The document summarizes the historical parallels between AI self-regulation efforts in the 2020s and internet self-regulation in the late 1990s. Many of the same large tech companies, like IBM, Apple, Amazon, and Microsoft, are now promoting AI self-regulation through initiatives like the Partnership on AI, as they did for the internet. However, internet self-regulation eventually gave way to co-regulation by the EU in the 2000s due to concerns over fundamental rights and lack of oversight. The document argues the same outcome may occur for AI if self-regulation fails to properly address issues like bias, privacy and transparency. International organizations like the UN, OECD and Council of Europe are also increasingly involved in discussions around
Global Governance of Generative AI: The Right Way ForwardLilian Edwards
AI regulation has been a hot topic since the rise of machine learning (ML) in the “big data” era, but generative AI or “foundation models” tools like ChatGPT, DALL-E 2(now 3) and CoPilot, ike ML before them, may create serious societal risks, including embedding and outputting bias; generating fake news, illegal or harmful content and inadvertent “hallucinations”; infringing existing laws relating eg to copyright and privacy; as well as environmental, competition and workplace concerns.
Many nations are now considering regulation to address these worries, and can draw on a number of basic and hybrid models of governance. This paper canvasses models of mandatory comprehensive legislation (where the EU AI Act hopes to place itself as a gold standard model); vertical mandatory legislation (where China has quietly taken a lead); adapting existing law (see the many copyright lawsuits underway); and voluntary “soft law” such as codes of ethics, “blueprints”, or industry guidelines. Both the domestic and international regulatory scenes for AI are also increasingly politicised as the rise of "AI safety" hype shows. Against this backdrop what choices should smaller countries such as the UK and Australia make? will international harmonisation lead to a race to the top as with the GDPR, or the bottom - rule by tech for tech?
Dr Alisdair Ritchie | Research: The Answer to the Problem of IoT SecurityPro Mrkt
Dr Alisdair Ritchie from the WMG, University of Warwick is taking us through his research on IoT security at the Midlands Cyber Security Expo 2019 #midscybersecurity19
Marsden CELPU 2021 platform law co-regulationChris Marsden
12 November 2021 20th Annual International Conference, Center for Law & Public Utilities, School of Law, Seoul National University: The Wave of Digital Economy and Exploration of the Direction of Online Platform Regulation
Professor Chris Marsden, Sussex Law @SussCIGR
Discussion: Dr Eun-Jung Kwon (KISDI)
Global Governance of Generative AI: The Right Way ForwardLilian Edwards
AI regulation has been a hot topic since the rise of machine learning (ML) in the “big data” era, but generative AI or “foundation models” tools like ChatGPT, DALL-E 2(now 3) and CoPilot, ike ML before them, may create serious societal risks, including embedding and outputting bias; generating fake news, illegal or harmful content and inadvertent “hallucinations”; infringing existing laws relating eg to copyright and privacy; as well as environmental, competition and workplace concerns.
Many nations are now considering regulation to address these worries, and can draw on a number of basic and hybrid models of governance. This paper canvasses models of mandatory comprehensive legislation (where the EU AI Act hopes to place itself as a gold standard model); vertical mandatory legislation (where China has quietly taken a lead); adapting existing law (see the many copyright lawsuits underway); and voluntary “soft law” such as codes of ethics, “blueprints”, or industry guidelines. Both the domestic and international regulatory scenes for AI are also increasingly politicised as the rise of "AI safety" hype shows. Against this backdrop what choices should smaller countries such as the UK and Australia make? will international harmonisation lead to a race to the top as with the GDPR, or the bottom - rule by tech for tech?
Dr Alisdair Ritchie | Research: The Answer to the Problem of IoT SecurityPro Mrkt
Dr Alisdair Ritchie from the WMG, University of Warwick is taking us through his research on IoT security at the Midlands Cyber Security Expo 2019 #midscybersecurity19
Marsden CELPU 2021 platform law co-regulationChris Marsden
12 November 2021 20th Annual International Conference, Center for Law & Public Utilities, School of Law, Seoul National University: The Wave of Digital Economy and Exploration of the Direction of Online Platform Regulation
Professor Chris Marsden, Sussex Law @SussCIGR
Discussion: Dr Eun-Jung Kwon (KISDI)
All The Things: Security, Privacy & Safety in a World of Connected DevicesJohn D. Johnson
Much of our technology today is connected to the Internet and communicating information about us, our homes and businesses, back to manufacturers in order to give us something of value in return. It is estimated that by 2025, there may be as many as 80 billion Internet of Things (IoT) devices connected to the Internet. As IoT becomes a normal part of our everyday lives, at home, on the road, and at the office, privacy, security and safety become paramount.
