Deterrence in Depth: Shaping A Pacific Defense Strategy


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This presentation was given to Centre for Military Studies, University of Copenhagen in Copenhagen, Denmark by Dr, Robbin F. Laird on May 22, 2014.

The Danish Centre for Military Studies (CMS) was established on 1 April 2010. CMS carries out strategic research and provides research-based public sector services with a focus on topical military and defence and security policy issues and provides an organisational framework for interdisciplinary research cooperation between the University of Copenhagen, other research institutions and other relevant parties.

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Deterrence in Depth: Shaping A Pacific Defense Strategy

  1. 1. This  presenta,on  was  given  to  Centre  for  Military  Studies,  University  of  Copenhagen   in  Copenhagen,  Denmark  by  Dr,  Robbin  F.  Laird  on  May  22,  2014.     The  Danish  Centre  for  Military  Studies  (CMS)  was  established  on  1  April  2010.  CMS   carries  out  strategic  research  and  provides  research-­‐based  public  sector  services  with   a  focus  on  topical  military  and  defence  and  security  policy  issues  and  provides  an   organisaDonal  framework  for  interdisciplinary  research  cooperaDon  between  the   University  of  Copenhagen,  other  research  insDtuDons  and  other  relevant  parDes.     hGp://       1  
  2. 2. This  briefing  is  based  on  our  new  book,  Rebuilding  American  Military  Power  in  the   Pacific:  A  21st  Century  Strategy  (Praeger,  2013)  and  reflects  as  well  discussions  held  in   the  Pacific  earlier  this  year.     Some  of  those  discussions  can  be  seen  in  the  Special  Report  on  Australian  Defense   Moderniza,on     hGp://­‐defense-­‐moderniza,on-­‐shaping-­‐capabili,es-­‐ for-­‐21st-­‐century-­‐opera,ons/     2  
  3. 3. This  is  a  work  in  progress  and  one  clearly  driven  by  the  evolving  strategic  context,   new  technologies  and  the  forging  of  new  concepts  of  opera,ons.     It  is  also  about  cross-­‐cuVng  moderniza,ons  among  the  US  and  its  allies  in  response   to  North  Korean  and  Chinese  military  developments  as  well,  notably  the  reach  and   range  of  missiles  and  the  “coming”  out  of  the  Chinese  forces  into  the  Pacific  at   greater  range  as  well     3  
  4. 4. This  slide  highlights  some  of  the  significant  drivers  of  change  in  the  Pacific  which  are   providing  for  pressure  points  on  US  and  allied  strategy  and  capabili,es:     The  impact  of  the  PRC;     The  second  nuclear  age  dynamics  represented  by  North  Korea  whereby  it  is  not   about  conven,onal  to  nuclear  deterrence;  its  is  about  dealing  with  a  small  nuclear   power’s  capability  right  away  if  hos,li,es  seem  imminent;     It  is  about  the  expansion  of  the  “size”  of  the  Pacific  with  the  Arc,c  opening,  a   development  akin  in  some  ways  to  the  opening  of  the  Suez  canal  on  Europe  and  Asia;     And  the  challenge  of  managing  the  sea  and  air  space  associated  with  the  transit  of   goods  and  services  over  a  vast  ocean  area  which,  in  turn,  allows  one  to  provide  for   SLOC  defense.     4  
