In larger freedom in the UK

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in larger freedom in the UK
AN AGENDA FOR ACTION FOLLOWING THE 2005 UN WORLD SUMMIT

REPORT OF
THE FCO-UNA NATIONAL ENGAGEMENT
ON UN REFORM

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Edited by Sarah Carter and Laura Mucha

Designed by John Schwartz
Printed by Marstan Press Limited

© United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UNA-UK)
London, 2005

ISBN 0-901796-23-9

UNA-UK
3 Whitehall Court
London SW1A 2EL
www.una-uk.org

Any omissions or errors in the representation or attribution of public and expert views
are solely the responsibility of UNA-UK.

The views expressed in this report are not in any way attributable to the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office. Nor do they necessarily reflect official UNA-UK policy as estab-
lished through UNA-UK Annual Conference.

The national engagement process was conducted by UNA-UK as part of its programme
of events to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the United Nations and UNA-UK.
The UN60 logo is used in this publication for educational and informational purposes
only, and does not imply that the views expressed are in any way attributable to the
United Nations.

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Contents

Foreword v
by the Foreign Secretary

List of abbreviations and key documents vii

Acknowledgements x

Executive Summary with Post-Summit Recommendations 1
A. Freedom from want 1
B. Freedom from fear 3
C. Freedom to live in dignity 5
D. Strengthening the United Nations 6

I. Introduction 13

II. Freedom from Want 15
A. A shared vision of development 17
B. National strategies 20
C. Making Goal 8 work: trade and financing for development 24
D. Ensuring environmental sustainability 36
E. Other priorities for global action 39
F. The implementation challenge 42

III. Freedom from Fear 45
A. A vision of collective security 47
B. Preventing catastrophic terrorism 49
C. Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons 54
D. Reducing the risk and prevalence of war 57
E. Use of force 69

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IV. Freedom to Live in Dignity 73
A. Rule of law 75
B. Human rights 81
C. Democracy 84

V. Strengthening the United Nations 87
A. General Assembly 90
B. The Councils 94
C. The Secretariat 105
D. System coherence 108
E. Regional organisations 111
F. Updating the Charter of the United Nations 113

Annex I: 2005 World Summit Outcome A/60/L.1 115

Annex II: List of Public Events 134

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Foreword
by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Rt Hon. Jack Straw MP

Eight months ago I launched the public debate on the High Level Panel's report "A
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility". At the time, I expressed my hope that
as many people as possible would be able to influence our thinking on the United
Nations in this momentous year for the organisation. I am delighted that so many
people were able to take part in the debates, organised by the United Nations Association
of the United Kingdom.
A total of ten national public debates were held: London, Cambridge, Leeds,
Birmingham, Edinburgh, Belfast, Aberystwyth, Manchester, Bath and Southampton.
More local debates were also held. UNA organised a number of expert consultations on
specific areas of the reform agenda with prominent UN-watching civil society organisa-
tions.
This report expertly summarises these discussions. It illustrates one simple fact. For
most people, the United Nations remains the only global organisation able to tackle the
challenges that we face today.
The British Government is a strong and committed supporter of the UN. We worked
tirelessly for a successful outcome to the UN World Summit in September. Overall, I
believe that the Summit delivered a worthwhile package of reforms and commitments
that will enable the UN to be better equipped to tackle the interrelated challenges of
development, security and human rights. As EU Presidency, the UK played an important
role in the often difficult negotiations on the Summit outcome document. The views
received from the British public and from UK civil society fed directly into this process.
Of the reforms agreed in New York, the "Responsibility to Protect" will be a vital tool
for the UN should states fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The agreement to create by the end of this
year a new Peacebuilding Commission will close an institutional gap in the UN's conflict
architecture and will assist countries emerging from conflict. The Summit agreed on an
unequivocal condemnation of terrorism, and called for urgent work to agree the UN's
counter-terrorism strategy. The agreement to establish a new Human Rights Council
will place the protection of human rights at the heart of the UN's architecture.
The Summit strongly endorsed the outcomes agreed at the G8 Summit at Gleneagles
on development and climate change. These included the need to accelerate progress
towards the Millennium Development Goals and to address the special needs of Africa.
Important new EU commitments on overseas development were welcomed by the
broader UN membership. The Summit also endorsed further work to strengthen UN
effectiveness in operational activities for tackling humanitarian crises and to ensure more
coherent international institutional arrangements for environmental action. All this was
underpinned by agreement on a number of reforms for the UN Secretariat, including a

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In larger freedom in the UK: report of the FCO–UNA national engagement on UN reform

mandate to the Secretary General to make proposals for further reforms in such areas as
ethics, accountability, oversight, and financial and human resource management.
In some areas, the final text did not meet all our aspirations. Our efforts to secure
stronger language on non-proliferation and disarmament were unsuccessful. We also
pushed for more extensive reforms of the UN Secretariat.
As a result, some have criticised the Summit's document as modest. It was always
going to be a formidable task to gain agreement across the board, reflecting the broad
agenda on the table and the diverse nature of the UN membership. However, as the
Prime Minister said in his speech in New York, if all the reforms agreed at the Summit
are fully implemented, it will represent an important step forward for the UN. The
Government is committed to the full and early implementation of the reforms.
I am greatly appreciative of the work of the United Nations Association of the United
Kingdom in organising the public debates, and for compiling such a comprehensive
report.

Jack Straw
October 2005

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List of abbreviations and key background documents

2005 UN World Summit Also called the Millennium Review Summit, the World
Summit, which took place from 14 to 16 September
2005, marked the start of the sixtieth session of the
General Assembly. Heads of state and government made
decisions related to UN reform and the proposals
contained in In Larger Freedom.

ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific countries

A more secure world: Our (December 2004) The report of the High-Level Panel on
shared responsibility Threats, Challenges and Change, an independent panel
of experts appointed by the Secretary-General to review
new and existing threats to international peace and
security.

CfA Commission for Africa

DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

ECOMOG ECOWAS Monitoring Group: a regional armed force
aligned with ECOWAS, the Economic Community of
West African States

ECOSOC Economic and Social Council

EPA Economic Partnership Agreement

FAO Food and Agricultural Organisation

ICC International Criminal Court

ICJ International Court of Justice

IFIs International Financial Institutions

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In Larger Freedom: towards (March 2005) The report of the Secretary-General
development, security and submitted to the General Assembly in advance of the
human rights for all 2005 UN World Summit. It draws largely from two
earlier reports: that of the High-Level Panel and that of
the Millennium Project. Often refered to as ‘ILF’
throughout this publication

Investing in development: a (February 2005) The report of the Millennium Project,
practical plan to achieve the an international team of development experts led by
Millennium Development Professor Jeffrey Sachs, which puts forward an action
Goals plan to meet the Millennium Development Goals by
2015. Also called the Sachs Report.

