CSBA Martinage Offset Strategy

1. 1
Exploiting U.S. Long
ng-
g-Term Advantages to Restore
ploiting U.S. Lon
ng
g erm Advantages to Resto
Te
T
U.S. Global Power Projection Capability
Robert Martinage
e –
– Senior Fellow

2. 2
Introduction
Antecedents of a “Third” Offset
Strategy
Why Not “Business As Usual”?
Enduring U.S. Advantages
Implementing a New Offset
Strategy: The GSS Concept
Conclusions
Agenda

3. 3
Introduction
• DoD
D faces a period of fiscal austerity of unknown duration
• Nevertheless, numerous national security challenges cannot
Nevertheless,
be ignored:
–
– Resurgent Russia
–
Resurgent Russia
R
R
–
– China seeks hegemony in East Asia
–
China seeks hegemony in East Asia
C
C
–
– North Korea as belligerent as ever
–
North Korea as belligerent as ever
N
N
–
– Iran expanding its missile arsenal, pursuing nuclear weapons
–
Iran expanding its missile arsenal, pursuing nuclear weapons
I
I
–
– Radical Islamic threat in Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, Central Asia
–
Radical Islamic threat in Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, Central Asia
R
R
– Adversaries deploying A2/AD systems specifically designed to threaten
– Adversaries deploying A2/AD systems specifica
Adversaries deploying A2/AD systems specifica
A
A
traditional U.S. methods of power projection
An offset strategy is needed to address growing scale and
complexity of security challenges in a fiscally constrained
ty challenges in a
ty challenges in a
environment

4. 4
Introduction
Antecedents of a “Third”
Offset Strategy
Why Not “Business As Usual”?
Enduring U.S. Advantages
Implementing a New Offset
Strategy: The GSS Concept
Conclusions
Outline

5. 5
Historical Antecedents
Past DoD Efforts to Offset Numerical Inferiority:
• 1950s – President Eisenhower’s “New Look” defense policy
emphasizes large numbers of nuclear weapons, long-range
bombers, and missiles.
• 1970s – Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Under
Secretary William Perry direct DoD to develop stealth,
precision strike weapons, and improved C4ISR.
President Eisenhower John Foster Dulles Harold Brown
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
M-65 Atomic Canon
“Atomic Annie”
HB1001
“Have Blue”
1950s 1970s

6. 6
Eisenhower’s “New Look”
• Eisenhower determined to deter the USSR
isenhower determined to deter
without bankrupting America.
– Soviet conventional forces greatly outnumbered U.S. forces
– Soviets could probe periphery and start proxy wars to exhaust U.S., as in Korea
1950–53
• Emphasized nuclear weapons, bomber forces, and missile forces as
Emphasized nuclear weapons, bom
backstop to conventional forces:
– Accelerated fielding of the hydrogen bomb
– B-47 and B-52 bombers with KC-135 tankers
– Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman ICBMs
– George Washington SSBN with Polaris SLBMs
– U-2 and Corona satellite for strategic reconnaissance
– BMEWS, Nike, airborne alerts, dispersal, and silos for survivability
•
, , , p ,
Air Force budget increased to 47% of
,
f DoD
D spending;
Air Force budget increased to 47% o
of oD
DoD
Army and Marine Corps budgets shrank
U-2 Dragon Lady
Atlas
• Ei
Ei
w
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
B-47

7. 7
Eisenhower’s “New Look”
• Nation needs a
a balanced strategy
y to
Nation needs a
a alanced strategy
ba y o
to
confront full range of anticipated threats.
• Global air warfare capability
y provides valuable
e strategic
Global air warfare capab
freedom of maneuver.
• Threats of
of
f asymmetric punishment
nt can be an effective
Threats o
of symmetric punis
as
instrument of deterrence.
• Covert operations
s can provide an affordable option for
Covert operations an provide a
ca
achieving national objectives.
• Alliances matter – they complicate enemy planning and
impose costs on competitors
rs
rs.
U-2 Dragon Lady
Atlas
• N
N
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
B-47
N i d l d
b
N
The Key Lessons

