The document is a motion to dismiss charges filed against a business owner for alleged violations of municipal signage and noise ordinances. It summarizes that the business owner is charged with signage and television violations for displaying their registered trademark and playing informational videos. The motion argues these violations infringe on the business owner's freedom of speech and equal protection rights. It requests dismissal of the charges and a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the ordinances until the legal issues are resolved. The motion contends the ordinances are unconstitutional and the city has failed to prove the business caused a nuisance or unreasonable interference with others.

1. DEBORAH DICKSON DAVIS
910 AZALEA HILL DRIVE (912) 257-6253
GREENVILLE, SC 29607 DLDICKSON@SAVANNAHLAWSCHOOL.ORG
WRITING SAMPLE
The attached writing sample is a motion to dismiss I drafted under the supervision of an attorney
in a personal injury firm. The facts have been changed to protect the confidentiality of all parties
involved.
I was responsible for the research, citing, editing, and drafting of the motion. Included is a nine
(9) page motion. This motion originally included a memorandum in support of the motion as well as
exhibits of the store front and signage in question. The research also required extensive research into
municipal codes, as well as obtaining a certified copy of the municipal codes to present with the motion.
The case involved a sign ordinance violation based on store signage and a television commercial played
inside the store in the storefront.
The issue pertained to raising the enforcement of the zoning municipal codes as a violation of the
Defendant’s freedom of commercial speech, which amounted to an improper taking under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Georgia Constitution. My argument extended the
holding in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2770-71, 189 L. Ed. 2d 675 (2014)
(extending businesses the right to exercise rights as a person under the First Amendment). Interference
with the store’s branding is a deprivation of a proprietary property interest that is protected as a
registered service mark.

2. 1
IN THE RECORDER’S COURT OF CENSORSHIP COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA
STATE OF GEORGIA,
MAYOR, AND ALDERMAN OF
CITY OF STARSHIP
Plaintiff,
v. CASE NO. 2014-00-0000-00
BUSINESS OWNERMAN
D/B/A THE SHOPPE
§ 8-3112 – SIGN PERMIT REQ.
§ 8-3114 – SIGN APP. REQ.
Defendant.
§ 8-3030 – CERT. OF APP. REQ.
§ 8-3119(2)(g)(4), (g)(8) – REST. SIGNS
§ 9-2034 – NOISE DISTURBANCE
§ 9-2036(c) – REG. OF SOUND EQUIP.
MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
COMES NOW, the Defendant BUSINESS OWNERMAN, through the undersigned counsel and
pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-7(b) to -8, 9-11-11.1(b), 9-11-12(b), and 9-11-12(d), respectfully moves
the Court to dismiss the charges against the Defendant on or about June 1, 2014, at 99 Shoppe Lane,
Starship, Georgia 99999. The Defendant moves that the Court dismiss this action on the grounds that the
charges fail to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. The information alleged to be a
violation of the zoning municipal codes of Starship is directly in violation of the Defendant’s freedom of
speech and equal protection under both the Georgia and U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. I, IV-V,
XIV; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ I-II, V, XIII.
Secondly, the Defendant moves this Court to enjoin the City of Starship (“City”) from enforcing
the City of Starship’s zoning ordinances against the Defendant’s signage and stay such proceedings until
entry of judgment or pending appeal. O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-65(b), 9-11-62 (West 2014). An affidavit,
Exhibits, a Memorandum of Law, and a proposed Order accompany this motion.

