Download to read offline
![Introduction: From Critica
l Theory
to Critica
llR Theory
Dialectic and Kant's Legacy
If critical social theory offers us a logical avenue for understanding social change,
then the term "dialectic" can be seen as the vehicle for maneuvering our understand
ing along this avenue. In modern critical social theory, dialectic serves as a scientific
and holistic method of analysis. Its purpose(s) is to investigate the social forces of
political order and transformation in terms of the relational oppositions and histori
cal contradictions between the individual and society and to examine the meaning
of reason (Vernunft) and rationality in the social context of ethical, economic, and
political struggles for justice and freedom. The dialectic in this sense is both inspired
byandderivedfrom the writings ofKant, Hegel, Marx, and Habermas, among others.
And, unlike ancient theory, which explores the dialectic as an "art of defining ideas
related to the method of determining the interrelation of ideas in the light of sin
gle principle," a modern conception of dialectic emphasizes the historical and social
(scientific) dimensions ofsocietal change. Thus, dialectic, as understood here, can be
employed in a variety ofways to explain societal transformation(s) in the contempo
raryworld, including the emergence ofhuman rights (gender and indigenous groups),
newinstitutionalnormsand f
ormsofcitizenship (EU), and global ethics.l As such, one
encounters different modern conceptions of dialectic, ranging from Marx's dialecti
cal materialism ("the progressive unification through the contradiction ofopposites")
and Habermas's hermeneutical dialectic (intersubjective interaction or communica
tive action) to Adorno's negative dialectics, which conceives dialectic as an inherently
subversive element ofreason and rationality.
In recent years, however, a pervasive skepticism has emerged concerning the dia
lectic and its role in advancing the emancipatory project ofmodernity (emancipation
that is gUided by the principles ofreason, rationality, justice, and societal and politi
cal integration). Such skepticism reflects what Richard Bernstein argues is a tension
between the modern and postmodern (Stimmung). As Bernstein notes, "[Stimmung]
is an amorphous, protean, and shifting [force] but which nevertheless exerts a power
ful influence on the ways in which we think, act, and experience.'" In his view, such
skepticism explains why postmodernist and modernist thinkers seek to address the
xiii](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/5101162-250530163122-0a4c766c/75/Critical-Theory-And-International-Relations-A-Reader-1st-Edition-Steven-C-Roach-16-2048.jpg)
![Introduction: From Critica
l Theory
to Critica
l IR Theory
Dialectic and Kant's Legacy
If critical social theory offers us a logical avenue f
or understanding social change,
then the term "dialectic" can be seen as the vehicle for maneuvering our understand
ing along this avenue. In modern critical social theory, dialectic serves as a scientific
and holistic method of analysis. Its purpose(s) is to investigate the social f
orces of
political order and transformation in terms of the relational oppositions and histori
cal contradictions between the individual and society and to examine the meaning
of reason (Vernunft) and rationality in the social context of ethical, economic, and
political struggles for justice and freedom. The dialectic in this sense is both inspired
byand derived from the writings ofKant, Hegel, Marx, and Habermas, among others.
And, unlike ancient theory, which explores the dialectic as an "art of defining ideas
related to the method of determining the interrelation of ideas in the light of sin
gle principle," a modern conception of dialectic emphasizes the historical and social
(scientific) dimensions ofsocietal change. Thus, dialectic, as understood here, can be
employed in a variety of ways to explain societal transformation(s) in the contempo
rary world, including the emergence ofhuman rights (gender and indigenous groups),
newinstitutional norms and forms ofcitizenship (EU), and global ethics.! As such, one
encounters different modern conceptions of dialectic, ranging from Marx's dialecti
cal materialism ("the progressive unification through the contradiction ofopposites")
and Habermas's hermeneutical dialectic (intersubjective interaction or communica
tiveaction) to Adorno's negative dialectics, which conceives dialectic as an inherently
subversive element ofreason and rationality.
In recent years, however, a pervasive skepticism has emerged concerning the dia
lectic and its role in advancing the emancipatory project ofmodernity (emancipation
that is guided by the principles ofreason, rationality, justice, and societal and politi
cal integration). Such skepticism reflects what Richard Bernstein argues is a tension
between the modern and postmodern (Stimmung). As Bernstein notes, "[Stimmung]
is an amorphous, protean, and shifting [force] but which nevertheless exerts a power
ful influence on the ways in which we think, act, and experience."3 In his view, such
skepticism explains why postmodernist and modernist thinkers seek to address the
xiii](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/5101162-250530163122-0a4c766c/75/Critical-Theory-And-International-Relations-A-Reader-1st-Edition-Steven-C-Roach-18-2048.jpg)
![Introduction: From Critical to CriticallR Theory xv
freedom as a way of transcending the irrationalism of the (political) passions. This
moral requirement might well explain Kant's paradoxical intellectual debt to David
Hume, the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher (empiricist skeptic) who, as Kant
remarked, had "interrupted my dogmatic slumber.''''
Hume, ofcourse, is not the onlyphilosopherwho deserves credit for inspiringKant's
modern formulation of dialectical criticism. Equally essential are the ancient philoso
phers, in particular, Plato, whose Meno dialogue addresses the dilemma ofhowwe can
know something ofwhich wehave no knowledge. What this problem (aporia) suggests
is that in acquiringknowledge ofsomething, we also fail to grasp its essence. Another
way ofputting this idea is to saythat our deeply embedded ethicalconvictionscan and
should always take the form ofthe following permanent questions about our political
existence: What is the role ofthe state? What are my moral duty and responsibility f
or
promoting civil society? Addressing these questions requires us to overcome the pre
sumption that there are permanent answers to life's greatest problems.
Inquiring, then, into the sources of authoritarianism constitutes one of the core
tasks of critical theory. Because political leaders can use their power to manipulate
the rules of institutions and the system, they can also subjugate the individual to the
state. Thus, the reason why speculative reason is so important in this respect is that
it stresses the immanent tensions between the state (society) and individual; it treats,
in other words, these tensions as existing, albeit changing constructs of our moral
understanding. In this way, speculative reason is predicated on the f
ollowing ques
tion: How do reason and dialectical thought enable us to challenge and overcome
dogmatism and barbarism?
Hegel's and Marx's answer to this question involved elaborate and systematic
attempts to historicize and materialize the dialectic. Hegel, for instance, conceived
the dialectic in terms of the historical unfolding of the absolute spirit and knowledge,
or the grand reconciliation between freedom and the state (Aufhebung); while Marx
built upon Hegel's dialectical project by theorizing about the class conflict between
the proletariat and bourgeoisie and how this conflict would be resolved through
the dissolution of capitalism (private property and the bourgeois state). In this way,
Marx, perhaps more than any other social theorist, revealed the practical qualities
of dialectical thought. His influence on the Frankfurt School's critical theory would
lead some to label the Frankfurt School as a "second stage of Marxism.'"
A central question for critical IR theorists, then, is how [an extended] critical
theory exposes the dogmatism and orthodoxy ofmilitant ideologies. Here, though,
we need to be careful about how we approach the word "extension." What exactly
are we extending? And how does the extension of dialectical criticism qualify the
international principles of justice or global forms of citizenship? To address these
questions, we need to examine the coreconcepts and aims ofcritical theory.
Why Critical Theory?
The Frankfurt Institute ofSocial Research (The Frankfurt School) officially coined
the term "critical theory" in 1937.' Its formulation of critical theory would incorpo
rate a wide range of ideas, including those of Kant, Marx, Hegel, Nietzsche, Freud,](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/5101162-250530163122-0a4c766c/75/Critical-Theory-And-International-Relations-A-Reader-1st-Edition-Steven-C-Roach-20-2048.jpg)
![1
The Roots of Critical Theory
German Idealism
Introduction
Thisfirst chapterfocuses on the foundations of critical theory (1800-1865). For many
writers at this time, the events of the French Revolution (1789-1799) served as a
reminder of the volatility of human passions, and the consequent failure to preserve
the ideals offreedom,justice, equality, reason, rationality and solidarity. Here,I have
included Kant's essays on the "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals" (1785),
"The Metaphysics of Morals, Theory of Right (1797)" and "Idea for a Universal His
tory with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784)," as well as selections from Hegel's The
Phenomenology o
fSpirit (1807) and The Philosophy ofRight (1821).
Kant conceived politics in terms of the tension between human nature and the
civil laws of the state (social contract). It was this antagonism that constituted man's
asocialsociability, and represented, asKant states, "a great tendency to live as an indi
vidual, to isolate himself since he also encounters in himself the unsocial characteris
tic of wanting to direct everything in accordance with his own ideas."In his essay on
"The Metaphysics of Morals," Kant theorized that civil society (Civilis-Communitas)
reflected the balance of constitutional rules and state coercion, or "the harmoniza
tion of public wills." Here he situated the moral autonomy of the individual (the self
legislating individual) within the antinomies of practical (moral) and pure reason
(universal), and experience and understanding.In this way, our understanding was
not simply conditioned by passions (happiness and sympathy); it operated indepen
dently of the passions, that is, through our reasoned capacity to act in accordance
with universal maxims or imperatives.
Following Kant, Hegel showed how this tension could be transcended through
the absolutization of spirit. Here he conceptualized the dialectic in historical terms:
as the unfolding of absolute freedom or the immanent reconciliation between reason
and freedom (Aujhebung). In The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel theorized about
the self's struggle to become conscious of itself through various stages or historical
moments. The most important [stage] involved the struggle between Lordsman and
Bondsman, in which the slave's or bondsman's struggle for freedom became a con
crete metaphor for realizing the idea of freedom for and in itself.In The Philosophy of
Right, the historical struggle entailed the movement through and ultimately beyond
the civil society institutions of the German state to one in which the German state
3](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/5101162-250530163122-0a4c766c/75/Critical-Theory-And-International-Relations-A-Reader-1st-Edition-Steven-C-Roach-34-2048.jpg)
![6 Critical Theory and International Relations: A Reader
the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that rational being-for example, of
the human will.
[Classification of Imperatives]
All imperatives command eitherhypothetically orcategorically. Hypotheticalimpera
tives declare a possible action to be practically necessary as a means to the attain
ment of somethingelse that one wills (or that one may will). A categoricalimperative
would be one which represented an action as objectively necessaryinitself apartfrom
its relation to a further end.
Every practical law represents a possible action as good and therefore as necessary
for a subject whose actions are determined by reason. Hence allimperatives are for
mulae for determining an action whichis necessary in accordance with the principle
of a will in some sense good. If the action would be good solely as a means to some
thingelse, the imperative is hypothetical; if the action is represented as good in itself
and therefore as necessary, in virtue of its principle, for a will which of itself accords
with reason, then the imperative is categorical.
An imperative therefore tells me which of my possible actions would be good; and
it formulates a practical rule for a will that does not perform an actionstraightaway
because the action is good-whether because the subject does not always know that
it is good or because, even if he did know this, he might still act on maxims contrary
to the ob
jective principles of practical reason.
A hypotheticalimperativethus says only that an actionis goodfor some purpose or
other, eitherpossible oractual. Inthefirst case, itis aproblematic practicalprinciple; in the
second case, an assertoric practical principle. A categorical imperative, which declares
an action to be ob
jectively necessary in itself without reference to some purpose-that
is, even without any further end-ranks as an apodeictic practical principle.
Everything that is possible only through the efforts of some rational being can
be conceived as a possible purpose of some will; and consequently there are in fact
innumerable principles of action so far as action is thought necessary in order to
achieve some possible purpose which can be effected by it. All scienceshave a practi
cal part consisting of problems which suppose that some endis possible for us and of
imperatives which tell us how it is to be attained. Hence the latter can in general be
called imperatives of skill. Here there is absolutely no question about the rationality
or goodness of the end, but only about what must be done to attain it. A prescription
required by a doctor in order to cure his man completely and one required by a poi
soner in order to make sure of killing him are of equal value so far as each serves to
effect its purpose perfectly. Since in early youth we do not know what ends may pres
ent themselves to us in the course of life, parents seek above all to make their chil
dren learn things ofmany kinds; they provide carefully for skill in the use of means
to all sorts of arbitrary ends, none of which can they be certain that it could not in
the future become an actual purpose of their ward, while it is alwayspossible that he
might adopt it. Their care in this matter is so great that they commonly neglect on
this account to form and correct the judgement of their children about the worth of
the things which they might possibly adopt as ends.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/5101162-250530163122-0a4c766c/75/Critical-Theory-And-International-Relations-A-Reader-1st-Edition-Steven-C-Roach-37-2048.jpg)
![f
e
11
y
e
If
:s
d
Y
It
y
,r
Ie
�s
It
n
:t
:0
i
)f
:y
,n
i
:0
s-
1-
IS
.n
Ie
on
)f
The Roots of Critical Theory 7
There is, however, one end that can be presupposed as actual in all rational beings
(so far as they are dependent beings to whom imperatives apply); and thus there is
one purpose which they not only can have, but which we can assume with certainty
that they all do have by a natural necessity-the purpose, namely, of happiness. A
hypothetical imperative which affirms the practical necessity of an action as a means
to the furtherance of happiness is assertoric. We may represent it, not simply as nec
essary to an uncertain, merely possible purpose, but as necessary to a purpose which
we can presuppose a priori and with certainty to be present in every man because it
belongs to his very being. Now skillin the choice of means to one's own greatest well
being can be called prudence in the narrowest sense. Thus an imperative concerned
with the choice of means to one's own happiness-that is, a precept of prudence-still
remains hypothetical: an action is commanded, not absolutely, but only as a means to
a further purpose.
Finally, there is an imperative which, without being based on, and conditioned by,
any further purpose to be attained by a certain line of conduct, enjoins this conduct
immediately. This imperative is categorical. It is concerned, not with the matter of
the action and its presumed results, but with its form and with the principle from
which it follows; and what is essentially good in the action consists in the mental
disposition, let the consequences be what they may. Thisimperative may be called the
imperative of morality.
Willing in accordance with these three kinds of principle is also sharply distin
gUished by a dissimilarity in the necessitation of the will. To make this dissimilarity
obvious, we should,I think, name these kinds of principle most appropriately in their
order if we said they were either rules of skill or counsels of prudence or commands
(laws) of morality. For only law carries with it the concept of an unconditioned, and
yet objective and so universally valid, necessity; and commands are laws which must
be obeyed-that is, must be followed even against inclination. Counsel does indeed
involve necessity, but necessity valid only under a subjective and contingent condi
tion-namely, if this or that man counts this or that as belonging to his happiness.
As against this, a categoricalimperative is limited by no condition and can quite pre
cisely be called a command, as being absolutely, although practically, necessary. We
could also callimperatives of the first kind technical (concerned with art); of the sec
ond kindpragmatic (concerned with well-being); of the third kind moral (concerned
with free conduct as such-that is, with morals).
[How are Imperatives Possible?]
The question now arises'How are all these imperatives possible?' This question does
not ask how we can conceive the execution of an action commanded by theimpera
tive, but merely how we can conceive the necessitation of the will expressed by the
imperative in setting us a task. How an imperative of skill is possible requires no
special discussion. Who wills the end, wills (so far as reason has decisive influence on
his actions) also the means which are indispensably necessary and in his power. So
far as willing is concerned, this propositionis analytic: for in my willing of an object
as an effect, thereis already conceived the causality of myselfas an acting cause-that](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/5101162-250530163122-0a4c766c/75/Critical-Theory-And-International-Relations-A-Reader-1st-Edition-Steven-C-Roach-38-2048.jpg)
![10 Critical Theory and International Relations: A Reader
[The Formula of Universal Law]
In this task we wish first to enquire whether perhaps the mere concept of a categorical
imperative may not also provide us with the formula containing the only proposi
tion that can be a categoricalimperative; for even when we know the purport of such
an absolute command, the question of its possibility will still require a special and
troublesome effort, which we postpone to the final chapter.
When I conceive a hypothetical imperative in general, I do not know beforehand
what it will contain-until its condition is given. But if I conceive acategorical imper
ative, I know at once what it contains. For since besides the law this imperative con
tains only the necessity that our maxim should conform to this law, while the law, as
we have seen, contains no condition to limit it, there remains nothing over to which
the maxim has to conform except the universality of a law as such; and it is this con
formity alone that the imperative properly asserts to be necessary.
There is therefore only a single categorical imperative and it is this: 'Act only on
that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a uni
versal law.'
Now if all imperatives of duty can be derived from this one imperative as their
principle, then even although weleave it unsettled whether what we call duty may not
be an empty concept, we shall still be able to show at least what we understand by it
and what the concept means.
[The Formula of the Law of Nature]
Since the universality of the law governing the production of effects constitutes what
is properly called nature in its most general sense (nature as regards its form)-that is,
the existence of things so far as determined by universal laws-the universal impera
tive of duty may also run asfollows: 'Actas ifthe maxim ofyouraction were to become
throughyour will a universal law o
fnature.'
[Illustrations]
We will now enumerate a few duties, following their customary division into duties
towards self and duties towards others and into perfect and imperfect duties.
1. A man feels sick of life as the result of a series of misfortunes that has mounted
to the point of despair, but he is still so far in possession of his reason as to ask
himself whether taking his own life may not be contrary to his duty to himself. He
now applies the test 'Can the maxim of my action really become a universal law of
nature?' His maxim is 'From self-love I make it my principle to shorten my life if its
continuance threatens more evil than it promises pleasure.' The onlyfurther question
to ask is whether this principle of self-love can become a universal law of nature. It is
then seen at once that a system of nature by whose law the very same feeling whose
function (Bestimmung) is to stimulate the furtherance of life should actually destroy](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/5101162-250530163122-0a4c766c/75/Critical-Theory-And-International-Relations-A-Reader-1st-Edition-Steven-C-Roach-41-2048.jpg)
![12 Critical Theory and International Relations: A Reader
[The Formula of Autonomy]
This principle of humanity, and in general of every rational agent, as an end in itself
(a principle which is the supreme limitingcondition of every man's freedom of action)
is not borrowed from experience; firstly, because it is universal, applying as it does to
all rational beings as such, and no experience is adequate to determine universality;
secondly, because in it humanity is conceived, not as an end of man (subjectively)
that is, as an object which, as a matter of fact, happens to be made an end-but as an
objective end-one which, be our ends what they may, must, as a law, constitute the
supreme limiting condition of all subjective ends and so must spring from pure rea
son. That is to say, the ground for every enactment of practical law lies objectively in
the rule and in the form of universality which (according to our first principle) makes
the rule capable of being a law (and indeed a law of nature); subjectively, however, it
lies in the end; but(according to our second principle) the subject of all ends is tobe
found in every rational being as an end in himself. From this there now follows our
third practical principle for the will-as the supreme condition of the will's confor
mity with universal practical reason-namely, the Idea ofthe will o
f every rational
beingas a will which makes universal law.
By this principle all maxims are repudiated which cannot accord with the will's own
enactment of universal law. The will is therefore not merely subject to the law, but is so
subject that it must be considered as also making the law for itself and precisely on this
account asfirst of all subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author).
[The Exclusion of Interest]
Imperatives as formulated above-namely, the imperative enjoining conformity of
actions to universal law on the analogy of a natural order and that enjoining the uni
versal supremacy of rationalbeings in themselves as ends- did, by the mere fact that
they were represented as categorical, exclude from their sovereign authority every
admixture of interest as a motive. They were, however, merelyassumed to be categori
calbecause we were bound to make this assumption if we wished to explain the con
cept of duty. That there were practical propositions which commanded categorically
could not itself be proved, any more than it can be proved in this chapter generally;
but one thing could have been done-namely, to show that in willing for the sake of
duty renunciation of all interest, as the specific mark distinguishing a categorical
from a hypotheticalimperative, was expressed in the very imperativeitselfby means
of some determination inherent in it. This is whatis done in the present third formu
lation of the principle-namely, in theIdea of the will of every rationalbeing asa will
which makes universal law.
Once we conceive a will of this kind, it becomes clear that while a will which is
subject to law may be bound to this law by some interest, nevertheless a will which
is itself a supreme lawgiver cannot possibly as such depend on any interest; for a
will which is dependent in this way would itself require yet a further law in order to
restrict the interest of self-love to the condition that thisinterest shoulditself be valid
as a universal law.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/5101162-250530163122-0a4c766c/75/Critical-Theory-And-International-Relations-A-Reader-1st-Edition-Steven-C-Roach-43-2048.jpg)
![f
)
�
e
n
,0
is
Jf
i
at
ry
'i
�
Iy
y;
of
al
ns
u-
ill
is
ch
a
to
id
The Roots of Critical Theory 13
Thus theprinciple that every human will is a will which by all its maxims enacts
universal law-provided only that it were right in other ways-would be well suited
to be a categorical imperative in this respect: that precisely because of the Idea of
making universal law, it is based on no interest and consequently can alone among all
possible imperatives be unconditioned, Or better still-to convert the proposition-if
there is a categorical imperative (that is, a law for the will of every rational being), it
can command us only to act always on the maxim of such a will in us as can at the
same time look upon itself as making universal law; for only then is the practical
principle and the imperative which we obey unconditioned, since it is wholly impos
sible for it to be based on any interest.
