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GPS SPOOFING
Low-cost GPS simulator
HUANG Lin, YANG Qing
Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research
Qihoo 360 Technology Co. Ltd.
Who we are? Unicorn Team
•  Qihoo360’s UnicornTeam consists of a group of
brilliant security researchers. We focus on the security
of anything that uses radio technologies, from small
things like RFID, NFC and WSN to big things like GPS,
UAV, Smart Cars, Telecom and SATCOM.
•  Our primary mission is to guarantee that Qihoo360 is
not vulnerable to any wireless attack. In other words,
Qihoo360 protects its users and we protect Qihoo360.
•  During our research, we create and produce various
devices and systems, for both attack and defense
purposes.
•  We are one of the DEF CON 23 vendors.
https://defcon.org/html/defcon-23/dc-23-vendors.html
YANG Qing
•  YANG Qing is the team leader of Unicorn Team.
•  He has rich experiences in wireless and hardware
security area, including WiFi penetration testing,
cellular network interception, IC card cracking etc.
His interests also cover embedded system
hacking, firmware reversing, automotive security,
and software radio.
•  He is the first one who reported the vulnerabilities
of WiFi system and RF IC card system used in
Beijing subway.
HUANG Lin
•  One of the early USRP users in China. Got the
first USRP board in 2005 in Orange Labs
•  Authored some tutorials about GNU Radio
which were popular in China
•  Made great effort on promoting Cloud-RAN
technology in China from 2010 to 2013
•  Join Qihoo 360 as a wireless security
researcher in 2014
Beginning of the story …
Civilian-use GPS C/A Signal
GPS C/A signal is for civilian usage, and unencrypted.
Replay attack is a typical GPS spoofing method.
Record Replay
Firstly try replay attack
•  Hardware
•  USRP B210
•  Active GPS antenna
•  Bias-tee circuit (Mini-Circuit
ZX85-12G-S+)
•  LNA (Mini-Circuit ZX60-V82-S+)
Record GPS signal by a USRP B210
Replay the signal by a bladeRF
Success!
Record then replay the
GPS signal. You can see
the cellphone gets the
position and timing
information from the
replayed GPS signal.
Nexus 5
If Create any GPS signal
rather than Record & Replay…
This is not a replay
•  Demo video
Search existing solutions on Internet
•  Expensive or at least not free
•  NAVSYS ~$5000•  NI LabVIEW ~$6000
Some famous cases of GPS spoofing
•  Leading lab: RadioNavigation
Lab from Univ. of Texas at
Austin (https://
radionavlab.ae.utexas.edu/ )
•  Prof. Todd E. Humphrey and
his team
•  2012 TED talk: how to fool GPS
•  2013: spoof an US$80M yacht
at sea
•  2014: unmanned aircraft
capture via GPS spoofing
We are not navigation experts.
How can we do GPS spoofing?
As SDR guys, we have
USRP bladeRF HackRF
And we found some source codes on Internet
•  This website collects many open source projects about
GPS
•  http://www.ngs.noaa.gov/gps-toolbox/index.html
•  This is a very good GPS receiver software based on GNU
Radio
•  http://gnss-sdr.org/
•  Most of projects are GPS receivers and few are
transmitters. This is a transmitter example:
https://code.csdn.net/sywcxx/gps-sim-hackrf
•  It’s not finalized !
DIY a GPS Simulator!
Basic principle of GPS system
GPS principle
Mathematics time
Key information in Pseudo-range equations
Calculate the
delays at
receiver
WHEN WHERE
Structure of message
1 bit (20 ms)
1 word (600 ms)
1 subframe (6 s)
1 page (30 s)
25 pages – the whole message (12.5 min)
x30
x10
x5
x25
Info of WHEN & WHERE
Subframe 1 Subframe 2 Subframe 3 Subframe 4 Subframe 5
Time information
WHEN
Ephemeris
WHERE
Start building the signal
Get Ephemeris data
•  Method 1
•  Download ephemeris data file from CDDIS website
•  ftp://cddis.gsfc.nasa.gov/gnss/data/daily/
•  Here we can only get yesterday’s ephemeris data
•  Method 2
•  Use ‘gnss-sdr’ program to receive the real-time GPS signal and get
the fresh ephemeris data
•  The ‘GSDR*’ files are the decoded ephemeris data, in standard
RINAX format.
