This document summarizes a Supreme Court case from Sri Lanka regarding whether a man, Christopher Abeysundere, was guilty of the offense of bigamy. The key facts are that Abeysundere was originally married to Natalie Abeysundere under the country's Marriage Registration Ordinance as Roman Catholics. During the subsistence of this first marriage, he purported to marry another woman, Kanthika Edirisinghe, under Muslim law after both had converted to Islam. The Supreme Court had to determine whether the second marriage was valid or void. The court provided an analysis of marriage law and precedent cases, ultimately overturning previous rulings and finding that the second marriage was void as the respondent's rights
This summary provides the high level details of a Supreme Court of the Philippines case involving a breach of promise to marry claim.
1) A woman filed a complaint against an Iranian exchange student for damages resulting from his breach of their agreement to marry. She alleged they had a relationship, he proposed marriage, but then broke off the engagement.
2) The trial court ruled in favor of the woman, ordering the man to pay damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling.
3) The case was appealed to the Supreme Court regarding whether Article 21 of the Civil Code, which allows damages for moral wrongs, was applicable. The Supreme Court upheld the previous rulings, finding the man had fraudulently promised
This document outlines the key elements of a valid contract to marry under Malaysian law, including definitions, requirements, breach and consequences. It discusses the requirements of offer, acceptance, consideration and capacity. Capacity requires that parties be single and of age. Breach can occur through failure to marry within a reasonable time or through anticipatory breach. Defences include misrepresentation, lack of a duty of full disclosure, and proof of moral/physical infirmity. Consequences of breach include general and special damages awards.
Mayra alias vaishnvi_vilas_shirshikarn_and_anr_v__state_of_up_and_otherssabrangsabrang
This document summarizes 17 writ petitions pertaining to interfaith marriages contracted by petitioners in Uttar Pradesh, India. In each case, one petitioner converted religions in order to marry their partner of a different faith. They now seek protection from the state, apprehending threats from family members opposed to the interfaith unions. The state respondent argues the petitioners require district approval for their conversions and marriages. However, the petitioner's counsel argues citizens have the right to choose their own faith and partner without state interference. The court will analyze the relevant laws around conversion, marriage, and personal liberties in order to make a determination.
Lawweb.in uk high courts judgment on modern perspective of donatio mortis causaLaw Web
There are three requirements to constitute a valid DMC. They are:
i) Donor contemplates his impending death.
ii) Donor makes a gift which will only take effect if and when his contemplated death occurs. Until then Donor has the right to revoke the gift.
iii) Donor delivers dominion over the subject matter of the gift to Recipient.
As many judges have observed, the doctrine of DMC (Donatio Mortis Causa) in the context of English law is an anomaly. It enables Donor to transfer property upon his death without complying with any of the formalities of section 9 of the Wills Act or section 52 of the Law of Property Act. Thus the doctrine paves the way for all of the abuses which those statutes are intended to prevent.The Lord Chancellor in Jones v Selby and Lord Chelmsford in Cosnahan drew attention to this risk. They stressed the need for the strictest scrutiny of the factual evidence. The Court of Appeal rightly stressed in Birch that the courts must not allow DMC to be used as a device in order to validate ineffective wills.
Neutral Citation Number: [2015] EWCA Civ 581
Case No: A3/2014/2704
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, CHANCERY DIVISION
MR HOLLANDER QC, SITTING AS A DEPUTY HIGH COURT JUDGE
HC12E03256
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
09/06/2015
B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE JACKSON
LORD JUSTICE PATTEN
and
LORD JUSTICE SALES
____________________
Between:
KENNETH PAUL KING Claimant/
Respondent
- and -
(1) THE CHILTERN DOG RESCUE
(2) REDWINGS HORSE SANCTUARY Defendants/Appellants
This judgment involves two related matrimonial appeals. The High Court of Kerala upheld the family court's judgment granting a divorce to the wife on the grounds of cruelty by the husband. The court found that the husband treated the wife as a source of money, constantly harassing her and her family for funds. He mismanaged his real estate business and spent money lavishly. He also physically and sexually abused the wife, even during her pregnancy. The husband further levelled false allegations of adultery against the wife. Taking all the circumstances into account, the High Court dismissed the husband's appeal and upheld the divorce.
Betrothal requires an offer and acceptance to marry, along with consideration. The parties must have capacity, meaning they are single and of age of majority. Breach of promise occurs if either party refuses to fulfill the promise to marry. The aggrieved party can claim damages against the breaching party. Defenses against claims include misrepresentation, incapacity of the plaintiff, and unchaste conduct of the plaintiff. Damages awarded may include general damages for hurt feelings and dignity, as well as special damages for calculable financial losses. While breach of promise claims were abolished in England in 1970, Malaysian courts have held they are still valid claims under Malaysian law.
Sc disclosure to media in crim cases order dec 17sabrangsabrang
The Supreme Court of India heard an appeal regarding the cancellation of anticipatory bail granted to the in-laws of a deceased woman named Deepti. The appellant argued that the High Court order granting anticipatory bail was incorrect based on the allegations in the FIR of dowry harassment and murder. It was argued that the investigation into Deepti's death was inadequate and did not consider the allegations of homicide. The respondents contended that the post-mortem report found Deepti died of suicide and that financial transactions between Deepti and her in-laws were business investments not related to dowry. The Court considered the submissions of both parties on the adequacy of the investigation and allegations in the FIR.
20211117 madras hc order on caste and conversionsabrangsabrang
The petitioner, who belongs to the Christian Adi-Dravidar community, married a woman who belongs to the Hindu Arunthathiyar community. He applied for an inter-caste marriage certificate to receive benefits but was denied. The court dismissed the petition, finding that conversion of religion does not change one's caste. Since both the petitioner and his wife belonged to Scheduled Castes by birth, they do not qualify for an inter-caste marriage certificate merely due to the petitioner's religious conversion. The purpose of such certificates is to benefit those who intermarry across major caste divisions, not for couples who share the same original caste.
This summary provides the high level details of a Supreme Court of the Philippines case involving a breach of promise to marry claim.
1) A woman filed a complaint against an Iranian exchange student for damages resulting from his breach of their agreement to marry. She alleged they had a relationship, he proposed marriage, but then broke off the engagement.
2) The trial court ruled in favor of the woman, ordering the man to pay damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling.
3) The case was appealed to the Supreme Court regarding whether Article 21 of the Civil Code, which allows damages for moral wrongs, was applicable. The Supreme Court upheld the previous rulings, finding the man had fraudulently promised
This document outlines the key elements of a valid contract to marry under Malaysian law, including definitions, requirements, breach and consequences. It discusses the requirements of offer, acceptance, consideration and capacity. Capacity requires that parties be single and of age. Breach can occur through failure to marry within a reasonable time or through anticipatory breach. Defences include misrepresentation, lack of a duty of full disclosure, and proof of moral/physical infirmity. Consequences of breach include general and special damages awards.
Mayra alias vaishnvi_vilas_shirshikarn_and_anr_v__state_of_up_and_otherssabrangsabrang
This document summarizes 17 writ petitions pertaining to interfaith marriages contracted by petitioners in Uttar Pradesh, India. In each case, one petitioner converted religions in order to marry their partner of a different faith. They now seek protection from the state, apprehending threats from family members opposed to the interfaith unions. The state respondent argues the petitioners require district approval for their conversions and marriages. However, the petitioner's counsel argues citizens have the right to choose their own faith and partner without state interference. The court will analyze the relevant laws around conversion, marriage, and personal liberties in order to make a determination.
Lawweb.in uk high courts judgment on modern perspective of donatio mortis causaLaw Web
There are three requirements to constitute a valid DMC. They are:
i) Donor contemplates his impending death.
ii) Donor makes a gift which will only take effect if and when his contemplated death occurs. Until then Donor has the right to revoke the gift.
iii) Donor delivers dominion over the subject matter of the gift to Recipient.
