Πώς η περαιτέρω χαλάρωση του δημοσιονομικού στόχου θα μπορούσε δυνητικά να οδηγήσει σε αύξηση του ΑΕΠ αλλά και σε βελτίωση των βασικών δημοσιονομικών μεγεθών μεσομακροπρόθεσμα
A Shared European Policy Strategy for Growth, Jobs, and StabilityLucio Ghioldi
Un documento di nove pagine del Governo Italiano diviso in tre punti e una conclusione.
Il primo punto è intitolato: "A Fragile Recovery: Challenges and Opportunities "
Il secondo punto è intitolato: "A Comprehensive Policy Mix". Dove si descrive un complesso di misure che realizzino una politica espansiva al posto di quella di austerità e rigore fin qui imposta dalla Commissione (e dalla Germania). Bisogna aumentare le capacità di crescita, sostenere la politica monetaria della Bce, varare una politica fiscale europea che tenda a riequilibrare le politiche nazionali aiutando la loro flessibilità in modo da ristabilire tra loro un equilibrio attualmente molto alterato. Completare l'Unione Bancaria ed estendere le garanzie in favore dei depositi bancari dei singoli Paesi. Fare intervenire l'Europa anche nelle politiche sociali e sindacali dei singoli Paesi, sempre al fine di rafforzare l'integrazione europea ed una politica di crescita e di equità. Rafforzare i confini europei verso il resto del mondo e smantellare al più presto possibile i confini interni ripristinati in molti Paesi violando il patto di Schengen. Dunque una politica comune dell'immigrazione più volte chiesta dall'Italia ma finora inesistente.
Il punto tre del documento rappresenta, con un titolo altamente significativo, lo sbocco istituzionale della politica europeista delineata nelle pagine precedenti: "From the Short-term to the Long-term View"
A Shared European Policy Strategy for Growth, Jobs, and StabilityLucio Ghioldi
Un documento di nove pagine del Governo Italiano diviso in tre punti e una conclusione.
Il primo punto è intitolato: "A Fragile Recovery: Challenges and Opportunities "
Il secondo punto è intitolato: "A Comprehensive Policy Mix". Dove si descrive un complesso di misure che realizzino una politica espansiva al posto di quella di austerità e rigore fin qui imposta dalla Commissione (e dalla Germania). Bisogna aumentare le capacità di crescita, sostenere la politica monetaria della Bce, varare una politica fiscale europea che tenda a riequilibrare le politiche nazionali aiutando la loro flessibilità in modo da ristabilire tra loro un equilibrio attualmente molto alterato. Completare l'Unione Bancaria ed estendere le garanzie in favore dei depositi bancari dei singoli Paesi. Fare intervenire l'Europa anche nelle politiche sociali e sindacali dei singoli Paesi, sempre al fine di rafforzare l'integrazione europea ed una politica di crescita e di equità. Rafforzare i confini europei verso il resto del mondo e smantellare al più presto possibile i confini interni ripristinati in molti Paesi violando il patto di Schengen. Dunque una politica comune dell'immigrazione più volte chiesta dall'Italia ma finora inesistente.
Il punto tre del documento rappresenta, con un titolo altamente significativo, lo sbocco istituzionale della politica europeista delineata nelle pagine precedenti: "From the Short-term to the Long-term View"
OTP Bank_Flash report 20170707_hu_deficitOTP Bank Ltd.
Az első negyedévben rekord többletet mutatott a költségvetés ESA egyenlege. A második negyedévi pénzforgalmi hiányt az EU-s források megelőlegezése okozta, a költségvetés alapfolyamatai továbbra is kedvezőek.
Swedbank was founded in 1820, as Sweden’s first savings bank was established. Today, our heritage is visible in that we truly are a bank for each and every one and in that we still strive to contribute to a sustainable development of society and our environment. We are strongly committed to society as a whole and keen to help bring about a sustainable form of societal development. Our Swedish operations hold an ISO 14001 environmental certification, and environmental work is an integral part of our business activities.
CBO makes baseline economic and budget projections covering the next 10 years and also the next 30 years. The projections incorporate the assumption that current laws generally do not change. To produce the 30-year economic projections, CBO uses its policy growth model, which relies on a standard economic framework that focuses on the inputs that drive growth in the supply side of the economy: the amount of labor, the productive services provided by capital, and total factor productivity.
Presentation by Wendy Edelberg, an Associate Director for Economic Analysis at CBO, and Jeffrey Werling, Assistant Director of CBO's Macroeconomic Analysis Division, at the 2019 Social Security Technical Panel.
In what follows we estimate a number of macroeconomic scenarios starting from the most pessimistic one where the economy feels the full effect of the austerity measures without any mitigating actions. In that scenario the economy will contract by -2.8%. We believe that the prospect of such an adverse outcome should motivate all policy makers to spring into action.
We also estimate a scenario under which Greek households, in an attempt to cushion the impact of austerity on their living standards, reduce their savings even further, limiting somewhat the size of economic contraction to -2.5%.
Yet, the only factor with true recession - mitigating potency is the clearance of Government Arrears which if distributed timely could help limit the level of GDP recession to -1.1%.
Governor Olli Rehn: The Finnish economy in early summer 2020: The worst has n...Suomen Pankki
Governor Olli Rehn
Bank of Finland
The Finnish economy in early summer 2020: The worst has not transpired – but we mustn’t fade in the second half
Bank of Finland Bulletin press conference 9 June 2020
www.eurojatalous.fi #bofbulletin
This presentation by Nikolay Begchin, Russian Federation, was made at the 10th Meeting of CESEE Senior Budget Officials held in Den Haag on 26-27 June 2014. Find more information at http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/10thannualmeetingofseniorbudgetofficialsfromcentraleasternandsoutheasterneuropeanceseecountries.htm
OTP Bank_Flash report 20170707_hu_deficitOTP Bank Ltd.
Az első negyedévben rekord többletet mutatott a költségvetés ESA egyenlege. A második negyedévi pénzforgalmi hiányt az EU-s források megelőlegezése okozta, a költségvetés alapfolyamatai továbbra is kedvezőek.
Swedbank was founded in 1820, as Sweden’s first savings bank was established. Today, our heritage is visible in that we truly are a bank for each and every one and in that we still strive to contribute to a sustainable development of society and our environment. We are strongly committed to society as a whole and keen to help bring about a sustainable form of societal development. Our Swedish operations hold an ISO 14001 environmental certification, and environmental work is an integral part of our business activities.
CBO makes baseline economic and budget projections covering the next 10 years and also the next 30 years. The projections incorporate the assumption that current laws generally do not change. To produce the 30-year economic projections, CBO uses its policy growth model, which relies on a standard economic framework that focuses on the inputs that drive growth in the supply side of the economy: the amount of labor, the productive services provided by capital, and total factor productivity.
Presentation by Wendy Edelberg, an Associate Director for Economic Analysis at CBO, and Jeffrey Werling, Assistant Director of CBO's Macroeconomic Analysis Division, at the 2019 Social Security Technical Panel.