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Most importantly, this Court must now enter its order enjoining all municipal ordinances herein as
the City’s actions violate the U.S. Constitution and the Georgia Constitution. As grounds for this Motion to
Dismiss pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b), the Defendant states as follows:
FIRST AMENDMENT VIOLATION
The Defendant seeks to enjoin the City from enforcing the City’s zoning ordinances against the
Defendant and stay any and all proceedings, regulation, administration, and enforcement of all signage
and noise codes to prevent irreparable harm to both the Defendant’s business as an entity and the
business’s goodwill within the Shoppe Street Sign District (“Sign District”). O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-65(b).
The Defendant asserts the following signage and television uses are protected forms of speech and
property as “Shoppe.” is a registered service mark. U.S. CONST. amend. I, IV-V, XIV; GA. CONST. art. I,
§ 1, ¶ I-II, V, XIII; 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 2014); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491-
98, 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1594-97, 131 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (rejecting formulaic
recitation of evaluating commercial speech test); W. Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 632, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 1182, 87 L. Ed. 1628 (1943) (“Symbolism [as an utterance] is a primitive but
effective way of communicating ideas . . . a short cut from mind to mind.”); Saia v. People of State of
New York, 334 U.S. 558, 559-62, 68 S. Ct. 1148, 1149-51, 92 L. Ed. 1574 (1948); cf. Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 385-93, 130 S. Ct. 876, 925-29, 175 L. Ed. 2d 753 (2010).
1.
The Shoppe signs depicting “Shoppe.” is a registered service mark owned by the Defendant,
which has been protected under federal and Georgia law since March 2, 2004. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n
(West 2014); O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-440 to –493 (West 2014). To continue receiving protection, the
Defendant must use the “Shoppe.” trademark in a manner that is not misleading, deceptive, fraudulent,
or used to further illegal objectives. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-71 (West 2014) (Federal Trade Commission);
O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-370 to -382 (West 2014) (Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act of 1968); O.C.G.A.

4. 3
§§ 10-1-390 to -438 (West 2014) (Fair Business Practices Act of 1975); Fulton Cnty. v. Galberaith, 282
Ga. 314, 315, 647 S.E.2d 24, 26 (2007); Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 222 F.3d 1262, 1274-
76(10th Cir. 2000).
2.
The “television” allegation, as both a sign and a sound device violation, violates the
constitutional protections accorded to all citizens because the sign and noise ordinance creates an
impossible situation for any individual or business to comply accordingly and discriminate between
what will be a violation or not. STARSHIP, GA., MUN. CODE § 8-3002, 9-2036 (2013). These ordinances
implicate violations of the First Amendment for noncommercial speech as well as commercial speech.
Therefore, the sign and noise ordinances are both overbroad and vague regulations. Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 2298-99, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1972); King Enterprises,
Inc. v. Thomas Twp., 215 F. Supp. 2d 891, 906 (E.D. Mich. 2002); see, e.g., STARSHIP, GA., MUN. CODE
§§ 8-3030(m), 9-2036(c).
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS
3.
Aside from the alleged sign and noise ordinance violations, the City has made no allegations of
misconduct arising from the Shoppe’s use of the “Shoppe.” service mark. See, e.g., Jacob Siegel Co. v.
Fed. Trade Comm'n, 327 U.S. 608, 613, 66 S. Ct. 758, 760, 90 L. Ed. 888 (1946). For the sign
violations, the City seeks to misappropriate the Shoppe’s use of the “Shoppe.” service mark by
interfering and removing the Shoppe’s signs allegedly in violation of the Starship, Georgia, Municipal
Code. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12-14, 99 S. Ct. 887, 895-96, 59 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1979). For
the noise violations, the City has not provided the required documentation with the measurements that
the Defendant emitted noise amount the allowable threshold for noise disturbances. Nor does the City

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present affidavits of the noise complainants. Thus, the Defendant asserts, for reasons enumerated in the
Memorandum of Law, that the zoning provisions asserted are null and void. The City enforcing
unconstitutional law lacks substantive due process seizing the Defendant’s property, disrupting the
Defendant’s business, and causing a loss in profits to defend unmeritorious litigation. U.S. CONST. IV-V,
XIV; GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, ¶ I-II, V, XIII.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant is charged with violating the City of Starship’s zoning ordinances for improper
signage and other offenses in the above-referenced case.
4.
On June 12, 2014, the Defendant was managing the Defendant’s retail establishment called the
Shoppe (“Shoppe”) located on 99 Shoppe Lane, in Starship, Georgia. The Shoppe is incorporated under
The Shoppe, Inc., which was established on January 2, 1985. The Defendant, Business Ownerman, is the
President of the Shoppe.
5.
According to the City of Starship Zoning Inspector, Dewey Censorman, the Defendant allegedly
violated several zoning ordinances as follows: (1) STARSHIP, GA., MUN. CODE § 8-3112 – SIGN
PERMIT REQ.; (2) STARSHIP, GA., MUN. CODE § 8-3114 – SIGN APP. REQ.; (3) STARSHIP, GA., MUN.
CODE § 8-3030 – CERT. OF APP. REQ.; (4) STARSHIP, GA., MUN. CODE § 8-3119(2)(g)(4) – REST.
SIGNS; (5) STARSHIP, GA., MUN. CODE § 8-3119(2)(g)(8) – REST. SIGNS; (6) STARSHIP, GA., MUN.
CODE § 9-2034 – NOISE DISTURBANCE; and (7) STARSHIP, GA., MUN. CODE § 9-2036(c) – REG. OF
SOUND EQUIP.

