基調講演：CTF: クールな奴らは皆やってるよ by クリス・イーグル

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ここ１０年でCapture the Flag（CTF：キャプチャー・ザ・フラッグ)と呼ばれるネットワークセキュリティゲームが台頭してきた。このゲームに参加している人ならこれらのゲームの面白さは既に理解済みだろう。このようなゲームは参加者に対して常に新しいチャレンジを提供するだけではなく、似たような事に興味を持つ人同士の交流や仲間内での高い評価を得るのみならず、最近では様々な賞品を勝つ機会を与えるまでになっている。このようなゲームは、正しく運用された場合は次世代のコンピュータープロフェッショナルを育てる事を可能にする点でも、非常に重要な要素の一つと言えるだろう。本講演ではこのようなゲームをトレーニングや人材育成的評価面で使用する際の課題と改善策に付いて発表する。クリス・イーグル - Chris Eagle カリフォルニア州モントレーの米海軍大学校にて上級講師として活躍中。コンピュータエンジニア／研究者として２８年以上のキャリアを持ち、研究内容はコンピュータネットワーク運用、フォレンジックとリバースエンジニアリングに関連する。Black Hat, Defcon, InfiltrateやShmooconなどのカンファレンスにて講演また、IDA Proに関するハンドブックの決定版と呼ばれる"The IDA Pro Book"の著者でもある。DEFCONのCapture The Flag Competionで複数回優勝しており、2009年から2012年までは、同CTF競技の開催運用側で活躍。現在はDARPAと共同でCyber Grand Challenge競技の構築を行っている。

Technology

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◦  Sk3wl0fRoot Capture the Flag (CTF)  
DefCon CTF (2004 , 2008 )
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◦  DDTEK, DefCon CTF (2009-2012)

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◦  WWEEBB
Courtesy of Kenshoto

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!  Defcon CTF
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◦  UC Santa Barbara iCTF
◦  Positive Hack Days CTF
◦  Codegate CTF

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◦  DefCon
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◦  Codegate – 430
◦  PHDays – 90
◦  DefCon –

!  Defcon
◦  Defcon 10, 2002 8
◦  Defcon 21, 2013 20 66%
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!  UCSB iCTF
◦  2003 – 14
◦  2012 – 90
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脆弱性を早期に発見するため、脆弱性報奨金制度（バグ・バウンティ・プログラム）を導入する企業が増えている。私はこれまでにFirefoxブラウザの脆弱性を報告し、開発元のMozilla Foundationから4万5000ドル（540万円）の報奨金を獲得している。Firefoxの脆弱性にはある共通の傾向がある。しかしそれらはFirefoxの開発者にも周知されておらず、新たな機能が実装される都度、類似の脆弱性が繰り返し作り込まれている。本セッションでは、私が発見した脆弱性を基に、Firefoxで頻出する脆弱性のパターンを紹介し、それらが作り込まれる原因を述べる。また、私がFirefoxのバグを効率的に探すために実践している手法も併せて紹介する。この手法はFirefoxに限らず、オープンソースのソフトウェア特有の問題点に基づくものである。

Mozillaの報奨金制度で100万円ほど稼いだ話

Muneaki Nishimura

Mozillaの報奨金制度で200万円ほど稼いだ話

Muneaki Nishimura

Firefoxの日和見暗号がカジュアルに無効化された話

Muneaki Nishimura

[cb22] Hayabusa Threat Hunting and Fast Forensics in Windows environments fo...

CODE BLUE

It started with computer hacking and Japanese linguistics as a kid. Zach Mathis has been based in Kobe, Japan, and has performed both red team services as well as blue team incident response and defense consultation for major Japanese global Japanese corporations since 2006. He is the founder of Yamato Security, one of the largest and most popular hands-on security communities in Japan, and has been providing free training since 2012 to help improve the local security community. Since 2016, he has been teaching security for the SANS institute and holds numerous GIAC certifications. Currently, he is working with other Yamato security members to provide free and open-source security tools to help security analysts with their work.