In what follows we estimate a number of macroeconomic scenarios starting from the most pessimistic one where the economy feels the full effect of the austerity measures without any mitigating actions. In that scenario the economy will contract by -2.8%. We believe that the prospect of such an adverse outcome should motivate all policy makers to spring into action.
We also estimate a scenario under which Greek households, in an attempt to cushion the impact of austerity on their living standards, reduce their savings even further, limiting somewhat the size of economic contraction to -2.5%.
Yet, the only factor with true recession - mitigating potency is the clearance of Government Arrears which if distributed timely could help limit the level of GDP recession to -1.1%.
Governor Olli Rehn: The Finnish economy in early summer 2020: The worst has n...Suomen Pankki
Governor Olli Rehn
Bank of Finland
The Finnish economy in early summer 2020: The worst has not transpired – but we mustn’t fade in the second half
Bank of Finland Bulletin press conference 9 June 2020
www.eurojatalous.fi #bofbulletin
This presentation by Nikolay Begchin, Russian Federation, was made at the 10th Meeting of CESEE Senior Budget Officials held in Den Haag on 26-27 June 2014. Find more information at http://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/10thannualmeetingofseniorbudgetofficialsfromcentraleasternandsoutheasterneuropeanceseecountries.htm
Measurement and Analysis of the Stability of Local Fiscal RevenueIJAEMSJORNAL
The stability of fiscal revenue, so called the fluctuation of fiscal revenue, refers to the fluctuation degree of local government's actual fiscal revenue deviating from the expected fiscal revenue. As the main way of funds for local governments to perform public service functions, fiscal revenue is an important starting point for local governments to regulate and participate in economic activities. The drastic fluctuation of fiscal revenue will interfere with the government's economic functions, reduce the quantity and quality of public services, and produce inefficient government activities. The economic and social activities carried out by governments at all levels in practice are numerous and complicated, which can be classified according to different purposes and perspectives. However, no matter which classification method is adopted, stable financial revenue is the core guarantee of government economic activities, which is in the position of "leading the development and affecting the whole body". Based on the combination variance method of white (1983), this paper constructs the stability index of local fiscal revenue, and measures the stability of fiscal revenue of all provinces in China, and interprets and analyzes the measurement results through the theoretical method of economics. It is found that there are significant regional differences in the fluctuation of local fiscal revenue in China. By comparing the changes of fiscal revenue fluctuation index in 2000, 2009 and 2018, the fluctuation index of fiscal revenue shows obvious regional differences. The fluctuation degree of the economically developed eastern coastal area is lower than that of the underdeveloped central and Western Region, and the southern region with lower economic activity is significantly lower than that of the north. On the other hand, the external shocks such as "replacing business tax with value-added tax" and financial crisis also have a positive impact on local tax fluctuations. Through the analysis of the experimental results, it is found that good economic foundation, capital accumulation, industrial structure and geographical location have a great impact on financial stability. Therefore, the government should pay attention to the gap between the stability of fiscal revenue in different regions, actively improve the economic foundation of the poor stability of the central and western regions, formulate differentiated economic and financial policies, vigorously develop the secondary and tertiary industries, and improve the stability of fiscal revenue to cope with regional economic risks and improve the administrative efficiency of the government.
Economic Environment - Christian KASTROP, OECDOECD Governance
This presentation was made by Christian Kastrop, OECD, at the 38th Annual Meeting of OECD Senior Budget Officials held in Lisbon, Portugal, on 1-2 June 2017
As the global financial crisis entered its most dramatic phase, in the second half of 2008, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), many governments and several distinguished scholars advocated expansionary fiscal olicy as the second most effective tool (after monetary stimulus) to fight deep recession and deflation. Now, more than a year later, the previous excitement surrounding the supposed power of fiscal stimulus largely disappeared and instead has been replaced by ising concerns over the sustainability of public finances in many countries. Unfortunately, the previous enthusiasts of the active counter‐cyclical fiscal policy have not always realized the causality between the two.
Authored by: Marek Dąbrowski
Published in 2009
Swedbank was founded in 1820, as Sweden’s first savings bank was established. Today, our heritage is visible in that we truly are a bank for each and every one and in that we still strive to contribute to a sustainable development of society and our environment. We are strongly committed to society as a whole and keen to help bring about a sustainable form of societal development. Our Swedish operations hold an ISO 14001 environmental certification, and environmental work is an integral part of our business activities.
Swedbank was founded in 1820, as Sweden’s first savings bank was established. Today, our heritage is visible in that we truly are a bank for each and every one and in that we still strive to contribute to a sustainable development of society and our environment. We are strongly committed to society as a whole and keen to help bring about a sustainable form of societal development. Our Swedish operations hold an ISO 14001 environmental certification, and environmental work is an integral part of our business activities.
In CBO’s projections, economic output is expected to grow by 2.3 percent in 2019, supporting strong labor market conditions that feature low unemployment and rising wages. After 2019, economic growth averages 1.8 percent per year, which is less than the historical average.
CBO estimates that the federal budget deficit for 2019 will be $960 billion. Under current law, budget deficits are projected to average $1.2 trillion a year between 2020 and 2029, boosting debt held by the public to 95 percent of GDP in that year—its highest level since just after World War II.
Ε. 2034 /10-05-2023: Οδηγίες για τη συμπλήρωση και την εκκαθάριση της δήλωσης φορολογίας εισοδήματος νομικών προσώπων και νομικών οντοτήτων φορολογικού έτους 2022.
ΓΔΟΥ 85/22: Περί της διαδικασίας και τις προϋποθέσεις χορήγησης ενίσχυσης με τη μορφή επιστρεπτέας προκαταβολής σε επιχειρήσεις που επλήγησαν οικονομικά λόγω κορωνοϊού.
Α. 1128 /21-09-2022: Καθορισμός της αρμόδιας αρχής, του τρόπου και της διαδικασίας για την καταβολή, μείωση και επιστροφή του οφειλόμενου ΦΠΑ, στο πλαίσιο των ειδικών καθεστώτων του ηλεκτρονικού εμπορίου, της απόδοσης αυτού στα άλλα κράτη-μέλη, των τηρούμενων λογιστικών καταχωρήσεων καθώς και ρύθμιση συναφών θεμάτων στην περίπτωση που η Ελλάδα είναι κράτος μέλος εγγραφής ή/και κράτος μέλος κατανάλωσης.
Α. 1089 /05-07-2022: Τροποποίηση της υπό στοιχεία Α. 1087/21 - Διαδικασία και προϋποθέσεις υπαγωγής στις διατάξεις του άρθρου 5Γ του ν. 4172/13, περί ειδικού τρόπου φορολόγησης εισοδήματος από μισθωτή εργασία και επιχειρηματική δραστηριότητα που προκύπτει στην ημεδαπή, φυσικών προσώπων που μεταφέρουν τη φορολογική τους κατοικία στην Ελλάδα.
