1. Student
name:
Muhammad
Harris
bin
Zainul
Student
ID
number:
619019
Course
title:
Government
and
Politics
of
Modern
Southeast
Asia
Course
code:
A14/15
Tutor’s
name:
Dr
Michael
Buehler
Question:
How
far
do
the
2008
election
results
reflect
a
deepening
of
democracy
in
Malaysia
since
the
reformasi
period?
Paper
title:
A
Post-­‐2008
Democratic
Malaysia:
Fact
or
Fiction?
Word
count:
5000
Introduction
This
essay
attempts
to
demonstrate
that
although
the
Opposition’
Pakatan
Rakyat
had
gained
a
significant
amount
of
states
in
the
2008
and
2013
General
Elections
(GE),
it
does
not
reflect
a
wider
deepening
of
democracy
in
Malaysia.
This
is
proven
through
evidence
that
despite
the
greater
Opposition
representation
in
Malaysia’s
bicameral
legislature,
there
is
a
continued
suppression
of
various
civil
liberties
needed
for
a
healthy
democracy.
Democracy
Abraham
Lincoln
described
a
democracy
as
being
‘government
of
the
people,
for
the
people,
by
the
people’.
Democracy
concerns
both
political
and
civil
rights.
The
former
consists
of
inter
alia,
the
right
of
participation
in
civil
society
and
politics,
and
the
right
to
vote.
Meanwhile,
civil
rights
comprises
of
protections
against
discrimination,
freedom
of
speech
and
expression,
the
freedom
of
the
press,
and
the
freedom
of
movement.1
Although
Malaysian
citizens
had
enjoyed
universal
suffrage
from
the
outset
of
Malaya’s
creation
–
Malaysia
is
still
described
as
a
‘semi-­‐democratic’
regime
because
of
the
limits
it
places
of
civil
and
political
liberties.
This
is
attributed
to
the
Barisan
National’s
(BN)
1
http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Civil_and_political_rights.html
(accessed
9
December
2014)

2. strategic
use
of
restrictions
on
certain
freedoms
such
as
on
communications
and
assembly,
and
also
through
the
manipulation
and
abuse
of
legislations.
In
this
type
of
regime,
a
transfer
of
power
is
always
possible
–
although
highly
unlikely.2
This
is
because
although
elections
occur
at
regular
intervals,
it
is
considered
‘only
partially
free
and
not
fair’.3
On
the
other
hand,
Syamsuddin
Taya
tries
to
place
Malaysia’s
‘semi-­‐democratic’
regime
in
perspective
to
her
ASEAN
neighbours.
Through
this
comparative
lens,
the
state
of
Malaysia’s
democracy
looks
healthy
because
it
lacks
the
political
violence
often
associated
with
Marcos’
Philippines
and
martial
Thailand.
Taya
evidences
his
claim
of
a
healthy
democracy
by
stating
that
in
the
2008
GE,
the
BN
not
only
lost
Selangor,
Penang,
Kedah
and
Perak,
as
well
as
Kelantan,
but
also
their
two-­‐thirds
majority.4
The
Reformasi
movement
Malaysian
opposition
politics
has
always
been
synonymous
with
Anwar
Ibrahim
–
the
once
former
deputy
prime
minister
of
Mahathir
Mohamad.
This
movement
had
emerged
out
of
the
rakyat’s
dissatisfaction
with
the
BN
government
who
had
ousted,
arrested
and
imprisoned
Anwar
with
what
many
thought
were
dubious
charges
of
sodomy
and
corruption.
His
arrest
is
said
to
be
a
watershed
moment
in
Malaysian
politics
as
it
galvanised
the
Malay
society
who
had
long
been
accustomed
to
UMNO’s
claim
to
protect
Malay
interests.5
2
Bridget
Welsh,
1996.
‘Attitudes
toward
Democracy
in
Malaysia:
Challenges
to
the
Regime?.’
In
Asian
Survey
36
(9):884.
3
Zurairi
AR,
2013.
“GE13
‘partially
free
but
not
fair’,
say
think
thanks”,
The
Malaysian
Insider,
8
May
2013.
4
Syamsuddin
Taya,
2010.
‘Political
Legal
Perspective:
Evaluating
Human
Rights
in
Malaysia.’
In
Asian
Journal
of
Social
Science
38:487.
5
Sheila
Nair,
2007.
‘The
Limits
of
Protest
and
Prospects
for
Political
Reform
in
Malaysia.’
In
Critical
Asian
Studies
39
(3):351.