[cb22] Tales of 5G hacking by Karsten Nohl

CODE BLUE

Most 5G networks are built in fundamentally new ways, opening new hacking avenues. Mobile networks have so far been monolithic systems from big vendors; now they become open vendor-mixed ecosystems. Networks are rapidly adopting cloud technologies including dockerization and orchestration. Cloud hacking techniques become highly relevant to mobile networks. The talk dives into the hacking potential of the technologies needed for these open networks. We illustrate the security challenges with vulnerabilities we found in real-world networks.

[cb22] Your Printer is not your Printer ! - Hacking Printers at Pwn2Own by A...

CODE BLUE

Printer has become one of the essential devices in the corporate intranet for the past few years, and its functionalities have also increased significantly. Not only print or fax, cloud printing services like AirPrint are also being supported as well to make it easier to use. Direct printing from mobile devices is now a basic requirement in the IoT era. We also use it to print some internal business documents of the company, which makes it even more important to keep the printer safe. Nowadays, most of the printers on the market do not have to be connected with USB or traditional cable. As long as you are using a LAN cable connected to the intranet, the computer can find and use the printer immediately. Most of them are based on protocols such as SLP and LLMNR. But is it really safe when vendors adopt those protocols? Furthermore, many printers do not use traditional Linux systems, but use RTOS(Real-Time Operating System) instead, how will this affect the attacker? In this talk, we will use Canon ImageCLASS MF644Cdw and HP Color LaserJet Pro MFP M283fdw as case study, showing how to analyze and gain control access to the printer. We will also demonstrate how to use the vulnerabilities to achieve RCE in RTOS in unauthenticated situations.

[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...

CODE BLUE

While hackers have known the importance of sharing research to improve security for years, the importance of coordinated vulnerability disclosure is increasingly recognized by governments around the world. The principals of disclosure an protecting security researchers are common across borders, but different countries have some key differences. This panel will present a global perspective that may in turn inform key public policy and company behavior. ENISA has published 'Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure policies in the EU' in April 2022 . This report not only provides an objective introduction to the current state of coordinated vulnerability disclosure policies in the Member States of the European Union, but also introduces the operation of vulnerability disclosure in China, Japan and the USA. Based on these findings, the desirable and good practice elements of a coordinated vulnerability disclosure process are examined, followed by a discussion of the challenges and issues. This session aims to share the contents of this report and clarify the challenges and future direction of operations in Japan, as well as national security and vulnerability handling issues in the US, in a panel discussion with representatives from various jurisdictions. The panelists are involved in the practice of early warning partnership notified bodies in Japan, the authors of the above report in Europe and the contributors to the above report in the US. In Japan, the issues of system awareness, incentives, increase in the number of outstanding cases in handling and so-called triage in handling vulnerabilities will be introduced. From the United States, the Vulnerabilities Equities Process for National Security and the publication of a non-prosecution policy for vulnerability research will be introduced, as well as a historical background on the issue. The aim is that the panel discussion will enable the audience to understand the international situation surrounding CVD, as well as future trends, in particular the important role of vulnerability in cybersecurity and the challenges faced by society around it.