8. 8
Brown / Perry Offset Strategy:
Stealth, C4ISR and Precision Strike
• SecDef
ef Harold Brown and USD William Perry devised technological
cDe
ef Harold Brown and USD William Perry devised technologic
H
“offset strategy” to counter 1970s Soviet conventional buildup.
•
• Core thrusts were
e ISR, PGMs, stealth
h
h a
aircraft, anti
t
t -
ti
ti-armor
• Core thrusts were
C
weapons, space
ere
ce
ce-
SR, PGMs s
IS
I
ere
e
e
e-
-based ISR /
stealth
Ms, s
/
/ comms
a craft, an
rc
i t
ti-a
th
h a
s
s
s / navigation
– Genesis of F-117, B-2, JSTARS, AWACS, GPS, ATACMS, BAT
•
• Capabilities became integral to 1980s
s AirLand
d Battle concept
•
• Key Lessons:
– Technology multiplied combat effectiveness
– Shifted competition into areas of U.S. advantage
– “High-low” mix to meet scale of global presence requirement
– Institutional commitment to “offset strategy” persisted
from Carter to Reagan administration
Assault Breaker
ATACMS
E-8 JSTARS
Missile
with Bus
PAVE Mover
Surface Launcher Fusion Center Targets
Terminally Guided
Sub-Munitions
•
• Sec
S
• Sec
S
“of
“
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8

9. 9
Toward a Third Offset Strategy
• New offset strategy should
d exploit enduring U.S. advantages
s in
New offset strategy should
d
unmanned operations, long
d
ng-
ploit e
xp
x
ex
g-range
nduring
it e
e and low
ring
w-
U.S. advantage
U
ng
w-observable air
unmanned
unmanned op
operations,
peration
perations, l
d op
d op
s undersea
lon
lon
n
ng
ng
g
g- ange
ange
a
a
ra
ra
r e
e nd low
nd low
an
an w
w
w
w- bservable air
bservable air
ob
ob
o
o
ns, l
ns, l
a warfare, and complex systems engineering in
operati
operations
order to
s,
s, ndersea
ndersea
un
un a
a arfare, and complex systems engineerin
arf
fa
are, an
are,
are d compl
d co e
ex systems enginee
ex sy
ex s
w
w
ons
ons
s
s
o
o project power despite adversary A2/AD capabilities
g
erin
es
es.
• N
N
New
w strategy should also:
– Reduce dependence on forward bases and space-based capabilities
– Foster novel concepts of operation that leverage mix of new and legacy
capabilities
– Increase emphasis on deterrence by denial and punishment rather than the
threat to restore the status quo
• Premium on survivable forward presence and global responsiveness
• Hold targets at risk within A2/AD umbrella and outside immediate combat zone
– Impose long-term costs upon rivals
– Leverage alliances to gain positional advantage and share burdens
• N
N
u
u
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9

10. 10
Antecedents of a “Third” Offset
Strategy
Why Not “Business As Usual”?
Enduring U.S. Advantages
Implementing a New Offset
Strategy: The GSS Concept
Conclusions
Outline

11. 11
Power Projection:
The Capacity Challenge
• 2014 QDR
R
R argues that U.S. will have sufficient military capacity to defeat
014 QDR
R rgues that U.S. will have sufficient military capacity to defeat
ar
one aggressor and “deny the objectives of, or impose unacceptable costs
ne aggressor and deny the objectives of, o
ne aggre
essor and deny the objectives of, o
esso
on, another aggressor in another region.”
• US will
ll likely lack the capacity to fight and win two major theater wars in
US will kely lack the capac
lik
overlapping timeframes
apac
s
s –
ci
pac
– if
y to fight and win two major theater
ity
ci
f
f
if
if we don’t project power differently.
• As the
e 2014 National Defense Panel Review
w notes:
– “A global war-fighting capability [is] the sine qua non of a superpower and
thus essential to the credibility of America’s overall national security strategy.”
– “U.S. military must have the capability and capacity to deter or stop
aggression in multiple theaters – not just one – even when engaged in a large-
scale war.”
• 20
20
20
o
o
o
11
11
11
11
1
11
11
11
11
1
11
11
11
1
11
1
11
1
11
11
11
1
11
1
11
11
11
11
11
11

12. 12
Power Projection:
The Capability Challenge
• Traditional approach to power projection:
– Build up combat power and logistical support.
– Maximize airpower sortie generation from close-in land- and sea-bases.
– Employ heavy mechanized ground forces.
• Problems with the traditional approach:
– Requires political access to forward bases and littoral waters.
– Depends on unimpeded use of ports and airfields.
– Strategically unresponsive – requires months to prepare.
– Difficult to implement in multiple theaters simultaneously.
– Entails growing operational risk…