3. Although
the
Reformasi
movement
started
as
non-­‐partisan,
this
changed
following
the
arrest
of
the
Parti
Keadilan
Rakyat
(PKR)
Reformasi
leaders
Tian
Chua,
Mohamad
Ezam
Mohamad
Nor,
Saari
Sungib,
Badrul
Ambin
Baharon,
Lokman
Adam,
Abdul
Ghani
Harun,
and
N.
Gobalakrishnan.6
Meredith
Weiss
attributes
the
success
of
the
Reformasi
movement
to
its
ability
to
activate
what
she
describes
as,
“the
latent
stores
of
social
and
coalitional
capital”
by
appealing
to
various
civil
society
agents
(CSA).
These
CSA
had
gradually
introduced
new
political
norms
to
the
rakyat,
and
helped
convince
them
that
the
moment
seems
propitious
for
change.7
This,
she
describes
as
being
the
most
important
difference
between
the
Reformasi
movement
and
previous
movements,
namely
that
the
Reformasi
movement
has
a
relatively
new
cluster
of
pro-­‐democracy
organisations.8
The
Reformasi
movement
has
undoubtedly
improved
the
quality
of
democracy
in
Malaysia
through
the
introduction
of
democratic
ideals
to
the
Malaysian
public.
However,
as
this
paper
will
later
demonstrate,
it
has
not
done
enough
to
make
Malaysia
a
democratic
country.
The
Malaysian
2008
and
2013
General
Elections
This
section
of
the
paper
seeks
to
demonstrate
that
there
is
a
strengthening
of
democracy
in
Malaysia
when
it
concerns
legislative
representation.
In
the
2008
GE,
the
BN
had
seen
a
severe
reduction
in
its
dominance.
In
the
GE
four
years
earlier,
the
BN
had
won
92%
of
the
219
parliamentary
seats,
and
all
state
elections
except
Kelantan.
On
the
other
hand,
in
2008
the
BN
barely
managed
to
get
half
of
the
6
Ibid:353-­‐354.
7
Meredith
Weiss,
2006.
‘Protest
and
Possibilities:
Civil
Society
and
Coalitions
for
Political
Change
in
Malaysia’
(Stanford
University
Press)
page
4.
8
Ibid:19.

4. 7.9million
ballots
cast
and
lost
the
popular
vote
in
Peninsular
Malaysia
where
they
only
managed
to
garner
49%
of
the
ballots.
The
BN
also
lost
four
important
states;
Selangor,
Penang,
Perak
and
Kedah
to
the
Opposition.
The
losses
in
Selangor
and
Penang
were
indicative
of
the
loss
of
support
for
the
BN
by
the
better
educated
urban
middle
class.9
What
is
arguably
the
sweetest
victory
for
opposition
supporters
in
the
2008
GE
is
the
defeat
of
S.
Samy
Vellu,
the
president
of
the
Malaysian
Indian
Congress
(MIC)
for
three
decades,
and
had
held
the
Sungai
Siput
seat
in
Perak
for
eight
terms.10
Although
the
swing
in
Opposition
support
is
impressive
as
a
whole,
two
events
merit
closer
analysis.
Firstly,
the
2008
Pakatan
win
in
Kedah
deserves
comment
because
it
is
the
first
time
the
opposition
had
won
in
this
Malay-­‐majority
state.
This
win
is
particularly
impressive
when
considering
that
the
people
in
Kedah
had
long
benefitted
from
UMNO’s
pro-­‐farmer
subsidy
policies.11
However,
in
the
2013
GE,
the
BN
had
managed
to
wrest
control
of
the
Kedah
state
from
Pakatan.
This
is
partially
due
to
its
infighting
and
PAS’
conservative
Islamic
policies
that
did
not
bode
well
with
the
Kedahans.
This
is
reflected
in
BN
winning
ten
of
the
fifteen
parliamentary
seats,
and
twenty-­‐one
out
of
thirty-­‐six
state
seats
in
Kedah.12
Although
Kedah
is
now
governed
by
the
BN,
it
evidences
a
healthy
democracy
in
the
state
as
the
rakyat
are
willing
to
change
their
ruling
governments
should
they
not
perform
as
expected.
9
Johan
Savaranamuttu,
2008.
‘A
Tectonic
Shift
in
Malaysian
Politics’.
In
March
8
Eclipsing
May
13
(ISEAS
Publishing)
pages
52-­‐53.
10
Kee
Thuan
Chye,
2008.
‘Merdeka
On
March
8’.
In
March
8
The
Day
Malaysia
Woke
Up
(Marshall
Cavendish
Editions)
page
28,
11
Savaranamuttu
2008:61.
12
http://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/ge13/13th-­‐malaysian-­‐general-­‐election-­‐result.html
(accessed
10
December
2014)

5. Additionally,
during
the
2008
GE,
Dr
Awang
Adek,
UMNO’s
designated
Mentri
Besar
for
Kelantan
had
lost
both
his
state
seat
of
Perupok
and
his
parliamentary
seat
in
Bacok.
Dr
Adek
lost
despite
his
strong
federal
backing,
and
promises
for
setting
up
a
Kelantan
University.
This
loss
warrants
a
mention
because
it
demonstrates
a
rejection
of
the
lure
of
development
that
had
oftentimes
translated
to
ballots.13
Meanwhile
in
the
2013
GE,
the
BN
managed
to
form
the
federal
government
although
it
lost
the
popular
vote
for
the
first
time
in
history
–
managing
to
obtain
only
46.5%
of
the
ballots.
However,
it
is
pivotal
to
note
that
11.25
million
voters
or
84.84%
of
those
eligible
to
vote
had
exercised
their
rights
in
the
2013
GE.
This
makes
it
the
highest
percentage
of
participation
in
any
GE
in
Malaysia.14
Although
still
far
from
perfect
–
with
allegations
of
phantom
voters,
blackouts
during
the
vote
counting
process,
and
attempts
to
smuggle
in
additional
ballot
boxes
–
when
political
rights
concerning
legislative
representation,
and
electorate
turnout
are
concerned;
Malaysian
democracy
has
never
been
in
a
healthier
state.
As
evidenced
in
Kedah,
there
is
a
culture
of
voting
out
the
incumbent
if
they
do
not
perform
as
expected.
Additionally,
although
the
BN
government
had
lost
the
popular
vote
in
2013,
the
country
demonstrated
deference
towards
democracy
to
accept
the
results
of
the
ballots
and
not
descend
into
racial
riots
that
had
plagued
the
Opposition
victory
in
1969.
The
Malaysian
Election
Commission
13
Savaranamuttu
2008:64.
14
The
Straits
Times,
2013.
“Malaysia
GE13:
Record
85%
turnout
for
polls;
BN
gets
46.5%
of
popular
vote”,
6
May
2013.

