This document summarizes business models that municipalities can pursue to improve broadband access, including maintaining the status quo, private ownership, and publicly owned networks. It describes how municipalities sometimes leverage their roles as users, rule-makers, financiers, infrastructure developers, and operators to negotiate with private internet service providers or build their own networks. The document provides examples of municipalities that have successfully worked with companies like Google and AT&T or taken on network ownership themselves to bring faster, more affordable broadband to their communities.

1. City of New Orleans
Broadband Around
the World
Best Practices and Lessons Learned from Other Jurisdictions
Jennifer Terry
December 9, 2014
Revised January 12, 2016

2. 1

3. 2
Acknowledgments
This report was prepared for the City of New Orleans under the auspices of the US Department of
Housing and Urban Development’s Strong Cities, Strong Communities (SC2) Fellowship program. During
my two-year fellowship, I worked with staff in the City’s Department of Information Technology and
Innovation to develop a long-term Broadband Master Plan for the City. Pursuant to that project, I
conducted research into the importance of broadband, reasons why people lack broadband access, and
possible strategies to help bring broadband to people who currently do not have it.
This report, along with the companion report, “Broadband: The World's Newest Public Utility,”
documents the research findings.
I would like to thank my colleagues at the City of New Orleans for their assistance during this process.
The people who selflessly shared relevant information and willingly served as sounding boards for ideas
are too numerous to name.
I also want to thank the SC2 Fellowship Management team for their assistance in framing the research
and for keeping me on task to completion.
Sincerely,
Jennifer

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5. 4
Introduction
As of January 2014, approximately 140 North American municipalities representing every region of the
United States and a few Canadian provinces had built a community owned broadband network, either
alone or in collaboration with the private or nonprofit sectors, or worked with the private sector to
improve the quality of broadband offered by the private sector. Some of these networks have been
operating since 1997; others began operations in 2013. Although the networks collectively offer a range
of services, including video (cable), data (internet), voice (telephone), smart grid, business services,
security, and videoconferencing, many offer data alone or offer data, video, and/or voice services only.1
With regard to business models, most of the communities have a municipal network, but a few employ a
public-private partnership model to serve businesses, institutions, and residents. About half of the
communities work with internet service providers (ISPs), local universities, school systems, mass transit
agencies, and their respective state governments to provide broadband service. The most common
technologies used are fiber-to-the-premises (FTTP), hybrid fiber coax (HFC), and wireless.2
These 140 municipalities decided to facilitate better broadband access because the maximum available
bandwidth in their communities was too slow and too expensive to meet their needs. In many instances,
when faced with this situation, municipal officials asked private-sector telecommunications providers to
upgrade their network and offered to assist firms. Often, these companies refused.
Because the internet access market is a natural monopoly, with very high initial costs for infrastructure,
this market requires long-term investment. Early profitability is unlikely and short-term losses are
normal.3
Therefore, for-profit telecommunications providers limit risk by concentrating service in the
geographic markets where they are most likely to make a profit. This concentration of services results in
subpar service in rural areas and poorer parts of urban areas.
In many instances, after telecommunications providers rebuffed initial offers to collaborate,
municipalities pursued other avenues. This report describes the efforts of approximately 40 municipal,
state, provincial, or national governments to increase the bandwidth and decrease the cost of
broadband in their jurisdictions. Most of the examples are from the United States, but the report
includes the experiences from Canada, Europe, and Asia as well.
The next sections of the report discuss factors one must understand when thinking about techniques to
improve the quality of broadband in the community, such as
 the various roles government entities play in the broadband market;
 the business models available to communities that build a telecom network;
 the governance structures commonly used by publicly owned networks;
 factors to consider when deciding to build a publicly owned network;
 observations of common experiences in communities that built their own networks; and
 best practices the most successful communities used when building their networks.
After these introductory sections provide context and background, the main body of the report includes
approximately 40 case studies describing the experiences of other communities as they pursued an
astounding range of options in their quest for better broadband.
1
“FTTH Search,” Broadband Communities Magazine, http://www.bbpmag.com/search.php?s0=1&cols=-co-st-an-se-ty-mu-su-
pa&st=&ve=&gr=&te=&se=&ty=-mun-ppr&qco=&qme=&qan=&qus=0&qmu=&qsu=&qpa=, accessed January 2014.
2
Ibid.
3
Eric Null, “Municipal Broadband: History’s Guide,” I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, 9 (2013): 50.