Decode the fresh ephemeris data
•  Software
•  Run ‘gnss-sdr’
•  Get the GSDR* file
Matlab code of GPS simulator
Example: structure of Subframe 2
Generate navigation message
Bits " Waveform
GPS principle again
Calculate the
transmission
time
How to calculate transmission time
Satellite is moving
Earth is rotating
Calculate the
coordinate according
to ephemeris data
Calculate the length
of signal path
NOT
EASY
Matlab code of generating waveform
Firstly offline verify the signal by ‘gnss-sdr’
OK
Secondly verify it by transmitting GPS signal file
over air by bladeRF
Soft-receiver ‘gnss-sdr’ demod the signal
OK
Try to spoof cellphone’s GPS …
Failure
Which part is not perfect?
Doppler effect
Another challenge: Doppler effect
Moving
towards
receiver
Moving
far from
receiver
GPS principle again
Delay will be longer and longer, if
moving far from receiver
Delay will be shorter and shorter, if
moving towards receiver
NOT EASY
Try cellphone again
•  Nexus 5 GPS chipset
•  Satellites are detected as pre-setting.
•  Satellite signal strengths are same as
we defined.
•  3D fixed by simulated signal
Bingo!
Bingo! Samsung Note 3
•  Located at Namco Lake in Tibet but
the cellphone is actually in Beijing.
Bingo! iPhone 6
•  Namco Lake in Tibet
•  iPhone positioning is much
slower.
•  The cellphone clock was also
reset to wrong time if auto-
calibration is enabled.
Set any time
•  You may find the date we set is always Feb. 14 2015. This
is because the ephemeris data file we use is at that day.
•  Actually not only space but also time, can be spoofed.
A cellphone in future time
We set the time as Aug. 6, 2015 (today is Jul. 14)
and position as Las Vegas.
Try to spoof cars
•  Demo video: The car, BYD Qin was located in a lake center.
DJI drone - forbidden area policy
•  To avoid the risk from
drone to people and to critical
facilities, drone flying are
forbidden in many cities.
•  For example, DJI drone’s
engine will keep off when it
finds the position is in
forbidden area.
A drone that crashed on the
grounds of the White House had
evaded radar detection.
Try to spoof DJI drone
•  Demo video Disable forbidden area
•  The drone is actually at a forbidden location in Beijing. We
gave it a fake position in Hawaii, then it was unlocked and
can fly up.
Try to spoof DJ drone
•  Demo video: Hijack flying drone
•  We gave a forbidden position to a flying drone, then it
would automatically land.
Lessons – how to anti-spoof
•  Application layer
•  Now usually GPS has highest priority. Cellphone is spoofed even if
it has cellular network connection.
•  Use multi-mode positioning, GLONASS, Beidou
•  Jointly consider cellular network and wifi positioning
•  Civil GPS receiver chipset
•  Use some algorithms to detect spoofing
•  Civil GPS transmitter
•  Add digital signatures into the extensible GPS civil navigation
message
GPS is still a great system
•  First global positioning system
•  Usable for all of the world
•  Very low cost, small size…
•  It keeps updating so we believe the security issue will be
improved in future.
Acknowledgment
•  JIA Liwei
•  Graduate student of BUAA majoring radio navigation
•  https://code.csdn.net/sywcxx/gps-sim-hackrf
•  JIAO Xianjun
•  Senior iOS RFSW engineer at Apple, SDR amateur
•  http://sdr-x.github.io/
Thank you!