This presentation will set the stage: What is IoT? How is it used today? How will it be used in the future? IoT provides both opportunities and risk to society, and IoT devices need to be secured as this world of connected devices become critical to how society functions.
IT law : the middle kingdom between east and WestLilian Edwards
Privacy as a value is often as conflicting with and less important than other major societal goals such as nation state secureity and business profits. China as a socialist state emerging a a major digital economuic force may fall prey to both these assumptions. However the recent history in the West shows that over zealous national secueity infringing citizen privacy, as revealed in the recent Snowden PRISM/TEMPORA etc scandals, may backlash against business profits as well as reducing citizen trust in security.China can learn from these lessons as it expands its own privacy law especially in the IT/telecoms area.
They (EU) quickly realized that Europe was at a competitive disadvantage. However, the push for EU digital sovereignty was not based only on these technological and business shortcomings. It also drew on 4 (four) other strands of thinking in the European policy arena.
the 2013 revelations by Edward Snowden about bulk electronic surveillance—including of Europeans—by the US National Security Agency (NSA) led to a harsh reaction in many countries, especially Germany. More recently, the US Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, which requires companies within US jurisdiction to provide federal law enforcement with access to foreign-located personal data, has reinforced those concerns.
this perception of European weakness at the hands of the NSA and Department of Justice coincided with a growing debate in Europe over the need for “strategic autonomy” in the security and defence sphere. In terms of security and defence, strengthening technological autonomy is now essential” for Europe
the COVID-19 pandemic and the explosion of online education and work brought the importance of digital policy to the fore. It also demonstrated the perils of supply-chain vulnerabilities, including dependence on any other country for essential goods or services, including vital technologies or digital services.
the EU has finally woken up to the dangers inherent in relying on companies and technologies from countries whose motives may be more geopolitical than commercial.
But with the release and gradual adoption of key legislative proposals, as well as new national rules in some member states, a pattern has emerged: resources and regulations are aimed at supporting the “Europeanization” of key technologies and assets (including data). In a growing set of circumstances, non-EU companies, wherever they operate, must prove their ability to meet EU standards, with little distinction made between companies based in allied countries—including the United States—and those based in authoritarian states such as China. The tendency toward Europeanization has been accelerated by the search for greater resiliency in digital infrastructures and technologies, especially in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
EU policymakers see it as intended to protect the interests of individuals and companies in the EU. But in seeking to promote a “sovereign” ability to safeguard those citizens and manage the European digital economy, the EU and its member states seem willing to use measures that veer toward discrimination and protectionism. At the very least, the EU’s single-market power has the ability to shape standard setting around the world, and the EU has demonstrated a willingness to force others to adopt EU standards or forgo access to its market. In some cases, EU or member-state rules disqualify non-EU companies from a part of that market.
Imposes significant constraints on the competitive behaviour of the largest platforms, designat
The presentation touches upon issues of strategic futures, digital twins, blockchain and the development of skills in the context of investment policy.
The Internet and Global Governance Principles and Norms MoseStaton39
The Internet and Global Governance: Principles and Norms for a New Regime
Author(s): Milton Mueller, John Mathiason and Hans Klein
Source: Global Governance, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April–June 2007), pp. 237-254
Published by: Brill
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/27800656
Accessed: 15-11-2018 01:42 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
Brill is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Global Governance
This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Thu, 15 Nov 2018 01:42:56 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Global Governance 13 (2007), 237-254
The Internet and Global Governance:
Principles and Norms
for a New Regime
<W -
Milton Mueller, John Mathiason,
and Hans Klein
Since the mid-1990s, efforts have been under way to construct an inter
national regime for global Internet governance. Beginning with the for
mation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers,
efforts at regime construction were a main focus of the 2001-2005 UN
World Summit on the Information Society. However, little progress was
made toward an international agreement. This reflected policymakers' ill
advised attempt to shortcut regime construction: they attempted to define
regime rules and procedures without first defining underlying principles
and norms. This article offers example sets of principles and norms of the
type that are missing and that could provide the foundation for an Internet
governance regime. The authors conclude that a framework convention
would be the appropriate institutional mechanism for advancing regime
construction. Keywords: Internet governance, regime theory, World Sum
mit on the Information Society, ICANN, framework convention.
