Presenting a paper made by Jacques Demerjian and Ahmed Serhrouchni (Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Télécommunications – LTCI-UMR 5141 CNRS, France
{demerjia, ahmed}@enst.fr)
4. Introduction (1/2)
• Dynamic IP attribution protocol is necessary for 2 reasons:
• The Lack of internet addresses
• The mobility of the equipment is adapted to dynamic addressing
• DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol) provides a framework
for passing configuration information to hosts on a TCP/IP network.
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5. Introduction (2/2)
• DHCP currently provides no authentication or security mechanisms
• Many security vulnerabilities and shortcomings
• Many contributions exists
• E-DHCP
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7. DHCP Basic Operations (1/2)
• Automate and manage the network configuration of network devices
that use TCP/IP protocol.
• Use Client-Server model
• Set on UDP
• Client initiates all interactions, and server replies
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8. DHCP Basic Operations (2/2)
• Client Broadcasts DHCPDiscover message
• Servers may returns DHCPOffer messages
• Client chooses one DHCPOffer and broadcasts a DHCPRequest
message
• Server Return DHCPAck or DHCPNAck message
• Client can decline or release address
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9. DHCP Importance
• No manual reconfiguration is required
• Reduced amount of work required for large network administration
• Administration can be done from a single point
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10. DHCP Shortcomings
• Lack of robust administrative source
• Lack of intelligence
• Limited Security
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11. DHCP Vulnerabilities
• No authentication
• Intureders can impersonate the identity of a client or DHCP server
• Unknown hosts can get an IP addresses
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14. Overview
• Stronger authentication process
• Authentication of entities and messages
• Access control authentication
• Based mainly on certificate concept
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20. E-DHCP Scenario (1/9)
• The client broadcast a DHCPDiscover
message on its local physical subnet.
• This message must include options such as:
• Network address and lease time suggestion
• E-DHCP authentication option
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Code Length Flag
URIIdentityCertificate =
www.MyWeb.com/Db/Certificate1
URIAttributeCertificate = 0
AuthenticationInformation = Signature value (Flag = 0) Or Sig encryption value (Flag= 1)
Client Server
Time
21. E-DHCP Scenario (2/9)
• To validate the Client authentication, the E-DHCP server:
• Extract the client X.509 IC from the URIIdentityCertificate field
• Extract the client public key from the X.509 IC
• Verify the value of Flag field
• If Flag = 0 , the server use the client public key to verify the validity of the
signature (contained in AuthenticationInformation)
• IF Flag =1, the server use its private key to decrypt the signature, then use the
client public key to verify its validity
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22. E-DHCP Scenario (3/9)
• The server may choose to accept
unauthorized DHCPDiscover message or not
• The Server responds with a DHCPOffer
message including E-DHCP authentication
option
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Code Length Flag
URIIdentityCertificate =
www.EWeb.com/Db/Certificate2
URIAttributeCertificate = 0
AuthenticationInformation = Signature value (Flag = 0) Or Sig encryption value (Flag= 1)
Client Server
Time
23. E-DHCP Scenario (4/9)
• To validate the Server authentication, the Client:
• Extract the server X.509 IC from the URIIdentityCertificate field
• Extract the server public key from the X.509 IC
• Verify the value of Flag field
• If Flag = 0 , the client use the server public key to verify the validity of the
signature (contained in AuthenticationInformation)
• IF Flag =1, the client use its private key to decrypt the signature, then use the
server public key to verify its validity
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24. E-DHCP Scenario (5/9)
• If authentication is not valid or the offer is
not acceptable, the client can discard it
• Else a DHCPRequest is sent to the server:
• Requesting offered parameters
• Confirming the correctness of previously
allocated address
• Extending the lease time
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Client Server
Time
25. E-DHCP Scenario (6/9)
• Same procedure followed in DHCPDiscover
message is used to specify E-DHCP
Authentication option
• URIAttributeCertificate field may contains a
value
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Code Length Flag
URIIdentityCertificate =
www.EWeb.com/Db/Certificate2
URIAttributeCertificate = 0
AuthenticationInformation = Signature value (Flag = 0) Or Sig encryption value (Flag= 1)
Client Server
Time
26. E-DHCP Scenario (7/9)
• The E-DHCP server validate the authentication of the client &
DHCPRequest message
• If the validation failed or the server can’t satisfy the client request, a
DHCPNAck message is sent
• Else, the server verifies URIAttributeCertificate field value;
• If value = 0 , server create an AC for the client and save it in AC database
• Else, the server extract the certificate and checks its validity, to renew it or
create a new one.
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27. E-DHCP Scenario (8/9)
• The E-DHCP server sends a DHCPAck
message to the client (including a E-DHCP
authentication option)
• The URIAttributeCertificate field contains the
client new (or renewed) AC
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Code Length Flag
URIIdentityCertificate =
www.EWeb.com/Db/Certificate2
URIAttributeCertificate =
www.EWeb.com/DB/ClCertificate
1
AuthenticationInformation = Signature value (Flag = 0) Or Sig encryption value (Flag= 1)
Client Server
Time
28. E-DHCP Scenario (9/9)
• The client receive the DHCPAck message and validate the
authentication of the server and the message
• If validated, The client extract configuration information from the
message and use them
• The client uses its attribute certificate
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29. E-DHCP Access Scenario (1/3)
• The client uses the IP address allocated by the E-DHCP server to a
connection with Access Control Server
• The Client and Access Control Server uses SSL client authentication
and SSL Server authentication
• Client and Server identity are confirmed
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30. E-DHCP Access Scenario (2/3)
• The Access Control Server verifies
• The Idenityt Certificate
• Attribute Certificate
• Validity of the link between X.509 IC and the AC
• Validity of the link between Client IP and the Client Identity
• If verification is successful, the ACS allows the client to be connected
to the authorized device
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32. E-DHCP Advantages (1/2)
• Avoids changing DHCP protocol
• Provides authentication of entities and messages
• Uses RSA (better security then symmetric)
• Strict control on equipment
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33. E-DHCP Advantages (2/2)
• Invulnerable to DOS
• Invulnerable to message interception
• Supports inter-domain authentication
• AC confirms client IP address ownership
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35. Conclusion (1/2)
• E-DHCP is an extension to DHCP
• Uses asymmetric keys encryption + X.509 IC + AC
• Authenticate DHCP messages
• Authenticate access control
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36. Conclusion (2/2)
• DHCP open source code base modification
• Attachment the DHCP server to an Attribute authority
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37. Future Work
• Validate the interoperability of our proposition with IPSec through
real scale developments and tests
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