FINAL CUMULATIVE UPDATE FOR CALIFORNIA SCHOOL LAW, THIRD EDITI

FINAL CUMULATIVE UPDATE FOR CALIFORNIA SCHOOL
LAW, THIRD EDITION
January 2018
This final cumulative update for the third edition of California
School Law encompasses
significant legal developments since the book was published in
September 2013. The update may
be downloaded and printed without charge. Each development is
linked to the relevant chapter
and page in California School Law. Thus, readers will find it
easy to scroll through this document
to find developments of particular interest. Another approach is
simply to print the update and
keep it together with the book.
Because many updates involve legislative changes to the
California Education Code, readers who
want to consult the statutes themselves should go to the
California Department of Education
website at www.cde.ca.gov and click on Laws and Regulations
under the “Resources” heading.

Note that as with the book, the information herein is not
intended to take the place of expert
advice and assistance from a lawyer. It is posted on the book’s
website with the understanding
that neither the publisher nor the authors are rendering legal
services. If specific legal advice or
assistance is required, the services of a competent professional
should be sought.
CHAPTER 1
LAW AND THE CALIFORNIA SCHOOLING SYSTEM
Page 8: Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act to
Person in Wheelchair at
Football Games.
As noted in Table 1-1 on this page, the federal Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) accords
persons with disabilities meaningful access to programs and
facilities at most businesses in the
country. A good illustration of how ADA applies to persons
outside the employment context
involves a federal lawsuit brought by a disabled person in a
wheelchair who claimed that the

failure of the Lindsay Unified School District in the Visalia-
Porterville metropolitan area to
modify its bleachers to accommodate wheelchairs denied hi m
meaningful access to view football
games. The high school bleachers at this small school district
were constructed in 1971 and are
not wheelchair accessible. But the district allows spectators in
wheelchairs at several locations on
the sides of the field including the end zone at the east side near
a concession stand. The plaintiff-
appellant argued that these locations are not the same as having
access to the bleachers where his
view of the field won’t be obstructed by persons walking in
front of him and by standing players
and coaches and in some locations by a fence. Under ADA Title
II regulations, public facilities
constructed prior to January 26, 1992, need not to be made
accessible and usable by persons with
disabilities but the public entity must make its programs readily
accessibility. Here, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that the school
district “offers many different
locations from which spectators who use wheelchairs are able to
view football games, and it is

undisputed that such spectators enjoy unobstructed views from
at least three of these locations.”
Thus the district is in compliance with ADA. Daubert v.
Lindsay Unified School District, 760
F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2014).
Page 9: Stocking Restrooms with Feminine Hygiene Products.
Public schools maintaining any combination of classes from
grade six to twelve meeting the 40
percent student poverty threshold are now required to stock at
least half of the restrooms with
feminine hygiene products. No charge is to be imposed for any
menstrual products including, but
not limited to, tampons and sanitary napkins for use in
connection with the menstrual cycle.
(Educ. Code § 35292.6)
http://www.cde.ca.gov/
2

County Community Schools.
Provisions of the Education Code relating to students who may
be involuntarily enrolled in a
county community school were amended in 2014 to (1) exclude
homeless children, (2) add
conditions to referrals made on the recommendation of a school
attendance review board, and (3)
limit types of juvenile offender referrals. With regard to school
attendance review board
recommended referrals, the thrust of the legislation is to have
both the school district and the
county board determine the extent to which the county
community school is able to meet the
needs of referred students. Referrals are not to be made initially
unless it is determined that the
county community school has sufficient space, can meet the
needs of the student, and the
parent/responsible adult/guardian has not objected to the
referral because of factors such as
safety, geographic distance, lack of transportation, and concern
about meeting the student’s
needs. The student has the right to return to the student’s
previous school or another appropriate
school within the district at the end of the semester following
the semester when the acts leading

to referral occurred. The right to return continues until the end
of the student’s eighteenth
birthday except for students with special needs. The right to
return in this instance ends when the
student turns twenty-two. The statute then addresses conditions
for county community school
enrollment of students on probation with or without the
supervision of a probation officer and
consistent with the order of a juvenile court. All of these
changes are quite detailed and should be
reviewed directly. See Education Code Sections 1981 and 1983.
Pages 29-30: Changes to the Interdistrict School Transfer
Program.
Sections 48300-48317 of the Education Code relating to the
interdistrict school transfer program
were revised in 2017 to spell out in more detail the components
of the program. Chief among
them is that on or before July 1, 2018, a school district opting
to become a district of choice must
register with both the Superintendent of Public Instruction and
the county board of education
where the district is located. Starting the following school year,
a school district of choice is not

to enroll students until the district has completed this
registration. Also a district of choice is to
give first priority for attendance of siblings of children already
attending schools or programs
within the district, second priority for attendance to students
eligible for free or reduced-price
meals, and third priority for attendance of children of military
personnel. These legislative
provisions remain in effect until July 1, 2023 and are repealed
on January 1, 2014 unless the
legislature decides otherwise.
Pages 33-34: Expansion of Charter School Student Admission
and Disciplinary
Requirements.
In 2017, Education Code Section 47605 (petitions for charter
schools operating within a school
district) and Section 47605.6 (petitions for countywide charter
schools) were amended to require
that if random drawing is necessary for student admission,
preferences may be extended beyond
students currently attending the charter school and students who
reside in the school district or

county for countywide charter schools to include, but not be
limited to, siblings of students
admitted or attending the school and children of the charter
school’s teachers, staff, and founders.
Each type of preference is to be approved by the chartering
authority at a public hearing, be
consistent with federal and California law, and not result in
limiting enrollment access for
students with disabilities; academically low-achieving students;
English learners; neglected or
delinquent students; homeless students; students who are
economically disadvantaged; foster
youth; or students based on nationality, race, ethnicity, or
sexual orientation. Preferences also are
not to include mandatory parental involvement.
These statutes also have been amended to require a charter
school petition to contain a
comprehensive description of procedures for disciplining or
removing students that are consistent
with federal and California law. These include giving oral or
written notice of charges for

3
suspensions of fewer than 10 days and, if the student denies the
charges, an explanation of the
evidence to support them and an opportunity for the student to
present the student’s side of the
story. For suspensions longer than 10 days and expulsions, the
charter school is to provide timely
written notice of the charges, an explanation of the student’s
basic rights, and a due process
hearing by a neutral officer within a reasonable number of days.
At the hearing the student has the
right to present testimony, evidence, and witnesses; to confront
and cross-examine adverse
witnesses; and to be represented by legal counsel or an
advocate. No student is to be involuntarily
removed for any reason unless the parent or guardian has been
given written notice no less than
five schooldays before the effective date of the action.
There also are other changes made in the charter school petition
process by this legislation. To
learn more, go to the State Department of Education website at
www.cde.ca.gov and click on

Laws and Regulations.
Page 34: California Supreme Court Addresses Due Process
Dimensions of County Board of
Education’s Role in Charter School Revocation.
As noted on this page, county boards of education can authorize
charters for schools serving a
county-wide student population, oversee their operation, and
revoke charters for noncompliance
with state law and the charter petition. Their role in this
capacity is similar to school boards. In a
case involving Today’s Fresh Start charter school, the
California Supreme Court addressed the
dimensions of due process of law when a county board of
education revokes a charter it has
granted.
Today's Fresh Start argued that in revoking its charter, the Los
Angeles County Board of
Education violated due process of law because the county board
operates schools in the county
and Today’s Fresh Start competes for students and funding.
Thus, the county board could not be

impartial. The California Supreme Court unanimously rejected
the argument, noting that the few
specialized schools the county board operates serve mostly high
school students and Today's
Fresh Start is a kindergarten through eighth grade school.
Furthermore, county board members
receive no financial benefit from revoking charters. The high
court also noted that under
Education Code Section 47605.6, county boards can only
approve charter schools like Today's
Fresh Start that provide instructional services not provided by
county offices of education.
Today's Fresh Start also maintained that the role of the Los
Angeles County Office of Education
and its governing board in accusatory, investigative, and
adjudicatory functions in the revocation
context undermines due process of law. The justices pointed out
that the legislature has given
both school districts and county offices of education these
multiple tasks, something neither
uncommon nor unconstitutional. To prove a denial of due
process, there must be evidence of
actual bias. Here there was none. The county superintendent
fulfilled her statutory responsibilities

of investigating concerns about the operation of the charter
school, and the general counsel of the
county office and board fulfilled her responsibilities in advising
the county board of its duties
without being an advocate or adjudicator. Today’s Fresh Start,
Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office
of Education, 159 Cal. Rptr.3d 358 (Cal. 2013).
What likely was a factor in triggering this lawsuit was that the
Los Angeles Board of Education
voted four to three to revoke the charter and upon appeal, the
State Board of Education split
evenly. The lesson learned is that care must be taken by charter
school authorizers to make sure
that the charter school investigation is carefully done and that
the charter school is given ample
opportunity to present its side of the story. If this is done, then
the chances of a charter school's
prevailing in a due process challenge revocation are remote.

4
Page 35: In Revoking a Charter, the Authorizer Must Establish
Substantial Evidence to
Overcome The Extra Weight Given to Charter School Academic
Performance.
As noted on this page, the charter school authorizer must
consider student achievement of all
student groups served by a charter school as the most
importance factor in a revocation decision.
But even if student achievement is high, this does not negate a
revocation decision if one or more
of the other factors set forth in Education Code Section
47607(c) for revoking a charter are
established. Operating three charter schools in Oakland, the
American Indian Model Schools
(AIMS) challenged the Oakland Board of Education’s
revocation of its charter after an
independent audit uncovered significant fiscal mismanageme nt.
The Alameda County Board of
Education later affirmed the district’s decision. At the time, the
AIMS schools were among the
top performing charter schools in the state. One of its schools
received the Title I California

Distinguished School Award from the California Department of
Education for closing the
achievement gap between rich and poor students. AIMS strongly
opposed the action, contending
that closure should not take place pending resolution of the
appeal process. Both the trial court
and court of appeals agreed, noting that there must be evidence
that the charter authorizer
considered student achievement as the most important factor in
deciding whether to revoke a
charter. Here that was not evident. Thus a preliminary
injunction was warranted preventing
closure. American Indian Model Schools v. Oakland Unified
School District, 173 Cal. Rptr.3d
544 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 2014).
Page 37: California Supreme Court Clarifies How Facilities Are
to be Provided to Charter
Schools.
In 2015 the California Supreme Court superseded the appellate
court decision noted on this page
regarding the Los Angeles Unified School District's provision
of facilities to charter schools
operating in the district. In a detailed unanimous opinion, the
high court discussed the meaning of

State Board of Education (SBE) regulations regarding how
available facilities for charter schools
are to be determined under Education Code Section 47614. It
concluded that a school district
must follow a three-step process in responding to a charter
school's request for classroom space.
First, the district must identify a comparison group of schools
with similar grade levels as set
forth in Section 11969.3 (a) of the SBE regulations. Second, the
district must count the number of
classrooms provided to noncharter K-12 students in the
comparison group whether the classrooms
are staffed by teachers or not. And third, the district must use
the resulting number of classrooms
as the denominator in the average daily attendance
(ADA)/classroom ratio for
allocating classrooms to charter schools based on their
projected ADA. California Charter
Schools Association v. Los Angeles Unified School District,
185 Cal. Rptr.3d 556 (Cal. 2015).
Page 38: How Near to Where a Charter School Wants to Locate
Must District-Provided
Facilities Be?

A California court of appeal faced this question in 2015 when
the Westchester Secondary Charter
School challenged a decision by the Los Angeles Unified
School District to provide a facility that
was near, but not in, the Westchester neighborhood where the
charter school wanted to be. The
district facility was Crenshaw High School located 2.53 miles
from Westchester and between 6.5
and 7.4 miles from the charter school’s first and second choice
campuses in Westchester. The
appellate judges noted that the term “near” is not defined in
either statutory or administrative law.
Rather, it is a flexible term. Furthermore, while the charter
school requested a facility in
Westchester, it said it would consider other campuses
reasonably close to Westchester. The court
also rejected the charter school’s claim that the district could
accommodate it at its second
preferred site in Westchester by eliminating set-aside space for
expansion of other programs at
that site as well as by giving it space at a closed former
elementary school being used for adult
education. The district’s reasons for doing so were justifiable.
Westchester Secondary Charter

School v. Los Angeles Unified School District, 188 Cal. Rptr.3d
792 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 2015).
5
CHAPTER 2
ATTENDANCE, INSTRUCTION, AND ASSESSMENT
Page 49: Additions to Compulsory Attendance Law.
A student whose parent or guardian lives outside the school
district but who is employed and
lives with the student at the student’s place of residence for a
minimum of three days during the
school week is to be admitted to public schools of the district
on a full-time basis. (Educ. Code §
48204 (a)(7)).
Also, attendance law now requires that before a school district
can conduct an investigation to
determine whether a student meets the residency requirements
for school attendance, the school

district must have an investigatory policy adopted at a public
meeting of the governing board.
(Educ. Code § 48204.2). Among other things, the investigatory
policy is to identify the
circumstances for conducting an investigation, describe the
methods used, prohibit surreptitious
photographing or video-recording of students being
investigated, and provide an appeal process.
Pages 50-51: Charter Schools Must Now Accommodate Both
Foster and Homeless Students.
In Addition, Many Foster Students Rights Now Extended to
Homeless Students.
The term “local education agency” in the context of
accommodating both foster and homeless
students has now been extended to charter schools (Educ. Code
§ 48859). In addition, new
legislation extends many of the rights of foster children to those
who are homeless. Among them
is the right of homeless students to continue education in the
school of origin through the duration
of homelessness. If a high school homeless student’s status
changes so the student is no longer
homeless before the end of the school year, the student is to be

allowed to continue through
graduation. If a homeless student in kindergarten or any of
grades 1-8 is no longer homeless, the
student is to be allowed to continue education in the school of
origin through the duration of the
academic year. If a homeless student is transitioning between
grade levels, the student is to
continue in the same attendance area of the school of origin. If
the homeless student is
transitioning to a middle or high school and the school
designated for matriculation is in another
school district, the local education agency is to allow the
homeless student to continue in the
school designated for matriculation in that school district. The
new school is to enroll the
homeless student even if the student has outstanding fees, fines,
textbooks, or other items or
funding due to the school last attended. The same is true if the
student is unable to produce
clothing or records normally required for enrollment such as
previous academic records, medical
records including immunization history, and proof of residency.
Other rights of foster children now extended to homeless

students include the right to receive
partial credits for courses if they switch schools midyear, the
right to meet only state graduation
requirements if they transfer high schools after their second
year unless the new district
determines the student is reasonably able to complete the
graduation requirements in time to
graduate by the end of the student’s fourth year, and the
requirement that districts notify the
district-appointed liaison before expelling a homeless student.
If the homeless student is in special
education, the liaison must be invited to the expulsion hearing.
(Educ. Code §§ 48915.5, 48852.7,
48918.1, 51225.1–51225.2).
Page 51: More on Student Records Pertaining to Foster and
Homeless Children.
See updates for Chapter 10.
Page 51: Education Code Section 48215 Deleted.

6
As noted on this page, this provision denying undocumented
immigrants various public services
including education was declared null and void in 1995 but
remained in the Education Code. In
2014 Governor Jerry Brown signed a bill deleting it.
Page 51: Immunization of Students.
While Education Code Section 48216 as stated on this page
gives governing boards the authority
to deny admission to students who have not been immunized, a
provision of the Health and
Safety Code has provided an exemption for medical reasons or
because parents believe
immunization is contrary to personal beliefs. Growing concern
about health and safety in public
schools resulted in a legislative change to the Health and Safety
Code (sections 120325, 120335,
120338, 120370, 120375). The same is true of Education Code
Section 49452.8 that pertains to
oral health assessment. For more about the changes in this
section, go to the State Department of
Education website at www.cde.ca.gov and click on Laws and
Regulations.

On or after July 2016, absent medical reasons, immunization for
infectious diseases listed in the
code such as diphtheria, hepatitis B, measles, mumps, whooping
cough, and chickenpox is
required for students enrolled for the first time at a private or
public elementary or secondary
school, child care center, day nursery, nursery school, family
day care home, or development
center or being admitted or advancing to grade 7. If there is
good cause to believe a student has
been exposed to one of the listed diseases and there is no
documented proof of immunization, the
student may be temporarily excluded from school until the local
health officer is satisfied that the
student is not at risk of developing or transmitting the disease.
The changes are not to prohibit a student who qualifies for an
individualized education program
from accessing special education and related services as stated
in the student’s individualized
educational plan (IEP). The changes also do not apply to home-
based private schooling or an
independent study program that does not encompass classroom-

based instruction.
A student who prior to January 1, 2016 has a letter or affidavit
on file at any of the above
institutions stating beliefs opposed to immunization is allowed
attendance until the student enrolls
in the next grade span. A grade span means birth to preschool,
kindergarten and grades 1-6
including transitional kindergarten, and grades 7-12. While the
exemption from existing specified
immunization requirements based on personal beliefs has been
eliminated, an exemption based on
both medical reasons and personal beliefs is allowed from
future immunization requirements
deemed appropriate by the State Department of Public Health.
A motion filed by a group of parents in federal court for a
preliminary injunction to halt
enforcement of the immunization changes as violating their
federal rights on a number of grounds
was rejected. Whitlow v. California, 203 F.Supp.3d 1079 (S.D.
Cal., 2016). The court noted that
“There is no question that society has a compelling interest in
fighting the spread of contagious

diseases through mandatory vaccination of school-aged
children. All courts, state and federal,
have so held either explicitly or implicitly for over a century.”
Page 57: Assuring Safety: Students Not to be Left Unattended
on School Buses.
Provisions of the Education Code pertaining to school buses
require that superintendents of
county schools, superintendents of school districts, leaders of
charter schools, and the owners or
operators of private schools that provide transportation to or
from school or school activity
develop a safety plan to assure student safety (Educ. Code §§
39831.3, 39860). The plan now is
to include procedures ensuring that a student is not left
unattended on a school bus. The same is
true for any contract negotiated for student transportation.
Drivers who fail to comply with this
requirement are to have their certificate revoked by the
Department of Motor Vehicles. The plan

7
also is to include procedures and standards for designating an
adult chaperone other than the
driver to accompany students on a school student activity bus.
In addition, the California Motor
Vehicles Department is to develop regulations before the 2018-
2019 school year requiring that
each school bus, school student activity bus without one or
more adult chaperones, youth bus, and
child care motor vehicle for more than eight persons including
the driver is to be equipped with a
child safety alert system at the interior of the bus so that the
driver can be sure that students are
not left unattended (Calif. Vehicle Code § 28160).
Page 57: Removing the Term “Redskins”
Beginning January 1, 2017, public schools are prohibited from
using the term “Redskins” as a
school or athletic team name, mascot, or nickname. An
exception is allowed for uniforms or other
materials bearing that name which were purchased before
January 1, 2017 if (1) the school selects
a new school or athletic team name, mascot, or nickname; (2)
the school refrains from purchasing

or selling uniforms to students or employees that bear the
“Redskins” name unless necessary to
replace damaged uniforms up to 20 percent of the total number
of uniforms used by a team or
band at the school during the 2016-2017 school year and
purchased prior to January 1, 2019; (3)
the school refrains from purchasing or acquiring for distribution
to students or employees any
yearbook, newspaper, program, or similar material that includes
the name in its logo or cover title;
and (4) the school does not purchase or construct a marquee,
sign, or fixture that includes the
“Redskins” name, and for facilities that already bear the name,
the name shall be removed during
maintenance. (Educ. Code §§ 221.2-221.3).
Pages 57-58: Civil Center Act Correction and Addition.
Education Code Section 38134 of the Civil Center Act that
requires a school governing board to
permit nonprofit organizations such the Girl Scouts, Boy
Scouts, parent-teacher associations, and
the like that promote youth and school activities to use its
facilities no longer conditions doing so

on no alternative facilities being available. This requirement
was removed in 2012. In 2016, the
legislature added to the list of nonprofit organizations having
access to school facilities a
recreational youth sports league that charges participants an
average fee of no more than $60 per
month.
Page 59: Can the Theft of a Cell Phone by a Student in Locker
Room Be Reduced from a
Felony to a Misdemeanor Following Enactment of Proposition
47 Known as the Safe
Neighborhood and Schools Act?
In 2014 Penal Code Section 459.5 was added by Proposition 47
making shoplifting not exceeding
$950 in a commercial establishment a misdemeanor rather than
a felony. A high school student in
Santa Clarita admitted to a school resource deputy that he had
stolen a cell phone from another
student’s locker in the high school locker room. He was charged
with a burglary offense as a
felony and placed on probation. Following the enactment of
Proposition 47, the student sought to
reduce his felony offense to misdemeanor shoplifting under

Section 459.5, arguing that the school
falls into the “commercial establishment” category. The
California appellate court agreed with the
juvenile court that, while a cafeteria or school bookstore might
fall into this category, a school
locker room is not a commercial establishment in the sense of
buying and selling of goods or
services. Thus, the cell phone theft was felony and could not be
reduced to a misdemeanor. In re
J.L., 195 Cal. Rptr.3d 482 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 2015).
Page 60: Changes in the Gun-Free School Zone Act (See Table
2.1).
This law has been amended to permit persons holding a valid
license to carry a concealed firearm
but not ammunition in an area that is in an area within 1000 feet
of, but not on, the grounds of a
public or private school. Only active and retired law
enforcement officers can bring concealed
firearms onto school grounds. An unloaded firearm and
ammunition or reloaded ammunition can

8
be on school grounds if kept in a motor vehicle in a locked
container or in the locked trunk of the
vehicle. (Penal Code §§ 626.9 and 30310).
Page 61: Enactment of Legislation to Promote Student Healthy
Eating and Physical Activity
After School.
In recent years, legislation has been enacted to promote student
health and safety on and off
campus in a number of ways. These include the 21st Century
High School After School Safety
and Enrichment for Teens (ASSETs) program and the After
School Education and Safety
Program (ASES). The former can be found in Education Code
Sections 8420-8428 and provides
grants through the California Department of Education (CDE)
that partner traditional public and
charter schools with communities to provide academic support
and constructive alternatives for
high school students and that support college and career
readiness. The latter can be found in
Education Code Sections 8482-8484.6 and provides grants

through CDE for educational and
literacy support and enrichment encompassing technical
education and physical fitness, among
others, to kindergarten through ninth grade students.
In 2014, the Distinguished After School Health (DASH)
Recognition Program focusing on
addressing childhood obesity was enacted. This law requires
CDE to develop a process for
identifying high quality after-school programs under ASSETs,
ASES, and similar initiatives that
focus on healthy eating and physical activity. Schools will have
the option of creating a certificate
and supporting document demonstrating how the program meets
criteria set forth in the statute.
CDE will post on its website a list of recognized schools
meeting the criteria. Details of the
DASH program are set forth in Education Code Sections 8490-
8490.7.
Page 61: Student Applications for Free or Reduced Price Meals.
In the interest of improving access to free or reduced price
meals by children from refugee and
immigrant households, Education Code Section 49557 has been

amended to require that in
addition to paper applications, school district governing boards
and county superintendents of
schools are to make applications available online subject to
specified requirements including a
link to the website on which translated applications are posted
by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture with instructions on how to submit it. The
instructions are to be clear for families that
are homeless or migrants.
Page 61: Enactment of the Child Hunger Prevention and Fair
Treatment Act of 2017.
Enacted in 2017, Education Code Section 49557.5 requires
public schools, school districts,
county offices of education, and charter schools serving free or
reduced-price meals during the
school day under the federal National School Lunch Program or
the federal School Breakfast
Program to ensure that students whose parent or guardian has
unpaid meal fees is not shamed,
treated differently, or served a meal that differs from those
served other students. Nor shall
disciplinary action taken against a student result in denial or

delay of a nutritionally adequate
meal. For related requirements, see the section by going to
www.cde.ca.gov and clicking on Laws
and Regulations under the “Resources” heading.
Page 61: Changes in Anti-Smoking Laws.
Smoking is now prohibited for persons under 21 in this state.
Education Code Section 48901 that
prohibits smoking or use of a tobacco product on public school
grounds, while attending school-
sponsored activities, or while under the supervision of school
employees now incorporates the use
of an electronic smoking device that creates an aerosol or vapor
and any oral smoking device for
the purpose of circumventing the prohibition of smoking. In
addition, any school district, charter
school, and county office of education that receives a grant
from the State Department of
Education for anti-tobacco education programs is to address the
consequences of tobacco use,

9
reasons why adolescents use tobacco, peer norms and social
influences that promote tobacco use,
and skills for resisting social pressure promoting tobacco use.
(Health and Safety Code § 104420).
Page 62: Changes to Automatic External Defibrillator Laws.
A provision has been added to the Education Code that permits
public schools to seek non-state
funds to acquire and maintain an automatic external
defibrillator (AED). The provision also
specifies that compliance with Health and Safety Code Section
1714.21 regarding AED use/non-
use insulates the school employee and the school or district
from civil damages resulting from
any act or omission in rendering emergency care or treatment,
except in instances of gross
negligence or willful or wanton misconduct resulting in
personal injury or wrongful death (Educ.
Code § 49417).
In addition, Health and Safety Code Section 1797.196 now
requires principals to ensure that

when an AED is placed in a public or private K-12 school,
administrators and staff receive
information describing sudden cardiac arrest and the school’s
emergency response plan. The
principal also is to ensure that all administrators and staff
understand proper use of the AED.
Principals also are to ensure that instructions on how to use an
AED are posted in 14-point type
next to every AED and that at least annually school employees
are notified as to the location of
all AEDs on the campus. The provision on designating trained
employees to respond to an
emergency that may necessitate use of an AED has been
removed since all employees now must
know how to do this.
Page 62: New Laws Enhancing Student Protection.
In 2016, the legislature added Section 33133.5 to the Education
Code requiring the
Superintendent of Public Instruction to develop a poster
notifying children of the appropriate
telephone number to report abuse or neglect and to post
downloadable version of the poster on the
California Department of Education’s website on or before July

