Dharmakirti_and_Thomas_Nagel_on_the_Orig.pdf

Dharmakirti and Thomas Nagel
on the Origin of Mental Activity
Submitted by: Timo Pieters (Vrije Universiteit)
Submitted to: Victor van Bijlert (Vrije Universiteit)
and Henk Blezer (Leiden University)
Date of submission: 4th of August, 2017
BA: Religiewetenschappen, traject Boeddhisme
Word count: 13.483
Final Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Bachelor of Arts
1

Verklaring van originaliteit
Hierbij verklaar ik dat deze scriptie een origineel werk is. De scriptie is het resultaat van mijn
eigen onderzoek en is alleen door mijzelf geschreven, tenzij anders aangegeven. Als informatie
en ideeën uit andere bronnen zijn overgenomen, wordt dat expliciet en volledig vermeld in de
tekst of in de noten. Een bibliografie is bijgevoegd.
Plaats en datum: Handtekening:
Arnhem, Nederland (08-08-2017)
Verklaring van goedkeuring
Hierbij stem ik ermee in dat mijn scriptie na goedkeuring beschikbaar wordt gesteld voor
vermenigvuldiging en interbibliothecair leenverkeer, en dat de titel en samenvatting
beschikbaar worden gesteld voor externe organisaties en door de Vrije Universiteit mogen
worden gepubliceerd.
Plaats en datum: Handtekening:
Arnhem, Nederland (08-08-2017)
Introduction
It is assumed by many that the nature and origin of the mind are fully understood in our current
age. Our ancestors might have been rather preoccupied with where it came from, what it is, and
where it might go (either dogmatically or philosophically), but today we are no longer “in the
dark”. Ever since the Enlightenment eurocentric civilization has been shedding it’s brilliant,
rational light on all phenomena shrouded in the darkness of dogmatic and mythological
antiquity, and has separated the wheat from the chaff. By the sheer passage of time we have
drifted closer and closer to a truly objective appreciation of reality as it is. We now know reality
to be mere matter, which means that objective reality is largely devoid of “what matters”: value,
meaning, purpose, and the mind that perceives “what matters”. These things in fact only exist
within the confines of human skulls, encapsulated in the intricately complex configurations of
nerve cells that constitute the very locus of our being: the brain. Our subjective experience of life
is for all intents and purposes a virtual reality simulation, running on the electrochemical
hardware of our neural circuits. The objective in this simulation is to ensure the survival of the
organism long enough so that it can pass on its genetic material, safeguarding its continuity
2

above all else. Aside from the obvious sarcasm with which I have just narrated this story, it
actually represents an accurate portrayal of the narrative that I was taught throughout my
primary and secondary schooling, not just about the history of human knowledge, but more
importantly about the nature of objective and subjective reality (mind). The most pernicious
thing I learned was that “we” had already figured it out. There is nothing more to learn about
the mind; it is basically caused by (or identical with) brain activity, so when you die it is simply
“lights out”. Your consciousness ceases to exist. After considerable research it dawned on me that
this might in fact be an unproven assumption that nevertheless had far-reaching consequences
when held. That is not to say that there is no reason to think this assumption might be true, but
just that the assumption has never actually been proven correct scientifically. During my
freshman year in university it dawned on me that the way one views the origin of the mind
determines one’s entire orientation towards life; it is not just an isolated fact-bit sitting in the
background. If one truly thinks that one’s mind equals electrical activity in the brain then
indeed the way of life that follows from this worldview could easily be hedonistic, that is to say;
exclusively maximizing sensory pleasure, survival, and procreation. This is not to say that one
will live an unethical or meaningless life, but that such a worldview does not warrant those
dimensions of life necessarily. I will define “mind” throughout this thesis as the individual,
mental activity of subjective experiencing, or “mental activity” for short. Given the
aforementioned relevance of the question where mental activity comes from, and the likelihood
that we do not fully understand the answer to this question yet, I will explore two main thinkers
that have seriously considered it. The first will be Dharmakirti, a Buddhist logician from the
6th-7th century in India. The second is Thomas Nagel, who became renowned for his paper
“What Is it Like to Be a Bat?” in which he explored the phenomenological character of
consciousness. Both of these thinkers present a remarkably convincing critique of a range of
1
theories that can be characterized as “psychophysical reductionism”, or the idea that subjective
states of consciousness are caused by or identical with physical phenomena (in the body). In
spite of the more than 1400 years between them they also seem to use strikingly similar
arguments. The main question for this thesis therefore is: “What are the relevant implications of
Dharmakirti’s arguments (found in his Pramanavarttika) concerning the origin of mental activity
for the contemporary philosophical discussion (as articulated by Thomas Nagel in his Mind and
Cosmos) about the origin of mental activity?” The structure of the thesis will be subdivided into
the following questions:
1.1: What are the fundamental philosophical premises of Dharmakirti’s opponent?
1.2: What is the epistemological context for Dharmakirti’s philosophy of mind?
1.3: What are Dharmakirti’s arguments against his opponent’s physicalist philosophy of mind?
1.4: What are the cosmological implications of Dharmakirti’s philosophy of mind?
2.1: What are the fundamental premises of psychophysical reductionism?
2.2: What is the epistemological context for Thomas Nagel’s philosophy of mind?
2.3: What are Thomas Nagel’s arguments against psychophysical reductionism?
2.4: What are the cosmological implications of Thomas Nagel’s anti-reductionist philosophy of mind?