We need not now wonder, when we look back upon all the previous efforts that
have been made to discover the principle of morality, why they have one and all been
bound to fail. Their authors saw man as tied to laws by his duty, but it never occurred
to them that he is subj ect only to laws which are made by himselfand yet are univer
sal, and that he is bound only to act in conformity with a will which is his own but
has as nature's purpose for it the function of making universal law, For when they
thoughtof man merely as subject to a law (whatever it might be) , the law had to carry
withit someinterest in order to attract or compel, because it did not spring as a law
from his own will: in order to conform with the law, his will had to be necessitated
by somethingelse to act in a certain way, This absolutely inevitable conclusion meant
that all the labour spent in trying to find a supreme principle of duty was lost beyond
recall; for what they discovered wasnever duty, but only thenecessity of acting from a
certain interest, This interest might be one's own or another's; but on such a view the
imperative wasbound to be always a conditioned one and could not possibly serveas a
moral law.I will therefore call my principle the principle of theAutonomy of the will
in contrast with all others, whichI consequently class under Heteronomy.
[The Formula of the Kingdom of Ends]
The concept of every rational being as one who must regard himself as making
universal law by, all the maxims of his will, and must seek to judge himself and
his actions from this point of view, leads to a closely connected and very fruitful
concept-namely, that of a kingdom ofends.
I understand by a 'kingdom' a systematic union of different rational beings under
common laws. Now since laws determine ends as regards their universal validity, we
shall be able-if we abstract from the personal differences between rational beings,
and also from all the content of their private ends-to conceive a whole of all ends in
systematic conjunction (a whole both of rational beings as ends in themselves and also
of the personal ends which each may set before himself ); that is, we shallbe able to con
ceive a kingdom of ends which is possible in accordance with the above principles.
For rational beings all stand under the law that each of them should treat himself
and all others, never merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end in him
self. But by so doing there arises a systematic union of rational beings under common
objective laws-that is, a kingdom. Since these laws are directed precisely to the rela
tion of such beings to one another as ends and means, this kingdom can be called a
kingdom of ends (which is admittedly only anIdeal).](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/5101162-250530163122-0a4c766c/75/Critical-Theory-And-International-Relations-A-Reader-1st-Edition-Steven-C-Roach-44-2048.jpg)
![1 4 Critical Theory and International Relations: A Reader
A rational being belongs to the kingdom of ends as a member, when, although he
makes its universal laws, he is alsohimselfsubject to these laws. He belongs to it as its
head, when as the maker of laws, he ishimself subject to the will of no other.
A rational being must alwaysregard himself as making laws in a kingdom of ends
which is possible through freedom of the will-whether it be as member or as head.
The position of the latter he can maintain, not in virtue of the maxim of his will
alone, but only if he is a completely independent being, without needs and with an
unlimited power adequate to his will.
Thus, morality consists in therelation of all action to the making of laws whereby
alone a kingdom of ends is possible. This making of laws must be found in every
rational being himself and must be able to spring from his will. The principle of his
will is therefore never to perform an action except on a maxim such as can also be a
universal law, and consequently such that the will can regarditselfas at the same time
makinguniversal law by means ofits maxim. Where maxims arc not already by their
very nature in harmony with this objective principle of rational beings as makers of
universal law, the necessity of acting on this principle is practical necessitation-that
is, duty. Duty does not apply to the head in a kingdom of ends, but it does apply to
every member and to all members in equal measure.
Thepractical necessity ofacting on this principles-thatis, duty-isin no way based
on feelings, impulses, and inclinations, but only on the relation of rational beings to
one another, a relation in which the will ofa rational being must always beregarded as
makinguniversal law, because otherwise he could not be conceived as an end in him
self Reason thus relates every maxim of the will, considered as making universal law,
to every other will and also to every action towards oneself: it does so, not because of
any further motive or future advantage, but from the Idea of the dignity of a rational
being who obeys no law other than that which he at the same time enacts himself.
[The Dignity of Virtue]
In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. If it has a price,
something else can be put in its place as an equivalent; if it is exalted above all price
and so admits of no equivalent, then it has a dignity.
What is relative to universal human inclinations and needs has a market price;
what, even without presupposing a need, accords with a certain taste-that is, with
satisfaction in the mere purposeless play of our mental powers-has af
ancy price
(Affektionspreis); but that which constitutes the sole condition under which anything
can be an end in itself has not merely a relative value-that is, a price-but has an
intrinsic value-that is, dignity.
Now morality is the only condition under which a rational being can be an end in
himself; for only through thisisit possible to be a law-making member in a kingdom
of ends. Thereforemorality, andhumanity sofar asit is capable ofmorality, is the only
thing which has dignity. Skill and diligence in work have a market price; wit, lively
imagination, and humour have a fancy price; but fidelity to promises and kindness
based on principle (not on instinct) have an intrinsic worth. In default of these, nature
and art alike contain nothing to put in their place; for their worth consists, not in the](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/5101162-250530163122-0a4c766c/75/Critical-Theory-And-International-Relations-A-Reader-1st-Edition-Steven-C-Roach-45-2048.jpg)
![bark if the shoot from which the piece is taken has been properly
imbued with sap.[I] Look at the inner rind of the separated bark, to
see if that be entire; if there be a hole in it, the eye of the bud has
been pulled away with the wood, rendering the bud useless, which
throw away; if there be no hole, return to the stock, and with the
haft of the knife gently raise the bark on each side of the
perpendicular incision, opening the lips wide enough to admit the
prepared slip with the eye. If the slip is longer than the upright
incision in the stock, reduce the largest end. Stock and bud being
ready, keep the latter in its natural position, introduce it between the
bark and wood of the stock, pushing it gently downwards until it
reaches the bottom of the perpendicular incision. Let the eye of the
bud project through the centre of the lips; lay the slip with the bud
as smooth as possible, and press down the raised bark of the stock.
The bud being deposited, bind that part of the stock moderately
tight with bass, beginning a little below the incision, proceeding
upward so as to keep the eye uncovered, finishing above the
incision. In a month after the operation, examine whether the bud
has united with the stock. If it has succeeded, the bud will be full
and fresh; if not, it will be brown and contracted. When it has taken,
untie the bandage, that the bud may swell, and in a few days
afterwards cut the head of the stock off about six inches above the
inoculation, and prevent all shoots from growing by pinching them
off. This will forward the bud, which will push and ripen wood this
season; but it must be carefully tied as it grows to the remaining
head of the stock. Some do not head down the stock until the
following spring, thereby not encouraging the bud to grow, which if
winter sets in early is the safest method.
[I] We once budded three eyes of the white moss rose, after
they had by mistake been carried in the pocket of a coat three
days. The shoot was soaked six hours in water, and two of the
buds grew. From this we infer that shoots, if properly wrapped
up, may be carried very great distances, and grow successfully.
OF WATERING.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/5101162-250530163122-0a4c766c/75/Critical-Theory-And-International-Relations-A-Reader-1st-Edition-Steven-C-Roach-63-2048.jpg)
![until they have begun to grow, protecting them entirely from the
sun, till that period, then take the opportunity of a cloudy day to
expose them. After this repotting, the following kinds are liable to
suffer from too much water: Pavonínum, Davey[)a]num, fúlgens,
ardens, citriodórum, rubéscens, florabùndum, ardèscens; with those
of a similar habit, and these species do not require so much
encouragement at the root as the strong growing sorts. The
tuberous rooted and deciduous species must be very moderately
supplied. Be careful when watering that the new soil does not
become saturated with water, as, though allowed to dry again, it will
not be so pure. When they shoot afresh, turn them regularly every
two weeks, to prevent them growing to one side.
ORANGES, LEMONS, &c.
As it is frequently very inconvenient to shift these trees into
larger tubs in the months of March and April, this month is a period
that is suitable both from the growth of the trees, and their being in
the open air. It would be improper to state the day or the week, that
depending entirely on the season. The criterion is easily observed,
which is when the first growth is over, these trees making another
growth in autumn. When they are large, they require great exertion,
and are frequently attended with inconvenience to get them shifted.
Where there is a quantity of them, the best plan that we have tried
or seen adopted is as follows: Have a strong double and a single
block trimmed with a sufficiency of rope; make it fast to the limb of
a large tree, or any thing that projects, and will bear the weight, and
as high as will admit of the plant being raised a few feet under it.
Take a soft bandage and put around the stem, to prevent the bark
from being bruised; make a rope fast to it, in which hook the single
block. Raise the plant the height of the tub, put a spar across the
tub, and strike on the spar with a mallet, which will separate the tub
from the ball. Then with a strong pointed stick probe a little of the
earth from amongst the roots, observing to cut away any that are
affected by dry-rot, damp, or mildew, with any very matted roots.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/5101162-250530163122-0a4c766c/75/Critical-Theory-And-International-Relations-A-Reader-1st-Edition-Steven-C-Roach-69-2048.jpg)
Critical Theory And International Relations A Reader 1st Edition Steven C Roach
- 1. Critical Theory AndInternational Relations A Reader 1st Edition Steven C Roach download https://ebookbell.com/product/critical-theory-and-international- relations-a-reader-1st-edition-steven-c-roach-10202324 Explore and download more ebooks at ebookbell.com
- 2. Here are somerecommended products that we believe you will be interested in. You can click the link to download. International Relations Theory And International Law A Critical Approach Adriana Sinclair https://ebookbell.com/product/international-relations-theory-and- international-law-a-critical-approach-adriana-sinclair-5403560 Class States And International Relations A Critical Appraisal Of Robert Cox And Neogramscian Theory Adrian Budd https://ebookbell.com/product/class-states-and-international- relations-a-critical-appraisal-of-robert-cox-and-neogramscian-theory- adrian-budd-10870258 Critical Theory In International Relations And Security Studies Interviews And Reflections 1st Edition Shannon Brincat https://ebookbell.com/product/critical-theory-in-international- relations-and-security-studies-interviews-and-reflections-1st-edition- shannon-brincat-57234372 Resisting Economic Globalization Critical Theory And International Investment Law David Schneiderman Auth https://ebookbell.com/product/resisting-economic-globalization- critical-theory-and-international-investment-law-david-schneiderman- auth-5334510
- 3. Critical Theory AndPolitical Modernity 1st Ed Jos Maurcio Domingues https://ebookbell.com/product/critical-theory-and-political- modernity-1st-ed-jos-maurcio-domingues-9964220 Critical Theory And Political Theology The Aftermath Of The Enlightenment 1st Ed Paul S Chung https://ebookbell.com/product/critical-theory-and-political-theology- the-aftermath-of-the-enlightenment-1st-ed-paul-s-chung-10487410 Critical Turns In Critical Theory New Directions In Social And Political Thought International Library Of Political Studies Volume 39 Saamus A Tuama https://ebookbell.com/product/critical-turns-in-critical-theory-new- directions-in-social-and-political-thought-international-library-of- political-studies-volume-39-saamus-a-tuama-1846144 International Perspectives On Crowdfunding Positive Normative And Critical Theory Jrme Mric Isabelle Maque Julienne Brabet https://ebookbell.com/product/international-perspectives-on- crowdfunding-positive-normative-and-critical-theory-jrme-mric- isabelle-maque-julienne-brabet-51569580 Critical Schooling Transformative Theory And Practice 1st Ed Francisco J Villegas https://ebookbell.com/product/critical-schooling-transformative- theory-and-practice-1st-ed-francisco-j-villegas-7320154
- 6. critical theory and internationalrelations A READER EDITED BY Steven C. Roach I����&t!r;n���up New York london
- 7. Routledge Taylor & FrancisGroup 270 Madison Avenue New York, NY 10016 © 2008 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC Routledge Taylor & Francis Group 2 Park Square Milton Park, Abingdon Oxon OX 144RN Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group. anInforma business Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper 10 9 8 7 6 5 432 1 International Standard Book Number-13: 978-0-415-95419-8 (Softcover) 978-0-415-95418-1 (Hardcover) No part of this book may be reprinted. reproduced. transmitted, or utilized in any form by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented. including photocopying, microfilming, and recording. or in any informa tion storage or retrieval system. without written permission from the publishers. Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Critical theory and international relations: a reader I edited by Steven C. Roach. p.cm. ISBN 0-415-95418-5 (hardback: alk. paper) --ISBN 0-415-95419-3(pbk.: alk.paper) 1.International relations.2.Critical theory.l. Roach, Steven C. IZ1242.C77 � 327.IOI--dc22 Visit the Taylor & Francis Web sitt> at http://www.taylorandfrancis.com and the Routledge Web site at http://www.routledge.com 2006009323
- 8. Contents Acknowledgments Introduction: From CriticalTheory to Critical IR Theory Dialectic and Kant's Legacy Why Critical Theory? The Extension of Critical Theory to Critical IR Theory A Historical Approach Part I Abstract Universalism and the Critique ofReason 1 The Roots of Critical Theory: German Idealism ix xiii xiii xv xviii xxii 3 Introduction 3 Immanuel Kant, Selection from Groundwork ofthe Metaphysics ofMorals 5 Immanuel Kant, Selection from The Metaphysic ofMorals IS Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" 24 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Selection from The Phenomenology ofthe Spirit 34 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Selection from The Philosophy ofRight 43 Part II Historical Materialism 2 Internationalism, Hegemony, and Orthodoxy 57 Introduction 57 Karl Marx, Selection from Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of1844 59 v
- 9. vi Contents Karl Marx,Selection from Capital Antonio Gramsci, Selection fromPrison Notebooks Georg Lukacs, "What is Orthodox Marxism?" from History and Class Consciousness 67 78 86 3 Psychological Repression and the Perils ofModernity 101 Introduction Sigmund Freud, Selection from Civilization anditsDiscontents Friedrich Nietzsche, Selection from The Genealogy ofMorals Max Weber, Selection from Economy and Society Part III Critical Synthesis 4 The Critique of Instrumental Reason: The Reification ofSociety Introduction Max Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory," from Critical Theory: Selected Essays Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Selection from Dialectic ofEnlightenment Theodor Adorno, Selection from Negative Dialectics Herbert Marcuse, Selection from One Dimensional Man 5 State Capitalism: Its Limitations and Possibilities 101 103 107 115 131 131 133 143 152 161 171 Introduction 171 Friedrich Pollock, "State Capitalism: Its Possibilities and Limitations" 173 Herbert Marcuse, "The Dialectic of the Soviet State," from SovietMarxism 187 Part IV Global Society 6 Communicative Action Theory: Hermeneutics and Recognition 197 Introduction 197 Jiirgen Habermas, Selection from The Theory ofCommunicativeAction 199
- 10. Contents vii Jiirgen Habermas,"Citizenship and National Identity" 206 Axel Honneth, "Disrespect and Resistance: The Moral Logic of Social Conflicts," from The Struggle f or Recognition 212 Nancy Fraser, "Dilemmas ofJustice in the Post-Socialist Age: From Redistribution to Recognition?" from Justice Interruptus 220 7 CriticallR Theory: Dialogic Communities, Ethics, and Normativity 227 Introduction 227 Mark Hoffman, "Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate" 229 Mark Neufeld, from The Restructuring ofInternational Relations Theory 237 Andrew Linklater, "The Question of the Next Stage in International Relations Theory: A Critical-Theoretical Point of View" 242 Mervyn Frost, "The Role of Normative Theory in IR" 259 8 Global Political Economy: Social forces and Dialectic 267 Introduction 267 Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Order" 269 Justin Rosenberg, Selection from The Empire ofCivil Society 279 Claire Cutler, "Locating Authority in the GlobalPolitical Economy" 285 Stephen Gill, "Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism" 292 Christian Heine and Benno Teschke, "Sleeping Beauty and the Dialectical Awakening: On the Potential of Dialectic for International Relations" 302 Part V A New Critical Phase? Normative Critical Theory and its Critics 9 Postmodern Thought: Genealogy, Power/Knowledge, and Deconstruction Introduction Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures" from Power/Knowledge Jacques Derrida, "Conjuring Marxism," from Specters ofMarx J.F. Lyotard, Selection from The Postmodern Condition 315 315 317 326 334
- 11. viii Contents 10 Postmodernismand feminism in IR 341 11 Introduction 341 Richard Ashley and R.B.J. Walker, "Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies» 343 Jens Bartelson, "The Problem: Deconstructing Sovereignty," from A GenealogyofSovereignty 360 Christine Sylvester, "Empathetic Cooperation: A Feminist Method for IR» 368 CriticallR Theory and its Response 377 Introduction 377 Richard Devetak, "The Project of Modernity and International Relations Theory» 378 Index 391
- 12. Acknowledgments This reader grewout ofmy early ruminations and conversations with several critical theorists in Berkeley, California, during the early 1990s. Such ruminations would continue during my formal training in international studies (Ph.D.), where many proved instrumental in shaping the ideas that would serve as the conceptual founda tion ofthe book, including Micheline Ishay and Jack Donnelly, among others. I ben efited a great deal from the suggestions and comments ofthe reviewer, Bernd Reiter and the former senior editor, Rob Tempio, who helped to further broaden the book's scope. I am also indebted to my wife, Erica, for her invaluable assistance with the editing ofthe book and in securing the permissions to reprint material. Accordingly, I would like to express my gratitude to the following publishers for allowing me to reprint the following materials. Chapter 2 reprinted from Kant's Political Writings, edited by Hans Reiss. Copyright © 1991 by Cambridge University Press. Reprinted with permission of Cambridge University Press. Chapter 3 reprinted from Kant's Political Writings, edited by Hans Reiss. Copyright © 1991 by Cambridge University Press. Reprinted with permission of Cambridge University Press. Chapter 4 reprinted from G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel's Phenomenology o fSpirit, with permis sion ofOxf ord University Press. Copyright © 1977 by Oxford University Press. Chapter8 reprinted fromAntonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks (New York: International Publishers, 1971), "Hegemony and Problems of Marxism," pp. 257-264, 409-414, with permission from International Publishers. Copyright © 1971 by International Publishers. Chapter 9 reprinted from Georg Lukacs, History o fClass Consciousness, with permis sion from Ms. Erzsebet Panuska, c/o MIT Press. Copyright © Erzsebet Panuska. Chapter 10 reprinted from Civilization and its Discontents by Sigmund Freud, trans lated byfames Strachey. Copyright © 1961 by fames Strachey, renewed 1989 by Alix Strachey. Used by permission of W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. Sigmund Freud © Copyrights, The Institute ofPsychoanalysis and the Hogarth Press forpermission toquote from Civilization and itsDiscontents from the StandardEdition o fthe Com plete Psychological Works o fSigmund Freud translated and edited by fames Strachey. Reprinted by permission ofthe the Random House Group, Ltd. ix
- 13. x Acknowledgments Chapter 10reprinted from The Birth o f Tragedy and the Genealogy ofMorals, by Fried rich Nietzsche, translated by Francis Golffing. Copyright © 1956 by Doubleday, a division of Random House, Inc. Used by permission of Doubleday, a division of Random House, Inc. Chapter 11 reprinted by permission fromthe University ofCalifornia Press, from Max Weber, Economy and Society, Vol. 2. Copyright © 1971 by the Regents ofthe Uni versity ofCalifornia. Chapter 13 reprinted from Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory: Selected Essays, by per mission from The Continuum International Publishing Group. Translated by Mat thew 1. O'Connell; English translation by © Herder and Herder Inc. Chapter 14 reprinted from Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic o f Enlightenment, bypermission fromThe ContinuumInternational Publishing Group. Translated by John Coming; Englishtranslation © 1972 by Herder and Herder Inc. Chapter 15 reprinted from Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, by permission from The Continuum International Publishing Group. Translated by E.B. Ashton; English translation © 1973 by The Continuum International Publishing Group. Chapter 16 reprintedfromHerbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man. Copyright © 1964 by Beacon Press. Reprinted with permission ofBeacon Press, Boston. Chapter 17 reprinted from Friedrich Pollock, "State Capitalism and its Possibilities," by permission from The Continuum International Publishing Group. Copyright © 1982 by The Continuum International Publishing Group. Chapter 18 reprinted from Soviet Marxism, by Herbert Marcuse. Copyright © 1979 by Columbia University Press. Reprinted with permission ofthe publisher. Chapter 19 reprinted from The Theory o f Communicative Action, Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization o f Society by Jiirgen Habermas. Introduction and English translation Copyright © 1984 by Beacon Press. German Text: Copyright © 1981 by Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main. Reprinted by permission of Beacon Press, Boston. Chapter 20 reprinted from Jiirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, translatedby William Rehg. Copyright © 1996 by MIT Press. Chapter 21 reprinted from Axel Honneth, The Struggle f or Recognition: The Moral Grammar o fSocial Conflicts, with permission from Polity Press. Copyright © 1995 by Polity Press. Chapter22 reprinted from Nancy Fraser, "From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilem mas of Justice in the Post-Socialist Age," with permission ofNewLeft Review. Copy right © 1997 New Left Review. Chapter 23 reprinted with permission by Millennium: Journal o fInternational Stud ies, from Mark Hoffman, "Critical Theory and the Inter-ParadigmDebate," Vol. 23, No. 1 (1994): 109-118. Copyright © 1994 by Millennium: Journal of International Studies. Chapter 24 reprinted from Mark Neuf eld, The Restructuringo fInternational Relations Theory. Copyright © 1997 Cambridge University Press. Reprinted with Permission ofCambridge University Press. Chapter 25 reprinted with permission byMillennium: Journal ofInternational Studies, from Andrew Linklater, "The Question ofthe Next Stage in International Relations Theory: A Critical Theoretic Point ofView," Vol. 21, No. 1 (1992). Copyright © 1994 by Millennium: Journal o fInternational Studies.