MDGs Millennium Development Goals: a series of eight, time-
bound goals encompassing targets related to poverty
reduction, health, gender equality and other development
indicators.

Millennium Declaration The declaration, signed by a record number of govern-
ments at the 2000 General Assembly, which contained
what later became articulated as the MDGs

Monterrey Conference (March 2002) The International Conference on
Financing for Development produced important agree-
ments on how to mobilise national and international
resources to support development.

NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development

NGO Non-governmental organisation

NNWS Non-nuclear-weapon state

NWS Nuclear-weapon state

OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

OHRM Office of Human Resources Management

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List of abbreviations and key background documents

OIOS Office of Internal Oversight Services

PRSP Poverty reduction strategy papers

SDT Special and differential treatment

TCC Troop-contributing country

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNEP United Nations Environment Programme

UNGA United Nations General Assembly

UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund

UNSC United Nations Security Council

WHO World Health Organisation

WMD Weapons of mass destruction

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Acknowledgements

We would like to thank all participants in the In Larger Freedom engagement process. In
particular we would like to express our gratitude for the contribution of over a hundred
UNA members - from Scotland, Northern Ireland, Wales and England - who not only
submitted their feedback on UN reform but also volunteered their time to assist us in the
smooth running of the public events. We would have liked to have been able to
acknowledge these individuals by name, but they are too numerous to list.

We are grateful to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for funding the process and
for working together with us on such an important initiative. We would like also to
acknowledge explicitly those government representatives and academic and policy experts
who contributed so crucially to the success of the debates by acting as keynote speakers,
panellists and rapporteurs: Paul Bentall, Simon Burall, Chris Corrin, Joanne Coysh,
Margaret Cund, Richard Dewdney, Lord Hannay, Alistair Harrison, Andrew Hurrell,
Mark Imber, Sir Richard Jolly, Sir Emyr Jones Parry, Tony Kay, Noel Lloyd, Vaughan
Lowe, Anthony McDermott, Malcolm McIntosh, Des McNulty MSP, Phil Mason,
Susan Matthew, Justin Morris, Tim Morris, Edward Mortimer, Marco Odello, Lord
Phillips of Sudbury, Bill Rammell MP, Sir Adam Roberts, Martyn Roper, Diane Sheard,
Gerry Simpson, John Simpson, Melanie Speight, Surya Subedi, Jennifer Welsh, Nick
Wheeler and Geof Wood.

Special thanks are due to Alexander Ramsbotham, Head of UNA’s John Bright Peace and
Security Programme, who headed the unit which organised the national engagement
process and the collation of expert input. Our National Rapporteurs, Sarah Carter and
Laura Mucha, supported by other UNA staff and volunteers, also played a central role in
the success of the engagement process by organising the debates and by recording,
compiling and editing over 2000 pages of public and expert input.

We are grateful to the Allan and Nesta Ferguson Charitable Trust for funding UNA’s
educational and informational work on disarmament, WMD and nuclear non-prolifera-
tion, which supported the compilation of those sections of this report.

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Executive Summary
with post-Summit recommendations

A. FREEDOM FROM WANT

A shared vision of development
Development is an end in itself and a means to greater international stability; it is thus
a responsibility to be shared between rich and poor countries within a global partner-
ship for development. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – informed by
the understanding that human development depends upon not only economic but also
social factors – constitute a comprehensive framework for international development,
and provide a means of both harmonising donor and recipient development strategies
and ensuring that the outcomes of these strategies are consistent with agreed develop-
ment objectives. The MDGs should be given the full support of the international
community.
The UK government should use its political position in the international system – and
in particular its influence with the US government and its status within the EU – to
maintain and build momentum behind the Millennium Development Goals and to
ensure that long-standing development pledges are now translated into concrete gains.

National strategies
National ownership of development strategies is fundamental to country-level progress
towards the MDGs. In providing financial support for these strategies, donor countries
should not impose conditionalities linked to liberalisation and fiscal austerity. Recipient
governments should, however, be required to frame national development strategies
around the MDGs to promote accountability and provide a means of evaluating develop-
ment policies. To ensure that successes are sustained, recipient countries should concen-
trate policies and investments in sectors of special relevance to development. A key
priority should be the achievement of gender equality, given the pivotal role of women
within development processes.
The UK government should encourage partner countries to formulate their own
development strategies based on the MDGs. The UK should not tie aid to privatisation
of services, and should dissuade other donor countries from imposing conditionalities
which do not directly contribute to the achievement of the MDGs.

Making Goal 8 work: trade and financing for development
To satisfy their collective responsibility under the global partnership for development,
rich countries must reform the international regimes for aid, debt and trade, in order to
create an enabling environment in which developing countries are able to implement

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domestic policies required to drive development. Those rich countries which have not
yet done so should increase to 0.7% the portion of gross national income allocated to
overseas development assistance (ODA), and provide clear timetables for reaching this
target. Assessments of debt sustainability should be reconfigured to refer to the level of
debt a country can service without compromising its achievement of the MDGs by
2015. Debts which prevent public spending in support of the MDGs should be
restructured or, in some cases, entirely relieved; the HIPC initiative is too limited and
cumbersome to allow seriously indebted countries the scope to reach the MDGs. The
asymmetry of the international economy poses a fundamental obstacle to reaching the
MDGs, and rich countries must take immediate and comprehensive steps to allow
developing countries to participate productively in the global economy. Agricultural
subsidies for producers in rich countries must be repealed and duty- and quota-free
access for least developing country exports granted. In parallel, immediate measures
should be implemented to secure short-term ‘gains’ towards the MDGs. Where
needed, malaria bed nets should be distributed widely and without cost to the user.
Such schemes should be properly incentivised through, wherever appropriate, collabo-
ration with the private sector.
The UK government should move forward its 2013 deadline to meet the 0.7% target,
in order to free up the resources needed now for achieving the MDGs by 2015. Through
its presidency of the EU, the UK government should seek the elimination of barriers to
imports from developing countries, as well as guarantees that the EU will continue to
allow poor countries to protect domestic industries until the latter are able to compete
with producers in wealthy countries. The UK should also work, through the G8, the EU
and wider international fora, to ensure that the development promise of the Doha
Round is fulfilled.