1, 2017. Among specific
elements, the poster is to include dialing “911” in case of an
emergency and to be produced in
five languages. School districts, charter schools, and private
schools are encouraged to display
appropriate versions of the poster in areas where students
congregate.
Education Code Section 215 has been added requiring school
districts, county offices of
education, state special schools, and charter schools serving
students in grades 7-12 to adopt a
policy on student suicide prevention in collaboration with
school and community stakeholders,
school-employed mental health professionals, and suicide
prevention experts. The policy is to
specifically address the needs of high-risk group as spelled out
in this section and be developed
prior to the 2017-2018 school year.
California Health and Safety Code Section 104495 has been
amended to prohibit persons in
playground and sandbox areas including those located on
public or private school grounds where

a youth sports event takes place from using a tobacco product
within 250 feet of the event.
Failure to comply will result in a $250 fine for each violation.
Page 62: School Counselor Not Immune from Liability for
Allegedly Giving Suspected
Child Abuse Report to Students’ Father.
See updates for Chapter 12.
Page 62: Restrictions on Assigning Students to Course Periods
without Educational Content.
In response to a lawsuit focused on high school students being
assigned to content-absent courses
because of lack of funds or teachers, Sections 51228.1 and
51228.2 have been added to the
Education Code specifying that personnel in school districts
with any 9-12 grades are prohibited
10
from assigning students enrolled in one of these grades to a
course period without educational

content for more than one week in a semester. An exception is if
the parent or guardian of a
student who has not reached the age of majority gives written
consent and the school official
believes the student will benefit from such an assignment. A
school’s having insufficient course
offerings is irrelevant.
The term “course period without educational content”
encompasses (1) sending a student home or
releasing the student from campus before the conclusion of the
school day; (2) assigning a student
to a service, instructional work experience, or an otherwise
named course in which the student is
to assist a certificated employee but not complete curricular
assignments during that period and
where the ratio of certificated employees to students assigned to
the course for curricular
purposes is less than one to one; and (3) assigning the student to
no course during the relevant
course period. This restriction does not affect other curricular
programs such as community
college dual enrollment, evening high school, independent
study, work-study courses or work

experience education. It also does not apply to students enrolled
in alternative schools,
community day schools, continuation schools, and opportunity
schools.
A similar restriction applies to assigning a high school student
to a course the student has already
completed and received a grade sufficient to satisfy admission
requirements to a California public
postsecondary institution and the school’s graduation
requirements. An exception is if the parent
or guardian consents in writing for students who have not
reached the age of majority and the
school official believes that student will benefit from being
assigned to the course period.
Another exception is if the student needs to take the course
more than once because of curricular
changes and can benefit from doing so. And as above, this
provision does not apply to dual
enrollment programs, evening high school, alternative schools,
and so on.
The statutes set forth a process for complaint filing and also
require the superintendent for public
instruction to set forth regulations to be adopted by the state

board of education for implementing
this law.
Page 62: Lawsuit Brought by Hindu Organization Challenging
Portrayal of Hindu Religion
in State Board of Education’s History-Social Science Content
Standards Partially Dismissed.
California Parents for the Equalization of Educational Materials
(CAPEEM) that seeks to
promote an accurate portrayal of the Hindu religion filed a
lawsuit against several members of the
State Board of Education (SBE) and the California Department
of Education (CDE) asserting that
the history-social science sixth grade standards and framework
are patently anti-Hindu. Among
other claims, CAPEEM alleged the standards do not describe
Hinduism as virtuous and do not
mention Hinduism’s divine origins and central figures. The SBE
sought to dismiss all the claims.
The federal district court ruled that the standards do not intrude
on the liberty rights of parents to
control their children’s upbringing under the Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause, do not

violate the right of parents to freely exercise their religious
beliefs under the free exercise clause
of the First Amendment, and do not discriminate against
Hinduism in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection clause. However, the court denied
the state’s motion to dismiss the
claim that the standards and framework constitute a violation of
the First Amendment
establishment clause. The judge cited as an illustration the
comments of a sixth grade student that
when her class was divided into castes, she felt discriminated
against based on her religion
because she said other students and the teacher considered
Hinduism as cruel, primitive, and
unjust. The judge noted that the student formed this impression
from the framework’s statement
to teachers to make clear that the caste system was both a
social/cultural structure as well as a
religious belief. Based on this assertion, the judge denied the
SBE’s motion to dismiss the
11

establishment clause claim. California Parents for the
Equalization of Educational Materials v.
Torlakson, 2017 WL 2986222 (F.Supp.3d N.D. Cal., 2017)
Page 65: Native American Studies.
Added in 2017, Education Code Section 51226.9 requires the
Instructional Quality Commission
to develop on or before December 31, 2021 and the State Board
of Education to approve on or
before March 31, 2022 a model curriculum in Native American
studies. The model curriculum is
to be developed with the assistance of Native American tribes in
California and to serve as a
guide for school districts and charter schools to adapt related
courses to reflect student
demographics in their communities. Following adoption of the
model curriculum, each school
district and charter school maintaining any grades of 9 to 12
that does not offer a standards-based
Native American studies curriculum is encouraged to offer such
a course of study as a social
sciences or English language arts elective. The course is to be
made available in at least one year

of a student’s enrollment. An outline of the course is to be
submitted as an A-G course for
admission to the University of California and California State
University.
Pages 69-70: Proposition 227 Curtailing Bilingual Education
Repealed.
In the November 2016 election a majority of voters successfully
endorsed a 2014 legislature
measure known as the California Education for a Global
Economy Initiative repealing
Proposition 227 that largely replaced bilingual education with
English immersion. The changes to
Education Code Section 300 and following sections go into
effect in July 2017. Under the new
measure, parents have the opportunity to choose a language
acquisition plan that best suits their
child’s needs. School districts and county officers of education
are to provide English learners
with a structured English immersion program so that these
students have access to the core
academic content standards and become proficient in English.
Districts and county offices also
are encouraged to provide to the extent possible opportunities
for native English speakers to

become proficient in one or more other languages. The right of
parents in the former English
immersion statute to sue for enforcement and be awarded
damages and attorneys’ fees has been
deleted.
In a related manner, Section 313.2 of the Education Code that
requires the Department of
Education to ascertain and disseminate information on the
number of students in each traditional
public and charter school who are, or are at risk of, becoming
long-term English learners has been
amended to include the manner in which English development
programs will meet student needs
and age-appropriate academic standards. Schools can comply
with this provision by sending this
information to parents and guardians if the definitions of
English learners and long-term English
learners are broader than those in state law.
Page 70: Provisions Pertaining to Gifted and Talented Students
(GATE) Repealed.
As noted in the next chapter updates, the enactment of the Local
Control Funding Formula (LCFF)

ended several categorical funding programs, channeling the
money into general funds provided to
school districts. GATE was one of the categorical programs
repealed.
Page 72: Change in Credentialing System.
As of 2017, the multi-subject teaching credential may include a
baccalaureate degree in
professional education (Educ. Code § 44225 (a)(1)).
Pages 82-83: Enactment of New Internet Privacy Rights Laws.
Provisions have been added to the California Business and
Professions Code protecting minors
from commercial marketing by Internet providers (Bus. & Prof.
Code §§ 22580-22582). Federal
law (the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA))
already requires operators of
12
commercial Internet sites or online services to provide notice of
what personal information is

collected and used, and gives parents the option of refusing to
permit collection of additional data
for children under age thirteen. Entitled the Privacy Rights for
California Minors in the Digital
World, the new California law expands this protection to minors
under age eighteen by
prohibiting operators of websites, online services, online
applications, or mobile applications
from marketing or advertising certain products or services to
them. The restrictions apply as well
to advertisers. The long list of restrictions includes alcoholic
beverages, firearms, aerosol paint
containers capable of defacing property, tobacco, drug
paraphernalia, electronic cigarettes, and
obscene matter. Disclosure of personal information about
minors to third parties is prohibited.
Operators also must permit minors who are registered users to
remove or request to be removed
content or information posted by them. This does not apply to
information posted by third parties.
Another law added to the California Business and Professionals
Code is the Student Online
Personal Information Protection Act (§§ 22584-22585).
Effective January 1, 2016, this detailed

law prohibits operators of Internet websites, online services,
online applications, or mobile
applications used primarily for K-12 school purposes from using
student information to target
advertising to students, parents, or guardians; using covered
information to amass student profiles;
or selling student information. Disclosure of covered
information is also prohibited unless in
furtherance of a K-12 purpose germane to the site, service, or
application under certain conditions
set forth in the statute. Operators are to establish security
measures and are required to delete
student information if requested by the school or district.
Operators are allowed to disclose
information if required by federal or state law or if for
legitimate research purposes. The law also
allows the use of de-identified student information for certain
purposes. Given both its
importance and complexity, the statute should be viewed in its
entirety.
A provision has been added to the Education Code requiring
school districts, county offices of
education, and charter schools to inform parents of programs

they propose to use to monitor their
students’ social media activities and to collect and store the
data and postings (Educ. Code §
49073.6). Many schools seek to gather this information to help
prevent bullying, sexting, school
violence, and student suicide. An opportunity for public
comment must be provided at a regularly
scheduled board meeting before such a program is adopted.
Presumably to deter litigation over
invasion of personal privacy, the statute gives students and their
parents the right to examine
information collected about them from social media and to make
corrections or deletions. To
protect student privacy over the long term, all such information
must be destroyed within one
year after the student turns eighteen or is no longer enrolled.
This legislation applies as well to
third parties hired by the governing board to undertake this
task.
Another provision added to the Education Code protects student
privacy rights when schools
enter into a contract with third parties to provide services
including those that are cloud-based for

digital storage, management, and retrieval of student records
(Educ. Code § 49073.1). The law
does not apply to existing contracts in effect before January 1,
2015 when the new law went into
effect until their expiration, amendment, or renewal.
As digital learning become increasingly incorporated in school
instructional programs, more
federal and state laws protecting parent, student, and teacher
privacy are likely to be enacted.
Page 86: NCLB Replaced by Every Student Succeeds Act
(ESSA).
The No Child Left Behind Act discussed on these pages and
referred to elsewhere in the book has
now been replaced by the much less controlling Every Student
Succeeds Act (ESSA). The
revision eliminates the need for waivers from requirements such
as assuring adequate yearly
progress toward all students becoming proficient on math and
reading tests or face loss of federal

13
funding. The annual yearly progress requirement has been
eliminated along with escalating
consequences for schools that don’t measure up. ESSA still
requires that students be tested in
reading and math from third to eighth grade and at least once in
high school. States are to
intervene to assist low performing schools including those with
underperforming subgroups. And
school evaluation is to include at least one other measure
beyond student test scores such as
graduation rates or English proficiency for nonnative speakers.
Given California’s changes in
student assessment and financial accountability as described
below and in the updates for Chapter
3, the state is well along in complying with ESSA’s provisions.
Pages 87-95: Replacement of the Standardized Testing and
Reporting (STAR) System and
Ending of CAHSEE.
In accord with the movement to implement common core
curriculum content standards, Senate
Bill 484 signed by the Governor Jerry Brown in October 2013
embraces the development of

academically rigorous content standards in all major subject
areas and sets forth a new assessment
system. The purpose is to model and promote high-quality
teaching and learning activities across
the curriculum so that students can acquire the knowledge,
skills, and processes needed for
success in the information-based global economy of the 21st
century (Educ. Code § 60602.5).
The student assessment system is designed to hold schools and
districts accountable for the
achievement of all students in meeting the standards. Identified
as the Measurement of Academic
Performance and Progress (MAPP) in SB 484, the new system
has been renamed the California
Assessment of Student Performance and Progress (CAASPP). It
replaces most of STAR (Educ.
Code § 60640). The new system is based on the work of a
multistate organization called the
Smarter Balanced Assessment Consortium that is developing
assessments aligned with the
common core state curriculum standards. In 2017, the California
High School Exit Exam
(CAHSEE) was ended, given its lack of linkage to the common

core.
The current assessment system reports student academic
performance in relation to state
academically rigorous content and performance standards and in
terms of college and career
readiness skills. When appropriate, the performance reports
include a measure of growth
describing the student's status in relation to past performance.
As in the past, students with special
needs are to be give appropriate accommodations in CAASPP
testing requirements and, if unable
to participate in the testing, given an alternate assessment
(Educ. Code § 60640 (k)).
CAASPP encompasses a summative assessment in English
language arts and mathematics for
grades three through eight and grade eleven that measures
content standards adopted by the State
Board of Education (SBE); grade-level science assessments in
grades five, eight, and ten until a
successor assessment is implemented; the California Alternate
Performance Assessment (CAPA)
in English language arts and mathematics in grades two to
eleven and in science in grades five,

eight, and ten until a successor instrument is implemented; a
voluntary early assessment program
for grade eleven students in English language arts and
mathematics; and a primary language
assessment program aligned to English language arts standards
for students enrolled in dual
language immersion programs. By March 1, 2016, the
Superintendent of Public Instruction (SPI)
was to submit to the State Board of Education (SBE)
recommendations for expanding CAASPP
to include additional assessments in such subjects as history-
social science, technology, and
visual and performing arts.
CAASPP assessment in English language arts and mathematics
was field-tested in the 2013-2014
school year. There was no assessment in these areas pursuant to
the old California Standards Text
because the common core curriculum together with CAASPP
transforms databases and disrupts

14
trend analysis. Adding to the transition was the adoption of the
Local Control Funding Formula
(LCFF), highlights of which are set forth in the update for
Chapter 3 below.
The adoption of the new assessment system affects the
calculation of school and district
Academic Performance Index (API) scores.
In addition to the above, Senate Bill 484 addressed a number of
matters relating to student
assessment and school accountability. Several of the more
significant include:
forth performance standards
on the CAASPP summative tests. Once adopted, these
performance standards are to be
reviewed by the state board every five years (Educ. Code §
60648).
toward implementation of a
technology-enable assessment system and the extent to which
assessments aligned to the
common core standards in English language arts and

mathematics can be fully
implemented (Educ. Code § 60648.5).
-based CAASPP
assessment is to be made
available for students who are unable to access the computer -
based version of the
assessment for a maximum of three years after a new
operational test is first administered
(Educ. Code § 60640 (e)).
quired to develop a
three-year plan of obtaining
independent technical advice and consultation regarding ways
of improving CAASPP.
Areas to examine include studies focused on validity,
alignment, testing fairness and
reliability, reporting procedures, and special student
populations such as English learners
and students with special needs (Educ. Code §60649).
For the latest information about CAASPP, go to
www.caaspp.org.
CHAPTER 3
EQUITY, ADEQUACY, AND SCHOOL FINANCE

Pages 115-118, 121-123, 130: Local Control Funding Formula
(LCFF) Replaces Revenue
Limit Funding and Most State Categorical Grants.
Accompanying Local Control and
Accountability Plan (LCAP) Has Significant Implications for
School Administrators.
As noted on page 130, when the third edition of California
School Law was being written, the
legislature and governor were preparing legislation to replace
revenue limits and most categorical
funding with a weighted student formula funding system that
includes a variance in per-student
funding depending upon student needs. Known as the Local
Control Funding Formula (LCFF),
the legislation went into effect in the 2013-2014 school year.
Over an eight-year period, the
amount of funding gradually will increase for full
implementation of the LCFF.
Basically, the LCFF provides a base grant for school districts
and charter schools that varies by
grade level. There is an adjustment of 10.4 percent on the base
grant for kindergarten through
grade three, provided that progress is made toward an average

class size of no more than twenty-
four students unless the collective bargaining agreement
provides otherwise. There is an
adjustment of 2.6 percent on the base grant amount for grades
nine through twelve. The LCFF
provides a supplemental grant equal to 20 percent of the
adjusted base grant for English learners,
low-income students, and foster youth. There is a concentrated
grant equal to 50 percent of the
adjusted base grant for targeted students exceeding 55 percent
of a local education agency’s
enrollment. There also is additional funding to assure that all
districts are restored to their 2007-
http://www.caaspp.org/
15
2008 state funding levels, adjusted for inflation, and that
guarantees a minimum amount of state
aid. Home-to-school transportation and Targeted Instructional
Improvement Grant funding are
add-ons to the LCFF. LCFF does not encompass state funding
for programs like special education

and the After School Education and Safety program, some local
funding like parcel taxes, and
federal dollars.
The LCFF also requires school districts, charter schools, and
county offices of education to
develop, adopt, and annually update a three-year Local Control
and Accountability Plan (LCAP)
using a template developed by the CDE. The LCAP is required
to identify goals and measure
progress for student subgroups across multiple performance
indicators. The School
Accountability Report Card (SARC) that provides parents and
others with information about
school performance will be linked to LCAP. The State Board of
Education (SBE) is required to
adopt and refine over time evaluation rubrics to assist both local
education agencies and oversight
entities evaluate strengths, weaknesses, areas that require
improvement, technical assistance
needs, and where interventions are warranted. A new entity
called the California Collaborative
for Educational Excellence (CCEE) has been set up to assist
struggling school districts in

improving student performance in compliance with their LCAP.
In effect, LCFF and LCAP place primary responsibility on
school governing boards and
administrators to allocate resources in such a way that all
students reach desired levels of
achievement and have the necessary skills and knowledge to go
on to postsecondary education
and employment. As noted on p. 85, given the changing
demographics of the California student
population, meeting their needs in many schools is challenging.
With the limited success of
categorical funding and rigid forms of state-level
accountability, it is not surprising that state
policymakers are deferring to the judgment of local school
officials. Now more than ever, those
closest to the education scene have the discretion to tailor the
educational process to meet the
needs of all their students.
For further information about LCFF and its accountability
components, go to the CDE website at
www.cde.ca.gov/fg/aa/lc

Clearly, the adoption of common core standards, the new
CAASPP assessment system, and the
LCFF for school funding likely will significantly affect future
operation of public schools in
California.
Pages 124-125: More on Charter School Facility Grant Program.
Grant eligibility has now been expanded for charter schools
under the 70 percent free or reduced-
price meals requirement. If the California School Finance
Authority finds that funding remains
after allocations based on these criteria have been made, the
Authority is to expand additional
charter school eligibility by reducing the 70 percent
requirement 1 percent at a time but in no case
below 60 percent (Educ. Code § 47614.5 (c)). Charter schools
receiving funding under this
program are now subject to audit under Education Code Section
41020.
Page 127: Helping Teachers with Housing Expenses.
As noted on this page, while California teacher salaries are
among the highest in the country, the

cost of living in this state is very high. The Teacher Housing
Act of 2016 allows a school district
to establish and implement programs helping school district
employees find affordable rental
housing by leveraging nonprofit and fiscal resources to housing
developers, promoting public and
private partnership, and fostering innovative financing
opportunities (Health and Safety Code §
53570 and following sections).
http://www.cde.ca.gov/fg/aa/lc
16
Page 130: Robles-Wong Lawsuit Challenging the California
School Finance System
Rejected.
In 2016 a California court of appeal rejected two related
lawsuits challenging the state’s current
school finance system as a violation of the state constitution. In
arguing for an adequate school
finance system to assure a quality education for all

schoolchildren, the appellants cited Section 1
of Article IX requiring the legislature to “encourage by all
suitable means the promotion of
intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement” in
the interest of a general diffusion
of knowledge and intelligence, and Section 5 requiring the
legislature to establish a system of free
common schools. The majority in this two-to-one decision ruled
that neither provision sets forth a
right to a public school education of a particular quality. Nor do
the provisions require the
legislature to provide a particular level of funding. While
agreeing with the appellants that a
quality education is an important societal goal, the
constitutional sections cited do not give the
courts the authority to “dictate to the Legislature, a coequal
branch of government, how to best
exercise its constitutional powers to encourage education and
provide for and support a system of
common schools throughout the state.”
In August 2016 the California Supreme Court by a 4-3 vote
denied the appellants’ petition for
appeal. While the majority gave no reason for the rejection,

Justice Goodwin Liu in a lengthy
dissent noted that “It is regrettable that this court, having
recognized education as a fundamental
right in a landmark decision 45 years ago (Serrano v. Priest
(1971) [citation omitted] should now
decline to address the substantive meaning of that right. The
schoolchildren of California deserve
to know whether their fundamental right to education is a paper
promise or a real guarantee. I
would grant the petition for review.” The denial of review and
Justice Liu’s dissent is included in
the court of appeal’s decision. Campaign for Quality Education
et al. v. State of
California/Robles-Wong v. State of California, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d
888 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 2016).
CHAPTER 4
UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Page 133-134, 166: Correction on Application of NLRA to Lay
Teachers in Catholic Schools.
While it is true that the National Labor Relations Act provides
full bargaining rights to employees
in the private sector, this is not true for lay teachers in Catholic

schools contrary to what is stated
on these pages. The 1977 U.S. Supreme Court Catholic Bishop
decision referenced on p. 166 held
that both religious and lay faculty at religious schools must be
excluded from NLRA coverage
because in enacting the act Congress had not expressed an
intent to include teachers in church-
operated schools. The Court sidestepped the question of
religious entanglement. However, several
states in the East have enacted laws that do permit lay faculty at
religious schools to unionize.
And several Catholic dioceses themselves permit teachers to
unionize. Here on the West Coast,
teachers, librarians, and counselors at four secondary schools
operated by the Roman Catholic
Archdiocese of San Francisco are represented by the San
Francisco Archdiocesan Federation of
Teachers, an affiliate of the California Federation of Teachers.
Page 142: New Employer Requirement Added to Educational
Employment Relations Act.
A public school employer must now give reasonable written
notice to a recognized union of the
employer’s intent to make any change to matters within the

scope of representation for purposes
of giving the union a reasonable time to negotiate the proposed
changes (Govt. Code §3543.2
(a)(2)).
Pages 158-159: Having to Pay Membership Fees Does Not
Violate Union Members’ Free
Speech Rights; Union Agency Fee Requirement for
Nonmembers Continues.
17
In 2015, a California federal district court rejected a lawsuit
brought by four dues-paying
members of several teacher unions contending that having to
join their union and pay dues forces
them to support certain union political and ideological views
with which they disagree, thus
violating their free speech rights. If they choose not to pay
union dues but only a fair share
service fee (often referred to as an agency fee), they argued that
they forfeit certain benefits

available to dues-paying union members. Either way, their First
Amendment free speech rights
are compromised. The district court rejected the contention,
noting that unions are not state actors
and thus the First Amendment doesn’t apply to them. The terms
of dues-paying membership are
not determined by the state but rather by the union. Bain et al.
v. California Teachers Association
et al., 156 F.Supp.3d 1142 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
About the same time, a case reached the U.S. Supreme Court
involving California teachers who
argued that requiring non-members in a public sector bargaining
unit to pay a fair share service
fee for union activities violates their First Amendment rights.
Both the Ninth Circuit and the
federal district court refused to rule on the matter, citing the
Abood decision discussed on p. 159.
In March 2016 the Supreme Court in an equally divided
decision affirmed the lower court
decisions without opinion. Friedrichs v. California Teachers
Association, 136 S.Ct. 1083 (2016).
The split vote means that the fair share service fee or agency
fee requirement anchored in the
Abood decision discussed on this page continues.

CHAPTER 5
EMPLOYMENT
Pages 175 and 177: Former Certificated Employee Rehired as a
Substitute is Not Entitled to
Permanent Status Immediately Upon Rehire.
Under Education Code Section 44931 a permanent certificated
employee who resigns and is
reemployed by the same school district within 39 months of his
or her last day of paid service is
entitled to return to permanent status.
The question for the court was whether Section 44931 applied if
the employee is rehired as a
substitute teacher. Edwards v. Lake Elsinore Unified School
District, 228 Cal. Rptr.3d 383 (Cal.
App. 4
Dist. 2014). The court held that Section 44931 does not apply
when the former permanent
certificated employee is rehired as a substitute teacher.
Lori Edwards served as a certificated employee of the Lake

Elsinore Unified School District from
the commencement of the 2003-04 school year until July 2006
at which time she voluntarily
resigned. In January 2007 she applied for reemployment with
the district as a substitute teacher.
Various records – including time sheets and retirement
documents – completed by Lori and the
district referred to her as a substitute teacher.
Lori alleged that the district improperly classified her as a
substitute teacher upon her rehire and
should have classified her as a permanent certificated employee.
Retroactive pay was the primary
remedy she sought because the district ultimately classified her
as a permanent certificated
employee effective August 2008.
Lori first argued that she was a permanent employee because the
district had not given her an
employment contract identifying her as a substitute employee.
The court, however, observed that
because Lori was hired as a substitute rather than a temporary
employee she was not entitled to a
written employment contract under Education Code Section

44916 at the time of her
reemployment in January 2007. The court also held that Lori
was not entitled to a written
18
employment contract under Education Code Section 44909,
which applies to certain categorically
funded positions, because she was not hired to fill a
categorically funded position.
Lori next argued that Education Code Section 44918 entitled her
to retroactive pay. The court
disagreed and noted that Section 44918 merely provides for
retroactive credit of one year of time
served as a probationary teacher for a substitute teacher who
works in a certificated position for at
least 75 percent of the school year and is hired as a
probationary teacher for the next school year.
The court also rejected Lori’s argument that she was entitled to
retroactive benefits under Section
44931 because the evidence established that she was rehired in

January 2007 as a substitute
employee and not as a permanent certificated employee.
Pages: 181, 192, and 195: Trial Court Decision Declaring
Certain Teacher Employment
Laws Unconstitutional Overruled.
In June 2014, a superior court judge in Los Angeles triggered
considerable controversy when he
ruled in Vergara v. State of California that sections of the
Education Code pertaining to the two-
year probationary period (44929.21), teacher dismissal (44934,
44938 (b)(1) and (2), 44944), and
last in-first out layoff (44955) violate the equal protection
clause of the California Constitution.
The plaintiffs in the case were nine public school students
alleging that the statutes result in
“grossly ineffective teachers obtaining and retaining permanent
employment, and that these
teachers are disproportionately situated in schools serving
predominately low-income and
minority students.” In doing so, the plaintiffs argued that the
statutes violate their fundamental
right to equal educational opportunity. The judge agreed and
ruled that laws fail to meet the strict

level of judicial scrutiny necessary when they intrude on
constitutional rights.
Two years later, a California appellate court reversed the trial
court’s decision. First, the court
found that which students are assigned grossly ineffective
teachers is not specifically identifiable
for purposes of an equal protection challenge because the
student group varies from year to year.
In effect, the subset of students is basically a random
assortment. This is particularly true when,
according to the trial court’s findings, only 1 to 3 percent of
California teachers are allegedly
grossly effective. Second, the court pointed out that it is not the
laws that assign poorly
performing teachers to schools serving large numbers of low
income and students of color but
school administrators who decide which teachers they want in
their schools and which teachers
should be transferred to other schools. This so-called “dance of
the lemons” results from staffing
decisions. Declaring the statutes facially unconstitutional would
not prevent administrators from
continuing to assign ineffective teachers to schools serving

mostly low-income students and
students of color.
In August 2016, the California Supreme Court by a 4-3 vote
declined to take up the matter, thus
leaving the appellate court decision standing. The majority
issued no opinion for the rejection. In
his dissent, Justice Mariano-Florentino Cuellar noted that
“Beatriz Vergara and her fellow
plaintiffs raise profound questions with implications for
millions of students across California.
They deserve an answer from this court. Difficult as it is to
embrace the logic of the appellate
court on this issue, it is even more difficult to allow that court's
decision to stay on the books
without review in a case of enormous statewide importance.”
The appellate court ruling later was
reissued to include the California Supreme Court’s dissenting
opinions. Vergara v. State of
California, 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 2016).
Page 187: Notice of Nonreelection Sufficient Despite Reference
to Incorrect Code Section.
Shanna Petersil was hired as a temporary certified employee by

the Santa Monica-Malibu Unified
School District in August of 2008. Shanna worked a single day
for the district before signing a
19
contract identifying her as a temporary employee. In March of
2009, the district sent a notice of
nonreelection to Shanna and then rehired her as a temporary
employee in July of 2009. The
district sent another notice of nonreelection to Shanna in March
of 2010. The notices referred to
Shanna as a temporary employee and referenced the Education
Code section permitting the
nonreelection of temporary employees.
Shanna argued to the court that the notices of nonreelection
were not sufficient because she was
actually a probationary employee by virtue of working a day
before signing her employment
contract and therefore not given sufficient notice of
nonreelection as the nonreelection notices

from the district only made reference to the Education Code
section pertaining to nonreelection of
temporary employees. The court agreed with Shanna that she
was in fact a probationary employee
because she worked a day before signing the contract
designating her as a temporary employee
but held that the reference in the nonreelection notices to the
incorrect code section did not
invalidate the district’s nonreelection. The court noted that
Education Code Section 44929.21 (b)
merely requires that the probationary employee be notified of
the board’s decision to reelect or
not reelect before March 15 of the second year of employment.
Shanna further argued that the
first notice of nonreelection was insufficient because it was not
personally served on her but
instead sent by certificated mail. The court rejected this
argument and noted that Shanna
acknowledged actual receipt of the notice, which was sufficient.
Petersil v. Santa Monica-Malibu
Unified School District, 161 Cal. Rptr.3d 851 (Cal. App. 2 Dist.
2013).
Pages 189 and 195-196: California Legislature Adds Egregious
Conduct to Dismissal

Statute as Part of Teacher Dismissal Reform Bill and Modifies
the Teacher Dismissal
Process.
Governor Brown signed AB 215 on June 25, 2014. The law
brings about substantial changes to
teacher discipline and dismissal proceedings, including the
addition of egregious conduct as a
new ground for dismissal.
AB 215 amends Education Code Section 44932 to permit
dismissal of a teacher for “egregious
conduct”, which is defined “exclusively as immoral conduct that
is the basis for an offense
described in Section 44010 [sex offense] or 44011 [controlled
substance offense] . . . or in
Sections 11165.2 [neglect of a child] or 111.65.6 [child abuse or
neglect], inclusive, of the Penal
Code.”
Section 44934.1 has been added to the Education Code to
provide for a separate hearing process
for cases based solely on egregious conduct. The hearing
process for an egregious conduct case is

outlined in Section 44934.1 and contains unique features
including adjudication by the Office of
Administrative Hearings (OAH) instead of the panel which
comprises the Commission on
Professional Competence, admission of evidence that is more
than four years old for certain sex
offenses and child abuse, and the opportunity for the prevailing
party to recover attorneys’ fees if
the OAH decision is appealed and upheld by the court.
Other changes have been made to the existing dismissal process.
Education Code Section 44934
was revised to permit a school district to amend written charges
to suspend or dismiss a teacher
less than 90 days before the hearing upon a showing of good
cause. Education Code Section
44936 was amended to permit the provision of written notice to
a teacher of suspension or
dismissal at any time during the year with the exception that a
notice of unsatisfactory
performance can only be given during the instructional year at
the schoolsite where the employee
is located. The prehearing procedures also have been revised
with limitations placed on discovery

unless egregious conduct is the only charge. Education Code
Section 44939 permits an employee
against whom suspension or dismissal is being pursued under
Section 44934 to file a motion with
20
the OAH seeking immediate reversal of the suspension without
pay that accompanies such
charges. Review of the motion is limited to a determination of
whether the facts alleged, if true,
are sufficient to warrant immediate suspension.
Section 44939.5 has also been added to the Education Code to
prohibit a school district from
entering into an agreement with a teacher that would prevent a
mandatory report of egregious
conduct or expunging from a teacher’s personnel file “credible
complaints of, substantiated
investigations into, or discipline for egregious conduct.”
Pages 194 and 196: Board’s Failure to Consider or For mulate
Written Charges Prior to

Initiating Termination of Permanent Certificated Employee
Does Not Invalidate
Termination.
Vincent DeYoung was a permanent certificated employee of the
Hueneme Elementary School
District. The district’s governing board voted to dismiss him
based on charges that he had
physically and abusively disciplined his students. The dismissal
hearing proceeded and Vincent’s
contract was terminated.
Education Code Section 44934 requires a governing board to
file or formulate written charges
prior to voting for the dismissal of a permanent certificated
employee. The district’s governing
board did not file or formulate written charges before voting for
Vincent’s dismissal and he
argued that their failure to do so invalidated his termination.
The court observed that while Section 44934 requires the
governing board to file or formulate
written charges before voting on dismissal, the statute does not
specify a remedy for a governing

board’s failure to do so. The court thereafter held that in the
absence of some prejudice to Vincent
– and the court found none – the governing board’s failure to
file or formulate written charges
before voting for the dismissal did not invalidate the subsequent
termination of the contract.
DeYoung v. Commission on Professional Competence of the
Hueneme Elementary School District,
175 Cal. Rptr 3d 383 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 2014).
Page 198: Reed Litigation Involving Teacher Layoffs in the Los
Angeles Unified School
District Settled.
The parties in this case agreed in 2014 that to exempt teachers
at the low-performing schools
involved in the litigation from seniority-based layoffs across the
district, the district must provide
funding to attract, mentor, and retain teachers at these schools.
Each school will receive an
additional assistant principal and counselor, a special education
coordinator, and several mentor
teachers. In the event of future layoffs, the settlement provides
that the district must establish that
its teacher training justifies exempting teachers at these

schools.
Page 200: School District Expending Funds for Personnel
Training Must Consider Needs of
Classified Personnel.
Sections 45390 and 45391 have been added to the Education
Code. These sections require a
school district expending funds for the professional
development of any schoolsite staff also to
consider the professional development needs of its classified
employees. The professional
development may be in any of a number of areas relevant to
public schools, including working
with at-risk youth, curriculum, and special education.
Page 205: California Legislature Extends Differential Pay for
Certificated Employees to
Maternity and Paternity Leave.
Education Code Section 44977.5 provides additional differential
pay benefits to a certificated
employee in the form of up to 12 school weeks of maternity or
paternity leave. The 12-week

