Maurice B. Singleton has over 20 years of experience in process engineering and information technology roles related to environmental, health, and safety systems. Early in his career, he led investigations into a catastrophic ethylene oxide reactor release and replacement of a sulfuric acid system after an employee was injured. As a process engineer, he conducted HAZOP and fugitive emissions studies. Later, as an IT project manager, he developed systems for incident management, behavior-based safety management, management of change, permitting, and environmental data reporting. He currently serves as the Upstream Americas HSE Data Manager, responsible for accuracy and auditability of HSE data across North and South America operations.
SRA Plenary: The gap between what worked and what works, Carey OppenheimTheSRAOrg
"It’s not rocket science it’s tougher than that" – the gap between what worked and what works.’
Carey Oppenheim, CEO, The Early Intervention Foundation
at SRA annual conference 2013
Implementation and application of a Process Safety Management System. This presentation will focus on the history, purpose and scope of a Process Safety Management (PSM) system. Topics covered include:
-Distinctions between personnel and process safety
-Framework and elements of PSM
-Importance of Safety Culture in the implementation and application of a PSM system
-Relevance and importance of regular audits and assessments of PSM systems
SRA Plenary: The gap between what worked and what works, Carey OppenheimTheSRAOrg
"It’s not rocket science it’s tougher than that" – the gap between what worked and what works.’
Carey Oppenheim, CEO, The Early Intervention Foundation
at SRA annual conference 2013
Implementation and application of a Process Safety Management System. This presentation will focus on the history, purpose and scope of a Process Safety Management (PSM) system. Topics covered include:
-Distinctions between personnel and process safety
-Framework and elements of PSM
-Importance of Safety Culture in the implementation and application of a PSM system
-Relevance and importance of regular audits and assessments of PSM systems
Training Slides of Safety Precautions & Emergency Response Plan discussing the importance of Safety.
For further information regarding the course, please contact:
info@asia-masters.com
www.asia-masters.com
Everyday Lessons from Extraordinary Circumstances.
The business decisions we make often have unforeseen, far-reaching effects wholly unrelated to its original intent.
Safety ManagementSafety Management
O
Management of
Change
A key to safety—not just process safety
By Mark D. Hansen and Gerald W. Gammel
www.asse.org OCTOBER 2008 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY 41
ON NOV. 25, 1998, a fire at the Equilon Enterprises oil
refinery delayed coking unit in Anacortes, WA, caused
six fatalities. A loss of electric power and steam supply
approximately 37 hours before the fire had resulted in
abnormal process conditions (CSB, 2001).
The investigation revealed that personnel had
expected a tarry mass to drain from the drum. [A
drum is a tower or vessel in which materials are
processed, heated or stored. Coke drums can be very
large (e.g., 120 ft tall with a 29 ft diameter) and typi-
cally stand several stories high.] The supervisor had
directed that the drum be opened with a minimum
number of people present. In response to concerns
that the limited flow of steam might not sufficiently
strip all the toxic compounds from the tar inside the
vessel, workers removing the bolts on the drum heads
were required to wear self-contained breathing appa-
ratuses. The top head was unbolted and lifted from
the drum. The bottom head was also unbolted and
held in place by a hydraulic dolly. The operator then
activated a release mechanism to lower the dolly.
Witnesses reported hearing a whooshing sound
and seeing a white cloud of vapor emanate from the
bottom of the drum. The hot petroleum vapor burst
into flames. The process supervisor, an operator and
the four contract personnel assisting were caught in
the fire and died (CSB, 2001). After the incident,
Equilon relocated the controls for the hydraulic
dolly to allow workers to position themselves far-
ther from a drum when opening it (CSB).
Lessons Learned
Why examine this accident? Because it illustrates
the need for management of change (MOC). MOC is
critical to process safety—and it is a concept that if
well implemented could likely prevent incidents in
many other industries as well. Many industries
would benefit from establishing policies to manage
deviations from normal operations. Systematic
methods for managing change are sometimes
applied to physical alterations, such as those that
occur when an interlock is bypassed, new equip-
ment is added or a replacement is “not in kind.”
For an MOC system to function effectively, field
personnel must know how to recognize which devia-
tions are significant enough to trigger further review.
Thus, operating procedures must include well-de-
fined limits for process variables for all common tasks.
Once on-site personnel are trained on MOC policy
and are knowledgeable about normal limits for
process variables, they can make informed judgments
regarding when to apply the MOC system.
Once a deviation is identified that triggers the
MOC system, management must gather the right
people and resources to review the situation. A mul-
tidisciplinary team may be required to thoroughly
identify potential hazards, develop protective meas-
ures and propos.
Training Slides of Safety Precautions & Emergency Response Plan discussing the importance of Safety.
For further information regarding the course, please contact:
info@asia-masters.com
www.asia-masters.com
Everyday Lessons from Extraordinary Circumstances.
The business decisions we make often have unforeseen, far-reaching effects wholly unrelated to its original intent.
Safety ManagementSafety Management
O
Management of
Change
A key to safety—not just process safety
By Mark D. Hansen and Gerald W. Gammel
www.asse.org OCTOBER 2008 PROFESSIONAL SAFETY 41
ON NOV. 25, 1998, a fire at the Equilon Enterprises oil
refinery delayed coking unit in Anacortes, WA, caused
six fatalities. A loss of electric power and steam supply
approximately 37 hours before the fire had resulted in
abnormal process conditions (CSB, 2001).