As many judges have observed, the doctrine of DMC (Donatio Mortis Causa) in the context of English law is an anomaly. It enables Donor to transfer property upon his death without complying with any of the formalities of section 9 of the Wills Act or section 52 of the Law of Property Act. Thus the doctrine paves the way for all of the abuses which those statutes are intended to prevent.The Lord Chancellor in Jones v Selby and Lord Chelmsford in Cosnahan drew attention to this risk. They stressed the need for the strictest scrutiny of the factual evidence. The Court of Appeal rightly stressed in Birch that the courts must not allow DMC to be used as a device in order to validate ineffective wills.
Neutral Citation Number: [2015] EWCA Civ 581
Case No: A3/2014/2704
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, CHANCERY DIVISION
MR HOLLANDER QC, SITTING AS A DEPUTY HIGH COURT JUDGE
HC12E03256
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
09/06/2015
B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE JACKSON
LORD JUSTICE PATTEN
and
LORD JUSTICE SALES
____________________
Between:
KENNETH PAUL KING Claimant/
Respondent
- and -
(1) THE CHILTERN DOG RESCUE
(2) REDWINGS HORSE SANCTUARY Defendants/Appellants
This judgment involves two related matrimonial appeals. The High Court of Kerala upheld the family court's judgment granting a divorce to the wife on the grounds of cruelty by the husband. The court found that the husband treated the wife as a source of money, constantly harassing her and her family for funds. He mismanaged his real estate business and spent money lavishly. He also physically and sexually abused the wife, even during her pregnancy. The husband further levelled false allegations of adultery against the wife. Taking all the circumstances into account, the High Court dismissed the husband's appeal and upheld the divorce.
Betrothal requires an offer and acceptance to marry, along with consideration. The parties must have capacity, meaning they are single and of age of majority. Breach of promise occurs if either party refuses to fulfill the promise to marry. The aggrieved party can claim damages against the breaching party. Defenses against claims include misrepresentation, incapacity of the plaintiff, and unchaste conduct of the plaintiff. Damages awarded may include general damages for hurt feelings and dignity, as well as special damages for calculable financial losses. While breach of promise claims were abolished in England in 1970, Malaysian courts have held they are still valid claims under Malaysian law.
Sc disclosure to media in crim cases order dec 17sabrangsabrang
The Supreme Court of India heard an appeal regarding the cancellation of anticipatory bail granted to the in-laws of a deceased woman named Deepti. The appellant argued that the High Court order granting anticipatory bail was incorrect based on the allegations in the FIR of dowry harassment and murder. It was argued that the investigation into Deepti's death was inadequate and did not consider the allegations of homicide. The respondents contended that the post-mortem report found Deepti died of suicide and that financial transactions between Deepti and her in-laws were business investments not related to dowry. The Court considered the submissions of both parties on the adequacy of the investigation and allegations in the FIR.
20211117 madras hc order on caste and conversionsabrangsabrang
The petitioner, who belongs to the Christian Adi-Dravidar community, married a woman who belongs to the Hindu Arunthathiyar community. He applied for an inter-caste marriage certificate to receive benefits but was denied. The court dismissed the petition, finding that conversion of religion does not change one's caste. Since both the petitioner and his wife belonged to Scheduled Castes by birth, they do not qualify for an inter-caste marriage certificate merely due to the petitioner's religious conversion. The purpose of such certificates is to benefit those who intermarry across major caste divisions, not for couples who share the same original caste.
This document defines key terms related to family law, including definitions of "family", different types of marriages (Christian, Islamic, Hindu, customary, civil, foreign), and classifications of families (nuclear, extended, kinship, households). It also discusses functions of family law such as defining and altering legal status, resolving disputes, and protecting vulnerable members. Under pre-capitalist societies, families were mainly polygamous and relationships/marriages were governed by clan leaders applying customary law. Polygamy provided benefits like increased labor, reproduction of the labor force, and adjusting for barrenness.
The appellant appealed against an order rejecting his application for temporary bail to attend the last rites of his deceased mother. The court heard the appeal and considered additional information provided in an affidavit. While the original reason for seeking temporary bail no longer applied due to time passed, the court found humanitarian grounds to grant temporary bail for the appellant to attend rituals and a condolence meeting for his mother scheduled on the anniversary of her death. The court ordered the appellant's release on temporary bail from August 13-21, 2021 subject to furnishing a bond and sureties, and reporting to police.
Lawweb.in whether husband can seek divorce if decree for restitution of conju...Law Web
- The document discusses a case where a husband filed for divorce on the grounds that his wife did not obey a decree for restitution of conjugal rights.
- The family court dismissed the divorce petition, finding that the husband took advantage of his own wrong by not taking steps to execute the decree himself and simply waiting for the statutory period to expire before filing for divorce.
- On appeal, the high court found that the family court took a wrong view and that the husband was entitled to divorce under the law as the wife did not resume conjugal relations within one year of the restitution decree. The high court allowed the husband's appeal and granted the divorce.
The Supreme Court of India heard an appeal regarding a domestic violence case and issues of interpreting the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The appellant's son was married to the respondent, and they lived together in the appellant's house. However, marital issues arose and the son filed for divorce. The respondent then filed a domestic violence complaint. The appellant subsequently filed a lawsuit seeking to remove the respondent from the property. The trial court ruled in favor of the appellant, but the high court overturned this decision and remanded the case. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Gahir & Associates specializes in all aspects of creating, growing, and protecting incorporated businesses. We help you develop an internal structure that is in compliance with all corporate law statutes. Before you make any significant changes or investments, reach out to Gahir & Associates’s finest corporate lawyers. For more details visit here - https://www.gahirlaw.com
The appellant filed for divorce from his wife on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. While the family court found that desertion was proven, it granted a decree of judicial separation instead of divorce, citing the peculiar circumstances of the case. The appellant appealed, arguing that desertion was established for over 8 years and the family court should have granted a divorce as requested.
moot file of sec 304 -b,201and 34 of indian penal codegagan deep
The document is an appeal filed on behalf of the prosecution in the Supreme Court of India regarding the case of Union of India vs. Ajay Gupta & Ors. It summarizes the key facts of the case, which involve the dowry death of a woman named Aarti shortly after her marriage. It outlines the judgments from the trial court and high court, and presents two issues for the Supreme Court's consideration: 1) whether Ajay Gupta and his wife can be held liable for dowry death and cruelty, and 2) whether two other individuals can be held liable for murder. It proceeds to provide arguments supporting the prosecution's position on both issues.
This judgment involves appeals related to the 1984 anti-Sikh riots in Delhi. The Court is delivering its judgment on the appeals against the acquittal of Respondent 1 (Sajjan Kumar) by the trial court.
The Court analyzes the evidence and finds extraordinary circumstances led to Sajjan Kumar not being named initially. It also finds failure to register FIRs and unsatisfactory initial investigations. The Court analyzes the testimonies of several prosecution witnesses and finds Sajjan Kumar was involved in the criminal conspiracy during the 1984 riots based on the evidence. It overturns the acquittal and convicts Sajjan Kumar, sentencing him to life imprisonment. The Court also upholds or modifies the convictions and sentences
1. Amit Gupta and Neha Gupta filed a petition seeking divorce by mutual consent under Section 13(B)(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
2. They got married in 2011 and have one daughter together but have been living separately since 2012 due to temperamental differences.
3. They reached an agreement on settlement terms including payment of money, return of belongings, custody of daughter, and withdrawal of legal cases.
First India provides exclusive Today's News Headlines from politics, technology, business news,sports, Bollywood news, life style and many more.For your morning update read First India English NewsPaper.Our special coverage are Rajasthan , Gujrat and power corridor of the country national capital Delhi and rest of India .
1) In the case of PT&T vs. Grace de Guzman, the Supreme Court ruled that PT&T's policy of not hiring married women was invalid and discriminatory, and that Grace's dismissal based on this policy was illegal.
