This presentation discusses risks to track workers from being struck by trains and barriers to improving safety. It analyzes fatality data and rules/controls governing track worker safety. Key issues include rules not derived from risk assessment; lack of defined processes for route setting and situational awareness in possessions; need for improved lookout protection systems and COSS competencies tailored to possessions. The presentation suggests developing a possession safety handbook and portable lookout warning systems to enhance safety.
5. Analysis by SSoW ‐ 1994 to 2009
• 32% of fatalities are those providing the SSoW
• Lookouts, when used, are 55% of fatalities
• Some SSoW may present intolerable levels of risk
Safe Role
System of Work
Total
COSS/
IWA
Lookout
Protection
Assistant
Machine
Controller
Other
Workforce
Established Possession 5 1 4
Possession Set Up 2 2
Open Line by Green Zone 3 3
Red Zone – Static 6 2 4
Red Zone – Mobile 7 4 3
None 2 1 1
Total 25 5 5 2 1 12
13. AC AC – AC Electrified Lines
DC DC – Electrified Lines
OTP On Track Plant
T3 Possession of the line for engineering work
T11 Movement of engineering trains and on‐track plant
under T3 arrangements
HB1 General duties and track safety for track worker
HB3 Duties of Lookout and site warden
HB6 General duties of an Individual Working Alone (IWA)
HB7 General duties of a Controller of Site Safety (COSS)
HB8 IWA, COSS or PC blocking a line
HB9 IWA or COSS setting up safe systems of work within
possessions
14. AC AC – AC Electrified
Lines
14 sections, COSS only concerned
with issue of OLE permit
OTP On Track Plant OTP movements, on & off tracking,
safe operation of OTP
T3 Possession of the line
for engineering work
Sets up the possession needed when
work require train movements
T11 Movement of
engineering trains and
on‐track plant under T3
Movements once possession is set
up. Does not include sideways
movements into the possession
HB7 General duties of a
Controller of Site Safety
No mention of possessions.
Mandates COSS form, most of which
is not relevant to possessions
HB9 IWA or COSS setting up
safe systems of work
within possessions
Explains how SSoW derived for open
line are applied to possessions.
31. Why
• Rules culture – A great strength but can lead to a blame culture
that does not allow for genuine mistakes and masks the need to
improve risk controls.
• Organisational culture ‐ Safety improvement requires a
willingness to openly identify problems. Under reporting of
hundreds of RIDDOR accidents is indicative of a culture that does
not encourage this.
• Risk not understood ‐ Suitable performance indicators for track
safety incidents are needed.
• Reluctance to accept risks associated with changed risk controls.
• Track safety rules are Group Standards subject to extensive
stakeholder communications that are produced by RSSB
committee whose focus is train movements. Only 3 of its 18
members work for Network Rail.
32. • LOWS eliminates need for lookout chains
• No duplication of site supervisor and COSS
• Avoid points run throughs
• Reduced time to start from simplified possession
communications
• Reduced travel time from access point to site of work
As well as reducing risk, suggestions in this presentation offer
productivity and cost savings. for example
Machine Controller
starting 2 mile walk
to site of work
in a freezing rain squall
ORR consider that NR’s infrastructure work 34% to 40% less
efficient than in Europe, in part due to way possessions are
undertaken.