The investigation revealed that personnel had
expected a tarry mass to drain from the drum. [A
drum is a tower or vessel in which materials are
processed, heated or stored. Coke drums can be very
large (e.g., 120 ft tall with a 29 ft diameter) and typi-
cally stand several stories high.] The supervisor had
directed that the drum be opened with a minimum
number of people present. In response to concerns
that the limited flow of steam might not sufficiently
strip all the toxic compounds from the tar inside the
vessel, workers removing the bolts on the drum heads
were required to wear self-contained breathing appa-
ratuses. The top head was unbolted and lifted from
the drum. The bottom head was also unbolted and
held in place by a hydraulic dolly. The operator then
activated a release mechanism to lower the dolly.
Witnesses reported hearing a whooshing sound
and seeing a white cloud of vapor emanate from the
bottom of the drum. The hot petroleum vapor burst
into flames. The process supervisor, an operator and
the four contract personnel assisting were caught in
the fire and died (CSB, 2001). After the incident,
Equilon relocated the controls for the hydraulic
dolly to allow workers to position themselves far-
ther from a drum when opening it (CSB).
Lessons Learned
Why examine this accident? Because it illustrates
the need for management of change (MOC). MOC is
critical to process safety—and it is a concept that if
well implemented could likely prevent incidents in
many other industries as well. Many industries
would benefit from establishing policies to manage
deviations from normal operations. Systematic
methods for managing change are sometimes
applied to physical alterations, such as those that
occur when an interlock is bypassed, new equip-
ment is added or a replacement is “not in kind.”
For an MOC system to function effectively, field
personnel must know how to recognize which devia-
tions are significant enough to trigger further review.
Thus, operating procedures must include well-de-
fined limits for process variables for all common tasks.
Once on-site personnel are trained on MOC policy
and are knowledgeable about normal limits for
process variables, they can make informed judgments
regarding when to apply the MOC system.
Once a deviation is identified that triggers the
MOC system, management must gather the right
people and resources to review the situation. A mul-
tidisciplinary team may be required to thoroughly
identify potential hazards, develop protective meas-
ures and propos.
1. Maurice B. Singleton
Destrehan, Louisiana 70047 maurice.singleton@gmail.com
+1 504 957 0415 https://www.linkedin.com/in/mauricesingleton
As a new process engineer at Shell’s Geismar plant, supporting the Ethylene Oxide
units, I participated on a team that investigated the catastrophic release of the entire
Ethylene Oxide reactor loop. Had the release found an ignition source, the results
could have been devastating. This investigation led to redesign and increased
inspection of the system. This experience with a significant Process Safety event
so early in my career had an influence on my career path.
During my next assignment at the Taft Plant, a co-worker was sprayed with 98%
sulfuric acid. He survived, but he had chemical burns over a significant part of his
body. I led the project to replace the sulfuric acid (which was used to neutralize a
high pH effluent from the plant) with a carbondioxide based system. Since the
plant already had experience with cryogenic materials, this did not add any new
types of hazard to the process. This experience with a significant Personal Safety
event has also stayed with me my entire career. At Taft, I also led the first HAZOP
and fugitive emissions studies.
I have always had an interest in new technologies and how they can be used in the
work environment. So, in the late 1990’s, I took a job outside the Chemical
Process Engineering area to lead a small team developing Shell Offshore Inc.’s
first intranet.
As the intranet migrated from a locally managed system to a more corporate-wide
system, I moved into an Information Technology project manager role. Due to my
prior process engineering background, many of the projects I participated in or led
were directly related to Environmental, Health and Safety, including the following:
Incident Management and Investigation system to manage all Health, Safety,
Environmental and Security events. This system was first introduced in
Shell Offshore, but later was adopted by Shell Chemical globally, and finally
by the entire global corporation.
Custom built-for-purpose Behavior Based Safety Management tool based on
Behavior Science Technology (BST) methodology. As of last year, we had
over 8 million behaviors recorded and used for performance improvements.
Electronic Management of Change system to comply with OSHA 29 CFR
1910.119 PSM standard. This system ensured that all proper approvals were
2. [Date]
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made in a timely manner. In addition, since all steps in the workflow were
tracked, improvements in the overall process could be made.
Permit to Work (PtW), Job Safety Analysis (JSA) and Lock-Out/Tag-Out
(LOTO) processesbased on Petrotechnics’ Sentinel Pro™ system, which
was being used by Shell facilities in the North Sea.
Environmental Permit tracking system to better manage the many phases of
HydrocarbonField and Well development.
I then posted to a promotion in the central business unit team as the Upstream
Americas HSE Data Manager where my major work duties included:
Responsible and Accountable for accuracy and auditability of HSE Data in
Shell’s North and South Americas Upstream business units. This data is
used to better understand and improve business level HSE performance.
Automating internal and external reporting of HSE data corporate
sustainability reports and to external regulatory agencies (OSHA, BSEE,
EPA, DEQ etc.) and industry associations (API, COS, etc.)