13. 13
Operational Risks with the
Traditional Approach
Kinetic ASAT
DF
DF-
F
F
F
F
F
F-
F
F
F
F 21
Kilo, Song
g -
g Class SSN
Hong
ng-
g
g
g
g
g
g-6 Bomber
DF
DF-
F
F
F
F
F-
F
F
F
F 15
DF
DF-
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F-
F
F
F
F 15 variant
DF
DF-
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F-
F
F
F
F
F 11A
DF
DF-
F
F
F
F
F
F-
F
F
F
F 15
DF
DF-
F
F
F
F
F
F
F-
F
F
F
F 11A
DF
DF-
F
F
F
F
F
F
F-
F
F
F
F 21D
SA
SA-
A-N
-N-
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N-20
Sovremenny Destroyer
SA
SA-
A-
-
-22
S300
HQ
HQ-
Q
Q
Q
Q-9
HY
HY-
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y-
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y 2
C
C-
C
C
C
C
C
C-704/NASR
HY
HY
HY-
H
HY
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y-
Y
Y
Y 2
H
H
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y-
-
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y 3A
DH
DH-
H
H
H
H
H
H
H
H-10
Sovremenny
y
y
y
y Destroy
D
30 days at 650 nm
75 days at 1,760 nm
Kilo, Song
g
g - lass SS
C
C
18 days at 930 nm
D t
D
1 day at 130 nm
Laser ASAT
Modern
Modern
Fighters
1 day at 130 nm
Fast Attack Craft
Over
er-
Ove
the
-
ve
er
r
r
r-
he
e-
th
he
e-
Horizon
on
H zo
oriz
Radar
Sea Mines
Anti
nt -
ti Satellite
An
nt
ti-
- atellite
Sa
S
Capabilities
Anti
t -
ti Ship
O
An
nt
ti- hip
Sh
S
Ballistic Missiles
Land
nd-
d Attack
Lan
nd
d- ttack
At
A
Ballistic Missiles
Land
nd-
d Attack /
Lan
Anti
n
nd
nt
t -
ttac
At
A
A
nd
d-A
ti
i Ship
2
2
H
HY
Y 2
H
A
A
A
A
A
A
R
A
A
A
A
R An
nt
t
ti
i- p
hip
h
Sh
Sh
S
Cruise Missiles
Advanced
Advanc
IADS
Space
ce-
e based
Spac
ISR/
- ased
ba
b
ac
ce
e
/
R/
/Comms
sed
ms/
ed
s/
/Nav
Strategic
Strategi
g
g
g
g
g
g c
depth/breadth
Hon
ng
g Bomber
6
6
Maritime Strike
Maritime
Aircraft
Advanced Submarines
Naval Surface Forces
G
G-
G-RAMM attacks on bases
G
G AMM attacks on base
A
RA
R
CBRN attacks on bases
Long Range
Long Ra
AAMs
Counter-
r PGM
Counte
e
er- G
PG
P
defenses
Laser ASAT
Directed
Directed
Directed
Energy
“Armed Merchant
Armed Me
“A
Cruisers”
• Close-in ports
and airbases
vulnerable to
attack
• Surface ships
and carriers
easier to detect,
track, and
attack at range
• Non-stealthy
aircraft
vulnerable to
modern IADS
• Space no longer
a sanctuary ys at 1 760 nm
75 day
Shang Class SSN
Cl i
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
13
3
3
13
13
13
3
13
13
13
1
13
13
13
3
13
13
1
13
13
13
13
3
3
13

14. 14
Strategic Risks with the
Traditional Approach
• Crisis Instability:
– Strong incentive for enemy to preemptively attack forward U.S. bases, forces, and
on-orbit satellites
• Cost Imposition on the United States:
– Defending regional hubs is very costly and cheaply countered
•
g g y y p y
Waning deterrent credibility and Allied confidence
ce:
– Enemies may increasingly perceive the likely cost of U.S. intervention as high
– Allies may begin to question credibility of U.S. security commitments
• Cr
–
14
Mobile TELs
ALCMs
Leakers
Leakers
SLCMs
Leakers

15. 15
Antecedents of a “Third” Offset
Strategy
Why Not “Business As Usual”?
Enduring U.S. Advantages
Implementing a New Offset
Strategy: The GSS Concept
Conclusions
Outline