2) In Estrada vs. Escritor, the Supreme Court ruled that Escritor could not be penalized for living with her partner without marriage, as her religious beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness allowed such arrangements.
3) In Balogbog vs. CA, the Supreme Court upheld the legitimacy of private respondents as the children of Gavino, even though there was no marriage certificate, as testimonial evidence proved Gav
BIA Remands of Immigration Judge James Nugent from 01/01/2014 to 05/26/2016Bryan Johnson
EOIR FOIA ID # 2016-23184. Also, see acknowledgment letter at following link: http://www.slideshare.net/abogadobryan/eoir-acknowledgment-letter-for-201623284
This document discusses marriage laws in Malaysia before and after the enforcement of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (LRA).
Prior to 1982, marriages were solemnized according to various statutes, customs, and religious laws. After LRA enforcement in 1982, all non-Muslim marriages must be registered and monogamous. The LRA standardized solemnization procedures and prohibited certain types of marriages for non-Muslims. Exemptions applied for natives of East Malaysia whose customary marriages remained valid if elected under native law.
This document outlines the key distinctions and grounds for void and voidable marriages under Malaysian law. It discusses:
1) The differences between void and voidable marriages, such as the need for a decree and who can bring an action. Void marriages are invalid from the start, while voidable marriages can be annulled.
2) The jurisdiction of Malaysian courts to hear nullity petitions, which requires the marriage be registered in Malaysia or the parties reside in Malaysia.
3) The grounds for declaring a marriage void under Section 69, such as polygamy, underage parties, prohibited relationships, and same-sex marriages.
4) The grounds for annulling a marriage as void
The concept of Marriage under Private International Lawcarolineelias239
Marriage is a broad concept under Private international law. Many new rules had been laid down in various decisions, which had developed the international matrimonial law. The relevancy of monogamous or polygamous marriages. And the validity matters like formal validity and essential validity is also discussed here
The document summarizes the key aspects of marriage and separation under Hindu law in India. It discusses the nature of marriage historically under old Hindu law as a sacred union versus a socio-legal contract. It then outlines the statutory grounds for judicial separation and divorce established by the Hindu Marriage Act 1955, including adultery, cruelty, desertion, conversion, insanity, disease, and presumed death. It concludes by distinguishing between judicial separation, which suspends marital obligations but maintains the marital tie, and divorce, which ends the marriage completely.
Petition In intervention to the Supreme Court of the Philippines on Marriage ...Crescencio Agbayani
This document is a petition-in-intervention filed with the Supreme Court of the Philippines challenging provisions of the Family Code that define marriage as only between a man and a woman. The petition is filed by an LGBT Christian church and three individuals, including a gay couple who were denied a marriage license. The petition argues that the relevant Family Code provisions violate constitutional rights to equal protection and the right to found a family according to one's religious convictions. It seeks to have those Family Code provisions declared unconstitutional.
This document provides class notes on family law definitions and types of marriages under Tanzanian law. It defines what constitutes a family and discusses different types of marriages such as Christian, Islamic, Hindu, and customary marriages. It also covers topics like residence after marriage, sororate marriages, levirate marriages, and marriages of convenience such as ghost and barren woman marriages. The document aims to educate students on key concepts and cases related to family law in Tanzania.
Restitution of conjugal rights a comparativestudySunit Kapoor
1. Restitution of conjugal rights (RCR) allows a spouse to petition a court to order the other spouse to resume living together if they have withdrawn from the marriage without reasonable cause.
2. The concept originated under British rule in India and was later codified under various personal laws like the Hindu Marriage Act.
3. Under these laws, RCR can be ordered if the petitioner proves withdrawal without cause, though reasonable excuses include cruelty, failure to perform marital duties, or non-payment of dowry under Muslim law. Constitutional challenges to RCR have been rejected by courts.
Restitution of conjugal rights a comparative study among indian personal lawsAnuja Aiyappan
The aim of the ppt is to understand what restitution of conjugal rights implies with respect to different Indian personal laws and to do a comparative study of the provisions for restitution of conjugal rights available under Hindu and Muslim Law. The report introduces the reader to the concept and origin of restitution of conjugal rights, different provisions available for restitution under Indian personal laws and what are the main constituents of the restitution of conjugal rights in the first chapter. Next, the constitutional validity of the relief for restitution of conjugal rights and the application of the restitution provision across various communities – Hindu, Muslim, Christian and Parsi. Finally in the last chapter, the comparison of the various provisions and applications of the restitution of conjugal rights under different Indian Personal Laws of Christian, Hindu and Muslim law is taken up.
This document defines key terms related to family law, including definitions of "family", different types of marriages (Christian, Islamic, Hindu, customary, civil, foreign), and classifications of families (nuclear, extended, kinship, households). It also discusses functions of family law such as defining and altering legal status, resolving disputes, and protecting vulnerable members. Under pre-capitalist societies, families were mainly polygamous and relationships/marriages were governed by clan leaders applying customary law. Polygamy provided benefits like increased labor, reproduction of the labor force, and adjusting for barrenness.
The appellant appealed against an order rejecting his application for temporary bail to attend the last rites of his deceased mother. The court heard the appeal and considered additional information provided in an affidavit. While the original reason for seeking temporary bail no longer applied due to time passed, the court found humanitarian grounds to grant temporary bail for the appellant to attend rituals and a condolence meeting for his mother scheduled on the anniversary of her death. The court ordered the appellant's release on temporary bail from August 13-21, 2021 subject to furnishing a bond and sureties, and reporting to police.
Lawweb.in whether husband can seek divorce if decree for restitution of conju...Law Web
- The document discusses a case where a husband filed for divorce on the grounds that his wife did not obey a decree for restitution of conjugal rights.
- The family court dismissed the divorce petition, finding that the husband took advantage of his own wrong by not taking steps to execute the decree himself and simply waiting for the statutory period to expire before filing for divorce.
- On appeal, the high court found that the family court took a wrong view and that the husband was entitled to divorce under the law as the wife did not resume conjugal relations within one year of the restitution decree. The high court allowed the husband's appeal and granted the divorce.
The Supreme Court of India heard an appeal regarding a domestic violence case and issues of interpreting the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The appellant's son was married to the respondent, and they lived together in the appellant's house. However, marital issues arose and the son filed for divorce. The respondent then filed a domestic violence complaint. The appellant subsequently filed a lawsuit seeking to remove the respondent from the property. The trial court ruled in favor of the appellant, but the high court overturned this decision and remanded the case. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Gahir & Associates specializes in all aspects of creating, growing, and protecting incorporated businesses. We help you develop an internal structure that is in compliance with all corporate law statutes. Before you make any significant changes or investments, reach out to Gahir & Associates’s finest corporate lawyers. For more details visit here - https://www.gahirlaw.com
The appellant filed for divorce from his wife on the grounds of cruelty and desertion. While the family court found that desertion was proven, it granted a decree of judicial separation instead of divorce, citing the peculiar circumstances of the case. The appellant appealed, arguing that desertion was established for over 8 years and the family court should have granted a divorce as requested.
moot file of sec 304 -b,201and 34 of indian penal codegagan deep
The document is an appeal filed on behalf of the prosecution in the Supreme Court of India regarding the case of Union of India vs. Ajay Gupta & Ors. It summarizes the key facts of the case, which involve the dowry death of a woman named Aarti shortly after her marriage. It outlines the judgments from the trial court and high court, and presents two issues for the Supreme Court's consideration: 1) whether Ajay Gupta and his wife can be held liable for dowry death and cruelty, and 2) whether two other individuals can be held liable for murder. It proceeds to provide arguments supporting the prosecution's position on both issues.
This judgment involves appeals related to the 1984 anti-Sikh riots in Delhi. The Court is delivering its judgment on the appeals against the acquittal of Respondent 1 (Sajjan Kumar) by the trial court.