ハッカーたちの間では、セキュリティ向上のために研究を共有することの重要性が何年も前から知られていた。一方、協調して脆弱性を開示することの重要性も、世界中の政府によってますます認識されるようになってきた。情報開示とセキュリティ研究者の保護という原則は国境を越えて共通であるものの、国によって重要な違いがある。本パネルでは、重要な公共政策や企業の行動に影響を与える可能性のあるグローバルな視点を提示する。 ENISAは、2022年4月に「EUにおける脆弱性開示政策の調整」を発表した。本報告書では、EU加盟国における脆弱性開示の協調政策の現状を客観的に紹介するだけでなく、中国、日本、米国における脆弱性開示の運用を紹介している。それらを踏まえて、協調的な脆弱性開示プロセスに望ましい要素やベストプラクティスの要素を検討し、その後、課題や問題点について議論する予定。本報告書の内容を共有し、日本における運用の課題と今後の方向性、米国における国家安全保障と脆弱性対応の課題を、各法域の代表者とのパネルディスカッションで明らかにすることを目的としています。パネリストは、日本では早期警戒パートナーシップ通知機関の実務に携わる方々、欧州では上記報告書の執筆者、米国では上記報告書の寄稿者日本では、脆弱性対応における体制意識、インセンティブ、未処理案件の増加、いわゆるトリアージなどの課題が紹介される予定米国からは、国家安全保障のための脆弱性情報の開示方針（Vulnerabilities Equities Process）、脆弱性研究の不起訴方針の公表などを紹介するとともに、この問題の歴史的背景を紹介する。パネルディスカッションを通じて、脆弱性開示政策を取り巻く国際情勢や今後の動向、特にサイバーセキュリティにおける脆弱性の重要な役割とそれを取り巻く社会が抱える課題について参加者に理解していただくことを目的とする。

[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...

CODE BLUE

[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション（3） by Lorenzo Pupillo

CODE BLUE

[cb22] ”The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure” Inte...

CODE BLUE

[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション（2）by Allan Friedman

CODE BLUE

[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...

CODE BLUE

[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション（1）by 高橋郁夫

CODE BLUE

[cb22] Are Embedded Devices Ready for ROP Attacks? -ROP verification for low-...

CODE BLUE

Yuuma Taki is enrolled in the Hokkaido Information University Information Media Faculty of Information Media (4th year). At university he is focusing on learning about security for lower-level components, such OS and CPU. In his third year of undergraduate school, he worked on trying to implement the OS security mechanism "KASLR", at Sechack365. Currently, he is learning about ROP derivative technology and embedded equipment security.

[cb22] Wslinkのマルチレイヤーな仮想環境について by Vladislav Hrčka

CODE BLUE

2021年10月、Lazarusグループに関連する可能性が高いユニークなローダーであるWSLinkの最初の分析を公開。ほとんどのサンプルは難読化され、高度な仮想マシン（VM）難読化機能で保護されている。サンプルには明確なアーティファクトが含まれておらず、当初は難読化を公的に知られているVMと関連付けなかったが、後にそれをCodevirtualizerに接続することに成功。このVMは、ジャンクコードの挿入、仮想オペランドの暗号化、仮想オペコードの重複、難読化手法仮想命令のマージ、ネストされたVMなど、いくつかの追加の難読化技術を導入する。本発表では、VMの内部を分析し、合理的な時間で難読化技術を「見抜く」ための半自動化されたアプローチについて説明する。また、難読化されたバイトコードと難読化されていないバイトコードを比較し、本手法の有効性を紹介する。われわれの手法は、仮想オペコードのセマンティクスを抽出する既知の難読化解除手法に基づいており、単純化規則によるシンボリック実行を使用。さらに、バイトコードチャンクとVMの内部構成を記号ではなく、具体的な値として扱い、既知の難読化手法で追加の難読化技術を自動的に処理できるようにする。

[cb22] Under the hood of Wslink’s multilayered virtual machine en by Vladisla...

CODE BLUE

In October 2021, we published the first analysis of Wslink – a unique loader likely linked to the Lazarus group. Most samples are packed and protected with an advanced virtual machine (VM) obfuscator; the samples contain no clear artifacts and we initially did not associate the obfuscation with a publicly known VM, but we later managed to connect it to CodeVirtualizer. This VM introduces several additional obfuscation techniques such as insertion of junk code, encoding of virtual operands, duplication of virtual opcodes, opaque predicates, merging of virtual instructions, and a nested VM. Our presentation analyzes the internals of the VM and describes our semi automated approach to “see through” the obfuscation techniques in reasonable time. We demonstrate the approach on some bytecode from a protected sample and compare the results with a non-obfuscated sample, found subsequent to starting our analysis, confirming the method’s validity. Our solution is based on a known deobfuscation method that extracts the semantics of the virtual opcodes, using symbolic execution with simplifying rules. We further treat the bytecode chunks and some internal constructs of the VM as concrete values instead of as symbolic ones, enabling the known deobfuscation method to deal with the additional obfuscation techniques automatically.