Α. 1090 /05-07-2022: Τροποποίηση της υπό στοιχεία Α.1138/12.6.2020 ΚΥΑ - Καθορισμός της έκτασης εφαρμογής, του χρόνου και της διαδικασίας ηλεκτρονικής διαβίβασης δεδομένων στην ΑΑΔΕ, καθώς και κάθε άλλου αναγκαίου θέματος για την εφαρμογή των διατάξεων του άρθρου 15Α του ν. 4174/2013 (ΚΦΔ)» και άλλες ρυθμίσεις.
Ε. 2042/10-5-22: Παροχή διευκρινίσεων σχετικά με τα πρόστιμα που αφορούν τις παραβάσεις έκδοσης πλαστών ή εικονικών φορολογικών στοιχείων ή λήψης εικονικών φορολογικών στοιχείων ή νόθευσης αυτών, καθώς και καταχώρισης στα βιβλία αγορών ή εξόδων που δεν έχουν πραγματοποιηθεί και για τα οποία δεν έχει εκδοθεί φορολογικό στοιχείο, κατόπιν έκδοσης της υπ'αρ. 2319/2021 Απόφασης του Συμβουλίου της Επικράτειας.
ΥΠΕΚΥΠ 40066/22 (ΦΕΚ 2152 Β/3-5-22): Ψηφιακή διαδικασία κανονισμού κύριων και επικουρικών συντάξεων λόγω γήρατος ή λόγω θανάτου, αρμοδιότητας της Γενικής Διεύθυνσης Συντάξεων Δημοσίου Τομέα, του e-ΕΦΚΑ.
Ε. 2040 /20-04-2022: Οδηγίες για τη συμπλήρωση και την εκκαθάριση της δήλωσης φορολογίας εισοδήματος νομικών προσώπων και νομικών οντοτήτων φορολογικού έτους 2021
Α. 1052 /20-04-2022: Τύπος και περιεχόμενο των δηλώσεων φορολογίας εισοδήματος φορολογικού έτους 2021 των νομικών προσώπων και νομικών οντοτήτων του άρθρου 45 του ν. 4172/2013 και καθορισμός δικαιολογητικών που υποβάλλονται μ’ αυτές - Υποβολή με τη χρήση ηλεκτρονικής μεθόδου επικοινωνίας των δηλώσεων φορολογίας εισοδήματος των νομικών προσώπων και νομικών οντοτήτων του άρθρου 45 του ν. 4172/2013.
ΚΥΑ, 35129/22 (ΦΕΚ 1819 Τεύχος Β/13.04.2022): Καθορισμός της διαδικασίας καταβολής του επιδόματος εορτών Πάσχα 2022 και ασφαλιστικών εισφορών εργαζομένων που καλύπτονται από τον κρατικό προϋπολογισμό.
Ε. 2031 /29-03-2022: Διευκρινίσεις για την εφαρμογή της περιπτ. ιστ΄της παρ. 1 του άρθρου 27 του Κώδικα ΦΠΑ περί απαλλαγής ΦΠΑ σε πράξεις που συνδέονται με δωρεές σε εκκλησιαστικά ΝΠΔΔ του άρθ. 1 παρ. 4 του ν.590/1977 και σε εποπτευόμενα από τα πρόσωπα αυτά εκκλησιαστικά ΝΠΙΔ.
Ν. 4916/22 (ΦΕΚ 65 Α/28-3-22): Εκσυγχρονισμός του πλαισίου λειτουργίας της Επιτροπής Κεφαλαιαγοράς - Πρόγραμμα συνεισφοράς Δημοσίου σε ευάλωτους οφειλέτες μέχρι τη μεταβίβαση της κατοικίας τους στον φορέα απόκτησης και επαναμίσθωσης του κεφαλαίου Α’ του μέρους δευτέρου του τρίτου βιβλίου του ν. 4738/2020 - Ενσωμάτωση στην ελληνική νομοθεσία των Οδηγιών (ΕΕ) 2020/1151 και (ΕΕ) 2021/1159, νέος μειωμένος ΕΝΦΙΑ, επείγουσες φορολογικές και τελωνειακές ρυθμίσεις για την αντιμετώπιση ιδίως της ενεργειακής κρίσης και άλλες διατάξεις
what is the best method to sell pi coins in 2024DOT TECH
The best way to sell your pi coins safely is trading with an exchange..but since pi is not launched in any exchange, and second option is through a VERIFIED pi merchant.
Who is a pi merchant?
A pi merchant is someone who buys pi coins from miners and pioneers and resell them to Investors looking forward to hold massive amounts before mainnet launch in 2026.
I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi merchant to trade pi coins with.
@Pi_vendor_247
when will pi network coin be available on crypto exchange.DOT TECH
There is no set date for when Pi coins will enter the market.
However, the developers are working hard to get them released as soon as possible.
Once they are available, users will be able to exchange other cryptocurrencies for Pi coins on designated exchanges.
But for now the only way to sell your pi coins is through verified pi vendor.
Here is the telegram contact of my personal pi vendor
@Pi_vendor_247
how to sell pi coins on Bitmart crypto exchangeDOT TECH
Yes. Pi network coins can be exchanged but not on bitmart exchange. Because pi network is still in the enclosed mainnet. The only way pioneers are able to trade pi coins is by reselling the pi coins to pi verified merchants.
A verified merchant is someone who buys pi network coins and resell it to exchanges looking forward to hold till mainnet launch.
I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi merchant to trade with.
@Pi_vendor_247
USDA Loans in California: A Comprehensive Overview.pptxmarketing367770
USDA Loans in California: A Comprehensive Overview
If you're dreaming of owning a home in California's rural or suburban areas, a USDA loan might be the perfect solution. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) offers these loans to help low-to-moderate-income individuals and families achieve homeownership.
Key Features of USDA Loans:
Zero Down Payment: USDA loans require no down payment, making homeownership more accessible.
Competitive Interest Rates: These loans often come with lower interest rates compared to conventional loans.
Flexible Credit Requirements: USDA loans have more lenient credit score requirements, helping those with less-than-perfect credit.
Guaranteed Loan Program: The USDA guarantees a portion of the loan, reducing risk for lenders and expanding borrowing options.
Eligibility Criteria:
Location: The property must be located in a USDA-designated rural or suburban area. Many areas in California qualify.
Income Limits: Applicants must meet income guidelines, which vary by region and household size.
Primary Residence: The home must be used as the borrower's primary residence.
Application Process:
Find a USDA-Approved Lender: Not all lenders offer USDA loans, so it's essential to choose one approved by the USDA.
Pre-Qualification: Determine your eligibility and the amount you can borrow.
Property Search: Look for properties in eligible rural or suburban areas.
Loan Application: Submit your application, including financial and personal information.
Processing and Approval: The lender and USDA will review your application. If approved, you can proceed to closing.