Ensuring environmental sustainability
Environmental sustainability, as both an objective and a precondition of the MDGs,
should underpin national and international development strategies. All development
initiatives should encourage local and international action to address the challenges of
desertification and the loss of biodiversity, including through implementation of the
relevant international conventions. It is imperative that effective international mecha-
nisms are found for mitigating and overcoming the threat of climate change, keeping in
mind the expiration of the Kyoto Protocol in 2012. While technological innovation
should be harnessed to identify cleaner and more efficient sources of energy, this in itself
is insufficient: the post-Kyoto international framework should reflect that although
climate change is emphatically a global problem the major producers of greenhouse gases
must bear primary responsibility for reducing emissions.
The UK government should seek to ensure that, following the expiration of the
Kyoto Protocol, an effective international framework is implemented which 1) encour-
ages and utilises scientific advances to mitigate and adapt to climate change; 2) protects

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Executive summary with post-Summit recommendations

developing country eco-systems to enhance resilience to the effects of climate change; 3)
seeks concrete and comprehensive agreements on stabilisation targets for greenhouse gas
emissions; and 4) incorporates policy mechanisms for rectifying unsustainable consump-
tion patterns.

Other priorities for global action
The success of development strategies is contingent upon the ability of the international
community to contain and reverse the spread of infectious disease and to mitigate the
negative effects of natural disasters. The international community should meet any
HIV/AIDS funding shortfalls, including that for the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS,
Malaria and Tuberculosis, so that important targets – such as the goal of providing
universal access to antiretroviral treatment for all HIV/AIDS sufferers by 2015 – are met.
In recognition of the link between development and resilience to natural disasters,
governments should implement the Hyogo Framework for Action, including the integra-
tion of disaster risk reduction strategies within development policies and planning. To
complement these efforts, an early warning system should also be established. A key
focus of all development initiatives should be the promotion of regional cooperation, to
improve infrastructure, enhance South-South trade, and encourage the establishment and
use of peer review mechanisms, along the lines of NEPAD’s. The international financial
institutions should be reformed further in order to provide a greater voice for the devel-
oping world.
The UK government should exert pressure on peers in the G8 and other fora to ensure
sufficient funding for efforts to combat infectious disease, including HIV/AIDS. It
should also provide leadership in international efforts to implement the Hyogo
Framework for Action, and in fostering greater multi-sectoral burden-sharing among
countries of regional groupings.

B. FREEDOM FROM FEAR

A vision of collective security
A new consensus – based on the recognition that threats to security are interconnected and
can only be overcome through multilateral action – is a precondition of collective security.
Prospects for forging this consensus are lessened by divergent security concerns among
member states, particularly (but not exclusively) between North and South. The UN is
uniquely situated to reconcile these differences and so act as an effective forum for collective
action, but, first, it requires comprehensive reform. Member states should support in full
the agenda for UN reform set by the 2005 World Summit, and take prompt, decisive steps
to implement the agreements enshrined in the Summit’s outcome document.
The UK, as a leading member of the international system and a key ally of the
world’s superpower, has an instrumental role to play in promoting a global consensus

3



on threats and in driving forward the reform of the UN so that it can implement this
consensus.

Preventing catastrophic terrorism
Effective multilateral counter-terrorism measures depend ultimately upon a common
basis of understanding. The international community should continue to seek agreement
on a definition of terrorism. Member states should fulfil the commitment made to agree
a comprehensive convention on terrorism, to lend coherence and strength to international
counter-terrorism strategies. All initiatives should respect human rights, humanitarian
and refugee laws.
The UK government – a vocal proponent of human rights – should ensure that both
the proposed comprehensive convention and all international counter-terrorism
measures in which the UK is involved are consistent with the highest human rights
standards. The UK should give full support to the comprehensive strategy put forward
by the Secretary-General, in which the defence of human rights forms one of five pillars
of action.

Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons
The threat posed by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons is clear. It is imperative
that efforts are directed at containing and diminishing stockpiles of not only nuclear but
also chemical and biological weapons. Neither the most recent conference to review the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) nor the 2005 World
Summit made progress towards overcoming the nuclear threat. Urgent and radical
measures need to be taken to revive the NPT and to reinvigorate the bargain upon which
it is based – namely that the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) progressively disarm, and the
non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) cooperate to stem proliferation. The NWS’ failure
to disarm is counter-productive and contravenes the NPT: the NWS should now take
concrete and irreversible steps towards disarmament, extend negative security assurances
to the NNWS, conclude a fissile material cut-off treaty, and reaffirm commitment to a
moratorium on nuclear test explosions until the entry into force of the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. In parallel, and in support of non-proliferation, agreement
should be secured on adopting the Model Additional Protocol for strengthening the
capacity for verifying compliance with the NPT.
The UK government should set an example among the NWS by complementing its
support for counter-proliferation measures with concrete, and irreversible, steps towards
nuclear disarmament. There should be a national debate on the merits of replacing Trident
which should consider whether the resources recovered would be put to better effect in
safeguarding the strategic security interests of the UK by being redirected elsewhere.
Other uses could be as follows: funding an increase in overseas development assistance to
enable the UK to realise the 0.7% target earlier than 2013; increasing the cultural and
historical expertise of the UK’s intelligence services in order to enhance the success of its

4



‘hearts and minds’ strategy for combating terrorism and addressing intra-state conflict; and
improving the training, quantity, availability and readiness of military, police and civilian
contingents available for UN peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and democracy-building.

Reducing the risk and prevalence of war
The UN’s capacity for conflict prevention should be enhanced, as proposed in In Larger
Freedom. Among the range of tools available to the UN, sanctions should be applied only
with selectivity. While regionalising peacekeeping can ease the strain on the UN’s resources,
regional organisations cannot always intervene with impartiality, and have variable capacity
for taking on peace operations. The establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission will
furnish the UN with the means to effect and sustain the transition from peacekeeping to
peacebuilding. Although the Commission will – indirectly – serve a preventive function by
interrupting the cycle of conflict, consideration should be given to equipping it with explicit
mechanisms for this purpose. The Commission should work closely with the international
financial institutions and with civil society groups to ensure that the development needs of
countries emerging from conflict are adequately taken into account. In accordance with
Security Council resolution 1325 women should play a prominent role in the formulation
and implementation of conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives.
The UK’s support for the Peacebuilding Commission has proved positive; it should
now strive to effect its timely establishment. The government should ensure that the
activities of the Commission are closely coordinated with those of the international
financial institutions and that civil society, women and minorities are assured input into
the Commission’s work.