16. 16
Leverage Key Enduring Sources of
U.S. Advantage
– Unmanned operations
– Extended-range air operations
– Low-observable air operations
– Undersea warfare
– Complex systems engineering and integration

17. 17
Unmanned Operations
• U.S. is a world leader in unmanned systems development and
U.S. is a world leader in unmanned systems development a
operation, as well as artificial intelligence and autonomy.
– We have maintained large numbers of UAS, employed them in combat, and
trained operators two decades.
• Unmanned systems can provide
e responsive, persistent coverage
Unmanned systems can provide
e esponsive, persisten
re
needed to find and attack mobile targets over wide
t cove
ten
e
e areas
• Unmanned systems offer
g
er
er much lower life
fe
fe-
e
e-cycle costs
s
s relative to
Unmanned system
manned aircraft
• Current
nt
nt and planned joint UAS fleet primarily consists of short
rt-
t- and
Current
medium
t
m-
d planned joint UAS
nd
n
an
m-range aircraft, and
S fleet pr
UAS
d
d consists
rimarily consists of sho
t pr
s
s almost entirely of non
sho
on
on-
rt
t- nd
a
a
or
r
sho
n
n-stealthy
medium
medium
m
m
m
m
m-r
r
aircraft.
•
Medium Range
Medium
MQ
ium
Q-
Rang
R
um
Q
Q 1B/C
M
MQ
MQ
Q
Q
MQ
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q-
/C
/C
B/
B/
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q- B
B
B
B
1
1
Q
Q 8B
M
M
M
M
MQ
M
MQ
MQ
MQ-
B
B
B
B
8B
8B
8
8
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q-
-8
8
8
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q 9A
MQ
MQ
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q-
-
- A
A
9
9A
9
9
UCLASS
U
UC
RQ
UC
UC
Q
RQ-
SS
SS
SS
S
AS
AS
CLA
C
CLA
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q-170
Long Range
Long Ra
RQ
g Ra
RQ-
nge
an
g Ra
Q
Q 4B
R
R
RQ
RQ
MQ
Q
Q
Q
Q
MQ
MQ
Q-
B
B
B
B
B
B
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q-
-
-
-4B
4B
4
4
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q-
-
-
-4C
Joint UAS Fleet, FY17
Unbalanced Range
Non
on-
n
n
n
n-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-Stealthy
No
on
n tealthy
t
S
Predator
Predator
P
Predator
Pred
Pred
Reaper
Reaper
Reaper
Fire Scout
Fire Scout
Fire Scout
Global Hawk
Global Haw
Global Haw
Triton
Semi
m -
mi
i-
-
-
-
-Stealthy
em
m
mi tealth
St
S
UCLASS
U
U
UCL
RQ
UC
UCL
RQ
RQ-
SS
SS
AS
AS
CLA
CLA
CLA
CL
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q-170
Joint UAS Fleet, FY17
Unbalanced Stealth
Predator Ground
Control Station
Avionics specialists
prepare a Global Hawk
MQ-9 takeoff

18. 18
Extended-Range Air Operations
• U.S. has unmatched capability for high
gh-
h-tempo
U.S. has unmatched
global ISR / strike.
– Over seventy years of experience developing, building, maintaining,
and using heavy bombers in combat.
– Aerial refueling is a key enabler for manned operations, and will have
an even more profound effect on unmanned operations.
•
p
Bombers have the long
g combat radius
s to
p
p
o
o enable rapid, global
Bombers have the l
response to short
he l
rt-
ong
g ombat radiu
co
o
he l
t-notice aggression
s
dius
on.
– Crew fatigue limits their ability to sustain long-range operations for
extended periods.
•
p
Current and planned joint air portfolio is heavily weighted
Current and planned joint air
towards manned and short
t air
rt-
portfolio is heavily weighted
r
air
t-range fighter / attack aircraft.
Short Range
Short Range
USAF/USN
USAF/USN
USAF/USN
Fighter/Attack
Long Range
ng Ra
B
g Ra
-
ng
an
g Ra
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B-1
B-
1
B
B
B
B
B
B 1
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B-2
B-
2
2
2
2
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B 2
2
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B-52
Joint Aviation Inventory, 2014 – 2023:
Unbalanced Range
B-52 landing gear test
B-2 Spirit, KC-135 tanker
A B-1B Lancer
drops cluster
munitions
Joint Aviation Inventory, 2014 – 2023:
Unbalanced Manned/Unmanned Mix
Manned
Manned
USAF/USN
USAF/USN
USAF/USN
Fighter/Attack
Fighter/Attack
Fighter/Attack
Long Range Strike
Long Range Strike
Long Range Strike
Manned ISR Aircraft
Unmanned
Unma
MQ
nma
MQ
MQ-
nned
n
ma
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q-1, MQ
ed
MQ
MQ-
d
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q-9, RQ
RQ-
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q-
-
-
-4, MQ
MQ-
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q-
-
-4, MQ
MQ-
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q-
-8, UCLASS