1
Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" The Philosophical Review 83, no. 4 (1974): 435-50.
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1.1: What are the fundamental philosophical premises of Dharmakirti’s opponent?
The school or philosophical position that Dharmakirti (supposedly) argued against was that of
the Charvakas (“the materialists”). It is as of yet unclear whether Dharmakirti argued against a
real philosophical opponent, or that he merely constructed straw-man arguments to contrast his
own. Eli Franco mentions in his study of Dharmakirti’s Pramanavarttika that his opponent could
have been the philosopher Kambalasvatara, but he likewise keeps the issue ambiguous.2
Regardless, this is not of ultimate concern to the topic at hand in this thesis, which is mostly
concerned with the arguments themselves, and not necessarily with who used them. The
Charvaka school was a likely candidate because, based on the minimal sources we have about
them, their hallmark was the criticism of rebirth and the mechanics of behavioral causality (Skt:
karma). The problem remains that almost all texts about the Charvakas are now lost, so it’s
3
virtually impossible for us to get a fully reliable account of their ideas and practices. Despite
that, their philosophical school seems to have been in existence up until the second half of the
first millennium. Virtually all that survives about them is in the form of references to them by
4
opponent schools, which could obviously just consist of straw-man characterizations of their
ideas. They most clearly rejected rebirth and karma by rejecting the notion of “another world”
(Skt: paraloka) that one might go to after death, such as a heaven or a next life. They argued this
on the basis of their assertion that only the (four) material elements are truly real, and that the
mental was a kind of epiphenomenon that could either be reduced to, or eliminated in favour of,
the material, just as the intoxicating properties of beer can be fully explained by its material
constituents. They insisted that there was no intangible aspect of the human being aside from
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the material elements that it is composed of that could leave the body and experience things
elsewhere. Interestingly enough, their rejection of the “other world” was based on a rejection of
an abiding self/soul, which Buddhists generally also reject. This idea again was based on the
notion that the supposed constituents of the self, including consciousness and perception, arise
directly from the material elements of the body. This means that there is no place for a self that
holds these constituents together, that would remain intact after death. Buddhists likewise reject
this notion of an abiding self that exists independently and unchanged, and that would provide
a static, unaffected continuity for our experiences. They do not however reject the continuity of
6
consciousness, which they generally define as a thoroughly impermanent continuum, consisting
of causally interrelated mental events that have no independent status. Dharmakirti’s critique of
materialistic reductionism was therefore not based on the Charvaka rejection of the self, but on
their rejection of the existence of past and future lives.
2
Eli Franco, Dharmakirti on Compassion and Rebirth, (Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien
Universität Wien, 1997), 5.
3
Johannes Bronkhorst, “Greater Magadha: Studies in the Culture of Early India,” in Handbook of Oriental Studies,
Section two, India; v. 19, ed. Johannes Bronkhorst et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1946), 150.
4
Ibid, 158.
5
Tom J.F. Tillemans, “On Minds, Dharmakirti, and Madhyamaka.” 2. The present paper, in different forms, was
presented at the Center for Buddhist Studies of the University of Kathmandu and the Dept. of Philosophy of the
University of Kyoto. It was subsequently the keynote address of the XVIth Congress of the International
Association of Buddhist Studies, Taiwan, 2011. This free version was obtained from Tillemans’ academia.edu site.
6
Except for the interesting anomaly of the Pudgalavadin school, that did maintain the notion of a self-sufficient
personality.
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1.2: What is the epistemological context for Dharmakirti’s philosophy of mind?
In the period when Dharmakirti was active (the 6th-7th century CE) the vast monastic
universities of India were strongholds of Buddhist learning and practice. Dharmakirti held his
teaching position at the most impressive Buddhist monastic university that was probably ever
built: Nalanda. The university was founded in the early sixth century by the king Sakraditya and
his son Budhagupta. Interestingly, it held a prominent role in the teaching life of the Buddha
7
himself when it was still a village and communal retreat place, as it figures in no less than nine
Pali scriptures. Unfortunately from 986 CE onwards the Muslim Turks started raiding
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North-West India from Afghanistan all the way to the plundering of West-India in the 11th
century. These Muslims forcibly converted people and destroyed Buddhist art treasures out of
their distaste for idolatry, so much so in fact that in India the Islamic term for an “idol” became
“budd”. This all culminated in the complete destruction of Nalanda university in 1198 CE by the
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Muslim armies of the Mamluk dynasty. According to the Tibetan historian gSum-pa mKhan-po
Ye-shes dPal, Nalanda’s campus housed three separate libraries, each with its own name
(Ratnasagara, Ratnodadhi and Ratnaranjaka), containing hundreds of thousands of volumes on
many disciplines. The largest of these was nine stories high. According to oral tradition these
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libraries burned for up to three months after the invaders set it ablaze. The curriculum that was
studied encompassed the Indian “five sciences” (Skt: Pancavidya) of (1) linguistics, (2) logic and
reasoning, (3) medicine (ayurveda), (4) fine arts and crafts (from mathematics to painting), and
finally (5) the “inner science” of spirituality (adhyatma vidya). This last branch was the one that
11
differed for each respective Indian tradition. For the Brahmins this last science meant the study
of the four Veda’s. In the case of Nalanda it meant the study of the three categories of Buddhist
scriptures on (1) monastic discipline (Vinaya), (2) discourses (Sutra’s), and (3)
metapsychology/phenomenology (Abhidharma). These three collections of scriptures describe in
many different ways the path to liberation (moksha) and full enlightenment (samyaksambodhi).