Use of force
Except in cases of self-defence from imminent attack, the UN Security Council is the
sole body that can legitimise the use of force under international law. In order to
enhance the political legitimacy of the Council’s authorisation of military force, the
Council should agree a resolution establishing criteria for the use of force, along the lines
of those proposed in In Larger Freedom.
The UK government should initiate negotiations on a draft resolution in informal
consultations of the Council, with a view to seeking broad support among both non-
permanent and fellow permanent members of the Council for criteria for the authorisa-
tion of the use of force.

C. FREEDOM TO LIVE IN DIGNITY

Rule of law
The endorsement at the 2005 UN World Summit of the principle of the responsibility to
protect is potentially a landmark decision and, depending on whether the Security

5



Council can agree on guidelines and trigger mechanisms for non-military and military
intervention, could equip the UN with the capacity to prevent genocide and a repeat of
the gross abuses perpetrated in Rwanda and Srebrenica, and now occurring in Darfur.
The UK government should table a Security Council resolution, following negotia-
tions with other Council members, setting out guidelines for the practical application of
the principle of the responsibility to protect.

Human rights
The UN’s human rights machinery has made a pivotal contribution to the formulation of
human rights norms, and has played an indispensable role in monitoring compliance with
human rights laws. Though central to these successes, the Commission on Human
Rights has been undermined by politicisation and severe resource constraints, and the
decision to replace the Commission with a new Human Rights Council is welcome. The
agreement at the World Summit to double the regular budget of the Office of the High
Commissioner over time is positive, but an increase in funding of a much greater
magnitude is necessary if the UN human rights system is to respond effectively to the
abuses reported to it. The treaty body system should be harmonised and reporting proce-
dures made less cumbersome. Steps should also be taken to enhance the diversity of the
membership of the treaty bodies.
The UK should support the strengthening of the treaty body system as a means of
enhancing the UN’s ability to promote and defend human rights, including by acting as
an early warning mechanism for conflict prevention.

Democracy
Attempts to promote the principles of democracy should recognise that democracy has
multiple manifestations. Imposing democracy on another society or political system is itself
undemocratic and ineffective; democracy must be built upon a foundation of consent, by
the host government and grass-roots society. The capacity of the UN to conduct
democracy-building should be strengthened. Resources allocated to the Democracy Fund
should be additional and not at the expense of other development initiatives.
The UK government should support democracy-building and the UN’s role within these
activities. The UK should advocate long-term approaches to democracy-building which
focus on grass-roots involvement and which encourage the input of civil society, women and
minority groups. The UK should provide financial resources to the Democracy Fund.

D. STRENGTHENING THE UN

General Assembly
The General Assembly needs radical reform to match the legitimacy it derives as a
universal forum with effectiveness and practical impact. The Assembly’s agenda must be

6



streamlined and focused on issues of substance, in keeping with the agreements made at
the 2005 World Summit. The General Assembly will profit from a more open relation-
ship with civil society and measures should be implemented to simplify access to UN
bodies for all appropriate NGOs but particularly those from the South. Greater outreach
by the General Assembly to the private sector is important but should be extended only
on the basis that companies enact clear and concrete changes to practice and policy, in
line with the principles of the Global Compact.
The UK should work with other member states to reform the General Assembly, in
particular focusing on restructuring its agenda in accordance with the mandate emerging
from the 2005 UN World Summit.

The Councils
Security Council
Security Council expansion should aim to increase the representative nature of the
Council’s composition without compromising its effectiveness. Models for Security
Council enlargement should not be restricted to what is politically feasible in terms of
geographical distribution of membership, but should also address the Council’s primary
function under Article 24 of the Charter – to take prompt and effective action to advance
peace and security. Disagreements among member states over models for Security
Council enlargement should not be permitted to obstruct the wider process of UN
reform.
In the absence of agreement on Security Council expansion, the UK should volun-
tarily restrict the use of its own veto to Chapter VII resolutions and should foreswear the
application of the British veto to the appointment of the Secretary-General. The UK
could also spearhead a broader evaluation of types of Security Council decisions to
determine which could be defined as procedural in nature and thus exempt from the
veto.

Economic and Social Council
The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is in urgent need of reform if it is to
make a substantive contribution to international development and the achievement of the
Millennium Development Goals. ECOSOC’s membership is presently too large, its
remit too wide and its mandate too weak for it to have an impact in global decision-
making with respect to economic and social issues.
In the short-term the UK government should support efforts by ECOSOC to coordi-
nate its work with the Bretton Woods Institutions and, when established, the
Peacebuilding Commission. In the long-term, the government should support the
replacement of ECOSOC with an Economic and Social Security Council, with a
mandate to coordinate relevant activities of the Bretton Woods Institutions and the UN,
and imbued with greater authority to galvanise resources in support of economic and
social objectives.

7


The new Human Rights Council
The replacement of the Commission on Human Rights with a Human Rights Council is
a positive step towards reforming the UN’s machinery to reflect more directly the UN’s
commitment to human rights. The modalities of the new Council must be geared to
avoid the politicisation which undermined the achievements of its predecessor.
The UK should support the process of establishing the Human Rights Council, so
that this body is equipped to fulfill its important mandate, including ensuring that the
vital contribution of civil society to the work of the Council is reflected in access and
participation rights.

The Secretariat
The Secretariat must be based on a culture of efficiency, accountability and transparency.
To facilitate this, UN member states must curtail interference in Secretariat employment
and micromanagement of the Secretary-General. Member states should empower the
Secretary-General to manage the human and financial resources of the Secretariat and
support the introduction of effective systems of independent management and financial
oversight. Approval should be given to the one-time staff buy-out requested by the
Secretary-General. Appointments at the UN should be on the basis of merit. Proactive
‘headhunting’ can ensure equitable geographical representation whilst promoting excel-
lence in recruitment.
The UK government should provide leadership in ensuring that the lessons learned
from the Oil-for-Food Programme are implemented, in particular that 1) management
practices and financial oversight within the Secretariat are improved and 2) programmes
initiated by the Security Council are designed to minimise opportunities for corruption,
with clear lines of responsibility drawn between member states and the Secretariat.

System Coherence
The sheer breadth of the UN’s activities has engendered, in some cases, the duplication
and overlap of remits. These mandates need urgently to be rationalised, and member
states should support this process by instructing diplomats on the governing boards of
UN agencies to pursue policies which do not compromise the coordination of UN
agencies. There is an urgent need for better international governance for the protection
of the environment.
The UK government should work with its partners in the international community to
foster better coordination among UN agencies. With a view to improving environmental
governance, the UK government should consider the utility of establishing a new UN
Environment Organisation to replace UNEP.