21
period is be reduced by any period of sick leave, including
accumulated sick leave, taken during
the paternity or maternity leave. Each certificated employee
may only receive one 12-week period
per maternity or paternity leave and to the extent Section
44977.5 conflicts with an existing
collective bargaining agreement, the section shall not apply
until expiration or renewal of the
agreement. Birth of an employee’s child and placement of a
child with an employee in connection
with the adoption or foster care of the child are included within
the section’s definition of
maternity or paternity leave.
Page 205: Leave Rights for Public Employees Who Are Military
Veterans.
A certificated employee hired on or after January 1, 2017, who
is a military veteran with a
military service-connected disability rated at 30 percent or more
by the U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs is entitled to a leave of absence for illness or

injury with pay of up to 10 days for
undergoing medical treatment for the military service-connected
disability. For certificated
employees, the days of treatment are 12. These provisions do
not affect a collective bargaining
agreement that provides greater leave rights. For more details,
see Education Code Sections
44978.2 and 45191.5.
Page 207: Title VII Update and Correction.
Title VII now encompasses discrimination based on sexual
orientation. The statement regarding
Title VII and sexual orientation in the middle of this page and
again on p. 211 needs to reflect the
change. Also, the reference in the bottom paragraph on p. 207
that straightforward allegations of
discrimination are termed disparate treatment claims was
misplaced. These are known as
intentional discrimination claims. Disparate impact claims are
those as described in the next
sentence in this paragraph.
Pages 208, 211: Can a Female Management Math Consultant Be
Paid Less Than Her Male

Counterparts?
It depends. Aileen Rizo, a Fresno County Office of Education
math consultant, filed a federal
lawsuit maintaining that basing her current lower salary on her
prior salary level violates (1) the
federal Equal Pay Act (29 U.S.C. §206(d), (2) Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, and (3) the
California Fair Employment and Housing Act. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
focused only on the Equal Pay Act, since it had ruled previously
that standards under Title VII are
the same and since there was no assertion that equal pay
standards under the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act are any different than under
federal law. In this case, the county
office of education asserted that while there was a pay
differential, this was caused by Rizo’s
lower prior salary, not her gender. The Ninth Circuit returned
the case to the trial court to
determine if there was justification for the county office’s
claims that the prior salary differential
was based on factors such as encouraging persons to leave
previous employment and the judicial
use of taxpayer dollars. If prior salary alone was responsible for

the differential, the Equal Pay
Act is being violated. Rizo v. Vovino, 854 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir.
2017).
CHAPTER 6
RIGHTS OF EXPRESSION
Page 218: U.S. Supreme Court Rules that Public Employee
Testimony in Judicial or
Administrative Hearings is Constitutionally Protected.
The case involved an Alabama community college
administrator, Edward Lane, who was hired
on a probationary basis to direct a statewide training program
for underprivileged youth. Lane
dismissed Suzanne Schmitz, an Alabama State Representative
who was employed by the training
program but regularly did not show up for work. Lane’s action
triggered considerable public
attention and prompted an FBI investigation into Schmitz’s
employment based on public

22
corruption concerns. Lane testified before a federal grand j ury
and later trial against Schmitz
about his reasons for firing her. Subsequently when the training
program experienced budget
shortfalls, Lane was one of 29 probationary employees who
were dismissed by Steve Franks, the
new community college president.
Lane sued Franks alleging that his dismissal was in retaliation
for his grand jury and trial
testimony. Both the trial and appellate courts relied on Garcetti
v. Ceballos to reject the lawsuit
because Lane’s speech, even if considered a matter of public
concern, was based on what he had
learned as an employee pursuant to his official duties. The U.S.
Supreme Court overturned this
part of the appellate court decision, ruling that the First
Amendment protects public employees
from retaliation for providing truthful sworn testimony under
oath even if the content of the
speech is learned while acting as an employee. This is so
because sworn speech “is a
quintessential example of speech as a citizen” and is protected

by Pickering v. Board of
Education when on a matter of public concern. Further, there
was no evidence that Lane’s
testimony was false or erroneous or undermined his
effectiveness as an employee (see the
Pickering discussion regarding when free speech even on
matters of public concern lose its
protection). Lane v. Franks, 134 S.Ct. 2369 (2014).
Page 219: No Free Speech Protection for High School Campus
Supervisor Who Told
Students to Video-Record Police Brutality During a Fight in the
School Parking Lot.
A Bear Creek High School campus supervisor contended that
she had a First Amendment right to
direct students to video-record police arrest of a female
African-American student they had taken
to the ground during a fight between students and non-students
in the school parking lot. The
supervisor allegedly yelled that the arrest “was police brutality”
and “bullshit” before she told
students to do the video-taping. The judge held that the campus
supervisor was speaking out as a
public official to students within the scope of her employment

and thus there was no violation of
her First Amendment rights when school officials reprimanded
her and recommended termination
of her employment for escalating the turmoil. Toney v. Young,
238 F.Supp.3d 1234 (E.D. Cal.
2017).
Page 221: More on Employee Complaints Made During the
Scope of Employment.
An Edmonds, Washington, middle school special education
teacher who managed the district’s
Educational/Behavioral Disorders program challenged her
dismissal as retaliation for speaking
negatively to school administrators and parents about the
program. In upholding the trial court’s
rejection of her claims, the Ninth Circuit, which has jurisdiction
for a number of western states
including California, cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s Garcetti v.
Ceballos decision in noting that
the comments were made within the scope of her employment
and thus not protected by the First
Amendment. Coomes v. Edmonds School District No. 15, 816
F.3d 1255 (9th Cir. 2016).

What is interesting about the ruling is that the judges noted that
the teacher’s job description
encompassed both up-the-chain complaints and speaking to
parents. So her complaints embedded
in a chain of emails to both were unprotected. The Ninth Cir cuit
did not address how
encompassing a job description can be, a matter that the U.S.
Supreme Court justices cautioned
against. The judges also sidestepped the teacher’s assertion that
speaking to her union about the
matter was constitutionally protected as made outside the scope
of her employment since she
hadn’t argued that point. Whether her complaints may have been
protected under Washington
State law also was not addressed and the case returned to the
trial court on this issue. As noted in
California School Law, employee speech may be more protected
under state law than under the
First Amendment.

23
Page 236: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Rules on
When Student Off-campus
Speech via an Electronic Communication Device Loses its Free
Speech Protection.
In a cautious 2013 decision that examines the complex
dimensions of student off-campus speech,
the Ninth Circuit upheld the ten-day suspension and later
ninety-day expulsion of a Nevada
student who sent a series of MySpace messages to his fellow
students about a planned school
shooting. Included in the postings from his home computer were
discussions of the weapons he
possessed, his admiration for Adolph Hitler, and his intention to
conduct a school shooting on
April 20. The latter is the date of Hitler’s birth and the
Columbine massacre. For example, in one
posting he stated “I wish then I could kill more people / but I
have to make due with what I got. /
1 sks & 150 rds / 1 semi-auto shot gun w/sawed off barrel / 1
pistle.” Some of his friends were
sufficiently concerned that they alerted school officials. The
student challenged the disciplinary
action on several grounds, one of which was violation of his

rights of free speech.
Rather than craft a one-size fits all standard, the appellate
judges noted that “when faced with an
identifiable threat of school violence, schools must take
disciplinary action in response to off-
campus speech that meets the requirements of Tinker.” These
requirements encompass material
interference with school activities and invasion of the rights of
others. In this case, they noted that
it was reasonable for school officials to take seriously what the
student had said about causing
violence at school. Indeed, the student admitted to a police
officer that he had weapons and
ammunition at his house. And clearly the student’s threatening
the entire student body and
targeting specific students by name constituted invasion of the
rights of others. Thus, the Tinker
standards were met. At the same time, the judges noted that
their decision did not imply approval
of the school’s action. They noted, for example, that school
officials could have opted for a less
punitive approach that encompassed in part counseling by a
mental health professional. Wynar v.

Douglas County School District, 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013).
Three years later the Ninth Circuit relied in part on Wyman in
affirming a lower court decision
that an Oregon school district did not violate a seventh grade
student's free speech rights by
suspending the student for verbally sexually harassing two
fellow seventh graders with
disabilities on the way home after school. The harassment
started a few hundred feet from the
school along a path that begins at the school door and runs from
school fields across a public park
to a street. There is no fence or other boundary marker that
separates the park from school
property. The judges agreed that school administrators could
reasonably foresee that the effects of
the harassment would affect the victims' school experience.
Indeed, the two students did tell the
assistant principal that they felt uncomfortable, and there was
some discussion about it among
students at lunch. What is important about this decision is that
goes beyond off-campus electronic
communication to focus on face-to-face student comments. C.R.
v. Eugene School District 4J,
835 F.3rd 1142 (9th Cir. 2016).

Banning Students from Wearing Clothing Displaying
the American Flag on
Cinco de Mayo Day Does Not Violate the First Amendment.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has upheld a
federal district court ruling that
school administrators had sufficient justification for asking
three high school students to remove
their shirts displaying the American flag or turn them inside out
on Cinco de Mayo day. Given
ongoing racial tension and gang violence between Hispanic and
white students on the campus, the
administrative directive fell within the reasonable forecast of
disruption condition set forth in
Tinker v. Des Moines School District. The appellate court noted
that officials did not enforce a
blanket ban on American flag apparel. Several students were
allowed to wear their shirts with less
prominent flag imagery to class when it was clear that the shirts
were not likely to make them
targets of retaliation. In effect, both the trial and appellate
courts deferred to the judgment of

24
school officials, based on the facts as presented. Dariano v.
Morgan Hill Unified School District,
767 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2014).
Page 242: Messages Displayed on Uniforms.
As noted on this page, in 2008 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit ruled two-to-one in
Jacobs v. Clark County School District that a Nevada school
district did not violate student
expression and free exercise of religion rights when it forbid the
display of messages on a school
uniform. Consisting of plain-colored tops and bottoms, the
uniform policy did permit display of
school logos but the majority viewed these as less a form of
expression than as an identification
mark.
In another Nevada case involving a similar elementary school
dress code policy, two three-judge
panels disagreed with one another in a case requiring students
to display the motto “Tomorrow’s

Leaders” above the school logo on the school required shirt and
also permitting an exemption
from complying with the dress code for nationally recognized
youth organizations like Boy
Scouts or Girl Scouts on regular meeting days. The motto
display, the first panel ruled, is a form
of compelled speech. And the policy is not content-neutral
because it permits an exemption for
certain youth organizations. Because of the free speech
implications, the judicial standard of strict
scrutiny must be made to assure that it is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest.
The Ninth Circuit returned the case to the trial court to apply
this standard to the dress code
policy to determine if it violated student First Amendment
rights. Frudden v. Pilling, 742 F.3d
1199 (9th Cir. 2014). Before the trial court ruled on the matter,
the school board of trustees
adopted a new policy under which school uniforms could have a
logo with the school name and
mascot but no other language. This meant that “Tomorrow’s
Leaders” could no longer be
displayed on school uniforms and the elementary principal so
informed parents. The trial court

subsequently ruled in favor of the defendants.
The case was then appealed again to the Ninth Circuit, and this
time a different panel disagreed
with the first panel on the standard to apply to the matter,
though agreeing that the matter was
moot in light of the change in the uniform policy. This three-
judge panel maintained that
intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny should have
been used. And, if this standard were
used, the “Tomorrow’s Leaders” motto and the exemption for
nationally recognized youth
organizations would not violate the First Amendment. But
because all the judges on the Ninth
Circuit had refused to hear the case a second time, this panel
deferred to the judgment of the first
panel on the strict scrutiny standard and upheld its ruling. It
sent the case back to the trial court to
determine if the individual school employees could be subject to
damages. Frudden v. Pilling,
877 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2017). How the Ninth Circuit will deal
with matters involving school
uniforms in the future remains to be seen.

CHAPTER 7
THE SCHOOL AND RELIGION
Page 263: Football Coach Went Too Far in Praying on Football
Field After Games.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that has
jurisdiction for a number of western
states including California agreed with a federal district court in
Bremerton, Washington, that a
high school assistant football coach's speech while kneeling in
prayer on the football field
following games in presence of students and spectators was not
private speech but public speech
by a school employee that could be subject to content control by
the school district under the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Garcetti v. Ceballos decision (see p. 218 in the
previous chapter). Here, the
district had placed the coach on administrative leave after he
continued to pray on the fifty-yard
line immediately after games contrary to the school district’s
directives to avoid religious

25
endorsement in his coaching capacity. Kennedy v. Bremerton
School District, 869 F.3d 813 (9th
Cir. 2017).
Page 265: See Update For Page 62 Above Regarding Lawsuit
Brought by Hindu
Organization Challenging Portrayal of Hindu Religion in State
Board of Education’s
History-Social Science Content Standards.
Page 269: Yoga Classes in the Encinitas School District Ruled
Not to Advance Religion.
Based on a detailed review of evidence produced in the trial
court, a California court of appeal
has ruled that incorporation of yoga in physical education for
elementary students in the Encinitas
Union School District does not advance religion contrary to the
establishment clause in Article I,
Section 4 of the California Constitution. The court noted that
when the program was initiated,
some parents complained that it was advancing Hinduism. The
program was funded by a grant
from the KP Jois Foundation, which promotes Ashtanga yoga as

explained in Hindu texts. The
district responded by revising the program to remove features
that could be construed as religious
(e.g., Sanskrit language, Ashtanga tree poster, guided
meditation scripts). Character quotations
from religious figures were replaced with those from famous
persons like Babe Ruth and Martin
Luther King. The appellate court noted that while a reasonable
person might know that a grant
from the Jois Foundation was linked to Hinduism, that same
person "would also be aware that, as
implemented (italics), the District's yoga program was clearly
not (italics) Astanga eight-limbed
yoga." The yoga teachers were from the district, and the district
itself was not involved with the
Jois Foundation. The latter's involvement in the program other
than funding it was in assisting the
district in ensuring that yoga teachers would be proficient
teaching yoga poses to students.
Sedlock v. Baird, 185 Cal. Rptr.3d 739 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 2015).
CHAPTER 8
STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES

Pages 297-298 and 308-311: California Code of Regulations,
Title 5, Revised to Conform to
Federal Law.
Effective July 1, 2014, various sections of Title 5 of the
California Code of Regulations relevant
to special education were revised to conform to federal law.
The eligibility categories in the Title 5 regulations are now
identical to those contained in federal
law. As a result, the definitions of autism and specific learning
disability have been revised.
These changes are significant in that the revised specific
learning disability definition now
permits school districts to utilize a response to intervention or
pattern of strengths and weaknesses
analysis to qualify a student under the eligibility category of
specific learning disability and the
revised autism definition contains different criteria than the
prior definition for “autistic-like
behaviors”. The revised eligibility categories are found in
California Code of Regulations, Title 5,
Section 3030. Other amendments to the Title 5 regulations
include replacing the phrase

“designated instruction and services” with “related services”
and clarifying qualifications for
individuals to provide special education and related services.
Page 300: United States Supreme Court Revisits Educational
Progress Required Under
Free Appropriate Public Education Standard.
In March of 2017 the United States Supreme Court revisited the
amount of educational progress
required under the free appropriate public education (FAPE)
standard for the first time since the
Court’s decision in Board of Education v. Rowley.
26
The case concerned Endrew F. who is eligible for services under
the category of autism and
attended Douglas County School District in Colorado from
preschool through the fourth grade.
Unsatisfied with the individualized education program (IEP)
made available to Endrew, his

parents filed an administrative due process hearing against the
district and later appealed that
decision – which was favorable for the district – to a federal
district court and the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals. The administrative law judge, federal district
court, and the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals all found that the IEPs developed for Endrew by the
District were reasonably
calculated for Endrew to make some progress which they
defined as “merely more than de
minimis.” De minimis means trivial.
The Court reversed the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and held
that a FAPE requires that an IEP
be reasonably calculated to enable the child to make appropriate
educational progress in light of
the child’s circumstances and that sufficient progress means a
level of benefit greater than
“merely more than de minimis.” The Court declined to establish
a bright line rule as to what
constitutes appropriate progress but did note that a FAPE
requires a school district to design a
program which allows the student to advance appropriately
toward attaining IEP goals and, when

possible, be involved in and make progress in the general
curriculum. The Court also
acknowledged that grade level advancement may not be a
realistic goal for all children with IEPs
but that these children are nonetheless entitled to an educational
program that is “appropriately
ambitious in light of the [child’s] circumstances.”
The Court’s decision does not appear to fundamentally alter the
legal analysis of a FAPE in
California as the Office of Administrative Hearings has for
many years required that a child
receive “meaningful” educational benefit and that the child’s
unique, disability-related needs are
to be considered in determining if meaningful educational
benefit was attained. Endrew F. v.
Douglas County School District, 137 S.Ct. 988 (2017).
Page 306: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Holds
that School District Should
Have Suspected Autism for Child, District’s Failure to Conduct
Autism Assessment Could
Not Be Excused by District’s Possession of Third Party Autism
Report, and District’s

Failure to Conduct Its Own Autism Assessment of the Child
Denied the Child a Free
Appropriate Public Education.
The Ninth Circuit addressed whether a school district could be
excused from conducting its own
assessment of a child in the area of autism because the district
received an autism report for the
child completed by an evaluator not subject to the assessment
criteria in the IDEA. The Ninth
Circuit held that the Paso Robles Unified School District could
not and that by doing so the
district denied the child, Luke, a free appropriate public
education. The decision emphasizes the
importance of school districts conducting their own appropriate
assessments of children in all
areas of suspected disability.
The district evaluated Luke in 2009 shortly before his third
birthday to determine if he was
eligible for special education services. The assessment plan
governing the district’s assessment of
Luke did not identify “social/adaptive behavior” – the category
covering autism – as an area of

assessment and no assessment tools were utilized during the
assessment to evaluate Luke to
determine if he did satisfy the eligibility category of autism. A
district school psychologist,
however, did informally observe Luke while he was being
assessed by other district employees
and determined that it was not necessary for the district to
evaluate Luke in the area of autism.
Two days before the district convened an IEP team meeting to
review its initial evaluation of
Luke the district received a report from the regional center.
Regional centers provide non-
educational services to children with disabilities. The regional
center report provisionally
27
diagnosed Luke with Pervasive Developmental Disorder, Not
Otherwise Specified, which is a
disorder on the autism spectrum. At the IEP team meeting, no
mention was made of the school
psychologist’s observation of Luke or the regional center report.

The IEP team determined that
Luke satisfied the eligibility criteria for speech or language
impairment.
Luke’s parents later filed a due process hearing request with the
Office of Administrative
Hearings (OAH) against the district. They alleged, among other
claims, that the district violated
the IDEA by failing to assess Luke in the area of autism and
failing to address Luke’s autism-
related needs at school. The OAH denied the parents’ claims
and found that regardless of whether
the district’s initial evaluation was deficient there was no need
for the district to conduct
assessment of Luke in the area of autism because the report
from the regional center thoroughly
assessed Luke in that area.
Luke’s parents appealed to federal district court which affirmed
the decision of the OAH. The
court held that it was not necessary for the district to conduct an
autism assessment of Luke
because the school psychologist did not observe Luke exhibiting
obvious characteristics of autism

during the observation and further held that even if such an
assessment were warranted any
failure to assess in the area of autism was harmless error
because the IEP team made appropriate
recommendations for Luke in consideration of the regional
center report.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and focused its
analysis on the school district’s
failure to assess Luke in all areas related to his suspected
disability. The Ninth Circuit noted that a
disability is “suspected”, and therefore must be assessed by the
school district consistent with the
requirements of the IDEA, when the district has notice that the
child has displayed symptoms of
the disability. Informed suspicions of parents or outside experts
are sufficient to place a school
district on notice that a particular disability is “suspected” and
it is for this reason that the Ninth
Circuit held that once the district received the regional center
report, it was on notice that autism
was a suspected disability for Luke and therefore an area in
which the district must evaluate Luke
consistent with the requirements of the IDEA. The Ninth Circuit
thereafter held that the school

psychologist’s informal observation of Luke was not an
appropriate assessment under the IDEA
because, among other flaws, the parents were not made aware of
the observation or the opinion
formed after the observation which the IDEA requires through
the provision of an assessment
plan to parents identifying the areas to be assessed and the
subsequent generation of reports from
those assessments with review of the reports by an IEP team.
The Ninth Circuit further held that
the regional center report did not excuse the district’s failure to
evaluate Luke in the area of
autism because the assessment conducted for that report w as not
performed consistent with the
requirements of the IDEA and there was no evidence that the
report was actually considered by
the IEP team.
A failure to assess in an area of suspected disability is a
procedural violation of the IDEA. The
IDEA states that a procedural violation in and of itself,
however, does not deny the child a FAPE.
Rather, to deny the child a FAPE, the violation must seriously
impair the parents’ opportunity to

participate in the formulation of the child’s IEP, resul t in the
loss of educational opportunity for
the child, or cause a deprivation of the child’s educational
benefits. The Ninth Circuit determined
that the district’s failure to assess Luke in the area of autism
was a substantial procedural
violation that both deprived him of educational benefit and
substantially hindered his parents’
participation in the IEP process.
The lesson of the case is clear. If a school district is on notice
that a child is suspected of having a
disability, the district must conduct its own IDEA-compliant
assessment of the child in the area of
28
suspected disability and provide an assessment report to the IEP
team for review. Timothy O. v.
Paso Robles Unified School District, 822 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.
2016).

U.S. Court of Appeals Determines that Classroom
Supports Provided to Student
Without IEP Were Special Education Services Which in
Combination with Educational
Impact Resulting from Absences Related to Child’s Psychiatric
Hospitalizations and
Suicide Attempts Demonstrated that Child Was Eligible for
Special Education Services
Under the IDEA.
The IDEA sets forth two criteria for a child to be determined
eligible for special education
services: The child must meet one or more of the IDEA’s
eligibility categories (e.g., autism,
specific learning disability, etc.) and, by reason thereof, require
special education and related
services. In this case the Ninth Circuit addressed whether L.J., a
student the parties agreed
satisfied three eligibility categories, required special education
and related services and therefore
an IEP. The Ninth Circuit determined that L.J. did require
special education and related services,
should have been determined eligible for an IEP by the
Pittsburg Unified School District, and was
denied a free appropriate public education by the district’s

failure to determine L.J. eligible for
special education services and develop an IEP for him.
L.J. demonstrated both physically and verbally aggressive
behaviors in the 2nd through 5th
grades including hitting and kicking his teachers and calling
teachers and students names. In the
2nd grade he responded to a teacher disciplining him by saying
he wanted to kill himself. An
emergency suicide evaluation diagnosed him with ADHD,
Oppositional Defiance Disorder, and
Bipolar Disorder. The district provided L.J. – even though he
did not have an IEP – with a
paraeducator to support him in the classroom. The district
evaluated L.J. for special education
services toward the end of his 3rd grade year and determined
that he was not eligible for special
education services. Later that summer L.J. was admitted for
psychiatric hospitalization and
detained as a danger to himself and others for banging his head
and making threats.
L.J.’s parents thereafter filed a due process hearing request with
the OAH against the district. The

parties resolved the case by agreeing that the district would
reevaluate L.J. and place him at a
different school site for his 4th grade year. In September of that
year L.J. was suspended for
throwing rocks and threatening to kill the principal. L.J.,
however, continued to receive the
support of the paraeducator and other special accommodations
and his academic performance was
satisfactory. The IEP team considered the district’s reevaluation
of L.J. and determined once
again that he was not eligible for special education services
under the IDEA.
L.J.’s parents filed another due process hearing request against
the district, and the OAH
determined that L.J. did not satisfy any of the IDEA’s eligibility
categories and did not require
special education services. L.J.’s parents appealed the decision
of the OAH to federal district
court, and the court disagreed with the OAH’s decision that L.J.
did not satisfy any of the IDEA’s
eligibility categories. The court determined that L.J. satisfied
the criteria for specific learning
disability, other health impairment, and serious emotional
disturbance but nonetheless ruled for

the school district by determining that L.J. did not need special
education services because of his
satisfactory performance in the general education classroom.
L.J.’s parents appealed the district court’s decision to the Ninth
Circuit. Neither party challenged
the district court’s determination that L.J. satisfied three of the
IDEA’s eligibility categories. The
parties focused their arguments on whether L.J. required special
education services. In ruling for
L.J., the Ninth Circuit focused on the types of supports the
district had provided to L.J. when he
did not have an IEP and determined that these supports were not
general education interventions
and instead special education. The Ninth Circuit held that
general education instruction does not
29
provide for the one-to-one direction L.J. received from a
paraeducator, the mental health services
L.J. received through a school wide mental health program, nor

the clinical interventions L.J.
received from a behavior specialist who advised staff on how to
address L.J.’s behaviors. The
Ninth Circuit concluded that although L.J. made progress in his
educational program without an
IEP the progress was attributable in substantial part to the
special education services he received.
The Ninth Circuit further supported its determination that L.J.
was eligible for an IEP by noting
that L.J.’s emotional issues negatively impacted his attendance
and that his absences interfered
with his education.
As schools increasingly provide school-wide interventions to
general education students to
improve educational outcomes, this case serves as a good
reminder of the careful consideration
that should be given to how those interventions figure into the
analysis of whether a particular
student requires special education services under an IEP. L.J.
v. Pittsburg Unified School District,
835 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2016).
Page 319: Effective July 1, 2013, Title 5, California Code of

Regulations Functional Analysis
Assessments and Behavior Intervention Plans are no Longer
Required.
Assembly Bill (AB) 86 aligns those portions of the Education
Code addressing behavior for
children with disabilities with the requirements of the IDEA.
AB 86 eliminates the requirements
previously found in the Title Five, California Code of
Regulations that school districts undertake
a functional analysis assessment and the requirement that a
school district develop a behavior
intervention plan. The California Education Code now provides
that a school district should
undertake a functional behavioral assessment or FBA (an
evaluation of behavior) for students that
require behavioral interventions and, where appropriate,
develop a behavior intervention plan or
BIP (a plan identifying how to address the student’s behaviors)
to support these students. The
term BIP as it is now used in the Education Code is derived
solely from the IDEA and is not a
reference to the detailed document previously known as a BIP
under the Title 5 regulations. AB
86 also adds language to the Education Code addressing the use

of emergency behavioral
interventions such as physical restraint. These same
requirements regarding emergency were
previously in the Title 5, California Code of Regulations. The
above-noted additions to the
Education Code are at Section 56520 and following sections.
Page 325: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Emphasizes Necessity of School
Districts Initiating Due Process Hearings to Resolve Program
Disputes.
Education Code Section 56346 requires a school district to
initiate a due process hearing if the
district determines that a component of the proposed special
education program to which the
parent does not consent is necessary to provide a FAPE to the
child. The question for the Ninth
Circuit in this case was whether the Los Angeles Unified School
District’s failure to initiate a due
process hearing for a period of one and one-half years while the
parent and district disagreed over
the placement offer in the child’s IEP was unreasonable and
denied the child a FAPE. The Ninth
Circuit determined that the district waited too long to file a due

process hearing request and
thereby denied the child a FAPE because the child remained in
an inappropriate placement.
A November 2010 IEP recommended that I.R., a second grader
eligible under the category of
autism, attend a special day class. I.R.’s mother refused to
consent to the special day class and
insisted that I.R instead attend a general education classroom
with a one-to-one aide. Subsequent
IEPs through 2012 continued to recommend that I.R. attend a
special day class and I.R.’s mother
maintained her position that I.R. attend a general education
classroom. The district did not initiate
a due process hearing to address the placement dispute and I.R.
remained in the general education
classroom preferred by her mother.
30
In May 2012 I.R.’s parents filed a due process hearing request

against the district alleging that the
district denied I.R. a FAPE on various grounds, including on the
basis that the district failed to
comply with Section 56346 by requesting its own due process
hearing to resolve the placement
dispute. The OAH found in favor of the district for the most
part and determined that the district’s
failure to request a hearing did not deny I.R. a FAPE because
the IEP team offer of a special day
class was appropriate for I.R. and it was the refusal of I.R.’s
mother to consent to the placement
which had denied I.R. a FAPE.
The federal district court affirmed the decision of the OAH, but
the Ninth Circuit reversed. The
Ninth Circuit held that the goal of Section 56346 is to ensure
that placement disputes are resolved
promptly and that while school districts must have some
flexibility to consider the reasons for a
parent’s refusal to consent to an IEP, the one and one-half year
delay by the district in not filing a
due process hearing request despite the placement dispute was
too long. The Ninth Circuit further
held that the district’s failure to timely file a hearing request

was a procedural violation of the
IDEA which denied I.R. a FAPE because I.R. lost educational
opportunity by remaining in an
inappropriate placement. I.R. v. Los Angeles Unified School
District, 805 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir.
2015).
Page 325: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Clarifies
Application of Two-Year
Statute of Limitations for Filing Administrative Due Process
Hearing Complaints.
The underlying dispute arose in 2009 when the parents of G.A.
– a child eligible for services
under the category of autism – challenged the Spokane School
District 81’s assessment and
individualized education program (IEP) for their child. The
administrative hearing request that
followed, however, included allegations that the district should
have identified G.A. as a child
with a disability as early as 2006.
The administrative law judge primarily ruled in favor of the
district and held that the claims
concerning an alleged failure to identify G.A. as a child with a

disability in 2006 were time-
barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to due
process hearing complaints under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The
administrative law judge reasoned that
because the parents filed their complaint on April 26, 2010, that
any allegations predating April
26, 2008, were barred by the statute of limitations.
A federal district court affirmed the administrative decision but
the Ninth Circuit reversed the
federal district court and held that an inquiry must be made as
to when G.A.’s parents “knew or
should have known” about the conduct that formed the basis for
their complaint. The Ninth
Circuit’s decision clarifies that the two-year statute of
limitations is not applied robotically and
must take into consideration whether the parents knew or should
have known about the conduct
forming the basis for their complaint before a determination is
made to bar claims based on the
statute of limitations. For example, if a school district evaluates
a child in 2006, convenes an IEP
team meeting that same year, and informs the parents that their

child is not eligible for services,
the parents will likely be barred from attempting to challenge
the 2006 IEP team decision in a
2010 hearing request because the parents were aware of the
district’s determination of non-
eligibility in 2006 and therefore should have filed a hearing
request no later than 2008. Avila v.
Spokane School District 81, 852 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2017).
that School District’s
Unilateral Alteration of Individualized Education Program
Constitutes a Denial of a Free
Appropriate Public Education and Failure to Respond to
Parents’ Hearing Request
Violates the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
31
M.C. suffers from a genetic disease which renders him blind and
M.C. also has deficits in all
academic areas. M.C.’s mother filed a due process hearing

complaint against the Antelope Valley
Union High School District challenging the procedural and
substantive appropriateness of the
individualized education programs developed by the district for
M.C. Among the areas of dispute
was the specific offer of services from a teacher of the visually
impaired (TVI services) and the
district’s failure to comply with the IDEA by issuing a written
response to the administrative due
process hearing complaint.
The district’s individualized education program (IEP) – to
which M.C.’s mother consented –
made 240 minutes per month of TVI services available to M.C.
On the first day of the due
process hearing, however, the district took the position that the
offer of 240 minutes per month of
TVI services was a clerical error and that the actual offer of
TVI services was 240 minutes per
week. The district thereafter sought to defend the
appropriateness of the IEP based on its position
that the IEP offer was for 240 minutes per week. The Ninth
Circuit held that the district’s
unilateral revision of the amount of TVI services offered in the