The way Dharmakirti fits into this system is through his contributions to the science of logic
and reasoning, and the way those (epistemological) principles tie into the inner science of mind.
Dharmakirti built his philosophy on the innovations of his predecessor, Dignaga (480 - 540 CE),
who was the first teacher to systematically formulate a Buddhist system of logic and
epistemology. Dignaga based his innovations on the work of earlier Buddhist philosophers, most
notably Vasubandhu (4th-5th century CE). Vasubandhu was most probably the first Buddhist
thinker to suggest that the only two valid means of ascertaining reality are perception
(pratyaksa) and inference (anumana). The knowledge gained is then communicated by means of
12
7
Hartmut Scharfe, Education in Ancient India. Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section Two, India = Handbuch Der
Orientalistik. Indien, V. 16. (Leiden: Brill 2002), 149.
8
H. N. Shastri, Nalanda and its Epigraphic Material (Delhi: Sri Satguru, 1942); in Stewart, op. cit., 67-
68.
9
Peter Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices, (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2013), 149.
10
Joseph Loizzo, “Sri-Nalanda-Mahavihara: “Ivory Tower” of India’s Golden Age,” in “CANDRAKIRTI AND THE
MOONFLOWER OF NALANDA” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2001). 13.
11
Jonathan C. Gold, The Dharma's Gatekeepers: Sakya Pandita on Buddhist scholarship in Tibet. (SUNY Press, 2008), 15.
12
Vittorio A. van Bijlert, Epistemology and Authority. (Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien
Universität Wien, 1989), 45.
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logical proof (sadhana) consisting of syllogisms. He defined perception as a form of cognition
that is not necessarily constituted by language. Only after raw (sensory) perception has occurred
can objects be attributed names and concepts. Perception is therefore knowledge that is solely
caused by the object in question. Conventional (conceptual) knowledge, being projected onto
conglomerates of fluctuating processes, is hereby rejected as a valid form of knowledge.
Interestingly, Vasubandhu does include both sensory and mental perception (meaning internal
objects such as emotions) in his definition. This fits the general Buddhist heuristic model of the
mind as the sixth sense, which perceives “internal” objects. Perception therefore has to be (1)
non-erroneous, (2) free from conceptualizations, and (3) not a product of inference in order to
count as a valid source of knowledge. Inference is then based on the direct perception of certain
things always being connected (invariably concomitant - nantariyaka), which allows one to
validly infer the presence of objects that are not directly perceived, the most common example
being fire and smoke. The syllogism then represents the form of deductive reasoning
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(inference) that can actually convey a fact to another person. Dignaga (480-540 AD) then
expanded on Vasubandhu’s framework to make the most significant contributions to Buddhist
logic and epistemology before Dharmakirti. His main work on epistemology was titled
Pramanasamuccaya (“Comprehensive Account of the Means of Valid Cognition”). Dignaga’s first
innovation was to connect the two means of valid cognition (perception and inference) to the
two aspects of perceived objects, namely their uniqueness (the particular), and conceptualized
generality (the universal) respectively. The characteristics that all phenomena equally possess
14
are their (1) impermanence, (2) unsatisfactoriness (Skt: duhkha), (3) openness (Skt: sunyata), and
(4) insubstantiality. The clear conceptual (and therefore inferential) discernment of these four
universal characteristics, which is seen as a necessary condition for the attainment of liberation
from suffering, is interestingly predicated on the momentary uniqueness that objects clearly
possess when directly perceived. Perception is therefore defined as being free from
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conceptualization (name-giving), just like in Vasubandhu’s definition. Dignaga then
distinguishes five kinds of conceptualization (name-giving): names (1) denoting only one object,
(2) denoting a class (genus), (3) denoting a quality, (4) action noun or verb, (5) denoting a
substance. The four kinds of perception he distinguished were of (1) sensory impressions, (2)
mental awareness of them, (3) mental awareness of emotions, and (4) higher (yogic) perception.
Cognition also always (reflexively) cognizes itself, which means it does not need an internal
witness to become aware of the knowledge gained. Dharmakirti then easily became the most
16
influential figure in Buddhist epistemology, and elucidated his own innovations in his
commentary on Dignaga’s work, titled Pramanavarttika (“Commentary on Valid Cognition”).
One of the primary epistemological innovations that Dharmakirti made was to clearly specify
what constitutes a valid inference, which concerns both “internal” inference (logical thought)
and “explicit” inference (stated syllogism). His main concern in this was that inference, once it is
a valid source of knowledge about reality, enables one to discern between what is useful and
13
Ibid, 49.
14
van Bijlert, Epistemology and Authority, 56.
15
Ibid, 57.
16
Ibid, 58.
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what is not. This has the profound implication that what it means for knowledge to be correct
17
is that it is (causally) efficacious. In other words, valid cognition of reality by definition enables
one to attain one’s goals. As Dharmakirti says in the opening line of his Nyayabindu (“Drop of
Reasoning”): “The accomplishment of all human aims is preceded by right [valid] knowledge, therefore,
the latter is here explained.” Dharmakirti’s goal then, like Dignaga’s, was therefore ultimately a
18
“pragmatic” one, namely to attain the ultimate human aim of liberation from suffering and to
attain the capacities that enable one to help all other beings do the same (full enlightenment).