Regional Organisations
Greater cooperation between the UN and regional organisations is a potentially valuable
means of burden-sharing. Regional organisations have an important role to play in

8



fostering good governance, coordinating initiatives to combat infectious diseases, and
reducing supply-side constraints to trade in poor countries. Member states should give
full support to initiatives aiming to build capacity in regional organisations such as the
African Union.
The UK government should support regional capacity-building initiatives by scaling
up financial and technical assistance to the AU and other suitable regional arrangements.

Updating the Charter
Although the UN Charter remains relevant 60 years after its creation, modifications are
necessary. The references to the ‘enemy states’ are obsolete; the World Summit’s decision
to delete these clauses from the Charter is welcome and constitutes a recognition of the
contribution of Germany, Japan and Italy to the work of the UN. The decision to abolish
the Trusteeship Council is welcome due to the expiry of the body’s purpose. Whatever
decision is eventually taken with respect to the Military Staff Committee, it should not
negate the quid pro quo upon which the privileges of the P5 are based – namely that, in
exchange for the veto, these countries must make a special contribution in armed forces
and/or resources for the maintenance of international peace and security.
As a permanent member of the Security Council, the UK has a continuing special
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security under the UN
Charter. In this context, the UK’s positive contribution of specialist expertise to the
start-up, logistical support and command of peacekeeping operations is noted, as is its
contribution of personnel in support of the UN-authorised operations in Bosnia and
Afghanistan. The UK government should nevertheless also reverse the downward trend
in the number of troops it sends to serve in UN peacekeeping operations.

9


I. Introduction


I. Introduction
The FCO-UNA National Engagement Process
During the spring and summer of 2005, the United Nations Association-UK, on behalf
of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, carried out a public and expert engagement
process to debate the reform of the United Nations and its future role in international
affairs. The FCO-UNA engagement process took as its basis the recommendations put
forward by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his report to the General Assembly –
entitled In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all – which
formed a blueprint for the September 2005 UN World Summit. The engagement
process also gave detailed consideration to the recommendations of two earlier reports –
that of the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, and that of the
UN Millennium Project – because their findings inform In Larger Freedom, and are in
some cases endorsed explicitly by the Secretary-General.
The FCO-UNA engagement process was inaugurated by Secretary of State Jack Straw
at the Banqueting House in Whitehall, London, on 10 February 2005. Both Prime
Minister Tony Blair and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan delivered keynote speeches.
Following the launch, UNA organised a series of national and regional public debates
around the country. These events provided the key vehicle for engaging with the public
and were structured around workshops covering core aspects of the Secretary-General's
recommendations. This unique process gave government ministers and civil servants
direct and sustained feedback on the proposals of the UN Secretary-General as the UK
engaged in negotiations leading up to the World Summit.
UNA-UK recorded hundreds of pages of public feedback and contacted over 200
academic and policy specialists to provide written submissions on specific areas of
expertise. In this report, titled In Larger Freedom in the UK, we now present these views,
making every attempt to express the broad range of opinion within the constraints of
space. Where appropriate, we have supplemented the feedback and submissions with
references to relevant academic, NGO and UN sources.
This report also articulates the central messages emerging from the public engagement
process: that there is overwhelming support in the UK for the UN, as well as a frank
recognition of its imperfections, and that, while opinion differs on how exactly to correct
these flaws, there is also broad agreement that to make the UN stronger and more
accountable would bring us closer to that world foreshadowed in the Preamble to the UN
Charter – a world of 'larger freedom'.

In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan states that the threats facing humanity are diverse and
interconnected, and that they traverse development, security and human rights. To each of
these three areas, the Secretary-General allocates a section of the report, entitling them,
respectively, Freedom from want; Freedom from fear; and Freedom to live in dignity. The fourth,
and final, section is cross-cutting and contains recommendations for the reform of the UN
itself, so that it is equipped to take this bold agenda forward.

13



For ease of reference we have followed as far as possible the structure of In Larger
Freedom. The feedback from the FCO-UNA engagement process has thus been grouped
under the headings of the corresponding recommendations in the Secretary-General's
report. We recommend that In Larger Freedom in the UK is read with the Secretary-
General's report to hand.

The 2005 World Summit Outcome
The 2005 World Summit has now concluded. Its declaration – the World Summit Outcome
– is appended to this report. Defying the pessimism of some but also falling short of its full
potential, the Summit has yielded mixed but, on balance, positive results.
On most issues contained in In Larger Freedom, the Summit has produced notable, if incre-
mental, progress. Member states have agreed to establish a Peacebuilding Commission to
support the recovery of societies emerging from conflict. To renew the UN's human rights
machinery, member states have agreed to form a new Human Rights Council, although its
membership and modalities have yet to be negotiated. Member states have voiced clear
support for reforming the UN Secretariat, but have requested that the Secretary-General put
forward more detailed proposals for subsequent decision by the General Assembly. Member
states have agreed to work towards a comprehensive convention on terrorism in coming
months, though an internationally accepted definition of terrorism remains elusive. Of
perhaps greatest significance, member states have endorsed the principle of the 'responsibility
to protect', placing the Security Council at the heart of international responses to genocide
and crimes against humanity.
These achievements notwithstanding, member states have failed to commit significant
additional resources to meet the Millennium Development Goals, and have failed to reflect in
their response to climate change the magnitude of the challenge it represents. Most disap-
pointingly they have failed, yet again, to take steps towards fulfilling their obligations under
the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

After the Summit: an agenda for action
The Summit represents a staging post, not a finishing line. It has generated what Lord
Hannay has described as "a critical mass of decisions", out of which are possible landmark
changes. The challenge is now one of realisation, and the next 12 months present a crucial
opportunity to implement those of the Secretary-General's proposals on which the Summit
made a start, and to push for acceptance of those which were overlooked.
We applaud the leadership of the UK delegation at the Summit. It is vital that the UK
government builds upon these achievements and continues to demonstrate strong and
active support for the UN. UNA-UK is committed to this process and will campaign
tenaciously for development, security and human rights for all through a stronger, more
credible and more effective UN.