  5. 5. The  Russians  will  become  a  mari,me  power  in  a  real  sense  with  the  Arc,c  opening   and  Canada  will  face  the  challenge  of  shaping  an  Arc,c  grid  to  manage  their  security   and  defense  challenges.     A  key  requirement  for  Canada  will  be  to  shape  a  grid  to  cover  the  full  geography,   including  her  ArcDc  interests.  If  one  conceptualizes  that  a  core  challenge  facing   Canadian  sovereignty  is  to  provide  for  security  and  defense  in  the  context  of  the  ArcDc   opening,  then  major  acquisiDons  should  be  made  over  Dme,  and  built  out  to  that   direcDon.         In  effect,  the  grid  covering  from  Northern  Europe  to  the  Northern  Pacific  and  over  the   ArcDc  –  built  with  allied  collaboraDon  –  is  clearly  a  key  challenge  but  also  one  which   could  focus  Canadian  force  development  and  also  defense  and  security  investments.  It   could  also  guide  a  way  to  think  about  public-­‐private  partnerships  in  the  region,  and   tapping  into  the  ongoing  development  of  various  Canadian  civilian  capabiliDes  that   are  relevant  to  the  ArcDc  opening.       hGp://www.frontline-­‐         5  
  6. 6. The  usual  Pacific  defense  graphic  shows  the  world  as  seen  from  the  PRC  facing  east   with  Taiwan  and  the  Taiwan  straits  and  then  Korea  and  then  Japan.         But  this  is  not  how  it  looks  from  the  US  standpoint;  the  tyranny  of  distance  is  what   greats  American  naval  and  airpower.     6  
  7. 7. As  things  stand  now,  the  core  for  the  US  effort  from  Hawaii  outward  is  to  enable  a   central  strategic  triangle,  one  that  reaches  from  Hawaii  to  Guam  and  to  Japan.  This   triangle  is  at  the  heart  of  America’s  ability  to  project  power  into  the  Western  Pacific.   With  a  20th  century  approach,  one  which  is  plaXorm-­‐centric  and  rooted  in  step  by   step  augmentaDon  of  force,  each  point  of  the  triangle  needs  to  be  garrisoned  with   significant  numbers  of  plaXorms  which  can  be  pushed  forward.  To  be  clear,  having   capability  in  this  triangle  is  a  key  element  of  what  the  United  States  can  bring  to  the   party  for  Pacific  operaDons,  and  it  remains  fundamental.  But  with  a  new  approach  to   an  aZack  and  defense  enterprise,  one  would  use  this  capability  differently  from  simply   providing  for  push  forward  and  sequenDal  escalaDon  dominance.     Rather  than  focusing  simply  on  the  image  of  projecDng  power  forward,  what  is  crucial   to  an  successful  Pacific  strategy  is  enabling  a  strategic  quadrangle  in  the  Western   Pacific,  anchored  on  Japan,  South  Korea,  Australia,  and  Singapore.  This  will  not  be   simple.  CompeDDon,  even  mutual  suspicion,  among  US  allies  in  the  Western  Pacific  is   historically  deep-­‐rooted;  as  a  former  7th  USAF  commander  underscored,  “history  sDll   maZers  in  impeding  allied  cooperaDon.”  But  in  spite  of  these  challenges  and   impediments,  enabling  the  quadrangle  to  do  a  beZer  job  of  defending  itself  and   shaping  interoperability  across  separate  naDons  has  to  become  a  central  strategic   American  goal.     7  
  8. 8. 8   Note:    1.    Numbers  include  US  Marines  and  Sailors  aGached  to  Marine  Corps   Opera,onal  units.    Japan  numbers  include  units  that  are  deployed  there  from  East   Coast,  West  Coast  and  Hawaii  as  part  of  the  Unit  Deployment  program.  Those  units’   numbers  have  been  subtracted  from  the  California  and  Hawaii  numbers,  to  avoid   double  coun,ng.     2.    Rotary  Wing  Aircraj  includes  Tiltrotor  (MV-­‐22)  