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DEFCON 23 - Lin Huang Ging Yang - GPS spoofing

  • 1. GPS SPOOFING Low-cost GPS simulator HUANG Lin, YANG Qing Unicorn Team – Radio and Hardware Security Research Qihoo 360 Technology Co. Ltd.
  • 2. Who we are? Unicorn Team •  Qihoo360’s UnicornTeam consists of a group of brilliant security researchers. We focus on the security of anything that uses radio technologies, from small things like RFID, NFC and WSN to big things like GPS, UAV, Smart Cars, Telecom and SATCOM. •  Our primary mission is to guarantee that Qihoo360 is not vulnerable to any wireless attack. In other words, Qihoo360 protects its users and we protect Qihoo360. •  During our research, we create and produce various devices and systems, for both attack and defense purposes. •  We are one of the DEF CON 23 vendors. https://defcon.org/html/defcon-23/dc-23-vendors.html
  • 3. YANG Qing •  YANG Qing is the team leader of Unicorn Team. •  He has rich experiences in wireless and hardware security area, including WiFi penetration testing, cellular network interception, IC card cracking etc. His interests also cover embedded system hacking, firmware reversing, automotive security, and software radio. •  He is the first one who reported the vulnerabilities of WiFi system and RF IC card system used in Beijing subway.
  • 4. HUANG Lin •  One of the early USRP users in China. Got the first USRP board in 2005 in Orange Labs •  Authored some tutorials about GNU Radio which were popular in China •  Made great effort on promoting Cloud-RAN technology in China from 2010 to 2013 •  Join Qihoo 360 as a wireless security researcher in 2014
  • 5. Beginning of the story …
  • 6. Civilian-use GPS C/A Signal GPS C/A signal is for civilian usage, and unencrypted. Replay attack is a typical GPS spoofing method. Record Replay
  • 7. Firstly try replay attack •  Hardware •  USRP B210 •  Active GPS antenna •  Bias-tee circuit (Mini-Circuit ZX85-12G-S+) •  LNA (Mini-Circuit ZX60-V82-S+)
  • 8. Record GPS signal by a USRP B210
  • 9. Replay the signal by a bladeRF
  • 10. Success! Record then replay the GPS signal. You can see the cellphone gets the position and timing information from the replayed GPS signal. Nexus 5
  • 11. If Create any GPS signal rather than Record & Replay…
  • 12. This is not a replay •  Demo video
  • 13. Search existing solutions on Internet •  Expensive or at least not free •  NAVSYS ~$5000•  NI LabVIEW ~$6000
  • 14. Some famous cases of GPS spoofing •  Leading lab: RadioNavigation Lab from Univ. of Texas at Austin (https:// radionavlab.ae.utexas.edu/ ) •  Prof. Todd E. Humphrey and his team •  2012 TED talk: how to fool GPS •  2013: spoof an US$80M yacht at sea •  2014: unmanned aircraft capture via GPS spoofing
  • 15. We are not navigation experts. How can we do GPS spoofing?
  • 16. As SDR guys, we have USRP bladeRF HackRF
  • 17. And we found some source codes on Internet •  This website collects many open source projects about GPS •  http://www.ngs.noaa.gov/gps-toolbox/index.html •  This is a very good GPS receiver software based on GNU Radio •  http://gnss-sdr.org/ •  Most of projects are GPS receivers and few are transmitters. This is a transmitter example: https://code.csdn.net/sywcxx/gps-sim-hackrf •  It’s not finalized !
  • 18. DIY a GPS Simulator!
