3. Where this research has been used
From: Carol.Crombie]
Sent: 27 May 2014 12:24
To: Murray Dennis
Subject: PIRC Investigation of Firearms Incident
Good morning Dennis
Further to our exchange of emails earlier in the year, the Commissioner has asked if your
Masters Dissertation has now been marked by an external body? He has asked me to
commend you on your effort in producing such a good piece of work.
Kind regards
Carol
Carol Crombie | Admin Team Leader/PA to Commissioner
Police Investigations & Review Commissioner
4. The National Decision Making Model is part of a national
policy which seeks to implement a clear and consistent
decision making process for all Firearms Commanders.
The purpose of the research was to establish to what
extent this model has met the needs of the police service to
enable Firearms Commanders to make ethical and
effective decisions during Firearms incidents?
6. The goal of any decision maker is to make the most
optimal decisions possible with a minimal amount of
cognitive strain or effort.
Perception and cognition is not only relevant to decision
making, but to a large degree determines it.
Dror et al (1999) warn us that perception is far from perfection,
it is never totally "objective".
The decision to use force is strongly based on the perception of
risk, and this perception is dependent on a variety of perceptual
and cognitive mechanisms which cannot be replicated in
training.
7. 2002
/3
2003/
4
2004/
5
2005/
6
2006/
7
2007/
8
2008/
9
2009/
10
2010/
11
Bedfordshire
269 414 419 534 639 1171 1118 819 991
Leicestershire
232 269 232 328 313 268 332 263 180
Northants
90 99 89 101 119 127 117 88 104
The Met
2447 2423 2322 2572 2770 2303 7374 7295 6009
Number of Operations involving armed
response vehicles (ARV's).
This dissertation represents and documents academic research as well as the
experiences and perceptions of the interviewees who are serving
Firearms Commanders from 3 Forces.
8. The Risk Principles for policing seek to guide
officers to make sound decisions despite what
is known as the cycle of blame
1. Willingness to make decisions in
conditions of uncertainty.
2. Safety is the primary consideration
in decision making.
3. Risk taking involves judgement and
balance.
4. Harm can never be totally
prevented. Judge by the quality of the
decision making, not by the outcome.
5. The many factors beyond an
individual's control should be taken
into account.
6. Decisions should be consistent with
those of similar rank, specialism and
experience in the same circumstances.
7. Whether to document a decision is a
risk decision itself.
8. Reducing risk aversion: a culture
that learns from successes as well as
failures.
9. Good risk taking depends upon
quality information.
10. Decisions consistent with these
principles should be encouraged and
supported.
Risk Principles and the Cycle of Blame
9. • Qualitative Research – anon questionnaire
- understanding why people behave as they do, their
knowledge, attitudes, beliefs and fears.
- This is vitally important when understanding why and how
people make decisions.
• Previous case studies
• Academic theory
Research methods
10. • Benefits of a qualitative approach
- detailed answers,
- valuable insights
- great deal of literature relating to decision making
• Limitations
- Limited academic/ literature relating to Firearms Command
- Presents a Semi-regional representation due to lack of
Metropolitan/larger Forces involvement
- Risk of bias due to small localised responses.
• Assumptions
- That the research is transferable to larger Forces
11. • Academics Alpert and Fridell (1992) have argued
convincingly that the lack of international evidence in this
area has impeded the development of effective, evidence-
based policy
• Research on the use of the NDM in relation to Firearms is
extremely limited – Research in relation to the NDM is also
limited.
• Police shootings are among the greatest challenges to
police legitimacy (Smith, 1994). The national context
shows that whilst deployments have increased, actual
police shootings remain low; however recent scrutiny of
police shootings has shown that just one incident can have
a significant effect on police accountability and legitimacy
and could potentially have an influence on Firearms
Commanders future decisions.
The Relevance
15. • Sharf and Binder postulate, the intricacies of
legal provision and considerations as to
whether "is what I am about to do“
reasonable in the circumstance, or absolutely
necessary, are not at the front of their
(Commanders) conscious mind.
• Rather, the predominate thought is likely to
be: "this person is about to kill, I have got to
do something now".
16. The late Lord Diplock observed:
“The balancing of risk against risk by the reasonable
man is not undertaken in the calm analytical
atmosphere of the courtroom after counsel and with
the benefit of hindsight ...but in the brief second or two
which the accused had to decide whether to shoot or
not under all the stresses to which he was exposed"
Finding: The decision makers perception of what support
they will receive in a "worst case scenario" play an
active part in their decision making process.
17. • Bias,
• Automaticity
• Stress
• Pressure
• Accountability
Internal and External Factors
Internal - state of mind of the decision maker.
External - collapsing time frame
18. Accountability
• The watershed case on accountability in respect of firearms was the incident
in Sussex in 1998. An team of armed police officers entered a block of flats
to arrest a number of suspects. During the course of this operation, an
officer shot dead an unarmed man.