6. 5
Government Roles Vis-à-Vis Broadband
Government entities can pursue a range of short-, mid-, and long-term strategies to improve their
residents’ access to broadband. By necessity, these strategies will take advantage of one or more of the
five roles that government can play with regard to broadband—user, rule-maker, financier,
infrastructure developer, or operator.
User
Similar to residents, businesses, and nonprofit organizations, government entities use broadband.
Likewise, governments have become dependent upon internet to run physical systems (e.g. connected
traffic lights, traffic cameras, and parking meters, etc.) and to help their employees conduct tasks
related to providing services to residents. Like other users, government often chafes at the high prices it
pays for broadband.
Unlike most users, government and large corporations can leverage the fact that they purchase a large
volume of data services to negotiate lower per unit prices. Although this helps government to decrease
the amount of money it spends on broadband, it does not usually help the community’s residents or
small and mid-sized businesses.
In the United States, government typically does not leverage its role as a broadband user (and its
associated purchasing power) to negotiate lower broadband prices for consumers. One exception
discussed in this report is Minneapolis, which contracted with US Internet to build and operate a wifi
network for the community. Minneapolis used its influence as the new network’s anchor tenant to
negotiate provisions to support affordable internet access for community members.
Usually, government is not contracting with a telecom to build a new network, and therefore cannot use
the influence of a network anchor tenant to negotiate better prices or other benefits for other network
users. Therefore, the number of situations in which government can use its role as broadband user to
generate better service and/or lower prices for the community at large or even specific members of the
community (e.g. lower-income people) is limited.
While government’s power as a user hinges upon its demand for services from telecoms, in its other
roles, government entities affect supply4
as described below.
Rule-maker
Like other organizations, government entities set rules about how their organizations and employees
may use broadband. Unlike other organizations, government also makes rules that affect access for the
larger community. In theory, a municipality that charges telecoms a high fee to use its right-of-way
(ROW), relative to ROW access fees charged by other municipalities, could increase the cost of building a
network in its community. If the telecom passes these costs to consumers, then prices for broadband in
that community could be more expensive than in other communities, thereby excluding some
community members from accessing broadband.
4
“Planning and Broadband: Infrastructure, Policy, and Sustainability,” American Planning Association PAS Report 569, July 2012, 25.

7. 6
On the other hand, a government entity can use its rule-making role to improve its community’s
broadband. Normally, telecoms need to use publicly owned ROW to build their networks; furthermore,
telecoms usually pay fees to use the ROW. Governments acquiring fiber for community use sometimes
alter regulations to require telecoms to provide extra fiber for such use, rather than pay a fee when the
telecoms use public ROW. Governments negotiate such agreements when telecoms want to build or
upgrade networks.
Most telecoms try to include provisions to limit how a government can use its free fiber. Usually, these
stipulations prohibit a government from providing broadband access to the public at their homes and
businesses, regardless of whether residents and business owners pay to use the fiber or government
provides free service. For example, Verizon and Comcast extracted agreements from Washington, DC
not to sell service directly to businesses and residents when the companies agreed to allow the City to
use its conduit and poles for a municipally owned fiber network.
Government has more opportunity to negotiate agreements to improve broadband in communities by
taking advantage of its rule-making authority than through its purchasing power as a user. After all,
government can leverage rule-making authority with regard to all telecoms that operate in the
community, whereas it can deploy its power as a user only with telecoms with whom it has, or could
reasonably entertain, a direct business relationship.
Financier
When a community builds its own network, government often must obtain outside funding. Often, a
community works with private or nonprofit partners to build a community network, with the
government handling financing and the partners providing the expertise to construct and operate the
network. If the consortium needs to borrow money, the government entity will borrow so the group can
take advantage of the government’s ability to issue tax-free bonds. In such instances, because the
government entity assumes the risk of debt to pay for the project, it may be able to insist that its
partners create packages to provide reasonable bandwidth at affordable prices to low-income people,
or provide another community benefit.
Therefore, in situations in which a community collaborates with other entities, it can use its role as
financier to negotiate enhancements that increase the new network’s potential benefit to the
community. However, because government in the United States is unlikely to finance a network owned
and operated by another entity, government’s ability to leverage the financier role is limited to
situations in which a community is building its own network. Hence, when government undertakes the
role of network financier, it is because it also has assumed the role of infrastructure developer.
Infrastructure developer
Obviously, acting as its own infrastructure developer provides a community with the best opportunity to
build the type of network it needs. A community that plans its network and oversees construction can
specify its requirements for bandwidth, security, reliability, and so forth. Once the network becomes
operational, government can act on behalf of the community to determine prices for the different
service tiers. Even if the governmental entity hires a vendor to oversee daily operations, the government
can exert a lot of control over pricing and other aspects of network operations by specifying these items
in the vendor’s contract.