19. 19
Low-Observable Air Operations
• U.S. has significant qualitative lead in design, manufacture,
U.S. has significant qualitative
and operation of LO aircraft.
– Stealth aircraft employed in Desert Storm (1991), Kosovo (1999),
Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), Libya (2011), and Syria (2014).
• Stealth enables precision attacks in
n denied airspace
ce.
• Current
nt
t and planned joint air portfolio is
s heavily weighted
Curren
nt
towards
nd pl
t n
an
non
d pl
-
anned joint air p
a
pl
stealthy aircraft
o
ir p
.
• F
F
F-
F
F 35 and F
F
F-
F
F 22 are more stealthy than fourth
th-
h generation
F
F- 5 and
35
3 F
F- 2 are more stealt
22
2
fighters but have the same
thy than fourt
th
h- eneration
ge
g
ealt
e disadvantages resulting from
g te s but a e t e sa
f
fighters b
figh
figh but have the same
ut h
ut
their short combat radius
d
d
e
me
e
e
us
us.
Non
on-
n
n
n
n
n-
-
-
-
-
-
-Stealthy
No
on
n tealthy
t
S
USAF/USN
USAF/USN
U
US
SAF/USN
SAF/
SAF
Fighter/Attack,
ig
ighter
B
gh
ghter
B-
/
/Att
r/
r/
hter
hter
B
B
B
B
B
B
B-1, B
/
/Att
B-
ack
ack
ta
ta
/Att
/Att
B
B
B
B
B
B
B-52
Semi
m -
mi
i-
-
-Stealthy
m
m
mi
F
mi
-
ealt
e
te
t
S
F 35
F-
5
5
35
35
F
F
F
F-
-
-3
3
3
F
F
F-22
Stealthy
Stealt
B
ealt
-
hy
th
ealt
B
B
B-2
Joint Aviation Inventory, 2014 – 2023:
Unbalanced Stealth
F-117
Nighthawk
drops a guided
bomb
B-2 Spirit
Night
vision
aerial
refueling

20. 20
Undersea Warfare
• USN submarine force was victorious in WW2 and has
USN submarine force was victorious in WW2 and ha
conducted constant SSN/SSBN patrols since 1958.
– USN used TLAMs in combat many times since 1991.
• SSNs permit operations in A2/AD environments and are
SSNs permit operations in
difficult, costly, and time
s in
me
me-
A2/AD environments a
A
in
e
e-consuming to counter.
• Current and planned overall Navy force structure is
Current and planned overall Navy force structure is
weighted towards surface forces, not submarine forces.
– In FY28, SSNs drop to 41 boats and SSGNs retire
• Undersea payload capacity in 2028 will be
e 38% of 2014 capacity
– Fewer than 12 SSBNs from FY30 to FY42
Surface
Surface
CVN
CVN
CVN
CG/DDG
CG/DDG
CG/DDG
FFG/LCS
FFG/LCS
FFG/LCS
Amphibious Ships
Amphibious Ships
mphibious Sh
Combat Logistics Ships
Subsurface
ubsurfac
SSN
SSN
SSN
SSBN
Navy Force Structure, 2030
“Wet training” aboard
SUBTRFAC
Dry dock bow repair
PCU Virginia
(SSN 774)

21. 21
Complex Systems Engineering
• Military and defense industry have designed, built, and
Military and defense industry have designed, bu
operated very complex weapons systems and
operated very c
operated very c
architectures.
• To exploit this advantage, the U.S. should link
To exploit this advantage, the U.S. should link
heterogeneous, geographically distributed platforms into a
heterogeneous, g
heterogeneous, geog
global surveillance
ge
geog
ce
ce-
raphically distri
raphically distri
g
g
eog
eog
e
e-strike network.