USDA loans are an excellent option for those looking to buy a home in California's rural and suburban areas. With no down payment and flexible requirements, these loans make homeownership more attainable for many families. Explore your eligibility today and take the first step toward owning your dream home.
how to sell pi coins in South Korea profitably.DOT TECH
Yes. You can sell your pi network coins in South Korea or any other country, by finding a verified pi merchant
What is a verified pi merchant?
Since pi network is not launched yet on any exchange, the only way you can sell pi coins is by selling to a verified pi merchant, and this is because pi network is not launched yet on any exchange and no pre-sale or ico offerings Is done on pi.
Since there is no pre-sale, the only way exchanges can get pi is by buying from miners. So a pi merchant facilitates these transactions by acting as a bridge for both transactions.
How can i find a pi vendor/merchant?
Well for those who haven't traded with a pi merchant or who don't already have one. I will leave the telegram id of my personal pi merchant who i trade pi with.
Tele gram: @Pi_vendor_247
#pi #sell #nigeria #pinetwork #picoins #sellpi #Nigerian #tradepi #pinetworkcoins #sellmypi
The Evolution of Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs) in India: Challenges...beulahfernandes8
Role in Financial System
NBFCs are critical in bridging the financial inclusion gap.
They provide specialized financial services that cater to segments often neglected by traditional banks.
Economic Impact
NBFCs contribute significantly to India's GDP.
They support sectors like micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), housing finance, and personal loans.
how to sell pi coins at high rate quickly.DOT TECH
Where can I sell my pi coins at a high rate.
Pi is not launched yet on any exchange. But one can easily sell his or her pi coins to investors who want to hold pi till mainnet launch.
This means crypto whales want to hold pi. And you can get a good rate for selling pi to them. I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi vendor below.
A vendor is someone who buys from a miner and resell it to a holder or crypto whale.
Here is the telegram contact of my vendor:
@Pi_vendor_247
The secret way to sell pi coins effortlessly.DOT TECH
Well as we all know pi isn't launched yet. But you can still sell your pi coins effortlessly because some whales in China are interested in holding massive pi coins. And they are willing to pay good money for it. If you are interested in selling I will leave a contact for you. Just telegram this number below. I sold about 3000 pi coins to him and he paid me immediately.
Telegram: @Pi_vendor_247
Turin Startup Ecosystem 2024 - Ricerca sulle Startup e il Sistema dell'Innov...Quotidiano Piemontese
Turin Startup Ecosystem 2024
Una ricerca de il Club degli Investitori, in collaborazione con ToTeM Torino Tech Map e con il supporto della ESCP Business School e di Growth Capital
What price will pi network be listed on exchangesDOT TECH
The rate at which pi will be listed is practically unknown. But due to speculations surrounding it the predicted rate is tends to be from 30$ — 50$.
So if you are interested in selling your pi network coins at a high rate tho. Or you can't wait till the mainnet launch in 2026. You can easily trade your pi coins with a merchant.
A merchant is someone who buys pi coins from miners and resell them to Investors looking forward to hold massive quantities till mainnet launch.
I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi vendor to trade with.
@Pi_vendor_247
where can I find a legit pi merchant onlineDOT TECH
Yes. This is very easy what you need is a recommendation from someone who has successfully traded pi coins before with a merchant.
Who is a pi merchant?
A pi merchant is someone who buys pi network coins and resell them to Investors looking forward to hold thousands of pi coins before the open mainnet.
I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi merchant to trade with
@Pi_vendor_247
Even tho Pi network is not listed on any exchange yet.
Buying/Selling or investing in pi network coins is highly possible through the help of vendors. You can buy from vendors[ buy directly from the pi network miners and resell it]. I will leave the telegram contact of my personal vendor.
@Pi_vendor_247
1. Page 0
Fiscal policy relaxation in a depressed economy
Can there be a “Free Lunch” for Greece?
Dr. Platon Monokroussos
Group Chief Economist
Eurobank Ergasias S.A.
July, 2017
2. Page 1
This study leans on the literature on regime-dependent fiscal multipliers and the existence of hysteresis effects to
demonstrate that, under certain conditions, a further relaxation of the agreed fiscal targets for Greece could not only
benefit the country’s growth outlook, but might also lead to improved (rather than worsened) fiscal dynamics in the
medium- and long-run.
This, rather counter-intuitive, argument is based on the assumption that fiscal multipliers are higher (and more
persistent) than usual when the economy features a massive output gap as a result of a severe recession and also that a
cyclical boost in output caused by an expansionary fiscal policy move may have a permanent positive effect on future
potential output.
Although quite diverse views continue to exist among professional economists and policy makers as regards the
quantitative and qualitative effects of fiscal policy, a more recent strand of the relevant literature appears to support the
regime-dependence of fiscal multipliers i.e., higher effects on output due to discretionary policy shocks in periods of deep
economic contractions than in normal economic times or expansions.
As regards hysteresis, i.e. the notion that in a depressed economy featuring ample cyclical unemployment and excess
capacity, an expansionary fiscal policy shock could prove self-financing, i.e. instigate both an improvement in the future
potential output and a decline in the debt to GDP ratio in the medium- and long-term (and vice versa for the case of a
contractionary fiscal policy shock), the literature has proposed a host of mechanisms to substantiate the existence of
such effects.
In the case of a fiscal policy-induced cyclical downturn in an economy already featuring a sizeable negative output gap,
such effects may include, inter alia, reduced labor force attachment on the part of the long-term unemployed, scarring
effects on young workers who have trouble beginning their careers, lower physical and human capital investments,
reduced R&D expenditure, and changes in managerial attitudes.
In Greece, an unprecedented in size (and heavily front-loaded) fiscal consolidation programme has been implemented
since 2010 to engineer an internal devaluation and correct the earlier acute macroeconomic imbalances. This facilitated a
huge improvement in the country’s fiscal accounts, but it has broadly failed so far to stabilize public debt dynamics. And
this, despite the aforementioned fiscal adjustment as well as any beneficial effects stemming from the PSI operation and
the broadly concessional interest rates currently paid on official-sector loans.
Indeed, over the period 2010-2016, the general government primary fiscal balance has improved by c. 14ppts-of-GDP
(and by 19.2ppts-of-GDP in cyclically adjusted terms), while the gross public debt to GDP ratio has increased by
52.3ppts. Furthermore, real GDP losses amounted to c. 25ppts, while real potential output was at the end of 2016 lower
by 13.7ppts relative to its end-2009 level (AMECO data).
Summary of views & key findings
3. Page 2
In view of the aforementioned, the study provides a quantitative assessment of a number of scenarios for the evolution of
Greece’s GDP and other important variables such as the general government fiscal balance and the gross public debt
ratio under a hypothetical permanent relaxation of the agreed target for the primary surplus, to 2.2%-of-GDP from 2018
onwards.
Assuming a range of (plausible) values for the short-term (impact) fiscal multiplier and for some other key parameters
used in the exercise (e.g. multiplier persistence and hysteresis coefficients), the study demonstrates that, under certain
conditions, the said fiscal policy intervention (relaxation of the primary surplus target) could lead to both higher GDP
levels and a lower debt to GDP ratio in the medium- and long-term relative to the current, no-policy-change baseline.