Veronica Lie Sam Daws
Head of Advocacy Executive Director
UNA-UK UNA-UK

14


II. Freedom from want



A. A SHARED VISION OF DEVELOPMENT
The ‘vision of development’ put forward in In Larger Freedom [We] share Kofi
(ILF) is broad, placing particular emphasis on the linkages Annan’s view that
among development, security and human rights. ILF’s develop- security and develop-
ment agenda is centred on the framework provided by the ment are inextricably
linked. Our experience
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and on the findings
of working towards
of the Millennium Project. Many of ILF’s recommendations sustainable develop-
draw from the Millennium Project’s action plan for achieving ment has taught us
the MDGs, set out in the report Investing in Development: a that we cannot hope to
practical plan for achieving the MDGs. eradicate poverty
The feedback presented in this section focuses on the utility without addressing the
pervasive threats to
of the development agenda put forward by ILF, and in partic-
the safety and well
ular the viability of the MDGs as guidelines and benchmarks being of people and
for international development policies. their communities.
Oxfam
During the FCO-UNA public engagement process, support International
was expressed for the comprehensive definition of develop-
ment adopted in the Secretary-General’s report, in which
There is an obvious
‘development’ is interpreted broadly, as an integral component, imbalance between
and likely product, of increased security and human rights. environmental/poverty
However, many participants viewed the emphasis on these issues and security
putative interlinkages with some scepticism, noting the issues within In
potential risk that urgent development priorities would be Larger Freedom and
this could help to
subordinated to security considerations, reflected for example
explain why the US is
in the distortion of aid to serve security interests. relatively supportive,
Recommendations were accordingly put forward which a) because it more readily
stipulated that necessary security measures should not be meets their own broad
resourced at the expense of equally necessary development agenda.
initiatives and b) asserted that development should be pursued Professor Vaughan
Lowe, University of
as an end in itself, rather than as a subsidiary wing of the ‘war
Oxford
on terror’.
Participants agreed that development is a responsibility to be
shared by rich and poor countries and supported recommenda-
tion 5 (a) which urges heads of state and government to:

Reaffirm, and commit themselves to implementing, the develop-
ment consensus based on mutual responsibility and accountability

17



I agree with the recog- agreed in 2002 at the International Conference on Financing for
nition that the MDGs Development held in Monterrey, Mexico, and the World Summit
should remain aspira- on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, South Africa.
tional so that ways can
Consistent with that historic compact, centred on the Millennium
be developed to ensure
that governments Development Goals:
support each other in
going for internation- i. Developing countries should recommit themselves to taking
ally agreed targets. primary responsibility for their own development by strength-
Professor Chris ening governance, combating corruption and putting in place
Corrin, University of
the policies and investments to drive private sector-led
Glasgow
growth and maximise domestic resources to fund national
development strategies; and
ii. Developed countries should undertake to support these efforts
through increased development assistance, a more develop-
ment-oriented trade system and wider and deeper debt relief.

ILF’s espousal of the Millennium Development Goals received
strong support. The MDGs were seen by the majority of
participants to constitute a useful global framework for
improving the alignment of international development strate-
gies and for providing clear benchmarks by which to hold both
donor and recipient countries to account.
We acknowledge that However, a number of contributors argued that the potential
there needs to be effectiveness of ILF’s development agenda was compromised by
coherence between flaws in the MDG framework. Though the Secretary-General
poverty reduction acknowledges certain limitations of the MDGs, disappointment
efforts and counter- was expressed that the subject had not been engaged with greater
terrorism initiatives,
analytical vigour. The following shortcomings were highlighted as
but the Millennium
Review Summit must areas of concern:
explicitly acknowledge
that the war on terror First, the MDGs are not exhaustive and suffer from notable
and the war on gaps, which have been reproduced by the Millennium Project
poverty require and ILF. According to the International Confederation of Free
different and separate
Trade Unions and the World Confederation of Labour, for
strategies.
Make Poverty instance, the Millennium Project did not consult adequately
History with the International Labour Organisation, with the result
that insufficient attention has been given to the contribution
of ‘decent work’ to the processes of development. A ninth
millennium development goal has accordingly been proposed,
recognising the role of appropriate employment as a facet of
development, and setting corresponding targets and indicators,

18



to gauge improvements in working conditions for female, male It does seem that the
strategy the UN is keen
and young persons, including higher and rising wage levels
to promote is precisely
and more equitable distribution of income. that which has created
poverty in the first place
Second, the MDGs do not represent optimal standards of – the private sector, neo-
human welfare; attaining the MDGs by the 2015 deadline will liberal orthodoxy,
serve to ameliorate, and not eliminate, the problems posed by security of property
rights and so on.
extreme poverty and social inequality. For example, even if the
Dr Ray Bush,
MDG in support of poverty reduction is achieved, this would University of Leeds
represent only a halving of the proportion of people living
with acute poverty; the same is true of the MDG working
towards improving access to water and sanitation. There is a fundamental
flaw in using GDP as
a measure of economic
Third, the ILF recommendations on development – and the
progress. Rather, a
MDGs upon which these proposals are based – overlook the measure is needed that
contribution of the ‘Washington Consensus’ to the prevailing factors in negative
asymmetry of the international economic system and the points against economic
‘poverty traps’ which often constrain developing countries from growth such as numbers
making progress on the MDGs. of people in hospital
who cannot contribute
to economic growth and
Fourth, the MDGs privilege quantitative over qualitative indi- require money for cost of
cators of human development, reinforcing the neo-liberal treatment.
preoccupation with economic, rather than social, indicators of Edinburgh
human well-being. Initiatives supporting the MDGs should
encourage the redistribution of income as a means of securing
In Larger Freedom
gains towards poverty reduction and towards enhancing
buys uncritically into
standards of living. an analysis of poverty
and increasing
Fifth, the MDGs place disproportionate demands on devel- inequality in terms of
oping countries to fulfil seven targets which are time-bound the liberal argument of
and concrete; conversely, rich countries are allocated only one ‘lack of market access’,
as opposed to one based
task, which is furthermore ambiguous, calling vaguely for a
on the kind of rich
‘global partnership for development’. Some participants historical under-
predicted that it would be poor – rather than rich – countries standing of the social
which would be blamed should the global partnership ulti- relations of power, and
mately fail to bring about the achievement of the MDGs. critical reflections on
the logic of liberalism.
Dr Heloise Weber,
Participants warmly welcomed, therefore, the Secretary-
University of Sussex
General’s challenge to rich countries to set aside the political
considerations which have hitherto blocked the eradication of
the ‘poverty that kills’. The Secretary-General’s stress on the

19



practical achievability of the MDGs was similarly
commended.
The concept of sustain-
able development To sum up:
carries a heavy burden.
It needs to cover the The ‘shared vision of development’ which is encapsulated in
simultaneous achieve- recommendation 5 (a), and which frames the concept upon
ment of three separate which the MDGs themselves are based, was supported
sets of objectives – strongly by the majority of participants, in recognition of
economic objectives like international development as a matter of fundamental justice,
growth and efficiency,
rather than charity. The MDGs were seen as a viable guiding
social objectives like
equity and poverty principle for international development strategies and a useful
reduction, and ecolog- mechanism for maintaining political momentum towards the
ical objectives such as realisation of development initiatives.
natural resource The key message, therefore, was one of broad support,
management. qualified by concern that the agenda should have been more
Sam Daws,
ambitious, that its provisions would not be carried out in
UNA-UK
practice, and that the MDGs would become yet another set of
unfulfilled promises.
The feedback relating to the Secretary-General’s specific
recommendations for action by developing and developed
countries is summarised below, under sections B and C,
respectively.