IEP denied M.C. a free
appropriate public education (FAPE) because it “vitiates the
parents’ right to participate at every
step of the IEP drafting process.” The Ninth Circuit further held
that if the district discovered that
the IEP did not reflect the understanding of the parties’
agreement, that the district was required
to notify M.C.’s mother of this discovery and seek her consent
for any amendment.
After a school district receives a due process hearing request
from parents, the district must issue
a written response to the hearing request no later than 10
calendar days after receipt of the request.
20 U.S.C. section 1415(c)(2)(B)(i). The District never issued a
written response to M.C.’s due
process hearing complaint. The Ninth Circuit held that this
failure violated the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act and remanded the case to the federal
district court to determine the
degree of prejudice that M.C. suffered to determine an award of
appropriate compensation. The
Ninth Circuit also held that should a school district make this
same mistake in the future that the

administrative law judge must not permit the hearing to proceed
and instead order the district to
issue a response to the hearing request and shift the cost of any
related delay in the hearing
process to the district. M.C. v. Antelope Valley Union School
District, 858 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir.
2017).
Page 330: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Addresses Standard for School
Districts to Recover Attorneys’ Fees in Special Education
Disputes.
A school district may recover attorneys’ fees and costs for
frivolous claims pursued against the
district by a parent under the IDEA, the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), Section 504 the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 504), and/or 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983. The Ninth Circuit held
that a school district may recover attorneys’ fees against the
attorneys of a parent and/or the
parent if any of the parent’s claims under these statutes are
frivolous. The Ninth Circuit further
held that a claim is frivolous if the outcome of the claim is
plainly obvious or the arguments

supporting the claim are completely without merit.
The case initiated with the school district filing a due process
hearing request to defend its
assessment of a student in lieu of granting the parent’s request
for the district to fund an
independent educational evaluation (IEE). An IEE is an
evaluation of the child that is undertaken
by an individual not employed by the school district and
typically sought as a second opinion
regarding the child’s needs by the parent. The IDEA requires a
school district to, without
unnecessary delay, respond to a parent’s request for an IEE by
either granting the IEE or filing a
hearing request to demonstrate the appropriateness of the
district’s assessment of the student (34
C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(2)). The school district prevailed in the
hearing by demonstrating that its
assessment of the child was appropriate.
32

The parent’s attorney thereafter sent a letter to the district
offering to forego an appeal of the
hearing decision if the district funded an IEE for the child and
paid attorneys’ fees and costs to
the parent’s attorney. The district’s attorney responded with a
letter declining the settlement offer
and noting the district’s reservation of its right to seek
sanctions in response to any such appeal
which the district viewed as frivolous in consideration of the
hearing decision.
The parent thereafter appealed the administrative decision to
federal district court and raised
claims against the district under the ADA, Section 504, and a
claim for money damages under
Section 1983 – all predicated on allegations arising from or
related to the request for the IEE,
subsequent hearing, and the district’s rejection of the settlement
offer from the parent’s attorney.
Before the federal district court, the school district not only
prevailed with the judge affirming the
underlying decision of the due process hearing but the judge
invited the district to file a motion

for attorneys’ fees because the bases for the parent’s appeal
were frivolous. The judge
subsequently awarded the district $94,602.34 in attorneys’ fees
and $2,058.21 in costs against the
parent who thereafter appealed.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s award of
attorneys’ fees to the school district under
the IDEA and Section 504 based on the determination that the
parent’s claims under these statutes,
while described by the court as poorly plead and argued, did not
rise to the level of being
frivolous because there was at least some basis for the claims.
However, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the determination of the district court that the parent’s
claims under the ADA and
Section 1983 were frivolous because the claims under these
statutes had no support under the law.
A retaliation claim under the ADA cannot be predicated on an
alleged violation of the IDEA, and
California school districts cannot be sued for money damages
under Section 1983. Because the
bulk of the litigation focused on the IDEA and Section 504, it is
likely that on remand to the

federal district court that the ultimate award against the parent
will be significantly less. C.W. v.
Capistrano Unified School District, 783 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir.
2015).
that Parents Obtained More
Relief Through Due Process Hearing as Compared to School
District’s Statutory Offer of
Settlement and that Parents Were Substantially Justified in
Rejecting the Offer.
If a school district issues a settlement offer to a parent more
than 10 days before the
commencement of a due process hearing and the parent rejects
the offer and obtains less
favorable relief from the hearing decision, the parent may not
be able to recover attorneys’ fees
generated subsequent to receipt of the offer (34 C.F.R. §
300.517(c)(2)). Because attorneys’ fees
liability often represents a school district’s greatest potential
financial exposure in a due process
hearing, a well-crafted statutory offer of settlement can
significantly reduce the district’s
exposure. However, this potential limitation on recovery of a
parent’s attorneys’ fees does not

apply if a court determines that the parent was substantially
justified in rejecting the school
district’s offer.
The Ninth Circuit analyzed and applied these aspects of the
IDEA’s statutory offer of settlement
provision to hold that the parents of T.B., a child with brain
damage and physical problems, not
only obtained more relief than the San Diego Unified School
District’s settlement offer through
the due process hearing decision but that the parents were also
substantially justified in rejecting
the district’s offer.
The parties participated in a due process hearing before the
OAH in 2007. While the district
prevailed on most of the issues, the OAH held that T.B.
prevailed on issues pertaining to his
33
health care plan and a transition plan designed to increase

T.B.’s access to a school program –
findings that led to a determination that the district did not
make a FAPE available to T.B. Both
parties appealed to federal district court, and T.B. raised
additional claims against the district
under Section 504 and the ADA.
Prior to the commencement of the due process hearing the
parties engaged in settlement
negotiations and the school district sent a settlement offer to the
parents comprised of $150,000
per year in funding for T.B.’s educational program.
The federal district court affirmed the underlying OAH decision
and held that the parents
established prevailing party status and an entitlement to
reasonable attorneys’ fees based on their
partial success. In the ensuing litigation regarding attorneys’
fees, the school district argued that
the parents should not be permitted to recover any attorneys’
fees incurred after the date of the
settlement offer and the federal district court agreed.
In reversing the federal district court’s determination that the

school district’s settlement offer cut
off the parents’ entitlement to attorneys’ fees generated after
the date of the offer, the Ninth
Circuit first observed that comparison of a school district’s
settlement offer versus the result of
the litigation must be made from the perspective of the parents.
The Ninth Circuit thereafter
identified the following reasons as to why the settlement offer
was not more favorable than the
relief obtained by the parents through the due process hearing:
The settlement offer did not
clearly provide for reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and
required the parents to waive any
claimed entitlement to such fees and costs, while the parents
preserved their claim for fees and
costs by proceeding to hearing; the settlement agreement
terminated T.B.’s right to stay put under
his last agreed upon educational program and instead defined
stay put as whatever placement the
school district offered at the end of the settlement period, while
T.B.’s right to stay put was not
limited in this way while the parents proceeded to hearing; and
the settlement offer required the
parents to coordinate and supervise T.B.’s educational program

on their own with an amount of
money that would not have covered all of the necessary
expenses and precluded T.B’s enrollment
in a public school for at least some period of time.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision emphasizes the importance of a
school district’s carefully crafting its
settlement offer to mirror the type of relief the parents may
obtain from the OAH without
including additional terms or conditions which a court may later
determine to be less favorable
than the relief obtained from the OAH or justify the parents’
decision to reject the offer. T.B. v.
San Diego Unified School District, 806 F.3d 451 (9th Cir.
2015).
that Parents’ Consent to
Implementation of the IEP Does Not Bar Claims for Damages
Under Section 504 and the
ADA.
The Ninth Circuit addressed whether the parents’ consent to an
IEP developed under the IDEA
operated as complete defense to claims for damages the parents

were pursuing against the
Paradise Valley Unified School District under Section 504 and
the ADA. The student, A.G., was
attending seventh grade in Vista Verde, a district school, in
2010 and enrolled in a program for
students with high IQs and one or more learning or behavioral
disabilities. A.G.’s behaviors at
that time were aggressive, disruptive, and noncompliant. An IEP
team meeting was held for A.G.
and the team proposed that A.G. attend the Roadrunner School,
a non-public school primarily
designed for children with emotional disturbances. A.G.’s
parents visited Roadrunner, agreed that
it would be an appropriate placement for A.G., and consented to
implementation of the IEP.
34
On A.G.’s second day of attendance at the Roadrunner School
she resisted entering school and
had to be physically escorted onto campus by staff and led to

the “Intervention Room”. During
that incident, A.G. kicked a paraprofessional in the face. An
off-duty police officer who worked
security at the school was summoned and arrested A.G. for
aggravated assault and criminal
damage. A.G. was placed in handcuffs and detained until her
mother arrived. A bit over a month
later the same off-duty officer was called to escort A.G. to the
Intervention Room and A.G.
resisted, allegedly poking the officer in the eye and thereafter
scratching the officer’s face and
neck. A.G. was handcuffed and arrested for aggravated assault
and transported to the police
precinct.
A.G.’s parents thereafter filed an administrative due process
hearing request against the school
district under the IDEA and filed a lawsuit in state court against
the school district, the City of
Phoenix, and the officer who arrested A.G. alleging tort claims
and violations of Section 504 and
the ADA. A.G. and the district reached a settlement resolving
only the IDEA claims. A separate
settlement was thereafter executed between A.G. and the City of

Phoenix and the officer which
resulted in dismissal of all claims against those defendants.
A.G.’s parents, however, continued to
litigate the Section 504 and ADA claims against the district.
A.G.’s parents alleged that the district violated Section 504 by
denying A.G. meaningful access to
public benefits. A.G. claimed that the placement at Roadrunner
School was not, as Section 504
requires, designed to meet her needs as adequately as the needs
of nonhandicapped persons are
met because she did not have access to elective classes
available at Vista Verde and the
Roadrunner School was not the least restrictive environment.
A.G.’s parents also alleged that the
district violated both Section 504 and the ADA by failing to
provide her with an aide and
behavioral supports at Vista Verde which would have enabled
her to remain there instead of
being placed at the Roadrunner School by the IEP team.
The federal district court granted summary judgment for the
district and dismissed A.G.’s Section
504 claim by reasoning that her parents’ consent to the IEP

placing A.G. at the Roadrunner
School waived this claim. The federal district court also
dismissed A.G.’s ADA claim by holding
that there was no evidence to establish that the provision of
additional behavioral supports would
have enabled A.G. to remain at Vista Verde. The federal district
court also noted that there was
no evidence that A.G.’s parents had made a request to the
district for A.G. to receive any
additional behavioral supports at Vista Verde. A federal district
court grants summary judgment
when the court determines there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and that the party
that filed the motion for summary judgment – the school district
in this case – is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
A.G.’s parents appealed the federal district court’s summary
judgment ruling, and the Ninth
Circuit reversed the federal district court. The Ninth Circuit
observed that consent to an IEP does
not operate as a waiver of any rights held by A.G. under Section
504. This means that even
though A.G.’s parents were in agreement with the Roadrunner

School and consented to A.G.
attending the school, their cooperation in the IEP process did
not waive A.G.’s right to later claim
that the placement at the Roadrunner School violated her rights
under Section 504. The Ninth
Circuit also noted that the plaintiff in an ADA case has no
obligation to first request an
accommodation to preserve a failure to accommodate claim
under the ADA. In reversing the
federal district court, the Ninth Circuit took no position on
whether A.G. would ultimately prevail
on her claims but merely held that the federal district court’s
dismissal of her claims under a
summary judgement ruling was not warranted. The case was
remanded to the federal district
court for further fact finding.
35
This case highlights the levels of complexity which arise when
plaintiffs seek redress under

Section 504 and the ADA for school district conduct which is
taken under the IDEA. A.G. v.
Paradise Valley Unified School District, 815 F.3d 1195 (9th
Cir. 2016).
that School District’s
Compliance with IDEA for Deaf or Hard-of-Hearing Child Does
Not Necessarily Establish
Compliance with the ADA.
The Ninth Circuit addressed whether a school district’s
compliance with its obligations to a deaf
or hard-of-hearing child under IDEA also established
compliance with its effective
communication obligations to that child under Title II of the
ADA. The decision involved two
cases in which high school students with hearing disabilities
requested that their respective school
districts provide Communication Access Realtime Transcription
(CART) as a classroom
accommodation. CART is a word-for-word transcription service
in which a trained stenographer
providers real-time captioning that appears on a computer
monitor. In each case, the school

districts denied the request for CART but offered other
accommodations. And in each case the
OAH and a federal district court determined that the
accommodations made available by the
school districts satisfied the IDEA. The federal district courts
also held that the school districts’
compliance with the IDEA foreclosed any alleged violations of
the ADA based on the school
districts’ denials of the requests for CART.
Title II of the ADA includes a so-called “effective
communications regulation” which requires
public entities to ensure that communications with individuals
with disabilities are as effective as
communications with others and identifies CART as one type of
auxiliary aide or service which
may be provided. On appeal before the Ninth Circuit, the
plaintiffs argued that the effective
communications requirement of the ADA provides a
substantively different legal standard with
which school districts must comply as compared to the IDEA
and that a school district’s
compliance with the IDEA does not necessarily establish the
school district’s compliance with the

effective communications regulation of Title II of the ADA. The
Ninth Circuit agreed.
The Ninth Circuit carefully analyzed the relevant statutes and
regulations of Title II of the ADA
and the IDEA and concluded that a court reviewing an alleged
violation of the effective
communication regulation under Title II of ADA and IDEA
must analyze the allegations
separately. It was on this narrow point that the Ninth Circuit
reversed the decisions of the federal
district courts and remanded the cases for the courts to
undertake a fact-specific analysis of
whether the school districts complied with the effective
communication regulation of Title II of
ADA. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that a school district’s
offer of accommodations for a
student with a hearing disability through an IEP may very well
comply with both IDEA and Title
II of ADA but that a court’s analysis must separately review the
school district’s actions under
each statute. K.M. v. Tustin Unified School District and K.H.
v. Poway Unified School District,
725 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2013).

CHAPTER 9
STUDENT DISCIPLINE
Pages 346-349: Education Code Amended to Limit Use of
Suspension and Expulsion for
Disrupting School Activities and Willfully Defying School
Personnel.
Education Code Section 48900 has been amended to prohibit the
suspension or expulsion of
students enrolled in kindergarten through the third grade under
48900 (k), which authorizes
discipline for disrupting school activities or otherwise willfully
defying the valid authority of
supervisors, teachers, administrators, school officials, or other
school personnel engaged in the
performance of their duties. The amendment also prohibits the
expulsion of any student
36
regardless of grade for a violation of 48900 (k). The amendment

to section 48900 (k) does not
remove the authority of a teacher to suspend a student from
class under Education Code Section
48910 as discussed on page 341.
Page 360: Definition of “Electronic Act” Extends to
Communications Created or
Transmitted On or Off Campus for Purposes of Disciplining
Cyberbullying.
Education Code Section 48900 (r) has been amended to state
that an electronic act for purposes of
cyberbulling includes a communication originated created or
transmitted on or off the school site.
Under an earlier drafting error the section had defined an
“electronic act” as the creation and
transmission of a message of electronic posting. The amendment
clarifies that creating or
transmitting a prohibited message is sufficient for discipline.
Even with these amendments to
Section 48900 (r) school personnel should carefully evaluate
any situation in which discipline is
contemplated for an electronic act to ensure that the discipline
does not violate the free speech
rights of the offending student.

Pages 360-361: California Court of Appeal Upholds School’s
Authority to Involuntarily
Transfer Student.
A California court of appeal has upheld the Clovis Unified
School District’s involuntary transfer
of a student under Education Code Section 48432.5. The district
suspended a high school student
for entering school grounds under the influence of a controlled
substance and recommended his
involuntary transfer to a continuation school under Section
48432.5. The student was given
written notice of the recommendation and an opportunity to
participate in a meeting to question
the recommendation. Later the district transferred the student to
continuation high school. The
district made the findings required by Section 48432.5 including
a determination that the
student’s conduct violated the Education Code, the student’s
presence on campus posed a danger
to others or threatened to disrupt the education process, and
other means of correction had failed
to bring about improvement in the student’s behavior.

The student challenged the involuntary transfer by suing the
school district. The trial court upheld
the transfer and the student appealed. The student argued that
Section 48432.5 mandates
exhaustion of all other means of correction before a student can
be involuntarily transferred and
that judicial review of an involuntary transfer should use a
heightened “independent judgment test”
instead of the “substantial evidence” standard applied by the
trial court. The substantial evidence
standard affords more deference to a school district’s
disciplinary decisions.
The court of appeal held that Section 48432.5 does not require
exhaustion of all other means of
correction before imposition of an involuntary transfer and
noted that several means of correction
had been utilized with the student consistent with the section.
The judges further upheld the
substantial evidence standard of review utilized by the trial
court and noted that while access to
public education is a fundamental interest, an involuntary
transfer to a continuation school does
not affect this interest because the student is not being denied

access to a public education. The
student still received a public education albeit at a different
school site. Nathan G. v. Clovis
Unified School District, 169 Cal. Rptr.3d 588 (Cal. App. 5 Dist.
2014).
Pages 360-361: New Law Pertaining to Transfer of a Student
Convicted of Violent Felony
or Misdemeanor.
In 2016 the legislature enacted a law pertaining to the transfer
of a student convicted of a violent
felony or a misdemeanor under provisions of the Penal Code to
another school in the district if
the student and the victim of the crime are enrolled in the same
school. The new law, Section
48929 of the Education Code, requires the school district’s
governing board to first adopt a policy
that gives the student and the student’s parent or guardian a
right to request a meeting with the
37

principal or designee, requires prior attempts to resolve the
conflict through such measures as
counseling, states whether the transfer decision is subject to
periodic review pursuant to a
specified procedure, and describes the process by which the
board approves or disapproves the
principal’s recommendation. Once approved, the policy is to be
included in the district’s annual
notice to parents and guardians of their rights and
responsibilities as set forth in Education Code
Section 48980.
Page 361: Student’s Dismissal from Charter School is not an
Expulsion and Does Not
Invoke Education Code Procedures Applicable to Expulsions.
Scott B. was a student at Orange County High School of the
Arts, a charter school. Scott
exhibited a knife at school and was subsequently suspended and
dismissed from the school. Scott
sued the school and requested that the court reverse his
dismissal.
As discussed on page 31, charter schools are subject to some
but not all of the laws applicable to

traditional public schools. Of particular relevance to Scott’s
lawsuit is the fact that Education
Code Section 48918, which provides for an expulsion hearing,
does not apply to students in
charter schools. The court recognized that there is a difference
between being expelled and being
dismissed and that Scott was merely dismissed and therefore not
entitled to the procedural
protection of an expulsion hearing. The court observed that
Scott was free to immediately enroll
in his traditional public school of residence upon being
dismissed from the charter school. Such is
not the case for an expelled student, who must generally serve
the term of expulsion before being
admitted to another school in accord with Section 48915.2 (a).
Scott nonetheless argued that his dismissal should be reversed
because the school’s decision to
dismiss him was arbitrary and capricious. The court rejected
Scott’s argument and noted that his
dismissal was justified because he brought a knife to school.
Scott. B. v. Board of Trustees of
Orange County High School of the Arts, 158 Cal. Rptr.3d 173
(Cal. App. 4 Dist. 2014).

Federal District Court Clarifies “Basis of
Knowledge” for Determining When
Students without an Individualized Education Program Are
Nonetheless Entitled to the
IDEA’s Disciplinary Protections.
The Anaheim Union High School District recommended a
disciplinary removal of J.E., a student
with a Section 504 plan, but without an individualized
education program under the IDEA. The
District disciplined J.E. as a general education student and did
not convene a manifestation
determination meeting. J.E. challenged the removal before the
Office of Administrative Hearings
(OAH) and argued that the district had a “basis of knowledge”
based on J.E.’s behavior in class,
comments made during a Section 504 meeting, and information
provided to the district by J.E.’s
mother. If a school district is deemed to have a “basis of
knowledge” that a student is a child
with a disability, the district must adhere to the IDEA’s
procedures, including convening a
manifestation determination meeting no later than ten school
days after recommending a

disciplinary removal that constitutes a change of placement.
One way in which it may be
determined that a district has a basis of knowledge that a
student is a child with a disability is if
the teacher of the child or other personnel of the district express
specific concerns about a pattern
of behavior demonstrated by the child directly to the director of
special education or the agency
or to other supervisory personnel. OAH agreed with J.E. that the
district had a basis of knowledge,
thereby violating the IDEA by not timely convening a
manifestation determination meeting. The
district appealed the OAH decision to a federal district court.
On appeal, the district argued that the above-noted phrase
“pattern of behavior” necessarily
implicates behavior related to disciplinary issues and should be
interpreted to only apply when the
behavior is disciplinary in nature. In an unreported but
informative decision, the court rejected the
38

district’s argument and held that a “pattern of behavior” is not
limited to disciplinary issues and
may well include behavior which is associated with a potential
disability but does not implicate
any discipline. In regard to J.E., the court held that sufficient
information, including teacher
concerns, a reported psychiatric hospitalization, and a reported
suicide attempt, was available to
the district and established a pattern of behavior such that the
IDEA’s disciplinary procedures
applied to J.E. and the district’s recommendation for his
disciplinary removal from school.
Anaheim Union High School District v. J.E., 2013 WL 2359651
(C.D. CA 2013) (unpublished).
CHAPTER 10
PUBLIC ACCESS, PRIVACY, AND STUDENT SEARCH AND
SEIZURE
Page 396: Immigration Status Now Included in California
Student Civil Liberties Act.
Education Code Section 200 and following sections now include
immigration status as entitling
students to equal rights and opportunities in educational

institutions of the state.
Page 397: U.S. Dept. of Education Issues New Guidance on
Student Records.
School officials will find new information from the U.S.
Department of Education especially
useful on how to provide information about student achievement
while at the same time
protecting student privacy. The Department’s Privacy Technical
Assistance Center’s (PTAC)
Transparency Best Practices for Schools and Districts can be
found at http://ptac.ed.gov. For a
user-friendly site for parents, students, and school officials on
the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act (FERPA), go to http://familypolicy.ed.gov.
Pages 400-401: Updates on Records for Foster and Homeless
Children.
Education Code Section 49073 was amended in 2013 to restrict
the release of directory
information regarding a homeless student as defined in the
McKinney-Vento Homeless
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. § 11434a(2)) without the written
consent of a parent or of the student

when the student reaches eighteen or attends a postsecondary
educational institution.
Education Code Section 49076 also was amended to permit a
student aged 14 or over to have
access to his or her school records if the student is both
homeless and unaccompanied as defined
in the McKinney-Vento Act. These records also can be released
to an individual who completes
the Caregiver’s Authorization Affidavit as provided in Family
Code Section 6552 and signs the
affidavit for the purpose of enrolling a minor in school.
Page 401: See Update for Pages 82-83 Above Regarding
Gathering and Protecting Student
Social Media Data.
Page 409: More on Locker Searches.
What about conducting a search of another student’s locker
where the student in question may
have stored illicit items? This arose in the Richmond High
School in West Contra Costa Unified
School District when a female student alerted campus security
officers that student T.H. shot

someone on a city bus the day before and she had heard that he
had taken the weapon to school.
The campus security officers alerted the police. One of the
campus security officers noted that
T.H. did not spend time at his locker but rather at one of the
nearby lockers and had done so with
his girlfriend on the day of the shooting at a time when students
were required to be in class or at
lunch. The campus security officers knew that students often
store illicit items in other students’
lockers. When the campus security officers opened this
particular locker, nothing was found.
They then searched other lockers in the area where T.H. had
been seen. In one of these lockers
assigned to student J.D. they found the butt of a sawed-off
shotgun along with papers containing
T.H.’s name.
http://ptac.ed.gov/
http://familypolicy.ed.gov/
39

When police officers questioned J.D. after reading him his
Miranda rights, J.D. admitted the
weapon belonged to him. In a delinquency proceeding, J.D.
challenged the search of his locker as
a violation of his privacy rights. The appellate court rejected
the argument, noting that student
privacy concerns need to be balanced against the need for
campus safety. Here there was
reasonable cause for school officials to search J.D.’s locker,
knowing that students often stored
illicit items in lockers assigned to other students and that T.H.
had frequented the locker area
where the weapon was found. In re J.D., 170 Cal. App.3d 464
(Cal. App.1 Dist. 2014).
Page 410: School Administrator’s Search of a California
Student’s Cell Phone Upheld.
An assistant principal at Antioch High School became
concerned about suspicious behavior of
two students who were not in class, one of whom was suspected
of bringing a firearm to school
but then discarding it in a campus trash can. The two students
were taken to two adjoining rooms
in the vice principals’ office for questioning. Meanwhile, the
firearm was found and taken to the

office. Another student was observed walking back and forth by
the office. The administrators
were concerned, as they did not yet know who brought the
firearm to school. The student was
directed to enter the office but did not do so. He was escorted
back to the office. The
administrators noticed that he was fidgety and reaching down
into his pocket. Concerned that he
had a concealed weapon in his clothing and was resisting their
checking, they took him to the
ground. The cell phone was found. Concerned that this student
was communicating with one of
the other two students detained in the office about the fi rearm
since they knew each other and had
argued earlier that morning, one of the administrators removed
the phone from the student’s
pocket to keep him from manipulating it. The student had turned
off the cell phone. So the
assistant principal plugged it into a USB cable, which brought it
back on line. The assistant
principal viewed the student’s collection of text messages and
photographs showing him holding
the firearm that later was recovered from the trash can.

When questioned about his potential involvement in the gun
incident by a second vice principal,
the student became irate and screamed profanities. According to
this assistant principal, he said
“Those are my photos. You can’t do that.” After becoming
belligerent, the student was subdued
by campus supervisors. The Antioch police were contacted.
When the student contested the cell
phone search at a juvenile court hearing as a violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights, the judge
rejected it and declared the juvenile a ward of the state. The
California appellate court concurred
with the ruling, noting that the discovery of a firearm and its
magazine cartridge on school
property coupled with the student’s connection with the other
two students in the office fell
within the reasonable grounds for a student search. “This is
particularly true,” wrote the judges,
“when one considers the gravity of the situation that initially
gave rise to the search – the
discovery of a firearm and magazine on school grounds.” In re
Rafael C., 200 Cal. Rptr3d 305
(Cal. App. 1 Dist. 2016).