The Court analyzes the evidence and finds extraordinary circumstances led to Sajjan Kumar not being named initially. It also finds failure to register FIRs and unsatisfactory initial investigations. The Court analyzes the testimonies of several prosecution witnesses and finds Sajjan Kumar was involved in the criminal conspiracy during the 1984 riots based on the evidence. It overturns the acquittal and convicts Sajjan Kumar, sentencing him to life imprisonment. The Court also upholds or modifies the convictions and sentences
1. Amit Gupta and Neha Gupta filed a petition seeking divorce by mutual consent under Section 13(B)(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
2. They got married in 2011 and have one daughter together but have been living separately since 2012 due to temperamental differences.
3. They reached an agreement on settlement terms including payment of money, return of belongings, custody of daughter, and withdrawal of legal cases.
First India provides exclusive Today's News Headlines from politics, technology, business news,sports, Bollywood news, life style and many more.For your morning update read First India English NewsPaper.Our special coverage are Rajasthan , Gujrat and power corridor of the country national capital Delhi and rest of India .
1) In the case of PT&T vs. Grace de Guzman, the Supreme Court ruled that PT&T's policy of not hiring married women was invalid and discriminatory, and that Grace's dismissal based on this policy was illegal.
2) In Estrada vs. Escritor, the Supreme Court ruled that Escritor could not be penalized for living with her partner without marriage, as her religious beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness allowed such arrangements.
3) In Balogbog vs. CA, the Supreme Court upheld the legitimacy of private respondents as the children of Gavino, even though there was no marriage certificate, as testimonial evidence proved Gav
BIA Remands of Immigration Judge James Nugent from 01/01/2014 to 05/26/2016Bryan Johnson
EOIR FOIA ID # 2016-23184. Also, see acknowledgment letter at following link: http://www.slideshare.net/abogadobryan/eoir-acknowledgment-letter-for-201623284
This document discusses marriage laws in Malaysia before and after the enforcement of the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 (LRA).
Prior to 1982, marriages were solemnized according to various statutes, customs, and religious laws. After LRA enforcement in 1982, all non-Muslim marriages must be registered and monogamous. The LRA standardized solemnization procedures and prohibited certain types of marriages for non-Muslims. Exemptions applied for natives of East Malaysia whose customary marriages remained valid if elected under native law.
This document outlines the key distinctions and grounds for void and voidable marriages under Malaysian law. It discusses:
1) The differences between void and voidable marriages, such as the need for a decree and who can bring an action. Void marriages are invalid from the start, while voidable marriages can be annulled.
2) The jurisdiction of Malaysian courts to hear nullity petitions, which requires the marriage be registered in Malaysia or the parties reside in Malaysia.
3) The grounds for declaring a marriage void under Section 69, such as polygamy, underage parties, prohibited relationships, and same-sex marriages.
4) The grounds for annulling a marriage as void
The concept of Marriage under Private International Lawcarolineelias239
Marriage is a broad concept under Private international law. Many new rules had been laid down in various decisions, which had developed the international matrimonial law. The relevancy of monogamous or polygamous marriages. And the validity matters like formal validity and essential validity is also discussed here
The document summarizes the key aspects of marriage and separation under Hindu law in India. It discusses the nature of marriage historically under old Hindu law as a sacred union versus a socio-legal contract. It then outlines the statutory grounds for judicial separation and divorce established by the Hindu Marriage Act 1955, including adultery, cruelty, desertion, conversion, insanity, disease, and presumed death. It concludes by distinguishing between judicial separation, which suspends marital obligations but maintains the marital tie, and divorce, which ends the marriage completely.
Petition In intervention to the Supreme Court of the Philippines on Marriage ...Crescencio Agbayani
This document is a petition-in-intervention filed with the Supreme Court of the Philippines challenging provisions of the Family Code that define marriage as only between a man and a woman. The petition is filed by an LGBT Christian church and three individuals, including a gay couple who were denied a marriage license. The petition argues that the relevant Family Code provisions violate constitutional rights to equal protection and the right to found a family according to one's religious convictions. It seeks to have those Family Code provisions declared unconstitutional.
This document provides class notes on family law definitions and types of marriages under Tanzanian law. It defines what constitutes a family and discusses different types of marriages such as Christian, Islamic, Hindu, and customary marriages. It also covers topics like residence after marriage, sororate marriages, levirate marriages, and marriages of convenience such as ghost and barren woman marriages. The document aims to educate students on key concepts and cases related to family law in Tanzania.
Restitution of conjugal rights a comparativestudySunit Kapoor
1. Restitution of conjugal rights (RCR) allows a spouse to petition a court to order the other spouse to resume living together if they have withdrawn from the marriage without reasonable cause.
2. The concept originated under British rule in India and was later codified under various personal laws like the Hindu Marriage Act.
3. Under these laws, RCR can be ordered if the petitioner proves withdrawal without cause, though reasonable excuses include cruelty, failure to perform marital duties, or non-payment of dowry under Muslim law. Constitutional challenges to RCR have been rejected by courts.
Restitution of conjugal rights a comparative study among indian personal lawsAnuja Aiyappan
The aim of the ppt is to understand what restitution of conjugal rights implies with respect to different Indian personal laws and to do a comparative study of the provisions for restitution of conjugal rights available under Hindu and Muslim Law. The report introduces the reader to the concept and origin of restitution of conjugal rights, different provisions available for restitution under Indian personal laws and what are the main constituents of the restitution of conjugal rights in the first chapter. Next, the constitutional validity of the relief for restitution of conjugal rights and the application of the restitution provision across various communities – Hindu, Muslim, Christian and Parsi. Finally in the last chapter, the comparison of the various provisions and applications of the restitution of conjugal rights under different Indian Personal Laws of Christian, Hindu and Muslim law is taken up.
The document summarizes a court case regarding a 16-year-old girl (the prosecutrix) who married and then accused her husband of kidnapping. The petitioners argue the marriage is invalid under child marriage laws and the prosecutrix should not be allowed to stay with her accused husband. The court examines child marriage laws and precedents. It determines that the prosecutrix, though married, remains a child under the law and cannot consent to sex or staying with her accused husband, as the marriage violates prohibitions on child marriage.
This document summarizes two court cases:
1) The first case involves Elias Borromeo who was found guilty of parricide for killing his wife Susana Taborada. The court affirmed the conviction, finding that Elias and Susana were legally married based on Elias' own testimony admitting they were married by a priest.
2) The second case involves a complaint against Judge Jose Bernabe for solemnizing a marriage between Marilou Moreno and Marcelo Moreno without a valid marriage license. The court found Judge Bernabe liable for misconduct and imposed a fine, warning that further violations will be dealt with more severely.
1. The case involved a Hindu man, G.C. Ghosh, who converted to Islam allegedly for the sole purpose of taking a second wife, which is allowed under Muslim personal law but prohibited under Hindu law.
2. The court held that if a Hindu spouse converts religion without genuine intention to profess the new religion, but merely to achieve an ulterior motive like a second marriage, such a marriage would be void as it violates Article 21 of the Indian constitution.
3. The court also held that conversion does not automatically dissolve an existing marriage under Hindu Marriage Act, and the first marriage would still be valid, making a second marriage amount to the offense of bigamy under law.
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2. The ways to obtain a divorce, including presumption of death, divorce by conversion, mutual consent, and breakdown of marriage on grounds such as adultery, behavior, desertion, or living apart.
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This document discusses divorce under Hindu marriage law in India. It begins by defining divorce as the legal process of dissolving a marriage and returning the parties to unmarried status. The main grounds for divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act are adultery, cruelty, and desertion. Adultery is defined as sexual intercourse between a married person and someone other than their spouse. Cruelty includes both physical and mental cruelty, with several examples provided such as abuse, threats, insults, and refusal to live together. Desertion is the abandonment of a spouse without reasonable cause for at least two years. The document provides details on proving the grounds for divorce and case law examples for interpreting key terms like adultery, cruelty,
1. The petitioners, a married couple, filed a habeas corpus petition claiming the detenue's (wife's) father was illegally preventing her from living with her husband. Both parties are adults who married willingly. The father accepted the wife's decision to live with her husband.