8. 7
Operator
If a government entity’s employees perform daily operational tasks for its community-owned network
rather than hiring a contractor, the government entity acts as the network operator and therefore
controls prices, bandwidth, etc. However, communities that hire contractors to operate their
community-owned network can influence parameters affecting network service and prices by including
service-level agreements and other requirements in vendor contracts. Communities that engage outside
vendors must ensure that their requirements allow the vendors to earn an adequate profit while
meeting community objectives.
Risks and Rewards
In summation, to influence the availability of broadband in a community as well as parameters of
available broadband service (e.g., price, bandwidth, reliability, etc.), government entities have many
roles available to them. However, these roles are not equal with respect to their potential to improve
broadband. The roles that allow communities the most direct impact on their broadband—operator,
infrastructure developer, and financier—also require communities to assume the most risk by
essentially becoming a telecom, even if that telecom only serves public sector users. The remaining roles
of user and rule-maker do not allow communities to control their broadband destinies; they also do not
require the same level of risk.
As demonstrated above, the roles are not mutually exclusive. Government entities in communities
without a community-owned network are internet users, and usually rule-makers as well. Governments
in communities with a community-owned network often serve as infrastructure developers, financiers,
and operators with regard to their networks. In addition, these governmental entities are broadband
users like many other organizations. Unlike other organizations, these government entities are users on
a network they also own and oversee. Furthermore, these government entities may exercise rule-
making authority vis-à-vis the community-owned network, in the sense that one department may run
the network while other departments oversee permits needed to construct or operate the network. As
shown by this non-exhaustive list, government often plays many roles simultaneously.
As shown by the various roles that government entities play in the broadband market, municipalities
have many possibilities to address this situation. Each option includes possible positive and negative
outcomes. The next section describes a few of these options.

9. 8
Business Models
Introduction
A municipality that builds a community-owned network can pursue several business models. Before
reviewing business models, it is important to examine how American municipalities commonly address
deplorable, overpriced service in their communities. They do nothing and maintain the status quo.
Status Quo
Municipalities pursuing this option hope private telecoms will upgrade their networks to meet 21st
century telecommunications needs. In other words, these municipalities do nothing to improve
broadband access in their communities. If the telecom does nothing on its own (the likely outcome),
then nothing changes and the community continues to have subpar internet service. Although the
community avoids risks associated with other options, the community assumes the risks associated with
having subpar internet service. These risks include but are not limited to
 a reduced ability to retain current residents and businesses in the community,
 a reduced ability to attract new residents and businesses to the community,
 declining wages and a stagnant economy, and
 lower health, education, and other outcomes for residents.
While incumbent telecoms try to focus public attention on the risks associated with a government entity
building a telecom network, they ignore the considerable risks associated with maintaining the status
quo. In broadband, as in life, there is always a risk associated with doing nothing.
Private Ownership
A municipality pursuing this option may convince a private-sector entity to build, own, and operate a
new network or expand/improve an existing network in its community. To entice internet service
providers (ISPs), a city may use tools at its disposal as a regulator, a customer, and an owner of valuable
assets to
 make it easier for telecoms to construct and/or operate a network, and
 increase demand for broadband to ensure ISPs a sufficient number of customers.
Specific tactics municipalities use include the following:
 written assurance of their role as network anchor client for a specific time period,
 access to rights-of-way and/or light poles,
 the right to lay fiber under streets or attach network infrastructure to other property, and
 help with relevant permitting processes.
For example, Austin, TX and Kansas City (KS and MO) each leveraged community-owned assets and
regulatory power to bring Google to their community as a new ISP offering fiber broadband. Raleigh-
Durham, NC and Winston-Salem, NC used community-owned assets and regulatory power to entice
AT&T, an existing ISP, to build a fiber network that could provide more bandwidth than AT&T’s existing
DSL network. Fort Wayne, IN worked with local anchor institutions to convince Verizon to bring FiOS
fiber service to their city.

