperial Control: The
Vijayanagara
Capital.” in ​American Anthropologist, ​97:1. Blackwell Publishing, 1995. 83­96.
Stein, Burton. “Political Economy and Society.” ​The New Cambridge History of India:
Vijayanagara.​ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.