Their epistemological project, which was to establish the validity of Buddha’s accounts about
reality based on logic, was merely an instrument for this ultimate goal. The logical structure that
Dignaga used for this can be accurately summarized by the following diagram taken from Eli
Franco’s work on Dharmakirti’s Pramanavarttika, annotated with his English translations of the
Sanskrit terms. The goal here is first of all to establish how the Buddha could have become a
“protector” of beings (tayitva), that is; truly protecting them from suffering as such by teaching
them the path to liberation (nirvana) from all suffering and its causes. The Buddha needs to have
been a true “protector” in this sense in order to be a valid “means of knowledge”
(pramanabhutatva).
In order for him to become a protector he needs to have had infinite compassion for all
lifeforms equally, i.e. “seeking the benefit of all beings” (jagaddhitaisita). The development of such
compassion would only be realistic if the following two preconditions were present; (1) the
existence of an infinite number of past lives, and (2) the capacity of mind to infinitely develop
mental capacities and qualities like compassion. It is within this context that Dharmakirti sets
19
out to establish the existence of beginningless past lives through logic. Dharmakirti slightly
changed Dignaga’s logical and causal structure to more clearly elucidate why this capacity for
17
Bijlert, 94.
18
Christian Coseru, Perceiving Reality: Consciousness, Intentionality, and Cognition in Buddhist Philosophy, New York:
Oxford University Press, 2012. 128 (note 11).
19
The fully developed compassion of the Buddha encompasses “perfection in intention” (asayasampat) in this
diagram.
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infinite compassion is so crucial for the possibility of becoming a “protector” of beings, and
therefore the possibility of being a valid source of knowledge (about liberation and
enlightenment).20
Since Dharmakirti’s Pramanasiddhi chapter (in his “Commentary on Valid Cognition”), which is
about the nature and origin of mental activity (subjective experiencing), is written in the form
of a debate we will examine the claims and arguments from both sides in debate form. The lively
form of debate that was practiced at Nalanda still survives in the Tibetan monastic universities,
so for the sake of imagination I invite the reader to this small video fragment of monks debating
in this way, so we might get a taste for what such debates must have been like to witness.21
1.3: What are Dharmakirti’s arguments against his opponent’s physicalist philosophy of mind?
As I have remarked before, it is impossible for us to determine whether the debate between
Dharmakirti and the Charvakas as it ensues in the Pramanasiddhi chapter is representative of a
debate that took place between actual opponents. That is not relevant for the discussion in this
thesis however, since it merely judges the relevance of the arguments themselves. I will now go
through Dharmakirti’s central arguments against his opponents’ physicalism in an enumerated
fashion to maintain some conceptual clarity along the way. I have chosen to paraphrase the
arguments based on Dharmakirti’s original text as well as Franco’s elucidation of each argument
in his book. Claims and arguments by Dharmakirti are abbreviated as Dk.C and Dk.A
respectively. Claims and arguments by his (actual or constructed) opponent are abbreviated as
Cv.C and Cv.A respectively. The enumeration couples each claim to its corresponding
argument. Its order is based on Franco’s elucidation rather than on Dharmakirti’s original text. I
will go through all the arguments to avoid a biased selection, but will emphasize the relevant
arguments for the overall discussion, which will be indicated with an underline, in the
conclusion and discussion. Before we get into the actual debate we must clarify certain terms.
The word “mind” in this debate refers to “mental activity”, defined by Dharmakirti as a stream
of successive mental (cognitive) events, rather than a monolithic entity of “mind”. The term
“support” (asraya) within the context of this debate refers to an “obtaining cause” (Skt:
upadanahetu) within a causal sequence (continuum), which in Abhidharma is defined as the
cause from which the result is obtained and which transforms into the result (and thereby ceases
20
Franco, Dharmakirti on Compassion and Rebirth, 95.
21
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V6daHMqrMUY
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to exist). The translation as “obtaining cause” is because it is that from which the result is
22
“obtained”. I consciously choose to avoid the common translations of “substantial substratum” or
“material cause” since they could be misunderstood in this context as referring to the physical
elements that make up something. Obtaining causes stand in contrast to “simultaneously acting
conditions” (Skt: sahakaripratyaya), which are assisting factors that must exist prior to the arising
of something and which assist in making the arising occur, but do not transform into what
arises. The classical example is that of a seed turning into a sprout. The seed here is the
23
obtaining cause, and therefore transforms into the sprout. Water, sunlight, and soil are merely
simultaneously acting conditions for this to occur. The six “senses” (Skt: indriya) in this debate
are more usefully translated as six types of “cognitive sensors”, or sensors for short, since in
modern classifications they would include their respective nervous systems, including the brain
areas necessary for processing, and not just the visible sense organs. The only exception is the
sixth non-physical type; the mind sensors, which are the six “primary consciousnesses” used in
Abhidharma models of the mind. It will suffice to say that these six types of consciousness
merely cognize the essential nature of the object, which is the category to which it belongs
(sight/sound/etc). Hence these six consciousnesses each correspond to a sensory or mental field.
Dk.C 1: The sensors are not the support of the mental cognition (Skt: manomati), but the mental cognition
is the support of the sensors (verse 39).