2. However, the couple expressed that the notice and objection period required under the Special Marriage Act to solemnize their marriage would invade their privacy and cause unnecessary social interference and pressure regarding their choice of partner.
3. The court must consider the issues raised regarding the rights of individuals to life and liberty in choosing a marriage partner without undue notice and objection periods required under law. The provisions of the Special Marriage Act may need
The Supreme Court of the Philippines upheld the Court of Appeals' decision declaring the devise in favor of Sofia J. Nepomuceno in the last will and testament of Martin Jugo to be null and void. While probate courts generally only examine the extrinsic validity of wills, exceptional circumstances allowed the court to examine intrinsic validity. As Martin Jugo admitted to an illicit relationship with Nepomuceno in the will itself, the court was within its jurisdiction to declare that specific devise invalid according to Article 739 of the Civil Code, which prohibits donations between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage.
A375 Example Taste the taste of the Lord, the taste of the Lord The taste of...franktsao4
It seems that current missionary work requires spending a lot of money, preparing a lot of materials, and traveling to far away places, so that it feels like missionary work. But what was the result they brought back? It's just a lot of photos of activities, fun eating, drinking and some playing games. And then we have to do the same thing next year, never ending. The church once mentioned that a certain missionary would go to the field where she used to work before the end of his life. It seemed that if she had not gone, no one would be willing to go. The reason why these missionary work is so difficult is that no one obeys God’s words, and the Bible is not the main content during missionary work, because in the eyes of those who do not obey God’s words, the Bible is just words and cannot be connected with life, so Reading out God's words is boring because it doesn't have any life experience, so it cannot be connected with human life. I will give a few examples in the hope that this situation can be changed. A375
The Book of Ruth is included in the third division, or the Writings, of the Hebrew Bible. In most Christian canons it is treated as one of the historical books and placed between Judges and 1 Samuel.
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Case 1
1. 185
NATALIE ABEYSUNDERE
v.
CHRISTOPHER ABEYSUNDERE AND ANOTHER
SUPREME COURT
G. P. S. DE SILVA, CJ.,
WADUGODAPITIYA, J.,
PERERA, J.,
WIJETUNGA, J. AND
SHIRANI BANDARANAYAKE, J.
S.C. APPEAL NO. 70/96
HIGH COURT GALLE NO. 5/94
M.C. GALLE NO. 6403
OCTOBER 13TH AND 14TH, 1997.
Penal Code, S. 362 B - Bigamy - Muslim Marriage contracted during the subsistence of a monogamous
marriage - Validity of the second marriage -Marriage Registration Ordinance, Sections 18, 19 (1), 35 (1) ,
35 (2) and section 64.
The accused-respondent and his first wife the appellant both Roman Catholics were married under the
Marriage Registration Ordinance. During the subsistence of the first marriage, the accused registered a
marriage with one Miss Edirisinghe under the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act. The accused was
convicted of the offence of bigamy. His defence was that prior to his second marriage, both he and Miss
Edirisinghe had embraced Islam; and as such, the second marriage was valid.
186
(1) Section 18 of the Marriage Registration Ordinance prohibits polygamy and sections 18, 19 (1), 35 (1)
and 35 (2) read together show beyond doubt that the Ordinance contemplates only a monogamous
marriage; and the respondent could not, by a unilateral conversion to Islam, cast aside his antecedent
statutory liabilities and obligations incurred by reason of the prior marriage. The rights of the respondent
are qualified and restricted by the legal rights of his wife whom he married in terms of the Marriage
Registration Ordinance.
(2) The second purported marriage of the respondent during the subsistence of the prior marriage
contracted under the Marriage Registration Ordinance is void, notwithstanding the respondent's
conversion to Islam. Attorney-General v. Reid (1966) 67 NLR 25 P.C. and Reid v. Attorney-General
(1964) 65 NLR 97 SC overruled.
Cases referred to:
1. Attorney-General v. Reid (1966) 67 NLR 25 P.C.
2. Weatherley v. Weatherley (1879) Kotze 71.
3. Niboyet v. Niboyet 4 PD 1 (Court of Appeal).
4. King v. Perumal (1912) 14 NLR 496 (Full Bench).
5. Pasmore and others v. Oswaldwistle Urban District Council (1898) A.C 387, 393.
6. Reid v. Attorney-General (1964) 65 NLR 97 SC.
2. 7. Smt Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani and Others (Petitioners) v. Union of India and others
(Respondents) AIR 1995 SC 1531.
APPEAL from the High Court, Galle.
Ranjit Abeysuriya, PC with M. Markhani, Ms. Priyadharshani Dias and Ms. Mrinali Talgodapitiya for the
appellant
D. S. Wijesinghe, PC with Jayantha de Almeida Gunaratne, Ms. Dhammika Dharmadasa and Upul
Ranjan Hewage for the respondent
B. P. Aluvihare, SSC for the Attorney-General.
R. K. W. Goonesekera as amicus curiae.
Cur. adv. vult
187
December 16, 1997.
G. P. S. DE SILVA, CJ.
The accused-respondent (hereinafter referred to as respondent) was convicted of the offence of bigamy
(s. 362 (B) of the Penal Code). The charge was that on 6.10.85 he contracted a second marriage with
Kanthika Chitral Saranalatha Edirisinghe whilst his lawful wife Natalie Manel Antoinette Abeysundera was
alive. These proceedings were instituted by the Police in the Magistrate's Court of Galle.
The offence of bigamy as set out in section 362 (B) of the Penal Code reads thus:
"Whoever, having a husband or wife living, marries in any case in which such marriage is void by reason
of its taking place during the life of such husband or wife, shall be punished with imprisonment . . ."
The ingredients of the offence are (i) at the time of his second marriage the accused already has a
spouse living, (ii) the accused purports to marry a second time during the subsistence of the prior
marriage, (iii) the second marriage is void by reason of its taking place while the prior valid marriage
remains undissolved.
In the present case there is no dispute that the ingredients (i) and (ii) above have been established by the
prosecution. The matter in issue is the third ingredient of the offence enumerated above.
The first marriage was solemnized at the All Saints' Church. Borella, on 27th September, 1958, (vide
marriage certificate P1). Admittedly, the respondent and his wife (who is the present appellant) were both
Roman Catholics. The respondent was an Engineer serving at the Colombo Municipal Council. He
worked at the Colombo Municipal Council until his retirement in 1975. Thereafter he worked abroad for 2
years and upon his return to Sri Lanka joined the "DFCC" in August, 1979. While working at the "DFCC",
he developed a friendship with Miss K. C. S. Edirisinghe. In 1980 the respondent instituted divorce
proceedings against the present appellant in the District Court of Colombo. The action, however, was
dismissed on 4th September, 1985 (P2). The respondent did not prefer an appeal against the judgment
dismissing his action. On 26th September, 1985, he gifted
188
his 'matrimonial home" to Miss K. C. S. Edirisinghe (deed of gift P3). At the trial before the Magistrate's
Court he made a statement from the dock and asserted that both he and Miss Edirisinghe were converted
3. to Islam in March, 1985. On 6th October, 1985, for the second time the respondent got married and it was
to Miss K. C. S. Edirisinghe, under the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act (P4 the certificate of marriage
dated 6.10. 85 and P5 the declaration dated 6. 10. 85 by the bridegroom in terms of section 18 (1) of the
Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act).
As stated earlier, the Magistrate convicted the respondent on the charge of bigamy; he was sentenced to
a term of 18 months rigorous imprisonment suspended for a period of 5 years and a fine of Rs. 2,000 was
also imposed. The respondent preferred an appeal to the Provincial High Court of Galle. His appeal was
successful, the conviction and sentence were set aside and he was acquitted. With the leave of this court,
the aggrieved party N. Manel A. Abeysundera has preferred the present appeal.