It is necessary to utilise
B. NATIONAL STRATEGIES
expertise at the
national level; it is not While the global partnership for development, discussed in
sufficient to provide the section above, highlights the obligation of rich countries
money alone.
to contribute resources and support towards sustainable inter-
Birmingham
national development, ILF stresses that the primary responsi-
bility for a country’s development rests with the government
Donor countries have and people of that country. A central aspect of ILF’s recom-
remained a persistent mendations for development, therefore, is national ‘ownership’
problem by imposing of development policies, to strengthen the accountability of
their own ideas rather
developing country governments within processes of develop-
than respecting what
the local community ment and to ensure that development policies are tailored to
want. In Larger address conditions specific to different countries. In keeping
Freedom offers an with this, the Secretary-General sets out as a guideline for
agenda for aligning nationally-derived development strategies seven investment
the actions of donors and policy priorities to encourage sustainable development
with the needs of local
outcomes.
people.
Southampton The feedback presented in this section assesses ILF’s

20



promotion of country ownership and evaluates the policy and If the responsibility of
investment priorities put forward. development is given
primarily to devel-
oping countries,
Participants in the public and expert engagement process
corruption needs
agreed with the Secretary-General’s assessment of extreme urgently to be stamped
poverty as the product of a highly complex set of problems out.
demanding, not only external financial assistance, but also the Southampton
implementation of comprehensive domestic programmes with
a range of economic and social objectives. Strong support was
expressed for recommendation 5 (c) in which heads of state
and government are urged to:

Decide that each developing country with extreme poverty should
by 2006 adopt and begin to implement a comprehensive national
strategy bold enough to meet the Millennium Development Goals
targets for 2015.

Support was expressed for ILF’s emphasis on linking develop-
ment efforts to local needs, evaluated on the basis of concrete and
monitorable targets; to this end, participants endorsed the
Secretary-General’s suggestion that developing country poverty
reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) be aligned explicitly with the
Millennium Development Goals.
However, one expert contributor noted that to link PRSPs
to a unified set of global criteria was somewhat counterintu-
itive, given that the ILF’s purported aim is to decentralise
development policy.
Also highlighted in the expert engagement process was ILF’s
failure to address within its proposals for restructuring PRSPs
whether the modified criteria will satisfy donors, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. It was
not guaranteed that the interests of the international financial
institutions (IFIs) would correspond to MDG-based PRSPs.

A framework for action
The Secretary-General proposes that country-level actions The international
towards the achievement of the MDGs be supported by three financial institutions
complementary features: transparent, accountable systems of have a lot to answer
good governance; growth-oriented economic policies supporting for in their part in
making countries
a vibrant private sector; and the involvement of civil society
dependent and poor.
organisations at both the domestic and international level. Birmingham

21



Participants agreed that good governance was a precondi-
tion to the success of development initiatives and that encour-
aging national agency in the formulation and execution of
development policies could help to foster better governance
and shore up national capacities for combating corruption.
Participants also acknowledged the potential contribution of
the private sector to development, but were reluctant to endorse
greater private sector involvement in the absence of effective
mechanisms for holding it to account. The possibility of alterna-
tive paths to economic growth were also highlighted, chal-
lenging the prevailing view that interventionist governments are
incapable of sound economic policies. The experiences of China
and India were cited as examples in this context.
The role of civil society was recognised, in particular its
potential for sustaining pressure on government actors; for
galvanising international political will; and for sharing best-
practices with other development actors.

National investment and policy priorities
The Secretary-General outlines seven ‘clusters’ of public invest-
ments and policies to inform wider development strategies.
These areas of focus, which are derived from the Millennium
Project and which overlap with the MDGs, are as follows:

1. Gender equality
2. The environment and better resource management
3. Rural development
4. Urban development
It is rather disap- 5. Health systems
pointing to see that 6. Education
once again gender 7. Science, technology and innovation
equality and improved
access to education and Contributors to the engagement process gave broad endorse-
reproductive health
ment to the investment and policy clusters listed above, but
care for girls and
women is afforded only highlighted areas which were judged to have been accorded
one explicit reference, insufficient attention. For example, some participants
despite the fact that expressed the view that measures to improve natural resource
poverty is heavily management should have been given greater urgency; others
feminised. thought that the recommendation calling for intensified efforts
Dr Jill Steans,
towards containing and fighting HIV/AIDS should have cited
University of
Birmingham specific figures to illustrate the shortfall in resources.

22



The most prevalent objection to ILF’s policy and invest- In Larger Freedom
completely fails to
ment clusters was that the relationship between gender
acknowledge that the
inequality and underdevelopment had been only cursorily MDGs cannot be
acknowledged and that the recommendation relating to gender achieved without
equality was too general to be effective. gender equality,
Recommendation 5 (j) urges heads of state and government to: women’s empowerment
and women’s rights.
UN Non-
Reaffirm gender equality and the need to overcome pervasive
Governmental
gender bias by increasing primary school completion and secondary Liaison Service
school access for girls, ensuring secure tenure of property, ensuring
access to reproductive health access to labour markets, providing
opportunity for greater representation in government decision- Thie paragraph on
making bodies, and supporting direct interventions to protect gender equality is
weak and insufficient.
women from violence.
Rather than just ‘reaf-
firming’ gender
Several participants expressed the view that the language of equality, the time is
recommendation 5 (j) and the text of the report should have now ripe for setting
more explicitly acknowledged the feminisation of poverty. It agreed benchmarks to
was strongly emphasised that, as a uniquely cross-cutting issue, be achieved in these
areas in order that
with implications for education, child mortality, HIV/AIDS
these may be assessed
etc., gender equality has crucial implications for all of the for ‘successful’ imple-
MDGs. mentation and
There was broad consensus that pervasive gender monitored over time.
inequality compromised not only prospects for sustainable Professor Chris
development but also the overall achievement of security and Corrin, University of
Glasgow
human rights. It was thought that gender should have been
given due prominence in ILF, and that the report’s treatment
of the subject – in both Freedom from Want and the report
overall – should have been more vigorous.