- 14. Acknowledgments Chapter 26 reprintedwith permission by Millennium: Journal o fInternational Studies, from Mervyn Frost, "The Role of Normative Theory in IR," Vol. 23, No. 1 (1994): 109-118. Copyright © 1994 by Millennium: Journal o fInternational Studies. Chapter 27 reprinted with permission by Millennium: Journal o fInternational Stud ies, from Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States andWorld Order: Beyond International Relations Theory," Vol. 10, No. 2 (1981): 16 pp. Copyright © 1981 by Millennium: Journal o fInternational Studies. Chapter 28 reprinted from Justin Rosenberg, The Empire o fCivil Society, pp. 129-35, with permission by Verso Press. Copyright © 1990 by Verso Press. Chapter 29 i�printed from Claire Cutler, "Locating Authority in the Global Political Economy," International Studies Quarterly, with permission by Blackwell Publish ing. Copyright © 1999 by Blackwell Publishing. Chapter 30 reprinted with permission by Millennium: Journal o fInternational Studies, from Stephen Gill, "Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neolib eralism," Vol. 24, No. 2 (1995): 17 pp. Copyright © 1995 by Millennium: Journal of International Studies. Chapter 31 reprinted with permission by Millennium: Journal of International Stud ies, from Christian Heine and Benno Teschke, "Sleeping Beauty and the Dialecti cal Awakening: On the Potential of Dialectic for International Relations," Vol. 25, No. 2 (1996): 404-423. Copyright © 1996 by Millennium: Journal o fInternational Studies. Chapter 32 reprintedfromPower/Knowledge byMichel Foucault, edited by Colin Gor don, Copyright © 1972, 1975, 1976, 1977 by Michel Foucault. Preface and Afterword © 1980 by Colin Gordon. Bibliography © 1980 by Colin Gordon. This collection © 1980 by the Harvester Press. Used by permission of Pantheon Books, a division ofRandom House, Inc. Chapter 34 reprinted from Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, trans lated by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, with permission by Minnesota University Press (1994). English Translation and Foreword copyright © 1984 by the University ofMinnesota. Original French-language edition translation copyright © by Les Editions de Minuit. Chapter 35 reprinted from Richard Ashley and R.B. J Walker, "Reading Dissidence/ Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies ," International Studies Quarterly, with permission by Blackwell Publishing. Copyright © 1995 byBlackwell Publishers. Chapter 36 reprinted from Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy o f Sovereignty. Copyright © 1995 Cambridge University Press. Reprinted with permission ofCambridge Uni versity Press. Chapter 37 reprinted with permission by Millennium: Journal o fInternational Stud ies, from Christine Sylvester, "Empathetic Cooperation: A Feminist Method for IR," Vol. 23, No. 2 (1994): 321-334. Copyright © 1994 by Millennium: Journal o fInterna tional Studies. Chapter 38 reprinted with permission by Millennium: Journal o fInternational Studies, Richard Devetak, "The Project of Modernity and International Relations Theory," Vol. 24, No. I (1995): 27-51. Copyright © 1995 by Millennium: Journal ofInterna tional Studies. xi
- 16. Introduction: From Critica lTheory to Critica llR Theory Dialectic and Kant's Legacy If critical social theory offers us a logical avenue for understanding social change, then the term "dialectic" can be seen as the vehicle for maneuvering our understand ing along this avenue. In modern critical social theory, dialectic serves as a scientific and holistic method of analysis. Its purpose(s) is to investigate the social forces of political order and transformation in terms of the relational oppositions and histori cal contradictions between the individual and society and to examine the meaning of reason (Vernunft) and rationality in the social context of ethical, economic, and political struggles for justice and freedom. The dialectic in this sense is both inspired byandderivedfrom the writings ofKant, Hegel, Marx, and Habermas, among others. And, unlike ancient theory, which explores the dialectic as an "art of defining ideas related to the method of determining the interrelation of ideas in the light of sin gle principle," a modern conception of dialectic emphasizes the historical and social (scientific) dimensions ofsocietal change. Thus, dialectic, as understood here, can be employed in a variety ofways to explain societal transformation(s) in the contempo raryworld, including the emergence ofhuman rights (gender and indigenous groups), newinstitutionalnormsand f ormsofcitizenship (EU), and global ethics.l As such, one encounters different modern conceptions of dialectic, ranging from Marx's dialecti cal materialism ("the progressive unification through the contradiction ofopposites") and Habermas's hermeneutical dialectic (intersubjective interaction or communica tive action) to Adorno's negative dialectics, which conceives dialectic as an inherently subversive element ofreason and rationality. In recent years, however, a pervasive skepticism has emerged concerning the dia lectic and its role in advancing the emancipatory project ofmodernity (emancipation that is gUided by the principles ofreason, rationality, justice, and societal and politi cal integration). Such skepticism reflects what Richard Bernstein argues is a tension between the modern and postmodern (Stimmung). As Bernstein notes, "[Stimmung] is an amorphous, protean, and shifting [force] but which nevertheless exerts a power ful influence on the ways in which we think, act, and experience.'" In his view, such skepticism explains why postmodernist and modernist thinkers seek to address the xiii
- 18. Introduction: From Critica lTheory to Critica l IR Theory Dialectic and Kant's Legacy If critical social theory offers us a logical avenue f or understanding social change, then the term "dialectic" can be seen as the vehicle for maneuvering our understand ing along this avenue. In modern critical social theory, dialectic serves as a scientific and holistic method of analysis. Its purpose(s) is to investigate the social f orces of political order and transformation in terms of the relational oppositions and histori cal contradictions between the individual and society and to examine the meaning of reason (Vernunft) and rationality in the social context of ethical, economic, and political struggles for justice and freedom. The dialectic in this sense is both inspired byand derived from the writings ofKant, Hegel, Marx, and Habermas, among others. And, unlike ancient theory, which explores the dialectic as an "art of defining ideas related to the method of determining the interrelation of ideas in the light of sin gle principle," a modern conception of dialectic emphasizes the historical and social (scientific) dimensions ofsocietal change. Thus, dialectic, as understood here, can be employed in a variety of ways to explain societal transformation(s) in the contempo rary world, including the emergence ofhuman rights (gender and indigenous groups), newinstitutional norms and forms ofcitizenship (EU), and global ethics.! As such, one encounters different modern conceptions of dialectic, ranging from Marx's dialecti cal materialism ("the progressive unification through the contradiction ofopposites") and Habermas's hermeneutical dialectic (intersubjective interaction or communica tiveaction) to Adorno's negative dialectics, which conceives dialectic as an inherently subversive element ofreason and rationality. In recent years, however, a pervasive skepticism has emerged concerning the dia lectic and its role in advancing the emancipatory project ofmodernity (emancipation that is guided by the principles ofreason, rationality, justice, and societal and politi cal integration). Such skepticism reflects what Richard Bernstein argues is a tension between the modern and postmodern (Stimmung). As Bernstein notes, "[Stimmung] is an amorphous, protean, and shifting [force] but which nevertheless exerts a power ful influence on the ways in which we think, act, and experience."3 In his view, such skepticism explains why postmodernist and modernist thinkers seek to address the xiii
- 19. xiv Introduction: FromCritical to Critical l R Theory politicaland ethical consequences oftheirtheory. Confrontingsuch consequences, as he insists, is not simply "contingent" or "accidental," but "a dialectical consequence of the questions that they raise themselves.''' We might therefore see the bond between postmodernists (Baudrillard, Lyotard, Derrida, Foucault, and Delueze) and modern ists in terms of the mutual struggle to locate the meaning offreedom and justice at the margins. Having said this, though, it is important to note the critical source of tension between these schools, especially as it concerns the dialectic and social total ity. For postmodernists, dialecticians reinforce exclusion and oppression by conceiv ing social integration and societal relations in holistic terms, that is, as an unfolding social totality. Not only does the dialectic engender an essentializing logic that privi leges Western-empowered notions of universality; it also ignores the relativization of truths/values and social fragmentation, or what Jacques Derrida refers to as the "indestructibility of otherness." To affirm this indestructibility is thus, on the one hand, to valorize difference and to resist hegemonic practices. On the other hand, affirming the relativization oftruth fails to provide construc tive criteria for promoting social and political integration. While we need to be con cerned with the problematics ofpower and sovereignty, it is equally important that we address the constitutive aspects ofknowledge building, consensus formation, and social empowerment. The question that arises, then, is whether the permanent dis missal of the dialectic undermines the principles of solidarity, equality, and toler ance. How, in other words, should we conceive critical social thought as a steering mechanism that is capable of gUiding our investigation into and understanding of societal and political change at the domestic and global levels? The comprehensive approach ofthis reader addresses these questions by focusing on the changing and evolving features of dialectical thought. Its primary aim is to provide the heuristic tools f or charting the evolution ofcritical theory into the global realm, through the writings of Kant, Hegel, Marx, the Frankfurt School and critical IR theory. In this way, it seeks to bridge an ongoing gap in critical IR studies between the tradition of critical theory and criticallR theory, and to encourage IR scholars, students, and practitioners to see the global realm as a new context for applying and engaging dialectic to understand social change. Given these objectives, it becomes important to inquire into the modern origins ofcritical social thought. We can begin our inquiry in this case with Kant's distinction between experience and cognition, or how the understanding does not begin with experience but arises out of it. It is this distinction that reveals the autonomous capacity of reason and rational understanding and that reaffirms the role of dialectical criticism by priori tizing the distinction between the "is" and "ought" in our theory of knowledge. In this way, Kant's philosophy created a new moral foundation for inquiring into the limits ofnature (experience) and the transformative possibilities ofa moralcivilsoci ety.' A key construct of this new f oundation was speculative reason. Kant thought of this dimension of reason as providing a space f or directing our thoughts toward the future possibilities of regulating and promoting human conduct. For him, this dimension necessitated an open-ended view of society, whose immanent task was to (re)orient our thoughts, ideas, rational judgments and concepts toward the rule oflaw. Kant in this sense shows us that dogmatism and orthodoxy are never too far away, and that we need to orientreason toward the universal or ethical ends ofmoral
- 20. Introduction: From Criticalto CriticallR Theory xv freedom as a way of transcending the irrationalism of the (political) passions. This moral requirement might well explain Kant's paradoxical intellectual debt to David Hume, the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher (empiricist skeptic) who, as Kant remarked, had "interrupted my dogmatic slumber.'''' Hume, ofcourse, is not the onlyphilosopherwho deserves credit for inspiringKant's modern formulation of dialectical criticism. Equally essential are the ancient philoso phers, in particular, Plato, whose Meno dialogue addresses the dilemma ofhowwe can know something ofwhich wehave no knowledge. What this problem (aporia) suggests is that in acquiringknowledge ofsomething, we also fail to grasp its essence. Another way ofputting this idea is to saythat our deeply embedded ethicalconvictionscan and should always take the form ofthe following permanent questions about our political existence: What is the role ofthe state? What are my moral duty and responsibility f or promoting civil society? Addressing these questions requires us to overcome the pre sumption that there are permanent answers to life's greatest problems. Inquiring, then, into the sources of authoritarianism constitutes one of the core tasks of critical theory. Because political leaders can use their power to manipulate the rules of institutions and the system, they can also subjugate the individual to the state. Thus, the reason why speculative reason is so important in this respect is that it stresses the immanent tensions between the state (society) and individual; it treats, in other words, these tensions as existing, albeit changing constructs of our moral understanding. In this way, speculative reason is predicated on the f ollowing ques tion: How do reason and dialectical thought enable us to challenge and overcome dogmatism and barbarism? Hegel's and Marx's answer to this question involved elaborate and systematic attempts to historicize and materialize the dialectic. Hegel, for instance, conceived the dialectic in terms of the historical unfolding of the absolute spirit and knowledge, or the grand reconciliation between freedom and the state (Aufhebung); while Marx built upon Hegel's dialectical project by theorizing about the class conflict between the proletariat and bourgeoisie and how this conflict would be resolved through the dissolution of capitalism (private property and the bourgeois state). In this way, Marx, perhaps more than any other social theorist, revealed the practical qualities of dialectical thought. His influence on the Frankfurt School's critical theory would lead some to label the Frankfurt School as a "second stage of Marxism.'" A central question for critical IR theorists, then, is how [an extended] critical theory exposes the dogmatism and orthodoxy ofmilitant ideologies. Here, though, we need to be careful about how we approach the word "extension." What exactly are we extending? And how does the extension of dialectical criticism qualify the international principles of justice or global forms of citizenship? To address these questions, we need to examine the coreconcepts and aims ofcritical theory. Why Critical Theory? The Frankfurt Institute ofSocial Research (The Frankfurt School) officially coined the term "critical theory" in 1937.' Its formulation of critical theory would incorpo rate a wide range of ideas, including those of Kant, Marx, Hegel, Nietzsche, Freud,
- 21. xvi Introduction: FromCritical to Critical l R Theory Weber, Lukacs and Gramsci. As such, critical theory reflected a synthesis of vari ous traditions of modern theory, including German Idealism, Historical Material ism, Modernism, and Psychoanalysis. Max Horkheimer, one of the founders of the school, saw the mission as one of investigating the relationship between reason and authority. But attempts to synthesize the traditions failed to produce a cohesive theory. Stephen Bronner, for instance, argues that critical theory, while shedding much needed light on the emancipatory project, remains an amalgamation of competing normative and sociological concerns.lO The reasons f or this lack ofcohesion are not clear-cut. But it is possible that the project of the Frankfurt School remained too ambitious; that synthesizing so many differing strands ofthought had compromised their focus, and allowed the deep skepticism or pessimism ofFreud's and Nietzsche's writingsto filter into theirviews ofthe Enlightenment's legacy. As we shall see, Hork heimer's and Adorno's critique of instrumental reason-which held that scientific and technical rationality had outstripped the progressive elements of reason-was emblematic of this deep skepticism. For many, however, Habermas's critique ofthis critique would motivate many to rethink the legacyofthe Enlightenment or the proj ect ofmodernity. His theory ofcommunicative action, f or instance, would convince many to reconsider the progressive aspects of the Enlightenment's ideals of reason and rationality. Nonetheless, the main reason why we study the Frankfurt School, whether it is Habermas's theory of communicative action, Horkheimer's and Adorno's critique of instrumental reason, or Herbert Marcuse's one-dimensional man, is that critical theory offers us a key set of insights into the changing dynamics of dogmatism and authoritarian political structures. From this vantage point, critical theory not only encompasses the objectives of critical thinking (reasoned argumentation and delib eration); it also reflects the process oflearning to do theory in the sense ofbecoming aware ofone's changing ties to (identitywith) society. Critical theory, therefore, pro vides us with a holistic deliberation approach to studying state authoritarianism, one which is comprised ofthe following four central tenets. First, critical social theory addresses the reflexive dimension of an individual's theory/ideas, or the intrinsic link between one's actions and values and his or her ideological orientation. Here ideology shapes one's underlying preferences, and is the lens through which one understands his or her environment.' One's knowledge and the tools he or she uses to acquire specialized knowledge are always being shaped by historical and social circumstancesY Theory, in this respect, is both holistic and practical in its undertaking, since it concerns the need to investigate the social gen esis offacts and the emerging social and political trends in society. AccQfdingly, to be self-reflexive is to be conscious ofthe social origins and conditions shaping the con tent ofthese facts. In this way, critical theory opposes positivism, or the employment of deductive, inductive and empiricist methods to objectify social phenomena. For critical theorists, social values inhere in our practical and theoretical understanding; they are, in other words, immanent to our action (praxis) and knowledge ofsociety. Second, critical social theory f ocuses on the mutability of political structures. It seeks, in this way, to demonstrate how political power and ideological controls can f oster the perception of the permanence of political and economic structures.