Since the mid-1990s, efforts have been under way to construct a global co
ordination and policymaking framework for the Internet. Such an inter
national regime for Internet governance would be, at minimum, the sole
global authority for the allocation of network addresses and domain names to
users around the world. It could do much more, however?perhaps make global
public policy on issues like unsolicited e-mail (spam), computer network secu
rity, and freedom of expression. Over the ten years of work on this regime, there
have been several loci of activity: the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and the World Summit on
the Information Society (WSIS). Despite eno ...
Can blockchain technology be the answer to IoT and AI security for Industry 4.0? Industrial Security Forum - The Secure Path of the Digital Future - Presentation at the Hannover Messe Industrie (HMI), Germany in April 2018
QUT Regulating Disinformation with AI Marsden 2024Chris Marsden
“It is the ‘AI regulation moment” intoned the Secretary General of both the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the United Nations itself, before the UN General Assembly passed a unanimous resolution on AI safety, and the G7 Hiroshima Dialogue of AI codes of conduct moved industrialised nations beyond self-regulation. Academic analysts and policymakers need to challenge a reversion to broken models, to ethics washing and to what is now being termed ‘AI washing’. I set out a critical agenda for remembering lessons from the Internet past to assert an AI co-regulatory future.
All The Things: Security, Privacy & Safety in a World of Connected DevicesJohn D. Johnson
Much of our technology today is connected to the Internet and communicating information about us, our homes and businesses, back to manufacturers in order to give us something of value in return. It is estimated that by 2025, there may be as many as 80 billion Internet of Things (IoT) devices connected to the Internet. As IoT becomes a normal part of our everyday lives, at home, on the road, and at the office, privacy, security and safety become paramount.
This presentation will set the stage: What is IoT? How is it used today? How will it be used in the future? IoT provides both opportunities and risk to society, and IoT devices need to be secured as this world of connected devices become critical to how society functions.
IT law : the middle kingdom between east and WestLilian Edwards
Privacy as a value is often as conflicting with and less important than other major societal goals such as nation state secureity and business profits. China as a socialist state emerging a a major digital economuic force may fall prey to both these assumptions. However the recent history in the West shows that over zealous national secueity infringing citizen privacy, as revealed in the recent Snowden PRISM/TEMPORA etc scandals, may backlash against business profits as well as reducing citizen trust in security.China can learn from these lessons as it expands its own privacy law especially in the IT/telecoms area.
They (EU) quickly realized that Europe was at a competitive disadvantage. However, the push for EU digital sovereignty was not based only on these technological and business shortcomings. It also drew on 4 (four) other strands of thinking in the European policy arena.
the 2013 revelations by Edward Snowden about bulk electronic surveillance—including of Europeans—by the US National Security Agency (NSA) led to a harsh reaction in many countries, especially Germany. More recently, the US Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, which requires companies within US jurisdiction to provide federal law enforcement with access to foreign-located personal data, has reinforced those concerns.
this perception of European weakness at the hands of the NSA and Department of Justice coincided with a growing debate in Europe over the need for “strategic autonomy” in the security and defence sphere. In terms of security and defence, strengthening technological autonomy is now essential” for Europe
the COVID-19 pandemic and the explosion of online education and work brought the importance of digital policy to the fore. It also demonstrated the perils of supply-chain vulnerabilities, including dependence on any other country for essential goods or services, including vital technologies or digital services.
the EU has finally woken up to the dangers inherent in relying on companies and technologies from countries whose motives may be more geopolitical than commercial.
But with the release and gradual adoption of key legislative proposals, as well as new national rules in some member states, a pattern has emerged: resources and regulations are aimed at supporting the “Europeanization” of key technologies and assets (including data). In a growing set of circumstances, non-EU companies, wherever they operate, must prove their ability to meet EU standards, with little distinction made between companies based in allied countries—including the United States—and those based in authoritarian states such as China. The tendency toward Europeanization has been accelerated by the search for greater resiliency in digital infrastructures and technologies, especially in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
EU policymakers see it as intended to protect the interests of individuals and companies in the EU. But in seeking to promote a “sovereign” ability to safeguard those citizens and manage the European digital economy, the EU and its member states seem willing to use measures that veer toward discrimination and protectionism. At the very least, the EU’s single-market power has the ability to shape standard setting around the world, and the EU has demonstrated a willingness to force others to adopt EU standards or forgo access to its market. In some cases, EU or member-state rules disqualify non-EU companies from a part of that market.