Dk.A 1: Destroying or damaging the sensors does not destroy or damage the mental cognition, but when
the mental cognition is destroyed the sensors are likewise destroyed. Therefore the sensors arise from
cognition.24
Dharmakirti argues against a major premise of his opponents’ philosophy, which is that mental
cognition arises from (i.e. is caused by) the five types of physical sensors (the sensory systems of
the body). Unfortunately Dharmakirti does not specify what he means by “mental cognition”
(manomati). There seem to be three possible interpretations. The first is that mental cognition
refers to mental activity as the subjective experiencing of cognitive appearances, stimulated by
the six types of sensors. The second is the Buddhist Idealist (Chittamatra) interpretation where
mental cognition refers to the “foundation consciousness” (alayavijnana) that underlies all
cognition, and that stores (karmic) imprints and tendencies. In this view, one cannot be sure of
the existence of an objective body as such, but only of the cognitive appearances of a body that
appear to the mind. In this view the body is therefore an “image” in this foundation
consciousness. The third interpretation would be the Buddhist Realist (Sautrantika) view that
25
Dharmakirti elucidates in verse 42: Even if there is no cognition without sensors, there are no sensors
without cognition either; therefore, sensors and cognition are (at least) mutual causes and have mutual
causes. In this interpretation sensors and cognition are interdependent, and therefore cannot
26
exist separately. The truly relevant interpretation for this thesis is the first, which was
articulated by Dan Arnold. Here, Dharmakirti argues that it is possible for there to be mental
22
I use the translations from Dr. Alexander Berzin’s glossary (https://glossary.studybuddhism.com/) throughout this
thesis, unless otherwise specified. Search: “obtaining cause”.
23
Tillemans, “On Minds, Dharmakirti, and Madhyamaka.” 3.
24
25
The Chittamatra philosophy is quite complex, partly due to its heterogeneity. I will not attempt a survey here.
26
9

activity (subjective appearances) without sensory input, while in contrast, sensory input in and
of itself does not constitute mental activity. The mental is therefore conceptually basic here. If
27
sensory input were the obtaining cause for mental activity, then it follows that restricting this
input, as in the case of sensory deprivation, should proportionally diminish mental activity
(cognition) as well. If one were to enter an ideal sensory deprivation tank for instance, one
would experience a complete cessation of mental activity, and go unconscious. Having spent an
28
hour in such a tank myself, I can attest to the fact that the opposite occurs. The mind actually
becomes more cognitively active. One generally experiences enhanced imagination (including
visions/hallucination), crystal clear thinking, and even mystical experiences. Now, one could
argue that these are never ideal circumstances, and that one always has some sensory input. Still,
significant reduction ought to diminish mental activity proportionally, which does not seem to
occur. If one were to claim that the five sensory systems are instead the obtaining cause for
mental activity, then it follows that destroying one of these sensory systems should immediately
impair the mind and its cognitive capacities. There are numerous cases however of people that
miss multiple sensory systems, but regardless of that have no significant reduction in mental
functionality, such as the famous case of Helen Keller. She became deaf and blind as an infant,
yet she obtained a bachelor of arts degree, and published twelve books on multiple fields of
study. Her mental (cognitive) capacities therefore greatly exceeded those of “normal” people that
have all their sensory systems intact. Dharmakirti’s criticism of the sensory (nervous) systems or
their input being the obtaining cause of mind is therefore a strong argument. This argument will
be reviewed in the conclusion and discussion.
Dk.C 2: Mind (mental activity) is completely autonomous.
Dk.A 2: The body cannot be the obtaining cause for the mind, and may influence the mind only in a
circumstantial way, just as fire may produce liquidity in copper as long as they occur together, but copper
is neither produced by fire nor ceases to exist when the fire is extinguished.29
Dharmakirti articulates the difference that the body (the five sensors) is merely a simultaneously
acting condition for the mind to function, and not its obtaining cause. Again, this is relevant
because if mental activity ends with the body it cannot be said to infinitely expand its capacities
and qualities, as would be required for the existence of a Buddha.
Cv.C 1: Repeated practice for more than one life is impossible.
Cv.A 1: The body is the obtaining cause of cognition and therefore destroying the body destroys cognition
as well.
Franco characterizes the opponent view in this case to be one of epiphenomenalism, meaning
that the mind is an effect or emergent property of the body, but never its cause. This also
30
implies the mind does not have causal efficacy in this view, and therefore corresponds quite
neatly to the modern version of epiphenomenalism (mind as an emergent property).
27
Dan Arnold, “Dharmakirti’s Dualism: Critical Reflections on a Buddhist Proof of Rebirth,” Philosophy Compass v3
n5 (September 2008): 1079-1096. 1085.
28
These lightless, soundproof tanks (almost) remove all sensory input, including tactile, since one floats in highly
saline water that is heated to skin temperature.
29
30
Ibid, 99.
10

Dk.C 3: The relationship between the obtaining cause (the body) and its effect (mental cognition) does not
function as proposed (by the opponent).
Dk.A 3: Exhalation, inhalation, sensors and cognition (i.e. “sentience”) do not arise from the body alone,
independently of causes of their own kind.31
Dharmakirti rejects the opponent’s claim because it is absurd to assume that at the time of birth,
breathing, sensors, and cognition, can arise from the body alone, independent of causes that are
similar in nature. This implies that “sentient” phenomena have to arise dependent upon causes
of the same ontological kind or category of phenomena, i.e., possess the same characteristic
properties. This, in essence, is Dharmakirti’s main argument: sentient phenomena (breaths,
sensors, and cognition) must have among their causes events that are themselves sentient
(possess the same properties of “sentience”), because phenomena must have ontologically
homogeneous causes. Even the modern physicalist model endorses this axiomatic principle; it is
32
impossible for physical phenomena (matter/energy) to give rise to phenomena that have no
physical properties. As we will see, this presented a virtually insurmountable challenge for
modern thinkers to somehow give mental (subjective) phenomena a place in the causal world,
regardless of their non-physical, phenomenological characteristics. We will return to the
relevant implications of this in the conclusion and discussion.