CHAPTER 11
RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION
Page 439: Single Gender Academies Pilot Program Repealed
Effective January 1, 2016.
Page 439: New Law Allows Single Gender Schools and Classes.
In 2017, the legislature enacted Education Code Section 232 and
following sections allowing
school districts with an average daily attendance of 400,000 or
more students as of July 1, 2017
and charter schools authorized by school districts of this size to
maintain single gender schools or
classes under certain conditions for the purpose of determining
their value. Among the numerous
conditions is compliance with Title IX, enrollment of no more
than 700 students in a single
40
gender school, enrollment of no more than 1,000 students in a
coeducational school maintaining

single gender classes, voluntary enrollment, and conducting
evaluations at least every two years.
Among other things, the evaluations are to include the impact of
the single gender school or class
on students who identify as LGBTQ or gender nonconforming.
Given the detailed nature of these
provisions, they should be viewed directly by going to
www.cde.ca.gov and clicking on Laws and
Regulations under the “Resources” heading. These code
provisions are effective only until
January 1, 2025.
Pages 439-441: New Law Requires Internet Posting of Title IX
Information.
Effective on or before July 1, 2017, all California public and
charter schools as well as private
schools receiving federal funds are required to post on their
website specific information about
Title IX. Included is the name of the Title IX coordinator, rights
provided by Title IX,
responsibilities of the school under Title IX, how to file a
complaint and how it will be
investigated, and a link to the U.S. Department of Education
Office for Civil Rights website

(Educ. Code § 221.61). A public school that does not have a
website is to have the information
posted on the school district or county office of education
website.
Page 440: Ninth Circuit Affirms Ollier Decision; Adopts Title
IX Tests.
In a lengthy decision that examines the Sweetwater case in
detail, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the federal district court decision. In
doing so, the appeals court
adopted the three-part test set forth by the Office of Civil
Rights in 1979 to determine compliance
with Title IX in the context of athletics: (1) whether
participation opportunities for male and
female students are provided in numbers substantially
proportionate to their respective
enrollments, or (2) whether the institution can show a history
and continuing practice of athletic
program expansion demonstrably responsive to the developing
interest and abilities of the number
of the underrepresented sex, or (3) whether it can be
demonstrated that the interest and abilities
of the underrepresented sex in athletics have been fully and

effectively accommodated by the
present program when the institution cannot show a continuing
practice of athletic program
expansion. Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High School District,
768 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2014).
Page 441: Transgender Students Now Allowed to Participate in
Programs and Use Facilities
Consistent with their Gender Identity.
California’s Sex Equity in Education Act has been amended to
allow students to participate in
school programs and activities and to use school facilities
consistent with how they view their
gender regardless of the gender listed on school records. Thus,
for example, transgender students
can use restroom facilities that are consistent with how they
view their gender. Programs and
activities include athletic teams and competitions (Educ. Code §
221.5). See also the update on p.
396 above regarding student immigration status.
Pages 441-442: Reporting of Gender Data in Competitive
Athletics Required.
Traditional public and charter elementary and secondary schools

participating in competitive
athletics are now required under the Sex Equity in Education
Act to report at the end of the year
student athletic participation data by gender (Educ. Code §
221.9). These data encompass the
enrollment of the school by gender, the number of boys and
girls who participate in athletics, and
the number of boys’ and girls’ teams classified by sport and by
competitive level. The data are to
be posted for at least three years on the school’s website or if
no website on the district’s or
charter operator’s website. The purpose is to call attention to
gender gaps as the first step in
addressing them for the purpose of increasing the benefits of
competitive athletics for female
students.
41
Page 446: Limitations on Removing Survey Questions

Pertaining to Sexual Orientation and
Identity.
Section 51514 was added to the Education Code in 2017
prohibiting a local educational agency
that administers a voluntary survey already including questions
pertaining to sexual orientation
and gender identity from removing those questions. The reason
is to collect accurate data to
effectively implement and deliver critical state services and
programs.
Page 446: U.S. Department of Education Confirms Application
of Title IX to Sexual
Orientation.
As noted on this page, a federal district court in California ruled
some years ago that Title IX
encompasses same-sex harassment. In April 2014 the U.S.
Department of Education issued a
Dear Colleague Letter stating that Title IX protects all students
at recipient institutions from sex
discrimination, including sexual violence: “Any student can
experience sexual violence: from
elementary to professional school students; male and female
students; straight, gay, lesbian,

bisexual and transgender students; part-time and full-time
students; students with and without
disabilities; and students of different races and national
origins.”
Page 447: Court Allows Parent to Sue School District His Son
Previously Attended Where
He was Subjected to Discrimination and Bullying.
Because there is a manifest public interest in enforcing anti -
discrimination and anti-bullying laws
in public schools, a California court of appeal has overruled a
trial court decision that the parent
of a special needs child who no longer attended the public
school where the bullying had occurred
could not sue the district for damages. As a citizen and
taxpayer, the parent has standing to seek
enforcement of these laws. Hector F. v. El Centro Elementary
School District, 173 Cal. Rptr.3d
413 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 2014).
CHAPTER 12
LEGAL LIABILITY

More Protection for Student Athletes.
In 2014 the legislature added Section 35179.5 to the Education
Code restricting school districts,
charter schools, and private schools from conducting more than
two full-contact practices per
week for high school or middle school football teams during the
preseason or regular season. A
practice includes a team camp session. The full-contact portion
of a practice is not to exceed 90
minutes in a day. No full-contact practice is to be held during
the off-season, meaning a period
extending from the end of the regular season until 30 days
before the commencement of the next
regular season. The California Interscholastic Federation (CIF)
is urged to develop rules to
implement these provisions.
Education Code Section 49475 also was amended to provide
that if a licensed health care
provider – meaning one trained in concussion management –
determines that a student athlete has
sustained a concussion or head injury, the athlete is to complete
a graduated return-to-play
protocol of no less than seven days under supervision of the

provider. The CIF is urged to work
with the American Academy of Pediatrics and the American
Medical Society for Sports Medicine
to develop implementing procedures.
Starting on July 1, 2017, the Eric Paredes Sudden Cardiac
Arrest Prevention Act requires the
State Department of Education (SDE) to post on its website
information and training information
about sudden cardiac arrest and encourages all schools to do the
same. In addition, each year
before a student participates in an athletic activity whether
governed by the California
Interscholastic Federation or not, the public or private school
that conducts the athletic activity
42
must have the parent or guardian of participating students
acknowledge receipt of the information
posted on the SDE’s website about sudden cardiac arrest
symptoms and warning signs. Athletic

personnel are to remove any student who passes out or faints
while participating in or
immediately following an athletic activity. The student is not to
be allowed to participate until
cleared to return in writing by a physician and surgeon or a
nurse practitioner or physician
assistant knowledgeable in this area. In addition, coaches are to
complete the sudden cardiac
arrest training course posted on the SDE website and to retake it
every two years. For details, see
Education Code Section 33479 and following sections.
Page 464: More on Assumption of Risk.
While students must assume some degree of assumption of risk
when they participate in
dangerous athletic activities as noted in the Lilley decision
discussed on this page, that
assumption does not eliminate the general requirement of
providing student supervision. This
point was made by a California court of appeal in a nonathletic
case involving a middle school
student who was seriously injured when forced to perform a flip
by another student while
engaging in break dancing in an unsupervised classroom. The

court noted testimony that teachers
were not to leave classrooms unsupervised and that students had
been told not to perform flips.
The court also noted testimony from the teacher that he did not
think it was necessary to tell the
school administration that he had opened his classroom for early
morning physical activity to help
them prepare for a talent show and had them sign a release form
[not clear what this stated], was
unaware of the no-flipping directive, and left his classroom only
briefly. Given that the injury to
the student could have been caused by failure to enforce the no
flipping rule, lack of informing
teachers about it, and/or negligent classroom supervision, the
appeals court returned the case to
the trial court. Jimenez v. Roseville City School District, 202
Cal. Rptr.3d 536 (Cal. App. 3 Dist.
2016). The lesson is for school administrators to make sure that
teachers are fully aware when
new student rules are made and that students are not left in
unsupervised classrooms where
physical activity can spiral into bodily harm.
Page 477: School Counselor Not Immune from Liability under

the Tort Claims Act for
Allegedly Giving Suspected Child Abuse Report to Students’
Father.
Two male high school students in the Grossmont Union High
School District reported to a school
counselor that they were being verbally and physically abused
by their mother. Some years before,
the mother had been given sole legal and physical custody of
the two boys. Later, she had
allowed the father to move back into the home so he could take
care of the sons while she was at
work. In accord with the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting
Act (CANRA), the school counselor
as a mandated reporter submitted a child abuse report to Child
Welfare Services and to the
school’s resources officer based on what the boys had told her.
According to the counselor, she
was advised to give a copy of the child abuse report to the boys’
father, who had transported the
boys to school, and to allow the father to take the boys to the
sheriff’s department. The father
instead took the boys and the report to the courthouse where he
sought to be awarded custody of
his sons. The family court later rejected his claim, affirming the

mother’s right to sole legal and
physical custody. Subsequently, the mother sued both the school
counselor and the school district
under the Tort Claims Act, alleging a violation of her right to
privacy under CANRA when the
counselor gave the boys’ father a copy of the child abuse report.
The trial court dismissed the
lawsuit, and the mother appealed.
The court of appeal overruled the trial court, pointing out that
in the interest of privacy protection,
the CANRA expressly prohibits a mandatory reporter from
disclosing a suspected child abuse
report to someone like the boys’ father who is not one of the
individuals or entities identified in
Section 11167.5 of the Penal Code. Thus, the counselor was not
exercising discretion under
Section 820.2 of the Tort Claims Act when she released the
suspected child abuse report to the
43

boys’ father. The appellate court also ruled that the trial court’s
granting summary judgment to
the school district was improper because the district could be
vicariously liable for the
counselor’s conduct under Section 815.2 of the Tort Claims Act.
Cuff v. Grossmont Union High
School District, 164 Cal. Rpt.3d 487 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 2013).
Page 482: Belanger Decision Affirmed. School Districts and
County Offices of Education
Remain Immune from Lawsuits under Section 1983.
The Ninth Circuit has ruled that neither the Local Control
Funding Formula (LCFF) nor the Local
Control and Accountability Plan (LCAP) that changed the way
public schools and county offices
of education are funded (see the discussion above in the update
for Chapter 3). Thus Eleventh
Amendment immunity from lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. Section
1983 continues. Sato v. Orange
County Dept. of Education, 861 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2017).
EDUCATION CODE - EDC
TITLE 2. ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
[33000 - 65001]
( Title 2 enacted by Stats. 1976, Ch. 1010. )

DIVISION 4. INSTRUCTION AND SERVICES [46000 - 65001]
( Division 4 enacted by Stats. 1976, Ch. 1010. )
PART 27. PUPILS [48000 - 49703]
( Part 27 enacted by Stats. 1976, Ch. 1010. )
CHAPTER 6. Pupil Rights and Responsibilities [48900 - 49051]
( Chapter 6 enacted by Stats. 1976, Ch. 1010. )
ARTICLE 1. Suspension or Expulsion [48900 - 48927]
( Article 1 repealed and added by Stats. 1983, Ch. 498, Sec. 91.
)
48900.
A pupil shall not be suspended from school or recommended for
expulsion, unless the superintendent of the school district or the
principal of the school in which the pupil is enrolled determines
that the pupil has committed an act as defined pursuant to any
of subdivisions (a) to (r), inclusive:
(a) (1) Caused, attempted to cause, or threatened to cause
physical injury to another person.
(2) Willfully used force or violence upon the person of another,
except in self-defense.
(b) Possessed, sold, or otherwise furnished a firearm, knife,
explosive, or other dangerous object, unless, in the case of
possession of an object of this type, the pupil had obtained
written permission to possess the item from a certificated school
employee, which is concurred in by the principal or the
designee of the principal.
(c) Unlawfully possessed, used, sold, or otherwise furnished, or
been under the influence of, a controlled substance listed in
Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 11053) of Division 10 of
the Health and Safety Code, an alcoholic beverage, or an
intoxicant of any kind.
(d) Unlawfully offered, arranged, or negotiated to sell a
controlled substance listed in Chapter 2 (commencing with
Section 11053) of Division 10 of the Health and Safety Code, an

alcoholic beverage, or an intoxicant of any kind, and either
sold, delivered, or otherwise furnished to a person another
liquid, substance, or material and represented the liquid,
substance, or material as a controlled substance, alcoholic
beverage, or intoxicant.
(e) Committed or attempted to commit robbery or extortion.
(f) Caused or attempted to cause damage to school property or
private property.
(g) Stole or attempted to steal school property or private
property.
(h) Possessed or used tobacco, or products containing tobacco
or nicotine products, including, but not limited to, cigarettes,
cigars, miniature cigars, clove cigarettes, smokeless tobacco,
snuff, chew packets, and betel. However, this section does not
prohibit the use or possession by a pupil of the pupil’s own
prescription products.
(i) Committed an obscene act or engaged in habitual profanity
or vulgarity.
(j) Unlawfully possessed or unlawfully offered, arranged, or
negotiated to sell drug paraphernalia, as defined in Section
11014.5 of the Health and Safety Code.
(k) (1) Disrupted school activities or otherwise willfully defied
the valid authority of supervisors, teachers, administrators,
school officials, or other school personnel engaged in the
performance of their duties.
(2) Except as provided in Section 48910, a pupil enrolled in
kindergarten or any of grades 1 to 3, inclusive, shall not be
suspended for any of the acts enumerated in paragraph (1), and
those acts shall not constitute grounds for a pupil enrolled in
kindergarten or any of grades 1 to 12, inclusive, to be
recommended for expulsion. This paragraph is inoperative on
July 1, 2020.
(3) Except as provided in Section 48910, commencing July 1,
2020, a pupil enrolled in kindergarten or any of grades 1 to 5,
inclusive, shall not be suspended for any of the acts specified in
paragraph (1), and those acts shall not constitute grounds for a

pupil enrolled in kindergarten or any of grades 1 to 12,
inclusive, to be recommended for expulsion.
(4) Except as provided in Section 48910, commencing July 1,
2020, a pupil enrolled in any of grades 6 to 8, inclusive, shall
not be suspended for any of the acts specified in paragraph (1).
This paragraph is inoperative on July 1, 2025.
(l) Knowingly received stolen school property or private
property.
(m) Possessed an imitation firearm. As used in this section,
“imitation firearm” means a replica of a firearm that is so
substantially similar in physical properties to an existing
firearm as to lead a reasonable person to conclude that the
replica is a firearm.
(n) Committed or attempted to commit a sexual assault as
defined in Section 261, 266c, 286, 287, 288, or 289 of, or
former Section 288a of, the Penal Code or committed a sexual
battery as defined in Section 243.4 of the Penal Code.
(o) Harassed, threatened, or intimidated a pupil who is a
complaining witness or a witness in a school disciplinary
proceeding for purposes of either preventing that pupil from
being a witness or retaliating against that pupil for being a
witness, or both.
(p) Unlawfully offered, arranged to sell, negotiated to sell, or
sold the prescription drug Soma.
(q) Engaged in, or attempted to engage in, hazing. For purposes
of this subdivision, “hazing” means a method of initiation or
preinitiation into a pupil organization or body, whether or not
the organization or body is officially recognized by an
educational institution, that is likely to cause serious bodily
injury or personal degradation or disgrace resulting in physical
or mental harm to a former, current, or prospective pupil. For
purposes of this subdivision, “hazing” does not include athletic
events or school-sanctioned events.
(r) Engaged in an act of bullying. For purposes of this
subdivision, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1) “Bullying” means any severe or pervasive physical or verbal

act or conduct, including communications made in writing or by
means of an electronic act, and including one or more acts
committed by a pupil or group of pupils as defined in Section
48900.2, 48900.3, or 48900.4, directed toward one or more
pupils that has or can be reasonably predicted to have the effect
of one or more of the following:
(A) Placing a reasonable pupil or pupils in fear of harm to that
pupil’s or those pupils’ person or property.
(B) Causing a reasonable pupil to experience a substantially
detrimental effect on the pupil’s physical or mental health.
(C) Causing a reasonable pupil to experience substantial
interference with the pupil’s academic performance.
(D) Causing a reasonable pupil to experience substantial
interference with the pupil’s ability to participate in or benefit
from the services, activities, or privileges provided by a school.
(2) (A) “Electronic act” means the creation or transmission
originated on or off the schoolsite, by means of an electronic
device, including, but not limited to, a telephone, wireless
telephone, or other wireless communication device, computer,
or pager, of a communication, including, but not limited to, any
of the following:
(i) A message, text, sound, video, or image.
(ii) A post on a social network internet website, including, but
not limited to:
(I) Posting to or creating a burn page. “Burn page” means an
internet website created for the purpose of having one or more
of the effects listed in paragraph (1).
(II) Creating a credible impersonation of another actual pupil
for the purpose of having one or more of the effects listed in
paragraph (1). “Credible impersonation” means to knowingly
and without consent impersonate a pupil for the purpose of
bullying the pupil and such that another pupil would reasonably
believe, or has reasonably believed, that the pupil was or is the
pupil who was impersonated.
(III) Creating a false profile for the purpose of having one or
more of the effects listed in paragraph (1). “False profile”

means a profile of a fictitious pupil or a profile using the
likeness or attributes of an actual pupil other than the pupil who
created the false profile.
(iii) (I) An act of cyber sexual bullying.
(II) For purposes of this clause, “cyber sexual bullying” means
the dissemination of, or the solicitation or incitement to
disseminate, a photograph or other visual recording by a pupil
to another pupil or to school personnel by means of an
electronic act that has or can be reasonably predicted to have
one or more of the effects described in subparagraphs (A) to
(D), inclusive, of paragraph (1). A photograph or other visual
recording, as described in this subclause, shall include the
depiction of a nude, semi-nude, or sexually explicit photograph
or other visual recording of a minor where the minor is
identifiable from the photograph, visual recording, or other
electronic act.
(III) For purposes of this clause, “cyber sexual bullying” does
not include a depiction, portrayal, or image that has any serious
literary, artistic, educational, political, or scientific value or
that involves athletic events or school-sanctioned activities.
(B) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) and subparagraph (A), an
electronic act shall not constitute pervasive conduct solely on
the basis that it has been transmitted on the internet or is
currently posted on the internet.
(3) “Reasonable pupil” means a pupil, including, but not limited
to, a pupil with exceptional needs, who exercises average care,
skill, and judgment in conduct for a person of that age, or for a
person of that age with the pupil’s exceptional needs.
(s) A pupil shall not be suspended or expelled for any of the
acts enumerated in this section unless the act is related to a
school activity or school attendance occurring within a school
under the jurisdiction of the superintendent of the school
district or principal or occurring within any other school
district. A pupil may be suspended or expelled for acts that are
enumerated in this section and related to a school activity or
school attendance that occur at any time, including, but not

limited to, any of the following:
(1) While on school grounds.
(2) While going to or coming from school.
(3) During the lunch period whether on or off the campus.
(4) During, or while going to or coming from, a school-
sponsored activity.
(t) A pupil who aids or abets, as defined in Section 31 of the
Penal Code, the infliction or attempted infliction of physical
injury to another person may be subject to suspension, but not
expulsion, pursuant to this section, except that a pupil who has
been adjudged by a juvenile court to have committed, as an
aider and abettor, a crime of physical violence in which the
victim suffered great bodily injury or serious bodily injury shall
be subject to discipline pursuant to subdivision (a).
(u) As used in this section, “school property” includes, but is
not limited to, electronic files and databases.
(v) For a pupil subject to discipline under this section, a
superintendent of the school district or principal is encouraged
to provide alternatives to suspension or expulsion, using a
research-based framework with strategies that improve
behavioral and academic outcomes, that are age appropriate and
designed to address and correct the pupil’s specific misbehavior
as specified in Section 48900.5.
(w) (1) It is the intent of the Legislature that alternatives to
suspension or expulsion be imposed against a pupil who is
truant, tardy, or otherwise absent from school activities.
(2) It is further the intent of the Legislature that the Multi-
Tiered System of Supports, which includes restorative justice
practices, trauma-informed practices, social and emotional
learning, and schoolwide positive behavior interventions and
support, may be used to help pupils gain critical social and
emotional skills, receive support to help transform trauma-
related responses, understand the impact of their actions, and
develop meaningful methods for repairing harm to the school
community.
(Amended by Stats. 2019, Ch. 279, Sec. 2. (SB 419) Effective

January 1, 2020.)
48900.1.
(a) The governing board of each school district may adopt a
policy authorizing teachers to require the parent or guardian of
a pupil who has been suspended by a teacher pursuant to
Section 48910 for reasons specified in subdivision (i) or (k) of
Section 48900, to attend a portion of a schoolday in the
classroom of his or her child or ward. The policy shall take into
account reasonable factors that may prevent compliance with a
notice to attend. The attendance of the parent or guardian shall
be limited to the class from which the pupil was suspended.
(b) The policy shall be adopted pursuant to the procedures set
forth in Sections 35291 and 35291.5. Parents and guardians
shall be notified of this policy prior to its implementation. A
teacher shall apply any policy adopted pursuant to this section
uniformly to all pupils within the classroom.
The adopted policy shall include the procedures that the district
will follow to accomplish the following:
(1) Ensure that parents or guardians who attend school for the
purposes of this section meet with the school administrator or
his or her designee after completing the classroom visitation
and before leaving the schoolsite.
(2) Contact parents or guardians who do not respond to the
request to attend school pursuant to this section.
(c) If a teacher imposes the procedure pursuant to subdivision
(a), the principal shall send a written notice to the parent or
guardian stating that attendance by the parent or guardian is
pursuant to law. This section shall apply only to a parent or
guardian who is actually living with the pupil.
(d) A parent or guardian who has received a written notice
pursuant to subdivision (c) shall attend class as specified in the
written notice. The notice may specify that the attendance of the
parent or guardian be on the day the pupil is scheduled to return
to class, or within a reasonable period of time thereafter, as
established by the policy of the board adopted pursuant to

subdivision (a).
(Amended by Stats. 2004, Ch. 895, Sec. 9. Effective January 1,
2005.)
48900.2.
In addition to the reasons specified in Section 48900, a pupil
may be suspended from school or recommended for expulsion if
the superintendent or the principal of the school in which the
pupil is enrolled determines that the pupil has committed sexual
harassment as defined in Section 212.5.
For the purposes of this chapter, the conduct described in
Section 212.5 must be considered by a reasonable person of the
same gender as the victim to be sufficiently severe or pervasive
to have a negative impact upon the individual’s academic
performance or to create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
educational environment. This section shall not apply to pupils
enrolled in kindergarten and grades 1 to 3, inclusive.
(Added by Stats. 1992, Ch. 909, Sec. 2. Effective January 1,
1993.)
48900.3.
In addition to the reasons set forth in Sections 48900 and
48900.2, a pupil in any of grades 4 to 12, inclusive, may be
suspended from school or recommended for expulsion if the
superintendent or the principal of the school in which the pupil
is enrolled determines that the pupil has caused, attempted to
cause, threatened to cause, or participated in an act of, hate
violence, as defined in subdivision (e) of Section 233.
2000.)
48900.4.
In addition to the grounds specified in Sections 48900 and
48900.2, a pupil enrolled in any of grades 4 to 12, inclusive,
may be suspended from school or recommended for expulsion if
the superintendent or the principal of the school in which the

pupil is enrolled determines that the pupil has intentionally
engaged in harassment, threats, or intimidation, directed against
school district personnel or pupils, that is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to have the actual and reasonably expected effect of
materially disrupting classwork, creating substantial disorder,
and invading the rights of either school personnel or pupil s by
creating an intimidating or hostile educational environment.
2003.)
48900.5.
(a) Suspension, including supervised suspension as described in
Section 48911.1, shall be imposed only when other means of
correction fail to bring about proper conduct. A school district
may document the other means of correction used and place that
documentation in the pupil’s record, which may be accessed
pursuant to Section 49069.7. However, a pupil, including an
individual with exceptional needs, as defined in Section 56026,
may be suspended, subject to Section 1415 of Title 20 of the
United States Code, for any of the reasons enumerated in
Section 48900 upon a first offense, if the principal or
superintendent of schools determines that the pupil violated
subdivision (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) of Section 48900 or that the
pupil’s presence causes a danger to persons.
(b) Other means of correction include, but are not limited to, the
following:
(1) A conference between school personnel, the pupil’s parent
or guardian, and the pupil.
(2) Referrals to the school counselor, psychologist, social
worker, child welfare attendance personnel, or other school
support service personnel for case management and counseling.
(3) Study teams, guidance teams, resource panel teams, or other
intervention-related teams that assess the behavior, and develop
and implement individualized plans to address the behavior in
partnership with the pupil and the pupil’s parents.
(4) Referral for a comprehensive psychosocial or

psychoeducational assessment, including for purposes of
creating an individualized education program, or a plan adopted
pursuant to Section 504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act of
1973 (29 U.S.C. Sec. 794(a)).
(5) Enrollment in a program for teaching prosocial behavior or
anger management.
(6) Participation in a restorative justice program.
(7) A positive behavior support approach with tiered
interventions that occur during the schoolday on campus.
(8) After school programs that address specific behavioral
issues or expose pupils to positive activities and behaviors,
including, but not limited to, those operated in collaboration
with local parent and community groups.
(9) Any of the alternatives described in Section 48900.6.
(Amended by Stats. 2019, Ch. 497, Sec. 61. (AB 991) Effective
January 1, 2020.)
48900.6.
As part of or instead of disciplinary action prescribed by this
article, the principal of a school, the principal’s designee, the
superintendent of schools, or the governing board may require a
pupil to perform community service on school grounds or, with
written permission of the parent or guardian of the pupil, off
school grounds, during the pupil’s nonschool hours. For the
purposes of this section, “community service” may include, but
is not limited to, work performed in the community or on school
grounds in the areas of outdoor beautification, community or
campus betterment, and teacher, peer, or youth assistance
programs. This section does not apply if a pupil has been
suspended, pending expulsion, pursuant to Section 48915.
However, this section applies if the recommended expulsion is
not implemented or is, itself, suspended by stipulation or other
administrative action.
(Amended (as amended by Stats. 1995, Ch. 972) by Stats. 2000,
Ch. 225, Sec. 1. Effective January 1, 2001.)
48900.7.

(a) In addition to the reasons specified in Sections 48900,
48900.2, 48900.3, and 48900.4, a pupil may be suspended from
school or recommended for expulsion if the superintendent or
the principal of the school in which the pupil is enrolled
determines that the pupil has made terroristic threats against
school officials or school property, or both.
(b) For the purposes of this section, “terroristic threat” shall
include any statement, whether written or oral, by a person who
willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death,
great bodily injury to another person, or property damage in
excess of one thousand dollars ($1,000), with the specific intent
that the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no
intent of actually carrying it out, which, on its face and under
the circumstances in which it is made, is so unequivocal,
unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the
person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate
prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes that
person reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her own
safety or for his or her immediate family’s safety, or for the
protection of school district property, or the personal property
of the person threatened or his or her immediate family.
1998.)
48900.8.
For purposes of notification to parents, and for the reporting of
expulsion or suspension offenses to the department, each school
district shall specifically identify, by offense committed, in all
appropriate official records of a pupil each suspension or
expulsion of that pupil for the commission of any of the
offenses set forth in Section 48900, 48900.2, 48900.3, 48900.4,
48900.7, or 48915.
(Amended by Stats. 2005, Ch. 677, Sec. 33. Effective October
7, 2005.)
48900.9.

(a) The superintendent of a school district, the principal of a
school, or the principal’s designee may refer a victim of,
witness to, or other pupil affected by, an act of bullying, as
defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (r) of Section 48900,
committed on or after January 1, 2015, to the school counselor,
school psychologist, social worker, child welfare attendance
personnel, school nurse, or other school support service
personnel for case management, counseling, and participation in
a restorative justice program, as appropriate.
(b) A pupil who has engaged in an act of bullying, as defined in
paragraph (1) of subdivision (r) of Section 48900, may also be
referred to the school counselor, school psychologist, social
worker, child welfare attendance personnel, or other school
support service personnel for case management and counseling,
or for participation in a restorative justice program, pursuant to
Section 48900.5.
(Amended by Stats. 2015, Ch. 303, Sec. 104. (AB 731)
Effective January 1, 2016.)
48901.
(a) No school shall permit the smoking or use of a tobacco
product by pupils of the school while the pupils are on campus,
or while attending school-sponsored activities or while under
the supervision and control of school district employees.
(b) The governing board of any school district maintaining a
high school shall take all steps it deems practical to discourage
high school students from smoking.
(c) For purposes of this section, “smoking” has the same
meaning as in subdivision (c) of Section 22950.5 of the
Business and Professions Code.
(d) For purposes of this section, “tobacco product” means a
product or device as defined in subdivision (d) of Section
22950.5 of the Business and Professions Code.
(Amended by Stats. 2016, 2nd Ex. Sess., Ch. 7, Sec. 9. (SB 5
2x) Effective June 9, 2016.)

48901.1.
Notwithstanding Section 47610 or any other law, commencing
July 1, 2020, the following provisions apply to charter schools:
(a) A pupil enrolled in a charter school in kindergarten or any
of grades 1 to 5, inclusive, shall not be suspended on the basis
of having disrupted school activities or otherwise willfully
defied the valid authority of supervisors, teachers,
administrators, school officials, or other school personnel
engaged in the performance of their duties, and those acts shall
not constitute grounds for a pupil enrolled in a charter school in
kindergarten or any of grades 1 to 12, inclusive, to be
recommended for expulsion.
(b) A pupil enrolled in a charter school in any of grades 6 to 8,
inclusive, shall not be suspended on the basis of having
disrupted school activities or otherwise willfully defied the
valid authority of supervisors, teachers, administrators, school
officials, or other school personnel engaged in the performance
of their duties. This subdivision is inoperative on July 1, 2025.
(Added by Stats. 2019, Ch. 279, Sec. 3. (SB 419) Effective
January 1, 2020.)
48901.5.
(a) The governing board of each school district, or its designee,
may regulate the possession or use of any electronic signaling
device that operates through the transmission or receipt of radio
waves, including, but not limited to, paging and signaling
equipment, by pupils of the school district while the pupils are
on campus, while attending school-sponsored activities, or
while under the supervision and control of school district
employees.
(b) No pupil shall be prohibited from possessing or using an
electronic signaling device that is determined by a licensed
physician and surgeon to be essential for the health of the pupil
and use of which is limited to purposes related to the health of
the pupil.

2003.)
48901.7.
(a) The governing body of a school district, a county office of
education, or a charter school may adopt a policy to limit or
prohibit the use by its pupils of smartphones while the pupils
are at a schoolsite or while the pupils are under the supervision
and control of an employee or employees of that school district,
county office of education, or charter school.
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), a pupil shall not be
prohibited from possessing or using a smartphone under any of
the following circumstances:
(1) In the case of an emergency, or in response to a perceived
threat of danger.
(2) When a teacher or administrator of the school district,
county office of education, or charter school grants permission
to a pupil to possess or use a smartphone, subject to any
reasonable limitation imposed by that teacher or administrator.
(3) When a licensed physician and surgeon determines that the
possession or use of a smartphone is necessary for the health or
well-being of the pupil.
(4) When the possession or use of a smartphone is required in a
pupil’s individualized education program.
(Added by Stats. 2019, Ch. 42, Sec. 2. (AB 272) Effective
January 1, 2020.)
48902.
(a) The principal of a school or the principal’s designee shall,
before the suspension or expulsion of any pupil, notify the
appropriate law enforcement authorities of the county or city in
which the school is situated, of any acts of the pupil that may
violate Section 245 of the Penal Code.
(b) The principal of a school or the principal’s designee shall,
within one schoolday after suspension or expulsion of any
pupil, notify, by telephone or any other appropriate method

chosen by the school, the appropriate law enforcement
authorities of the county or the school district in which the
school is situated of any acts of the pupil that may violate
subdivision (c) or (d) of Section 48900.
(c) Notwithstanding subdivision (b), the principal of a school or
the principal’s designee shall notify the appropriate law
enforcement authorities of the county or city in which the
school is located of any acts of a pupil that may involve the
possession or sale of narcotics or of a controlled substance or a
violation of Section 626.9 or 626.10 of the Penal Code. The
principal of a school or the principal’s designee shall report any
act specified in paragraph (1) or (5) of subdivision (c) of
Section 48915 committed by a pupil or nonpupil on a schoolsite
to the city police or county sheriff with jurisdiction over the
school and the school security department or the school police
department, as applicable.
(d) A principal, the principal’s designee, or any other person
reporting a known or suspected act described in subdivision (a)
or (b) is not civilly or criminally liable as a result of making
any report authorized by this article unless it can be proven that
a false report was made and that the person knew the report was
false or the report was made with reckless disregard for the
truth or falsity of the report.
(e) The principal of a school or the principal’s designee
reporting a criminal act committed by a schoolage individual
with exceptional needs, as defined in Section 56026, shall
ensure that copies of the special education and disciplinary
records of the pupil are transmitted, as described in Section
1415(k)(6) of Title 20 of the United States Code, for
consideration by the appropriate authorities to whom he or she
reports the criminal act. Any copies of the pupil’s special
education and disciplinary records may be transmitted only to
the extent permissible under the federal Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (20 U.S.C. Sec. 1232g et seq.).
January 1, 2014.)