It is important to note that in the self-financing fiscal relaxation scenarios presented in the study, the assumed values for
the above mentioned parameters broadly fall in the acceptable range of values for crisis episodes used in some recent
empirical studies conducted by the European Commission.
Furthermore, the assumed values for the short-term multipliers are broadly in line with the multipliers for crisis-hit
economies reported in some recent empirical studies, including the ones published earlier by Eurobank Economic
Research (to our knowledge, the most comprehensive empirical studies for regime-dependent fiscal multipliers in Greece
published thus far).
Although the empirical estimation of fiscal multipliers and the existence or not of hysteresis effects remain highly
debatable topics in leading academic and policy cycles, we believe that the present study constitutes a valuable addition
to the relevant debate.
From a policy standpoint, we see value in revisiting/re-evaluating the agreed short-, medium- and long-run fiscal policy
path in Greece, with a view to minimizing the negative macroeconomic effects implied by the (still-demanding) targets for
the general government primary surplus.
Summary of views & key findings (continued)
4. Page 3
Part I
Fiscal policy relaxation in a depressed economy
Can there be a “Free Lunch” for Greece?
5. Page 4Source: AMECO (European Commission)
An unprecedented (and front-loaded) fiscal adjustment that inescapably
exacerbated the huge contraction of domestic output
6. Page 5
Structural Balance of General Government Excluding
Interest (% Potential GDP) in 2016
Source: AMECO (European Commission)
Greece currently features the highest structural fiscal balance in the EA
7. Page 6Source: EC Compliance Report - The Third Adjustment Programme for Greece, Second Review (Jun. 2017), Eurobank Economic Research
Gross public debt & gross financing needs (*)
(% of GDP)
European Commission’s baseline DSA scenario for Greece
EC baseline scenario
Key assumptions
(*) The depicted evolution of the public debt & GFN ratios may
deviate somewhat from what is projected in the Commission’s
DSA due to differences in some underlying assumptions
Nominal GDP growth
between 4.3% and 4.0% in 2018-
2030; 3.2% afterwards
General government primary
suplus (% GDP)
3.5% in 2018-2022; 3.0% in 2023;
2.5% in 2024; 2.2% afterwards
Privatization revenue
(full, projection horizon)
€17bn
Set aside for bank recap needs
(EUR bn)
none
Market refinancing rates (%)
5.10% in 2019; 5.50% 2021; slowly
converging thereafter towards 4.3%
by 2060
5%
7%
9%
11%
13%
15%
17%
19%
21%
23%
25%
80%
100%
120%
140%
160%
180%
200%
2017
2019
2021
2023
2025
2027
2029
2031
2033
2035
2037
2039
2041
2043
2045
2047
2049
2051
2053
2055
2057
2059
Debt (left axis) GFN (right axis)
8. Page 7Source: Eurobank Economic Research
How a fiscal policy intervention may affect the evolution of the debt ratio
Let us assume that a discretionary fiscal policy shock is implemented by the domestic authorities in the current
period e.g. the fiscal authority introduces measures aiming to improve (increase) the primary general government
balance by one unit.
The aforementioned intervention influences the debt to GDP ratio in the current period (and, maybe, in future periods if the
ensuing fiscal drag shows a certain degree of persistence) via the following three (3) channels:
― 1st numerator effect: fiscal intervention causes a one-to-one increase in the primary fiscal balance;
― 2nd numerator effect: the aforementioned effect is partially offset (and, in certain instances, more than outweighed) by the
impact of automatic stabilizers e.g. lower tax revenues/higher unemployment benefits due to the ensuing economic
contraction (fiscal drag);
― denominator effect: fiscal intervention causes a decline in economic activity and thus, it reduces the denominator of the
debt-to-GDP.
The first of the above mentioned effects tends to reduce the debt to GDP ratio, while the latter two tend to increase it.
In periods when 1st numerator effect < 2nd numerator effect + denominator effect, the fiscal consolidation is self-
defeating.
In periods when the above relationship holds for a fiscal relaxation, the said policy intervention is self-financing.
In the case of Greece, the public debt to GDP ratio increased by c. 69.5ppts-of-GDP between 2008 and 2016, despite the
PSI exercise and the sharp improvement in the primary fiscal balance (by 9.3ppts-of-GDP) over that period.
Clearly, the aforementioned analysis suggests that the fiscal consolidation programmes implemented in Greece over the
last several years have so far failed to stabilize the country’s public debt dynamics.
9. Page 8Source: Eurobank Economic Research, Bousard, J., Castro F. and Salto M. “Fiscal Multipliers and Public Debt Dynamics in Consolidation”
European Commission Economic Papers 460/July 2012
Greece: simulation exercise
Can a relaxation of the agreed medium-term fiscal target be self-financing?
In the following pages, we present the projected evolution of Greece’s gross public debt to GDP ratio under four (4)
hypothetical scenarios, denoted S1, S2, S3 & S4.
― All scenarios assume that the official target for the general government primary balance (as % of GDP) is adjusted to 2.2%,
from 2018 onwards (i.e., over the full projection horizon 2018-2060).
― For simplicity, the said intervention (in our case, fiscal relaxation vs. the assumed baseline) is hypothesized to be
exogenous, discretionary and of permanent nature i.e., not to be reversed by an offsetting policy move in the future.
― This compares with the following path for the primary balance to GDP ratio agreed at the Eurogroup of 15 June, 2017:
FY-2017: 1.75%; period 2018-2022: 3.5%; FY-2023: 3.0%; FY-2024: 2.5%; period 2025-2060: 2.2%.
― Crucially, the scenarios under examination incorporate different assumptions regarding: the first-year (impact) multiplier,
the degree of multiplier persistence and the long-run impulse response of GDP to fiscal consolidation (herein, a proxy for
the existence of “hysteresis” effects).
― Furthermore, the market interest rate for refinancing Greek debt is assumed to increase by 3bps per 1ppt deviation of the
debt-to-GDP ratio from the 60% threshold. This is in line with what is assumed in the EC’s latest (June 2017) baseline
DSA analysis for Greece.
― In all scenarios under examination, the reaction of automatic stabilizers to the change in output growth caused by the
hypothesized policy intervention (herein, a permanent reduction in the primary balance to GDP target from 3.5% to 2.2%
from 2018 onwards) is captured by a cyclical semi-elasticity of government balance to the output gap of 0.42. This is in
line with the European Commission services’ calculations, as presented in Boussard et al., (2012).
Key parameter values used in the simulation exercise
Fiscal multipliers are assumed to follow the convex, autoregressive decay path presented in page 10 of this document.
The first-year (impact) multiplier is assumed to take the following discrete value: 0.75 (low), 1.5 (intermediate), 2.0 (high)
and 2.5 (very high). These are in line with the values assumed in some recent papers published by the European
Commission services (see e.g. Bousard et al., 2012) as well the estimates found in a couple of relevant empirical studies
for Greece, see e.g. Monokroussos, P. and D. Thomakos, 2012 & 2013 (see also technical appendix of this document).