When this appeal came up before a Bench of 3 Judges, Mr. Abeysuriya, counsel for the appellant, at first
stated that he would accept the correctness of the decision of the Privy Council in Attorney-General v.
Reid
(1)
. However, at a subsequent stage of the argument, counsel submitted that he would be
challenging the correctness of the decision of the Privy Council in Reid's case (supra). It was in these
circumstances that an order was made directing that this appeal be heard before a Bench comprising five
Judges (Article 132 (3) of the Constitution). It is relevant to note that the principal reason for the acquittal
of the respondent by the Judge of the High Court was the ruling given by the Privy Council in Reid's case
(supra).
The material facts in the present case are almost the same as the facts in Reid's case. Reid married Edna
Margaret de Witt at St. Mary's Church, Badulla, on 18th September, 1933. Both parties were Christians at
the time of the marriage and they lived together until 1957. In 1957 Reid's wife left him and obtained an
order for maintenance against him in the Magistrate's Court of Colombo. On 13th June 1959, Reid and a
divorced lady named Fatima Pansy were converted to Islam. On 16th July 1959, they got married in
Colombo and the marriage was solemnized by the Registrar of Muslim Marriages under the provisions of
the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act, not-
189
withstanding the fact that Reid's earlier marriage was subsisting. Reid was indicted before the District
Court of Colombo and was convicted of the offence of bigamy under section 362 (B) of the Penal Code.
He appealed against the conviction to the Supreme Court and his conviction was quashed. The Attorney-
General appealed against the judgment of the Supreme Court to the Privy Council. The Attorney-
General's appeal, however, was dismissed by the Privy Council. As in the instant case, the only question
that arose for consideration is whether the third ingredient of the offence of bigamy was established. Their
Lordships of the Privy Council concluded that "whatever may be the situation in a purely Christian country
(as to which their Lordships express no opinion) they cannot agree that in a country such as Ceylon a
Christian monogamous marriage prohibits for all time during the subsistence of that marriage a change of
faith and of personal law on the part of a husband resident and domiciled there. They agree with the
observations of Innes, J. almost 100 years ago. In their Lordships view in such countries there must be an
inherent right in the inhabitants domiciled there to change their religion and personal law and so to
contract a valid polygamous marriage if recognized by the laws of the country notwithstanding an earlier
marriage. If such inherent right is to be abrogated it must be done by statute. Admittedly, there is none ...
It follows that as the Attorney-General of Ceylon cannot establish that this second marriage was void by
the law of Ceylon by reason of the earlier Christian monogamous marriage the appeal must fail."
In order to consider the crucial question that arises for decision in this appeal, namely, whether the
second marriage was void, it is first necessary to consider the nature of a contract of marriage and in
particular the precise character of the first marriage which the respondent contracted under the Marriage
Registration Ordinance. It is not disputed that the first marriage was a valid marriage contracted in terms
of the Marriage Registration Ordinance.
First, as to the general nature of the contract of marriage; Wille in Principles of South African Law, 5th
edition states:
4. "Marriage is an institution which is regulated by the law, and which confers a status on the parties to it. It
is a juristic act sui generis . . . The legal consequences of a valid marriage are that a continuing collection
of rights and duties, mostly reciprocal, are
190
conferred or imposed on the parties. This combination of rights and duties is usually termed a
relationship" (p. 89).
Kotze, J. in Weatherley v. Weatherley
(2)
stated :
"Marriage is not a mere ordinary private contract between the parties, it is a contract creating a status and
gives right to important consequences directly affecting society at large. It lies indeed at the root of
civilized society."
Brett, LJ. in Niboyet v. Niboyet
(3)
(Court of Appeal) expressed himself in the following terms:
"Marriage is the fulfilment of a contract satisfied by the solemnization of the marriage, but marriage
directly it exists creates by a law a relation between the parties and what is called a status of each. The
status of an individual, used as a legal term, means a legal position of the individual in or with regard to
the rest of a community. That relation between the parties, and that status of each of them with regard to
the community, which are constituted upon marriage are not imposed or defined by contract or agreement
but by law."
What then are the provisions of the law in terms of which the respondent chose to enter into a contract of
marriage on 27th September 1958? (i.e. the first marriage). The material provisions of the Marriage
Registration Ordinance are sections 18,19 (1), 35 (1) & (2) and the definition of "marriage" contained in
the interpretation section, namely, section 64.
Section 18 : "No marriage shall be valid where either of the parties thereto shall have contracted a prior
marriage which shall not have been legally dissolved or declared void."
Section 19 (1) "No marriage shall be dissolved during the lifetime of the parties except by judgment of
divorce a vinculo matrimonil pronounced in some competent court."
191
Section 35 (1): "A marriage in the presence of the registrar shall, except as hereinafter provided, be
solemnized between the parties at his office or station with open doors, and between the hours of six
O'clock in the morning and six O'clock in the afternoon, and in the presence of two or more respectable
witnesses, and in the following manner:
(2) The registrar shall address the parties to the following effect:
"Be it known unto you. A, B and C, D., that by the public reception of each other as man and wife in my
presence, and the subsequent attestation thereof by signing your name to that effect in the registry book,
you become legally married to each other, although no other rite of a civil or religious nature shall take
place; and know ye further that the marriage now intended to be contracted cannot be dissolved during
your lifetime except by a valid judgment of divorce, and that" if either of you before the death of the other
shall contract another marriage before the former marriage is thus legally dissolved, you will be guilty of
bigamy and be liable to the penalties attached to that offence."
Section 64: "In this Ordinance, unless the context otherwise requires -
5. 'marriage" means any marriage, save and except marriages contracted under and by virtue of the
Kandyan Marriage Ordinance, 1870, or the Kandyan Marriage and Divorce Act, and except marriages
contracted between persons professing Islam."
There is little doubt that section 18 expressly prohibits polygamy and sections 18, 19 (1) and 35 (1) &
(2) read together show beyond doubt that the Marriage Registration Ordinance contemplates only a
monogamous marriage. As stated by Dr. H. W. Tambiah in his work Laws and Customs of the Tamils of
Jaffna, "by the General Marriage Ordinance only monogamy is recognised . . ." (page 106). The
192
respondent having solemnized his first marriage under the Marriage Registration Ordinance is bound to
monogamy and, what is more, the only mode by which such marriage could be dissolved is by a
"judgment of divorce a vinculo matrimonil pronounced in some competent court". The obligation of
monogamy and the mode of dissolution of the marriage are the statutory incidents of the first marriage
which the respondent entered into with the appellant.
As rightly pointed out by Mr. R. K. W. Goonesekera, the judgment of the Privy Council in Reid's case
makes no reference at all to the enactments which preceded the present Marriage Registration
Ordinance. Mr. Goonesekera drew our attention to section 28 of Ordinance No. 6 of 1847.
The section reads thus:
"28. And it is further enacted, that no marriage solemnized in any part of this Island, after the notification
in the Gazette of the confirmation of this Ordinance by Her Majesty, shall be valid (except among
Muhammedans) where either of the parties thereto shall have contracted a prior marriage, which shall not
have been legally dissolved or declared void by decree of some competent court. And every person,
except a Muhammedan, who shall, after such period as aforesaid contract a subsequent marriage, before
his or her prior marriage shall have been so dissolved or declared void and every person except a
Muhammedan, who shall marry another whom he or she shall know to be bound by a previous marriage
not so dissolved or declared void, shall be guilty of bigamy, and liable to imprisonment with or without
hard labour for any period not exceeding three years. Provided always, that no person marrying a second
time, whose husband or wife shall have been continually absent from such person for the space of seven
years then last past, and shall not have been known by such person to be living within that time, shall be
deemed to be guilty of bigamy."