To sum up:
There was robust support for the Secretary-General’s recom-
mendation that developing country actors maintain ownership
over formulating and executing development policy. It was
stressed that nationally-led efforts needed to be complemented
by the support of the international community. While it was
agreed that the policy and investment priorities identified by
the Secretary-General formed a viable blueprint for national
development strategies, certain gaps and insufficiencies were
noted, in particular the weak treatment of the links between
gender and poverty.

23



C. MAKING GOAL 8 WORK:
TRADE AND FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT

The development framework presented by ILF, and enshrined
in the eighth Millennium Development Goal, requires devel-
oping countries to accept principal responsibility for the
management and implementation of development strategies. In
keeping with this model, ILF states that, where possible, the
resources required for executing development initiatives should
be mobilised domestically, and primarily through a straightfor-
ward reallocation of government expenditure, geared to facili-
tate the policies necessary for delivering the MDGs. However,
as ILF recognises, such a reallocation of revenue is practicable
only where sufficient revenue exists – i.e. in middle-income and
a very few low-income countries. The bulk of low-income
countries and nearly all least developed countries lack the basic
resources necessary to redirect expenditure towards projects in
support of the MDGs. In this case, the terms of the partnership
embodied in MDG 8 oblige rich countries to offset the deficit,
by increasing flows of official development assistance (ODA);
by cancelling and relieving the debt burdens of the poorest
countries; and by making the international regime for trade
more equitable .
The feedback presented in this section is largely rooted in
the objectives of the Make Poverty History movement,
echoing its demands for more and better aid; debt relief; and
fair trade.
After 30 years, we are
Aid
still talking about a
target of 0.7%. Participants in the engagement process repeated the
Edinburgh Secretary-General’s call for considerable and steep increases in
ODA to meet the shortfall in resources which currently
obstructs progress on the MDGs, and gave support to recom-
We need to move
mendation 5 (d) of the report, which urges heads of state and
beyond rhetoric to
action on increasing government to:
ODA.
Leeds Undertake to ensure that developed countries that have not already
done so establish timetables to achieve the target of 0.7% of gross
national income for official development assistance by no later than
2015, starting with significant increases no later than 2006 and
reaching at least 0.5% by 2009.

24



However, while participants welcomed the specificity of the The US has voiced
timeline put forward, many expressed the view that the active opposition to the
schedule’s demands on wealthy countries were too relaxed, and proposed ODA target
of 0.7%, so does this
that it was furthermore illogical to expect the required increase
mean pursuing this
in ODA to 0.7% GNI to translate, within the same year, into agenda is counterpro-
the demonstrated achievement of diverse development objec- ductive?
tives. Participants accordingly urged rich countries to scale up Oxford
ODA commitments prior to 2015 and called on the UK
government to provide leadership in this area.
We deserve an update
Participants largely welcomed the Secretary-General’s
from the UK
endorsement of the UK government’s proposals for the Chancellor on the
creation of an International Finance Facility to ‘front-load’ International Finance
future flows of aid to secure immediate gains in support of the Facility.
MDGs. However, doubts were expressed regarding the initia- Edinburgh
tive’s viability in light of US opposition to the scheme. A large
number of participants felt also that support for the initiative
might have been more robust had it been more fully explained.
Apprehension was expressed that the UK government might
abandon its commitment to the 0.7% target, should interna-
tional support for the IFF ultimately fail.
Noting the threat posed by corruption to the success of
development targets, and the simultaneous imperative of
increasing aid to facilitate the attainment of development
objectives, participants welcomed the underlying logic of
recommendation 5 (n), in which the Secretary-General calls
on governments to:

Decide that, starting in 2005, developing countries that put forward
sound, transparent and accountable national strategies and require
increased development assistance should receive a sufficient increase in
aid, of sufficient quality and arriving with sufficient speed to enable
them to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.

Two important qualifications were, however, added to the
support expressed for this recommendation. First, it was stressed
that the requirement to demonstrate ‘sound’ domestic policies
should not serve as a means of imposing deleterious condition-
alities on developing countries. Second, participants questioned
the degree to which potential structural constraints to aid effec-
tiveness in recipient countries had been considered by the archi-
tects of ILF recommendation 5 (n) and the Millennium Project.

25



The Sachs report Expert submissions by the Overseas Development Institute
overplays the aid expand upon these two qualifications; for convenience, related
component of develop- feedback from the public engagement process is also included
ment, but aid is not
in the following section.
the only relevant issue.
Sir Richard Jolly,
UNA-UK Conditionality: Conditionality is based on a principle of
‘bottom-up’ accountability (i.e. the obligation of recipients
to donors) and was thus judged to be in direct contravention
In the case of corrup- of the evolving norm which asserts common responsibility
tion, it is necessary to
for global development. The application and exercise of
recognise that the
resourcing of aid is far conditionality, furthermore, were noted to place an unneces-
less important than sary burden on recipient countries by fostering financial
what is done with it. uncertainty and by compromising the government’s capacity
Southampton for forward-planning. This was seen to be a crucial point,
given that one prominently cited reason for past failures of
development projects has been the unpredictability of aid
Aid needs to be more
effective; channelling flows.
more aid is not the It was advised, therefore, that no new mechanisms be
complete solution. established for tying the allocation of ODA to conditions –
Aberystwyth particularly since the MDGs themselves provide a structure
for guiding and appraising the disbursement of funds
earmarked for development purposes. To consolidate the
principle of mutual responsibility for international develop-
ment, a recommendation was put forward to enhance
‘downward accountability’ – that is, the responsibility of
donor countries to deliver on ODA pledges and to maximise
the ‘space’ available to developing country governments to
manage development.
In this context, contributors welcomed the Secretary-
General’s endorsement of the Paris High-Level Forum on
Aid Effectiveness and ILF’s related proposal for donor
countries to align mechanisms for aid delivery with the
MDG-based PRSPs of recipient countries. This was seen
by contributors as an important step towards harmonising
donor behaviour, the fragmentation of which in the past has
swelled the transaction costs of aid for developing
countries.

Structural constraints in recipient countries to aid effective-
ness: The Secretary-General acknowledges the existence of
‘capacity constraints’ to aid effectiveness; nevertheless, the

26

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