6. This
part
of
the
paper
seeks
to
demonstrate
that
the
Malaysian
Election
Commission
(EC)
is
not
independent
and
is
often
influenced
by
the
ruling
government
at
the
expense
of
democratic
values.
For
an
EC
to
carry
out
its
basic
duties
within
a
competitive
political
system,
it
has
to
be
regarded
as
generally
or
sufficiently
fair
by
all
groups.
To
achieve
this,
the
EC
has
to
meet
two
criteria;
one,
that
the
EC
is
competent
to
carry
out
its
functions.
Secondly,
it
also
has
to
be
impartial
when
conducting
its
duties,
making
its
independence
a
pivotal
element.15
The
non-­‐partisanship
of
the
EC
is
questionable
after
the
events
of
April
2002.
The
EC
had
then
sought
to
amend
the
electoral
laws
in
response
to
a
court
decision
that
annulled
the
1999
Likas
state
constituency
election
due
to
the
presence
of
phantom
voters
on
the
electoral
roll.
Dismayed
that
the
election
can
be
voided,
the
EC
initiated
amendments
to
preclude
judicial
intervention
in
the
legality
of
electoral
rolls.
The
amended
Section
9A
of
the
Elections
Act
1958
now
provides
that
an
electoral
roll
“shall
be
deemed
to
be
final
and
binding
and
shall
not
be
questioned
or
appealed
against
in,
or
reviewed,
quashed,
or
set
aside
by
any
court”.16
This
amendment
removes
one
of
the
most
basic
tenets
of
a
democracy,
the
separation
of
powers.
This
tenet
provides
for
a
system
of
checks
and
balances
within
the
different
branches
of
government
to
ensure
accountability
and
transparency.
With
this
in
mind,
the
amendment
clearly
demonstrates
the
lack
of
respect
paid
by
the
EC
towards
to
the
functions
of
a
judiciary
in
a
democratic
country.
15
Lim
Hong
Hai,
2005.
‘Making
the
System
Work:
The
Election
Commission’.
In
Elections
and
Democracy
(Penerbit
Universiti
Kebangsaan
Malaysia)
page
250.
16
Lim
2005:256.

7. On
the
other
hand,
the
Elections
Act
1958
was
amended
to
increase
the
maximum
compensation
payable
for
an
objection
to
the
registration
of
another
if
it
was
found
to
be
made
without
reasonable
cause
from
two
hundred
ringgit
to
one
hundred
ringgit.
Moreover,
the
same
Act
was
amended
to
raise
the
deposit
payable
from
five
thousand
ringgit
to
twenty
thousand
ringgit.
The
Elections
Offences
Act
1954
was
also
amended
to
increase
the
ceiling
of
electoral
spending
from
thirty
thousand
to
one
hundred
thousand
ringgit
for
a
state
seat,
and
from
fifty
thousand
to
a
maximum
of
two
hundred
thousand
for
a
Parliamentary
seat.17
The
implications
of
these
amendments
is
not
limited
to
deterring
smaller,
less
funded
parties
from
participating
in
elections.
It
also
increases
the
risk
of
money
politics
that
will
only
benefit
the
better-­‐funded
political
parties
linked
to
the
BN
government.
The
reduction
of
participatory
politics
is
another
sign
of
the
deterioration
of
democracy
in
Malaysia.
Not
limited
to
questionable
amendments
of
legislations,
the
EC
was
also
criticised
for
its
use
of
the
infamous
not-­‐so-­‐indelible
ink
in
the
2013
GE.
This
event
is
farcical
to
say
the
least,
especially
in
how
it
played
out
and
the
subsequent
statements
issued
by
the
EC
following
the
criticisms.
A
month
before
the
GE,
on
11th
April
2013,
Bernama
reported
that
the
EC
chief,
Tan
Sri
Abdul
Aziz
Yusof
had
commented
that
the
National
Fatwa
Council
had
given
the
green
light
for
the
use
of
indelible
ink
in
the
upcoming
elections.
Additionally,
the
Health
Ministry
and
Chemistry
Department
had
declared
the
use
of
the
ink
to
be
safe.
However,
17
Lim
2005:256-­‐257.