22. 22
Antecedents of a “Third” Offset
Strategy
Why Not “Business As Usual”?
Enduring U.S. Advantages
Implementing a New Offset
Strategy: The GSS Concept
Conclusions
Outline

23. 23
The Joint Global Surveillance Strike (GSS)
Network
• Leverage enduring advantages in the five capability areas to
verage enduring advantages in the five capability area
ev
create a joint global surveillance strike (GSS) network.
• Attributes of the GSS:
–
– Balanced: Tailored attributes for different roles and environments
–
– Resilient: Less dependent on close-in bases, reduced sensitivity to air
defense threat, tolerant of disruption in space capability
–
– Responsive: Able to generate surveillance-strike presence within hours
of decision to do so
–
– Scalable:Can be expanded to influence events in multiple locations
around the world concurrently
• With “high
gh-
h-low” mix of elements, GSS network could be cost
st-
With hig
gh
h
effective in
ow m
h- o
o
lo
n both
mix o
m
h low
ix o
w
w-
f elements, GSS netwo
of
x o
w
w-medium and medium
two
m
m-
rk could be c
or
wo
m
m-high threat
effective in
effective in
n
n
n oth
oth
bo
bo
bo
b h
h
environments.
• L
Le
e
Le

24. 24
Exploiting Advantages in
Unmanned Operations
• Employ UAS to maintain persistent ISR
SR-
R-strike orbits and
mploy UAS to maintain pers
hedge against loss of space
pers
-
istent IS
SR
R- trike orbits and
t
s
si
ers
based ISR, navigation, timing, and
communications
• Develop
p automated aerial refueling
g for UAS:
– Refuelable UAS offer extended mission endurance with low life-cycle
cost, and are an affordable way to provide scalable, persistent coverage
over multiple areas at once.
• Rebalance UAS fleet
et with acquisition of three new survivable,
Rebala
long
bala
ng
ng-
nce UAS flee
et w
a
bala
g
g-range systems:
1. Stealthy HALE ISR UAS
2. Stealthy, refuelable land-based UCAS
3. Stealthy, refuelable sea-based UCAS
• Acquire UUVs and payload modules to
o expand limited SSN
Acquire U
capacity
• E
E
E

25. 25
Exploiting Advantages in
Long-Range / LO Air Operations
• Harness synergy between low passive radar signatures and
advance electronic
c
c attack.
• Focus R&D on enhanced
d
d IR signature
e management.
• Future joint long-range ISR and strike fleet should be
increasingly unmanned and survivable
le
le.
• D
g y
D
Develop and field stealthy HALE UAS, stealthy land
nd-
d- and sea
ea-
D velop and field st
ev
based UCAS, and
teal
ld st
d LRS
teal
RS-
eal
S-B
y HALE UAS
thy
lt
al
B
B to sustain
S, stealthy lan
UAS
n
n U.S. advantage
n
nd
e
e in
nd se
ea-
- n
a
a
d
d-
n
n
n
n
n global,
ba
bas
low
as
as
w
w-
UCAS, and
UCAS, and
d
d R
R
LR
LR
RS
RS
S
S-B
B
B
B
B
B o sustain
o sustain
to
to
d
d
sed
sed
s
w
w-observable air operations.
•
p
Missions to include:
– Wide-area surveillance
– Electronic attack
– High-volume precision strike and HDBT defeat
– Persistent surveillance-attack
– Mining and ASuW
a

26. 26
Exploiting Advantages in
Undersea Operations
• SSNs and SSGNs to provide covert ISR coverage and SOF
support in peacetime, as well as ASW,
W,
W ASuW
W
W
W
W, counter
e
e -
r
r-
-sensor,
support in pea
and counter
pea
e
e -
cetime, as well as ASW
W, A
a
pea
r
r-
-land attacks in wartime.
• Navy should expand undersea strike capacity, including
ability to conduct electronic attack, counter
e
e -
r
r
r-
-sensor, and
ability to
counter
to
e
e -
conduct electro
c
to
r
r-
-air operations.
• To mitigate decline in SSN/SSGN force structure:
– Procure Virginia Payload Module
– Field family of UUVs for littoral operations
– Develop towed and seabed payload modules
– Develop wider array of undersea
weapons
sup
Towed
Payload
Module
Virginia
Payload
Module
Upward
falling
Seabed
payload
modules