Imposes significant constraints on the competitive behaviour of the largest platforms, designat
The presentation touches upon issues of strategic futures, digital twins, blockchain and the development of skills in the context of investment policy.
The Internet and Global Governance Principles and Norms MoseStaton39
The Internet and Global Governance: Principles and Norms for a New Regime
Author(s): Milton Mueller, John Mathiason and Hans Klein
Source: Global Governance, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April–June 2007), pp. 237-254
Published by: Brill
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/27800656
Accessed: 15-11-2018 01:42 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
Brill is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Global Governance
This content downloaded from 130.65.109.155 on Thu, 15 Nov 2018 01:42:56 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Global Governance 13 (2007), 237-254
The Internet and Global Governance:
Principles and Norms
for a New Regime
<W -
Milton Mueller, John Mathiason,
and Hans Klein
Since the mid-1990s, efforts have been under way to construct an inter
national regime for global Internet governance. Beginning with the for
mation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers,
efforts at regime construction were a main focus of the 2001-2005 UN
World Summit on the Information Society. However, little progress was
made toward an international agreement. This reflected policymakers' ill
advised attempt to shortcut regime construction: they attempted to define
regime rules and procedures without first defining underlying principles
and norms. This article offers example sets of principles and norms of the
type that are missing and that could provide the foundation for an Internet
governance regime. The authors conclude that a framework convention
would be the appropriate institutional mechanism for advancing regime
construction. Keywords: Internet governance, regime theory, World Sum
mit on the Information Society, ICANN, framework convention.
Since the mid-1990s, efforts have been under way to construct a global co
ordination and policymaking framework for the Internet. Such an inter
national regime for Internet governance would be, at minimum, the sole
global authority for the allocation of network addresses and domain names to
users around the world. It could do much more, however?perhaps make global
public policy on issues like unsolicited e-mail (spam), computer network secu
rity, and freedom of expression. Over the ten years of work on this regime, there
have been several loci of activity: the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and the World Summit on
the Information Society (WSIS). Despite eno ...
Can blockchain technology be the answer to IoT and AI security for Industry 4.0? Industrial Security Forum - The Secure Path of the Digital Future - Presentation at the Hannover Messe Industrie (HMI), Germany in April 2018
QUT Regulating Disinformation with AI Marsden 2024Chris Marsden
“It is the ‘AI regulation moment” intoned the Secretary General of both the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the United Nations itself, before the UN General Assembly passed a unanimous resolution on AI safety, and the G7 Hiroshima Dialogue of AI codes of conduct moved industrialised nations beyond self-regulation. Academic analysts and policymakers need to challenge a reversion to broken models, to ethics washing and to what is now being termed ‘AI washing’. I set out a critical agenda for remembering lessons from the Internet past to assert an AI co-regulatory future.
Today, I will be presenting on the topic of
"Generative AI, responsible innovation, and the law."
Artificial Intelligence has been making rapid strides in recent years,
and its applications are becoming increasingly diverse.
Generative AI, in particular, has emerged as a promising area of innovation, the potential to create highly realistic and compelling outputs.
Oxford Internet Institute 19 Sept 2019: Disinformation – Platform, publisher ...Chris Marsden
With the move to a more digital, mobile, and platform-dominated media environment people increasingly find and access news and information via platforms like search engines and social media. These have empowered citizens in many ways and are important drivers of attention to established publishers but have also enabled the distribution of disinformation from a range of different actors. In a context where citizens are often increasingly sceptical of both platforms, publishers, and public authorities, what do we know about the scale and scope of disinformation problems and what can different actors do to counter the problems we face?
https://www.scl.org/articles/10662-interoperability-an-answer-to-regulating-ai-and-social-media-platforms
Acetabularia Information For Class 9 .docxvaibhavrinwa19
Acetabularia acetabulum is a single-celled green alga that in its vegetative state is morphologically differentiated into a basal rhizoid and an axially elongated stalk, which bears whorls of branching hairs. The single diploid nucleus resides in the rhizoid.