[cb22] CloudDragon’s Credential Factory is Powering Up Its Espionage Activiti...

CODE BLUE

Kimsuky is a North Korean APT possibly controlled by North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau. Based on reports from the Korea Internet & Security Agency (KISA) and other vendors, TeamT5 identified that Kimsuky's most active group, CloudDragon, built a workflow functioning as a "Credential Factory," collecting and exploiting these massive credentials. The credential factory powers CloudDragon to start its espionage campaigns. CloudDragon's campaigns have aligned with DPRK's interests, targeting the organizations and key figures playing a role in the DPRK relationship. Our database suggested that CloudDragon has possibly infiltrated targets in South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Victims include think tanks, NGOs, media agencies, educational institutes, and many individuals. CloudDragon's "Credential Factory" can be divided into three small cycles, "Daily Cycle," "Campaign Cycle," and "Post-exploit Cycle." The"Daily Cycle" can collect massive credentials and use the stolen credentials to accelerate its APT life cycle. In the "Campaign Cycle," CloudDragon develops many new malware. While we responded to CloudDragon's incidents, we found that the actor still relied on BabyShark malware. CloudDragon once used BabyShark to deploy a new browser extension malware targeting victims' browsers. Moreover, CloudDragon is also developing a shellcode-based malware, Dust. In the "Post-exploit Cycle," the actor relied on hacking tools rather than malicious backdoors. We also identified that the actor used remote desktop software to prevent detection. In this presentation, we will go through some of the most significant operations conducted by CloudDragon, and more importantly, we will provide possible scenarios of future invasions for defense and detection.

[cb22] From Parroting to Echoing: The Evolution of China’s Bots-Driven Info...

CODE BLUE

Social media is no doubt a critical battlefield for threat actors to launch InfoOps, especially in a critical moment such as wartime or the election season. We have seen Bot-Driven Information Operations (InfoOps, aka influence campaign) have attempted to spread disinformation, incite protests in the physical world, and doxxing against journalists. China's Bots-Driven InfoOps, despite operating on a massive scale, are often considered to have low impact and very little organic engagement. In this talk, we will share our observations on these persistent Bots-Driven InfoOps and dissect their harmful disinformation campaigns circulated in cyberspace. In the past, most bots-driven operations simply parroted narratives of the Chinese propaganda machine, mechanically disseminating the same propaganda and disinformation artifacts made by Chinese state media. However, recently, we saw the newly created bots turn to post artifacts in a livelier manner. They utilized various tactics, including reposting screenshots of forum posts and disguised as members of “Milk Tea Alliance,” to create a false appearance that such content is being echoed across cyberspace. We particularly focus on an ongoing China's bots-driven InfoOps targeting Taiwan, which we dub "Operation ChinaRoot." Starting in mid-2021, the bots have been disseminating manipulated information about Taiwan's local politics and Covid-19 measures. Our further investigation has also identified the linkage between Operation ChinaRoot and other Chinese state-linked networks such as DRAGONBRIDGE and Spamouflage.

[cb22] Who is the Mal-Gopher? - Implementation and Evaluation of “gimpfuzzy”...

CODE BLUE

Malwares written in Go is increasing every year. Go's cross-platform nature makes it an opportune language for attackers who wish to target multiple platforms. On the other hand, the statically linked libraries make it difficult to distinguish between user functions and libraries, making it difficult for analysts to analyze. This situation has increased the demand for Go malware classification and exploration. In this talk, we will demonstrate the feasibility of computing similarity and classification of Go malware using a newly proposed method called gimpfuzzy. We have implemented "gimpfuzzy", which incorporates Fuzzy Hashing into the existing gimphash method. In this talk, we will verify the discrimination rate of the classification using the proposed method and confirm the validity of the proposed method by discussing some examples from the classified results. We will also discuss issues in Go-malware classification.