27. 27
Exploiting Advantages in
Complex Systems Engineering
• GSS should link the nodes within a resilient and protected C3
architecture.
• Develop advanced battle management system to fuse and
Develop advanced battle management system to fuse an
correlate ISR data, as well as to allocate ISR and strike
resources quickly and efficiently.
• Initially rely on legacy C3 paths and core GSS platforms, and
Initially rely on legacy C3 paths and core GSS platforms, a
over time, add more nodes and communications paths.
a

28. 28
Selected GSS Network Elements –
Restore Balance Across Threat Spectrum
Manned
Unmanned
Responsiveness
Threat Level
B-2
LRS-B
SSN
SSGN
B-1
B-52
Tankers
P-8
AWACS
JSTARS
Army SOF
CG
DDG
CVN
F-35
F-22
Army A2/AD
Networks
F-15
F-16 F-18
E-2D
LCS
MQ-X
UUV
Payload Modules
Global Hawk Triton
N-UCAS
RQ-170
MQ-1
MQ-9
MQ-8
Army / USMC
Ground Forces
New HALE
ISR UAS

29. 29
GSS Implementation Actions
• What should we do to make GSS a reality?
– Accelerate development and potentially expand procurement of LRS-B
– Develop and field stealthy HALE UAS
– Develop and field stealthy, refuelable, carrier- and land-based UCAS
– Automated aerial refueling (especially for UAS/UCAS)
– Counter-space capability to deter attacks on US satellites
– GPS alternatives such as HALE UAS “pseudolites,” advanced IMUs, and
miniaturized atomic clocks
• W
–

30. 30
GSS Implementation Actions, cont’d
• What else should we develop and field?
– Multi-mission, long-endurance UUVs
– Undersea strike: Virginia Payload Module, seabed payload pods, towed
payloads, improved TLAM, multi-mission missiles, sub-launched
conventional ballistic missile
– Expanded undersea sensor networks
– Improved naval mines and long-range ASW weapons
– EM rail guns and directed energy weapons
– New counter-sensor weapons
– Expeditionary ground-based A2/AD, including air defense missiles,
coastal defense, mines, UUVs

31. 31
Potential Funding Offsets
• Shed excess bases, rein in personnel costs.
• Pursue burden sharing with allies
• Refocus current programs (e.g., UCLASS, F/A
/A-
A-XX,
Refoc
MQ
efoc
-
us
cu
foc
X)
• Restore balance:
–
– Scale
le
l -
e-back force structure and modernization programs
– Scal
S le
e- ack force structure and modernization progra
ba
b
optimized for power projection in permissive (low
a
ogra
w
w-
optimized for power projection i
opti
o im
mized for power projection i
miz
miz
medium threat) environments

32. 32
Antecedents of a “Third” Offset
Strategy
Why Not “Business As Usual”?
Enduring U.S. Advantages
Implementing a New Offset
Strategy: The GSS Concept
Conclusions
Outline

33. 33
Restoring U.S. Global Power Projection
With a New Offset Strategy
• Adversaries are developing their own ISR
SR
SR-
R
R-strike networks
ks—
—
—with an
Adversaries are developing the
emphasis on missile systems
g the
ms
ms—
own IS
SR
R trike network
t
st ks with an
w
eir
he
—
—
—
—to challenge conventional U.S. power
emphasis on
projection
• To “offset,”
” DoD
D should leverage its “core competencies” in
To offset, oD
DoD hould lev
sh
unmanned systems, long
lev
ng
ng-
erage its core
ve
lev
g
g-
-range and low
ore
w
w-
competencies in
c
ore
w
w-
-observable airpower,
unmanned systems, lon
ng
g ange and low
a
ra w
w bservable air
ob
o
undersea warfare, and complex systems engineering
• Global Surveillance
ce-
e-Strike (GSS) network with a “high
gh-
h-low” mix of
Global Surveillanc
ce
e trike (GSS) network with a hig
St
S gh
h ow mix of
o
lo
elements could provide balanced, resilient, globally responsive,
elements could provide balanced, re
scalable power projection capacity
• If deterrence fails, GSS network could deny the aggressor’s war
If deterrence fails, GSS network could deny the aggressor s war
aims, inflict asymmetric punishment, and roll back his A2/AD
aims, inflic
network
• GSS force could reach IOC in the mid
id-
d-to
o
to-
o
o-late 2020s if focused R&D
GSS force could reach IOC in the mi
id
d to
to
o
o te 2020s
a
la
begins now and the government stays the course
• A
A
A
e
e

34. 34
Questions?