It is thus clear that as far back as 1847, our law made express provision prohibiting polygamy (except in
the case of Muslims) and defining the offence of bigamy. A provision to the same effect was found in
section 19 of Ordinance No. 2 of 1895. Thus in 1911 Lascelles, CJ. in King v. Perumal
(4)
(Full Bench)
stated:
193
"That polygamy has been prohibited and has been an offence under the Municipal law of Ceylon for more
than half a century, except in the case of Muhammadans, is beyond all question" (at page 505).
Having considered the statute law and rules of Private International Law the learned Chief Justice went
on to state -
"It is thus clear that, except in the case of Muhammadans, polygamy is as obnoxious to the public
policy of Ceylon as to that of European States. . . In view of the circumstance that polygamy is
expressly prohibited by the Municipal law of the Colony (except in the case of Muhammadans) I am
clearly of opinion that a polygamous marriage between persons who are not Muhammadans is void in
Ceylon . . ."
6. It is also relevant to note that Wood Renton, J. who was the trial Judge in Perumal's case while "stating
the case" in terms of section 355 (1) of the then Criminal Procedure Code expressed the view that the
Marriage Registration Ordinance, No. 19 of 1907 "not only contemplates monogamous marriage alone
but expressly prohibits polygamy. . .".
It is therefore abundantly clear that the concept of monogamy and the prohibition on polygamy was a part
of our law relating to marriage as long ago as 1847, Unfortunately, neither the relevant statutes nor the
Full Bench decision in Perumal's case were cited before the Privy Council in Reid's case.
Perumal's case is important for another reason. Dealing with the concept of a "Christian marriage" in
relation to the rule of Private international Law "under which the capacity to marry depends upon the
domicil of the parties" and the "well-recognized exceptions to the rule," Lascelles, CJ observed:
"But the use of these expressions (the general consent of all Christendom', the law of God' and the law of
Christendom') does not imply that it is only in countries where Christianity is the prevailing religion that
polygamous and incentuous marriages are beyond the pale of private international law. If a non-Christian
country has followed the rule of Christendom as to polygamy and by its Municipal law has prohibited such
marriages it surely stands
194
on the same footing as Christendom as regards the non-recognition of polygamous marriages. The only
distinction is that in the former case the prohibition rests on grounds of public policy, whilst in the
latter case it is associated with the teaching of Christianity" (at page 505).
Thus the submission of Mr. Goonesekera that prohibition against polygamy (except in the case of
Muslims) under our statute law rests on grounds of public policy is well-founded. As stressed by Mr.
Goonasekera, the integrity of the institution of marriage is the most important consideration. None of
these matters were considered by the Privy Council. The Privy Council was content to observe, "whatever
may be the situation in a purely Christian country (as to which their Lordships express no opinion) they
cannot agree that in a country such as Ceylon a Christian monogamous marriage prohibits for all time
during the subsistence of that marriage a change of faith and of personal law on the part of a husband
resident and domiciled there" Attorney-General v. Reid (supra) at 32.
There is no question that Reid was free to change his faith, but the true question which arose for decision
was whether Reid could cast off the statutory obligations which directly arose from his previous marriage
in terms of the Marriage Registration Ordinance by the simple expedient of unilateral conversion to
Islam. Could he by his own act overcome the incidents of the marriage he chose to contract in terms of
the Marriage Registration Ordinance? In my view, the answer is emphatically in the negative. The statute
expressly provides for the mode of dissolution of the marriage, and that is the only mode provided for by
law. "The principle that where a specific remedy is given by a statute, it thereby deprives the person who
insists upon a remedy of any other form of remedy than that given by the statute, is one which is very
familiar and runs through the law". Pasmore and others v. The Oswaldtwistle Urban District Council
(5)
.
The Privy Council in Reid's case did not focus on the crucial question whether by a unilateral conversion
to Islam subsequent to a lawful marriage in terms of the Marriage Registration Ordinance, Reid could
absolve himself of the statutory liabilities incurred and the statutory obligations undertaken by him. The
Privy Council overlooked the fact that the "rights" of Reid were qualified and restricted by the legal rights
of his wife whom he married in terms of the Marriage Registration Ordinance.
195
Savitri Goonesekera in her work on the Sri Lanka Law on Parent and Child relevantly states (commenting
on Reid's case):
"In emphasizing the right of a person to change his personal law by a unilateral act, the Privy Council
7. seems to have been influenced by the theory that the inhabitants of Sri Lanka have an inherent right to
change their religion and personal law. This view, we have observed, is not correct with regard to other
personal laws (i.e. other than Muslim law) that apply in Sri Lanka. Besides, the concept of the
monogamous marriage, in the non-Muslim law on family relations in this country, indicates that there is no
absolute right to convert to Islam and change one's personal law. . . In Reid's case the Attorney-General
argued that a marriage under the General Marriages Ordinance created a status of monogamy which
could not be changed legally unless the marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Privy Council rejected
this argument stating that whatever may be the situation in a purely Christian country . . . in a country like
Ceylon ... a monogamous marriage (does not) prohibit for all time during the subsistence of that marriage,
a change of faith and personal law. The Privy Council, we have observed, was unaware of the fact that
there are strict limitations on the application of the other personal laws. In rejecting the Attorney-General's
argument, the Court refused to appreciate that even the right of conversion to Islam and of becoming
subject to Muslim law could be qualified in a non Muslim state, where the monogamous marriage
was the norm in the law on family relations." (at pages 56 and 57).
Again, the Privy Council in Reid's case failed altogether to appreciate the significance of section 35 of the
Marriage Registration Ordinance in the context of a statute which recognizes only a monogamous
marriage. The comment of the Privy Council on section 35 reads thus :
"Their Lordships have not overlooked section 35 of the Marriage Registration Ordinance which tends to
support Mr. Liftman's argument, but the exhortation contained in the registrar's address is no more than a
warning and though it may be apt to mislead the ordinary man or woman ignorant of the definition of
marriage contained in section 64, it cannot successfully be prayed in aid
196
when considering whether the offence of bigamy has been committed in terms of section 362 (B) of the
Penal Code" Attorney-General v. Reid (supra) at 32.
It is to be noted that section 35 contemplates the situation where the Registrar addresses the parties to
the marriage just before they place their signature on "the registry book". They are unambiguously told in
simple language that the marriage intended to be contracted cannot be dissolved except by a valid
judgment of divorce and if either of the parties contracts another marriage before the former marriage is
legally dissolved he or she will be guilty of bigamy. It is difficult to understand what the Privy Council
meant by saying that the "exhortation" is apt "to mislead the ordinary man or woman". The true meaning
of section 35 is lucidly expressed by Savitri Goonesekera in the following terms :
"He (the Registrar) is required to tell them that the marriage can only be dissolved by a valid judgment of
divorce, or death, and that a marriage prior to dissolution amounts to bigamy. This provision on the
Registrar's directive is therefore not based on a misconception of the law, as the Privy Council suggested.
It is an articulation of the concept that status of marriage acquired under the General Marriages
Ordinance prevents a spouse from contracting a valid second marriage. Inasmuch as a subsequent
marriage under the Ordinance is declared void when a prior marriage has not been legally dissolved, the
statute contemplates the creation of a monogamous marital status." (Sri Lanka Law on Parent and
Child, p. 58).
It is thus clear that the approach of the Privy Council to a pivotal provision in the Marriage Registration
Ordinance is fundamentally flawed.
Mr. D. S. Wijesinghe for the respondent adopted the reasoning of His Lordship Chief Justice Basnayake
in Reid's case"' and strenuously contended that the entirety of the Marriage Registration Ordinance has
no application whatever to persons professing Islam. The respondent's second marriage was under the
Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act and ex facie it is a valid and [awful marriage. In short, counsel's
submission was that the prohibition contained in section 18 of the Marriage Registration Ordinance will
not and cannot apply to persons professing Islam. Reliance was placed on the definition
8. 197
of "marriage" in section 64 of the Ordinance. Counsel for the Attorney General agreed with the
submissions of Mr. Wijesinghe.