[cb22] Mal-gopherとは？Go系マルウェアの分類のためのgimpfuzzy実装と評価 by 澤部祐太, 甘粕伸幸, 野村和也

CODE BLUE

Goで書かれたマルウェアは年々増加している。Goはクロスプラットフォームの性質を持っており、複数のプラットフォームを標的にしたい攻撃者にとって好都合な言語である。その一方で、ライブラリが静的にリンクされていることからユーザ関数とライブラリの区別が難しく、アナリストにとって解析が困難である。そうした状況で、Goマルウェアの分類や探索の需要が高まっている。本講演ではgimpfuzzyという新たな提案手法を用いてGoマルウェアに対し類似性の計算や分類が可能であることを検証する。われわれは既存手法であるgimphashにFuzzy Hashingを組み込んだ「gimpfuzzy」を新たに実装した。講演では提案手法を利用した分類の判別率を検証し、分類された結果の中からいくつかの事例を取り上げその妥当性について確認する。また、Goマルウェアの分類における課題についても検討を行う予定である。

[cb22] Tracking the Entire Iceberg - Long-term APT Malware C2 Protocol Emulat...

CODE BLUE

Malware analysts normally obtain IP addresses of the malware's command & control (C2) servers by analyzing samples. This approach works in commoditized attacks or campaigns. However, with targeted attacks using APT malware, it's difficult to acquire a sufficient number of samples for organizations other than antivirus companies. As a result, malware C2 IOCs collected by a single organization are just the tip of the iceberg. For years, I have reversed the C2 protocols of high-profile APT malware families then discovered the active C2 servers on the Internet by emulating the protocols. In this presentation, I will explain how to emulate the protocols of two long-term pieces of malware used by PRC-linked cyber espionage threat actors: Winnti 4.0 and ShadowPad. Both pieces of malware support multiple C2 protocols like TCP/TLS/HTTP/HTTPS/UDP. It's also common to have different data formats and encoding algorithms per each protocol in one piece of malware. I'll cover the protocol details while referring to unique functions such as server-mode in Winnti 4.0 and multiple protocol listening at a single port in ShadowPad. Additionally, I'll share the findings regarding the Internet-wide C2 scanning and its limitations. After the presentation, I'll publish over 140 C2 IOCs with the date ranges in which they were discovered. These dates are more helpful than just IP address information since the C2s are typically found on hosted servers, meaning that the C2 could sometimes exist on a specific IP only for a very limited time. 65% of these IOCs have 0 detection on VirusTotal as of the time of this writing.

[cb22] Fight Against Malware Development Life Cycle by Shusei Tomonaga and Yu...

CODE BLUE

We are swamped with new types of malware every day. The goal of malware analysis is not to reveal every single detail of the malware. It is more important to develop tools for efficiency or introduce automation to avoid repeating the same analysis process. Therefore, malware analysts usually actively develop tools and build analysis systems. On the other hand, it costs a lot for such tool developments and system maintenance. Incident trends change daily, and malware keeps evolving. However, it is not easy to keep up with new threats. Malware analysts spend a long time maintaining their analysis systems, and it results in reducing their time for necessary analysis of new types of malware. To solve these problems, we incorporate DevOps practices into malware analysis to reduce the cost of system maintenance by using CI/CD and Serverless. This presentation shares our experience on how CI/CD, Serverless, and other cloud technologies can be used to streamline malware analysis. Specifically, the following case studies are discussed. * Malware C2 Monitoring * Malware Hunting using Cloud * YARA CI/CD system * Malware Analysis System on Cloud * Memory Forensic on Cloud Through the above case studies, we will share the benefits and tips of using the cloud and show how to build a similar system using Infrastructure as Code (IaC). The audience will learn how to improve the efficiency of malware analysis and build a malware analysis system using Cloud infrastructure.