• James Ashley was shot as he got out of bed during a raid at his home in St
Leonards
• The shooting led to the Chief Constable at the time, Paul Whitehouse,
resigning
19. Accountability
• The officer who fired the fatal shot was taken to court on a murder
charge. This clearly has implications for individual accountability and
sent out a signal that an officer, in the course of their duty could still
be held to account for the most serious of offences. Then in
acquitting him, the presiding Judge, Rafferty, stated that those who
should have been held accountable were not present.
• In effect, she put out the strong message that accountability should
be drawn upwards in the organisation. Several Senior officers were
tried and acquitted. Justice Rafferty, stated at the second trial:
"...The lack of training of.... the Gold Commander and one of the
Inspectors charged with misfeasance was symptomatic of the
organisational state of the Sussex Police..."
20. Pressure of Accountability
Academic findings indicate that accountability may influence police
judgments and decisions by altering emotions, motivational goals and
attention focus. The influence of this social mechanism may depend on police
perceptions of the organisational culture driving the form accountability takes.
Accountability is most likely to encourage optimal performance when police
view the organisation to provide a supportive environment . This is in contrast
to an unfair, illegitimate environment driven by a culture of blame. Within a
supportive environment, police are more likely to be motivated by accuracy
than self-preservation. A supportive environment also encourages attention to
remain focussed on providing judgments and decisions suitable for the
situation rather than becoming distracted by anxiety over the potential to be
blamed and punished.
21. • The effects of time pressure on decision making has found that a
speed-accuracy trade-off can occur with time constraints, and
that individuals utilise many non-compensatory coping
strategies, including acceleration and filtration of information
(Janis, 1983)
• The detrimental effects of time pressure on overall decision
quality, with the general finding that individuals perform
significantly worse under time pressure.
• (Kocher & Sutter, 2006) claim that an inverse relationship exists
between time pressure and one’s willingness to accept risk. They
concluded that increases in time pressure lead to decreases in
risk taking.
• ( Cooper, 2007) some are energized by the effects of stress whilst
the capabilities of others are dampened by it. This again has
different effects upon different persons. Fear has a marked
tendency to distort or deform the decision-making process. Fear
has the capacity to destroy reason.
Stress and Pressure
22. External factors
• Even when the internal factors have been determined, the decision
process and outcome greatly depend on a variety of external
factors.
• Dror et al (1999) studied how time pressure affects risk-taking
decisions. Their main finding was two-fold. First, time pressure
reduced decision thresholds. Rather than switching decision
strategies, the decision makers modified their decision criteria for
reaching a decision.
• Second, time pressure did not have a uniform effect on risk taking. A
polarisation was found in which more conservative decisions were
made under time pressure when the risk was low, but more risk-
taking decisions were made when the risk was high. Thus, time
pressure caused riskier decisions when the decision factors were
already high-risk.
23. • Question: What effect does stress and pressure have on your
performance?"
• Responses:
- "It certainly ruins the rest of your day."
- "There is a clear focus on the task at hand, however multi-tasking becomes
difficult."
- "I think it is important to recognise the human responses that pressure can
produce, but I think pressure is part of the challenge and I relish that..."
- "Stress inevitably affects how we all think in terms of detail and managing
our thought processes. After my 54 months in the FCR I felt physically ill
and was on tablets for some time."
- "Can lead to taking shortcuts and not exploring all options again from the
start."
- "Tend to focus on a successful outcome and this reduces lateral thinking in
finding alternative solutions when things change."
24. State of Mind – Priming
Based on the information you have ....
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12
25.
26. The mind is not a camera
• Dror et al (1999) suggest it is important to understand how perception and decision
making play key roles in human performance and policing.
• The reason it is important to consider perception and cognition in police decision making
is because humans are not passive encoders of information.
• The mind is not a camera; we make subjective assumptions and impose order and
interpretation on the "objective" reality.
• Evidence indicates that when an individual has an appropriate bias to apply to a situation
they spend less time encoding behavioural information and can infer the gist of a situation
with few perceptual details (Fiske et al, 1987; Von Hippel et al, 1993).
• ( Doerner and Ho, 1994), using a series of scenarios designed to examine the speed of
decisions made found an over-reliance on bias based processing.
27. CoE or Mission at hand
Code of
Ethics
Often replaced by
the immediate
mission at hand
Subject to contamination by
Internal/External factors
Commanders own
personal values
28. Commander Interpretation of the CoE section of the NDM?
• "... Impacted on (the NDM) by my own values,
organisational values coupled with pressure to
run as or not as a firearms job knowing all are
scrutinised..."
• "I would agree that the values section may be
open to interpretation, certainly more so than
other areas of the NDM... it is possible to be so
focussed on risk...that VALUES become almost
a secondary consideration."
• "I believe it is open to interpretation as it is easy
to place your own values at the core."
29. Automaticity
• Automaticity is defined as the processing of information in response to
information in a way that is automatic and involuntary, occurring without
conscious control.
• James (1890) argues that prior behaviour has a powerful impact on choice.