  • 19. Basic principle of GPS system
  • 22. Key information in Pseudo-range equations Calculate the delays at receiver WHEN WHERE
  • 23. Structure of message 1 bit (20 ms) 1 word (600 ms) 1 subframe (6 s) 1 page (30 s) 25 pages – the whole message (12.5 min) x30 x10 x5 x25
  • 24. Info of WHEN & WHERE Subframe 1 Subframe 2 Subframe 3 Subframe 4 Subframe 5 Time information WHEN Ephemeris WHERE
  • 26. Get Ephemeris data •  Method 1 •  Download ephemeris data file from CDDIS website •  ftp://cddis.gsfc.nasa.gov/gnss/data/daily/ •  Here we can only get yesterday’s ephemeris data •  Method 2 •  Use ‘gnss-sdr’ program to receive the real-time GPS signal and get the fresh ephemeris data •  The ‘GSDR*’ files are the decoded ephemeris data, in standard RINAX format.
  • 27. Decode the fresh ephemeris data •  Software •  Run ‘gnss-sdr’ •  Get the GSDR* file
  • 28. Matlab code of GPS simulator
  • 29. Example: structure of Subframe 2
  • 32. GPS principle again Calculate the transmission time
  • 33. How to calculate transmission time Satellite is moving Earth is rotating Calculate the coordinate according to ephemeris data Calculate the length of signal path NOT EASY
  • 34. Matlab code of generating waveform
  • 35. Firstly offline verify the signal by ‘gnss-sdr’ OK
  • 36. Secondly verify it by transmitting GPS signal file over air by bladeRF
  • 38. Try to spoof cellphone’s GPS … Failure
  • 39. Which part is not perfect? Doppler effect
  • 40. Another challenge: Doppler effect Moving towards receiver Moving far from receiver
  • 41. GPS principle again Delay will be longer and longer, if moving far from receiver Delay will be shorter and shorter, if moving towards receiver NOT EASY
  • 42. Try cellphone again •  Nexus 5 GPS chipset •  Satellites are detected as pre-setting. •  Satellite signal strengths are same as we defined. •  3D fixed by simulated signal Bingo!
  • 43. Bingo! Samsung Note 3 •  Located at Namco Lake in Tibet but the cellphone is actually in Beijing.
  • 44. Bingo! iPhone 6 •  Namco Lake in Tibet •  iPhone positioning is much slower. •  The cellphone clock was also reset to wrong time if auto- calibration is enabled.
  • 45. Set any time •  You may find the date we set is always Feb. 14 2015. This is because the ephemeris data file we use is at that day. •  Actually not only space but also time, can be spoofed.
  • 46. A cellphone in future time We set the time as Aug. 6, 2015 (today is Jul. 14) and position as Las Vegas.
  • 47. Try to spoof cars •  Demo video: The car, BYD Qin was located in a lake center.
  • 48. DJI drone - forbidden area policy •  To avoid the risk from drone to people and to critical facilities, drone flying are forbidden in many cities. •  For example, DJI drone’s engine will keep off when it finds the position is in forbidden area. A drone that crashed on the grounds of the White House had evaded radar detection.
  • 49. Try to spoof DJI drone •  Demo video Disable forbidden area •  The drone is actually at a forbidden location in Beijing. We gave it a fake position in Hawaii, then it was unlocked and can fly up.
  • 50. Try to spoof DJ drone •  Demo video: Hijack flying drone •  We gave a forbidden position to a flying drone, then it would automatically land.
  • 51. Lessons – how to anti-spoof •  Application layer •  Now usually GPS has highest priority. Cellphone is spoofed even if it has cellular network connection. •  Use multi-mode positioning, GLONASS, Beidou •  Jointly consider cellular network and wifi positioning •  Civil GPS receiver chipset •  Use some algorithms to detect spoofing •  Civil GPS transmitter •  Add digital signatures into the extensible GPS civil navigation message
  • 52. GPS is still a great system •  First global positioning system •  Usable for all of the world •  Very low cost, small size… •  It keeps updating so we believe the security issue will be improved in future.
  • 53. Acknowledgment •  JIA Liwei •  Graduate student of BUAA majoring radio navigation •  https://code.csdn.net/sywcxx/gps-sim-hackrf •  JIAO Xianjun •  Senior iOS RFSW engineer at Apple, SDR amateur •  http://sdr-x.github.io/