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Do Rules Keep Track Workers Safe
This presentation discusses risks to track workers from being struck by trains and barriers to improving safety. It analyzes fatality data and rules/controls governing track worker safety. Key issues include rules not derived from risk assessment; lack of defined processes for route setting and situational awareness in possessions; need for improved lookout protection systems and COSS competencies tailored to possessions. The presentation suggests developing a possession safety handbook and portable lookout warning systems to enhance safety.
Do Rules Keep Track Workers Safe
- 2. This presentation considers: • the risk of track workers being struck by trains • how well this risk is managed by rules and other risk controls •barriers to improvements and • suggests where we go from here It is supported by a conference paper that contains everything in this presentation
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- 5. Analysis by SSoW ‐ 1994 to 2009 •32% of fatalities are those providing the SSoW • Lookouts, when used, are 55% of fatalities • Some SSoW may present intolerable levels of risk Safe Role System of Work Total COSS/ IWA Lookout Protection Assistant Machine Controller Other Workforce Established Possession 5 1 4 Possession Set Up 2 2 Open Line by Green Zone 3 3 Red Zone – Static 6 2 4 Red Zone – Mobile 7 4 3 None 2 1 1 Total 25 5 5 2 1 12
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- 9. Underlying Cause Rules for provision of “Morpeth” AWS magnets ‐ Morpeth North curve did not qualify Lesson Not always appropriate to prescribe rules Morpeth1984 Immediate Cause Driver did not slow for 40 mph curve
- 10. • Rules are required for real time operations but are not always appropriate for planned work • The Rule Book is the only Group Standard whose purpose and scope is not stated. Standards should have a defined purpose and scope •Group Standards are required for matters “which involve co‐operation between two or more rail duty holders”, so work under direct control of one Railway Group member should not be a Group Standard • Network Rail is the employer of all those who undertake infrastructure work and has the legal responsibility for track safety risk controls
- 11. Management of Health and Safety at Work Regs • Undertake a “suitable and sufficient risk assessment” to develop risk controls. Further risk assessment when circumstances change •Provide comprehensible and relevant information on risk control measures Construction(Design and Management) Regs • Provide pre‐construction information needed for site safety • Ensure design takes account of safety of those who will operate and maintain completed project
- 12. • Rules should be derived from risk assessment as required by MHASAW Regulations. A further risk assessment is required when circumstances change • Rules are only one type of control measure. The risk assessment must also specify other risk control measures •Rules and other risk controls cannot be considered in isolation from each other. A cohesive approach by a single authority is needed
- 13. AC AC – ACElectrified Lines DC DC – Electrified Lines OTP On Track Plant T3 Possession of the line for engineering work T11 Movement of engineering trains and on‐track plant under T3 arrangements HB1 General duties and track safety for track worker HB3 Duties of Lookout and site warden HB6 General duties of an Individual Working Alone (IWA) HB7 General duties of a Controller of Site Safety (COSS) HB8 IWA, COSS or PC blocking a line HB9 IWA or COSS setting up safe systems of work within possessions
- 14. AC AC – ACElectrified Lines 14 sections, COSS only concerned with issue of OLE permit OTP On Track Plant OTP movements, on & off tracking, safe operation of OTP T3 Possession of the line for engineering work Sets up the possession needed when work require train movements T11 Movement of engineering trains and on‐track plant under T3 Movements once possession is set up. Does not include sideways movements into the possession HB7 General duties of a Controller of Site Safety No mention of possessions. Mandates COSS form, most of which is not relevant to possessions HB9 IWA or COSS setting up safe systems of work within possessions Explains how SSoW derived for open line are applied to possessions.
- 17. 1. Maximum speed in possession work‐sites Not clear that the 5 mph required for a green zone only applies to COSS’s site of work. It does not apply to entire possession work‐site. With access points miles apart, a 5 mile round trip from access to site of work is not untypical 2.Control of On‐track plant (OTP) movements Rule Book requires ES to authorise each move. However there may be hundreds of individual OTP moves in a possession work‐site. Custom and practice is for the ES to delegate movement authority to Machine Controller . Module T11 does consider how OTP enters possessions and there is no requirement to record this
- 18. 3. Route setting in possessions Although the route has been set incorrectly every time a point is run through, there is no defined process to set routes in possessions, as there is for a signal failure on open line. 4. Red Zone working in possessions Lookouts are for unexpected trains at high speed. Workforce control of movements should be considered 5.Issue of isolation permits to COSSs rather than ES This does not take account of ES authorising COSSs to start work and thus increases the number of communications before work can start.