Palestine last event orientationfvgnh .pptxRaedMohamed3
An EFL lesson about the current events in Palestine. It is intended to be for intermediate students who wish to increase their listening skills through a short lesson in power point.
Model Attribute Check Company Auto PropertyCeline George
In Odoo, the multi-company feature allows you to manage multiple companies within a single Odoo database instance. Each company can have its own configurations while still sharing common resources such as products, customers, and suppliers.
The French Revolution, which began in 1789, was a period of radical social and political upheaval in France. It marked the decline of absolute monarchies, the rise of secular and democratic republics, and the eventual rise of Napoleon Bonaparte. This revolutionary period is crucial in understanding the transition from feudalism to modernity in Europe.
For more information, visit-www.vavaclasses.com
How to Make a Field invisible in Odoo 17Celine George
It is possible to hide or invisible some fields in odoo. Commonly using “invisible” attribute in the field definition to invisible the fields. This slide will show how to make a field invisible in odoo 17.
Introduction to AI for Nonprofits with Tapp NetworkTechSoup
Dive into the world of AI! Experts Jon Hill and Tareq Monaur will guide you through AI's role in enhancing nonprofit websites and basic marketing strategies, making it easy to understand and apply.
Welcome to TechSoup New Member Orientation and Q&A (May 2024).pdfTechSoup
In this webinar you will learn how your organization can access TechSoup's wide variety of product discount and donation programs. From hardware to software, we'll give you a tour of the tools available to help your nonprofit with productivity, collaboration, financial management, donor tracking, security, and more.
The Roman Empire A Historical Colossus.pdfkaushalkr1407
The Roman Empire, a vast and enduring power, stands as one of history's most remarkable civilizations, leaving an indelible imprint on the world. It emerged from the Roman Republic, transitioning into an imperial powerhouse under the leadership of Augustus Caesar in 27 BCE. This transformation marked the beginning of an era defined by unprecedented territorial expansion, architectural marvels, and profound cultural influence.
The empire's roots lie in the city of Rome, founded, according to legend, by Romulus in 753 BCE. Over centuries, Rome evolved from a small settlement to a formidable republic, characterized by a complex political system with elected officials and checks on power. However, internal strife, class conflicts, and military ambitions paved the way for the end of the Republic. Julius Caesar’s dictatorship and subsequent assassination in 44 BCE created a power vacuum, leading to a civil war. Octavian, later Augustus, emerged victorious, heralding the Roman Empire’s birth.
Under Augustus, the empire experienced the Pax Romana, a 200-year period of relative peace and stability. Augustus reformed the military, established efficient administrative systems, and initiated grand construction projects. The empire's borders expanded, encompassing territories from Britain to Egypt and from Spain to the Euphrates. Roman legions, renowned for their discipline and engineering prowess, secured and maintained these vast territories, building roads, fortifications, and cities that facilitated control and integration.
The Roman Empire’s society was hierarchical, with a rigid class system. At the top were the patricians, wealthy elites who held significant political power. Below them were the plebeians, free citizens with limited political influence, and the vast numbers of slaves who formed the backbone of the economy. The family unit was central, governed by the paterfamilias, the male head who held absolute authority.
Culturally, the Romans were eclectic, absorbing and adapting elements from the civilizations they encountered, particularly the Greeks. Roman art, literature, and philosophy reflected this synthesis, creating a rich cultural tapestry. Latin, the Roman language, became the lingua franca of the Western world, influencing numerous modern languages.
Roman architecture and engineering achievements were monumental. They perfected the arch, vault, and dome, constructing enduring structures like the Colosseum, Pantheon, and aqueducts. These engineering marvels not only showcased Roman ingenuity but also served practical purposes, from public entertainment to water supply.
A Strategic Approach: GenAI in EducationPeter Windle
Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies such as Generative AI, Image Generators and Large Language Models have had a dramatic impact on teaching, learning and assessment over the past 18 months. The most immediate threat AI posed was to Academic Integrity with Higher Education Institutes (HEIs) focusing their efforts on combating the use of GenAI in assessment. Guidelines were developed for staff and students, policies put in place too. Innovative educators have forged paths in the use of Generative AI for teaching, learning and assessments leading to pockets of transformation springing up across HEIs, often with little or no top-down guidance, support or direction.