[cb22] What I learned from the direct confrontation with the adversaries who ...

CODE BLUE

In November 2019, I started monitoring the Bitcoin operation by the adversaries who hid IP addresses of their C&C server in the blockchain. In June 2020, I started collaborating with Professor Christian Doerr of the Hasso Plattner Institute based on the idea of redirecting C&C server communication to a sinkhole server (called takeover), and we successfully achieved this in August. However, the adversaries quickly took evasive action, where they managed to implement an evasion mechanism in only two weeks and restarted their attack. Although we could not conduct our takeover, our monitoring system could worked well. The end of their attack was brought upon by the surge in Bitcoin prices. Due to the fees for the Bitcoin miners, a transaction had reduced the adversaries' profits, and we confirmed the last C&C update was in January 2021 and the abandonment of the attack infrastructure came in March. Since then, no similar attacks have been observed by my monitoring system. Although this attack has already concluded and is unlikely to restart unless the value of Bitcoin declines, I would like to share the know-how I have learned through the direct confrontation with the adversaries. That is, at the time of the confrontation with them, this attack was highly novel, and the adversaries themselves did not fully understand the best solution for its' operation. They needed to evolve their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) while operating the system. We carefully analyzed their TTPs and tried to catch them off their guard. Even more troublesome was the need to understand as quickly as possible what they intended to do each time they were affected by the Bitcoin halving or making a simple operational error. This presentation is a culmination my insights learned from interactions with these adversaries and I am looking forward to sharing this information with everyone.

[cb22] ブロックチェーンにC&Cサーバー情報を隠ぺいした攻撃者との直接対峙により得られたもの by 谷口剛

CODE BLUE

本研究では 2019 年 11 月から C&C サーバーの IP アドレスをブロックチェーンに隠ぺいした攻撃者のビットコイン運用監視を開始した。2020 年 6 月に C&C サーバ通信をシンクホールサーバへ直接誘導する (テイクオーバーと呼ぶ) アイデアによる国際協業を Hasso Plattner Institute の Christian Doerr 教授と開始し、8 月にテイクオーバーに成功した。攻撃者のテイクオーバー回避は早く、約 2 週間で回避メカニズムを実装し攻撃を再開した。テイクオーバーは回避されてしまったが、ビットコイン運用監視は機能し続けた。この攻撃の終息はビットコイン高騰がきっかけとなった。ビットコイン取引における採掘者への手数料が利益を圧迫する要因となり、2021 年 1 月に最後の C&C 情報の更新、3 月に攻撃インフラ放棄を確認した。その後、本研究の監視範囲において同種の攻撃は観察されていない。この攻撃はすでに終息し、ビットコインの価値が下がらない限り再開される可能性は低いが、本講演では攻撃者との直接対峙により得られたノウハウを共有したい。つまり、攻撃者と対峙していた当時、この攻撃は新規性が高く、攻撃者自身も最適な運用方法を理解できていなかった。運用しながら攻撃手法を進化させる必要があり、われわれも攻撃手法を慎重に分析しながら隙を狙っていた。さらに厄介なのが、攻撃者がビットコイン半減期の影響を受けたり、単純な運用ミスをしたりして、そのたびに、われわれも攻撃者の意図を可能な限り早く理解しなければならなかったという点だ。この対峙により得られた知見は、本講演者による CODE BLUE 講演でも活かしており、本質的なノウハウとして共有する。

[cb22] SMARTIAN: Enhancing Smart Contract Fuzzing with Static and Dynamic Da...

