The document discusses the European Union's policy towards China. It notes that China has become more powerful economically and assertive in various spheres. The EU's approach of unconditional engagement has not achieved its goals of liberalizing China. The document outlines four groups among EU member states in their approaches to China: Assertive Industrialists who are willing to stand up to China, Ideological Free-Traders focused on free trade, Accommodating Mercantilists prioritizing economic ties, and European Followers who defer to the EU. It argues the EU needs a more coherent, globally-focused policy that improves coordination between member states in dealing with China.

1. Aswin Ariaynto Azis
Week 14

2.  China has become economically more
powerful, more assertive on range of sphere:
economic, diplomatic, military, and that of
human rights.
 Getting reluctance in important isssues for US,
and expanding its relations with Myanmar,
Noth Korean, Sudan and Turkmenistan.
 Getting more protective on its own
sovereignty.

3.  Favourable demography, steady macro-
economic policy, classfication as developing
country, as it is actually 1st trading nation &
second largest economy, skillful and pragmatic
diplomacy, and lipservice.
 The strategy of divide and rule.
 Compare to the past which is more
accomodative when it’s not very strong.
 A floor which turns out to be ceiling.

4.  China strategy is not a revisionist challenge to
the international system and its rule. In fact,
vice versa.
 However, it builds negative coalition.
 It also presents offensive as defensive and the
opponents as either the trouble makers or rule-
breakers

5.  The EU-China strategy is based on a belief that
China, under the influece of European
engagement, will liberalise its economy,
improve the rule of law, and democratise its
politics.
 Unconditional engagement: a policy that gives
China access to all the economic and other
benefits cooperation with Europe while asking
for little in return.
 ex: trade deficit, trade barriers, modest
contribution to IMF

6.  The game of chess?
 Pan Wei argue “ the EU is weak, politically
divided and military non influential.
Economically, it’s giant, but we no longer fear
it because we know that EU needs China more
than China needs the EU.
 China knows its strenght and no longer bothers
to hide it.
 Ex: EU_China summit cancellation

7.  How to manage China’s impact on the
European economy; and
 How to engage China politically

8.  Assertive Industrialist,
 Ideological free-traders
 Accomodating merkantilist
 European Followers

9.  The small group of Assertive Industrialists is made
up of the Czech Republic, Germany and Poland.
These are the only EU Member States willing to
stand up to China vigorously on both political and
economic issues.
 The Assertive Industrialists do not agree that
market forces should shape the nature of the EU-
China relationship. They stand ready to pressure
China with sector-speciic demands, to support
protective “anti-dumping” measures against
unfairly subsidised Chinese goods, or to threaten
other trade actions.

10.  The Ideological Free-Traders – Denmark, the
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK – are mostly ready to
pressure China on politics and mostly opposed to
restricting its trade. Their aversion to any form of trade
management makes it very dificult for the EU to
develop an intelligent and coherent response to
China’s carefully crafted, highly centralised, often
aggressive trade policy.
 For these countries, free-trade ideology is an
expression of economic interest: their economies and
labour markets – oriented towards high technology
and services, particularly finance – benefit, or expect to
benefit, from Chinese growth rather than being
threatened by cheap Chinese imports.

11.  The Accommodating Mercantilists are the largest group,
comprising Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Italy,
Malta, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. The
assumption these countries share is that good political
relations with China will lead to commercial beneit. These
Member States feel that economic considerations must dominate
the relationship with China; they see anti-dumping measures as a
useful tool and oppose awarding China market economy status.
 They compensate for their readiness to resort to protectionist
measures by shunning confrontation with China on political
questions. As with the Ideological Free-Traders on trade, the
ccommodating Mercantilists’ refusal to bring pressure to bear on
Beijing on political issues weakens a key component of the EU’s
China policy: these countries have often kept the EU from
developing a more assertive stance on issues like Tibet or human
rights. At the extremes, some effectively act as proxies for China
in the EU.

12.  The fourth group, the European Followers, is made up of
those Member States who prefer to defer to the EU when
managing their relationship with China. As such, Austria,
Belgium, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania and
Luxembourg are the most “European-spirited” of the four
groups, but they are followers rather than leaders.
 Many of the European Followers do not consider their
relationship with China to be central to their foreign policy.
They rely on EU support to protect them from Chinese
pressure on issues like Taiwan or Tibet. While their
readiness to support EU policy is positive, their reluctance
to participate more actively in the debate feeds the
perception that China is not a key EU priority.

13.  China FP is shaped primarily by domestic
priorities: sustain economic growth and bolster
political legitimacy
 China has become too rich and too powerful to
continue operating under the radar. Its policy
towards EU is economic in nature, more access
to EU market and investment, wants
technology tranfers, EU share on climate
change, and EU refrain from Taiwan and Tibet.

14.  Europe needs to reframe its policy on China in
global terms rather instead of thinking its
relationship in bilateral terms.
 The idea reciprocal engagement?

15.  China has evolved to be a rich and strong state,
Europe realize that it is more powerful than it
was, however do not reckon how China’s
policy affect global issues and every region
around the world. A global China policy is
needed to enhance European leverage by
working with other countries.

16.  EU has to be more internally coherent. How?
1. Improve coordination between member states.
2. Lauch a political review on China policy, both EU and member
states.
3. Review sectoral and area approach. Make it more effective.
4. Consistent delivering the same message from one summit to
another.
5. Find alternative to twin-track approach.
6. Take the decision on EU policy at the higher level (COASI)
7. Training on the European Union diplomat( EEAS)
8. Involve European business and NGO to gain political
letigimacy and influence.
9. Calibricate a-EU wide response to chinese reprisals against
member states on sensitive issues such as the Dalai Lama and
Taiwan