  9. 9. 9   Notes:    1.  Numbers  include  US  Marines  and  Sailors  aGached  to  Marine  Corps   Opera,onal  units.      Japan,  Guam  and  Australia  numbers  include  units  that  are   deployed  there  from  East  Coast,  West  Coast  and  Hawaii  Marine  Corps  units  as  part  of   the  Unit  Deployment  program.    Those  units’  numbers  have  been  subtracted  from  the   California  and  Hawaii  numbers,  to  avoid  double  coun,ng.     2.    Rotary  Wing  Aircraj  includes  Tiltrotor  (MV-­‐22)  
  10. 10. Within  the  distributed  laydown,  the  Marines  must  retain  the  ability  rapidly  to   respond  to  crises  across  the  range  of  demands,  from  Major  Combat  opera,on  in  NE   Asia  to  low-­‐end  Humanitarian  Assistance  and  Disaster  Relief  (HADR)    wherever  it   occurs.     Each  loca,on  for  the  Marines  is  in  transi,on  as  well.  From  Okinawa  and  Iwakuni,  the   Marines  can  locally  train  in  Japan,  Korea  and  the  Philippines,  as  well  as  respond  with   “Fight  Tonight”  capabili,es  if  necessary.     From  Guam,  the  Marines  can  train  locally  in  the  Commonwealth  of  the  Northern   Mariana  Islands  (CNMI)  to  the  north,  the  Federated  States  of  Micronesia  to  the   south,  and  Palau  and  the  Philippines  to  the  west.    Guam  and  CNMI  provide  the   Marines  something  we  do  not  have  anywhere  else  in  the  Pacific:    A  loca,on  on  U.S.   soil  where  they  can  train  unilaterally  or  with  partner  na,ons.     In  broad  terms,  prior  to  the  DL  (ca.  2011),  the  Marines  were  located  in  Japan  (25,000   in  Mainland  Japan  and  Okinawa),  Hawaii  (approximately  6,000)  and  on  the  West   Coast  (approximately  45,000  in  California  and  Arizona).    With  the  DL  (ca.  2025),  there   will  be  a  projected  force  distribu,on  as  follows:  Mainland  Japan  and  Okinawa   (15,000),  Guam  (approximately  4700),  Hawaii  (approximately  8800),  West  Coast   (approximately  43,000)  and  a  rota,onal  force  in  Northwest  Australia  of     10  
  11. 11. The  last  slide  and  this  one  focus  on  the  Pacific  exercises  of  the  Marines,  the  USN  and   the  USAF  in  working  with  allies.    These  exercises  are  a  crucial  ,ssue  through  which   combat  innova,on  is  being  shaped  among  the  allies  and  the  US  in  forging  a  21st   century  approach  to  Pacific  defense.     11  
  12. 12. A  key  element  of  the  reshaping  of  the  PACAF  approach  to  air  dominance  is  making   progress  on  integrated  air  and  missile  defense.    The  Army’s  ADA  systems  are  a  key   part  of  the  air  dominance  re-­‐set.     12  
  13. 13. 13  
  14. 14. 14  
  15. 15. 15  
  16. 16. 16  
  17. 17. hGp://www.frontline-­‐     hGp://­‐defense-­‐moderniza,on-­‐shaping-­‐capabili,es-­‐ for-­‐21st-­‐century-­‐opera,ons/       17  
  18. 18. Two  key  Aussie  air  assets  as  part  of  its  moderniza,on  strategy  are  seen  here:  the   KC-­‐30A  air  tanker  and  the  Wedgetail  air  baGle  management  system.     The  photos  were  taken  on  visits  to  the  bases  of  the  respec,ve  squadrons  in  Australia   in  March  2014.   18  
  19. 19. Japanese  defense  policy  is  in  evolu,on.     It  started  with  a  very  narrow  self-­‐defense  concept  which  focused  on  the  homeland   narrowly  understood.    But  as  the  US  role  in  the  region  changed  over  the  past  twenty   years  and  threats  in  the  neighborhood  expanded  such  a  policy  made  liGle  strategic   sense.     The  focus  is  now  on  “dynamic  defense”  which  is  shaping  air  and  mari,me  capabili,es   to  defend  Japan  more  broadly  and  to  over  ,me  work  with  the  US  and  allies  to  be  able   to  protect  Japanese  interests  running  North-­‐South.     hGp://­‐re-­‐set-­‐of-­‐pacific-­‐defense-­‐australia-­‐and-­‐japan-­‐weigh-­‐in/           19  