- 22. Introduction: From Criticalto Critical lR Theory xvii Such reified thinking characterizes the Nazis' use of heroic and naturalized sym bols ofblood and soil to champion the eternal greatness of the German (Nazi) state. Marx, Lukacs and the Frankfurt School theorists, for instance, drew on the oppres sive practices of capitalism to establish the link between reification and oppression/ authoritarianism. By reification we are referring to the false conversion ofsomething into its concrete form, that is, the false identification of the authenticity and social content ofthis f orm or product. Thus, for example, Georg Lukacs conceives the reifi cation ofconsciousness in terms ofthe inert immediacy of social facts (the proletar ian victory in the Soviet Union). When we critically assess the falseness of political structures in relation to the changing social circumstances of society, we also seek to expose the dogmatism of these structures. For Horkheimer and the rest of the Frankfurt School theorists, such dogmatism symptomized humankind's desire to dominate nature; it showed, in other words, why some chose to use naturalized and eternal symbols to dominate and oppress other peoples. Third, critical social theory is an open-ended interdisciplinaryapproach rooted in both ethical concerns and social and economic relations of production. In Grams ci's writings on the dialectical interaction between civil society and the state, ethics and cultural concerns remain immanent to social progress and equality. Here, cul tural concerns refer, in part, to the the role of organic intellectuals in educating the masses. For some critical IR theorists, such a project, when extended to the global level, underscores the immanence of excluSionary and inclusionary modes of citi zenship and political participation in the global civil society. This project, in turn, rejects any Archimedean point ofreference by which to measure orvalidate the uni versal value ofrights and goods. As noted above, the normative dimension ofcritical theory assumes that an individual's ethical responsibilities are always being shaped by changing social circumstances. For this reason, our knowledge is never complete per se, which is to say that we can never have the final say over what does and does not constitute absolute or permanent moral knowledge. We can onlyassume that the conditions that shape our knowledge claims also [permanently) presuppose the ten sions between societal change and our moral convictions. What becomes important, then, is the need for an interdisciplinary and pliable theory to explain this complex theoretical task. Fourth, critical social theory is an integrative analysis of social reality. It provides "gUides to social reality, producing models and cognitive mappings of societies, and the 'big pictures' that enable us to see, f or example, how the economy polity, social institutions, discourses, practices, and culture interact to produce a social system."l2 In this case, critical social theory offers a big picture of the changing contours of the international and/or global realm, whose main features include the counter hegemonic efforts ofinternational social movements, NGOs, new f orms of citizen ship, and new supranationalinstitutions (EU, ICC, etc.). This is one main reason why, as we shall see, that many critical IR theorists have claimed that critical theory offers a new paradigmatic approach ofinternational relations theory. In sum, critical social theory remains both relevant and applicable to under standing the complex interaction of identities, practices, and institutions at both the domestic and international levels. As the f ourth tenet suggests, the extension of
- 23. xviii Introduction: FromCritical to Critical lR Theory critical theory into IR theory reflects a progressive, albeit problematic theoretical development in IR theory. The Extension of Critical Theory to Critical IR Theory THE IR DIMENSION Turning to international relations theory we encounter three so-called great debates (accompanied by a recently emerging f ourth) regarding the scientific and theoreti cal parameterS' ofthe discipline. The first debate between idealism and realism arose out of E.H. Carr's Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939Y This was eventually f ollowed by the second debate between scientific methodology and history (1950s and 1960s), which culminated in Kenneth Waltz's Theory ofInternational Politics. By the 1980s, the emergence of an inter-paradigm debate between structuralism, pluralism and realism gave rise to a third debate between positivism and post-positivism. Here we can point to the following two ways in which critical theory initially entered into international relations theory: (1) an internalized approach that works within real ism or conventional IR approaches in order to formulate a critical realist theory; and (2) an externalized approach that works within the critical theory tradition to posit a self-standing theoretical approach, equipped with the methodological tools and gov erning principles to compete with other IR research programs or approaches.ls Realism in IR consists ofalongtradition ofideas datingbackto ancient times. The key concepts ofrealism include the balance ofpower, hegemony, and power politics. (see Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and HansMorgenthau). In IR theorywe distin gUish between a political and a structural realism. The f ormer, f or instance, focuses on the functional components ofthe balance ofpower and the operational and ethical parameters of foreign policy decisions. Meanwhile, structural realism is more rigid and processual in its approach to the international system. It uses scientific variables (distribution ofcapabilities across states) and establishes continuous patterns in IR to measure the causes and effects of state behavior.I. Thus, structural realism turns on sharp and often rigid dichotomies between objectivity and subjectivity, ontologyand epistemology, and state and nonstate actors. Not only does it reduce the variabilityof state behavior to the ontological realm of anarchy, but it also ignores the role played by history in explaining the political transformation ofthe international system. In his 1981 article on political realism, Richard Ashley attempted to move beyond these rigidities of parsimonious theory, by distinguishing between a prac tical and technical realism. Drawing on Habermas's communicative action theory, he argued that structural realism failed to show how the competitive power inter ests ofstates were constituted by social interaction or the intersubjectivity ofvalues, norms, and interests. In this sense, Ashley was not simply concerned with develop ing a critical theory of IR per se, but with restructuring realism in a way that inter nalized the ethical and political content of the power and competitive interests of states.17 Yet precisely because Ashley sought to internalize the shared power interests of states, he failed to adequately expose the ideological dimensions of the interstate system. As Mark Hoffman notes, Ashley overlooked the fact that realism "performs
- 24. Introduction: From Criticalto Critical lR Theory xix an ideological function in legitimising an order in which only certain interests are realised-the technical and practical interests of states and the state system. This leaves it void of emancipatory interests, of the humanist element that is central to critical theory."l" Nonetheless, it is important to stress that by working within the realist paradigm, internalized approaches staticize the political and social structures of the inter national system. As such, they contradict one of the fundamental aims of critical theory: to demonstrate how the ideological elements of political structures subjugate and threaten human reason, freedom, and equality. This is one of the main reasons why critical IR theorists have strongly criticized Alexander Wendt's social theory of international politics; in particular, his "thin constructivism," which retains the state centric assumptions of realism in order to formulate a scientific realism based on three cultures of anarchy: namely, Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian.19 Certainly it could be said that Wendt's theory steers a path between the limits of realism and postmodern relativism, offering what Samuel Barkin aptly describes as "realist con structivism."20 However, Wendt's theory also allows the scientific variables of realism to limit analysis of the structural influences of NGOs and other nonstate actors. By contrast, then, an externalized approach seeks to devise an alternative theory to conventionalIR approaches. Not only does it critique the limits of conventional approaches, such as realism and neo-institutionalism, it also reflects the anti positivist orientation of critical theory and the attendant possibilities of drawing on the critical theory tradition to restructure theIR discipline. As one of the first critical theorists of the international political economy, Robert Cox distinguished between problem solvers and those who employ the scientific or positivist methods to measure and predict the recurrent effects of state power and interests; and critical theorists, who interpret the social forces of world order in terms of ethics and the mutability of structures (the internationalization of the state).21 His efforts to develop a criti cal theory approach to the international political economy would ultimately inspire Andrew Linklater to formulate a criticalIR theory, which placed the emancipatory project at the core of international theory.22 Linklater's principal aim, as we shall see, was to position critical theory in IR by building on Mark Hoffman's earlier claim (1987) that critical theory had emerged (out of the inter-paradigm debate) as a new, albeit undeveloped paradigm ofIR theory. Accordingly, by themid- to late-1980s, the evolution of critical theory intoIR theory marked an important feature of the transi tion from the inter-paradigm debate ofIR theory to the third debate.23 Facilitating this transition was a series of transformative events including the dis solution of the Soviet Union, the rapid advancements in informational technology (e.g., satellite technology and the Internet), and the effects of these advancements on the erosion of state sovereignty. More than anything, these events helped inspire a renewed and sustained focus on ethics and morality, while also challenging the reductivist and deterministic approaches of structuralism and positivism. As such, they raised several normative and empiricalquestions regarding the changing global order. Are states really the exclusive or primary actors/agents of the international system? If realism and rationalism have ignored the ethical and moral implications of power (war), how do we explain the state's obligation to resolve inter-communal conflict? Moreover, what is the normative connection between this trend and the
- 25. xx Introduction: FromCritical to Critical l R Theory emergence of global governance (not world government), in which NGOs, social movements, environmental and peace movements, and private actors have come together to influence decisionmaking at the global level? And how do these nonstate actors influence and explain the emergence ofthe World Trade Organization (WTO), Kyoto Protocols, and the International Criminal Court (ICC)? As we shall see, however, critical theory in IR addresses each one ofthese ques tions. Here, we should also note the important contribution ofinternational political theory, in particular CharlesBeitz'swork oninternationalethics.24 Beitz, for instance, analyzed many of the key features of international society, including liberal cosmo politan right, global justice,25 and global responsibility. Beitz formulated, among other things, a global original position (via John Rawls' Theory oflusticfi16) in order to address general problems in normative IR theory (including an equitable global distribution of social goods). In doing so, however, he also exposed the problem of championing the tradition of rationalism, which, as Nicholas Rengger notes, "ulti mately 'squeezes out' non-rationalist normative voices that address crucial problems in IR."27 Whether or not Beitz's analysis squeezes out non-rationalist perspectives, it is important that we realize that the inclusion of more critical perspectives will continue to allow IR theorists to address new problems in global politics, while also exposing the limits ofconventional IR theories. In short, both international political theory and critical IR theory stress the role ofhistory, ethics, and social and political integration. Yet, in doing so, they also draw attention to the important challenge posed by radical IR approaches (e.g., postmod ernism, feminism and other critical theory approaches): namely, the need to focus on the dark side ofreason, universality, and rationality, or the systemic effects ofoppres sion, patriarchy, marginalization and racism. If critical IR theory is to move beyond this challenge, then it must become a self-reflexive theory that can accommodate the concerns of the postmodernists. This task, however, raises the following question: How should we address this dark side ofthe Enlightenment's legacy (the promotion ofits signature ideals ofreason, rationality, freedom, justice, solidarity and equality) within a reflexive, yet pluralistic theoretical framework that does not allow an any thing-goes approach (pure relativism)? Critical IR Theory and The Third and Fourth Debates: Challenges and Prospects To address this question, let us examine some ofthe central issues surrounding the "third debate" in IR theory. As noted earlier, the debate pits positivism against post positivism and seeks to promote a methodological pluralism that "will lead to the reexamination of scientific dissensus and its relationship to scientific progress."'· As such, it focuses attention on the value of difference and a plurality ofvoices in the field, and exposes the points of crisis in the discipline by actively interrogating the hegemonic practices in international relations (sovereignty).'9 Accordingly, by the early to mid-1990s, the third debate encompassed a range of interpretive modes ofanalyses, including postmodernism, feminism, critical IR the ory, constructivism, post-colonialism and Neo-Gramscian approaches to the inter national political economy. Within this cluster oftheories, several competing claims
- 26. Introduction; From Criticalto Critical IR Theory xxi to knowledge emerged, including, among other things, the need for articulating a social dialectic to explain the trajectory of IR,'o the governing forces and principles of inclusion and exclusion within and outside the discipline,3l the arbitrary mean ing of territorial boundaries or state sovereignty,32 and the role of gender, individual private actors, NGOs, social, environmental and peace groups in IR." While such approaches focus much-needed attention on many long-neglected and newly emer gent social movements, they also reflect a difficult tradeoff between a plurality of competing critical theory approaches and the loss of a set of governing assumptions that can direct and guide the discipline along a coherent path. Perhaps an apt meta phor that captures the complexity of this tradeoffis constellation, whichAdorno bor rowed from Walter Benjamin to describe the increasing fragmentation of modern society. As he states, societal relationsare"juxtaposed rather than an integrated clus ter of changing elements that resist reduction to a common denominator, essential core, or generative first principle."34 Still, few will argue that an open-ended methodology of some kind is needed, especially given the complexity of global issues and the need to devise imagina tive theoretical approaches to reflect upon and resolve these issues. What remains unclear, however, is whether we can develop an empirical and policy-relevant critical IR theory. It is precisely this issue that lies at the core of what some are referring to as a fourth debate. In a recent specialissue of the Review ofInternational Studies, for instance, severalleading criticalIR theorists wereasked to discuss the implications of Jiirgen Habermas's discursive ethics for a "practical"35 critical theory of international relations. In his article on dialogical politics, for instance, Linklater argued that IR theorists needed to address the problematic limitations to Habermas's proceduralism and to see its procedural limitations as a necessary precondition for further accom modating relativist claims.36 Others have drawn on Axel Honneth's theory of the struggle for recognition to articulate the empirical prospects of a critical IR theory. For instance, JiirgenHaacke states thatHonneth's account of the strugglefor recogni tion"would not appear to exhibit the same tensionas is inherent between Habermas's discourse ethics and his analYSis of contemporary (international) politics."" In sum, we might point to three important focal points of the fourth debate and beyond. First is the ongoing and unmet need to bring together history with a phi losophy of science, or rather, as Fred Halliday insists, of treating the philosophy of social science as heuristic tools for advancing the IR discipline.38 Here, it is critical that we engage critical IR theory as an emerging whole, that is, to critically analyze the logical and historical implications of the ideas found in the modern or derivative texts of critical IR theory, such as Kant, Hegel, Marx, Weber, Nietzsche, Adorno and Habermas. Second, critical IR theorists will need to develop a practical and policy relevant critical IR theory rooted in the discursive link between policymaking and the theoretical abstractions of identity and political will formation. And, lastly, criti cal IR theorists will need to reexamine the diverse dialectical traditions of critical social thought, perhaps with a view to imagining new ways of formulating a reflex ive dialectic, including the counterposing of negative dialectics (Adorno) to positive dialectics (Hegel, Marx and Habermas). In this way, it will be important to return to the debate on the dialect initiated by Christian Heine and Benno Teschke in the
- 27. xxii Introduction: FromCritical to Critical lR Theory mid-1990s.39 The two, as we shallsee, posited that dialectic could, if properly under stood, offer the methodological steering mechanism for IR theory. Whether this latter focus will expose the dialectical interaction of critical theory and postmodernism is certainly an intriguing methodological issue. But itis also true that fundamental tensions continue to divide normative and structuralist-oriented critical theorists (international political economy). And while it is possible that these strands of political and economic thought may evolve into a major disjuncture within the sub-field of critical IR theory, as some have pointed out, it is important to real ize that this challenge will require a deeper appreciation of the extension of critical theory into the global realm.40 Given these tensions, it should be emphasized that while this reader is intended to be comprehensive in scope, it does leave out certain critical perspectives on IR, most notably constructivism and post-colonial approaches. This is not to say that constructivists and post-colonialwriters (subaltern) are not critical theorists. Rather, in excluding these perspectives, this reader seeks to focus on a particular historical lineage of critical social thought. A Historical Approach In providing a framework for studying the evolution of critical theory into critical IR theory, this reader adopts a historical method (periodization) to understand the philosophical underpinnings and emergence of critical IR theory. The primary aim is to expose the social and political tensions that have helped to extend critical theory into the globalsphere(e.g. , regionalintegrationand globalforms of communication). Three historically based criteria will serve as the basis ofinvestigation. First, what are the main ideas of abstract universalism; and how do these ideas engender a histori cal materialist interpretation to counter the oppressive forces of industrialization? Second, how do the extreme ideological dimensions of the totalitarian state expose the limits and problems in our understanding of social change? And third, how does technological rationality, or the Frankfurt School's views on the authoritarian state, give way to a revolutionary, hermeneutical interpretation of constitutional law and worldSOciety; namely, the liberating and oppressive forces of globalization? In this way, this reader offers a detailed, historical lineage of critical theory: from German Idealism to the critical theory debates of IR theory. Accordingly, there are four phases of critical theory in which changing social and economic circumstances have helped engender critical and revolutionary insights into the laws and dynamics of society. These include the early/abstract phase, 1800-1865; the historical material ist phase, 1866-1914; the critical synthesis phase, 1915-1965; and the globalization phase, 1966-present. As such, each of these periods reveal the impact of the changing social conditions on the evolution of critical IR theory: from a purely abstract universalism to a her meneutical understanding of global society. Together, they allow us to see critical IR theory as constituting an open-ended dialectical project of critical theory, in which the opposing meanings of society and state have given way to a deeper understanding .
- 28. Introduction: From Criticalto Critical lR Theory xxiii of the oppressive and liberating forces of world society. Such periodization is also intended to facilitate our understanding of the primary tasks of critical IR theory, which, as Richard Devetak points out, "is to reflect on the possibility of extending the rational, just, and democratic organization of politics to the entire species;'''4 and, as Andrew Linklater states, "how critical theory continues to evolve beyond the paradigm of production to a commitment to dialogic communities that are deeply sensitive about alI forms inclusion and exclusion-domestic, transnational and internationaL'''2 Endnotes 1. Raymond Williams, Keywords (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 106. 2. Or, as Engels would later state, "the science ofgeneral laws ofmotion, both ofthe exter nal world and human thought-two sets oflaws which are identical in their substance but differ in their expression." Quoted in Ibid. 3. Richard J. Bernstein, The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons o fModer nitylPostmodernity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), p. 11. 4. Ibid. 5. Immanuel Kant, Kant's Political Writings, editedbyHans Reiss(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 6.. Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, translated by P.G. Lucas (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1962), p. 9. 7. See Plato, Protagoras and Meno (London: Penguin Classics). 8. See AndrewAratoand EikeGebhardt (eds.) The EssentialFrank f urt School Reader (New York: Continuum Press, 1982). 9. The Frankfurt School was established in 1923, and later moved to New York City (Columbia University) in the 1930s to escape Nazi persecution. It would not move back to Germany until the 1950s. For an excellent historical overview ofthe Frankfurt School's first generation of theorists, see Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: The History o fthe Frank f urt School and the Institute o fSocial Research, 1923-1950 (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1973). 10. See Stephen Eric Bronner, O fCritical Theory and its Theorists, 2nd Edition (New York: Routledge, 2002). 11. Thus, as Tim Dantexplains, "criticaltheorydoes notseekto objectifydistancebutaims to be adopted as a mode of knowledge and action by all human beings so that their decisions shape their history, rather than their actions following mechanically those of a system." See Tim Dant, Critical Social Theory (London: Sage Publications, 2003) p. 136. 12. Steven Best and DouglasKellner, Postmodern Theory: CriticalInterrogations (NewYork: The Guilford Press, 1991), p. 260. 13. E.H. Carr , The T wenty Y ears Crises: 1919-1939, 2nd Edition (London: Macmillan, 1946), p. 236. 14. Kenneth Waltz, Theory o fInternational Politics (Palo Alto, CA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). 15. I derive these two ways from Mark Hoffman's distinction between internal andexternal critical theory approaches to JR. See Mark Hoffman, "Critical Theory and the Inter Paradigm Debate," Millennium: Journal o fInternational Studies, 16(2) (1987), pp. 231-249.
- 29. xxiv Introduction: FromCritical to Critical lR Theory 16. Foran excellent overviewofrealism, seeJackDonnelly, Realism and International Rela tions (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2000). 17. Richard K. Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," International Studies Quarterly, 25(2) (June 1981): 204-236. 18. Mark Hoffman, "Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate," Millenium 16(2) (1987): 238. 19. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory o fInternational Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni versity Press, 1999). 20. Samuel J. Barkin, "Realist Constructivism," International Studies Review, 5(3) (2003): 325. 21. Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Order: Beyond International Relations Theory," Millenium 10(2) (1981). 22. Andrew Linklater, "The Question ofthe Next Stage in International Relations Theory: A Critical Theoretic Point ofView," Millennium: Journal o fInternational Studies, 21(2) (1992): 77-98. 23. YosefLapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospects ofInternational Relations Theory in a Post-positivist Era," International Studies Quarterly, 33(3): 235-254, 1989. 24. See Charles Beitz, The Political Theory o fInternational Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). 25. It should be noted that whereas political theory remains rooted in domestic concep tions ofjustice and freedom, international theory, by contrast, has traditionally ori ented itselfto principles ofpower and interests, which provide the means and ends to regulate state conduct. 26. See John Rawls, Theoryo fJustice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1971). For an excellent introduction of the normative approaches to IR theory, see Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches. Third Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003). 27. NicholasRengger, "Political TheoryandInternational Relations: Promised Land orExit forEden?," International A ff airs, 76: 769, 2000. 28. YosefLapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospects ofInternational Relations Theory in a Positivists Era," p. 244. 29. See Steve Smith, Booth Ken, Zalewski, Marysia, eds. International Theory: Positivism & Beyond. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 30. ChristianHeinl! and Benno Teschke, "Sleeping Beauty and the Dialectical Awakening: On the Potential ofDialecticfor International Relations," Millennium: Journal o fInter national Studies, (1996), 25(2), pp. 399-423. 31. SeeAndrewLinklater, "The Changing Contours ofCritical International Relations The ory;" in RichardWyn Jones (ed.) Critical Theory and World Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynn Reinner Publishers); op. cit. The Transf ormation o f Political Community (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998). 32. See, e.g., Richard Ashley, "Living on Border Lines: Man, Post-structuralism, and War," in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds.), InternationallIntertextual Relations. (New York: Lexington, 1989). 33. Sylvester, Christine, "Empathetic Cooperation: A Feminist Method for IR," Millen nium: Journal o fInternational Relations, 23(2): 324-334, 1994. 34. Quoted in Bernstein, TheNew Constellation. p. 42. 35. Thomas Diez and Jill Steans, "A Useful Dialogue? Habermas and International Rela tions," Review o fInternational Studies, 31 (2005), 127.
- 30. Introduction: From Criticalto Critical lR Theory xxv 36. Andrew Linklater, "Dialogic Politics and the Civilising Process," Review o f Interna tional Studies 31(1) (January 2005): 141-154. 37. Jiirgen Haacke, "The Frankfurt School and International Relations: On the Centrality ofRecognition," Review o fInternational Studies 31(1) (January 2005): 189-194. 38. Fred Halliday, "The Future ofInternational Relations: Fears and Hopes," in Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (eds.) International Theory: Positivism & Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 318-327. 39. Christian Heine and Benno Teschke, "Sleeping Beauty and Dialectical Awakening: On the Potential of Dialectic for International Relations," Millennium: Journal o fInterna tional Studies, 24(2): 404-423, 1995. 40. Richard Wyn Jones (ed.) Critical Theory and W orldPolitics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001). 41. Richard Devetak, "The Project ofModernity and International Relations Theory," Mil lennium: Journal o fInternational Studies, 24(1): 48, 1995. 42. Andrew Linklater, "The Changing Contours of Critical International Relations The ory," in RichardWynJones (ed.) Critical Theory and World Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2001); p. 25.
- 32. Part I Abstract Universalismand the Critique of Reason
- 34. 1 The Roots ofCritical Theory German Idealism Introduction Thisfirst chapterfocuses on the foundations of critical theory (1800-1865). For many writers at this time, the events of the French Revolution (1789-1799) served as a reminder of the volatility of human passions, and the consequent failure to preserve the ideals offreedom,justice, equality, reason, rationality and solidarity. Here,I have included Kant's essays on the "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals" (1785), "The Metaphysics of Morals, Theory of Right (1797)" and "Idea for a Universal His tory with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784)," as well as selections from Hegel's The Phenomenology o fSpirit (1807) and The Philosophy ofRight (1821). Kant conceived politics in terms of the tension between human nature and the civil laws of the state (social contract). It was this antagonism that constituted man's asocialsociability, and represented, asKant states, "a great tendency to live as an indi vidual, to isolate himself since he also encounters in himself the unsocial characteris tic of wanting to direct everything in accordance with his own ideas."In his essay on "The Metaphysics of Morals," Kant theorized that civil society (Civilis-Communitas) reflected the balance of constitutional rules and state coercion, or "the harmoniza tion of public wills." Here he situated the moral autonomy of the individual (the self legislating individual) within the antinomies of practical (moral) and pure reason (universal), and experience and understanding.In this way, our understanding was not simply conditioned by passions (happiness and sympathy); it operated indepen dently of the passions, that is, through our reasoned capacity to act in accordance with universal maxims or imperatives. Following Kant, Hegel showed how this tension could be transcended through the absolutization of spirit. Here he conceptualized the dialectic in historical terms: as the unfolding of absolute freedom or the immanent reconciliation between reason and freedom (Aujhebung). In The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel theorized about the self's struggle to become conscious of itself through various stages or historical moments. The most important [stage] involved the struggle between Lordsman and Bondsman, in which the slave's or bondsman's struggle for freedom became a con crete metaphor for realizing the idea of freedom for and in itself.In The Philosophy of Right, the historical struggle entailed the movement through and ultimately beyond the civil society institutions of the German state to one in which the German state 3
- 35. 4 Critical Theoryand International Relations: A Reader would serve as the final concrete expression of the idea of freedom. For as Hegel notes, "the state is the actuality of the ethical Idea." Despite its profound and lasting influence, Hegel's theory of the state failed to take stock of the persistent tensions between changing societal realities and state power. In the end, Hegel's abstract idealism seemed to cast a veil between the social depriva tion of the workers and the economic practices of the bourgeoisie, whose exploitative practices contradicted the (bourgeois-controlled) state's role in preserving individual freedom. How these growing social and economic disparities drove the class struggle for freedom was as much a cognitive idea as it was a material one. It would be this material contradiction that would provide the basis of Marx's seminal analysis of historical materialism. Endnotes 1. Immanuel Kant, "Idea for Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Right", in Kant's Political Writings, Hans Reiss (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 45. 2. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy o fRight (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 155.