6. 5
6.
The City charged the Defendant with three sign violations: the Vendor sign on the front façade;
the Shoppe painted sign on the rear façade; and the television behind the glass in the portico looping
informational videos.
7.
According to the Noise Control Ordinance for the City of Starship, Georgia, the City charged the
Defendant with nuisance per se for the television playing audibly to the public from speakers installed
within the portico. STARSHIP, GA., MUN. CODE § 9-2034 (2013). The City presented no affidavits of such
allegedly reported complaints of a nuisance. O.C.G.A. § 24-8-802 (West 2014). Nor did the City present
any reports of the required sound measurements that serve as a basis for charging the Defendant with
emitting noise greater than the allowed threshold of 65 decibels. STARSHIP, GA., MUN. CODE § 9-2034
(2013).
LAW
This motion is based upon the attached Memorandum of Law regarding the Defendant’s rights
under both the U.S. Constitution and the Georgia Constitution against an intrusive government. The
Defendant has the right against unreasonable intrusions by the government that has a chilling effect on
commercial speech under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution
and the parallel constitutional rights under the Georgia Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. I, IV-V, XIV;
GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ I-II, V, XIII.
8.
The Shoppe sign is a representation of the Shoppe’s logo, brand, service mark, and, ultimately,
the Shoppe’s identity as a person under federal, state, and local law. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ V; 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141n (West 2014); 1 U.S.C. § 1 (West 2014); O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-440 to –493 (West

7. 6
2014); STARSHIP, GA., MUN. CODE § 8-3002 (2013); Friedman, 440 U.S. at 12-14; cf. Citizens United,
558 U.S. at 385-93 (protecting corporations’ identity through expressive conduct); Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2770-71, 189 L. Ed. 2d 675 (2014) (extending businesses the right
to exercise rights as a person under the First Amendment). The Shoppe, as a business, has the right to
exercise the freedom of speech as a person without restriction to the Shoppe’s identity, provided that the
Shoppe does not abuse the privilege (i.e., causing harm to others). GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ V; O.C.G.A.
§§ 16-13-21, 10-1-370 to -382, 10-1-390 to -438 (West 2014); 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-71 (West 2014). All
three signs in question are a manifestation of the Shoppe’s identity and expression whereby the City
oppresses the Shoppe’s freedom of speech and interferes with the Shoppe’s identity as a protected
property interest; the Shoppe’s branding is a lawful message to the public.
9.
The Zoning Inspector charged the Defendant without a reasonable or founded basis thereby
violating the Defendant’s rights under the Georgia Statute 9-11-11.1(b); Article I, Section 1, Paragraphs
I-II, V, and XIII of the Georgia Constitution; and the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments
of the U.S. Constitution. In this case, the Zoning Inspector exercised unreasonable, unfettered discretion
that deprived the Defendant equal protection of the laws when assessing the “Visual Compatibility
Factors” of the Defendant’s property in relation to other similarly situated properties and qualifying the
television as a prohibited “Flashing Sign” and “Sound Device.” The lack of consistent enforcement on
behalf of the City of Starship permits the reasonable inference that the Zoning Inspector singled out the
Defendant in an arbitrary manner to enforce the City of Starship’s zoning ordinances thus masking an
attempt to regulate the Defendant’s protected commercial speech.