CODE BLUE

Unlike traditional software, smart contracts have the unique organization in which a sequence of transactions shares persistent states. Unfortunately, such a characteristic makes it difficult for existing fuzzers to find out critical transaction sequences. To tackle this challenge, we employ both static and dynamic analyses for fuzzing smart contracts. First, we statically analyze smart contract bytecodes to predict which transaction sequences will lead to effective testing, and figure out if there is a certain constraint that each transaction should satisfy. Such information is then passed to the fuzzing phase and used to construct an initial seed corpus. During a fuzzing campaign, we perform a lightweight dynamic data-flow analysis to collect data-flow-based feedback to effectively guide fuzzing. We implement our ideas on a practical open-source fuzzer, named SMARTIAN. SMARTIAN can discover bugs in real-world smart contracts without the need for the source code. Our experimental results show that SMARTIAN is more effective than existing state-of-the-art tools in finding known CVEs from real-world contracts. SMARTIAN also outperforms other tools in terms of code coverage.

[cb22] Scaling the Security Researcher to Eliminate OSS Vulnerabilities Once ...

CODE BLUE

Imagine a world where a security researcher becomes aware of a security vulnerability, impacting thousands of Open Source Software (OSS) projects, and is enabled to both identify and fix them all at once. Now imagine a world where a vulnerability is introduced into your production code and a few moments later you receive an automated pull request to fix it. Hundreds of thousands of human hours are invested every year in finding common security vulnerabilities with relatively simple fixes. These vulnerabilities aren't sexy, cool, or new, we've known about them for years, but they're everywhere! The scale of GitHub and tools like CodeQL (GitHub's code query language) enable one to scan for vulnerabilities across hundreds of thousands of OSS projects, but the challenge is how to scale the triaging, reporting, and fixing. Simply automating the creation of thousands of bug reports by itself isn't useful, and would be even more of a burden on volunteer maintainers of OSS projects. Ideally, the maintainers would be provided with not only information about the vulnerability, but also a fix in the form of an easily actionable pull request. When facing a problem of this scale, what is the most efficient way to leverage researcher knowledge to fix the most vulnerabilities across OSS? This talk will cover a highly scalable solution - automated bulk pull request generation. We'll discuss the practical applications of this technique on real world OSS projects. We'll also cover technologies like CodeQL and OpenRewrite (a style-preserving refactoring tool created at Netflix and now developed by Moderne). Let's not just talk about vulnerabilities, let's actually fix them at scale. This work is sponsored by the new Dan Kaminsky Fellowship; a fellowship created to celebrate Dan's memory and legacy by funding open-source work that makes the world a better (and more secure) place.

LoRaWAN 4チャンネル電流センサー・コンバーター CS01-LB 日本語マニュアル

CRI Japan, Inc.

FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Welcome Slides.pdf

FIDO Alliance

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LoRaWAN 4チャンネル電流センサー・コンバーター CS01-LB 日本語マニュアル

CRI Japan, Inc.

FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Welcome Slides.pdf

FIDO Alliance

単腕マニピュレータによる複数物体の同時組み立ての基礎的考察 / Basic Approach to Robotic Assembly of Multi...

Fukuoka Institute of Technology

セル生産方式におけるロボットの活用には様々な問題があるが，その一つとして 3 体以上の物体の組み立てが挙げられる．一般に，複数物体を同時に組み立てる際は，対象の部品をそれぞれロボットアームまたは治具でそれぞれ独立に保持することで組み立てを遂行すると考えられる．ただし，この方法ではロボットアームや治具を部品数と同じ数だけ必要とし，部品数が多いほどコスト面や設置スペースの関係で無駄が多くなる．この課題に対して音𣷓らは組み立て対象物に働く接触力等の解析により，治具等で固定されていない対象物が組み立て作業中に運動しにくい状態となる条件を求めた．すなわち，環境中の非把持対象物のロバスト性を考慮して，組み立て作業条件を検討している．本研究ではこの方策に基づいて，複数物体の組み立て作業を単腕マニピュレータで実行することを目的とする．このとき，対象物のロバスト性を考慮することで，仮組状態の複数物体を同時に扱う手法を提案する．作業対象としてパイプジョイントの組み立てを挙げ，簡易な道具を用いることで単腕マニピュレータで複数物体を同時に把持できることを示す．さらに，作業成功率の向上のために RGB-D カメラを用いた物体の位置検出に基づくロボット制御及び動作計画を実装する． This paper discusses assembly operations using a single manipulator and a parallel gripper to simultaneously grasp multiple objects and hold the group of temporarily assembled objects. Multiple robots and jigs generally operate assembly tasks by constraining the target objects mechanically or geometrically to prevent them from moving. It is necessary to analyze the physical interaction between the objects for such constraints to achieve the tasks with a single gripper. In this paper, we focus on assembling pipe joints as an example and discuss constraining the motion of the objects. Our demonstration shows that a simple tool can facilitate holding multiple objects with a single gripper.