α (persistence parameter): 0.30 (low), 0.60 (intermediate), 0.80 (high) and 0.90 (very high).
β (long-run impulse response of GDP to fiscal consolidation): 0.30 (high), 0.10 (intermediate), 0.0 (no long-term
impact).
Parameters a and β are assumed to follow a normal distribution with the assumed values falling within the respective
ranges for crisis episodes reported in Boussard et al., (2012).
10. Page 9Source: Boussard et al. (2012); EC (2013), Eurobank Economic Research
Greece: simulation exercise
Assumed fiscal multipliers & key parameter values
scenario
acronym
Scenario
characteristics
m1
first-year (impact)
multiplier
α
persistence parameter
β
long-run impulse
response of GDP to fiscal
consolidation
fiscal target
adjusted to 2.2% of GDP
from 2018 onwards
S1
high impact multiplier
value/ high multiplier
persistence / positive long-
run GDP response to fiscal
relaxation
2.0 0.80 0.30 2.2%
S2
high impact multiplier
value/ high multiplier
persistence / positive long-
run GDP response to fiscal
relaxation
2.5 0.90 0.30 2.2%
S3
intermediate impact
multiplier value/
intermediate multiplier
persistence / positive long-
run GDP response to fiscal
relaxation
1.5 0.60 0.10 2.2%
S4
low impact multiplier
value/ low multiplier
persistence / no long-run
GDP response to fiscal
relaxation
0.75 0.30 0.00 2.2%
11. Page 10Source: Boussard et al. (2012); EC (2013), Eurobank Economic Research
Technical highlights
In order to incorporate multiplier persistence &
hysteresis in our simulation exercise we follow
Boussard et al. (2012)1 and European Commission
(2013)2 and assume:
Fiscal multipliers follow the following convex,
autoregressive decay path:3
mt,i = (m1 – β)αi-t + β, with t=1,...,τ and i = t, t+1,…,T
where,
m1 is the impact (i.e., first year) multiplier;
mt,i is the fiscal multiplier applying at time i to the
fiscal consolidation/relaxation done in year t (i ≥ t);
a: persistence parameter (0 <α < 1);
β: hysteresis parameter, representing the long-run
impulse response of GDP to fiscal consolidation/
relaxation (no assumption on the sign of β)
Α negative value of β indicates that “hysteresis” effects
are present (see e.g. de Long and Summers, 2012);
such a situation may arise when e.g. a cyclical
downturn today (vs. the assumed baseline) casts a
shadow (has a negative impact) on future potential
output.
By the same logic, a positive value of β represents a
situation in which a cyclical upturn boosts future
potential output.
For β = 0, it is assumed that there are no hysteresis
effects.
Multiplier assumptions
Modelling multiplier persistence & hysteresis
Stylized paths of GDP impulse responses
used in the simulation
1. “Fiscal Multipliers and Public Debt dynamics in Consolidations”
2. “Effects of fiscal consolidation envisaged in the 2013 Stability and
Convergence Programmes on public debt dynamics in EU Member
States”
3. This decay function reproduces relatively well the shape of the impulse-
response function by typical DSGE models for most of the permanent fiscal
shocks (see Bussard et al., 2012).
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
t=1
t=2
t=3
t=4
t=5
t=6
t=7
t=8
t=9
t=10
t=11
t=12
t=13
t=14
t=15
t=16
t=17
t=18
t=19
t=20
m1=1.0; α=0.6; β=-0.2
m1=1.0; α=0.3; β=0
m1=1.0; α=0.6; β=0.2
12. Page 11Source: European Commission Compliance Report, The Third Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece, Second Review (Jun. 2017)
& Eurobank Economic Research
Simulation analysis - Scenarios S1, S2, S3, S4
Evolution of nominal GDP & gross public debt to GDP ratio
Green-shaded areas indicate a self-financing fiscal expansion
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2030 2040 2050 2060
Debt-to-GDP
ratio (%)
176.5 174.6 167.2 159.9 153.0 146.8 123.1 109.3 99.9 91.7
Nominal GDP
(€ bn)
181.2 187.7 195.2 203.0 210.9 219.2 287.8 397.7 545.0 746.8
Debt-to-GDP
ratio (%)
176.5 170.5 164.3 158.1 152.3 147.3 123.3 108.5 98.7 90.4
Nominal GDP
(€ bn)
181.2 192.6 199.5 206.7 214.2 222.1 289.1 398.6 545.8 747.5
Debt-to-GDP
ratio (%)
176.5 169.1 162.7 156.3 150.4 145.1 120.6 106.1 96.8 88.9
Nominal GDP
(€ bn)
181.2 193.8 200.8 208.1 215.6 223.4 290.0 399.0 545.9 747.6
Debt-to-GDP
ratio (%)
176.5 171.8 166.6 161.0 155.5 150.7 127.0 111.9 101.6 92.8
Nominal GDP
(€ bn)
181.2 191.4 197.5 204.5 211.9 219.8 288.0 398.0 545.3 747.0
Debt-to-GDP
ratio (%)
176.5 173.8 168.8 163.0 157.4 152.4 128.4 113.2 102.8 93.8
Nominal GDP
(€ bn)
181.2 189.5 195.8 203.2 211.0 219.2 287.8 397.7 545.0 746.8
European Commission
baseline
(June 2017)
Scenario S1
high impact multiplier/high
multiplier persistence /
positive long-run GDP response
to fiscal relaxation
Scenario S2
high impact multiplier/high
multiplier persistence /
positive long-run GDP response
to fiscal relaxation
Scenario S3
intermediate impact
multiplier/intermediate
multiplier persistence /
positive long-run GDP response
to fiscal relaxation
Scenario S4
low impact multiplier/low
multiplier persistence / no long-
run GDP response to fiscal
relaxation
14. Page 13
Fiscal multipliers
Key definitions
The term fiscal multiplier refers to the ratio of a change in output (ΔΥ) to an exogenous change in the fiscal balance,
be it a change in government spending (ΔG) or a change in government revenue (ΔΤ) or a combination of the two.1
Depending on the time horizon considered, there are several relevant ratios that fit the term fiscal multiplier:
─ The impact multiplier, defined as the ratio of a contemporaneous change in output (at time t0) to an exogenous change in
the fiscal balance at time t0 i.e., ΔY(t0) / ΔG(to).
─ The multiplier at some future point in time (say, N period from now), defined as the ratio of a change in output at time
t0+N to an exogenous change in the fiscal balance at time t0 i.e., ΔY(t0 + N) / ΔG(to).
─ The cumulative multiplier, defined as the ratio of the cumulative change in output over an exogenous change in the fiscal
balance over a time horizon of N periods i.e., ΔY(t0 + i) / ΔG(to + i), with i = 0, 1,…,N.
─ The peak or maximum multiplier, defined as the ratio of the largest change in output over any time horizon N to an
exogenous change in the fiscal balance at time t0, i.e., max ΔY(t0 + N) / ΔG(to), for every N.