  20. 20. It  is  not  really  about  a  Pivot  to  the  Pacific.     It  is  about  the  PRC,  North  Korea  and  the  allies  reshaping  the  strategic  environment.     The  ques,on  then  becomes  how  can  the  US  reshape  its  capabili,es  and  strategies  to   be  relevant.   20  
  21. 21. The  size  of  the  Pacific  poses  its  own  challenges.    Shaping  scalable  and  modular  forces   among  the  US  and  the  allies  is  crucial  to  operate  at  distance  and  to  shape  targeted   forces  to  deal  with  local  crises.     Also  the  constant  challenge  of  dealing  with  humanitarian  and  disaster  relief   challenges  in  the  region  taxes  US  and  allied  forces.  There  is  a  frequent  demand  to   come  to  mutual  support  and  aid  as  well  as  to  encompass  a  much  wider  range  of   partners  in  the  region.     All  of  these  dynamics  require  not  simply  the  existence  and  development  of  forces  in   the  abstract.    It  requires  regular  training  among  the  allies  and  with  the  United  States.     As  a  result,  the  exercise  regimes  are  a  crucial  lifeblood  for  forging  real  capabili7es   and  effec7ve  and  innova7ve  approaches  to  move  forward.     hGp://­‐pacific-­‐exercises-­‐and-­‐training-­‐shaping-­‐a-­‐deterrence-­‐ in-­‐depth-­‐strategy/     21  
  22. 22. The  rebuilding  of  American  military  power  will  be  reshaped  by  a  number  of  new   technologies  as  well  as  approaches.         The  challenge  will  be  to  be  innova,ve  enough  to  move  ahead  in  a  fiscally  constrained   environment  and  in  the  heavy  presence  of  legacy  thinking.     22  
  23. 23. This  graphic  shows  the  impact  of  ,ltorator  technology  coupled  with  the  KC-­‐130Js  in   reshaping  a  core  capability       hGp://­‐sp-­‐magp-­‐cr-­‐training-­‐for-­‐scalability/     hGp:// %20Response/     hGp:// op,on=com_content&view=ar,cle&id=33573:the-­‐sp-­‐magp-­‐cr-­‐training-­‐for-­‐ scalability&ca,d=3:Civil%20Security&Itemid=113       23  
  24. 24. hGp://­‐pacaf-­‐commander-­‐and-­‐reworking-­‐pacific-­‐defense-­‐the-­‐ aor-­‐will-­‐become-­‐a-­‐caoc/     hGp://­‐chief-­‐of-­‐staff-­‐of-­‐the-­‐australian-­‐air-­‐force-­‐on-­‐the-­‐future-­‐ of-­‐air-­‐power-­‐the-­‐impact-­‐of-­‐the-­‐f-­‐35-­‐on-­‐the-­‐raaf/     hGp://­‐changer-­‐the-­‐f-­‐35-­‐and-­‐the-­‐pacific/           24  
  25. 25. t  is  clear  that  the  F-­‐35  global  enterprise  is  a  unique  enabler  of  the  en7re  re-­‐set  of   US  and  allied  airpower.     Yet  this  crucial  and  even  central  reality  is  hardly  recognized  in  the  mounds  or  should   one  say  piles  of  commentary  on  the  F-­‐35  program.     And  indeed,  notably  in  tes,mony  of  defense  officials  in  front  of  Congress,  is  the   absence  of  emphasis  upon  how  central  the  allies  are  to  the  program,  or  that  the  F-­‐35   has  recently  become  the  plane  of  choice  for  all  of  the  core  Pacific  allies.     Allies  are  not  simply  “partners”  in  the  program  they  are  the  enablers  of  21st   century  air  combat  development  and  approaches.     Allies  are  not  simply  “following”  the  US  lead;  they  are  innova,ng  on  their  own  and   will  infuse  the  F-­‐35  global  enterprise  with  the  spirit  of  innova,on  and  inven,on,  not   mortgaged  by  the  “sequestra,on”  somnolent  evident  in  Washington.     hGp://­‐f-­‐35-­‐global-­‐enterprise-­‐viewed-­‐from-­‐down-­‐under/     25  