CS集会#13_なるほどわからん通信技術　発表資料

Yuuitirou528 default

FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: LY-DOCOMO-KDDI-Mercari Panel.pdf

FIDO Alliance

FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: PlayStation Passkey Deployment Case Study.pdf

FIDO Alliance

TaketoFujikawa_物語のコンセプトに基づく情報アクセス手法の基礎検討_JSAI2024

Matsushita Laboratory

論文紹介: Offline Q-Learning on diverse Multi-Task data both scales and generalizes

atsushi061452

MPAなWebフレームワーク、Astroの紹介 (その2) 2024/05/24の勉強会で発表されたものです。

iPride Co., Ltd.

【DLゼミ】XFeat: Accelerated Features for Lightweight Image Matching

harmonylab

公開URL：https://arxiv.org/pdf/2404.19174 出典：Guilherme Potje, Felipe Cadar, Andre Araujo, Renato Martins, Erickson R. ascimento: XFeat: Accelerated Features for Lightweight Image Matching, Proceedings of the 2024 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR) (2023) 概要：リソース効率に優れた特徴点マッチングのための軽量なアーキテクチャ「XFeat（Accelerated Features）」を提案します。手法は、局所的な特徴点の検出、抽出、マッチングのための畳み込みニューラルネットワークの基本的な設計を再検討します。特に、リソースが限られたデバイス向けに迅速かつ堅牢なアルゴリズムが必要とされるため、解像度を可能な限り高く保ちながら、ネットワークのチャネル数を制限します。さらに、スパース下でのマッチングを選択できる設計となっており、ナビゲーションやARなどのアプリケーションに適しています。XFeatは、高速かつ同等以上の精度を実現し、一般的なラップトップのCPU上でリアルタイムで動作します。

FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: CloudGate.pdf

FIDO Alliance

論文紹介：When Visual Prompt Tuning Meets Source-Free Domain Adaptive Semantic Seg...

Toru Tamaki

2024年度_サイバーエージェント_新卒研修「データベースの歴史」.pptx

yassun7010

YugabyteDB適用に向けた取り組みと隠れた魅力 (DSS Asia 2024 発表資料)

NTT DATA Technology & Innovation

FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: NEC & Yubico Panel.pdf

FIDO Alliance

【AI論文解説】Consistency ModelとRectified Flow

Sony - Neural Network Libraries

YouTube nnabla channelの次の動画で利用したスライドです。【AI論文解説】Consistency ModelとRectified Flow https://youtu.be/3IKCrAPe55k Consistency ModelとRectified Flowに関連する以下の論文を紹介しています。 Consistency models（解説編Part1で紹介） - “Consistency Models,” ICML 2023. - “Improved Techniques for Training Consistency Models,” ICLR 2024. - “Consistency Trajectory Models: Learning Probability Flow ODE Trajectory of Diffusion,” ICLR 2024. Rectified flow（解説編Part2で紹介） - “Flow Straight and Fast: Learning to Generate and Transfer Data with Rectified Flow,” ICLR 2023. - “InstaFlow: One Step is Enough for High-Quality Diffusion-Based Text-to-Image Generation,” ICLR 2024.