Cv.C 2: Consciousness (sentience) arises from the material elements (of the body), and not from causes of
the same kind. Only a special transformation of the elements into the form of a body produces life
(sentience).
Cv.A 2: Therefore only certain parts of the elements cause sentience, just like certain stones contain gold,
while others do not.
Dk.C 4: The diversity of life, and the regularity within its diversity, would be unexplainable if life arose
from the material elements alone.33
The material elements referred to here are those found in Abhidharma; earth (solidity), water
(cohesion), fire (heat/energy), and wind (motion). These “elements” are quite unlike the elements
of the periodic table, because they are more like principles or forces. All four are said to occur in
all material phenomena, but in varying proportions, which gives each phenomenon its distinct
characteristics. Dharmakirti’s point is that since these elemental forces are omnipresent, it is
impossible to account for the diversities and regularities of life that supposedly arise from them.
A modern parallel of the four elements would perhaps be the “four fundamental forces” used in
physics, that are also not reducible to more basic forces: (1) the gravitational force (attributed to
the curvature of spacetime), (2) the electromagnetic force (manifests itself through the forces
between electric charges and magnetic fields, involving the exchange of photons), (3) the weak
nuclear force (mediates radioactive decay), and (4) the strong nuclear force (holds the atomic
nucleus together). All of these are mathematically described as fields. The modern account of
34
the origin of life (“sentience”) is fundamentally a reductive one, namely that all of (conscious)
life spontaneously emerged from the most fundamental physical forces of nature. Dharmakirti’s
31
Ibid, 102.
32
Dan Arnold, “Dharmakirti’s Dualism: Critical Reflections on a Buddhist Proof of Rebirth,” 1083.
33
34
http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/Forces/funfor.html
11

argument is therefore also an argument against modern reductive accounts of the origin of life,
such as the Oparin-Haldane hypothesis. Dharmakirti’s point is solid, since the fact that the
35
reductionist model still remains unproven today suggests that it is almost impossible to explain
the diversity and the regularity within the diversity of life, based on analysing its elementary
physical components alone.
Dk.A 4: If sentient phenomena (sensors, cognitions) were produced purely by the material elements alone,
without causes of their own kind, then just as the elements are transformed into the cause of life
somewhere (where they take the form of a body), the same would happen everywhere because the cause of
the transformation is the same.36
The absurd consequence of the material elements causing life (sentience) is that life would
spring forth continuously wherever these material elements (physical forces) exist, which would
happen everywhere, all the time, since the elements are present everywhere. Clearly this is not
happening. The material elements alone therefore cannot account for the existence and diversity
of life, and sentient phenomena can likewise not arise from the body alone independently of
causes of their own kind.
Cv.C 3: Every cognition at death (the final cognition in life) does not link to another cognition (in the next
life).
Cv.A 3: Because it is a cognition at death, just like the last cognition of the Arhat (liberated being). Thus,
37
everyone is liberated after death, just like the Arhat.
An Arhat is defined as a being who has totally uprooted suffering and its causes (disturbing
emotions, karma), and therefore has no impetus to compulsively take on a new body on the basis
of craving (disturbing emotions) after death. Some believe that an Arhat therefore actually
ceases to exist at death, since there is no impetus for further cognitions.
Dk.C 5: There is no contradiction whatsoever between the cognition at death of an Arhat and the
production of a further cognition.
Dk.A 5: It is the disconnection from the defilements (disturbing emotions) which prevents rebirth.
Dharmakirti therefore disproves this notion of death being equal to liberation, and that Arhats
cease to exist when they become liberated.
Dk.C 6: The body as the cause of cognition is likewise not established.
Dk.A 6: Because that which is claimed to be a cause is not a cause at all, it’s absence cannot be adduced as
reason. If the mental cognition were to arise from the body with sensors it would be like (have the nature
of) a sense cognition, which means it would be limited to certain kinds of objects. Nor does it arise from
the body with all the sensors together, because the sensors do not cooperate (blend together). Nor does it
arise from the body without the sensors, because the body (alone) is devoid of consciousness.38
If the mental cognition were caused by the body there would be three possibilities. Either it is
caused by (1) one sensory system of the body, (2) by the body with all sensory systems together,
or (3) the body independently of its sensory systems. If the first were true then mental cognition
35
This hypothesis claims that biological life spontaneously emerged from the interactions of elementary
compounds.
36
Ibid, 113. The physicalist opponent does not admit to any existents over and above the material elements, so the
(obtaining) cause is omnipresent.
37
Arhats are beings who have attained nirvana (liberation from suffering), but are not enlightened (a Buddha).
38
Ibid, 119.
12

would have the nature of that sensory system, and could therefore only cognize a certain range
of objects. If the second were true, then Dharmakirti’s first argument applies that destroying one
sensory system would terminate mental activity, since its obtaining cause is no longer complete.
If the third were true then a dead body would have consciousness as well, which is an absurd
consequence.
Cv.A 4: Why, if the body is not the cause of the mental cognition, do they always exist together?
Dk.C 7: They have the same cause,
Dk.A 7: just as sight and hearing of the same person or color and flavour of the same object always exist
together without being each other’s cause.
Cv.C 5: It cannot be explained why the mental cognition is transformed by the body if the body is not its
cause.