48903.
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (g) of Section 48911 and
in Section 48912, the total number of days for which a pupil
may be suspended from school shall not exceed 20 schooldays
in any school year, unless for purposes of adjustment, a pupil
enrolls in or is transferred to another regular school, an
opportunity school or class, or a continuation education school
or class, in which case the total number of schooldays for which
the pupil may be suspended shall not exceed 30 days in any
school year.
(b) For the purposes of this section, a school district may count
suspensions that occur while a pupil is enrolled in another
school district toward the maximum number of days for which a
pupil may be suspended in any school year.
1999.)
48904.
(a) (1) Notwithstanding Section 1714.1 of the Civil Code, the
parent or guardian of any minor whose willful misconduct
results in injury or death to any pupil or any person employed
by, or performing volunteer services for, a school district or
private school or who willfully cuts, defaces, or otherwise
injures in any way any property, real or personal, belonging to a
school district or private school, or personal property of any
school employee, shall be liable for all damages so caused by
the minor. The liability of the parent or guardian shall not
exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000), adjusted annually for
inflation. The parent or guardian shall be liable also for the
amount of any reward not exceeding ten thousand dollars
($10,000), adjusted annually for inflation, paid pursuant to
Section 53069.5 of the Government Code. The parent or
guardian of a minor shall be liable to a school district or private
school for all property belonging to the school district or
private school loaned to the minor and not returned upon

demand of an employee of the school district or private school
authorized to make the demand.
(2) The Superintendent annually shall compute an adjustment of
the liability limits prescribed by this subdivision to reflect the
percentage change in the average annual value of the Implicit
Price Deflator for State and Local Government Purchases of
Goods and Services for the United States, as published by the
United States Department of Commerce for the 12-month period
ending in the prior fiscal year. The annual adjustment shall be
rounded to the nearest one hundred dollars ($100).
(b) (1) Any school district or private school whose real or
personal property has been willfully cut, defaced, or otherwise
injured, or whose property is loaned to a pupil and wil lfully not
returned upon demand of an employee of the school district or
private school authorized to make the demand may, after
affording the pupil his or her due process rights, withhold the
grades, diploma, and transcripts of the pupil responsible for the
damage until the pupil or the pupil’s parent or guardian has paid
for the damages thereto, as provided in subdivision (a).
(2) The school district or private school shall notify the parent
or guardian of the pupil in writing of the pupil’s alleged
misconduct before withholding the pupil’s grades, diploma, or
transcripts pursuant to this subdivision. When the minor and
parent are unable to pay for the damages, or to return the
property, the school district or private school shall provide a
program of voluntary work for the minor in lieu of the payment
of monetary damages. Upon completion of the voluntary work,
the grades, diploma, and transcripts of the pupil shall be
released.
(3) The governing board of each school district or governing
body of each private school shall establish rules and regulations
governing procedures for the implementation of this
subdivision. The procedures shall conform to, but are not
necessarily limited to, those procedures established in this code
for the expulsion of pupils.
(Amended by Stats. 2012, Ch. 589, Sec. 10. (AB 2662)

Effective January 1, 2013.)
48904.3.
(a) Upon receiving notice that a school district has withheld the
grades, diploma, or transcripts of any pupil pursuant to Section
48904, any school district to which the pupil has transferred
shall likewise withhold the grades, diploma, or transcripts of
the pupil as authorized by that section, until the time that it
receives notice, from the district that initiated the decision to
withhold, that the decision has been rescinded under the terms
of that section.
(b) Any school district that has decided to withhold a pupil’s
grades, diploma, or transcripts pursuant to Section 48904 shall,
upon receiving notice that the pupil has transferred to any
school district in this state, notify the parent or guardian of the
pupil in writing that the decision to withhold will be enforced
as specified in subdivision (a).
(c) For purposes of this section and Section 48904, “school
district” is defined to include any county superintendent of
schools.
(d) This section and Section 48904 shall also apply to the state
special schools, as described in subdivision (a) of Section
48927.
2003.)
48905.
An employee of a school district whose person or property is
injured or damaged by the willful misconduct of a pupil who
attends school in such district, when the employee or the
employee’s property is (1) located on property owned by the
district, (2) being transported to or from an activity sponsored
by the district or a school within the district, (3) present at an
activity sponsored by such district or school, or (4) otherwise
injured or damaged in retaliation for acts lawfully undertaken
by the employee in execution of the employee’s duties, may

request the school district to pursue legal action against the
pupil who caused the injury or damage, or the pupil’s parent or
guardian pursuant to Section 48904.
(Repealed and added by Stats. 1983, Ch. 498, Sec. 91. Effective
July 28, 1983.)
48906.
When a principal or other school official releases a minor pupil
to a peace officer for the purpose of removing the minor from
the school premises, the school official shall take immediate
steps to notify the parent, guardian, or responsible relative of
the minor regarding the release of the minor to the officer, and
regarding the place to which the minor is reportedly being
taken, except when a minor has been taken into custody as a
victim of suspected child abuse, as defined in Section 11165.6
of the Penal Code, or pursuant to Section 305 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code. In those cases, the school official shall
provide the peace officer with the address and telephone number
of the minor’s parent or guardian. The peace officer shall take
immediate steps to notify the parent, guardian, or responsible
relative of the minor that the minor is in custody and the place
where he or she is being held. If the officer has a reasonable
belief that the minor would be endangered by a disclosure of the
place where the minor is being held, or that the disclosure
would cause the custody of the minor to be disturbed, the
officer may refuse to disclose the place where the minor is
being held for a period not to exceed 24 hours. The officer
shall, however, inform the parent, guardian, or responsible
relative whether the child requires and is receiving medical or
other treatment. The juvenile court shall review any decision
not to disclose the place where the minor is being held at a
subsequent detention hearing.
2006.)
48907.

(a) Pupils of the public schools, including charter schools, shall
have the right to exercise freedom of speech and of the press
including, but not limited to, the use of bulletin boards, the
distribution of printed materials or petitions, the wearing of
buttons, badges, and other insignia, and the right of expression
in official publications, whether or not the publications or other
means of expression are supported financially by the school or
by use of school facilities, except that expression shall be
prohibited which is obscene, libelous, or slanderous. Also
prohibited shall be material that so incites pupils as to create a
clear and present danger of the commission of unlawful acts on
school premises or the violation of lawful school regulations, or
the substantial disruption of the orderly operation of the school.
(b) The governing board or body of each school district or
charter school and each county board of education shall adopt
rules and regulations in the form of a written publications code,
which shall include reasonable provisions for the time, place,
and manner of conducting such activities within its respective
jurisdiction.
(c) Pupil editors of official school publications shall be
responsible for assigning and editing the news, editorial, and
feature content of their publications subject to the limitations of
this section. However, it shall be the responsibility of a
journalism adviser or advisers of pupil publications within each
school to supervise the production of the pupil staff, to maintain
professional standards of English and journalism, and to
maintain the provisions of this section.
(d) There shall be no prior restraint of material prepared for
official school publications except insofar as it violates this
section. School officials shall have the burden of showing
justification without undue delay prior to a limitation of pupil
expression under this section.
(e) “Official school publications” refers to material produced by
pupils in the journalism, newspaper, yearbook, or writing
classes and distributed to the student body either free or for a
fee.

(f) This section does not prohibit or prevent the governing
board or body of a school district or charter school from
adopting otherwise valid rules and regulations relating to oral
communication by pupils upon the premises of each school.
(g) An employee shall not be dismissed, suspended, disciplined,
reassigned, transferred, or otherwise retaliated against solely
for acting to protect a pupil engaged in the conduct authorized
under this section, or refusing to infringe upon conduct that is
protected by this section, the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution, or Section 2 of Article I of the California
Constitution.
January 1, 2011.)
48908.
All pupils shall comply with the regulations, pursue the
required course of study, and submit to the authority of the
teachers of the schools.
July 28, 1983.)
48909.
When a petition is requested in juvenile court or a complaint is
filed in any court alleging that a minor of compulsory school
attendance age or any pupil currently enrolled in a publ ic school
in a grade to and including grade 12 is a person who (a) has
used, sold, or possessed narcotics or other hallucinogenic drugs
or substances; (b) has inhaled or breathed the fumes of, or
ingested any poison classified as such in Section 4160 of the
Business and Professions Code; or (c) has committed felonious
assault, homicide, or rape the district attorney may, within 48
hours, provide written notice to the superintendent of the school
district of attendance, notwithstanding the provisions of Section
827 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, and to the pupil’s
parent or guardian.
(Amended by Stats. 1991, Ch. 1202, Sec. 1.)

48910.
(a) A teacher may suspend any pupil from class, for any of the
acts enumerated in Section 48900, for the day of the suspension
and the day following. The teacher shall immediately report the
suspension to the principal of the school and send the pupil to
the principal or the designee of the principal for appropriate
action. If that action requires the continued presence of the
pupil at the schoolsite, the pupil shall be under appropriate
supervision, as defined in policies and related regulations
adopted by the governing board of the school district. As soon
as possible, the teacher shall ask the parent or guardian of the
pupil to attend a parent-teacher conference regarding the
suspension. If practicable, a school counselor or a school
psychologist may attend the conference. A school administrator
shall attend the conference if the teacher or the parent or
guardian so requests. The pupil shall not be returned to the class
from which he or she was suspended, during the period of the
suspension, without the concurrence of the teacher of the class
and the principal.
(b) A pupil suspended from a class shall not be placed in
another regular class during the period of suspension. However,
if the pupil is assigned to more than one class per day this
subdivision shall apply only to other regular classes scheduled
at the same time as the class from which the pupil was
suspended.
(c) A teacher may also refer a pupil, for any of the acts
enumerated in Section 48900, to the principal or the designee of
the principal for consideration of a suspension from the school.
2005.)
48911.
(a) The principal of the school, the principal’s designee, or the
district superintendent of schools may suspend a pupil from the
school for any of the reasons enumerated in Section 48900, and

pursuant to Section 48900.5, for no more than five consecutive
schooldays.
(b) Suspension by the principal, the principal’s designee, or the
district superintendent of schools shall be preceded by an
informal conference conducted by the principal, the principal’s
designee, or the district superintendent of schools between the
pupil and, whenever practicable, the teacher, supervisor, or
school employee who referred the pupil to the principal, the
principal’s designee, or the district superintendent of schools.
At the conference, the pupil shall be informed of the reason for
the disciplinary action, including the other means of correction
that were attempted before the suspension as required under
Section 48900.5, and the evidence against him or her, and shall
be given the opportunity to present his or her version and
evidence in his or her defense.
(c) A principal, the principal’s designee, or the district
superintendent of schools may suspend a pupil without
affording the pupil an opportunity for a conference only if the
principal, the principal’s designee, or the district superintendent
of schools determines that an emergency situation exists.
“Emergency situation,” as used in this article, means a situation
determined by the principal, the principal’s designee, or the
district superintendent of schools to constitute a clear and
present danger to the life, safety, or health of pupils or school
personnel. If a pupil is suspended without a conference before
suspension, both the parent and the pupil shall be notified of the
pupil’s right to a conference and the pupil’s right to return to
school for the purpose of a conference. The conference shall be
held within two schooldays, unless the pupil waives this right or
is physically unable to attend for any reason, including, but not
limited to, incarceration or hospitalization. The conference shall
then be held as soon as the pupil is physically able to return to
school for the conference.
(d) At the time of suspension, a school employee shall make a
reasonable effort to contact the pupil’s parent or guardian in
person or by telephone. If a pupil is suspended from school, the

parent or guardian shall be notified in writing of the suspension.
(e) A school employee shall report the suspension of the pupil,
including the cause for the suspension, to the governing board
of the school district or to the district superintendent of schools
in accordance with the regulations of the governing board of the
school district.
(f) (1) The parent or guardian of a pupil shall respond without
delay to a request from school officials to attend a conference
regarding his or her child’s behavior.
(2) No penalties shall be imposed on a pupil for failure of the
pupil’s parent or guardian to attend a conference with school
officials. Reinstatement of the suspended pupil shall not be
contingent upon attendance by the pupil’s parent or guardian at
the conference.
(g) In a case where expulsion from a school or suspension for
the balance of the semester from continuation school is being
processed by the governing board of the school district, the
district superintendent of schools or other person designated by
the district superintendent of schools in writing may extend the
suspension until the governing board of the school district has
rendered a decision in the action. However, an extension may be
granted only if the district superintendent of schools or the
district superintendent’s designee has determined, following a
meeting in which the pupil and the pupil’s parent or guardian
are invited to participate, that the presence of the pupil at the
school or in an alternative school placement would cause a
danger to persons or property or a threat of disrupting the
instructional process. If the pupil is a foster child, as defined in
Section 48853.5, the district superintendent of schools or the
district superintendent’s designee, including, but not limited to,
the educational liaison for the school district, shall also invite
the pupil’s attorney and an appropriate representative of the
county child welfare agency to participate in the meeting. If the
pupil or the pupil’s parent or guardian has requested a meeting
to challenge the original suspension pursuant to Section 48914,
the purpose of the meeting shall be to decide upon the extension

of the suspension order under this section and may be held in
conjunction with the initial meeting on the merits of the
suspension.
(h) (1) For purposes of this section, a “principal’s designee” is
one or more administrators at the schoolsite specifically
designated by the principal, in writing, to assist with
disciplinary procedures.
(2) In the event that there is not an administrator in addition to
the principal at the schoolsite, a certificated person at the
schoolsite may be specifically designated by the principal, in
writing, as a “principal’s designee,” to assist with disciplinary
procedures. The principal may designate only one person at a
time as the principal’s primary designee for the school year.
(3) An additional person meeting the requirements of this
subdivision may be designated by the principal, in writing, to
act for purposes of this article when both the principal and the
principal’s primary designee are absent from the schoolsite. The
name of the person, and the names of any person or persons
designated as “principal’s designee,” shall be on file in the
principal’s office.
(i) This section is not an exception to, nor does it place any
limitation on, Section 48903.
January 1, 2018.)
48911.1.
(a) A pupil suspended from a school for any of the reasons
enumerated in Sections 48900 and 48900.2 may be assigned, by
the principal or the principal’s designee, to a supervised
suspension classroom for the entire period of suspension if the
pupil poses no imminent danger or threat to the campus, pupils,
or staff, or if an action to expel the pupil has not been initiated.
(b) Pupils assigned to a supervised suspension classroom shall
be separated from other pupils at the schoolsite for the period of
suspension in a separate classroom, building, or site for pupils
under suspension.

(c) School districts may continue to claim apportionments for
each pupil assigned to and attending a supervised suspension
classroom provided as follows:
(1) The supervised suspension classroom is staffed as otherwise
provided by law.
(2) Each pupil has access to appropriate counseling services.
(3) The supervised suspension classroom promotes completion
of schoolwork and tests missed by the pupil during the
suspension.
(4) Each pupil is responsible for contacting his or her teacher or
teachers to receive assignments to be completed while the pupil
is assigned to the supervised suspension classroom. The teacher
shall provide all assignments and tests that the pupil will miss
while suspended. If no classroom work is assigned, the person
supervising the suspension classroom shall assign schoolwork.
(d) At the time a pupil is assigned to a supervised suspension
classroom, a school employee shall notify, in person or by
telephone, the pupil’s parent or guardian. Whenever a pupil is
assigned to a supervised suspension classroom for longer than
one class period, a school employee shall notify, in writing, the
pupil’s parent or guardian.
(e) This section does not place any limitation on a school
district’s ability to transfer a pupil to an opportunity school or
class or a continuation education school or class.
(f) Apportionments claimed by a school district for pupils
assigned to supervised suspension shall be used specifically to
mitigate the cost of implementing this section.
1995.)
48911.2.
(a) If the number of pupils suspended from school during the
prior school year exceeded 30 percent of the school’s
enrollment, the school should consider doing at least one of the
following:
(1) Implement the supervised suspension program described in

Section 48911.1.
(2) Implement an alternative to the school’s off-campus
suspension program, which involves a progressive discipline
approach that occurs during the schoolday on campus, using any
of the following activities:
(A) Conferences between the school staff, parents, and pupils.
(B) Referral to the school counselor, psychologist, child welfare
attendance personnel, or other school support service staff.
(C) Detention.
(D) Study teams, guidance teams, resource panel teams, or other
assessment-related teams.
(b) At the end of the academic year, the school may report to
the district superintendent in charge of school support services,
or other comparable administrator if that position does not
exist, on the rate of reduction in the school’s off-campus
suspensions and the plan or activities used to comply with
subdivision (a).
(c) It is the intent of the Legislature to encourage schools that
choose to implement this section to examine alternatives to off-
campus suspensions that lead to resolution of pupil misconduct
without sending pupils off campus. Schools that use this section
should not be precluded from suspending pupils to an off-
campus site.
1995.)
48911.5.
The site principal of a contracting nonpublic, nonsectarian
school providing services to individuals with exceptional needs
under Sections 56365 and 56366, shall have the same duties and
responsibilities with respect to the suspension of pupils with
previously identified exceptional needs prescribed for the
suspension of pupils under Section 48911.
(Added by Stats. 1985, Ch. 907, Sec. 3. Effective September 23,
1985.)
48912.

(a) The governing board may suspend a pupil from school for
any of the acts enumerated in Section 48900 for any number of
schooldays within the limits prescribed by Section 48903.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 35145 of this
code and Section 54950 of the Government Code, the governing
board of a school district shall, unless a request has been made
to the contrary, hold closed sessions if the board is considering
the suspension of, disciplinary action against, or any other
action against, except expulsion, any pupil, if a public hearing
upon that question would lead to the giving out of information
concerning a school pupil which would be in violation of
Article 5 (commencing with Section 49073) of Chapter 6.5.
(c) Before calling a closed session to consider these matters, the
governing board shall, in writing, by registered or certified mail
or by personal service, notify the pupil and the pupil’s parent or
guardian, or the pupil if the pupil is an adult, of the intent of
the governing board to call and hold a closed session. Unless
the pupil or the pupil’s parent or guardian shall, in writing,
within 48 hours after receipt of the written notice of the board’s
intention, request that the hearing be held as a public meeting,
the hearing to consider these matters shall be conducted by the
governing board in closed session. In the event that a written
request is served upon the clerk or secretary of the governing
board, the meeting shall be public, except that any discussion at
that meeting which may be in conflict with the right to privacy
of any pupil other than the pupil requesting the public meeting,
shall be in closed session.
1993.)
48912.5.
The governing board of a school district may suspend a pupil
enrolled in a continuation school or class for a period not longer
than the remainder of the semester if any of the acts enumerated
in Section 48900 occurred. The suspension shall meet the

requirements of Section 48915.
(Added by Stats. 1983, Ch. 498, Sec. 91. Effective July 28,
1983.)
48913.
The teacher of any class from which a pupil is suspended may
require the suspended pupil to complete any assignments and
tests missed during the suspension.
July 28, 1983.)
48913.5.
(a) Upon the request of a parent, a legal guardian or other
person holding the right to make educational decisions for the
pupil, or the affected pupil, a teacher shall provide to a pupil in
any of grades 1 to 12, inclusive, who has been suspended from
school for two or more schooldays the homework that the pupil
would otherwise have been assigned.
(b) If a homework assignment that is requested pursuant to
subdivision (a) and turned into the teacher by the pupil either
upon the pupil’s return to school from suspension or within the
timeframe originally prescribed by the teacher, whichever is
later, is not graded before the end of the academic term, that
assignment shall not be included in the calculation of the
pupil’s overall grade in the class.
(Added by Stats. 2019, Ch. 779, Sec. 3. (AB 982) Effective
January 1, 2020.)
48914.
Each school district is authorized to establish a policy that
permits school officials to conduct a meeting with the parent or
guardian of a suspended pupil to discuss the causes, the
duration, the school policy involved, and other matters pertinent
to the suspension.
(Amended by Stats. 1987, Ch. 134, Sec. 6. Effective July 7,
1987.)

48915.
(a) (1) Except as provided in subdivisions (c) and (e), the
principal or the superintendent of schools shall recommend the
expulsion of a pupil for any of the following acts committed at
school or at a school activity off school grounds, unless the
principal or superintendent determines that expulsion should not
be recommended under the circumstances or that an alternative
means of correction would address the conduct:
(A) Causing serious physical injury to another person, except in
self-defense.
(B) Possession of any knife or other dangerous object of no
reasonable use to the pupil.
(C) Unlawful possession of any controlled substance listed in
Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 11053) of Division 10 of
the Health and Safety Code, except for either of the following:
(i) The first offense for the possession of not more than one
avoirdupois ounce of marijuana, other than concentrated
cannabis.
(ii) The possession of over-the-counter medication for use by
the pupil for medical purposes or medication prescribed for the
pupil by a physician.
(D) Robbery or extortion.
(E) Assault or battery, as defined in Sections 240 and 242 of the
Penal Code, upon any school employee.
(2) If the principal or the superintendent of schools makes a
determination as described in paragraph (1), he or she is
encouraged to do so as quickly as possible to ensure that the
pupil does not lose instructional time.
(b) Upon recommendation by the principal or the superintendent
of schools, or by a hearing officer or administrative panel
appointed pursuant to subdivision (d) of Section 48918, the
governing board of a school district may order a pupil expelled
upon finding that the pupil committed an act listed in paragraph
(1) of subdivision (a) or in subdivision (a), (b), (c), (d), or (e)
of Section 48900. A decision to expel a pupil for any of those

acts shall be based on a finding of one or both of the following:
(1) Other means of correction are not feasible or have
repeatedly failed to bring about proper conduct.
(2) Due to the nature of the act, the presence of the pupil causes
a continuing danger to the physical safety of the pupil or others.
(c) The principal or superintendent of schools shall immediately
suspend, pursuant to Section 48911, and shall recommend
expulsion of a pupil that he or she determines has committed
any of the following acts at school or at a school activity off
school grounds:
(1) Possessing, selling, or otherwise furnishing a firearm. This
subdivision does not apply to an act of possessing a firearm if
the pupil had obtained prior written permission to possess the
firearm from a certificated school employee, which is concurred
in by the principal or the designee of the principal. This
subdivision applies to an act of possessing a firearm only if the
possession is verified by an employee of a school district. The
act of possessing an imitation firearm, as defined in subdivision
(m) of Section 48900, is not an offense for which suspension or
expulsion is mandatory pursuant to this subdivision and
subdivision (d), but it is an offense for which suspension, or
expulsion pursuant to subdivision (e), may be imposed.
(2) Brandishing a knife at another person.
(3) Unlawfully selling a controlled substance listed in Chapter 2
(commencing with Section 11053) of Division 10 of the Health
and Safety Code.
(4) Committing or attempting to commit a sexual assault as
defined in subdivision (n) of Section 48900 or committing a
sexual battery as defined in subdivision (n) of Section 48900.
(5) Possession of an explosive.
(d) The governing board of a school district shall order a pupil
expelled upon finding that the pupil committed an act listed in
subdivision (c), and shall refer that pupil to a program of study
that meets all of the following conditions:
(1) Is appropriately prepared to accommodate pupils who
exhibit discipline problems.

(2) Is not provided at a comprehensive middle, junior, or senior
high school, or at any elementary school.
(3) Is not housed at the schoolsite attended by the pupil at the
time of suspension.
(e) Upon recommendation by the principal or the superintendent
of schools, or by a hearing officer or administrative panel
appointed pursuant to subdivision (d) of Section 48918, the
governing board of a school district may order a pupil expelled
upon finding that the pupil, at school or at a school activity off
of school grounds violated subdivision (f), (g), (h), (i ), (j), (k),
(l), or (m) of Section 48900, or Section 48900.2, 48900.3, or
48900.4, and either of the following:
(1) That other means of correction are not feasible or have
repeatedly failed to bring about proper conduct.
(2) That due to the nature of the violation, the presence of the
pupil causes a continuing danger to the physical safety of the
pupil or others.
(f) The governing board of a school district shall refer a pupil
who has been expelled pursuant to subdivision (b) or (e) to a
program of study that meets all of the conditions specified in
subdivision (d). Notwithstanding this subdivision, with respect
to a pupil expelled pursuant to subdivision (e), if the county
superintendent of schools certifies that an alternative program
of study is not available at a site away from a comprehensive
middle, junior, or senior high school, or an elementary school,
and that the only option for placement is at another
comprehensive middle, junior, or senior high school, or another
elementary school, the pupil may be referred to a program of
study that is provided at a comprehensive middle, junior, or
senior high school, or at an elementary school.
(g) As used in this section, “knife” means any dirk, dagger, or
other weapon with a fixed, sharpened blade fitted primarily for
stabbing, a weapon with a blade fitted primarily for stabbing, a
weapon with a blade longer than 31/2 inches, a folding knife
with a blade that locks into place, or a razor with an unguarded
blade.

(h) As used in this section, the term “explosive” means
“destructive device” as described in Section 921 of Title 18 of
the United States Code.
January 1, 2013.)
48915.01.
If the governing board of a school district has established a
community day school pursuant to Section 48661 on the same
site as a comprehensive middle, junior, or senior high school, or
at any elementary school, the governing board does not have to
meet the condition in paragraph (2) of subdivision (d) of
Section 48915 when the board, pursuant to subdivision (f) of
Section 48915, refers a pupil to a program of study and that
program of study is at the community day school. All the other
conditions of subdivision (d) of Section 48915 are applicable to
the referral as required by subdivision (f) of Section 48915.
(Added by Stats. 1996, Ch. 937, Sec. 3. Effective September 26,
1996.)
48915.1.
(a) If the governing board of a school district receives a request
from an individual who has been expelled from another school
district for an act other than those described in subdivision (a)
or (c) of Section 48915, for enrollment in a school maintained
by the school district, the board shall hold a hearing to
determine whether that individual poses a continuing danger
either to the pupils or employees of the school district. The
hearing and notice shall be conducted in accordance with the
rules and regulations governing procedures for the expulsion of
pupils as described in Section 48918. A school district may
request information from another school district regarding a
recommendation for expulsion or the expulsion of an applicant
for enrollment. The school district receiving the request shall
respond to the request with all deliberate speed but shall
respond no later than five working days from the date of the

receipt of the request.
(b) If a pupil has been expelled from his or her previous school
for an act other than those listed in subdivision (a) or (c) of
Section 48915, the parent, guardian, or pupil, if the pupil is
emancipated or otherwise legally of age, shall, upon enrollment,
inform the receiving school district of his or her status with the
previous school district. If this information is not provided to
the school district and the school district later determines the
pupil was expelled from the previous school, the lack of
compliance shall be recorded and discussed in the hearing
required pursuant to subdivision (a).
(c) The governing board of a school district may make a
determination to deny enrollment to an individual who has been
expelled from another school district for an act other than those
described in subdivision (a) or (c) of Section 48915, for the
remainder of the expulsion period after a determination has
been made, pursuant to a hearing, that the individual poses a
potential danger to either the pupils or employees of the school
district.
(d) The governing board of a school district, when making its
determination whether to enroll an individual who has been
expelled from another school district for these acts, may
consider the following options:
(1) Deny enrollment.
(2) Permit enrollment.
(3) Permit conditional enrollment in a regular school program or
another educational program.
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the governing
board of a school district, after a determination has been made,
pursuant to a hearing, that an individual expelled from another
school district for an act other than those described in
subdivision (a) or (c) of Section 48915 does not pose a danger
to either the pupils or employees of the school district, shall
permit the individual to enroll in a school in the school district
during the term of the expulsion, provided that he or she,
subsequent to the expulsion, either has established legal

residence in the school district, pursuant to Section 48200, or
has enrolled in the school pursuant to an interdistrict agreement
executed between the affected school districts pursuant to
Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 46600).
(Amended by Stats. 1996, Ch. 937, Sec. 4. Effective September
26, 1996.)
48915.2.
(a) A pupil expelled from school for any of the offenses listed
in subdivision (a) or (c) of Section 48915, shall not be
permitted to enroll in any other school or school district during
the period of expulsion unless it is a county community school
pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 1981, or a juvenile court
school, as described in Section 48645.1, or a community day
school pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 48660)
of Chapter 4 of Part 27.
(b) After a determination has been made, pursuant to a hearing
under Section 48918, that an individual expelled from another
school district for any act described in subdivision (a) or (c) of
Section 48915 does not pose a danger to either the pupils or
employees of the school district, the governing board of a
school district may permit the individual to enroll in the school
district after the term of expulsion, subject to one of the
following conditions:
(1) He or she has established legal residence in the school
district, pursuant to Section 48200.
(2) He or she is enrolled in the school pursuant to an
interdistrict agreement executed between the affected school
districts pursuant to Chapter 5 (commencing with Section
46600) of Part 26.
1996. Operative July 1, 1996, by Sec. 9 of Ch. 974, which was
amended by Stats. 1996, Ch. 937.)
48915.5.
(a) An individual with exceptional needs, as defined in Section

56026, may be suspended or expelled from school in accordance
with Section 1415(k) of Title 20 of the United States Code, the
discipline provisions contained in Sections 300.530 to 300.537,
inclusive, of Title 34 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and
other provisions of this part that do not conflict with federal
law and regulations.
(b) A free appropriate public education for individuals with
exceptional needs suspended or expelled from school shall be in
accordance with Section 1412(a)(1) of Title 20 of the United
States Code and Section 300.530(d) of Title 34 of the Code of
Federal Regulations.
(c) If an individual with exceptional needs is excluded from
schoolbus transportation, the pupil is entitled to be provided
with an alternative form of transportation at no cost to the pupil
or parent or guardian provided that transportation is specified in
the pupil’s individualized education program.
(d) If the individual with exceptional needs is a foster child, as
defined in Section 48853.5, and the local educational agency
has proposed a change of placement due to an act for which a
decision to recommend expulsion is at the discretion of the
principal or the district superintendent of schools, the attorney
for the individual with exceptional needs and an appropriate
representative of the county child welfare agency shall be
invited to participate in the individualized education program
team meeting that makes a manifestation determination pursuant
to Section 1415(k) of Title 20 of the United States Code. The
invitation may be made using the most cost-effective method
possible, which may include, but is not limited to, electronic
mail or a telephone call.
(e) If the individual with exceptional needs is a homeless child
or youth, as defined in Section 11434a(2) of Title 42 of the
United States Code, and the local educational agency has
proposed a change of placement due to an act for which a
decision to recommend expulsion is at the discretion of the
principal or the district superintendent of schools, the local
educational agency liaison for homeless children and youth

designated pursuant to Section 11432(g)(1)(J)(ii) of Title 42 of
the United States Code shall be invited to participate in the
individualized education program team meeting that makes a
manifestation determination pursuant to Section 1415(k) of
Title 20 of the United States Code. The invitation may be made
using the most cost-effective method possible, which may
include, but is not limited to, electronic mail or a telephone
call.
January 1, 2015.)
48916.
(a) An expulsion order shall remain in effect until the governing
board, in the manner prescribed in this article, orders the
readmission of a pupil. At the time an expulsion of a pupil is
ordered for an act other than those described in subdivision (c)
of Section 48915, the governing board shall set a date, not later
than the last day of the semester following the semester in
which the expulsion occurred, when the pupil shall be reviewed
for readmission to a school maintained by the district or to the
school the pupil last attended. If an expulsion is ordered during
summer session or the intersession period of a year-round
program the governing board shall set a date, not later than the
last day of the semester following the summer session or
intersession period in which the expulsion occurred, when the
pupil shall be reviewed for readmission to a school maintained
by the district or to the school the pupil last attended. For a
pupil who has been expelled pursuant to subdivision (c) of
Section 48915, the governing board shall set a date of one year
from the date the expulsion occurred, when the pupil shall be
reviewed for readmission to a school maintained by the district,
except that the governing board may set an earlier date for
readmission on a case-by-case basis.
(b) The governing board shall recommend a plan of
rehabilitation for the pupil at the time of the expulsion order,
which may include, but not be limited to, periodic review as

well as assessment at the time of review for readmission. The
plan may also include recommendations for improved academic
performance, tutoring, special education assessments, job
training, counseling, employment, community service, or other
rehabilitative programs.
(c) The governing board of each school district shall adopt rules
and regulations establishing a procedure for the filing and
processing of requests for readmission and the process for the
required review of all expelled pupils for readmission. Upon
completion of the readmission process, the governing board
shall readmit the pupil, unless the governing board makes a
finding that the pupil has not met the conditions of the
rehabilitation plan or continues to pose a danger to campus
safety or to other pupils or employees of the school district. A
description of the procedure shall be made available to the pupil
and the pupil’s parent or guardian at the time the expulsion
order is entered.
(d) If the governing board denies the readmission of an expelled
pupil pursuant to subdivision (c), the governing board shall
make a determination either to continue the placement of the
pupil in the alternative educational program initially selected
for the pupil during the period of the expulsion order or to place
the pupil in another program that may include, but need not be
limited to, serving expelled pupils, including placement in a
county community school.
(e) The governing board shall provide written notice to the
expelled pupil and the pupil’s parent or guardian describing the
reasons for denying the pupil readmittance into the regular
school district program. The written notice shall also include
the determination of the educational program for the expelled
pupil pursuant to subdivision (d). The expelled pupil shall
enroll in that educational program unless the parent or guardian
of the pupil elects to enroll the pupil in another school district.
2004.)
48916.1.