1. For a more extensive note on the relevant definitions and the determinants of fiscal multipliers see e.g. Spilimbergo et al. (2011), IMF Staff
Position Note (09/11).
15. Page 14
Determinants of fiscal multipliers
A bird’s eye view on the literature
Prior theoretical and empirical work on the response of main macroeconomic aggregates to exogenous fiscal shocks has
shown that the size and, in certain instances, the sign of the fiscal multiplier can be country-, estimation method-, and
economic conditions-specific. In general, it appears that quite diverse views continue to exist among economists and policy
makers as regards the quantitative and qualitative effects of fiscal policy.
As noted in e.g. Berti et al. (2013)1, many factors influence the size of fiscal multipliers. They can be grouped as follows:
i) the composition of the fiscal intervention and its credibility, as well as the fiscal rules adopted by the government; ii) the
effects of monetary policy on interest rates and the perceived riskiness of the sovereign; iii) the access of households and
companies to finance; iv) other economic factors, like price and wage flexibility, the exchange rate regime in which the
country operates and external demand.
Based on the existing literature, Berti et al. (2013) note that in case of financial crises fiscal multipliers tend to be larger than
usual (see, for instance, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2011). In particular, fiscal multipliers tend to be higher when
monetary policy is constrained by the liquidity trap (Christiano et al., 2011), economic agents are financially constrained
(Galí et al., 2007), important nominal price and wage rigidities are in place (Woodford, 2011; Andrés et al., 2012), economies
are relatively closed (Corsetti and Müller, 2012, and Ilzetzki et al., 2012) and exchange rates are irrevocably fixed, as in the
Euro Area (see, among others, Ilzetzki et al. ,2012, Corsetti et al., 2012, and Erceg and Lindé, 2012). When this is the case,
fiscal consolidation possibly entails short-term increases in the public debt-to-GDP ratio of the consolidating countries, due
to its short-term negative impact on economic activity. The higher the initial debt ratio and the greater the budget elasticity
to the cycle, the more likely this is.
One should anyway also consider that, as underlined in the literature, another key driver behind the impact of fiscal
consolidation is given by financial markets' perception of the possibility for a certain country to default on its sovereign. In
this sense, multipliers applying to consolidation efforts would not be large in instances where fiscal policy action lowers the
probability of default perceived by financial markets (see, for instance, Ilzetzki et al., 2012, Corsetti et al., 2012, and
Hernández de Cos and Moral Benito, 2013).
1. Berti K., F. Castro and M. Salto (2013) “Effects of fiscal consolidation envisaged in the 2013 Stability and Convergence Programmes on public
debt dynamics in EU Member States”, European Commission, Economic Papers 504/September 2013.
16. Page 15
Are fiscal multipliers regime-dependent?
Findings of a recent meta regression analysis
Compound cum. multipliers of fiscal impulses for different regimes (*)
“UPPER” for economic upturns (actual output > potential output)
“AVERAGE” (actual output in line with potential output)
“LOWER” for economic downturns (actual output < potential output)
(*) blue-bold bars: baseline specification; green-striped bars: specification with all
possible interactions
Gechert, S. and A. Rannenberg (2014) “Are Fiscal
Multipliers Regime-Dependent? A Meta Regression
Analysis” IMK Macroeconomic Policy Institute, WP
139/Sept. 2014.
The study analyzes whether estimated multiplier
effects are systematically higher if the economy suffers
a downturn.
For that purpose, a meta-regression analysis is
conducted based on a unique data set of 98 empirical
studies with more than 1800 observations on
multiplier effects.
Controlling for regime dependence of the multiplier, the
Study finds that multipliers significantly increase (by
about 0.6 to 0.8 units) during a downturn.
Moreover, spending multipliers significantly exceed tax
multipliers (by about 0.3 units) in normal times and
even more so during recessions.
Based on a broad array of empirical evidence, the
study concludes that in order to limit the adverse
consequences for growth, fiscal consolidation should
take place during the recovery and should be primarily
tax-based.
On the right side of this page, see relevant figure
presented in the aforementioned study
17. Page 16
How big (small?) are fiscal multipliers in Greece?
Findings of some recent empirical analyses
In two recent empirical studies on the macroeconomic effects of exogenous fiscal shocks in Greece, regime-
dependent fiscal multipliers are estimated for a range of key government revenue and expenditure categories; see
Monokroussos, P. and D. Thomakos, 20121 & 20132.
Monokroussos, P. and D. Thomakos (2013) employ a Multivariate Threshold Autoregressive Model (TVAR) to investigate the
time- and regime-dependent properties of Greece’s fiscal multiplies. Some of the most important findings of the
aforementioned study are summarized below:
― The response of real output to discretionary shocks in government current spending on goods and services and/or
government tax revenue depends on the regime in which the shock occurs as well as on the size and direction
(expansionary vs. contractionary) of the initial shock.
― In general, expansionary or contractionary shocks taking place in lower output regimes (economic downturns) appear to
have much larger effects on output - both on impact and on a cumulative basis - than shocks of similar sign and size
occurring in upper regimes (economic expansions).
― In lower regimes, the contractionary effects on output from a negative fiscal shock (spending cut or tax hike) rise with the
absolute size of the shock. The same applies for expansionary fiscal shocks (spending hikes or tax cuts). Similar effects
apply for fiscal shocks taking place in upper output regimes, though to a much lesser extent.
― Regarding the current fiscal adjustment programme in Greece, our empirical results appear to support the case for a more
gradual implementation profile of the agreed austerity package for 2013-2016. This is especially because, the
aforementioned programme is heavily front-loaded, relying mainly on steep cuts in government expenditure items that are
understood to have large fiscal multipliers e.g. wages and pensions.
― Given the overall size of Greece’s fiscal adjustment programme, our multiplier estimates suggest that Greek GDP will
decline by up to €1.89 cumulatively over a three-year period per €1 discretionary decrease in real government spending on
goods and services.
― Furthermore, our estimates argue in favor of higher public investment spending in the current depressionary environment
as a means of boosting short- and medium-term economic growth. In particular, our GIRF estimates imply among others
that for a 5% YoY positive discretionary shock in the public investment programme, real output rises by between €2.91
and €3.99 cumulatively over a 12 quarter period per €1 increase in real investment expenditure.
1. Monokroussos, P. and D. Thomakos (2012) “Fiscal Multipliers in deep economic recessions and the case for a 2-year extension in Greece’s
austerity programme” Eurobank Economic Research, October 2012.
2. Monokroussos, P. and D. Thomakos (2013) “Greek fiscal multipliers revisited: Government spending cuts vs. tax hikes and the role of public
investment expenditure” Eurobank Economic Research, March 2013.
18. Page 17
How big (small?) are fiscal multipliers in Greece?
Findings of some recent empirical studies
Source: Monokroussos, P. and D. Thomakos (2013) “Greek fiscal multipliers revisited:
Government spending cuts vs. tax hikes and the role of public investment expenditure”
Eurobank Economic Research, March 2013.