8. when
the
Election
Day
came,
the
voters
were
dismayed
that
the
indelible
ink
could
be
easily
washed
off
with
soap,
toothpaste,
and
even
in
some
cases,
grass.18
Responding
to
this
criticism,
the
EC
stated
that
the
indelible
ink
that
was
used
had
a
different
strength
compared
to
those
used
in
other
countries
owing
to
the
fact
that
it
had
to
comply
with
both
halal
and
health
regulations.
Additionally,
the
EC
chairman
told
reporters
that
an
official
letter
from
the
Ministry
of
Health
had
stated
that
the
content
of
silver
nitrate
within
the
ink
must
not
exceed
1%.
This
is
because
a
higher
content
of
silver
nitrate
could
cause
internal
organ
failure.19
This
official
account
clearly
contradicts
the
earlier
statements
issued
by
the
EC
which
had
stated
that
the
National
Fatwa
Council
had
approved
of
its
halal
status.
On
the
other
hand,
the
claim
of
a
higher
silver
nitrate
content
is
dangerous
is
also
questionable
at
best
as
the
United
Nations
Development
Program
had
stated
that
the
best
practice
is
to
use
a
“form
of
indelible
ink
based
on
a
silver
nitrate
solution
of
5-­‐25%”.20
This
event
is
an
obvious
breach
of
trust
and
faith
from
the
rakyat
with
the
EC,
and
also
violates
the
spirit
of
Article
114
of
the
Federal
Constitution
that
made
the
EC
responsible
for
carrying
out
elections
in
the
full
spirit
of
democracy
without
fear
or
favor.21
The
Malaysian
legislations
18
Kasthuriraani
Patto,
2013.
“Malaysians
let
down
by
‘indelible’
ink
scandal”.
(accessed
10
December
2014)
<http://anilnetto.com/malaysian-­‐politics/malaysian-­‐elections/the-­‐indelible-­‐
ink-­‐scandal/>
19
Zurairi
AR,
2013.
“Halal
status
affected
indelible
ink’s
strength,
says
EC”,
The
Malaysian
Insider,
5
May
2013.
20
http://unpcdc.org/media/222605/undp-­‐procurement-­‐guide-­‐post-­‐conflict-­‐elections_2005.pdf
(accessed
12
December
2014)
21
Kasthuriraani
Patto,
2013.
“Malaysians
let
down
by
‘indelible’
ink
scandal”.
(accessed
10
December
2014)
<http://anilnetto.com/malaysian-­‐politics/malaysian-­‐elections/the-­‐indelible-­‐
ink-­‐scandal/>

9. In
a
democracy,
a
country
subscribes
to
the
rule
of
law.
One
of
the
canons
of
the
rule
of
law
is
that
only
one
set
of
laws
should
apply
to
its
citizens,
and
the
presence
of
the
Sharia
court
and
Sharia
laws
are
in
a
clear
violation
of
this.
Moreover,
unelected
religious
scholars
who
are
making
binding
fatwas
on
the
Muslim
population
circumvent
the
democratic
law
making
process.
Additionally,
it
is
also
an
offence
to
question
the
validity
of
these
oftentimes-­‐absurd
fatwas.22
Additionally,
over
the
years
there
has
been
an
increase
in
the
erosion
of
women’s
rights
when
it
concerns
Sharia
law.
For
example
in
Kedah,
the
old
Section
17(3)(i)
of
the
Kedah
Islamic
Family
Law
1984
requires
a
man
to
prove
that
the
requested
polygamy
marriage
is
not
only
necessary,
but
just.
Section
13(3)(ii)(b)
of
the
same
Act
then
requires
“equal
treatment
to
all
wives”
as
a
criterion
before
allowing
polygamy.
Despite
this
paper
citing
the
relevant
Kedah
state
Sharia
legislation,
similar
ones
around
found
in
every
other
state
in
Malaysia
with
the
exception
of
Kelantan.
The
then
strict
nature
of
polygamy
is
evidenced
in
Ruzaini
bin
Hassan’s
application
for
polygamy
in
the
High
Court
of
Negeri
Sembilan
in
2001.
Here,
the
court
dismissed
his
application
on
financial
affordability
grounds.23
However,
this
position
was
changed
when
the
aforementioned
state
Sharia
laws
were
replaced
at
the
turn
of
the
millennium.
The
new
Sharia
family
law
statutes
codify
men’s
entitlements
at
the
expense
of
women’s
rights.
For
example,
Selangor’s
Islamic
Family
Law
2003
made
applications
for
polygamy
more
lenient.
This
was
achieved
through
removing
the
requirement
to
satisfy
both
necessity,
and
just
elements
and
instead
making
it
sufficient
to
satisfy
either
one.
22
For
example,
the
fatwa
banning
yoga
over
fears
that
it
might
corrupt
Muslims.
23
Maznah
Mohamad,
2014.
‘Women,
Family
and
Syariah
in
Malaysia’.
In
Misplaced
Democracy:
Malaysian
Politics
and
People
(SIRD
Publishing)
page
182.