(a) At the time an expulsion of a pupil is ordered, the governing
board of the school district shall ensure that an educational
program is provided to the pupil who is subject to the expulsion
order for the period of the expulsion. Except for pupils expelled
pursuant to subdivision (d) of Section 48915, the governing
board of a school district is required to implement the
provisions of this section only to the extent funds are
appropriated for this purpose in the annual Budget Act or other
legislation, or both.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any educational
program provided pursuant to subdivision (a) may be operated
by the school district, the county superintendent of schools, or a
consortium of districts or in joint agreement with the county
superintendent of schools.
(c) Any educational program provided pursuant to subdivision
(b) may not be situated within or on the grounds of the school
from which the pupil was expelled.
(d) If the pupil who is subject to the expulsion order was
expelled from any of kindergarten or grades 1 to 6, inclusive,
the educational program provided pursuant to subdivision (b)
may not be combined or merged with educational programs
offered to pupils in any of grades 7 to 12, inclusive. The district
or county program is the only program required to be provided
to expelled pupils as determined by the governing board of the
school district. This subdivision, as it relates to the separation
of pupils by grade levels, does not apply to community day
schools offering instruction in any of kindergarten and grades 1
to 8, inclusive, and established in accordance with Section
48660.
(e) (1) Each school district shall maintain the following data:
(A) The number of pupils recommended for expulsion.
(B) The grounds for each recommended expulsion.
(C) Whether the pupil was subsequently expelled.
(D) Whether the expulsion order was suspended.
(E) The type of referral made after the expulsion.

(F) The disposition of the pupil after the end of the period of
expulsion.
(2) The Superintendent may require a school district to report
this data as part of the coordinated compliance review. If a
school district does not report outcome data as required by this
subdivision, the Superintendent may not apportion any further
money to the school district pursuant to Section 48664 until the
school district is in compliance with this subdivision. Before
withholding the apportionment of funds to a school district
pursuant to this subdivision, the Superintendent shall give
written notice to the governing board of the school district that
the school district has failed to report the data required by
paragraph (1) and that the school district has 30 calendar days
from the date of the written notice of noncompliance to report
the requested data and thereby avoid the withholding of the
apportionment of funds.
(f) If the county superintendent of schools is unable for any
reason to serve the expelled pupils of a school district within
the county, the governing board of that school district may enter
into an agreement with a county superintendent of schools in
another county to provide education services for the distri ct’s
expelled pupils.
2006.)
48916.5.
The governing board may require a pupil who is expelled from
school for reasons relating to controlled substances, as defined
in Sections 11054 to 11058, inclusive, of the Health and Safety
Code, or alcohol, prior to returning to school to enroll in a
county-supported drug rehabilitation program. No pupil shall be
required to enroll in a rehabilitation program pursuant to this
section without the consent of his or her parent or guardian.
(Added by Stats. 1988, Ch. 50, Sec. 1.)
48917.

(a) The governing board, upon voting to expel a pupil, may
suspend the enforcement of the expulsion order for a period of
not more than one calendar year and may, as a condition of the
suspension of enforcement, assign the pupil to a school, class,
or program that is deemed appropriate for the rehabilitation of
the pupil. The rehabilitation program to which the pupil is
assigned may provide for the involvement of the pupil’s parent
or guardian in his or her child’s education in ways that are
specified in the rehabilitation program. A parent or guardian’s
refusal to participate in the rehabilitation program shall not be
considered in the governing board’s determination as to whether
the pupil has satisfactorily completed the rehabilitation
program.
(b) The governing board shall apply the criteria for suspending
the enforcement of the expulsion order equally to all pupils,
including individuals with exceptional needs as defined in
Section 56026.
(c) During the period of the suspension of the expulsion order,
the pupil is deemed to be on probationary status.
(d) The governing board may revoke the suspension of an
expulsion order under this section if the pupil commits any of
the acts enumerated in Section 48900 or violates any of the
district’s rules and regulations governing pupil conduct. When
the governing board revokes the suspension of an expulsion
order, a pupil may be expelled under the terms of the original
expulsion order.
(e) Upon satisfactory completion of the rehabilitation
assignment of a pupil, the governing board shall reinstate the
pupil in a school of the district and may also order the
expungement of any or all records of the expulsion proceedings.
(f) A decision of the governing board to suspend an expulsion
order does not affect the time period and requirements for the
filing of an appeal of the expulsion order with the county board
of education required under Section 48919. Any appeal shall be
filed within 30 days of the original vote of the governing board.

1996.)
48918.
The governing board of each school district shall establish rules
and regulations governing procedures for the expulsion of
pupils. These procedures shall include, but are not necessarily
limited to, all of the following:
(a) (1) The pupil shall be entitled to a hearing to determine
whether the pupil should be expelled. An expulsion hearing
shall be held within 30 schooldays after the date the principal or
the superintendent of schools determines that the pupil has
committed any of the acts enumerated in Section 48900, unless
the pupil requests, in writing, that the hearing be postponed.
The adopted rules and regulations shall specify that the pupil is
entitled to at least one postponement of an expulsion hearing,
for a period of not more than 30 calendar days. Any additional
postponement may be granted at the discretion of the governing
board of the school district.
(2) Within 10 schooldays after the conclusion of the hearing,
the governing board of the school district shall decide whether
to expel the pupil, unless the pupil requests in writing that the
decision be postponed. If the hearing is held by a hearing
officer or an administrative panel, or if the governing board of
the school district does not meet on a weekly basis, the
governing board of the school district shall decide whether to
expel the pupil within 40 schooldays after the date of the
pupil’s removal from his or her school of attendance for the
incident for which the recommendation for expulsion is made by
the principal or the superintendent of schools, unless the pupil
requests in writing that the decision be postponed.
(3) If compliance by the governing board of the school di strict
with the time requirements for the conducting of an expulsion
hearing under this subdivision is impracticable during the
regular school year, the superintendent of schools or the
superintendent’s designee may, for good cause, extend the time
period for the holding of the expulsion hearing for an additional

five schooldays. If compliance by the governing board of the
school district with the time requirements for the conducting of
an expulsion hearing under this subdivision is impractical due
to a summer recess of governing board meetings of more than
two weeks, the days during the recess period shall not be
counted as schooldays in meeting the time requirements. The
days not counted as schooldays in meeting the time
requirements for an expulsion hearing because of a summer
recess of governing board meetings shall not exceed 20
schooldays, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 48925, and
unless the pupil requests in writing that the expulsion hearing
be postponed, the hearing shall be held not later than 20
calendar days before the first day of school for the school year.
Reasons for the extension of the time for the hearing shall be
included as a part of the record at the time the expulsion
hearing is conducted. Upon the commencement of the hearing,
all matters shall be pursued and conducted with reasonable
diligence and shall be concluded without any unnecessary delay.
(b) Written notice of the hearing shall be forwarded to the pupil
at least 10 calendar days before the date of the hearing. The
notice shall include all of the following:
(1) The date and place of the hearing.
(2) A statement of the specific facts and charges upon which the
proposed expulsion is based.
(3) A copy of the disciplinary rules of the school district that
relate to the alleged violation.
(4) A notice of the parent, guardian, or pupil’s obligation
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 48915.1.
(5) Notice of the opportunity for the pupil or the pupil’s parent
or guardian to appear in person or to be represented by legal
counsel or by a nonattorney adviser, to inspect and obtain
copies of all documents to be used at the hearing, to confront
and question all witnesses who testify at the hearing, to
question all other evidence presented, and to present oral and
documentary evidence on the pupil’s behalf, including
witnesses. In a hearing in which a pupil is alleged to have

committed or attempted to commit a sexual assault as specified
in subdivision (n) of Section 48900 or to have committed a
sexual battery as defined in subdivision (n) of Section 48900, a
complaining witness shall be given five days’ notice before
being called to testify, and shall be entitled to have up to two
adult support persons, including, but not limited to, a parent,
guardian, or legal counsel, present during his or her testimony.
Before a complaining witness testifies, support persons shall be
admonished that the hearing is confidential. This subdivision
shall not preclude the person presiding over an expulsion
hearing from removing a support person whom the presiding
person finds is disrupting the hearing. If one or both of the
support persons is also a witness, the provisions of Section
868.5 of the Penal Code shall be followed for the hearing. This
section does not require a pupil or the pupil’s parent or
guardian to be represented by legal counsel or by a nonattorney
adviser at the hearing.
(A) For purposes of this section, “legal counsel” means an
attorney or lawyer who is admitted to the practice of law in
California and is an active member of the State Bar of
California.
(B) For purposes of this section, “nonattorney adviser” means
an individual who is not an attorney or lawyer, but who is
familiar with the facts of the case, and has been selected by the
pupil or pupil’s parent or guardian to provide assi stance at the
hearing.
(c) (1) Notwithstanding Section 35145, the governing board of
the school district shall conduct a hearing to consider the
expulsion of a pupil in a session closed to the public, unless the
pupil requests, in writing, at least five days before the date of
the hearing, that the hearing be conducted at a public meeting.
Regardless of whether the expulsion hearing is conducted in a
closed or public session, the governing board of the school
district may meet in closed session for the purpose of
deliberating and determining whether the pupil should be
expelled.

(2) If the governing board of the school district or the hearing
officer or administrative panel appointed under subdivision (d)
to conduct the hearing admits any other person to a closed
deliberation session, the parent or guardian of the pupil, the
pupil, and the counsel of the pupil also shall be allowed to
attend the closed deliberations.
(3) If the hearing is to be conducted at a public meeting, and
there is a charge of committing or attempting to commit a
sexual assault as defined in subdivision (n) of Section 48900 or
to commit a sexual battery as defined in subdivision (n) of
Section 48900, a complaining witness shall have the right to
have his or her testimony heard in a session closed to the public
when testifying at a public meeting would threaten serious
psychological harm to the complaining witness and there are no
alternative procedures to avoid the threatened harm, including,
but not limited to, videotaped deposition or contemporaneous
examination in another place communicated to the hearing room
by means of closed-circuit television.
(d) Instead of conducting an expulsion hearing itself, the
governing board of the school district may contract with the
county hearing officer, or with the Office of Administrative
Hearings pursuant to Chapter 14 (commencing with Section
27720) of Part 3 of Division 2 of Title 3 of the Government
Code and Section 35207 of this code, for a hearing officer to
conduct the hearing. The governing board of the school district
may also appoint an impartial administrative panel of three or
more certificated persons, none of whom is a member of the
governing board of the school district or employed on the staff
of the school in which the pupil is enrolled. The hearing shall
be conducted in accordance with all of the procedures
established under this section.
(e) Within three schooldays after the hearing, the hearing
officer or administrative panel shall determine whether to
recommend the expulsion of the pupil to the governing board of
the school district. If the hearing officer or administrative panel
decides not to recommend expulsion, the expulsion proceedings

shall be terminated and the pupil immediately shall be
reinstated and permitted to return to the classroom instructional
program from which the expulsion referral was made, unless the
parent, guardian, or responsible adult of the pupil requests
another school placement in writing. Before the placement
decision is made by the parent, guardian, or responsible adult,
the superintendent of schools or the superintendent’s designee
shall consult with school district personnel, including the
pupil’s teachers, and the parent, guardian, or responsible adult
regarding any other school placement options for the pupil in
addition to the option to return to his or her classroom
instructional program from which the expulsion referral was
made. If the hearing officer or administrative panel finds that
the pupil committed any of the acts specified in subdivision (c )
of Section 48915, but does not recommend expulsion, the pupil
shall be immediately reinstated and may be referred to his or
her prior school or another comprehensive school, or, pursuant
to the procedures set forth in Section 48432.5, a continuation
school of the school district. The decision not to recommend
expulsion shall be final.
(f) (1) If the hearing officer or administrative panel
recommends expulsion, findings of fact in support of the
recommendation shall be prepared and submitted to the
governing board of the school district. All findings of fact and
recommendations shall be based solely on the evidence adduced
at the hearing. If the governing board of the school district
accepts the recommendation calling for expulsion, acceptance
shall be based either upon a review of the findings of fact and
recommendations submitted by the hearing officer or panel or
upon the results of any supplementary hearing conducted
pursuant to this section that the governing board of the school
district may order.
(2) The decision of the governing board of the school district to
expel a pupil shall be based upon substantial evidence relevant
to the charges adduced at the expulsion hearing or hearings.
Except as provided in this section, no evidence to expel shall be

based solely upon hearsay evidence. The governing board of the
school district or the hearing officer or administrative panel
may, upon a finding that good cause exists, determine that the
disclosure of either the identity of a witness or the testimony of
that witness at the hearing, or both, would subject the witness to
an unreasonable risk of psychological or physical harm. Upon
this determination, the testimony of the witness may be
presented at the hearing in the form of sworn declarations that
shall be examined only by the governing board of the school
district or the hearing officer or administrative panel. Copies of
these sworn declarations, edited to delete the name and identity
of the witness, shall be made available to the pupil.
(g) A record of the hearing shall be made. The record may be
maintained by any means, including electronic recording, so
long as a reasonably accurate and complete written transcription
of the proceedings can be made.
(h) (1) Technical rules of evidence shall not apply to the
hearing, but relevant evidence may be admitted and given
probative effect only if it is the kind of evidence upon which
reasonable persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of
serious affairs. A decision of the governing board of the school
district to expel shall be supported by substantial evidence
showing that the pupil committed any of the acts enumerated in
Section 48900.
(2) In hearings that include an allegation of committing or
attempting to commit a sexual assault as defined in subdivision
(n) of Section 48900 or to commit a sexual battery as defined in
subdivision (n) of Section 48900, evidence of specific
instances, of a complaining witness’ prior sexual conduct is to
be presumed inadmissible and shall not be heard absent a
determination by the person conducting the hearing that
extraordinary circumstances exist requiring the evidence be
heard. Before the person conducting the hearing makes the
determination on whether extraordinary circumstances exist
requiring that specific instances of a complaining witness’ prior
sexual conduct be heard, the complaining witness shall be

provided notice and an opportunity to present opposition to the
introduction of the evidence. In the hearing on the admissibility
of the evidence, the complaining witness shall be entitled to be
represented by a parent, guardian, legal counsel, or other
support person. Reputation or opinion evidence regarding the
sexual behavior of the complaining witness is not admissible for
any purpose.
(i) (1) Before the hearing has commenced, the governing board
of the school district may issue subpoenas at the request of
either the superintendent of schools or the superintendent’s
designee or the pupil, for the personal appearance of percipient
witnesses at the hearing. After the hearing has commenced, the
governing board of the school district or the hearing officer or
administrative panel may, upon request of either the county
superintendent of schools or the superintendent’s designee or
the pupil, issue subpoenas. All subpoenas shall be issued in
accordance with Sections 1985, 1985.1, and 1985.2 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. Enforcement of subpoenas shall be done in
accordance with Section 11455.20 of the Government Code.
(2) Any objection raised by the superintendent of schools or the
superintendent’s designee or the pupil to the issuance of
subpoenas may be considered by the governing board of the
school district in closed session, or in open session, if so
requested by the pupil before the meeting. Any decision by the
governing board of the school district in response to an
objection to the issuance of subpoenas shall be final and
binding.
(3) If the governing board of the school district, hearing officer,
or administrative panel determines, in accordance with
subdivision (f), that a percipient witness would be subject to an
unreasonable risk of harm by testifying at the hearing, a
subpoena shall not be issued to compel the personal attendance
of that witness at the hearing. However, that witness may be
compelled to testify by means of a sworn declaration as
provided for in subdivision (f).
(4) Service of process shall be extended to all parts of the state

and shall be served in accordance with Section 1987 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. All witnesses appearing pursuant to
subpoena, other than the parties or officers or employees of the
state or any political subdivision of the state, shall receive fees,
and all witnesses appearing pursuant to subpoena, except the
parties, shall receive mileage in the same amount and under the
same circumstances as prescribed for witnesses in civil actions
in a superior court. Fees and mileage shall be paid by the party
at whose request the witness is subpoenaed.
(j) Whether an expulsion hearing is conducted by the governing
board of the school district or before a hearing officer or
administrative panel, final action to expel a pupil shall be taken
only by the governing board of the school district in a public
session. Written notice of any decision to expel or to suspend
the enforcement of an expulsion order during a period of
probation shall be sent by the superintendent of schools or his
or her designee to the pupil or the pupil’s parent or guardian
and shall be accompanied by all of the following:
(1) Notice of the right to appeal the expulsion to the county
board of education.
(2) Notice of the education alternative placement to be provided
to the pupil during the time of expulsion.
(3) Notice of the obligation of the parent, guardian, or pupil
under subdivision (b) of Section 48915.1, upon the pupil’ s
enrollment in a new school district, to inform that school
district of the pupil’s expulsion.
(k) (1) The governing board of the school district shall maintain
a record of each expulsion, including the cause for the
expulsion. Records of expulsions shall be nonprivileged,
disclosable public records.
(2) The expulsion order and the causes for the expulsion shall
be recorded in the pupil’s mandatory interim record and shall be
forwarded to any school in which the pupil subsequently enrolls
upon receipt of a request from the admitting school for the
pupil’s school records.

January 1, 2015.)
48918.1.
(a) (1) If the decision to recommend expulsion is a discretionary
act and the pupil is a foster child, as defined in Section
48853.5, the governing board of the school district shall provide
notice of the expulsion hearing to the pupil’s attorney and an
appropriate representative of the county child welfare agency at
least 10 calendar days before the date of the hearing. The notice
may be made using the most cost-effective method possible,
which may include, but is not limited to, electronic mail or a
telephone call.
(2) If a recommendation of expulsion is required and the pupil
is a foster child, as defined in Section 48853.5, the governing
board of the school district may provide notice of the expulsion
hearing to the pupil’s attorney and an appropriate representative
of the county child welfare agency at least 10 calendar days
before the date of the hearing. The notice may be made using
the most cost-effective method possible, which may include, but
is not limited to, electronic mail or a telephone call.
(b) (1) If the decision to recommend expulsion is a
discretionary act and the pupil is a homeless child or youth, as
defined in Section 11434a(2) of Title 42 of the United States
Code, the governing board of the school district shall provide
notice of the expulsion hearing to the local educational agency
liaison for homeless children and youth designated pursuant to
Section 11432(g)(1)(J)(ii) of Title 42 of the United States Code
at least 10 calendar days before the date of the hearing. The
notice may be made using the most cost-effective method
possible, which may include, but is not limited to, electronic
mail or a telephone call.
(2) If a recommendation of expulsion is required and the pupil
is a homeless child or youth, as defined in Section 11434a(2) of
Title 42 of the United States Code, the governing board of the
school district may provide notice of the expulsion hearing to
the local educational agency liaison for homeless children and

youth designated pursuant to Section 11432(g)(1)(J)(ii) of Title
42 of the United States Code at least 10 calendar days before
the date of the hearing. The notice may be made using the most
cost-effective method possible, which may include, but is not
limited to, electronic mail or a telephone call.
January 1, 2015.)
48918.5.
In expulsion hearings involving allegations brought pursuant to
subdivision (n) of Section 48900, the governing board of each
school district shall establish rules and regulations governing
procedures. The procedures shall include, but are not limited to,
all of the following:
(a) At the time that the expulsion hearing is recommended, the
complaining witness shall be provided with a copy of the
applicable disciplinary rules and advised of his or her right to:
(1) receive five days’ notice of the complaining witness’s
scheduled testimony at the hearing, (2) have up to two adult
support persons of his or her choosing, present in the hearing at
the time he or she testifies; and (3) to have the hearing closed
during the time they testify pursuant to subdivision (c) of
Section 48918.
(b) An expulsion hearing may be postponed for one schoolday
in order to accommodate the special physical, mental, or
emotional needs of a pupil who is the complaining witness
where the allegations arise under subdivision (n) of Section
48900.
(c) The district shall provide a nonthreatening environment for a
complaining witness in order to better enable them to speak
freely and accurately of the experiences that are the subject of
the expulsion hearing, and to prevent discouragement of
complaints. Each school district shall provide a room separate
from the hearing room for the use of the complaining witness
prior to and during breaks in testimony. In the discretion of the
person conducting the hearing, the complaining witness shall be

allowed reasonable periods of relief from examination and
cross-examination during which he or she may leave the hearing
room. The person conducting the hearing may arrange the
seating within the hearing room of those present in order to
facilitate a less intimidating environment for the complaining
witness. The person conducting the hearing may limit the time
for taking the testimony of a complaining witness to the hours
he or she is normally in school, if there is no good cause to take
the testimony during other hours. The person conducting the
hearing may permit one of the complaining witness’s support
persons to accompany him or her to the witness stand.
(d) Whenever any allegation is made of conduct violative of
subdivision (n) of Section 48900, complaining witnesses and
accused pupils are to be advised immediately to refrain from
personal or telephonic contact with each other during the
pendency of any expulsion process.
1997.)
48918.6.
In addition to any other immunity that may exist, any testimony
provided by a pupil witness in an expulsion hearing conducted
pursuant to this article is expressly deemed to be a
communication protected by subdivision (b) of Section 47 of the
Civil Code.
2003.)
48919.
If a pupil is expelled from school, the pupil or the pupil’s
parent or guardian may, within 30 days following the decision
of the governing board to expel, file an appeal to the county
board of education which shall hold a hearing thereon and
render its decision.
The county board of education, or in a class 1 or class 2 county
a hearing officer or impartial administrative panel, shall hold

the hearing within 20 schooldays following the filing of a
formal request under this section. If the county board of
education hears the appeal without a hearing conducted pursuant
to Section 48919.5, then the board shall render a decision
within three schooldays of the hearing conducted pursuant to
Section 48920, unless the pupil requests a postponement.
The period within which an appeal is to be filed shall be
determined from the date a governing board votes to expel even
if enforcement of the expulsion action is suspended and the
pupil is placed on probation pursuant to Section 48917. A pupil
who fails to appeal the original action of the board within the
prescribed time may not subsequently appeal a decision of the
board to revoke probation and impose the original order of
expulsion.
The county board of education shall adopt rules and regulations
establishing procedures for expulsion appeals conducted under
this section. If the county board of education in a class 1 or
class 2 county elects to use the procedures in Section 48919.5,
then the board shall adopt rules and regulations establishing
procedures for expulsion appeals conducted under Section
48919.5. The adopted rules and regulations shall include, but
need not be limited to, the requirements for filing a notice of
appeal, the setting of a hearing date, the furnishing of notice to
the pupil and the governing board regarding the appeal, the
furnishing of a copy of the expulsion hearing record to the
county board of education, procedures for the conduct of the
hearing, and the preservation of the record of the appeal.
The pupil shall submit a written request for a copy of the
written transcripts and supporting documents from the school
district simultaneously with the filing of the notice of appeal
with the county board of education. The school district shall
provide the pupil with the transcriptions, supporting documents,
and records within 10 schooldays following the pupil’s written
request. Upon receipt of the records, the pupil shall immediately
file suitable copies of these records with the county board of
education.

2001.)
48919.5.
(a) A county board of education in a class 1 or class 2 county
may have a hearing officer pursuant to Chapter 14 (commencing
with Section 27720) of Part 3 of Title 3 of the Government
Code, or an impartial administrative panel of three or more
certificated persons appointed by the county board of education,
hear appeals filed pursuant to Section 48919. The members of
the impartial administrative panel shall not be members of the
governing board of the school district nor employees of the
school district, from which the pupil filing the appeal was
expelled. Neither the hearing officer, nor any member of the
administrative panel, hearing a pupil’s appeal shall have been
the hearing officer or a member of the administrative panel that
conducted the pupil’s expulsion hearing.
(b) A hearing conducted pursuant to this section shall not issue
a final order of the county board. The hearing officer or
impartial administrative panel shall prepare a recommended
decision, including any findings or conclusions required for that
decision, and shall submit that recommendation and the record
to the county board of education within three schooldays of
hearing the appeal.
(c) Sections 48919, 48920, 48921, 48922, 48923, and 48925 are
applicable to a hearing conducted pursuant to this section.
(d) Within 10 schooldays of receiving the recommended
decision and record from the hearing officer or the impartial
administrative panel, the county board of education shall review
the recommended decision and record and render a final order
of the board.
(e) For purposes of this article, the following definitions shall
apply:
(1) “Countywide ADA” means the aggregate number of annual
units of regular average daily attendance for the fiscal year in
all school districts within the county.

(2) “Class 1 county” means a county with 1994/95 countywide
ADA of more than 500,000.
(3) “Class 2 county” means a county with 1994/95 countywide
ADA of at least 180,000 but less than 500,000.
1998.)
48920.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 54950 of the
Government Code and Section 35145 of this code, the county
board of education shall hear an appeal of an expulsion order in
closed session, unless the pupil requests, in writing, at least five
days prior to the date of the hearing, that the hearing be
conducted in a public meeting. Upon the timely submission of a
request for a public meeting, the county board of education
shall be required to honor the request. Whether the hearing is
conducted in closed or public session, the county board may
meet in closed session for the purpose of deliberations. If the
county board admits any representative of the pupil or the
school district, the board shall, at the same time, admit
representatives from the opposing party.
July 28, 1983.)
48921.
The county board of education shall determine the appeal from a
pupil expulsion upon the record of the hearing before the
district governing board, together with such applicable
documentation or regulations as may be ordered. No evidence
other than that contained in the record of the proceedings of the
school board may be heard unless a de novo proceeding is
granted as provided in Section 48923.
It shall be the responsibility of the pupil to submit a written
transcription for review by the county board. The cost of the
transcript shall be borne by the pupil except in either of the
following situations:

(1) Where the pupil’s parent or guardian certifies to the school
district that he or she cannot reasonably afford the cost of the
transcript because of limited income or exceptional necessary
expenses, or both.
(2) In a case in which the county board reverses the decision of
the local governing board, the county board shall require that
the local board reimburse the pupil for the cost of such
transcription.
July 28, 1983.)
48922.
(a) The review by the county board of education of the decision
of the governing board shall be limited to the following
questions:
(1) Whether the governing board acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction.
(2) Whether there was a fair hearing before the governing
board.
(3) Whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion in the
hearing.
(4) Whether there is relevant and material evidence which, in
the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been
produced or which was improperly excluded at the hearing
before the governing board.
(b) As used in this section, a proceeding without or in excess of
jurisdiction includes, but is not limited to, a situation where an
expulsion hearing is not commenced within the time periods
prescribed by this article, a situation where an expulsion order
is not based upon the acts enumerated in Section 48900, or a
situation involving acts not related to school activity or
attendance.
(c) For purposes of this section, an abuse of discretion is
established in any of the following situations:
(1) If school officials have not met the procedural requirements
of this article.