- 19. 1. Situational Awareness Workforce must have a situational awareness of all aspects of the possession. Diagrams are an effective way of providing this especially as various limits being demarcated in different ways Limit Demarcation PossessionSignals and / or points numbers Possession work‐site Mileage COSS’s Site of Work As agreed with ES, not documented Isolation limits (AC) OLE mast numbers Access points Mileage No specification for possession diagrams or process to provide employees or contractors with the information needed for such diagrams.
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- 21. 2. Controller of Site Safety (COSS) •COSSs need to be able to set up many different safe systems of work (SSoW). On the open line this is a demanding role •This is not so in an all lines blocked Possession as the SSoWhas, in effect, already been established •Many COSSs only work in all lines blocked possessions, but to do so they must have the full range of COSS competencies •A suitable COSS possession competency would thus reduce training requirement and eliminate risk of a COSS losing competence to set up open line SSoWs due to lack of practice •It is not feasible for many who supervise possession work to obtain the full COSS competency and so workgroups often have both a COSS and site supervisor managing their safety
- 22. 3. Facilities for PICOP / ES • Although simple possessions can be managed from a van by those who know their area, complex possessions need facilities to reduce risk of reliance on human memory e.g. an office, magnetic board with diagram and forms to track movements and on / off tracking • “I’d rather control a complex work‐site with facilities such as this than a simple work‐site from the back of a van” 4. Access points •Personnel and plant often travel miles along the railway from access point to site of work • Opportunities to provide access points as part of projects are often lost with no standard requiring their provision
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- 24. • Possession rules are in various modules / handbooks and have been evolved from the need to control train movements with other rules “bolted on” in an ad hoc manner. They need to be better presented and enhanced to address issues not currently addressed •This could be resolved by a possession safety handbook which could be provided relatively quickly as there is little, if any, requirement to change existing rules • Scope of this guide should be interfaces between the operational railway and between different principal contractors • The starting point for such a guide must be the requirements of the work rather than train movements
- 25. RIMINI A significant improvement in 2001 giving greater emphasis on work planning but:‐ • Does not specify T2 hierarchy (T2A / T2D less prone to human error than detonator protection) • Complex paperwork •9 years after RIMINI introduced, there is no process to provide asset information required for planning
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- 27. Lookout Operated Warning Systems (LOWS) • LOWS does not require the lookout to be in sight of workgroup, so the lookout need not be close to the track • LOWS could eliminate the need for a lookout chain (site, intermediate and distant lookouts) •Widespread use of LOWS could reduce risk to lookouts and provide cost savings • Some LOWS trials but minimal use of LOWS • LOWS systems used are cumbersome and cannot be used for mobile worksites. There is a need to develop easily used portable systems
- 28. Track Circuit Operating Devices (TCODs) • TCODs enable COSS on site to directly maintain a signal at danger •Eliminates risk of miscommunication with signaller • Not widely used although popular with those who use them • Type approval issues • Unclear where they can be used • Fixed TCODs are switches that activate track circuits and is a low cost alteration to signalling system
- 29. Trackside facilities • Although significant sums have been spend on access points, a strategy is required for the provision of assets to improve safety and possession efficiency • This includes access points, remotely operated DEPs, track warning systems and lockouts •Although these can be expensive to provide, cost can be minimal if specified at start of project design • CDM requires project designers to consider safety of those working on the track. This applies to anyone taking a design decision (e.g. Project Sponsors who specify project requirements)
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- 31. Why • Rules culture – A great strength but can lead to a blame culture that does not allow for genuine mistakes and masks the need to improve risk controls. •Organisational culture ‐ Safety improvement requires a willingness to openly identify problems. Under reporting of hundreds of RIDDOR accidents is indicative of a culture that does not encourage this. • Risk not understood ‐ Suitable performance indicators for track safety incidents are needed. • Reluctance to accept risks associated with changed risk controls. • Track safety rules are Group Standards subject to extensive stakeholder communications that are produced by RSSB committee whose focus is train movements. Only 3 of its 18 members work for Network Rail.
- 32. • LOWS eliminates need for lookout chains • No duplication of site supervisor and COSS •Avoid points run throughs • Reduced time to start from simplified possession communications • Reduced travel time from access point to site of work As well as reducing risk, suggestions in this presentation offer productivity and cost savings. for example Machine Controller starting 2 mile walk to site of work in a freezing rain squall ORR consider that NR’s infrastructure work 34% to 40% less efficient than in Europe, in part due to way possessions are undertaken.
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