10. 9
Less commonly, municipalities that are having difficulty managing an existing community-owned
network may sell it to a private-sector entity that would accept network ownership and operation, as
Provo, UT did with Google. Subsequent sections of this report highlight the efforts of Kansas City, Provo,
and Fort Wayne to secure fast, affordable broadband for their communities.
In other instances, municipalities try to encourage existing telecom firms to upgrade service with more
generous bandwidth and data limits and to reduce prices. Such service improvements may require
network enhancements. Regardless of whether municipalities work with existing ISPs or new providers,
municipalities want to entice all ISPs operating in the community to improve service and lower prices.
Municipalities seeking better broadband from a private firm often try to negotiate favorable terms for
themselves as a direct customer and, more rarely, for the community as a whole. For example, a
municipality may try to negotiate lower rates for themselves as anchor clients and for their employees
as residential subscribers. They may try to stipulate bandwidth offerings, data limits, and prices on the
network (iProvo after its sale to Google). Although the municipality does not control the network under
this scenario, the introduction of a new ISP could increase competition enough to give the municipality
power to negotiate with new and incumbent ISPs to improve service and reduce costs.
One major risk with this approach is that the private sector’s short-term profit focus may result in the
private firm abandoning the network before the municipality can realize the long-term benefits of the
negotiated arrangement.
Recent attempts by Austin, Kansas City, Provo, Raleigh-Durham, and Winston-Salem to improve
broadband access via privately owned broadband improvements may introduce enough competition to
improve broadband offerings and reduce prices in these cities. Unfortunately, at the time of the writing
of this report in November 2014, these projects are in the planning or early implementation phase.
Therefore, it is too soon to judge their long-term impact on broadband supply and access, although the
short-term impact seems beneficial for consumers.
What is clear is that these projects do little to reduce community dependence on the private sector.
Consequently, such projects represent a continuation of the status quo—even if the quality and price of
broadband improve in the short term.
Business Models for Publicly Owned Networks
The previous section outlined risks associated with maintaining the status quo and described ways that
municipalities attempt to work with ISPs to improve the quality and/or price of broadband in their
communities. This section concentrates on business models for publicly owned broadband networks,
and benefits and risks associated with each business model.
Public Ownership/Public Operation: Municipalities pursuing this option build, own, and operate a
broadband network. Within the public ownership/public operation model, institutional networks serve
public-sector customers such as government, K-12 schools, higher education, and libraries, while
municipal networks serve business and residential clients in addition to public-sector entities.
For municipalities, the main benefit of the public ownership/public operation model is that the
municipality can run its network entirely in the public interest, unlike a for-profit firm. Drawbacks
include the need to increase payroll to run a new service and the almost-certain need to acquire debt to
pay to build the network. This report discusses the experiences of many communities, including Bristol
(TN and VA); Chattanooga, TN; Burlington, VT; and Santa Monica, CA among others, in building and

11. 10
operating a community-owned network. Of these communities, only Santa Monica built its network
without assuming debt.
Public Ownership/Private or Nonprofit Operation aka Public Private Partnership (PPP): Municipalities
that pursue this option contract with a private-sector or nonprofit wholesaler that sells service to retail
customers on a community-owned network. From the customer perspective, the wholesaler is their ISP,
even though the community owns the network that hosts the services.
This model benefits the municipality in that it retains control of the network itself while avoiding the
hassles of daily operations. This model benefits private firms by permitting them to avoid expensive
infrastructure investments.
Municipalities may prefer to contract with one or many wholesalers, depending on their needs. A
requirement that the network remain open to multiple service providers may reduce wholesaler
willingness to work with the municipality. If an interested wholesaler insists on being a monopoly
provider, the municipality can use its ownership of the network to insist the wholesaler provide a certain
level of service and/or prices that meet certain criteria. Likewise, if a wholesaler concedes to the
presence of competing wholesalers on the network, they will try to negotiate concessions. These
concessions could make this option less attractive to a municipality than operating the network itself.
From the municipality’s perspective, another drawback to this model is loss of municipal control over
the customer experience because the wholesaler ISPs run operations. This report discusses the
experiences of Chicago, IL; Provo, UT; Seattle, WA; and Utah’s UTOPIA network in working with the
private sector to operate a community-owned network. In addition, the report highlights cities that sell
service directly to customers and through wholesale intermediaries, such as Lafayette, LA; Santa
Monica, CA; South Bend, IN; and Tacoma, WA.
Nonprofit Ownership: A municipality can build a broadband network and sell it to a nonprofit entity to
operate, or otherwise arrange for a nonprofit entity to build and operate a network. The benefits and
drawbacks of this model are similar to those of a privately owned network.
Although a municipality might negotiate with a nonprofit to build and operate a network in its
community, it is unlikely that a municipality would build a network with the intention of selling it to
another entity, even a nonprofit, thereby losing ultimate control of the asset. Typically, when a
municipality sells its publicly owned network to another entity, the network has not met subscriber and
revenue targets, thereby eroding resident and politician support for the network.
Civic Wireless Model: A municipality can offer free wireless access to the public in public spaces;
typically, the city itself or a civic entity pays the cost of this service. The city or civic entity may own and
operate the network itself or may hire others to operate a network it owns. A third option is for the city
or civic entity to pay a private firm to offer free wireless services in public spaces on the private firm’s
network, similar to what New York City proposes to do via its partnership with CityBridge (as described
in this report). Although civic wireless networks can provide residents with access to broadband outside
the home, this model is insufficient to improve home broadband access for most residents.
Because home access is critical for people to become truly conversant with broadband, any option that
does not provide affordable access to broadband at home represents only a partial step in efforts to
provide adequate broadband access and reduce the “digital divide.”