10. Not
only
does
the
new
Sharia
law
infringe
upon
women’s
civil
rights,
the
Sharia
courts
also
oftentimes
demonstrated
blatant
double
standards
when
coming
to
its
decisions.
This
can
be
evidenced
by
analysis
the
standard
of
proof
required
in
the
Hasnah
v
Yusoff,
and
Halijah
binti
Abu
Talib
v
Mohd
Nadzir
bin
Salleh
case.
In
the
former,
the
mere
act
of
defiance
in
following
the
husband’s
orders
was
deemed
to
be
sufficient
grounds
for
divorce.
Meanwhile
in
the
latter,
the
wife
had
to
bring
five
witnesses
to
evidence
the
neglect
and
abusive
behavior
of
the
husband
before
a
consideration
for
divorce
could
be
made.24
When
comparing
the
pre-­‐2000
Sharia
law
with
the
current
one,
it
is
evident
that
there
has
not
been
a
deepening
of
democracy
when
it
concerns
Sharia
law.
Instead,
there
are
reasonable
concerns
that
the
state
of
democracy
in
Malaysia
is
on
a
decline
especially
when
considered
in
light
of
the
reaction
to
the
“I
Want
To
Touch
A
Dog”
fiasco
of
this
year25.
Unfortunately,
undemocratic
legislations
is
not
exclusive
to
Sharia
law
in
Malaysia,
as
there
are
other
legislations
that
are
often
used
to
extend
the
interests
of
the
ruling
government.
The
most
infamous
of
which
is
arguably
the
draconian
Internal
Security
Act
(ISA).
Before
the
Najib
government
ultimately
replaced
it,
the
ISA
allowed
for
detention
without
trial.
This
infamous
draconian
law
has
been
used
on
almost
all
of
the
Opposition
leaders
including,
Anwar
Ibrahim,
Karpal
Singh,
and
Lim
Guan
Eng.
While
the
new
Security
Offences
(Special
Measures)
Act
2012
(SOSMA)
that
replaces
the
ISA
is
no
doubt
an
improvement,
it
is
by
no
means
a
guarantee
of
Malaysians’
basic
rights
will
be
protected.
This
is
the
case
despite
the
Attorney
General’s
claims
that
24
Mohamad
2014:186.
25
Thomas
Fuller,
2014.
“Want
To
Touch
A
Dog?
In
Malaysia
It’s
a
Delicate
Subject”,
New
York
Times,
26
October
2014.

11. Subsection
4(3)
of
SOSMA
provides
that
no
person
is
to
be
arrested
under
the
Act
solely
for
his
political
belief
or
political
identity. The
Malaysian
Bar
Council
had
pointed
out
that
the
extension
of
the
detention
period
should
not
be
in
the
purview
of
a
police
officer
of
or
above
the
rank
of
Superintendent,
but
instead,
subjected
to
judicial
oversight.
Additionally,
Lim
Chee
Wee,
the
Bar
Council
President
has
made
known
his
reservations
about
the
definition
of
a
security
offence
as
being
too
wide.26
The
fear
of
abusing
the
broad
definition
of
‘security
offence’
is
not
unfounded
–
the
ISA
had
also
stated
in
its
preamble
that
it
is
only
meant
to
combat
“a
substantial
body
of
persons”
intent
on
overthrowing
the
government
by
unlawful
means.27
On
the
other
hand,
the
Peaceful
Assembly
Bill
replaced
the
Police
Act
1967
which
had
been
used
to
arrest
more
than
1600
protestors
during
the
Bersih
2.0
rally.
Similar
to
SOSMA,
Najib’s
reforms
fall
short
of
granting
Malaysians
a
guarantee
of
their
fundamental
liberties.
This
is
attributed
to
the
Bill
granting
wide
powers
to
authorities
to
classify
behaviours
as
illegal
or
dangerous.28
For
example,
the
Bill
allows
the
police
to
impose
restrictions
relating
to
“the
manner
of
the
assembly”
and
“the
conduct
of
participants
during
the
assembly”.
Additionally,
there
are
no
reasonableness
or
proportionality
requirements,
allowing
the
police
to
effectively
control
the
topic
of
the
protest.
The
deputy
director
of
Human
Rights
Watch’s
Asia
Division,
Phil
Roberson,
described
the
Bill
as
a
‘cruel
joke’29
on
Malaysian
civil
society.30
26
http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/legal/general_news/the_heat_is_on_sosma.html
(accessed
13
December
2014)
27
Ding
Jo-­‐Ann
and
Jacqueline
Ann
Surin,
2011.
‘Freedom
of
Expression
in
Malaysia
2011.’
(Centre
for
Independent
Journalism)
page
18.
28
Ibid:20.
29
Phil
Robertson,
2011.
“Political
Bait
and
Switch
Trumps
Rights
Reform
in
Malaysia”.
Human
Rights
Watch,
(accessed
13th
December
2014)