Having cited section 18, His Lordship Chief Justice Basnayake reasoned thus: "The section declares that
no marriage" shall be valid when there is a prior 'subsisting marriage'. Now what is a marriage for the
purpose of section 18? That expression is defined in section 64 and it means 'any marriage save and
except marriages contracted under and by virtue of the Kandyan Marriage Ordinance 1870 or the
Kandyan Marriage and Divorce Act and except marriages contracted between persons professing Islam.
There is nothing in the context of section 18 which renders the definition inapplicable". Mr. Abeysuriya for
the appellant submitted that the approach of His Lordship the Chief Justice was "simplistic". Section 18 is
an all-important provision of the Ordinance. The section enshrines the concept of a monogamous
marriage and expressly prohibits polygamy. I therefore cannot agree that "there is nothing in the context
of section 18 which renders the definition inapplicable". The definition of "marriage" applies "unless the
context otherwise, requires" (section 64). The Marriage Registration Ordinance is founded on the concept
of a monogamous marriage and this is the relevant context. To have recourse to the definition of the term
"marriage", in the way suggested, would render a basic and essential provision of the Ordinance largely
nugatory. This is not a permissible mode of interpretation. By reason of the definition of "marriage",
persons professing Islam cannot marry under the Marriage Registration Ordinance. The true issue is not
whether the respondent's second marriage under the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act is valid or not, but
whether by a unilateral conversion to Islam he could cast aside his antecedent statutory liabilities and
obligations incurred by reason of the prior marriage.
As stated earlier, the answer is clearly in the negative.
Mr. R. K. W. Goonesekera cited before us a recent judgment of the Supreme Court of India which seems
to me of decisive importance - Smt Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani and others (petitioners) v. Union of
India and others (respondents 71 . The question that arose for decision was "whether a Hindu husband,
married under Hindu law, by embracing Islam, can solemnize a second marriage. Whether such a
marriage without having the first marriage dissolved under law would be a valid marriage, qua the first
wife who continues to be Hindu? Whether the apostate husband would be guilty of the offence under
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section 494 of the Indian Penal Code"? After a careful and a comprehensive consideration of the position
under Hindu law, and the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 as well as several decisions of the Indian courts,
Justice Kuldip Singh concluded that the "second marriage of a Hindu husband after his conversion to
Islam is a void marriage in terms of section 494 of the Indian Penal Code". Justice Kuldip Singh reasoned
as follows :
"It is, thus, obvious from a catena of case law that a marriage celebrated under a particular personal law
cannot be dissolved by the application of another personal law to which one of the spouses converts and
the other refuses to do so. Where a marriage takes place under Hindu law the parties acquire a status
and certain rights by the marriage itself under the law governing the Hindu Marriage and if one of the
parties is allowed to dissolve the marriage by adopting and enforcing a new personal law, it would
tantamount to destroying the existing rights of the other spouse who continues to be Hindu. We,
therefore, hold that under the Hindu Personal Law as it existed prior to its codification in 1955, a Hindu
marriage continued to subsist even after one of the spouses converted to Islam. There was no automatic
dissolution of the marriage . . . The position has not changed after coming into force of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 (the Act) rather it has become worse for the apostate ... A marriage solemnized,
whether before or after the commencement of the Act, can only be dissolved by a decree of divorce on
any of the grounds enumerated in section 13 of the Act ... It is obvious from the various provisions of the
Act that the modern Hindu law strictly enforces monogamy. A marriage performed under the Act cannot
be dissolved except on the grounds available under section 13, of the Act. In that situation parties who
have solemnized the marriage under the Act remain married even when the husband embraces Islam in
9. pursuit of other {sic!) wife. A second marriage by an apostate under the shelter of conversion to Islam
would nevertheless by (sic) a marriage in violation of the provisions of the Act by which he would be
continuing to be governed so far as his first marriage under the Act is concerned despite his conversion to
Islam. The second marriage of an apostate would, therefore be (sic) illegal marriage qua his wife who
married him under the Act and continues to be Hindu. Between the apostate and his Hindu wife the
second marriage is in violation of the
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provisions of the Act and as such would be non est. Section 494 Indian Penal Code is as under :
Marrying again during lifetime of husband or wife' - Whoever, having a husband or wife living marries in
any case in which such marriage is void by reason of its taking place during the life of such husband or
wife, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven
years, and shall also be liable to fine.
The necessary ingredients of the section are : (1) having a husband or wife living; (2) marries in any case;
(3) in which such marriage is void; (4) by reason of its taking place during the life of such husband or wife
. . .
It is no doubt correct that the marriage solemnized by a Hindu husband after embracing Islam may not be
strictly a void marriage under the Act because he is no longer a Hindu, but the fact remains that the said
marriage would be in violation of the Act which strictly professes monogamy . . .
The expression "void" under section 494 I. P. C. has been used in the wider sense. A marriage which is
in violation of any provisions of law would be void in terms of the expression used under section
494 I. P. C.
"A Hindu marriage solemnized under the Act can only be dissolved on any of the grounds specified under
the Act. Till the time a Hindu marriage is dissolved under the Act none of the spouses can contract
second marriage. Conversion to Islam and marrying again would not, by itself, dissolve the Hindu
marriage under the Act. The second marriage by a convert would therefore be in violation of the Act
and as such void in terms of section 494 I. P. C. Any Act which is in violation of mandatory
provisions of law is per se void.
The real reason for the voidness of the second marriage is the subsisting (sic) of the first marriage which
is not dissolved even by the conversion of the husband. It would be giving a go-bye to the substance of
the matter and acting against the spirit of the statute if the second marriage of the convert is held to be
legal", (pages 1536 to 1537).
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In my view, the reasoning of Justice Kuldip Singh set out in extenso above is cogent and valid, and is
clearly applicable to the facts of the fact before us, and to Reid's case.
In the early part of his judgment Justice Kuldip Singh made a very relevant observation which Mr. R. K.
W. Goonesekera rightly emphasized in the course of his submissions. The issues that arise are
concerned with an institution of the utmost importance, namely marriage and the family. Said the learned
Judge, "Marriage is the very foundation of the civilized society. The relation once formed, the law steps
in and binds the parties to various obligations and liabilities thereunder. Marriage is an institution in
the maintenance of which the public at large is deeply interested. It is the foundation of the family and in
turn of the society without which no civilization can exist." (page 1533). These wider considerations, so
relevant and important for a correct appreciation of the issues involved, I say with the utmost respect,
were completely lost sight of by the Privy Council and His Lordship the Chief Justice. To attempt to
literally transpose the definition of the expression "marriage" to the core provision in the Ordinance
10. (section 18) has the effect of emasculating the section. This approach is wrong for it takes no account of
the basic principle enshrined in the Ordinance, the recognition of monogamy alone and the explicit
prohibition on polygamy.
For the reasons I have endeavored to set out above, I hold that Reid's case [supra] was wrongly decided
and must be overruled. As stated earlier, the material facts in Reid's case and in the present appeal
before us are almost identical and the legal issues are the same. I accordingly hold that the second
purported marriage of the respondent to Miss Edirisinghe during the subsistence of the prior valid
marriage contracted under the Marriage Registration Ordinance is void, notwithstanding the respondent's
conversion to Islam. It follows that the charge of bigamy (section 362 (B) of the Penal Code) preferred
against the respondent is proved.
The appeal against the acquittal of the respondent by the Judge of the High Court is accordingly allowed
and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. I affirm the conviction and the sentence imposed by the
learned Magistrate.
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Whilst thanking Mr. Abeysuriya, Mr. Wijesinghe and Mr. Aluvihare for their assistance in this not
altogether easy case, I wish to place on record my deep appreciation of the assistance given by Mr. R. K.
W. Goonesekera who appeared as amicus on the invitation of the court.
WADUGODAPITIYA, J. - I agree.
PERERA, J. - I agree.
WIJETUNGA, J. - I agree.
BANDARANAYAKE, J. - I agree.
Appeal allowed.