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10.
To show that the Defendant created a nuisance per se, the government must show that the
Defendant used the Defendant’s property in such a manner to deprive another person’s use and
enjoyment of another property or that the Defendant’s conduct was tortious in nature to the detriment of
the public general welfare and safety. Lee St. Auto Sales, Inc. v. Warren, 102 Ga. App. 345, 345, 116
S.E.2d 243, 244 (1960). The Defendant’s use of the property must have been unreasonable under the
circumstances toward others similarly situated that relates to the locality and character of the area. Vill.
of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 385, 47 S. Ct. 114, 117, 71 L. Ed. 303 (1926);
STARSHIP, GA., MUN. CODE § 9-2034 (2013). The City has failed to meet its burden to prove that the
Defendant is liable for nuisance per se. O.C.G.A. §§ 24-8-802, 41-1-1 (West 2014).
11.
Absent the Defendant’s unreasonable behavior, the Zoning Inspector improperly charged the
Defendant with creating a public nuisance regarding the television’s audibility. Here, the City has
attempted to pass off a television as a “flashing” sign, yet a television does not fall within the definition
of a sign within the signage ordinance. Additionally, the noise ordinance bans all commercial speech
from any sound device. The City has not even approached the threshold showing required for a whether
the Defendant’s conduct was unreasonable under the circumstances other than merely alleging a
complaint made by a random, unidentified person. The Zoning Inspector’s basis for the complaint
regarding the television is hearsay because the complaint is an out of court statement improperly
asserted to prove the matter asserted: the Defendant’s television was disrupting another’s enjoyment and
use of property. No such complaint was ever offered to nor validated by the Defendant.

9. 8
12.
Absent a valid basis, the Zoning Inspector improperly intruded onto the Defendant’s business to
harm the identity of the Defendant’s business when enforcing zoning regulations against the business’s
signage. In this case, the business’s signage is both an expression of the business’s identity and the
culmination of branding an entity recognized as a separate personhood as well as protected intellectual
property. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 2014); 1 U.S.C. § 1 (West 2014); STARSHIP, GA., MUN. CODE § 8-
3002, -3148 (2013). Thus, such enforcement of the zoning regulations against the Defendant’s business
violates the Article I, Section 1, Paragraphs I-II, V, and XIII of the Georgia Constitution, and the First,
Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Provisions of zoning ordinances
may be found as unconstitutional rather than declaring zoning ordinances in the aggregate as
unconstitutional. Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 383-84, 47 S. Ct. 114, 117, 71
L. Ed. 303 (1926).
13.
Additionally, the Defendant exercises the right against the City of Starship as state actors who
are depriving the Defendant of the substantive due process regarding the Defendant’s freedom of
commercial speech and the Defendant’s use of property in accordance with others similarly situated to
the Defendant under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and the
parallel constitutional rights under the Georgia Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. IV-V, XIV; GA.
CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ II, V, XIII; Gagliardi v. Vill. of Pawling, 18 F.3d 188, 193 (2d Cir. 1994).
14.
Thus, the City of Starship applies the zoning ordinances in such a manner that is tantamount to
denying the Defendant equal protection of the laws. The City of Starship deprives the Defendant of the
right to use and enjoy the Defendant’s property in a reasonable manner. U.S. CONST. V, XIV; GA.

10. 9
CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ II. Such arbitrariness and unreasonableness amounts to a tortious interference of the
Defendant’s business, the use and enjoyment of the Defendant’s property, and, ultimately, the
Defendant’s liberty and freedom of speech.
WHEREFORE, the Defendant requests for the reasons set forth herein and for such reasons as
may appear upon an oral hearing of this Motion:
(1) that the Court give the Defendant a pre-trial hearing of this Motion pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-
11-12(d) (West 2014);
(2) that the Court grant the Defendant a preliminary injunction against the City of Starship from
enforcing the zoning ordinances on the Defendants signage pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-65
(West 2014);
(3) that the Court dismiss the case for failure to state a claim pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b)
(West 2014);
(4) that the Court grant the Defendant’s request and mandate the City to pay any and all
reasonable expenses incurred from defending unconstitutional charges, including reasonable
attorney fees pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-11.1(b), 9-15-14, 13-16-11 (West 2014); and
(5) such other relief as the Court shall deem just and proper.
Respectfully submitted, this day of , 20 .
___________________________
Attorney at Bar, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
State Bar No. 999999
Attorney at Bar, Esq.
Anywhere Law Firm, LLC
123 Law Central Blvd.
Starship, Georgia 31401
(912) 257-6253 t
(912) 999-9999 f
dldickson@savannahlawschool.org
www.savannahlawschool.org