Once an individual has learned that a behaviour provides a viable solution to
a problem it is likely to be repeated whenever the individual re-encounters a
similar situation.
• (Fiske & Schneider, 1984). The training of police Firearms Commanders has
for many years involved the use of stimulus-response conditioning (in terms
of the presence of a weapon — stimulus — creating a deploy firearms
response; absence of a weapon a no firearms response). The repetitive
nature of this training means that such responses are practiced with relative
regularity; such practice leading to automaticity and proceduralisation of the
task.
• Training conditioning has been extensively covered by Grossman (1995,
2004), who evidences a large number of cases in which Officers and
Commanders have reacted in a manner inappropriate to the real-life
situation they find themselves in due to the effects of the conditioning they
have received in a training environment.
30. • Thunholm (2003) reported that most decision makers appeared to have made up
their minds as to the appropriate course of action to take prior to the most effective
moment of decision.
• Edland and Svenson (1993) postulated that time pressure may make generating new
alternatives difficult, thus leading to individuals becoming "locked into" pre-existing
responses, combining bias and time pressure with doing what they always do.
• According to Russo et al (1998), a mental commitment to a given course of
action leads to the distortion of subsequently received information to allow it
to fit with the chosen course of action. The effects of stress/time pressure,
bias and automaticity on decision-making have profound implications for
firearms policing. ... Fast thinking (as opposed to Slow thinking)
• The tendency towards rigidity displayed by those within NDM environments,
accompanied by the attendant reliance on prototypes, means that
Commanders will often persist with a tactical option even if there is no
evidence to support that it is the correct technique to employ.
31. Thinking Fast Thinking Slow
• http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JiTz2i4VHFw
• Kahneman (1982), adapted a device that other
researchers originally proposed, calls the “two
systems” of the human mind. System 1, or fast
thinking, operates automatically and quickly with
little or no effort and no sense of voluntary
control. System 2, or slow thinking, allocates
attention to the mental activities that demand
effort, such as complex computations and
conscious, reasoned choices about what to think
and what to do.
32. Question: Do you ever make routinised decision making?”
Responses:
- "Yes, if a tactic or plan has worked well for a previous deployment under
similar circumstances then it is common sense assuming it is an accepted
tactic to use it again if circumstances are similar, remembering that every
job is different so tactics need to be adapted slightly dependent on the
prevailing circumstances."
- "Yes – absolutely. If a situation/scenario is similar to a previous one – then I
will consider utilising the same approach/tactics BUT will adapt/tailor to
suite."
- "As humans we learn to solve problems based upon previous experiences.
Whilst I strive not to use routinised decision making – I do consider certain
tactics as they have work effectively in similar circumstances in the past."
- "Yes – we are all, to a greater or lesser extent, ‘creatures of habit’ and have
different personality traits which is inevitably reflected in individuals decision
making."
33. Question: “Do you ever make gut based decisions?”
Responses:"
- I had answered no, but on reflection I have at times been
clear on a course of action without being able to fully
justify it."
- "No. If you apply the NDM properly you won't make gut
decisions."
- "Yes! Often get the tingle down the back that something
is not right. However I have confidence that actually
there is some science behind gut feeling and actually the
gut feeling is usually based on previous experiences
etc."
34. • The analysis looked for common themes, which may have had a positive or
negative effect on the use of the NDM during decision making.
• The survey found that most officers did not consider post incident justification in
their decision making process but some indications are that there was a level of
detrimental post incident scrutiny:
Question:
- “Do you ever make decisions based on the fear of criticism?”
Responses:
- “No, and now I am paying the price for it."
- "I think the pressure placed on assessment/post incident criticism etc does
hamper my performance to some degree..."
- "If you spend time thinking about the potential implications of your decisions then
you either won't make any decision or you could make a decision for the wrong
reasons."
Analysis
35. Recommendations and Findings
• A key thread that repeated throughout the survey is that the NDM can be
applied to all policing scenarios but is prone to subjectivity and differing
interpretations.
• The complexity of decision making at Spontaneous Firearms Command
level and training to the differences between tactical planning and the
realities confronted by Commanders is vital if the NDM is to meet the needs
of the Police Service and enable Firearms Commanders to make ethical
and effective decisions during Firearms incidents.
• This is supported by Survey Respondent 11:
"Ideally there would be more scenario based training from the Firearms
Commanders and a better understanding of what influences our decisions."
36. Training
• Burrows (1996) who conducted a comprehensive review of every occasion that
police officers opened fire in England and Wales between 1991 to 1993 and
warns:
" There is a fundamental difference between being in real-life situations and a
training environment, however realistically they may be constructed."
• Recommendations:
• 1) Only experienced Firearms Commanders should be utilised to mentor
prospective Firearms Commanders.
• 2) Consideration should be given to pre-planned experienced Commanders
becoming part of the mentoring system.
• 3) Training courses should have a greater input on automaticity, bias, cognitive
processes, stress and time pressure effects on decision making.
• 4) There should be an increase in the number of mentored sessions prior to
giving a Firearms Commander independent authorisation.