Output response to government current expenditure shocks
(G: real government spending on goods and services; T: real government taxes
net of transfers & property income; Y real output )
19. Page 18
On hysteresis and self-defeating/self-financing fiscal interventions
The specter of self-defeating consolidations was initially raised in Gros (2011)1, where a simple framework was utilized to
show that austerity could indeed increase the debt ratio in the short-run. In a similar vein, Delong and Summers (2012)2
suggest that in a depressed economy even a small amount of “hysteresis” - i.e., a small impact on potential output due to the
economic downturn – means, by simple arithmetic, that expansionary fiscal policy is likely to be self-financing. Although the
authors clarify that their argument “does not justify unsustainable fiscal policies, nor does it justify delaying the passage of
legislation to make unsustainable fiscal policies sustainable” it is clear that the notion of hysteresis takes particular
importance for fiscal consolidations undertaken during deep economic downturns, where multipliers are likely to be both
high and persistent i.e., their recessionary effects stretch well beyond the year when the fiscal adjustment is applied.
A number of mechanisms have been suggested in the literature to substantiate the notion of hysteresis. Some of these
include (see Delong and Summers, 2012):
― reduced labor force attachment on the part of the long-term unemployed;
― scarring effects on young workers who have trouble beginning their careers;
― reductions in government physical and human capital investments as social insurance expenditures make prior claims
on limited public financial resources;
― reduced investment both in research and development and in physical capital;
― reduced experimentation with business models and informational spillovers, and changes in managerial attitudes;
― other effects.
1. Gros, Daniel, 2012, "Can Austerity Be Self-defeating?" CEPS, Intereconomics : review of European economic policy.- Berlin : Springer, ISSN
1613-964X, ZDB-ID 2066476X. - Vol. 47.2012, 3, p. 175-184.
2. Delong, J. Bradford & Summers, Lawrence H., 2012, "Fiscal Policy in a Depressed Economy “ Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring
2012, The Brookings Institution.
20. Page 19
Can an expansionary fiscal policy in a depressed economy be self-financing?
1. Delong, J. Bradford & Summers, Lawrence H., 2012, "Fiscal Policy in a Depressed Economy “ Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring
2012, The Brookings Institution.
“In a depressed economy, with short-term nominal interest rates at their zero lower bound [or with monetary policy being
constrained because of the institutional arrangements of the euro area - phase within brackets is our addition], ample cyclical
unemployment, and excess capacity, increased government purchases would be neither offset by the monetary authority
raising interest rates nor neutralized by supply-side bottlenecks. Then even a small amount of hysteresis—even a small
shadow cast on future potential output by the cyclical downturn—means, by simple arithmetic, that expansionary fiscal policy
is likely to be self-financing. Even if it is not, it is highly likely to pass the sensible benefit-cost test of raising the present value
of future potential output. Thus, at the zero bound, where the central bank cannot or will not but in any event does not perform
its full role in stabilization policy, fiscal policy has the stabilization policy mission that others have convincingly argued it lacks
in normal times. Whereas many economists have assumed that the path of potential output is invariant to even a deep
and prolonged downturn, the available evidence raises a strong fear that hysteresis is indeed a factor. Although nothing in
our analysis calls into question the importance of sustainable fiscal policies, it strongly suggests the need for caution
regarding the pace of fiscal consolidation.”
Delong and Summers (2012)1
21. Page 20
A reduced-form framework for assessing under what conditions fiscal
expansion is self-financing
1. Delong, J. Bradford & Summers, Lawrence H., 2012, "Fiscal Policy in a Depressed Economy “ Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring
2012, The Brookings Institution.
In line with Delong and Summers (2012)1, let us assume:
A temporary increase in government spending by ΔG, measured in percentage-point -of-potential-GDP-years.
A reduction of the present period’s output gap, Υn (“n” for “now”) by an amount ΔΥn (also measured in percentage point-
years), due to the aforementioned policy intervention:
(1) ΔΥn = μ*ΔG , where μ is the short-term (impact) multiplier coefficient
Financing this expansion of government purchases requires increasing the national debt by an amount ΔD, also measured in
percentage-point-of-potential-GDP-years. Given μ as before and assuming a baseline marginal tax-and-transfer rate t, the
required increase in the national debt is then:
(2) ΔD = (1-μτ)*ΔG.
If now the economy’s long-run growth rate is g and the real government borrowing rate is r, this additional debt ΔD imposes
on the government an annual financing burden in percentage points of a year’s potential GDP of:
(3) (r-g)*ΔD = (r-g)*(1-μτ)*ΔG , if it is to maintain a stable long-run debt-to-GDP ratio.
Assume next that in future periods production is determined by supply and that there is no gap between real aggregate
demand and potential output. Then, in a typical future period, potential and actual output Yf (where “f ” stands for “future”)
will be reduced by a hysteresis parameter η times the depth by which the economy is depressed in the present:
(4) ΔYf = η*ΔΥn = η*μ*ΔG.
A fiscal expansion undertaken to prevent hysteresis thus creates a fiscal dividend; it raises future tax collections by an
amount:
(5) τ*ΔYf = τ*η*μ*ΔG.
Equations (3) and (5) together imply that if:
(6) (r-g)*(1-μτ) - η*μ*τ ≤ 0,
then at the margin, transitory expansionary fiscal policy is self-financing.
Rearranging equation 6, we can show that this net future fiscal dividend from the present-period fiscal expansion DG arises
as long as r satisfies:
(7) r ≤ g + η*μ*τ / (1-μτ)
22. Page 21
Critical Values for the real effective interest rate on debt for a fiscal
expansion to be self-financing
1. Delong, J. Bradford & Summers, Lawrence H., 2012, "Fiscal Policy in a Depressed Economy “ Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring
2012, The Brookings Institution.
Parameter values for base case
Parameter Interpretation Value range
μ Present-period government spending multiplier 0-2.5
r Real government borrowing rate & social rate of time discount, per year 0.025-?
g Trend growth rate of potential GDP, per year 0.0095-0.0125
τ Marginal tax-and-transfer rate 0.33-0.40
η Hysteresis: proportional reduction in potential output from a temporary downturn 0.0-0.2
Critical Values of the Real Treasury Rate for Fiscal Expansion to Be Self-Financing
Hysteresis η μ = 0 μ = 0.5 μ = 1.0 μ=1.5 μ=2.0 μ=2.5
0.000 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00% 1.00%
0.025 1.00% 1.53% 2.35% 3.76% 6.83% 18.50%
0.050 1.00% 2.06% 3.69% 6.53% 12.67% 36.00%
0.100 1.00% 3.12% 6.38% 12.05% 24.33% 71.00%
0.200 1.00% 5.24% 11.77% 23.11% 47.67% 141.00%
Critical real Treasury interest rate for individual value of
multiplier μ (% per year)
In line with Delong and Summers (2012)1,
23. Page 22
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