Cv.A 5: For instance, the transformation of the body by poison causes a mental transformation as pain.39
Dk.C 8: The transformation occurs, but the body is not the obtaining cause.
Dk.A 8: The transformation is caused by the apprehension (cognition) of the body (the body as object, not
as cause). The body may be said to be an assisting factor in the production of cognition, but not its cause.
Dk.C 9: The fact that the body is sometimes the assisting factor for the sequence of cognitions (mental
activity) does not mean that the sequence ceases to exist when the body ceases to exist.
Dk.A 9.1: Just as fire may change the color of a pot, but the pot does not cease to exist when the fire stops.
Dk.A 9.2: If the body were the obtaining cause of cognition, there would follow an absurd consequence,
namely that the cognition would last as long as the body, in which case a dead body too would have to
have cognition.40
Tom Tillemans argues that this line of reasoning is based on scientific ignorance on the part of
Dharmakirti, since modern research has shown that an alive body is not physically identical to a
dead body, and therefore the two cannot be equated in this context. I would argue that, even if
41
one factors in the appropriate differences, the argument still discredits the possibility of most
tissues of the body acting as the obtaining cause for mental activity. Most tissues of the body
remain physically identical immediately after the onset of clinical death, yet mental activity
ceases. What the argument fails to prove however, is that brain activity could be the obtaining
cause for mental activity, since this obviously ceases upon death. Therefore I will further explore
this version of the argument in the conclusion and discussion.
Cv.C 6: Cognition is absent in a dead body,
Cv.A 6: because breath is also a cause of cognition, and there is no breath in a dead body.42
This is quite possibly a reference to vitalism, the idea that there is a subtle animating principle
associated with the physical breath that animates the body, and that is closely associated with
consciousness. One need only refer to physical breath however to follow the discussion further.
Here Dharmakirti begins a lengthy discussion of why cognition is independent of the breaths.
This is not truly relevant in relation to modern discussion, and therefore to this thesis, but I
have included it for the sake of comprehensiveness and context.
39
Ibid, 119.
40
Ibid, 121.
41
Tillemans, “On Minds, Dharmakirti, and Madhyamaka.” 3.
42
13

Dk.C 10: Cognition is the cause of the breath, not the other way around.43
Dk.A 10.1: It can be observed that breath is controlled by cognition, not the other way around.
Dk.A 10.2: Breath is impossible without consciousness, since drawing in and pushing out air can not
happen without an effort, and effort implies consciousness.
Dk.A 10.3: If cognition were the resultant effect of exhalation and inhalation it would increase and
decrease according to the increase and decrease in breathing.
Dk.A 10.4: If breath in fact were the cause of cognition, then the cognition would be present as long as
exhalation and inhalation are present, and they, being caused by the body, would be present as long as the
body is present. Consequently there would be no dead body, which is an inadmissible consequence.
Dk.C 11: There is no inadmissible consequence if one assumes that cognition is the cause of cognition,
Dk.A 11: because there is a further cause for the continuity of a sequence of cognitions in a certain body.
Here Dharmakirti reveals his own position, which is that mental activity is a causal stream of
mental moments that have no beginning or end.
Cv.C 7: The body inhabited or governed by exhalation, inhalation, etc., produces the cognition.
Dharmakirti then goes into a discussion of what are the restricting factors that prevent the
arising of more than one cognition at a time per body. He seems to apply a Middle Way
(Madhyamaka) analysis of paradoxical consequences.
Dk.C 12: Given the assumption that the body is composed of atoms (particles/parts), these parts either
produce the cognition collectively, as an aggregate, or individually, each by itself.
His way of framing exhausts all logical possibilities of how the parts could produce cognition.
Dk.A 12.1: If the parts were to produce cognition collectively then cognition would not arise when a single
part of the body is missing.
This is an absurd consequence, since it clearly does not occur. The parts could be interpreted as
atoms, bodyparts, or sensory systems, but in all instances the argument works.
Dk.A 12.2: If each individual part of the body were capable of producing cognition by itself, there would
arise as many cognitions as there are parts (or atoms) of the body.44
If each individual part could give rise to (act as the obtaining cause of) cognition they would
give rise to as many “minds” as there are parts of the body. This also an absurd consequence. We
will return to this argument in the conclusion and discussion.
Cv.C 8: The breaths are the main cause of cognition, and not every part of the body is capable of
producing a cognition.
Dk.C 13: This will not solve the problem,
Dk.A 13.1: because the fact that there are multiple breaths implies there would still be several cognitions at
the same time.
Dk.A 13.2: Even if one assumes that there is only one breath, this could not account for the gradual arising
of many cognitions during one’s lifetime,
Dharmakirti here uses a variant of the "neither one nor many" argument.
Dk.C 14: Breath cannot be restricting factor of cognition,
Dk.A 14: because many cognitions can arise during one long breath (such as looking around in a circle
while taking a deep breath).
43
44
Ibid, 123.
14

Cv.A 9: If one conceives of breath as momentary one may assume that many momentary breaths are the
cause of many momentary cognitions.
Dk.C 15: This merely shifts the same problem to the breaths.
Dk.A 15.1: If the manifold cognitions arise from many gradual breaths then the breaths can only arise from
gradual causes. The body is not gradual however, and therefore cannot produce gradual breaths.
Dk.A 15.2: Nor could the previous breath cause the next one, because there is no previous breath for the
first breath in this life according to the Charvaka.
Dk.A 15.3: One cannot assume that breath is one (unitary) because it is connected with different places.