- 36. The Roots ofCritical Theory Immanuel Kant, Selection from Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals [Imperatives in General) 5 Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has the power to act in accordance with his idea of laws-that is, in accordance with prin ciples-and only so has he a will. Since reason is required in order to derive actions from laws, the will is nothing but practical reason. If reason infallibly determines the will, then in a being of this kind the actions which are recognized to be objectively necessary are also subjectively necessary-that is to say, the will is then a power to choose only that which reason independently of inclination recognizes to be practi cally necessary, that is, to be good. But if reason solely by itself is not sufficient to determine the will; if the will is exposed also to subjective conditions (certain impul sions) which do not always harmonize with the objective ones; if, in a word, the will is not in itself completely in accord with reason (as actually happens in the case of men); then actions which are recognized to be objectively necessary are subjectively contingent, and the determining of such a will in accordance with objective laws is necessitation. That is to say, the relation of objective laws to a will not good through and through is conceived as one in which the will of a rational being, although it is determined by principles of reason, does not necessarily follow these principles in virtue of its own nature. The conception of an objective principle so far as this principleisnecessitating for a will is called a command (of reason), and the formula of this command is called an Imperative. All imperatives are expressed by an 'ought' (Sol/en). By this they mark the rela tion of an objective law of reason to a will which is not necessarily determined by this law in virtue of its subjective constitution (the relation of necessitation). They say that something would be good to do or to leave undone; only they say it to a will which does not always do a thing because it has been informed that this is a good thing to do. The practicallygood is thatwhich determines the willby concepts of rea son, and therefore notby subjective causes, but objectively-that is, on grounds valid for every rational being as such. It is distinguished from thepleasant as that which influences the will, not as a principle of reason valid for every one, but solely through the medium of sensation by purely subjective causes valid only for the senses of this person or that. A perfectly good will would thus stand quite as much under objective laws (laws of the good), but it could not on this account be conceded as necessitated to act in conformity with law, since of itself, in accordance with its subjective constitution, it can be determined only by the concept of the good. Hence for thedivine will, and in general for a holy will, there are no imperatives: 'I ought' is here out of place, because 'I will' is already of itself necessarily in harmony with the law. Imperatives are in consequence only formulae for expressing the relation of objective laws of willing to
- 37. 6 Critical Theoryand International Relations: A Reader the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that rational being-for example, of the human will. [Classification of Imperatives] All imperatives command eitherhypothetically orcategorically. Hypotheticalimpera tives declare a possible action to be practically necessary as a means to the attain ment of somethingelse that one wills (or that one may will). A categoricalimperative would be one which represented an action as objectively necessaryinitself apartfrom its relation to a further end. Every practical law represents a possible action as good and therefore as necessary for a subject whose actions are determined by reason. Hence allimperatives are for mulae for determining an action whichis necessary in accordance with the principle of a will in some sense good. If the action would be good solely as a means to some thingelse, the imperative is hypothetical; if the action is represented as good in itself and therefore as necessary, in virtue of its principle, for a will which of itself accords with reason, then the imperative is categorical. An imperative therefore tells me which of my possible actions would be good; and it formulates a practical rule for a will that does not perform an actionstraightaway because the action is good-whether because the subject does not always know that it is good or because, even if he did know this, he might still act on maxims contrary to the ob jective principles of practical reason. A hypotheticalimperativethus says only that an actionis goodfor some purpose or other, eitherpossible oractual. Inthefirst case, itis aproblematic practicalprinciple; in the second case, an assertoric practical principle. A categorical imperative, which declares an action to be ob jectively necessary in itself without reference to some purpose-that is, even without any further end-ranks as an apodeictic practical principle. Everything that is possible only through the efforts of some rational being can be conceived as a possible purpose of some will; and consequently there are in fact innumerable principles of action so far as action is thought necessary in order to achieve some possible purpose which can be effected by it. All scienceshave a practi cal part consisting of problems which suppose that some endis possible for us and of imperatives which tell us how it is to be attained. Hence the latter can in general be called imperatives of skill. Here there is absolutely no question about the rationality or goodness of the end, but only about what must be done to attain it. A prescription required by a doctor in order to cure his man completely and one required by a poi soner in order to make sure of killing him are of equal value so far as each serves to effect its purpose perfectly. Since in early youth we do not know what ends may pres ent themselves to us in the course of life, parents seek above all to make their chil dren learn things ofmany kinds; they provide carefully for skill in the use of means to all sorts of arbitrary ends, none of which can they be certain that it could not in the future become an actual purpose of their ward, while it is alwayspossible that he might adopt it. Their care in this matter is so great that they commonly neglect on this account to form and correct the judgement of their children about the worth of the things which they might possibly adopt as ends.
- 38. f e 11 y e If :s d Y It y ,r Ie �s It n :t :0 i )f :y ,n i :0 s- 1- IS .n Ie on )f The Roots ofCritical Theory 7 There is, however, one end that can be presupposed as actual in all rational beings (so far as they are dependent beings to whom imperatives apply); and thus there is one purpose which they not only can have, but which we can assume with certainty that they all do have by a natural necessity-the purpose, namely, of happiness. A hypothetical imperative which affirms the practical necessity of an action as a means to the furtherance of happiness is assertoric. We may represent it, not simply as nec essary to an uncertain, merely possible purpose, but as necessary to a purpose which we can presuppose a priori and with certainty to be present in every man because it belongs to his very being. Now skillin the choice of means to one's own greatest well being can be called prudence in the narrowest sense. Thus an imperative concerned with the choice of means to one's own happiness-that is, a precept of prudence-still remains hypothetical: an action is commanded, not absolutely, but only as a means to a further purpose. Finally, there is an imperative which, without being based on, and conditioned by, any further purpose to be attained by a certain line of conduct, enjoins this conduct immediately. This imperative is categorical. It is concerned, not with the matter of the action and its presumed results, but with its form and with the principle from which it follows; and what is essentially good in the action consists in the mental disposition, let the consequences be what they may. Thisimperative may be called the imperative of morality. Willing in accordance with these three kinds of principle is also sharply distin gUished by a dissimilarity in the necessitation of the will. To make this dissimilarity obvious, we should,I think, name these kinds of principle most appropriately in their order if we said they were either rules of skill or counsels of prudence or commands (laws) of morality. For only law carries with it the concept of an unconditioned, and yet objective and so universally valid, necessity; and commands are laws which must be obeyed-that is, must be followed even against inclination. Counsel does indeed involve necessity, but necessity valid only under a subjective and contingent condi tion-namely, if this or that man counts this or that as belonging to his happiness. As against this, a categoricalimperative is limited by no condition and can quite pre cisely be called a command, as being absolutely, although practically, necessary. We could also callimperatives of the first kind technical (concerned with art); of the sec ond kindpragmatic (concerned with well-being); of the third kind moral (concerned with free conduct as such-that is, with morals). [How are Imperatives Possible?] The question now arises'How are all these imperatives possible?' This question does not ask how we can conceive the execution of an action commanded by theimpera tive, but merely how we can conceive the necessitation of the will expressed by the imperative in setting us a task. How an imperative of skill is possible requires no special discussion. Who wills the end, wills (so far as reason has decisive influence on his actions) also the means which are indispensably necessary and in his power. So far as willing is concerned, this propositionis analytic: for in my willing of an object as an effect, thereis already conceived the causality of myselfas an acting cause-that
- 39. 8 Critical Theoryand International Relations: A Reader is, the use of means; and from the concept of willing an end, the imperative merely extracts the concept of actions necessary to this end. (Synthetic propositions are required in order·to determine the means to a proposedend, buttheseare concerned, not with the reason for performing the act of will, but with the cause which produces the object.) That, in order to divide a line into two equal parts on a sure principle, I must from its ends describe two intersecting arcs-this is admittedly taught by math ematics only in synthetic propositions; but when I know that the aforesaid effect can be produced only by such an action, the proposition 'If I fully will the effect, I also will the action required for it' is analytic; for it is one and the same thing to conceive something as an effect possible in a certain way through me and to conceive myself as acting in the same way with respect to it. If it were only as easy to find a determinate concept of happiness, the imperatives of prudence would agree entirely with those of skill and would be equally analytic. For here as there it could alike be said 'Who wills the end, wills also (necessarily, if he accords with reason) the sole means which are in his power.' Unfortunately, how ever, the concept of happiness is so indeterminate a concept that although every man wants to attain happiness, he can never say definitely and in unison with himself what it really is that he wants and wills. The reason for this is that all the elements which belong to the concept of happiness are without exception empirical-that is, they must be borrowed from experience; but that none the less there is required for the Idea of happiness an absolute whole, a maximum of well-being in my present, and in every future, state. Now it is impossible for the most intelligent, and at the same time most powerful, but nevertheless finite, being to form here a determinate concept of what he really wills. Is it riches that he wants? How much anxiety, envy, and pestering might he not bring in this way on his own head! Is it knowledge and insight? This might perhaps merely give him an eye so sharp that it would make evils at presenthidden from him and yet unavoidable seem all the more frightful, or would add a load of still further needs to the desireswhich already give himtroubleenough. Is it long life? Who will guarantee that it would not be a long misery? Is it at least health? How often has infirmity of body kept a man fromexcessesinto which perfect health would have let him fal1!-and so on. In short, he has no principle by which he is able to decide with complete certainty what will make him truly happy, since for this he would require omniscience. Thus we cannot act on determinate principles in order to be happy, but only on empirical counsels, for example, of diet, frugality, politeness, reserve, and so on-things which experience shows contribute most to well-being on the average. From this it follows that imperatives of prudence, speaking strictly, do not command at all-that is, cannot exhibitactions objectively as practi cally necessary; that they are rather to be taken as recommendations(consilia), than as commands (praecepta), of reason; that the problem of determining certainly and universally what action will promote the happiness of a rational being is completely insoluble; and consequently that in regard to this, there is no imperative possible which in the strictest sense could command us to do what will make us happy, since happiness is an Ideal, not of reason, but of imagination-an Idea resting merely on empirical grounds, of which it is vain to expect that they should determine an action by which we could attain the totality of a series of consequences which is in fact
- 40. f f n If :s >, t, :e y, d ls id 11. st ct Ie lr es y, to Ig :i III Id Iy ,le ce In In lCt The Roots ofCritical Theory 9 infinite. Nevertheless, if we assume that the means to happiness could be discovered with certainty, this imperative of prudence would be an analytic practical proposi tion; for it differs from the imperative of skill only in this-that in the latter the end is merely possible, while in the former the end is given. In spite of this difference, sinceboth command solely the means to something assumed to be willed as an end, the imperative which commands him who wills the end to will the means is in both cases analytic. Thus there is likewise no difficulty in regard to the possibility of an imperative of prudence. Beyond all doubt, the question 'How is the imperative of morality possible?' is the only one in need of a solution; for it is in no way hypothetical, and consequently we cannot base the objective necessity which it affirms on any presupposition, as we can with hypothetical imperatives. Only we must never forget here that it is impossible to settle by an example, and so empirically, whether there is any imperative of this kind at all: we must rather suspect that all imperatives which seem to be categorical may none the less be covertly hypothetical. Take, for example, the saying 'Thou shalt make no false promises.' Let us assume that the necessity for this abstention is no mere advice for the avoidance of some further evil-as it might be said 'You ought not to make a lying promise lest, when this comes to light, you destroy your credit.' Let us hold, on the contrary, that an action of this kind must be considered as bad in itself, and that theimperativeof prohibition is therefore categorical. Even so, we can not with any certainty show by an example that the will is determined here solely by the law without any further motive, although it may appear to be so; for it is always possible that fear of disgrace, perhaps also hidden dread of other risks, may uncon sciously influence the will. Who can prove by experience that a cause is not present? Experience shows only that it is not perceived. In such a case, however, the so-called moral imperative, which as such appears to be categorical and unconditioned, would infact be onlya pragmatic prescription calling attention to our advantage andmerely bidding us take this into account. We shall thus have to investigate the possibility of a categorical imperative entirely apriori, since here we do not enjoy the advantage of having its reality given in expe rience and so of being obliged merely to explain, and not to establish, its possibility. So much, however, can be seen provisionally-that the categorical imperative alone purports to be a practicallaw, while all the rest may be calledprinciples of the will but not laws; for an action necessary merely in order to achieve an arbitrary purpose can be considered as in itself contingent, and we can always escape from the precept if we abandon the purpose; whereas an unconditioned command does not leave it open to the will to do the opposite at its discretion and therefore alone carries with it that necessity which we demand from a law. In the second place, with this categorical imperative or law of morality, the reason for our difficulty (in comprehending its possibility) is a very serious one. We have here a synthetiC apriori practical proposition; and since in theoretical knowledge there is so much difficulty in comprehending the possibility of propositions of this kind, it may readilybe gathered that in practical knowledge the difficulty will be no less.
- 41. 10 Critical Theoryand International Relations: A Reader [The Formula of Universal Law] In this task we wish first to enquire whether perhaps the mere concept of a categorical imperative may not also provide us with the formula containing the only proposi tion that can be a categoricalimperative; for even when we know the purport of such an absolute command, the question of its possibility will still require a special and troublesome effort, which we postpone to the final chapter. When I conceive a hypothetical imperative in general, I do not know beforehand what it will contain-until its condition is given. But if I conceive acategorical imper ative, I know at once what it contains. For since besides the law this imperative con tains only the necessity that our maxim should conform to this law, while the law, as we have seen, contains no condition to limit it, there remains nothing over to which the maxim has to conform except the universality of a law as such; and it is this con formity alone that the imperative properly asserts to be necessary. There is therefore only a single categorical imperative and it is this: 'Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a uni versal law.' Now if all imperatives of duty can be derived from this one imperative as their principle, then even although weleave it unsettled whether what we call duty may not be an empty concept, we shall still be able to show at least what we understand by it and what the concept means. [The Formula of the Law of Nature] Since the universality of the law governing the production of effects constitutes what is properly called nature in its most general sense (nature as regards its form)-that is, the existence of things so far as determined by universal laws-the universal impera tive of duty may also run asfollows: 'Actas ifthe maxim ofyouraction were to become throughyour will a universal law o fnature.' [Illustrations] We will now enumerate a few duties, following their customary division into duties towards self and duties towards others and into perfect and imperfect duties. 1. A man feels sick of life as the result of a series of misfortunes that has mounted to the point of despair, but he is still so far in possession of his reason as to ask himself whether taking his own life may not be contrary to his duty to himself. He now applies the test 'Can the maxim of my action really become a universal law of nature?' His maxim is 'From self-love I make it my principle to shorten my life if its continuance threatens more evil than it promises pleasure.' The onlyfurther question to ask is whether this principle of self-love can become a universal law of nature. It is then seen at once that a system of nature by whose law the very same feeling whose function (Bestimmung) is to stimulate the furtherance of life should actually destroy
- 42. The Roots ofCritical Theory 11 life would contradict itself and consequently could not subsist as a system of nature. Hence this maxim cannot possibly hold as a universal law of nature and is therefore entirely opposed to the supreme principle of all duty. 2. Another finds himself driven to borrowing money because of need. He well knows that he will not be able to pay it back; but he sees too that he will get no loan unless he gives a firm promise to pay it back within a fi xed time. He is inclined to make such a promise; but he has still enough conscience to ask 'Is it not unlawful and contrary to duty to get out of difficulties in this way?' Supposing, however, he did resolve to do so, the maxim of his action would run thus: 'WheneverI believe myself short of money, I will borrow money and promise to pay it back, though I know that this will never be done.' Now this principle of self-love or personal advantage is perhaps quite compatible with my own entire future welfare; only there remains the question 'Is it right?' I therefore transform the demand of self-love into a universal law and frame my question thus: 'How would things stand if my maxim became a universal law?'I then see straight away that this maxim can never rank as a universal law of nature and be self-consistent, but must necessarily cont radict itself. For the universality of a law that every one believing himself to be in need can make any promise he pleases with the intention not to keep it would make promising, and the very purpose ofpromising, itself impossible, since no one would believe he wasbeing promised anything, but would laugh at utterances of this kind as empty shams. 3. A third finds in himself a talent whose cultivation would make him a useful man for all sorts of purposes. But he seeshimself in comfortable circumstances, and he pre fersto give himself upto pleasure ratherthan to bother about increasing and improving hisfortunate natural aptitudes. Yet he asks himself further 'Does my maxim of neglect ing my natural gifts, besides agreeing in itself with my tendency to indulgence, agree also with what is called duty?' He then seesthat a system of nature could indeed always subsist under such a universal law, although (like the South SeaIslanders) every man shouldlet histalents rust andshouldbe bent on devoting hislifesolelyto idleness, indul gence ' procreation, and, in a word, to enjoyment. Only he cannot possibly willthat this should become a universal law of nature or should be implanted in us as such a law by a natural instinct. For as a rational being henecessarily willsthat all his powersshouldbe developed, since theyservehim, andaregiven him, for all sortsof possible ends. 4. Yet af ourth is himself flourishing, but he sees others who have to struggle with great hardships(and whom he could easilyhelp); and he thinks 'What doesit matterto me? Let everyone beashappyasHeaven wills orashecan make himself;I won't deprive him of anything;I won't even envy him; onlyI have no wish to contribute anythingto his well-being orto his support in distress!' Now admittedly if such an attitude were a universal law of nature, mankind could get on perfectly well-better no doubt than if everybody prates about sympathy and goodwill, and even takes pains, on occasion, to practise them, but onthe other hand cheats where he can, traffics in human rights, or violates them in other ways. But although it is possible that a universal law of nature could subsist in harmony with this maxim, yet it is impossible to willthat such a prin ciple should hold everywhere as a law of nature. For a will which decided in this way would be in conflict with itself, since many a situation might arise in which the man needed love andsympathy from others, and in which, by such a law of nature sprung from his own will, he would rob himself of all hope ofthe help he wants for himself.
- 43. 12 Critical Theoryand International Relations: A Reader [The Formula of Autonomy] This principle of humanity, and in general of every rational agent, as an end in itself (a principle which is the supreme limitingcondition of every man's freedom of action) is not borrowed from experience; firstly, because it is universal, applying as it does to all rational beings as such, and no experience is adequate to determine universality; secondly, because in it humanity is conceived, not as an end of man (subjectively) that is, as an object which, as a matter of fact, happens to be made an end-but as an objective end-one which, be our ends what they may, must, as a law, constitute the supreme limiting condition of all subjective ends and so must spring from pure rea son. That is to say, the ground for every enactment of practical law lies objectively in the rule and in the form of universality which (according to our first principle) makes the rule capable of being a law (and indeed a law of nature); subjectively, however, it lies in the end; but(according to our second principle) the subject of all ends is tobe found in every rational being as an end in himself. From this there now follows our third practical principle for the will-as the supreme condition of the will's confor mity with universal practical reason-namely, the Idea ofthe will o f every rational beingas a will which makes universal law. By this principle all maxims are repudiated which cannot accord with the will's own enactment of universal law. The will is therefore not merely subject to the law, but is so subject that it must be considered as also making the law for itself and precisely on this account asfirst of all subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author). [The Exclusion of Interest] Imperatives as formulated above-namely, the imperative enjoining conformity of actions to universal law on the analogy of a natural order and that enjoining the uni versal supremacy of rationalbeings in themselves as ends- did, by the mere fact that they were represented as categorical, exclude from their sovereign authority every admixture of interest as a motive. They were, however, merelyassumed to be categori calbecause we were bound to make this assumption if we wished to explain the con cept of duty. That there were practical propositions which commanded categorically could not itself be proved, any more than it can be proved in this chapter generally; but one thing could have been done-namely, to show that in willing for the sake of duty renunciation of all interest, as the specific mark distinguishing a categorical from a hypotheticalimperative, was expressed in the very imperativeitselfby means of some determination inherent in it. This is whatis done in the present third formu lation of the principle-namely, in theIdea of the will of every rationalbeing asa will which makes universal law. Once we conceive a will of this kind, it becomes clear that while a will which is subject to law may be bound to this law by some interest, nevertheless a will which is itself a supreme lawgiver cannot possibly as such depend on any interest; for a will which is dependent in this way would itself require yet a further law in order to restrict the interest of self-love to the condition that thisinterest shoulditself be valid as a universal law.