12.
Lastly,
the
Sedition
Act
1948,
a
draconian
law
that
allows
the
police
to
investigate
people
doing
anything
that
has
a
“seditious
tendency”.
The
problem
with
this
legislation
that
leads
to
abuse
is
the
absurdly
broad
definition
of
the
words
“seditious
tendencies”.
In
2014
alone,
N.
Surendran,
Teresa
Kok,
Nizar
Jamaluddin,
Khalid
Samad,
RSN
Rayer,
and
Rafizi
Ramli,
all
opposition
politicians
had
been
charged
under
the
Sedition
Act.
More
worrisome,
Azmi
Sharom,
a
University
of
Malaya
law
professor,
Susan
Loone,
a
Malaysiakini
journalist
had
also
been
charged.31
This
demonstrates
the
Najib
government’s
lack
of
deference
to
dissenting
voices,
instead,
opting
to
muzzle
them
through
intimidation.
This
is
despite
Najib’s
promise
to
repeal
the
Sedition
Act
and
replacing
it
with
the
National
Harmony
Bill.
Political
commentators’
reservations
on
Najib’s
honesty
in
seeing
this
through
were
subsequently
substantiated
when
Najib
declared
that
the
Sedition
Act
would
remain
during
the
2014
UMNO
General
Assembly
at
Putra
World
Trade
Centre.32
The
circumvention
of
the
democratic
law
making
process
through
binding
fatwas
and
also
the
discriminatory
Sharia
courts
infringes
upon
the
civil
liberties
guaranteed
in
a
democratic
country.
In
a
wider
context,
the
continued
abuse
of
the
aforementioned
legislations
demonstrates
that
although
the
Opposition
has
been
making
steady
gains
in
the
GE,
the
state
of
Malaysian
democracy
in
respect
to
civil
liberties
leaves
much
to
be
wanted
for.
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/16/political-­‐bait-­‐and-­‐switch-­‐trumps-­‐rights-­‐reform-­‐
malaysia>
30
Ding
and
Surin
2011:20.
31
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/14/malaysia-­‐sedition-­‐act-­‐wielded-­‐silence-­‐opposition
(accessed
13th
December
2014)
32
Anisah
Shukry
and
Eileen
Ng,
2014.
“Sedition
Act
stays,
says
Najib”,
The
Malaysian
Insider,
27
November
2014.

13. The
Malaysian
judiciary
An
impartial
judiciary
is
one
of
the
hallmarks
of
a
democratic
country.
This
is
because
only
then
can
judges
provide
fair
and
impartial
justice.
The
need
for
the
judiciary
to
be
independent
from
the
government
is
due
to
its
responsibility
to
protect
citizens
against
unlawful
acts
of
government.33
Sadly,
the
situation
concerning
the
Malaysian
judiciary
is
far
from
this
idealistic
description.
The
V.
K.
Lingam
tapes
evidence
this
claim.
The
aforementioned
tapes
were
a
short,
but
comprehensive
video
showing
V.
K.
Lingam,
a
prominent
lawyer
in
KL,
boasting
on
the
telephone
about
how
he
brokered
the
appointment
of
judges.34
This
lead
to
approximately
1200
lawyers,
Opposition
politicians,
and
also
civil
society
actors
to
hand
a
memorandum
to
the
Prime
Minister
in
what
was
later
billed
the
“Walk
for
Justice”.
The
memorandum
demanded
that
a
Royal
Commission
of
Inquiry
(RCI)
be
set
up
to
investigate
the
authenticity
of
the
video
and
also
the
state
of
the
judiciary.35
Although
today
the
judiciary
is
generally
regarded
to
be
subservient
to
the
ruling
government,
there
was
a
spate
of
cases
in
the
late
1980s
where
judges
had
ruled
against
the
Government’s
interests.
These
decisions
angered
Mahathir,
the
then
Prime
Minister
and
lead
to
verbal
assaults
on
the
Judiciary
and
also
the
amendment
of
Article
121
of
the
Federal
Constitution.
The
latter
is
important
because
it
took
away
the
power
of
the
judiciary
to
determine
its
own
jurisdiction,
and
instead
placed
it
in
the
hands
of
the
legislature.36
33
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-­‐the-­‐judiciary/the-­‐judiciary-­‐the-­‐government-­‐and-­‐the-­‐
constitution/jud-­‐acc-­‐ind/independence/
(accessed
14th
December
2014)
34
Azmi
Sharom,
2008.
‘We
Need
To
Correct,
Correct,
Correct
The
Judiciary’.
In
March
8
The
Day
Malaysia
Woke
Up
(Marshall
Cavendish
Editions)
page
228.
35
Ibid:229.
36
Ibid:230.