  26. 26. hGp://­‐21st-­‐century-­‐approach-­‐to-­‐airpower-­‐the-­‐italian-­‐air-­‐force-­‐ and-­‐the-­‐f-­‐35/     The  first  issue  is  the  ques,on  of  why  the  Italian  Air  Force  was  mixing  its  fleet  between   As  and  Bs.     “We  studied  the  issue  carefully  and  for  the  kind  of  missions  we  face  we  needed  the   flexibility  which  the  B  can  add  to  the  fleet.    We  need  to  go  to  the  mission  not  the   airfield.    We  will  operate  in  many  areas  where  there  are  only  short  runways;  the  B   allows  us  to  operate  in  those  condi,ons.     We  can  mix  the  fleet  and  operate  at  sea  on  land,  on  our  own  ships  or  own  others.    It   is  the  kind  of  flexibility,  which  we  see  as  crucial  to  a  21st  century  seVng.     I  will  give  you  an  example  of  what  we  don’t  want.    We  planned  to  operate  with  the   USMC  in  Afghanistan.    But  we  were  three  months  later  in  the  deployment  than  we   intended  because  our  Tornados  could  not  operate  in  the  same  condi,ons  as  the   USMC.    We  had  to  take  three  months  to  build  out  the  air  base  from  which  we  would   operate  with  them.     Time  is  crucial  to  many  of  the  missions  in  which  we  will  be  engaged.    The  Bs  give  me  a     26  
  27. 27. hGp://­‐report-­‐on-­‐italy-­‐and-­‐the-­‐f-­‐35/     It  is  also  difficult  to  argue  with  the  proposi,on  that  the  Mediterranean  and  the   Middle  East  will  not  be  a  busy  opera,onal  area  for  NATO  and  allied  forces.     The  F-­‐35  fleet  that  rolls  out  from  a  diversity  of  users  will  need  the  kind  of  opera,onal   and  maintenance  support  which  can  be  provided  at  Cameri.     The  Italians  have  built  major  warehouse  facili,es  to  hold  parts  for  the  F-­‐35  as  well  as   maintenance  bay  accommoda,ons  secured  to  collateral  SECRET,  and,  with  the  IT   system  which  can  manage  the  parts  which  are  stamped  with  common  parts   iden,fiers,  it  will  be  straighporward  to  manage  the  inventory  coming  in  and  out  of   these  warehouses  to  support  an  allied  fleet.     A  way  to  look  at  this  would  be  the  shape  a  graphic  as  follows  with  Cameri  as  the  hub   to  support  the  Western  and  Eastern  Mediterranean  and  the  en,re  sweep  of  allied   F-­‐35  fleet  opera,ons.    This  could  include  the  USAF,  the  USN,  the  USMC,  the  Italian   forces,  the  Bri,sh  forces,  the  Norwegian  forces,  etc.     The  Italians  have  understood  the  F-­‐35  fleet  concept  and  have  laid  down  an   infrastructure  to  support  it  AT  THE  SAME  TIME  as  they  built  their  FACO  and  wing     27  
  28. 28. The  size  of  the  Pacific  poses  its  own  challenges.    Shaping  scalable  and  modular  forces   among  the  US  and  the  allies  is  crucial  to  operate  at  distance  and  to  shape  targeted   forces  to  deal  with  local  crises.     Also  the  constant  challenge  of  dealing  with  humanitarian  and  disaster  relief   challenges  in  the  region  taxes  US  and  allied  forces.  There  is  a  frequent  demand  to   come  to  mutual  support  and  aid  as  well  as  to  encompass  a  much  wider  range  of   partners  in  the  region.     28  