- 44. f ) � e n ,0 is Jf i at ry 'i � Iy y; of al ns u- ill is ch a to id The Roots ofCritical Theory 13 Thus theprinciple that every human will is a will which by all its maxims enacts universal law-provided only that it were right in other ways-would be well suited to be a categorical imperative in this respect: that precisely because of the Idea of making universal law, it is based on no interest and consequently can alone among all possible imperatives be unconditioned, Or better still-to convert the proposition-if there is a categorical imperative (that is, a law for the will of every rational being), it can command us only to act always on the maxim of such a will in us as can at the same time look upon itself as making universal law; for only then is the practical principle and the imperative which we obey unconditioned, since it is wholly impos sible for it to be based on any interest. We need not now wonder, when we look back upon all the previous efforts that have been made to discover the principle of morality, why they have one and all been bound to fail. Their authors saw man as tied to laws by his duty, but it never occurred to them that he is subj ect only to laws which are made by himselfand yet are univer sal, and that he is bound only to act in conformity with a will which is his own but has as nature's purpose for it the function of making universal law, For when they thoughtof man merely as subject to a law (whatever it might be) , the law had to carry withit someinterest in order to attract or compel, because it did not spring as a law from his own will: in order to conform with the law, his will had to be necessitated by somethingelse to act in a certain way, This absolutely inevitable conclusion meant that all the labour spent in trying to find a supreme principle of duty was lost beyond recall; for what they discovered wasnever duty, but only thenecessity of acting from a certain interest, This interest might be one's own or another's; but on such a view the imperative wasbound to be always a conditioned one and could not possibly serveas a moral law.I will therefore call my principle the principle of theAutonomy of the will in contrast with all others, whichI consequently class under Heteronomy. [The Formula of the Kingdom of Ends] The concept of every rational being as one who must regard himself as making universal law by, all the maxims of his will, and must seek to judge himself and his actions from this point of view, leads to a closely connected and very fruitful concept-namely, that of a kingdom ofends. I understand by a 'kingdom' a systematic union of different rational beings under common laws. Now since laws determine ends as regards their universal validity, we shall be able-if we abstract from the personal differences between rational beings, and also from all the content of their private ends-to conceive a whole of all ends in systematic conjunction (a whole both of rational beings as ends in themselves and also of the personal ends which each may set before himself ); that is, we shallbe able to con ceive a kingdom of ends which is possible in accordance with the above principles. For rational beings all stand under the law that each of them should treat himself and all others, never merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end in him self. But by so doing there arises a systematic union of rational beings under common objective laws-that is, a kingdom. Since these laws are directed precisely to the rela tion of such beings to one another as ends and means, this kingdom can be called a kingdom of ends (which is admittedly only anIdeal).
- 45. 1 4 CriticalTheory and International Relations: A Reader A rational being belongs to the kingdom of ends as a member, when, although he makes its universal laws, he is alsohimselfsubject to these laws. He belongs to it as its head, when as the maker of laws, he ishimself subject to the will of no other. A rational being must alwaysregard himself as making laws in a kingdom of ends which is possible through freedom of the will-whether it be as member or as head. The position of the latter he can maintain, not in virtue of the maxim of his will alone, but only if he is a completely independent being, without needs and with an unlimited power adequate to his will. Thus, morality consists in therelation of all action to the making of laws whereby alone a kingdom of ends is possible. This making of laws must be found in every rational being himself and must be able to spring from his will. The principle of his will is therefore never to perform an action except on a maxim such as can also be a universal law, and consequently such that the will can regarditselfas at the same time makinguniversal law by means ofits maxim. Where maxims arc not already by their very nature in harmony with this objective principle of rational beings as makers of universal law, the necessity of acting on this principle is practical necessitation-that is, duty. Duty does not apply to the head in a kingdom of ends, but it does apply to every member and to all members in equal measure. Thepractical necessity ofacting on this principles-thatis, duty-isin no way based on feelings, impulses, and inclinations, but only on the relation of rational beings to one another, a relation in which the will ofa rational being must always beregarded as makinguniversal law, because otherwise he could not be conceived as an end in him self Reason thus relates every maxim of the will, considered as making universal law, to every other will and also to every action towards oneself: it does so, not because of any further motive or future advantage, but from the Idea of the dignity of a rational being who obeys no law other than that which he at the same time enacts himself. [The Dignity of Virtue] In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a dignity. If it has a price, something else can be put in its place as an equivalent; if it is exalted above all price and so admits of no equivalent, then it has a dignity. What is relative to universal human inclinations and needs has a market price; what, even without presupposing a need, accords with a certain taste-that is, with satisfaction in the mere purposeless play of our mental powers-has af ancy price (Affektionspreis); but that which constitutes the sole condition under which anything can be an end in itself has not merely a relative value-that is, a price-but has an intrinsic value-that is, dignity. Now morality is the only condition under which a rational being can be an end in himself; for only through thisisit possible to be a law-making member in a kingdom of ends. Thereforemorality, andhumanity sofar asit is capable ofmorality, is the only thing which has dignity. Skill and diligence in work have a market price; wit, lively imagination, and humour have a fancy price; but fidelity to promises and kindness based on principle (not on instinct) have an intrinsic worth. In default of these, nature and art alike contain nothing to put in their place; for their worth consists, not in the
- 46. r f r, ,f ,1 :e e; h :e .g n n n ly ly 5S ,e Ie The Roots ofCritical Theory 15 effects which result fromthem, not inthe advantage or profit they produce, but inthe attitudes of mind-that is, inthe maxims of the will-which are ready in this way to manifest themselves in action even if they are not favoured by success. Such actions too need norecommendationfrom any subjective disposition or tastein orderto meet with immediate favour and approval; they need no immediate propensity or feeling for themselves; they exhibit the will which performs them as an object of immediate reverence; nor is anything other than reason required to impose them upon the will, not to coax them from the will-which last would anyhow be a contradiction in the case of duties. This assessment reveals as dignity the value of such a mental attitude and puts it infinitely above all price, with which it cannot be brought into reckoning or comparison without, as it were, a profanation of its sanctity. What is it then that entitles a morally good attitude of mind-or virtue-to make claims so high?It is nothing less than the share which it affords to a rational being in themakingo funiversal law, and whichtherefore fits himto be a member in a possible kingdom of ends. For this he was already marked out in virtue of his own proper nature as an end in himself and consequently as a maker oflaws in the kingdom of ends-as free inrespect of all laws of nature, obeying only thoselaws which he makes himself and in virtue of which his maxims can havetheir part in the making of uni versal l aw (to which he at the same time subjects himself). For nothing can have a value other than that determined for it by the l aw. But the l aw-making which deter mines all value must for this reason have a dignity-that is, an unconditioned and incomparable worth-for the appreciation ofwhich, as necessarily given by a rational being, the word 'reverence' is the only becoming expression. Autonomy is therefore the ground ofthe dignity of human nature and of every rational nature. Immanuel Kant, Selection from The Metaphysics of Morals Introduction to the Theory of Right §A Definition of the Theory of Right The sumtotal ofthoselawswhich can be incorporatedin external legislation istermed the theory o fright (Jus).Iflegislation ofthis kind actually exists, the theory is one of positive right.If a person who is conversant with it or has studied it (Juriconsultus) is acquainted with the external laws in their external function, i.e., in their application to instances encounteredin experience, he is saidto be experienced in matters o fright (lurisperitus). This body of theory may amount to the same asjurisprudence (Juris prudentia), but it will remain only the science of right (Iuriscientia) unless both its elements are present. The l atter designation applies to a systematic knowledge of the theory of natural right (Ius naturae), although it is the student of natural right who has to supply the immutable principles on which all positive legislation must rest.
- 47. 16 Critical Theoryand International Relations: A Reader §B What is Right? Thejurist, if he does not wish to lapseinto tautology or to base his answer on the laws of a particular country at a particular time instead of offering a comprehensive solu tion, may well be just as perplexed on being asked this as the logician is by the notorious question: 'What is truth?' He will certainly be able to tell us what is legally right (quid sit iuris) within a given context, i.e., what the laws say orhave said in a particular place and at a particular time: but whether their provisions are alsoin keeping with right, and whether they constitute a universal criterionbywhich we may recognisein general what is right and whatis unjust(iustum et iniustum), are questionswhose answers will remain concealed from him unless he abandonssuch empirical principles for a time andlooks for the sources of these judgements in the realm of purereason. This will enablehim to lay the foundations of all possible positive legislations. And while empirical laws may give him valuable guidance, a purely empirical theory ofright, like the wooden head in Phaedrus' fable, may have a fine appearance, but will unfortunately contain no brain. The concept of right, in so far as it is connected with a corresponding obligation (i.e., the moral concept of right), applies within the following conditions. Firstly, it applies only to those relationships between one person and another which are both external and practical, that is, in so far as their actions can in fact influence each other either directly or indirectly. But secondly, it does not concern the relationship between the will of one person and the desires of another (and hence only the latter's needs, as in acts of benevolence or hardheartedness); it concerns only the relationship between the will of the first and the will of the second. And thirdly, the will's material aspect, i.e., the end which each party intends to accomplish by means of the object of his will, is completely irrelevant in this mutual relationship; for example, we need not ask whether someone who buys goods from me for his own commercial use will gain anything in the process. For we are interested only in theform of the relation ship between the two wills, in so far as they are regarded asfree, and in whether the action of one of the two parties can be reconciled with the freedom of the other in accordance with a universal law. Right is therefore the sum total of those conditions within which the will of one person can be reconciled with the will of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom. §C The Universal Principle of Right 'Every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual's will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right.' Thus if my action or my situation in general can co-exist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law, anyone who hinders me in either does me an injustice; for this hindrance or resistance cannot co-exist with freedom in accordance with universal laws. It also followsfrom this thatI cannot be required to make this principle of all max ims my own maxim, i.e., to make it the maxim ofmy own actions; for each individual
- 48. The Roots ofCritical Theory 1 7 can be free s o long as I d o not interfere with his freedom by my external actions, even although his freedom may be a matter of total indifference to me or althoughI may wish in my heart to deprive him of it. ThatI should make it my maxim to act in accordance with right is a requirement laid down for me by ethics. Thus the universal law of right is as follows: let your external actions be such that the free application ofyour will can co-exist with the freedom of everyone in accor dance with a universal law. And although this law imposes an obligation on me, it does not mean thatI am in any way expected, far less required, to restrictmy freedom myselfto these conditions purely for the sake of this obligation. On the contrary, rea son merely says that individual freedom is restricted in this way by virtue of the idea behind it, and that it may also be actively restricted by others; and it states this as a postulate which does not admit of any further proof. If it is not our intention to teach virtue, but only to state what is right, we may not and should not ourselves represent this law ofright as a possible motive for actions. §D Right Entails the Authority to Use Coercion Any resistance which counteracts the hindrance of an effect helps to promote this effect and is consonant with it. Now everything that is contrary to right is a hin drance to freedom based on universal laws, while coercion is a hindrance or resis tance to freedom. Consequently, if a certain use to which freedom is put is itself a hindrance to freedom in accordance with universal laws (i.e., if it is contrary to right) , any coercion which is used against it will be a hindrance to a hindrance o ffreedom, and will thus be consonant with freedom in accordance with universal laws-that is, it will be right.It thus follows by the law of contradiction that right entails the author ity to apply coercion to anyone who infringes it. §E In its 'strict'Sense, Right can also be envisaged as the Possibilit y o fageneral and reCiprocal Coer cion consonant with the Freedom o fEveryone in accordance with Universal Laws This proposition implies that we should not conceive of right as being composed of two elements, namely, the obligation imposed by a law, and the authority which someone who obligates another party through his will possesses to coerce the lat ter into carrying out the obligation in question. Instead, the concept of right should be seen as consisting immediately of the possibility of universal reCiprocal coercion being combined with the freedom of everyone. For j ust as the only obj ect of right in general is the external aspect of actions, right in its strict sense, i.e., right unmixed with any ethical considerations, requires no determinants of the will apart from purely external ones; for it will then be pure and will not be confounded with any precepts of virtue. Thus only a completely external right can be called right in the strict (or narrow) sense. This right is certainly based on each individual's awareness of his obligations within the law; but if it is to remain pure, it may not and cannot
- 49. 1 8 CriticalTheory and International Relations: A Reader appeal to this awareness as a motive which might determine the will to act in accor dance with it, and it therefore depends rather on the principle of the possibility of an external coercion which can coexist with thefreedom of everyonein accordance with universal laws. Thus when it is said that a creditor has a right to require the debtor to pay his debt, it does not mean that he can make the latter feel that his reason itself obliges him to act in this way. It means instead that the use of coercion to compel everyoneto do this can very well be reconciled with everyone's freedom, hence, also with the debtor's freedom, in accordance with a universal external law: thus right and the authority to apply coercion mean one and the same thing. The law of reciprocal coercion, which is necessarily consonant with the freedom of everyone within the principle of universal freedom, is in a sense the construction of the concept ofright: that is, it represents this concept in pure a priori intuition by analogy with the possibility of free movement of bodies within the law oftheequality ofaction and reaction. Just as the qualities of an object of pure mathematics cannot be directly deduced from the concept but can only be discovered from its construc tion, it is not so much th� concept ofright butrather a general, reciprocal and uniform coercion, subject to universal laws and harmonising with the concept itself, which makes any representation of the concept possible. But while this concept of dynamics (Le., that of theequality of action andreaction) is based upon a purelyformal concept of pure mathematics (e.g., of geometry), reason has taken care that the understanding is likewise as fully equipped as possible with a priori intuitionsfor the construction of the concept of right. In geometry, the term 'right' (rectum), in the sense of 'straight,' can be used either as the opposite of 'curved' or of 'oblique.' In the first sense, it applies to a line whose intrinsic nature is such that there can be only one of its kind between two given points. But in the second sense, it applies to an angle between two intersecting or coincident lines whose nature is such that there can be only one of its kind (a right angle) between the givenlines. The perpendicUlar line which forms a right angle will not incline more to one side than to the other, and will divide the area on either side of it into two equal parts. By this analogy, the theory of right will also seek an assur ance that each individual receives (with mathematical precision) what is his due. This cannot be expected of ethics, however, for it cannot refuse to allow some room for exceptions (latitudinem). (Editor's Note: Kant then adds some remarks on "equivocal right." He does not mean right in the strict sense, but in the wider sense of the word. Only two aspects of right arise here: equity and the right of necessity. Kant remarks of equity that it concerns only such cases as are outside strict right, Le., where there is no case in law at all. The right of necessity applies to cases where one acts against someone else (for instance, by taking someone else's life because one's own life is in danger). A man cannot be punished with any greater punishment than the loss of life itself. There can be therefore no law punishing a man who acts out of necessity. Kant explains the division of the theory of right into private and publicright. He also distinguishes between innate and acquired rights. In his view, freedom (Le., independence from the coercive will of another), in so far as it can co-exist with the freedom of everyone
- 50. s ,t e ,t s it " n 'e .s 's n e The Roots ofCritical Theory 1 9 else in accordance with a universal law, is the sole original right. It belongs to every man by virtue of his humanity. Equality, honesty, and the right to act towards others in such a way that their rights are not infringed all derive from this right offreedom. Kant also provides a general division of the metaphysics of morals, distinguishing between those duties which are duties ofright and those which are duties ofvirtue. In the first section of The Metaphysical Elements ofRight, Kant deals with private right which is concerned with property. There are two kinds of property: property which one possesses directly through phYSical possession and property which one only pos sessesindirectly. Kant examines the philosophical foundations of thelaw ofproperty, deducing it from the idea of original communal possession of the soil. He also argues that external possession of things of which we are not in phYSical possession is pos sible only because we are noumenal beings, not necessarily bound by the limits of mere empirical (phenomenal) possessions. Kant goes on to argue that external pos sessions are possible only in a state of civil society, whereas, in a state ofnature, such possession can have only a provisional character. Subsequently, Kant deals with the right of acquiring things and with various other rights, such as the rights of persons, marriage, parentage, landlords, contract, money, books, inheritance, etc. His discus sion of the theory of private right is followed by a discussion of the theory of public right, which is printed below.) The Theory of Right, Part II: Public Right Section I: Political Right §43 Public right is the sum total ofthoselawswhichrequire to be made universally public in order to produce a state of right. Itis therefore a system oflawsfor a people, i.e. , an aggregate of human beings, or for an aggregate of peoples. Since these individuals or peoples must influence one another, they need to live in a state of right under a unify ing will: that is, they require a constitution in order to enjoy their rights. A condition in which the individual members ofa people are related to each other in this way is said to be a civil one (status civilis), and when considered as a whole in relation to its own members, it is calleda state (civitas). Since the state takes the form ofa union created by the common interest of everyone in living in a state of right, it is called a commonwealth (respublica latius sic dicta). In relation to other peoples, how ever, itis simply called apower(potentia-hence the word'potentate'); andifit claims to be united by heredity, it may also call itself a congeneric nation (gens). Within the general concept of public right, we must therefore include not onlypolitical right but also international right (iusgentium). And since the earth's surface is not infinite but limited by its own configuration, these two concepts taken together necessarily lead to the idea of an international political right (ius gentium) or a cosmopolitan right (ius cosmopoliticum). Consequently, if even only one of these three possible forms of rightful state lacks a principle which limits external freedom by means oflaws, the structure of all the rest must inevitably be undermined, and finally collapse.