14. Following
this,
the
then
Lord
President,
Salleh
Abas
had
wrote
a
letter
to
the
King
requesting
that
His
Majesty
to
stop
Mahathir’s
accusations
and
comments
against
the
judiciary.
37
Mahathir
argued
that
the
act
amounted
to
misconduct,
and
subsequently
created
a
special
tribunal
on
the
matter.
The
composition
of
the
tribunal
itself
was
questionable
as
it
was
headed
by
the
acting
Lord
President
Hamid
Omar,
the
man
who
would
become
lord
president
if
Salleh
Abas
were
to
be
found
guilty.
The
blatant
conflict
of
interests
that
would
impinge
on
Salleh
Abas’
rights
to
a
fair
hearing
obviously
did
not
matter
to
Mahathir
then.38
Salleh
Abas
had
sought
to
challenge
the
constitutional
propriety
of
this
tribunal
in
the
High
Court,
and
subsequently
in
the
Federal
Court.
When
the
Federal
Court
had
granted
the
stay
requested,
the
acting
lord
president
sacked
George
Seah
and
Wan
Suleimen,
two
of
the
senior
judges
who
heard
the
appeal
in
the
Federal
Court.39
After
the
Salleh
Abas’
appeal
was
disposed
of,
he
was
subsequently
sacked.
This
lead
to
what
Azmi
Sharom
describes
as
a
“slide
into
the
state
of
ignominy
for
the
Malaysian
judiciary”.
This
is
best
evidenced
by
the
High
Court
judge,
Muhammad
Kamil
Awang’s
final
case
before
retirement
on
the
legality
of
a
by-­‐election
where
he
had
stated
in
open
court
that
he
had
been
instructed
to
rule
in
favour
of
the
government.40
Although
Abdullah
Badawi
had
issued
an
apology
and
offered
ex
gratia
payments
to
the
unfairly
dismissed
senior
judges,
the
RCI’s
recommendations
to
try
those
who
were
37
Ibid:231.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid.

15. linked
to
the
V.
K.
Lingam
tapes
were
not
taken
up.
41This
demonstrates
the
continued
impunity
to
prosecution
enjoyed
by
the
ruling
elite
where
even
the
administration
of
justice
is
subservient
to
their
private
interests.
Another
issue
that
had
plagued
the
Malaysian
judiciary
is
the
inconsistency
of
judges
recusing
themselves
for
perceived
or
actual
bias.
In
PP
v
Mohamed
Ezam
Mohd
Nor,
the
judge
had
recused
himself
on
grounds
that
His
Lordship’s
brother
was
the
head
of
the
prosecution
service
and
had
signed
the
charge
against
the
accused.
This
demonstrates
that
His
Lordship
had
taken
seriously
public
perception
for
perceived
bias.42
Contradictingly
in
Bumicrystal
Technology
v
Rowstead
Systems
Sdn
Bhd,
the
judge
had
refused
to
recuse
himself
although
the
PAS-­‐led
government
owned
one
of
the
parties
in
the
case
and
His
Lordship
had
previously
been
a
legal
adviser
for
UMNO.43
The
lack
of
judicial
certainty
will
undoubtedly
erode
the
administration
of
justice
and
to
a
greater
extent
the
civil
liberties
guaranteed
in
a
democracy.
Moreover,
there
has
also
been
outcry
over
the
lack
of
written
judgments
in
Federal
Court
cases
concerning
the
Perak
Crisis.
Edmund
Bon,
a
prominent
Malaysian
human
rights
lawyer
had
stated
that;
“written
judgments
are
important
as
matters
concerning
public
interest
and
constitutional
importance
must
be
sufficiently
explained
and
reasoned”.44
41
Ibid:232-­‐233.
42
Edmund
Bon,
2010.
‘Bias,
Public
Perception
and
Recusal:
Judicial
Consistency
At
Last?’.
In
Perak:
A
State
of
Crisis
(LoyarBurok
Publications)
page
7.
43
Ibid:8.
44
Edmund
Bon,
2010.
‘Tell
Us
Why,
Please?’.
In
Perak,
A
State
of
Crisis
(LoyarBurok
Publications)
pages
39-­‐40.

16. The
absence
of
well-­‐reasoned
legal
judgments
in
important
public
interest
cases
only
goes
to
further
reduce
the
Malaysian
public’s
confidence
that
the
judiciary
is
free
from
political
interference.
The
Malaysian
media
No
paper
on
Malaysian
democracy
is
complete
without
an
analysis
of
the
Malaysian
media.
This
is
because
“deep-­‐rooted
press
freedom
is
not
just
important
but
essential
to
a
functioning
free
democratic
society”.
The
justification
of
this
is
that
without
a
free
media,
the
public
will
not
be
fully
able
to
make
a
learned
choice
in
elections
thus
degrading
the
quality
of
democracy.45
In
Jason
Abott’s
Electoral
Authoritarianism,
he
sought
to
code
political
bias
in
two
Malay,
two
Chinese-­‐language,
and
two
English
language
newspapers
during
two
separate
month-­‐long
periods.
The
first
period
coincides
with
the
12th
GE
in
2008,
and
the
second
which
acts
as
a
control,
in
the
same
date
period
in
2006,
representing
a
midpoint
in
the
Malaysian
electoral
cycle.46
The
Malay
newspapers
chosen
for
his
study
was
Berita
Harian,
which
was
founded
on
the
same
day
Malaya
gained
its
independence
in
1957.
Following
numerous
takeovers,
Media
Prima
now
owns
it.
Although
throughout
its
existence
it
was
in
private
hands,
there
has
always
been
a
close
link
to
UMNO
through
close
personal
connections
and
share
ownership.47
45
https://www.journalism.co.uk/news-­‐commentary/-­‐complex-­‐links-­‐between-­‐free-­‐press-­‐and-­‐
functioning-­‐democracy-­‐/s6/a553464/
(accessed
14th
December
2014)
46
Jason
Abbott,
2011.
‘Electoral
Authoritarianism
and
the
Print
Media
in
Malaysia:
Measuring
Political
Bias
and
Analyzing
Its
Cause’.
In
Asian
Affairs:
An
American
Review
38:3.
47
Ibid:5.