This Gasta posits a strategic approach to integrating AI into HEIs to prepare staff, students and the curriculum for an evolving world and workplace. We will highlight the advantages of working with these technologies beyond the realm of teaching, learning and assessment by considering prompt engineering skills, industry impact, curriculum changes, and the need for staff upskilling. In contrast, not engaging strategically with Generative AI poses risks, including falling behind peers, missed opportunities and failing to ensure our graduates remain employable. The rapid evolution of AI technologies necessitates a proactive and strategic approach if we are to remain relevant.
2024.06.01 Introducing a competency framework for languag learning materials ...Sandy Millin
http://sandymillin.wordpress.com/iateflwebinar2024
Published classroom materials form the basis of syllabuses, drive teacher professional development, and have a potentially huge influence on learners, teachers and education systems. All teachers also create their own materials, whether a few sentences on a blackboard, a highly-structured fully-realised online course, or anything in between. Despite this, the knowledge and skills needed to create effective language learning materials are rarely part of teacher training, and are mostly learnt by trial and error.
Knowledge and skills frameworks, generally called competency frameworks, for ELT teachers, trainers and managers have existed for a few years now. However, until I created one for my MA dissertation, there wasn’t one drawing together what we need to know and do to be able to effectively produce language learning materials.
This webinar will introduce you to my framework, highlighting the key competencies I identified from my research. It will also show how anybody involved in language teaching (any language, not just English!), teacher training, managing schools or developing language learning materials can benefit from using the framework.
Honest Reviews of Tim Han LMA Course Program.pptxtimhan337
Personal development courses are widely available today, with each one promising life-changing outcomes. Tim Han’s Life Mastery Achievers (LMA) Course has drawn a lot of interest. In addition to offering my frank assessment of Success Insider’s LMA Course, this piece examines the course’s effects via a variety of Tim Han LMA course reviews and Success Insider comments.
2. Associate Director,
Monash Data Futures Institute
Director, Monash Digital Law Group
Professor of AI,
Technology and the Law
Visiting Professor UKRI TAS Regulation & Governance Hub
3. 1999 – when the Internet was (new-ish) cool
• Y2K ‘Millenium Bug’ (ta, Jordan!)
• Just before the bubble burst – boo.com,
WorldCom, Enron
“I was dreaming' when I wrote this
So sue me if I go too fast
Life is just a party
And parties weren't meant to last”
4. THE INTERNET TECHBROS PARTYING OF 1999 IN
GENEVA WAS REPLACED BY REGULATION
• the 2023 party for self-regulation may soon be
over for AI techbros
• Why, Floridi has a ‘winter is coming’ paper out…
• This ‘paper’ considers the historical parallels in
• technology policy making,
• soft law instruments and
• proposals for legislation between
• the late 1990s and early 2020s.
5. AI SELF-REGULATION CLAIMS ARE BEING MADE
BY THE SAME COMPANIES THAT PROMOTED
INTERNET SELF-REGULATION IN THE LATE 1990S
• IBM, Apple, Amazon and Microsoft/OpenAI
• now joined by Alphabet, Meta and SpaceX/X/Musk
• In the mid 1990s, this approach was led by
• the Bertelsmann Foundation and Carnegie Endowment,
• which co-opted research from Oxford University (CSLS) and
the Hans Bredow Foundation, and
• used hosting and stewardship institution building of the OECD.
6. PARTNERSHIP ON AI FOUNDED IN 2016
• Taken the place formerly occupied by the (non-deceased) Global
Information Infrastructure Commission (1995-date),
• to impose a corporate self-regulation agenda dressed up in
multistakeholder clothing
• In 2016, academic capture and multistakeholder-washing had become
more sophisticated, academic ‘partners’ included
• the Harvard Berkman Centre (founded 1999 after the GIIC moment), MIT,
Berkeley, Princeton, Santa Clara, University of Washington, Cornell, Tufts,
Brown, Duke, USC, Carnegie,
• as well as Turing Institute (and constituents Oxford, Cambridge, UCL), UK
Digital Catapult (sic), Netherlands Innovation Center for Artificial
Intelligence, Fraunhofer Institute, and even Tokyo University and ANU.
Again, OECD provided the Forum and a ‘soft law’ Recommendation of the
Council on AI principles.