- 51. 20 Critical Theoryand International Relations: A Reader §44 Experience teaches usthe maxim that human beings act in a violent andmalevolent manner, andthat they tend to fight among themselves until an external coercivelegis lation supervenes. But it is not experience or any kind of factual knowledge which makes public legal coercion necessary. On the contrary, even if we imagine men to be as benevolent and law-abiding as we please, the a priori rational idea of a non-lawful state will stilltei! usthat before a publicand legal state is established, individualmen, peoples and states cannever be secureagainst acts ofviolencefrom one another, since each will have his own right to do what seems right andgood to him, independently of the opinion of others. Thus the first decision the individual is obliged to make, if he does not wish to renounce all concepts of right, will be to adopt the principle that one must abandon the state of nature in which everyone follows his own desires, and unite with everyone else (with whom he cannot avoid having intercourse) in order to submit to external, public and lawful coercion. He must accordingly enter into a state whereinthat which is to be recognised as belonging to each person is allotted to him by law and guaranteed to him by an adequate power (which is not his own, but exter nal to him). In other words, he should at all costs enter into a state of civil society. The state of nature need not necessarily be a state of injustice (iniustus) merely because those who live in it treat one another solely in terms of the amount of power they possess. But it is a state devoid ofjustice (status iustitia vacuus), for if a dispute over rights (ius controversum) occurs in it, there is no competent judge to pronounce legally valid decisions. Anyonemaythus use force to impelthe othersto abandon this state for a state of right. For although each individual's concepts ofright may imply that an external object can be acquired by occupation or by contract, this acquisi tion is only provisional until it has been sanctioned by a public law, since it is not determined by any public (distributive) form of justice and is not guaranteed by any institution empowered to exercise this right. If no-one were willing to recognise any acquisition asrightful, not even provision ally so, before a civil state had been established, the civil state would itself be impos sible. For in relation to their form, the laws relating to property contain exactly the same things in a state of nature asthey would prescribe in a civil state, in so far as we conceive of this state only in terms of concepts of pure reason. The only difference is that in the second case, the conditions under which the laws are applied (in accor dance with distributive justice) are given. Thus if there were not even aprovisional system of external property in the state of nature, there would not be any rightful duties in it either, so that there couldnot be any commandment to abandon it. §45 A state (civitas) is a union of an aggregate of men under rightful laws. In so far as these laws are necessary a priori and follow automatically from concepts of external right in general (and are not just set up by statute) , the form of the state will be that of a state in the absolute sense, i. e., as the idea of what a state ought to be according
- 52. 1 e 1 l, e Y if It d o :e n ly �r te :e is ly i )t Iy 1- s- 1e �e is ,r- al ul The Roots ofCritical Theory 21 to pure principles of right. This idea can serve as an internal gUide (norma) for every actual case where men unite to form a commonwealth. Every state contains three powers, i.e., the universally united will is made up of three separate persons (triaspolitical. These are the rulingpower (or sovereignty) in the person of the legislator, the executivepower in the person of the individual who governs in accordance with the law, and thejudicialpower (which allots to everyone what is his by law) in the person of thejudge (potestas legislatoria, rectoria et iudicia ria). They can be likened to the three propositions in a practical operation of reason: the major premise, which contains the law of the sovereign will, the minor premise, which contains the command to act in accordance with the law (Le., the principle of subsumption under the general will), and the conclusion, which contains the legal decision (the sentence) as to the rights and wrongs of each particular case. §46 The legislative power can belong only to the united will of the people. For since all rightissupposed to emanatefrom this power, thelaws it givesmust beabsolutelyinca pable of doing anyone an injustice. Now if someone makes dispositions for another person, it is always possible that he may thereby do him an inj ustice, although this is never possible in the case of decisions he makes for himself (for volenti nonfit iniu ria). Thus only the unanimous and combined will of everyone whereby each decides the samefor all and all decide the same for each-in other words, the general united wHl of the people-can legislate. The members of such a society (societas civilis) or state who unite for the purpose oflegislating are known ascitizens (cives), and the three rightful attributes which are inseparable from the nature of a citizen as such are as follows: firstly, lawfulfreedom to obey no law other than that to which he has given his consent; secondly, civil equality in recognising no-one among the people as superior to himself, unless it be someone whom he is just as morally entitled to bind by law as the other is to bind him; and thirdly, the attribute of civil independence which allows him to owe his exis tence and sustenance not to the arbitrary will of anyone else among the people, but purely to his own rights and powers as a member of the commonwealth (so that he may not, as a civil personality, be represented by anyone else in matters of right). Fitness to vote is the necessary qualification which every citizen must possess. To be fit to vote, a person must have an independent position among the people. He must therefore be not j ust a part of the commonwealth, but a member of it, i.e., he must by his own free will actively participate in a community of other people. But thislatter quality makes it necessary to distinguish between the active and thepassive citizen, although the latter concept seems to contradict the definition of the concept of a citizen altogether. The following examples may serve to overcome this difficulty. Apprentices to merchants or tradesmen, servants who are not employed by the state, minors (naturaliter vel civiliter), women in general and all those who are obliged to dependfor their living (i.e., for food and protection) on the offices ofothers (exclud ing the state) -all of these people have no civil personality, and their existence is, so to speak, purely inherent. The woodcutter whom I employ on my premises; the
- 53. 22 Critical Theoryand International Relations: A Reader blacksmith in India who goes from house to house with his hammer, anvil and bel lows to do work with iron, as opposed to the European carpenter or smith who can put the products of his work up for public sale; the domestic tutor as opposed to the academic, the tithe-holder as opposed to the farmer; and so on-they are all mere auxiliaries to the commonwealth, for they have to receive orders or protection from other individuals, so that they do not possess civil independence. This dependence upon the will of others and consequent inequality does not, how ever, in any way conflict with the freedom and equality of all men as human beings who together eonstitute a people. On the contrary, it is only by accepting these condi tions that such a people can become a state and enter into a civil constitution. But all arenot equally qualified within thisconstitution to possess the right to vote, Le., to be citizens and not j ust subjects among other subjects. For from the fact that as passive members of the state, they can demand to be treated by all others in accordance with laws of natural freedom and equality, it does not follow that they also have a right to influence or organise the state itself asactive members, or to co-operate in introduc ing particular laws. Instead, it only means that the positive laws to which the voters agree, of whatever sort they may be, must not be at variance with the natural laws of freedom and with the corresponding equality of all members of the people whereby they are allowed to work their way up from their passive condition to an active one. §47 All of the three powers within the state are dignities, and since they necessarily fol low from the general idea of a state as elements essentialfor its establishment (con stitution), they arepolitical dignities. They involve a relationship between a universal sovereign (who, if considered in the light of laws of freedom, can be none other than the united people itself) and the scattered mass of the people as subjects, Le., a rela tionship of commander (imperans) to him whoobeys (subditus). The act by which the people constitutes a state for itself, or more precisely, the mere idea of such an act (which alone enables us to consider it valid in terms of right), is theoriginal contract. By this contract, all members of the people (omnes et singuli) give up their external freedom in order to receive it back at once asmembers of a commonwealth, i.e., of the people regarded as a state (universi). And we cannot say that men within a state have sacrificed a part of their inborn external freedom for a specific purpose; they have in fact completely abandoned their wild and lawless freedom, in order to find again their entire and undiminished freedom in a state of lawful dependence (Le., in a state of right), for this dependence is created by their own legislative will. §48 The three powers in the state are related to one another in the follOWing ways. Firstly, as moral persons, they are co-ordinate (potestates coordinatae), Le., each is comple mentary to the others in forming the complete constitution of the state (complemen tum ad sufficientiam). But secondly, they are also subordinate (subordinatae) to one
- 54. 11 e e 11 �s II e e h. o 's ,f Y 11 e :t t. II e e e 1 e The Roots ofCritical Theory 23 another, so that the one cannot usurp any function of the others to which it minis ters; for each has its own principle, so that although it issues orders in the quality of a distinct person, it does so under the condition of a superior person's will. Thirdly, the combination of both relationships described above assures every subject of his rights. It can be saidofthese powers, considered in their appropriate dignity, that thewill of the legislator (legislatoris) in relation to external property cannot be reproached (i.e., it is irreprehensible), that the executive power of the supremeruler (summi recto ris) cannot be opposed (i.e., it is irresistible), and that the verdict of the supremejudge (supremi iudicis) cannot be altered (i.e., it is without appeal). §49 The ruler of the state (rex, princeps) is that moral or physical person who wields the executive power (potestas executoria). He is the agent of the state who appoints the magistrates, and who prescribes rules for the people so that each may acquire some thing or retain what is his by law (i.e., by subsuming individual cases under the law). If the ruler is taken to be a moral person, he is called the directory or government. Hiscommands to the people, the magistrates, and their superiors (ministers) who are responsible for administering the state (gubernatio), are not laws but ordinances or decrees; for they depend upon decisions in particular cases and are issued subject to revision. Agovernment which were also to make laws would be called a despotic as opposed to apatriotic government. This is not to be confused with apaternal govern ment (regimen paternale); the latter is the most despotic kind of all, for it treats the citizens like children. A patriotic government (regimen civitatis et patriae) means that although the stateitself(civitas) treats its subjects as if they weremembers of one family, it also treats them as citizens of the state, i.e., in accordance with laws guar anteeing their own independence. Thus each is responsible for himself and does not depend upon the absolute will of anyone equal or superior to him. The sovereign of the people (the legislator) cannot therefore also be the ruler, for the ruler is subject to the law, through which he is consequently beholden to another party, i.e., the sovereign. The sovereign may divest the ruler of his power, depose him, or reform his administration, but he cannot punish him. (And that is the real meaning of the common English saying that the king-Le., the supreme executive authority-can do no wrong.) For to punish the ruler would in turn be an act of the executive power, which alone possesses the supreme authority to apply coercion in accordance with the law, and such a punishment would mean subj ecting the execu tive power itself to coercion, which is self-contradictory. Finally, neither the sovereign nor the ruler may pass judgement; they can only appoint judges as magistrates. The people judge themselves, through those fellow citizens whom they have nominated as their representatives, by free election, for each particular juridical act. For a legal decision or sentence is a particular act of public justice (iustitiae distributivae) by an administrator of the state (a judge or court of law) upon a subject; i.e., one who belongs to the people, and it does not carry the necessary authority to grant or assign to the subject that which is his. Now since each
- 55. Exploring the Varietyof Random Documents with Different Content
- 56. Hot-House. JUNE AND JULY. Asthe plants of the Hot-house are all exposed to the open air, the directions will include both months. If the repotting is over, as recommended last month, all the attention they will require until the end of August, is the administering of water at the roots, and by the syringe over head. It will be impossible to say how great are their wants, that depending entirely upon the nature of the plant, the situation, and the season; but never neglect to look over them every evening, and after very dry nights they will need a fresh supply in the morning, observing to give to none except they are becoming a little dry. Make weekly examinations for insects of any description, and when they appear, have them instantly destroyed. Always after heavy rains look over the pots, in case water should be standing in them, which would injure the roots. Where any is found, turn the pot on its side, and in a few hours examine the draining which is defective; small pots in continued rains should be turned likewise. Tie up all plants and shoots to prevent them from being destroyed by the wind, and be attentive to pick all weeds from the pots. Turn round all the plants occasionally, to prevent them from being drawn to one side by the sun or light.
- 57. Green-House. JUNE AND JULY. Theplants being out of the house, there need be little added under this head. Their treatment is in the general, and the required attention is in giving water according to their different constitutions and habits. Where there are not rain or river water, it should stand at least one day in butts or cisterns, to take the chilly air from it, and become softened by the surrounding atmosphere. This is more essential to the health of the plants than is generally supposed. The small plants in dry weather will need water evening and morning. Continue regular syringings as directed last month. There are frequently rains continuing for several days, which will materially injure many plants, if they are not turned on their sides until the rain is over, especially small plants. The syringings should never be done till after the waterings at the roots, and they should never be seldomer than every alternate evening. Turn all the plants frequently to prevent them from being drawn to one side by the sun or light. Carefully look over them at these turnings, to detect any insects. And observe that the tuberose rooted geraniums, such as Ardéns, Bicòlor, Trístum, &c. are not getting too much water, they being now dormant.
- 58. Flower Garden. JUNE ANDJULY. HOLLAND BULBS. The lifting of these will be general in June. For directions see May. It is not advisable to take up Jonquils, Fritillària, Crocus, and Iris, oftener than every alternate year; Jonquils may stand three years. Anemones and Ranunculus should be carefully lifted after their leaves begin to fade. Do not expose them to the sun, but cover slightly with earth or sand until they are perfectly dry, when they may be sifted out of the earth, and put into drawers carefully labeled. Some recommend to soak these roots in soap-suds, to destroy a worm that they are frequently attacked with. We know not how far this may be carried, nor the good or bad effects, never having practised it. AUTUMN FLOWERING BULBS. These are Amaryllis lùtea, now called Sternbérgia lùtea; A. Belladónna, now Belladónna purpuráscens; and Nerìne sarniénsis. This is a beautiful flowering bulb, and requires the protection of a frame during winter. The old bulb seldom flowers oftener than two succeeding years, and then decays, but the off-sets will flower the second year; therefore when the old bulbs are lifted, they ought to be immediately planted, and receive every encouragement to strengthen them for flowering. Crôcus satìvus, C Pallàsii, C. serotìnus, and C. nudiflòrus, and all the species of Cólchicum, with species of several other genera not introduced into the country. They should all be lifted as soon as the foliage is decayed, and kept only a
- 59. few weeks outof the ground, and then again replanted in fresh soil. The economy of the genus Cólchicum in regard to its bulbs, flowers, and seeds, is altogether singular, and may be termed an anomaly of nature. In producing the new bulbs or off-sets in a very curious manner, the old one perishes. The flowers which arise with long slender tubes from the root die off in October, without leaving any external appearance of seeds. These lie buried all the winter within the bulb, in spring they grow upon a fruit stalk, and are ripe about the first of June. How beautiful and admirable is this provision! The plant blooming so late in the year, would not have time to mature its seeds before winter; and is, therefore, so contrived that it may be performed out of the reach of the usual effects of frost, and they are brought above the surface when perfected, and at a proper season for sowing. CARNATIONS AND PINKS. In order to make the former flower well, if the weather is dry, give them frequent waterings at the root, and tie them up neatly to their rods. The criterion of a fine carnation is—the stem strong and straight, from thirty to forty inches high, the corolla three inches diameter, consisting of large round well formed petals, but not so many as to crowd it, nor so few as to make it appear thin or empty; the outside petals should rise above the calyx about half an inch, and then turn off in a horizontal direction, to support the interior petals, they forming nearly a hemispherical corolla. The interior petals should decrease in size toward the centre, all regularly disposed on every side; they should have a small degree of concavity at the lamina or broad end, the edges perfectly entire. The calyx above one inch in length, with strong broad points in a close and circular body. The colours must be perfectly distinct, disposed in regular long stripes, broadest at the edge of the lamina, and gradually becoming narrower as they approach the unguis or base of the petal, there terminating in a fine point. Those that contain two colours upon a white ground are esteemed the finest.
- 60. Of a doublepink—the stem about twelve inches, the calyx smaller but similar to a carnation; the flowers two inches and a half in diameter; petals rose edges; colour white, and pure purple, or rich crimson; the nearer it approaches to black it is the more esteemed; proportions equal as in carnation. Those that are very tasteful with these flowers are attentive to the manner of their opening. Where the calyx is deficient in regular expansion to display the petals; that is, where there is a tendency to burst open on one side more than on the other, the opposite side in two or three different indentions should be slit a little at several times with the point of a small sharp knife, taking care not to cut the petals, and about the centre of the calyx tie a thread three or four times round to prevent any farther irregularity. Some florists and connoisseurs place cards on them. This is done when the calyx is small. Take a piece of thin pasteboard, about the size of a dollar; cut a small aperture in its centre to admit the bud to pass through. When on tie it tight to the rod, to prevent the wind from blowing it about; and when the flower is expanded, draw up the card to about the middle of the calyx, and spread the petals one over the other regularly upon it. When these plants are in flower, their beauty may be prolonged by giving them a little shade from the mid-day sun by an awning of any simple description. Where they are in pots, they can be removed to a cool shady situation, (but not directly under trees.) OF LAYING CARNATIONS AND PINKS. This is a necessary and yearly operation to keep a supply of plants, and likewise to have them always in perfection. As the process of laying, though simple, may not be known to all who are desirous of cultivating these plants, we will give an outline of the mode of operation. Provide first a quantity of small hooked twigs (pieces of Asparagus stems are very suitable) about three inches long, for pegging the layers down in the earth. Select the outward strongest and lowest shoots that are round the plant, trim off a few of the under leaves, and shorten with the knife the top ones even,
- 61. and then applyingit at a joint about the middle of the under-side of the shoot, cut about half through in a slanting direction, making an upward slit towards the next joint, near an inch in extent; and loosening the earth, make a small oblong cavity one or two inches deep, putting a little fresh light earth therein. Lay the stem part where the slit is made into the earth, keeping the cut part open, and the head of the layer upright one or two inches out of the earth; and in that position peg down the layer with one of the hooked twigs, and cover the inserted part to the depth of one inch with some of the fresh earth, pressing it gently down. In this manner proceed to lay all the proper shoots of each plant. Keep the earth a little full round the plant, to retain longer the water that may be applied. Give immediately a moderate watering, with a rose watering pot, and in dry weather give light waterings every evening. Choose a cloudy day for the above operation. In about two months they will be well rooted. PRUNING ROSES. The best time to prune what are termed "Garden roses" is immediately after flowering, which is generally about the middle of June. Cut out all old exhausted wood, and where it is too thick and crowded, shortening those shoots which have flowered to a good fresh strong eye, or bud, accompanied with a healthy leaf, but leaving untouched such shoots as are still in a growing state, except where they are becoming irregular. Such should be cut to the desired shape. There is not a better period of the year for puting these bushes in handsome order, which ought to be studied. All wood that grows after this pruning will ripen perfectly and produce fine flowers next year. Our reasons for doing so at this period are these: The points of the shoots of the more delicate sorts of roses are very apt to die when pruned in winter or spring; hence the consequences of this evil are avoided. The stronger the wood of roses is made to grow, the flowers will be the larger and more profuse, and this effect is but
- 62. produced by cuttingout the old and superfluous wood; at least it prevents any loss of vegetative power, which ought always to be considered. OF BUDDING OR INOCULATION OF ROSES. According to what we have previously hinted in regard to having roses as standards, where such are desired, the month of July is a proper time for the operation of budding. The kinds to be taken for stocks should be of a strong free growth. Such as Ornamental parade; Dutch tree; R. vilòsa; R. canína; and frequently the French Eglantine, are taken. Be provided with a proper budding-knife, which has a sharp thin blade adapted to prepare the bud, with a tapering ivory haft made thin at the end for raising the bark of the stock. For tieings use bass strings from Russia mats, which should be soaked in water to make them more pliable. The height of the stock or stem at which the bud is to be inserted, is to be determined by the intended destination of the tree, (as it may be properly called.) Choose a smooth part of the stem, from one to three years old. Having marked the place, prune away all the lateral shoots about and underneath it. With the knife directed horizontally, make an incision about half an inch long in the bark of the stock, cutting into the wood, but not deeper; then applying the point of the knife to the middle of this line, make a perpendicular incision under the first, extending from it between one and two inches. Having a healthy shoot of the growth of this year provided of the kind that is desired, begin at the lower end of this shoot, cut away all the leaves, leaving the footstalk of each. Being fixed on a promising bud, insert the knife about half an inch above the eye, slanting it downwards, and about half through the shoot. Draw it out about an inch below the eye, so as to bring away the bud unimpaired with the bark, and part of the wood adhering to it; the wood now must be carefully detached from the bark. To do this insert the point of the knife between the bark and wood at one end, and holding the bark tenderly, strip off the woody part, which will readily part from the
- 63. bark if theshoot from which the piece is taken has been properly imbued with sap.[I] Look at the inner rind of the separated bark, to see if that be entire; if there be a hole in it, the eye of the bud has been pulled away with the wood, rendering the bud useless, which throw away; if there be no hole, return to the stock, and with the haft of the knife gently raise the bark on each side of the perpendicular incision, opening the lips wide enough to admit the prepared slip with the eye. If the slip is longer than the upright incision in the stock, reduce the largest end. Stock and bud being ready, keep the latter in its natural position, introduce it between the bark and wood of the stock, pushing it gently downwards until it reaches the bottom of the perpendicular incision. Let the eye of the bud project through the centre of the lips; lay the slip with the bud as smooth as possible, and press down the raised bark of the stock. The bud being deposited, bind that part of the stock moderately tight with bass, beginning a little below the incision, proceeding upward so as to keep the eye uncovered, finishing above the incision. In a month after the operation, examine whether the bud has united with the stock. If it has succeeded, the bud will be full and fresh; if not, it will be brown and contracted. When it has taken, untie the bandage, that the bud may swell, and in a few days afterwards cut the head of the stock off about six inches above the inoculation, and prevent all shoots from growing by pinching them off. This will forward the bud, which will push and ripen wood this season; but it must be carefully tied as it grows to the remaining head of the stock. Some do not head down the stock until the following spring, thereby not encouraging the bud to grow, which if winter sets in early is the safest method. [I] We once budded three eyes of the white moss rose, after they had by mistake been carried in the pocket of a coat three days. The shoot was soaked six hours in water, and two of the buds grew. From this we infer that shoots, if properly wrapped up, may be carried very great distances, and grow successfully. OF WATERING.
- 64. If the seasonis dry, look over the late planted shrubs, and give them frequent copious waterings; and a few of the finest annuals that are wanted to flower perfectly should be attended to. Dahlias suffer very much in dry seasons, therefore it is advisable to water the most beautiful (or all) of them two or three times per week, and be careful to tie up their shoots to any support that is given to them, in case of high winds breaking or otherwise destroying the flower stems.
- 65. Rooms. JUNE AND JULY. Theonly attention requisite to these plants, is in giving water, keeping them from being much exposed to either sun or high winds, and preventing the attack of insects. Water must be regularly given every evening, when there has not been rain during the day. Where they are in a growing state, they are not liable at this season of the year to suffer from too much water, except in a few instances, such as the Lemon-scented Geranium, and those kinds that are tuberose rooted, as Ardèns, Bicòlor, Tristúm, &c. which should have moderate supplies. All the plants ought to be turned round every few weeks to prevent them from growing to one side, by the one being more dark than the other, and keep those of a straggling growth tied neatly to rods. Wherever insects of any description appear, wash them off directly. Give regular syringings or sprinklings from the rose of a watering pot. Be particularly attentive in this respect to the Caméllias, which will keep the foliage in a healthy state, and prevent the effects of mildew. If the foliage of Lílium longiflòrum, or japónicum, has died down, do not water them while dormant, as they are easily injured by such treatment.
- 66. Hot-House. AUGUST. The plants ofthe Hot-house that were repotted in May and June, according to the directions therein given, will at present be in an excellent state of health, provided they have got at all times the requisite supplies of watering. And as we already have been very explicit on that subject, more remarks now would be merely repetition. REPOTTING. If any of the repottings were neglected, during May or June, let it be done about the first of this month. Let young plants that are growing freely, where the roots have filled the pots, and the plants required to grow, have pots one size larger. In turning out the ball of earth, keep it entire, not disturbing any of the roots. OF PAINTING, REPAIRING, AND CLEANSING THE HOUSE. The necessary repairs of the Hot-house are too often put off to the last day or week; and then with hurry are superficially attended to. Previous to the first of September, have all the wood-work painted; which ought to have one coat every year, and the glass all repaired. Have the flues and furnace examined, and all rents plastered over, or any deficiency made good. Give the flue a thick coat of lime white-wash, and properly white-wash the whole interior stages and shelves to destroy any larvæ of insects; or, what is preferable for the latter, use oil paint. If there is a tan bed, have that renewed; take out what is most decayed, and add new tan. Wash
- 67. out the floorperfectly clean, so that all may be in readiness for the plants next month.