  29. 29. An  emergent  force  is  the  enhanced  role  of  connec7vity  among  joint  and  coali7on   plaQorms  and  systems.         It  is  no  longer  simply  seVng  a  goal  for  greater  interoperability;  it  is  building  in  to  the   Pacific  defense  effort  greater  capability  for  divergent  plaporms  and  systems  to  be   connected  in  a  dynamic  defense  and  deterrent  force.     One  way  to  express  this  dynamic  is  the  coming  of  the  aerospace  combat  cloud  and   the  ability  to  engage  in  collabora,ve  opera,ons  much  more  effec,vely  and   fundamentally.  The  cloud  concept  has  been  highlighted  by  Lt.  General  (re,red)   Deptula,  the  Dean  of  the  Mitchell  Ins,tute  for  Aerospace  Studies  of  the  Air  Force   Associa,on,  as  a  key  focal  point  in  shaping  the  way  ahead  in  integrated  combat   power.     29  
  30. 30. Rather  than  “integra,ng”  separate  plaporms  and  separate  services  and  domains,  a   joint  and  coali,on  force  is  emerging  which  can  distribute  through  a  baGlespace  and   operate  by  cross  connec,ng  and  shaping  an  offensive  defensive  enterprise.        Shaping  a  force  that  is  cloud-­‐ready  is  a  key  to  the  effort  and  acquisi,on  of  new   plaporms  in  the  future  needs  to  proceed  from  an  understanding  that  they  need  to   connect  to  the  cloud  and  operate  flexibly  in  providing  either  offensive  or  defensive   capabili,es  dependent  on  the  mission  and  the  priori,es  shaped  by  the  decision-­‐ making  process.     And  that  process  itself  is  undergoing  major  changes  as  distributed  capabili,es   populate  the  cloud  and  allow  the  force  to  operate  in  real  ,me.    The  combat  cloud   provides  situa,onal  dynamic  decisions  to  be  made  by  war  fighters  at  all  levels  to  get   deep  inside  the  adversary’s  decision  cycle     hGp://­‐next-­‐phase-­‐of-­‐air-­‐power-­‐crajing-­‐and-­‐enabling-­‐the-­‐ aerospace-­‐combat-­‐cloud/     hGp://­‐gce-­‐drives-­‐usmc-­‐avia,on-­‐innova,on-­‐major-­‐cuomo-­‐of-­‐ the-­‐infantry-­‐officer-­‐course-­‐discusses-­‐the-­‐iocs-­‐team-­‐perspec,ve/               30  
  31. 31. 31 While  joint  opera,ons  designed  to  integrate  the  effects  of  separate  plaporms   by  separate  service  components  in  their  respec,ve  domains  has  evolved  to  a   degree,  a  joint  and  coali,on  concept  of  opera,ons  is  emerging  that  can   achieve  even  greater  synergy.    That  greater  synergy  will  be  made  possible   through  cross-­‐domain  opera,ons  by  plaporms  distributed  throughout  the   baGlespace.         Those  cross-­‐domain  synergies  can  be  achieved  only  with  an  architecture   enabled  by  robust,  reliable,  and  secure  connec,vity  allowing  for  the  universal   sharing  of  informa,on  to  achieve  the  desired  effects  of  the  objec,ves  of  the   opera,on.    This  is  the  goal  of  what  is  being  no,onally  described  as  a  “Combat   Cloud.”         Shaping  a  force  that  can  share  informa,on  among  a  dispirit  collec,on  of   systems  resident  in  a  cloud-­‐like  architecture  will  be  key  to  the  concept.     Acquisi,on  of  new  plaporms  in  the  future  can  be  op,mized  by  an   understanding  that  they  need  to  connect  in  the  cloud  and  operate  flexibly  in   order  to  provide  either  offensive  or  defensive  capabili,es  dependent  on  the   mission  and  their  priori,es  as  shaped  by  the  decision-­‐making  process.      
  32. 32. 32