(2) If the decision to expel a pupil is not supported by the
findings prescribed by Section 48915.
(3) If the findings are not supported by the evidence.
A county board of education may not reverse the decision of a
governing board to expel a pupil based upon a finding of an
abuse of discretion unless the county board of education also
determines that the abuse of discretion was prejudicial.
July 28, 1983.)
48923.
The decision of the county board shall be limited as follows:
(a) If the county board finds that relevant and material evidence
exists which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not
have been produced or which was improperly excluded at the
hearing before the governing board, it may do either of the
following:
(1) Remand the matter to the governing board for
reconsideration and may in addition order the pupil reinstated
pending the reconsideration.
(2) Grant a hearing de novo upon reasonable notice thereof to
the pupil and to the governing board. The hearing shall be
conducted in conformance with the rules and regulations
adopted by the county board under Section 48919.
(b) If the county board determines that the decision of the
governing board is not supported by the findings required to be
made by Section 48915, but evidence supporting the required
findings exists in the record of the proceedings, the county
board shall remand the matter to the governing board for
adoption of the required findings. This remand for the adoption
and inclusion of the required findings shall not result in an
additional hearing pursuant to Section 48918, except that final
action to expel the pupil based on the revised findings of fact
shall meet all requirements of subdivisions (j) and (k) of
Section 48918.
(c) In all other cases, the county board shall enter an order

either affirming or reversing the decision of the governing
board. In any case in which the county board enters a decision
reversing the local board, the county board may direct the local
board to expunge the record of the pupil and the records of the
district of any references to the expulsion action and the
expulsion shall be deemed not to have occurred.
2001.)
48924.
The decision of the county board of education shall be final and
binding upon the pupil and upon the governing board of the
school district. The pupil and the governing board shall be
notified of the final order of the county board, in writing, either
by personal service or by certified mail. The order shall become
final when rendered.
1983.)
48925.
As used in this article:
(a) “Day” means a calendar day unless otherwise specifically
provided.
(b) “Expulsion” means removal of a pupil from (1) the
immediate supervision and control, or (2) the general
supervision, of school personnel, as those terms are used in
Section 46300.
(c) “Schoolday” means a day upon which the schools of the
district are in session or weekdays during the summer recess.
(d) “Suspension” means removal of a pupil from ongoing
instruction for adjustment purposes. However, “suspension”
does not mean any of the following:
(1) Reassignment to another education program or class at the
same school where the pupil will receive continuing instruction
for the length of day prescribed by the governing board for
pupils of the same grade level.

(2) Referral to a certificated employee designated by the
principal to advise pupils.
(3) Removal from the class, but without reassignment to another
class or program, for the remainder of the class period without
sending the pupil to the principal or the principal’s designee as
provided in Section 48910. Removal from a particular class
shall not occur more than once every five schooldays.
(e) “Pupil” includes a pupil’s parent or guardian or legal
counsel.
1983.)
48926.
Each county superintendent of schools in counties that operate
community schools pursuant to Section 1980, in conjunction
with superintendents of the school districts within the county,
shall develop a plan for providing education services to all
expelled pupils in that county. The plan shall be adopted by the
governing board of each school district within the county and
by the county board of education.
The plan shall enumerate existing educational alternatives for
expelled pupils, identify gaps in educational services to
expelled pupils, and strategies for filling those service gaps.
The plan shall also identify alternative placements for pupils
who are expelled and placed in district community day school
programs, but who fail to meet the terms and conditions of their
rehabilitation plan or who pose a danger to other district pupils,
as determined by the governing board.
Each county superintendent of schools, in conjunction with the
superintendents of the school districts, shall submit to the
Superintendent of Public Instruction the county plan for
providing educational services to all expelled pupils in the
county no later than June 30, 1997, and shall submit a triennial
update to the plan to the Superintendent of Public Instruction,
including the outcome data pursuant to Section 48916.1, on
June 30th thereafter.

1996. Operative July 1, 1996, by Sec. 9 of Ch. 974, which was
amended by Stats. 1996, Ch. 937.)
48927.
(a) This chapter shall also apply to pupils attending the
California School for the Blind and the two California Schools
for the Deaf, which shall be referred to as the “state special
schools.”
(b) Because the state special schools have a governance
structure different from that of school districts, for the purposes
of this section the following definitions shall apply:
(1) “Superintendent” means the appropriate principal of the
state special school in which the pupil is enrolled, or the
principal’s designee, for purposes of Sections 48900, 48900.2,
48900.3, 48900.4, 48900.5, 48900.7, and 48911, and
subdivisions (a) and (j) of Section 48918.
(2) “Governing board of each school district,” “governing board
of any school district,” or “each governing board of a school
district” means the Superintendent of Public Instruction or his
or her designee for purposes of subdivision (a) of Section
48900.1, subdivision (b) of Section 48901, subdivision (b) of
Section 48901.5, Section 48907, Section 48910, the first
paragraph of Section 48918, and the first paragraph of Section
48918.5.
(3) “Governing board” means the Superintendent of the State
Special School in which the pupil is enrolled for purposes of
Section 48912, subdivision (d) of Section 48915, Section
48915.5, Section 48916, Section 48917, subdivisions (a), (c),
(d), (f), (h), (i), (j), and (k) of Section 48918, and Sections
48921, 48922, 48923, and 48924.
(4) “Governing board” means the governing board of the district
of residence of the expelled pupil for purposes of subdivision
(f) of Section 48915 and Section 48916.1. In the case of an
adult pupil expelled from a state special school, “governing
board” means the governing board of the school district that

referred the pupil to the state special school for purposes of the
code section cited in this paragraph.
(5) “Superintendent of schools or the governing board” means
the appropriate principal of the state special school in which the
pupil is enrolled, or the principal’s designee, for the purposes of
Section 48900.6.
(6) “School district” or “district” means the state special school
in which the pupil is enrolled for purposes of Section 48900.8,
subdivision (b) of Section 48903, Section 48905, Section 48909,
Section 48914, paragraph (1) of subdivision (e) of Section
48916.1, subdivision (c) of Section 48918.5, Section 48919,
Section 48920, and Section 48921.
(7) “County board of education” or “county board” means the
Superintendent of Public Instruction or his or her designee for
purposes of Sections 48920, 48921, 48922, 48923, and 48924.
(8) “Local educational agency” includes a state special school
for purposes of Section 48902 and Section 48915.5.
(9) “A change in placement” for purposes of paragraph (2) of
subdivision (a) of Section 48915.5 means a referral by the state
special school to the pupil’s school district of residence for
placement in an appropriate interim alternative educational
setting.
(10) “Individualized education program team” means the
individualized education program team of the pupil’s school
district of residence with appropriate representation from the
state special school in which the pupil is enrolled for purposes
of subdivision (a) of Section 48915.5.2.
(11) “Individualized education program team” means the
individualized education program team of the state special
school in which the pupil is enrolled with appropriate
representation from the pupil’s school district of residence for
purposes of subdivisions (b), (c), and (d) of Section 48915.5.3.
(c) Subdivision (b) of this section shall be deemed to provide
the same due process procedural protections to pupils in the
state special schools as afforded to pupils in the public school
districts of the state.

(Amended by Stats. 2003, Ch. 62, Sec. 56.5. Effective January
1, 2004.)
1
Canyon Crest Academy
5951 Village Center Loop Road
San Diego, CA 92130
T: (858) 350-0253
F: (858) 350-0280
www.sduhsd.net/cc
Discipline Policy
201 -201
San Dieguito Union High School District
Board of Trustees
Joyce Dalessandro
Barbara Groth
Beth Hergesheimer
Amy Herman

John Salazar
Superintendent
Ken Noah
2
Canyon Crest Academy – Discipline Policy
All CCA students and parents are required to sign a Discipline
Policy Notification Form that is submitted
during Readiness Days and certifies that students are familiar
with key school rules and are aware of
the discipline policy as a whole.
(See below for more details)
mit vulgar or
obscene acts or make inappropriate
displays of affection or be in possession of obscene, or vulgar
material.
athletic, or activity programs is not
acceptable.
not harass or intimidate students or staff.
harassment and or sexual

assault.
substances (drugs or alcohol).
alcohol, drugs, or paraphernalia at
school or at school events.
Juniors. NO guest passes
during school hours.
Tablets and other similar devices
are allowed at school and may be used to support learning.
The use of this technology is at the
discretion and supervision of each classroom teacher.
o Consequences for Breaking School Rules (one or more of the
following may occur)
School,
School/Class Suspension, Alternative School Placement,
Expulsion
o Students will wear shoes at all times. Prescribed clothing
must be worn for Physical
Education. No bare midriff tops, bathing suits, or other
revealing clothing that might
interfere with the educational process. Pants must fit at the

waist & underwear must
not show. No clothing or jewelry displaying alcohol, sex,
controlled substances or the
promotion of gangs or violence. No chains or spiked apparel.
o Consequences for Dress Code Violation
discipline procedures as
listed under “consequences for breaking school rules”. In
addition the student
may be sent to Assistant Principal’s office and /or sent home to
change.
o Honest behavior is an expectation for all students in the San
Dieguito Union High
School District. The purpose of this regulation is to create and
maintain an ethical
academic atmosphere. Specific types of academic dishonesty,
which will not be
tolerated, are defined below:
- Any intentional giving of or use of
external assistance
relating to an examination, test, or quiz without express
permission of the
teacher. This includes looking on another student’s paper,
sharing answers, or
copying another student’s paper.
3

- any intentional falsification or invention of
data, citation, or other
authority in an academic exercise.
- While collaboration is often
encouraged,
unauthorized collaboration is not permitted.
- Any intentional representation of another’s
ideas, words, or works
as one’s own. Plagiarism includes the misuse of published
material, electronic
material, and/or the work of other students. The original writer
who
intentionally shares his/her paper for another to copy, without
the permission of
the teacher, is also engaged in plagiarism.
- Any intentional and unauthorized
alteration of student,
teacher, or library materials.
- any unauthorized signing of another person’s name
to school related
documents.
- any theft of materials.
- any giving or selling of
unauthorized
materials.
o Consequences for Academic Dishonesty
thoroughly and

appropriate disciplinary measures will be taken consistent with
Board policy.
Depending on the severity of the offense one or more of the
following
consequences may occur:
will be
contacted.
permitted.
ract (in the class of the
infraction) for
the remainder of that class.
examination will
result in a district code of conduct violation.
for the
remainder of the school year.
o If your child is going to be late a parent or legal guardi an
must send a signed note or
call attendance office.
o Arriving more than 30 minutes late without a note or
parent/legal guardian phone call

constitutes a truancy.
o Students will remain on campus during the school day unless
they have an off-
campus pass. The off campus pass must be issued prior to the
student leaving
campus by the attendance office or an Assistant Principal. Off
Campus Passes will
not be delivered by the attendance office to students in the
classroom.
o Absences must be cleared through the attendance office by
phone or note from a
parent or legal guardian within 2 days.
o Admit slips will be issued before school, at break, lunch and
after school only.
o Students will not leave class during the period without a pass
and teacher permission.
Students in Video, Leadership, Yearbook, Journalism, teacher
or office aide must
have a pass or badge identifying them.
4
o Students will carry their CCA ID cards during the regular
school day and at all school
sponsored events and activities.
o Tardies
considered tardy. A

written pass from a staff member, attendance office or an
administrator may
excuse a tardy within 48 hours.
for Tardies
- - Verbal Warning
— Teacher Contacts Parent
— Teacher refers student to a 4-hour Saturday
School
Assignment
—Teacher refers student to the alpha Assistant
Principal
hool
o Saturday School is held from 8:15am until 10:15am. Students
are scheduled for a
specific date and receive notification of where to report.
o Students that have been assigned Saturday School must be on
time and bring
schoolwork or reading material. “No Show” students will
receive
further disciplinary action.
o It shall be the policy of the San Dieguito Union High School
District to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sex, disability, race, color,
national origin, religious
creed, age, marital status, or sexual orientation in the

educational programs and
activities which it operates.
o Intentional harassment is defined as threats or intimidation
directed against a student
or group of students that is sufficiently severe or pervasive that
it materially disrupts
class work, creates disorder, and invades the rights of that
student or group of
students.
o Hate violence is defined as any act punishable under
California Statues that interferes
with the exercise of an individual’s civil rights, defacing or
damaging personal property
or felonies against persons because of the victim’s race, color,
religion, nationality, or
ancestry. (Penal Code Sections 442.6, 442.7, and 442.7.75.)
o Students are subject to suspension and/or expulsion for
harassment and/or hate
violence when other means of correction have failed to bring
about proper conduct or
if the student’s presence causes a continuing danger to physical
safety or threaten to
disrupt the educational process.
o Definition: “Sexual harassment” means unwelcome sexual
advances, requests for
sexual favors, and any other verbal, visual, or physical conduct

of a sexual nature
made by any person from or in the work or educational setting
under any of the
following conditions:
term or a condition
of an individual’s employment, academic status, or progress.
or rejection of, the conduct by the individual
is used as the
basis of employment or academic decisions affecting the
individual.
5
impact upon the
individual’s work or academic performance, or of creating an
intimidating,
hostile, or offensive work or educational environment.
is used as the
basis for any decision affecting the individual regarding the
benefits and
services, honors, programs, or activities available at or through
the educational
institution.
on the basis of
sex, including sexual harassment, in any district program or
activity.

r types of conduct which are prohibited in the district
and which may
constitute sexual harassment include:
derogatory comments
or sexually degrading descriptions.
overly personal
conversation.
d in a
predominately single-
sex class.
in the educational
environment.
violation of the
district’s sexual harassment policy or who participates in the
investigation of a
sexual harassment complaint.
ited against members of the same
sex as well as
against members of the opposite sex.

o School consequences for any instances of sexual harassment
will be strictly imposed.
o In the best interest of students, employees and the general
public, the Board of
Education prohibits the use of tobacco products at all times on
district property and in
district vehicles. This prohibition applies to all employees,
students, visitors and other
persons at any school or school sponsored activities or athletic
event. It applies to
any meeting on any property owned, leased or rented by or from
the district. Tobacco
products are prohibited from use or possession by students on
campus or within
1,000 feet of campus boundaries.
o Students and staff members are entitled under the California
State Constitution to
attend schools that are safe, secure, and peaceful. The presence
of weapons or
replicas contribute to a climate of fear and disrupts the learning
environment of the
school Replicas of weapons whether they be toy firearms,
theatrical props, cap guns,
starter pistols or replicas of other deadly weapons, have no
place in the school
environment.

6
dly weapon (including
replicas)
in a threatening manner or to incite fear, inflict injury, or
disrupt the
educational process are subject to suspension/expulsion.
service
representative may remove from the possession of any student
any
firearm, knife (including Swiss army, pocket, etc.), explosive or
other
dangerous objects, while the student is on school premises or
engaged
in any school sponsored activity or going to or returning from
school or
otherwise under the authority of the school.
student will
surrender all dangerous objects or be subject to disciplinary
action for
such refusal. Parents and appropriate law enforceme nt officials
shall be
notified by the principal/designee of the taking of weapons and
the
disciplinary action followed. Students are subject to suspension
or
expulsion for possessing illegal weapons upon a first offense.
Illegal
weapons will be turned over to the police department as
evidence.

Other items may be returned to parents and/or guardians.
times to
conduct searches of vehicles or require students to submit to
searches
for weapons, drugs, or contraband.
o SDUHSD provides students with access to computer
equipment, software, and
network services. These tools support learning, collaboration,
and educational
research related to the district curriculum. All technology and
network usage must be
consistent with these purposes, the Acceptable Use Policy, and
all provisions of law
governing the actions of the user. Students are expected to use
any district
technology equipment, software, and network services only for
assignments/projects
that are assigned by their classroom teachers. Some examples
of inappropriate use
include playing games; installing, downloading, copying, or
deleting files; and
attempting to access or use anyone else’s account or password.
o Consequences for individuals violating the Acceptable Use
Policy vary depending on
the nature and seriousness of the violation. Consequences might
include conference,
loss of computer/technology access, suspension and/or

expulsion.
o Student parking is available in the student parking lot only
and all students must have
valid parking permit to utilize the lot. Parking permits may be
purchased through the
ASB office. Per SDUHSD policy, students must attend a Start
Smart class before
they are eligible to purchase a permit. Cars parked
in the incorrect lot or without a
permit may receive a San Diego police department
parking ticket.
Students under age 18 must be accompanied by a
parent/guardian or
other person specified by law when transporting
passengers under 20 years of age,
at any time for the first twelve months of obtaining a
drivers license.
For any questions regarding the CCA Discipline
Policy, please contact the CCA Assistant
Principal’s office at 858-350-0253, ext. 4003.
Rev: 6/9/11
Untitled

Scenario
--‐
clevelandboy
All
scenarios/case
studies
for
this
course
are
based
on
real
situations
and
have
been
written
by
former/current
assistant
principals
and
principals
in
California
schools.
Schools
are
purposefully
NOT

identified
and
all
names
have
been
changed.
Setting:
You
are
a
Dean
of
Students
at
a
smaller
comprehensive
high
school
in
the
San
Diego
area.
Since
it’s
a
smaller
campus,

with
less
than
1000
students
enrolled,
you
know
pretty
much
all
the
faces
of
students,
and
also
have
a
good
handle
on
the
gossip
and
happenings
of
the
campus.
Your
role
is
to
support

the
Principal
in
disciplinary
actions,
special
education
IEPs,
and
organizing
events
like
Prom
and
graduation.
You
feel
lucky
to
be
on
this
campus
where
there
are
few
major
disciplinary
issues,
and
those

that
do
occur
are
connected
to
kids
stealing
alcohol
at
the
local
market
down
the
street
and
showing
up
to
school
buzzed.
But,
maybe
because
the
campus
is
so
small,
you
do
have
kids

living
in
a
world
heavily
defined
by
cliques.
And
you
spend
a
lot
of
time
counseling
kids
that
it’s
OK
to
not
be
part
of
the
‘cool
kids,’
and
that
they
will
find
their

role
and
niche
in
the
school
and
world.
Event:
You
have
a
student,
Mike,
who
has
been
struggling
with
a
poor
self--‐ image
and
low
self--‐ esteem.
He
is
physically
much
smaller
than

other
students
in
the
11th
grade,
and
he
has
the
knack
of
saying
the
wrong
things
at
the
wrong
times.
He
has
struggled
to
fit
in,
but
until
recently,
grades
were
good
and
attendance

solid.
In
the
last
month,
however,
Mike’s
teachers
have
come
to
you
repeatedly
about
his
lack
of
turning
in
homework,
his
tardiness
to
class,
that
he
is
struggling
to
stay
awake
in

class,
and
that
he
seems
to
be
aggressive
in
his
responses
to
questions
or
expressions
of
concern.
Because
of
Mike’s
rapidly
declining
grades,
you
met
with
him
and
his
parents
about

a
week
ago.
In
the
meeting
he
had
been
sullen
and
quiet,
sitting
with
arms
tightly
folded
across
his
chest.
He
seems
to
have
lost
weight.
At
the
start
of
the
meeting,

Mike’s
parents
were
on
the
defensive,
trying
to
make
you
feel
like
you
were
wasting
their
important
time,
and
that
pulling
them
away
from
work
for
a
meeting
when
he
still
has
time
to

improve
his
grades
is
inconvenient
to
them.
After
you
explained
that
you
would
rather
have
this
meeting
now,
while
there
IS
time
to
improve
grades
before
the
end
of
the
semester,
versus
a
meeting

to
sign
him
up
for
summer
school,
they
were
more
open
to
hearing
things.
When
the
bell
rang,
you
excused
Mike
so
that
he
would
not
be
late
for
his
next
class.

In
reality,
you
wanted
a
chance
to
talk
to
his
parents
without
him
present.
You
wanted
to
bring
up
the
possibility
of
drugs
or
alcohol
abuse
–after
all,
Mike
was
exhibiting
classic
symptoms
of

a
student
who
was
experimenting,
and
his
psychological
profile
would
make
him
a
good
target
for
someone
pushing
drugs
or
peer
pressure
to
drink.
The
parents
were
of
course
furious

at
you
for
suggesting
such
a
thing.
You
had
to
remind
them
that
you
are
there
as
a
resource
and
that
you
are
not
sure,
and
that
you
have
no
evidence,
but
that
you

encourage
them
to
be
watchful.
That
included
a
suggestion
to
place
parental
monitoring
software
on
Mike’s
computer
so
that
they
would
get
a
better
sense
of
what
is
happening
in
his
world
via
his

online
chats,
etc.
Since
that
meeting,
Mike’s
been
avoiding
you.
When
you
pass
him
in
the
halls
or
on
the
quad
he
doesn’t
make
eye
contact
or
say
hello
like
he
used
to.

You
assumed
that
his
parents
shared
with
him
your
concerns
–
although
you
were
disappointed,
you
felt
that
at
least
Mike
now
knew
someone
is
watching.
Sometimes
that
was
important.
Just

after
school
started
today,
you
get
a
very
upset
phone
call
from
Mike’s
mom.
She
would
like
to
come
in
and
see
you
immediately.
When
she
arrives
at
your
office,
she
is

not
her
normal
self
–
she’s
disheveled,
seems
harried
and
upset.
As
soon
as
the
office
door
closes,
she
pulls
out
stacks
of
paper
from
her
oversized
purse
and
shoves
them
at
you,
demanding

that
you
read
them.
It
seems
that
the
meeting
with
the
parents
had
created
enough
concern
that
they
HAD
followed
your
suggestion
of
placing
internet
monitoring
software
on
all
computers
in
the

household.
What
you
hold
in
your
hand
is
screenshots
from
the
software,
documenting
Mike’s
activity
on
Facebook.
Most
of
it
is
the
usual
teenage
chatter.
Mike
was
mostly
responding
late
at
night
to

other
people’s
comments.
But
there
was
a
chat
conversation
with
someone,
username
‘clevelandboy,’
that
immediately
created
concern.
Mike:
“I
told
you
I
can’t
show
up
then”
Clevelendboy:
“u
aint
got

much
choice,
gotta
be
there”
Mike:
“I
have
class
until
3”
Clevelandboy:
“pussy”
Mike:
“I’m
not
afraid
of
u,
asshole”
Clevelandboy:
“u
shud
be
by
the
time
im
done
wt
u
they’ll

have
to
find
u
in
a
Tijuana
grave
and
nobody
will
be
able
to
id
your
bod”
Mike:
“Look
I
don’t
have
enough
cash
right
now”
Clevelandboy:
“so
steal
it
ur
parents
have

plenty
of
$$”
Mike:
“they’ll
know
I
took
it
I’ll
get
allowance
at
the
end
of
week”
Clevelandboy:
“no
way
by
then
u’ll
be
dead
Tomorrow
or
else”
(Let’s
just
say
there

was
a
lot
more
text
that
had
to
be
edited
out
due
to
the
nature
of
the
language.)
You
are
shocked.
This
is
not
the
nature
of
interaction
of
kids
on
your
campus.

Who
is
this
‘clevelandboy’?
Why
isn’t
he
using
his
real
name?
And
why
does
Mike
owe
him
money?
Is
it
drugs?
Regardless,
the
threats
in
it
are
not
to
be
ignored.
According

to
Mike’s
mom,
she
was
made
aware
of
the
situation
when
he
refused
to
come
to
school
today.
She
was
concerned
and
logged
into
the
software.
After
she
had
shown
him

what
she’d
been
reading,
he
shut
down,
left
the
breakfast
table
and
shut
himself
in
his
room,
refusing
to
come
out.
You
ask
the
mom
to
give
you
copies
of
the
pages,
and

tell
her
to
go
home
and
check
on
Mike.
You
promise
that
you
will
be
in
touch,
but
that
you
have
to
look
into
this
first.
The
threats
need
to
be
taken

very
seriously
–
even
if
they
were
just
meant
to
scare
Mike.
From
a
previous
situation
involving
a
death
threat
over
a
cell
phone
voicemail,
you
know
that
a
threat
made
via
cell
phone

voicemail
or
SMS/text
message,
is
considered
by
the
police
to
be
a
felony
level
‘terrorist
threat’
since
it
involves
making
a
threat
using
federal
communication
lines
and
resources.
Using
the
internet,
you

are
assuming,
is
going
to
be
the
same
thing,
if
not
worse.
You
log
onto
Facebook
and
search
out
‘clevelandboy.’
When
you
find
him,
you
click
on
his
profile.
His
profile
picture
doesn’t

tell
you
anything,
but
the
other
pictures
do.
He
is
a
student
from
your
school
and
you
recognize
him
as
someone
who
has
had
a
history
of
petty
bullying
in
middle
school
–
typical

stuff:
shoving
smaller
kids,
taking
other
kids’
belongings.
In
high
school
he
has
flown
under
the
radar,
but
his
name
has
still
crept
up
a
few
times.
It
seemed
that
he
has
‘expanded’
his

interests.
Questions:
1. What
are
your
top
three
concerns
in
this
situation?
2. What
are
your
first
three
action
steps
in
this
situation?
3. What
disciplinary
action
will
you
take
against
‘clevelandboy’?
Explain

your
answer.
Administrator Recommendation of Expulsion Matrix
This matrix is a tool designed to help administrators decide
when expulsion of a student is deemed mandatory, expected, or
at administrators discretion.
Expulsion is the most serious disciplinary action that a school
administrator may recommend and which a school district may
impose on a student. Expulsion can only occur by action of the
school district governing board, but administrators have an
important role in recommending expulsion. Due process
procedures for student expulsion are prescribed in
California Education Code (EC) EC Section 48915 that
categorizes the types of offenses which require an expulsion
recommendation, as well as those which do not require an
expulsion recommendation. If an administrator does recommend
expulsion for a specified offense, a student is entitled to a
hearing within 30 school days after that determination, unless
the student or parents or guardians request in writing that the
hearing be postponed. It is important to note that suspension for
students in grades kindergarten to grade eight, inclusive, for
disruption or defiance (EC Section 48900[k]) is prohibited, and
expulsion for students in kindergarten to grade twelve,
inclusive, is also prohibited.
EC Section 48900 paragraphs (v) and (w) encourage other
means of correction, rather than suspension or expulsion, be
used to bring about proper conduct as part of a Multi -Tiered
System of Supports. This Multi-Tiered System of Supports

includes restorative justice practices, trauma-informed
practices, social and emotional learning, and schoolwide
positive behavior interventions and support, which may be used
to help pupils gain critical social and emotional skills, receive
support to help transform trauma-related responses, understand
the impact of their actions, and develop meaningful methods for
repairing harm to the school community. This also includes
referral to a School Attendance Review Board for students who
are habitually insubordinate or disorderly during attendance at
school (EC Section 48263). EC Section 48900.5 lists many
other means of correction that may be documented prior to a
suspension or expulsion recommendation.
It is also notable that EC Section 48917 authorizes the local
governing board, at any time following voting to expel a pupil,
to suspend the enforcement of the expulsion order and assign
the student to a school, class, or program that is deemed
appropriate for the rehabilitation of the student. During the
period of the suspension of the expulsion order, the pupil is
deemed to be on probationary status.
Must Recommend Expulsion (Mandatory)
Shall Recommend Expulsion Unless Particular Circumstances
Render Inappropriate
May Recommend Expulsion (Discretionary)
EC 48915(c)
Act must be committed at school or school activity.
1. Firearm
a. Possessing firearm when a district employee verified firearm
possession and when student did not have prior written
permission from a certificated employee which is concurred
with by the principal or designee.
b. Selling or otherwise furnishing a firearm.
2. Brandishing a knife at another person.
3. Unlawfully selling a controlled substance listed in Health and
Safety Code Section 11053 et. seq.
4. Committing or attempting to commit a sexual assault as
defined in subdivision (n) of EC 48900 or committing sexual

battery as defined in subdivision (n) of 48900.
5. Possession of an explosive.
Adapted from San Diego City Schools, Zero Tolerance
Graduated Sanctions Student Discipline Guidelines, January
2001
Act must be committed at school or school activity.
EC Section 48915 (a) states that an administrator shall
recommend expulsion for the following violations [except for
subsections (c) and (e)] unless the administrator finds that
expulsion is inappropriate due to a particular circumstance.
1. Causing serious physical injury to another person, except in
self-defense. EC Section 48915 (a)(1).
2. Possession of any knife, explosive, or other dangerous object
of no reasonable use to the pupil. EC Section 48915 (a)(2).
3. Possession and/or use of any substance listed in Chapter 2
(commencing with Section 11053) of Division 10 of the Health
and Safety Code, except for the first offense for possession of
not more than one avoirdupois ounce of marijuana other than
concentrated cannabis.
4. Robbery or extortion. EC Section 48915 (a)(4).
5. Assault or battery, or threat of, on a school employee.
The recommendation for expulsion shall be based on one or
both of the following:
1. Other means of correction are not feasible or have repeatedly
failed to bring about proper conduct.
2. Due to the nature of the act, the presence of the pupil causes
a continuing danger to the physical safety of the pupil or others
[see Section 48915 (b)].
Acts committed at school or school activity or on the way to
and from school or school activity.
a. Inflicted physical injury†
b. Possessed dangerous objects
c. Possessed drugs or alcohol (policy determines which
offense)
d. Sold look alike substance representing drugs or alcohol
e. Committed robbery/extortion

f. Caused damage to property‡
g. Committed theft
h. Used tobacco (policy determines which offense)
i. Committed obscenity/profanity/vulgarity
j. Possessed or sold drug paraphernalia
k. Disrupted or defied school staff
l. Received stolen property
m. Possessed imitation firearm
n. Committed sexual harassment
o. Harassed, threatened or intimidated a student witness
p. Sold prescription drug Soma
q. Committed hazing
r. Engaged in an act of bullying, including, but not limited to,
bullying committed by means of an electronic act, as defined in
subdivisions (f) and (g) of Section 32261, directed specifically
toward a pupil or school personnel.
The recommendation for expulsion shall be based on one or
both of the following:
1. Other means of correction are not feasible or have repeatedly
failed to bring about proper conduct.
2. Due to the nature of the act, the presence of the pupil causes
a continuing danger to the physical safety of the pupil or others
[see Section 48915 (b)].
† Section 48900 (s) (Statutes of 2001) states a pupil who aids or
abets in infliction of physical injury to another, as defined
in Penal Code 31, may suffer suspension, but not expulsion.
However, if a student is adjudged by a court to have caused,
attempted to cause, or threatened personal injury, the student
may be expelled.
‡ Section 48900 (t) "school property" includes, but is not
limited to, electronic files and databases.
Behavioral Intervention Strategies and Supports
Provides information about behavioral intervention strategies
and supports which can keep students in school and hold them
accountable without suspension or expulsion.

FINAL CUMULATIVE UPDATE FOR CALIFORNIA SCHOOL LAW, THIRD EDITI

FINAL CUMULATIVE UPDATE FOR CALIFORNIA SCHOOL LAW, THIRD EDITI

More Related Content

Similar to FINAL CUMULATIVE UPDATE FOR CALIFORNIA SCHOOL LAW, THIRD EDITI

More from ChereCheek752

Recently uploaded

FINAL CUMULATIVE UPDATE FOR CALIFORNIA SCHOOL LAW, THIRD EDITI