Cv.C 10: The breaths are many and they produce cognition together.
Dk.A 16: If one were to stop breathing for a moment the cognition could not arise, which clearly does not
occur.
Dk.A 16.2: One cannot say that in different situations different breaths produce cognition, because
cognition would vary according to whether it is produced by one breath or the other.45
The debate still continues, but now Dharmakirti arrives at his own philosophy of mind. He first
has to show how he avoids the inadmissible consequence that all momentary cognitions would
arise at the same time.
Dk.C 17: One cognition produces only one cognition,
Dk.A 17.1: because its capacity is limited.46
Dk.A 17.2: As long as one keeps looking at one object, one cannot see another object. The fact that a
cognition which could have arisen, at least in principle, does not arise, points at this restriction.47
Dharmakirti here argues for the momentariness of mental events. His argument rests on the
limited capacity of the mind to only cognize one phenomenon at a time. The fact that several
cognitions at a time could in principle arise, but in fact do not arise, indicates an intrinsic
restriction on the cognitive capacity of the mind. Cognitive psychological research interestingly
indicates the same thing; the attentional system is only capable of attending to one thing at a
time. Multitasking turns out to be merely the rapid switching of attentional objects, which
occurs quickly enough to give the illusion of simultaneous processing.48
Cv.C 11: Although the body is capable of producing many cognitions, the cognition that arises first from
the body limits the capacity of the body to produce any further cognitions.
The opponent tries to accommodate the principle that one cognition produces only one
cognition. Franco estimates this to be a straw-man argument based on context.
Dk.C (commentator) 18: This suggestion is unfounded.
49
Dk.A (commentator) 18.1: It would be like saying that the first moment of smoke arises from fire and then
limits the capacity of fire to produce more smoke.
Again we see a typical implementation of inferential logic on the basis of examples.
Dk.A (commentator) 18.2: Likewise the causes of the first cognition are not somehow “aware” of the fact
that cognition has been produced, and that therefore they need not keep producing it.
45
Ibid, 124.
46
Skt: Saktiniyama.
47
Ibid, 125.
48
A.M. Treisman, & G. Gelade, “A feature-integration theory of attention,” Cognitive Psychology 12(1) (1980): 97-136.
49
This point was made by one of the commentators on the Pramanavarttika; Prajnakaragupta.
15

Dharmakirti’s theory then contains several problems. One is that it cannot explain why a
cognition should be related to the body. Cognition should in principle be able to exist on its
own. Dharmakirti accepts this, and likewise most Buddhists throughout history have integrated
this aspect into their cosmology in the form of a formless realm/sphere (Skt: Arupadhatu) where
beings exist with exclusively mental faculties. These various spheres are also the cosmological
manifestations of phenomenological states of meditative absorption that a practitioner may
familiarize him or herself with during embodied lifetimes, which then results in such a rebirth
state. Under normal circumstances however the cognition of a being would assist the obtaining
cause of the body, and then they occur together.
Dk.C 19: The cause of the body in the next life are the five bases (five sensors).
Dharmakirti then echoes the Buddhist view that even a disembodied being in the intermediate
state (antarabhava) after death possesses five sensors, albeit in a very subtle form that is
produced by the mind, quite like the sensors one possesses in dreams.50
Cv.C 12: Neither the formless spheres nor the five senses (in the intermediate state) are observed by
anyone, nor are the five senses seen to produce a new body after death.
Cv.A 12: Therefore there is no causal relation between them.
Dk.A 20: Non-observation does not imply non-existence.
Dharmakirti makes the epistemological point that mere non-observation of something does not
establish its non-existence or non-occurrence, and therefore is not a valid inference. There are
obviously innumerable subtle features of the world that are not accessible to superficial
perception. Dignaga therefore included yogic (extrasensory) perception, acquired through
decades of rigorous meditative training, as a valid means of knowing such subtle features, yet
this can hardly function as a means of knowledge in this context. In recent decades however,
multidisciplinary research has delivered empirical data of causally effective and functionally
independent mental phenomena, including disembodied sensory perception. Especially the
51
“near death experience” (NDE) research of Pim van Lommel (and Bruce Greyson) has presented
convincing empirical data of mental activity, including corroborated sensory perception,
functioning independently of brain activity. In Pim van Lommel’s long-term study the
explanations of said phenomena that had previously been put forward by sceptics, such as
oxygen-deprivation (anoxia), narcotics, and psychological disposition, could be positively ruled
out as relevant factors. No one has so far been able to conclusively disprove these findings,
52
which suggests that Dharmakirti’s claim of disembodied sense perception actually has an
empirical basis in reality.
Cv.C 13: The senses do not link to another life,
Cv.A 13: because they are senses, just as the senses of one person do not link to the senses of another.
Dk.C 21: The reason is not conclusive (Skt: sesavat).
50
Robert Thurman, The Tibetan Book of the Dead: Liberation through Understanding in the Between, Random House
Publishing Group, 2011. 255.
51
Probably the most significant compendium of empirical research indicating the irreducibility, functional
independence, and causal efficacy of mental phenomena, see: Edward F. Kelly et al., Irreducible Mind: Toward a
Psychology for the 21st Century, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2009.
52
Pim van Lommel, Eindeloos Bewustzijn: Een Wetenschappelijke Visie op de Bijna-Dood Ervaring. Utrecht: Uitgeverij Ten
Have, 2012. H6 (144-146), H7 (169-171), H8 (189-191).
16

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