- 68. Green-house. AUGUST. Any of theMyrtles, Oranges, Lemons, Oleanders, &c. that were headed down in April or May, will be pushing many young shoots. The plant must be carefully examined, to observe which of the shoots ought to be left to form the tree. Having determined on this, cut out all the others close to the stem with a small sharp knife; and if the remaining shoots are above one foot long, pinch off the tops to make them branch out. The trees that were entirely headed down, should not have above six shoots left, which will, by being topped, make a sufficient quantity to form the bush or tree. GERANIUMS. These plants, about the first of the month, require a complete dressing. In the first place collect them all together, and with a sharp knife cut off the wood of this year to within a few eyes of the wood of last year. Citriodórum and its varieties do not need pruning. The plants grown from cuttings during the season, that have flowered, cut them to about four inches from the pot. This being done, have the earth all prepared with potshreds or fine gravel for draining the delicate kinds. And in a shaded situation turn the plants progressively out of the pots they are in, reducing the balls of earth so that the same pots may contain them again, and allow from half an inch to two inches, according to the size of the pot, of fresh soil around the ball, which press down by a thin piece of wood cut for the purpose. Finish by leveling all neatly with the hand. Give very gentle waterings from a pot with a rose mouth, for a few weeks,
- 69. until they havebegun to grow, protecting them entirely from the sun, till that period, then take the opportunity of a cloudy day to expose them. After this repotting, the following kinds are liable to suffer from too much water: Pavonínum, Davey[)a]num, fúlgens, ardens, citriodórum, rubéscens, florabùndum, ardèscens; with those of a similar habit, and these species do not require so much encouragement at the root as the strong growing sorts. The tuberous rooted and deciduous species must be very moderately supplied. Be careful when watering that the new soil does not become saturated with water, as, though allowed to dry again, it will not be so pure. When they shoot afresh, turn them regularly every two weeks, to prevent them growing to one side. ORANGES, LEMONS, &c. As it is frequently very inconvenient to shift these trees into larger tubs in the months of March and April, this month is a period that is suitable both from the growth of the trees, and their being in the open air. It would be improper to state the day or the week, that depending entirely on the season. The criterion is easily observed, which is when the first growth is over, these trees making another growth in autumn. When they are large, they require great exertion, and are frequently attended with inconvenience to get them shifted. Where there is a quantity of them, the best plan that we have tried or seen adopted is as follows: Have a strong double and a single block trimmed with a sufficiency of rope; make it fast to the limb of a large tree, or any thing that projects, and will bear the weight, and as high as will admit of the plant being raised a few feet under it. Take a soft bandage and put around the stem, to prevent the bark from being bruised; make a rope fast to it, in which hook the single block. Raise the plant the height of the tub, put a spar across the tub, and strike on the spar with a mallet, which will separate the tub from the ball. Then with a strong pointed stick probe a little of the earth from amongst the roots, observing to cut away any that are affected by dry-rot, damp, or mildew, with any very matted roots.
- 70. Having all dressed,place a few potshreds over the hole or holes in the bottom of the tub; measure exactly the depth of the ball that remains around the plant, and fill up with earth, pressing it a little with the hand, until it will hold the ball one inch under the edge of the tub. If there is from four to six inches of earth under it, it is quite enough. Fill all around the ball, and press it down with a stick, finishing neatly off with the hand. Observe that the stem of the tree is exactly in the centre. This being done, carry the tree to where it is intended to stand, and give it water with a rose on the pot. The earth will subside about two inches, thus leaving three inches, which will at any time hold enough of water for the tree. Trees thus treated will not require to be shifted again within four or five years, having in the interim got a few rich top-dressings. Frequently in attempting to take out of the tubs those that are in a sickly state, all the soil falls from their roots, having no fibres attached. When there are any such, after replanting, put them in the Green-house, and shut it almost close up, there give shade to the tree, and frequent sprinklings of water, until it begins to grow, when admit more air gradually until it becomes hardened. These trees should be put in very small tubs, and a little sand added to the soil. Give very moderate supplies of water, merely keeping the soil moist. Tubs generally give way at the bottom when they begin to decay, and in the usual method of coopering after this failure they are useless, the ledging being rotten, and will not admit of another bottom. The staves should be made without any groove, and have four brackets nailed on the inside, having the bottom in a piece by itself that it can be placed on these brackets, and there is no necessity of it being water tight. Then when it fails, it can be replaced again at a trifling expense. A tub made this way will last out three or four bottoms, and is in every respect the cheapest, and should be more wide than deep. Large Myrtles and Oleanders may be treated in the same manner as directed for the above. OF PRUNING ORANGES, LEMONS, &c.
- 71. These trees willgrow very irregularly, especially the Lemon, if not frequently dressed or pruned. Any time this month look over them all minutely, and cut away any of the small naked wood where it is too crowded, and cut all young strong straggling shoots to the bounds of the tree, giving it a round regular head. It is sometimes necessary to cut out a small limb, but large amputations should be avoided. Cover all wounds with turpentine or bees-wax, to prevent the bad effects of the air. OF REPOTTING PLANTS. Any of the plants enumerated in March under this head, may be now done according to directions therein given, and which apply to all sizes. This is the proper period for repotting the following:— Cálla, a genus of four species. None of them in our collections, and in fact are not worth cultivation, except C. æthiòpica, Ethiopian Lily, which is admired for the purity and singularity of its large white flowers, or rather spatha, which is cucullate, leaves sagittate. It is now called Richárdia æthiópica. The roots which are tubers should be entirely divested of the soil they have been grown in, breaking off any small offsets, and potting them wholly in fresh earth. When growing they cannot get too much water. The plant will grow in a pond of water, and withstand our severest winters, provided the roots are kept at the bottom of the water. Cyclamen. There are eight species and six varieties of this genus, which consists of humble plants with very beautiful flowers. The bulbs are round, flattened, and solid, and are peculiarly adapted for pots and the decorating of rooms. C. côum, leaves almost round; flowers light red; in bloom from January to April. C. pérsicum, with its four varieties, flower from February to April; colour white, and some white and purple. C. hederæfòlium, Ivy-leaved; colour lilac; there is a white variety; flowers from July to September. C. Europæum, colour lilac, in bloom from August to October. C. neapolitànum, flowers red, in bloom from July to September. These
- 72. are all desirableplants. When the foliage begins to decay, withhold the accustomed supplies of water, keeping them in a half dry state; and when growing they must not be over watered, as they are apt to rot from moisture. Keep them during the summer months in the shade. The best time for potting either of the sorts is when the crown of the bulb begins to protrude. If the pots are becoming large, every alternate year they may be cleared from the old soil, and put in smaller pots with the crown barely covered. When the flowers fade, the pedicles twist up like a screw, inclosing the germen in the centre, lying close to the ground until the seeds ripen, from which plants can be grown, and will flower the third year. Lachenàlia, a genus of about forty species of bulbs, all natives of the Cape of Good Hope, and grow remarkably well in our collections. The most common is L. trícolor. L. quadrícolor, and its varieties, are all fine; the colours yellow, scarlet, orange, and green, very pure and distinct; L. rùbida. L. punctàta, L. orchoídes, and L. nervòsa, are all fine species. The flowers are on a stem from a half to one foot high, and much in the character of a hyacinth. The end of the month is about the time of planting. Five inch pots are large enough, and they must get very little water till they begin to grow. Oxalis, above one hundred species of Cape bulbs, and like all other bulbs of that country, they do exceedingly well in our collections, in which there are only comparatively a few species, not exceeding twelve. O. rubèlla, branching, of a vermilion colour; O. marginàta, white; O. elongàta, striped; and O. amæna, are those that require potting this month. The first of September is the most proper period for the others. This genus of plants is so varied in the construction of its roots, that the same treatment will not do for all. The root is commonly bulbous, and these will keep a few weeks or months out of the soil, according to their size. Several are only thick and fleshy: these ought not to be taken out of the pots, but kept in them, while dormant; and about the end of this month give them gentle waterings. When they begin to grow, take the earth from the roots, and pot them in
- 73. fresh soil. Ina few years the bulbs are curiously produced, the original bulb near the surface striking a radical fibre downright from its base, at the extremity of which is produced a new bulb for the next year's plant, the old one perishing. Ornithógalum, Star of Bethlehem, about sixty species of bulbs, principally from the Cape of Good Hope. Many of them have little attraction. The most beautiful that we have seen are O. lactéum, which has a spike about one foot long of fine white flowers; and O. aùreum, flowers of a golden colour, in contracted racemose corymbs. These two are magnificent. O. marítimum is the officinale squill. The bulb is frequently as large as a human head, pear-shaped, and tunicated like the onion. From the centre of the root arise several shining glaucous leaves a foot long, two inches broad at base, and narrowing to a point. They are green during winter, and decay in the spring; then the flower-stalk comes out, rising two feet, naked half way, and terminated by a pyramidal thyrse of white flowers. The bulb ought to be kept dry from the end of June till now, or it will not flower freely. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS. Watering, and other practical care of the plants, to be done as heretofore described. Frequently the weather at the end of this month becomes cool and heavy. Dew falling through the night will in part supply the syringing operation, but it must not be suspended altogether. Three times a week will suffice. Any of the plants that are plunged should be turned every week. In wet weather observe that none are suffering from moisture.
- 74. FLOWER-GARDEN AUGUST. EVERGREEN HEDGES. These alwaysmake two growths in the season, and the best time to perform the clipping or dressing of them is before the plants begin their second growth. Choose if possible dull and cloudy days for the operation. The general practice in forming these, is to have the sides even, and the top level, forming a right angle on each side. However neat in appearance this may be considered, it certainly is stiff and formal. We never approve of shearing where it can be avoided, and when adopted, nature ought to be imitated. We consider that all hedges and edgings ought to be narrowed at the top. CARNATIONS AND PINKS. If layed about the end of June, and been properly attended, they will by the end of this month be well rotted and fit for transplanting. Clear away the earth lightly, and cut them clean off from the parent plant, nearer the stool than the original slit. Raise them neatly out of the earth, with as many of the root-fibres as possible; cut off the naked part of the stem close to the fibrous roots, and trim away the straggling leaves. Plant the finest sorts in four inch pots, and those more common three plants in five inch pots, in the form of a triangle, which can be separated in spring to plant in the garden. Any of the principal stools should be (if in the ground) lifted and put into seven inch pots to be preserved: the others may be allowed to stand through the winter, covering them with a few dry leaves. Keep
- 75. them in theshade a few weeks, when they may be fully exposed. Give gentle and frequent sprinklings of water until they have taken fresh root; or if in want of pots, mark out a bed that can be covered with a frame, preparing the soil therein properly. Plant them from four to six inches apart. Shade them from the sun until they begin to grow, giving sprinklings of water over the foliage every evening. BULBOUS ROOTS. Look over the bulbs that are out of the ground, and examine those that require planting. Fritillària, about twenty species, but few of them generally cultivated, except F. imperiàlis, Crown Imperial; and F. pérsica. These will require planting, and ought not to be lifted oftener than every third year. There are four or five varieties of the above, showy flowers, and singular in appearance. They require a deep rich loamy soil, and if in beds, plant them from three to four inches deep, and one foot apart. They will grow under shade of trees, or any situation where the soil is adapted for them. No imbricated or scaly bulb ought to be retained long out of the ground. When any of these are lifted, and the young bulbs taken off, they should be planted at once. See particularly on bulbous roots in general next month. SOWING SEEDS OF BULBOUS ROOTS. Where any seeds of these are saved, with the intention of sowing, let it be done this month. Procure boxes about seven inches deep, and in size proportioned to the quantity to be sown. Put five inches of light sandy soil in the box, level it smoothly, and sow the seeds separately and thickly; cover with half an inch of light sandy loam, with a portion of earth from the woods. Keep the box or boxes in a sheltered situation, giving frequent sprinklings of water to keep the earth damp, which must be protected with a frame, or covered with leaves during winter. The plants will appear in spring, and must be watered and kept in the shade: when the leaves decay in June,
- 76. put one inchmore soil upon them, and the second year they can be planted with the small offsets in the garden, and treated as other bulbs. They must be carefully marked every year. Tulips require many years of trial before their qualities are known; and a poor soil is best to produce their characters after the first bloom. SOWING AND SAVING SEEDS. About the end of this month or first of next, is an advisable period to sow seed of Delphínum Ajácis flòreplèno, or Double Rocket Larkspur. This plant does not flower in perfection except it is sown in autumn, and grown a little above ground before winter, when a few leaves can be lightly thrown amongst them, but not to cover them entirely, as that would cause damp, and they would rot off. Coreópsis tinctòria, which is now Calliópsis tinctòria, and a beautiful plant, should likewise be sown. Be attentive in saving all kinds of seeds, many of which will keep best in the capsule. Name them all correctly, and with the year in which they were grown.
- 77. Rooms. AUGUST. For the kindsof plants that require potting, we refer to the Green-house for this month. All that are therein specified are peculiarly adapted for rooms, and we would call attention to the genus Cyclamen, which has not been generally introduced into the collections of our ladies; as, from the character and beauty of the flowers, they are very attracting and highly deserving of culture. Attend to the Geraniums as there directed, and be particular in having them cut down, and repotted, as there fully described. The Oranges, Lemons, Oleanders, and Myrtles, that are kept in cellars or rooms, should have the same attention in this month as directed in the Green-house, which to repeat here would be occupying space unnecessarily. Réseda odoráta, or Mignonette, is one of the most fragrant annuals. To have it in perfection, the seed should be sown about the end of this month, or beginning of next, into pots of fine light earth, and sprinkled with water frequently. When it comes up the plants must be thinned out or transplanted; the former method is preferable. Keep them from frost during winter, and always near the light. This will equally apply to the Green-house.
- 78. Hot-House. SEPTEMBER. DRESSING THE PLANTS. Havinglast month put the house in complete order, all that remains necessary to be attended to, is the state of the plants and pots, which should be regularly examined, and of those where the roots fill the soil, a little may be taken off the top, supplying its place with fresh earth, thereby giving what is called a top dressing. Give each a sufficient rod that requires it, tieing the plant neatly thereto; minutely scrutinise each for insects, and where they are detected, have them eradicated. Finally, wash all contracted foulness from off the pots, at the same time pick off any decayed leaves; thus all will be in perfect order to take into the house. If any plants have been kept in the Hot-house during summer, they must likewise go through the same operations. OF TAKING IN THE PLANTS. From the 16th to the 24th, according to the season, is the proper time to take in the Hot-house plants. It is preferable to have them what might be deemed a few days too early, than have them in the slightest affected by cold. Commence by housing the largest first, and those that stand farthest in the house, observing to place the most tender sorts nearest the heat or warmest part of the house. For observations on them, see May: in regard to arrangement, that must be according to the taste of the operator. We may observe that in a small collection it
- 79. is better tohave them in a regular than in a picturesque form. A dry shelf is indispensable in this department for placing on it all herbaceous plants, such as Cánna, Hedychium, Zíngiber, Kæmpféria, &c. the watering of which from this time should be gradually suspended, that they may have their required cessation to make them flower well. This shelf may be in any situation; one in darkness, where other plants will not grow, will answer perfectly well. If there is a bark bed, do not, until the end of December, plunge any of the pots therein. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS. The plants being now all under protection, they must have as much air as possible admitted to them every day, by opening the doors, front and top sashes, closing only at night. The syringings must be continued, and care taken that plants of a deciduous or herbaceous nature are not over watered. Alstrœmèrias are apt to rot while dormant when they are supplied with water. The tuberous species might be kept almost dry. Some practical men of sound science repot these plants in this month into fresh soil, and allow them to stand till January almost without water. We have never adopted this method with any description of plants, but do not doubt of its success with that genus. See that the ropes and pullies of the sashes are in good order, and fit to stand all winter.
- 80. Green-House. SEPTEMBER. During this monthevery part of the Green-house should have a thorough cleansing, which is too frequently neglected, and many hundreds of insects left unmolested. To preserve the wood work in good order, give it one coat of paint every year. Repair all broken glass, white-wash the whole interior, giving the flues two or three coats, and cover the stages with hot-lime, white-wash, or oil-paint; examine ropes, pullies, and weights, finishing by washing the pavement perfectly clean. If there have been any plants in the house during summer, be sure after this cleansing that they are clean also, before they are returned to their respective situations. OF WATERING. The intensity of the heat being over for the season, the heavy dews during night will prevent so much absorption amongst the plants. They will, in general, especially by the end of the month, require limited supplies of water comparatively to their wants in the summer months. Be careful amongst the Geraniums that were repotted in August, not to water them until the new soil about their roots is becoming dry. Syringing in this month may be suspended in time of heavy dews, but in dry nights resort to it again. The herbaceous plants and those of a succulent nature must be sparingly supplied. The large trees that were put in new earth will require a supply only once a week, but in such quantity as will go to the bottom of the tubs. PREPARING FOR TAKING IN THE PLANTS.
- 81. About the endof the month all the plants should be examined and cleaned in like manner as directed for those of the Hot-house last month, which see. From the 1st to the 8th of October is the most proper time to take them into the Green-house, except those of a half hardy nature, which may stand out till the appearance of frost. All the Geraniums that were put in the shade after shifting, may after the 10th be fully exposed, which will in some degree prevent them from being weak. Turn them in such a manner as will make them grow equally. Always endeavour to have these plants short and bushy, for they are unsightly otherwise, except where a few very large specimens are desired for show. All Myrtles and Oleanders that were headed down, if the young shoots are too crowded, continue to thin them out, and give regular turnings, that all the heads may grow regularly. STOCKS AND WALL-FLOWERS, That are wanted to flower in the Green-house (where they do remarkably well) and are in the ground, have them carefully lifted before the end of the month, and planted in six or seven inch pots, with light loamy soil. Place them in the shade till they take fresh root, and give them frequent sprinklings of water. As soon as the foliage becomes erect, expose them to the full sun, and treat as Green-house plants. CHRYSANTHEMUMS. These very ornamental plants blooming so late, and at a period when there are few others in flower, one of each variety (or two of some of the finest) should be lifted and put in 8 inch pots, in light loamy soil, and treated as above directed for Stocks, &c. These will flower beautifully from October to December, and when done blooming the pots may be plunged in the garden, or covered with any kind of litter, until spring, when they can be divided and planted out.
- 82. CAPE AND HOLLANDBULBS. About the end of this month is the period for all of these that are intended for the Green-house to be potted. We specified some of the former last month, and will here enumerate a few others. Babìana, a genus of small bulbs, with pretty blue, red, and yellow flowers. B. distíca, pale blue flowers in two ranks. B. strícta, flowers blue and white. B. tubiflòra is beautiful, colour white and red. B. plicàta has sweet-scented pale blue flowers. There are about twenty species of them, and they grow from six to twelve inches high. Four inch pots are sufficient for them. Gladìolus, Corn-flag, a genus of above fifty species. There are several very showy plants amongst them, and a few very superb. G. floribúndus, large pink and white flowers. G. cardinàlis, flowers superb scarlet, spotted with white. G. byzantìnus, large purple flowers. G. blándus, flowers of a blush rose colour, and handsome. G. cuspidàtus, flowers white and purple. G. psittácinus is the most magnificent of the genus, both in size and beauty of flower; the flowers are striped with green, yellow, and scarlet, about four inches diameter, in great profusion, on a stem about two feet high, and though rare in Europe may be seen in some collections in this country. The beauty of this genus is all centred in the flowers; the leaves are similar to Iris. Ixia, a genus containing about twenty-five species of very free- flowering bulbs. I. monadélpha, flowers blush and green. I. leucántha, flowers large, white. I. capitàta, flowers in heads of a white and almost black colour. I. cònica, flowers orange and velvet. I. columellàris is beautifully variegated with purple, blush, and vermilion colours. The flower stems are from six to twenty-four inches high. Sparáxis, a beautiful genus of twelve species, closely allied to the last, but more varied in colour. S. grandiflòra striàta is striped with purple ground blush. S. versícolor, colours crimson, dark purple, and
- 83. Welcome to ourwebsite – the perfect destination for book lovers and knowledge seekers. We believe that every book holds a new world, offering opportunities for learning, discovery, and personal growth. That’s why we are dedicated to bringing you a diverse collection of books, ranging from classic literature and specialized publications to self-development guides and children's books. More than just a book-buying platform, we strive to be a bridge connecting you with timeless cultural and intellectual values. With an elegant, user-friendly interface and a smart search system, you can quickly find the books that best suit your interests. Additionally, our special promotions and home delivery services help you save time and fully enjoy the joy of reading. Join us on a journey of knowledge exploration, passion nurturing, and personal growth every day! ebookbell.com