7. 1990S SELF-REGULATION EFFORT EVENTUALLY
GAVE WAY TO EU CO-REGULATION
• in the E-Commerce Directive of March 2000 (implemented from 2003ish),
• but succeeded in its greatest triumph, Data Protection ‘Safe Harbor’
• (sic and sick: see Reidenberg 1998 Lex Informatica)
• EC sacrificed Data Protection Directive 1995 to US self-regulation,
• whose emperor’s new clothes were only declared transparent in the
Schrems I decision,
• following which regal tailors invented even more transparently flimsy self-
regulatory schemes which continue to be the subject of Schrems litigation.
8. Marsden and Tambini
“There is a danger that some aspects
of internet self-regulation fail to
conform to accepted standards.
We recommend co-regulatory audit
as the best balance of fundamental
rights and responsive regulation.”
Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (European Commission) , Programme
in Comparative Law and Policy (2004) Self-Regulation of Digital Media Converging on the Internet: Industry Codes of
Conduct in Sectoral Analysis, Final Report of IAPCODE Project for European Commission DG Information Society
Safer Internet Action Plan, 30 April, Section 12.7 at https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-
/publication/b7c998d9-75d6-464d-9d91-d59aa90a543c/language-en
2001-4 EC selfregulation.info
We still collaborate – see Regulating Big Tech (OUP, 2021)
9. WHERE STRATEGIC LAW ENFORCEMENT INTEREST
DEMANDED, THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE
PROVIDED THE 2001 BUDAPEST CONVENTION
• , to which even the US, Australia and Japan acceded
• In 2023, the EU AI Act is stuck in trilogue horse-trading,
• the Council of Europe is offering a Framework Convention on
AI that has suspiciously see-through gauze covering, and
• Schrems is back in court over the mis-enforcement of the
General Data Protection Regulation 2016.
10. TELECOM ’99 SUMMIT OF OCTOBER
• The denouement of the ethics washing and self-regulation
washing of the corporate Internet giants,
• and their academic lackeys,
• where the dot-com boom was held to be too important to let
self-aggrandizing Internet companies self-regulate.
11. UNITED NATIONS AI SUMMIT JULY 2023
• equivalent for the corporate AI giants, and their academic lackeys,
• after LLM/chatGPT frenzy of investment and hype in early 2023 .
12. IT IS THE ‘AI REGULATION MOMENT’
• intoned the Secretaries General of both
• the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and
• the United Nations itself
13. POLICYMAKING DRAFT AT IGF
KYOTO, JAPAN: OCTOBER 9
• G7 digital ministers will meet in November, to approve whatever has been decided
• G7 pledged to create an international (but voluntary) code of conduct around the most advanced uses of AI.
• That included commitments for companies around the safe development of the technology; robust security measures to stop harmful
use cases; and the creation of risk management plans to convince officials that firms wouldn’t do anything that hurts society.
• United States, Japan, U.K. prefer solely voluntary commitments around security, risks and innovation.
• The White House pitched this approach in July when it signed up Microsoft, Meta and Google to a series of non-binding pledges.
• Japan, too, is eager to give companies significant leeway in how they develop AI systems, within reason, including potentially
allowing firms to train their large language models on copyrighted material.
• Europeans and Canada.
• AI Act, Ottawa draft legislation, published short-term code of practice included transparency requirements/ non biased data sets.
• G7 creating a patchwork of international cooperation. aim: allowing these systems to be used, wherever rolled out.
• voluntary code of practice (European Commission pitched during the most recent EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council meeting) is
the best step forward. efforts to focus these commitments on solely the largest AI companies were recently scrapped.
• Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI) —New Delhi from December 12-14. wider set of non-Western
countries under India’s current chair of the G20. group bringing together 29 countries from Argentina to South Korea.
• United Kingdom trying to gatecrash with its own meeting — slated for November 1-2 and focused on “AI safety” —
• no one — including those within the British government — has a clue to what will come from this event.
• U.K. is also eager to invite China, which hasn’t gone down well with some G7 countries.
15. Council of Europe
Strasbourg effect?
As with data protection – Convention 108+
‘
• CAI - Committee on Artificial Intelligence - Artificial
Intelligence (coe.int)
• Convention on Regulation of Artificial Intelligence
• Agreed November 2023?
• Treats human rights as integral to regulation – unlike EU
• EU negotiating as a party:
• https://futurium.ec.europa.eu/en/european-ai-
alliance/blog/eu-participates-actively-council-europe-
negotiations-development-new-convention-artificial
‘