17. On
the
other
hand,
in
the
1960s
Utusan
Malaysia
had
been
a
fair
newspaper.
Initial
attempts
by
UMNO
to
influence
editorial
policy
was
met
with
a
strike
by
its
editor,
Said
Zahari.
When
UMNO
took
over
Utusan
Malaysia,
Zahari
argued
that
it
represented
“the
death
of
the
press”.
True
enough
to
his
predictions,
Utusan
Malaysia
today
is
viewed
as
one
of
the
most
pro-­‐government
papers
in
circulation.48
Measuring
opposition
bias
from
the
2006
data
sets
show
that
the
opposition
barely
received
any
column
inches
in
either
newspapers.
For
example,
out
of
the
472
items
evaluated
in
Utusan
Malaysia
for
2006,
only
10
contained
an
opposition
bias.
The
Berita
Harian
finding
closely
mirrors
this.
In
contrast,
the
2008
analysis
shows
a
large
spike
in
the
number
of
articles
with
an
opposition
bias.
Out
of
the
515
items
coded
in
Utusan
Malaysia,
194
had
an
opposition
bias.
On
the
other
hand,
265
of
the
380
items
coded
in
Berita
Harian
carried
an
opposition
bias.49
This
shows
the
effective
strategy
employed
by
the
UMNO
controlled
media,
to
not
only
push
for
biased
articles
to
be
publish,
but
also
to
severely
limit
any
sort
of
political
coverage
for
the
opposition
during
non-­‐election
times.
Not
limited
to
that,
the
Printing
Presses
and
Publications
Act
(PPPA)
1984
also
restricts
the
freedom
of
the
press.
Section
3
of
the
Act
requires
all
publications
to
apply
for
an
annual
permit
from
the
Home
Ministry
–
which
can
be
refused,
revoked,
or
suspended
at
the
Home
Minister’s
discretion
without
the
option
of
a
judicial
review.
Moreover,
Section
7
allows
the
government
to
ban
the
publication,
circulation,
or
import
of
any
books
that
it
deems
to
be
either
prejudicial
to
public
order,
or
morality,
or
security.50
48
Ibid:17.
49
Ibid:8.
50
Ibid:15.

18. The
unfettered
nature
of
powers
awarded
to
the
Home
Minister
by
the
PPPA
is
worrisome
as
it
leaves
it
open
to
abuse.
This
is
seen
when
PAS
was
forced
to
restrict
the
publication
of
its
Harakah
newspaper
from
biweekly
to
bimonthly.
Additionally,
Sin
Chew
Daily
and
The
Star
had
their
licenses
revoked
during
the
racial
tensions
of
1987.51
However,
it
is
also
important
to
note
that
Pakatan
Rakyat
does
not
have
clean
hands
when
it
comes
to
press
freedom
either.
The
Selangor
Times
demonstrates
this
due
to
the
presence
of
the
Selangor
Mentri
Besar’s
political
secretary
and
his
press
secretary
as
advisors
who
vet
the
paper
before
it
goes
to
print.
Although
admittedly
there
has
been
no
evidence
of
political
interference,
it
is
still
potentially
problematic
from
the
point
of
view
of
press
freedom52.
This
arguably
demonstrates
that
Pakatan
understands
the
needs
for
the
freedom
of
the
press
greater
than
the
BN
coalition.
It
is
submitted
that
without
a
truly
free
press,
a
democratic
Malaysia
is
only
a
pipedream.
A
healthy
democracy
requires
the
freedom
of
speech,
and
any
sort
of
restrictions
is
severely
frowned
upon.
Conclusion
Although
in
the
12th
and
13th
GE
the
Pakatan
Rakyat
had
been
steadily
increasing
its
representation
in
both
State
and
Parliamentary
seats
–
one
could
argue
that
it
is
not
reflective
of
a
wider
trend
of
the
democratisation
of
Malaysia.
Prime
Minister
Najib’s
backtracking
on
his
previous
promise
to
democratise
Malaysia
through
the
replacement
of
the
Sedition
Act
demonstrates
this
perfectly.
While
Najib
has
to
be
credited
to
some
extend
for
the
replacement
of
the
Police
Act
and
the
ISA,
his
half-­‐hearted
attempts
at
democratic
reform
leaves
much
to
be
desired
for.
51
Ibid.
52
Ding
and
Surin
2011:52.

19. The
broad
unreasonable
provisions
found
within
both
the
Peaceful
Assembly
Bill
and
SOSMA
do
not
contain
the
necessary
safeguards
for
democratic
civil
liberties.
On
the
other
hand,
the
farcical
nature
of
the
EC
with
reference
to
the
use
of
indelible
ink
also
places
another
dark
spot
on
the
state
of
democracy
in
Malaysia.
Lastly,
the
continued
use
of
the
media
as
a
tool
for
government
propaganda,
while
muzzling
legitimate
dissent
demonstrates
the
lack
of
deference
towards
the
freedom
of
speech
necessary
for
a
healthy
democracy.

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