12. 11
Governance: Publicly Owned Networks
Municipalities that decide to build and operate a publicly owned network need to select a governance
structure that determines what political entity will oversee the network and defines that political
entity’s role and responsibilities. Whereas a business model relates to what entity will handle the
technical and operational aspects of running the network and interfacing with customers, governance
refers to the political and financial considerations of overseeing the network. As with business models,
there are many governance options available depending on state and local laws and political conditions.
These include
 embedment in municipal government;
 establishment of separate municipal boards;
 establishment of special boards, authorities, and commissions;
 establishment of utility cooperatives; and
 creation of multi-government interlocal projects5
As expected, each governance structure includes multiple potential positive and negative impacts. The
communities included in this report opted for a variety of governance structures. For example, Santa
Monica, CA chose to embed its network operations in municipal government; the City’s information
technology department handled the design and construction of the municipal fiber network and
continues to handle daily network operations. Many other cities (including Bristol, VA and Lafayette, LA)
used an existing publicly owned utility to construct their community fiber networks, then created a new
entity to oversee the fiber network operations. Such networks are separate from the pre-existing
utilities or any other parts of city government. For these communities, creating a new organization with
its own board, rules, and regulations, offered the chance to simplify network governance by segregating
it from other areas of community life overseen by the public sector. The UTOPIA network in Utah and
the network serving Bristol, VA and surrounding counties are examples of multi-government interlocal
projects.
5
Casey Lide, “Connecting Your Community: Bringing Broadband to Town” (presentation at the Virginia Municipal League Annual Conference,
October 4, 2004): 7.

13. 12
Deciding to Build a Publicly Owned Network
The previous sections discussed the roles government plays with respect to the broadband market and
provided an overview of the types of business models and governance structures available to
government entities that build a government owned network. It is helpful to understand these factors
when thinking about the questions that every government entity must ask itself when considering
whether to build a government owned network.
Greenfield Municipalities
For “greenfield” municipalities (those without high-speed broadband internet access), it may be easier
to support municipal involvement in broadband provision. Because they will be providing new service,
rather than redundant service, they should be able to procure customers because people will not be
locked into contracts with an incumbent.
Likewise, they will not face opposition from a local incumbent telecom provider because there is no
local incumbent telecom provider. However, they may face opposition from telecoms that do not serve
their community. These telecoms will not want the community to build a successful network and
establish a precedent that does not support the telecom industry narrative that “government is not able
to construct and operate a telecom network.”
Greenfield municipalities may have an easier time than non-greenfield municipalities in portraying the
telecoms as an outside entity trying to interfere in the community. Without any prior involvement in the
community, residents may find it odd that a telecom suddenly expresses interest in their community
when it indicates the intent to build a network.
Brownfield Municipalities
“Brownfield” municipalities (those with existing broadband access) must answer many questions to
determine whether they should become involved in broadband provision.
 Is the price of broadband service expensive enough to justify overbuilding?
 Is existing broadband service inadequate enough to justify overbuilding?
“Brownfield” internet municipalities must develop a deep understanding of the high-speed internet
market in their area. To justify involvement, the municipality likely will require significant price
reductions and economic and social benefits. Incumbent internet service providers are also more likely
to launch legal challenges to “brownfield” municipalities. Municipal officials must be prepared to face
numerous technical, legal, political, and monetary challenges.6
Municipal Network vs. Institutional Network
If a municipality chooses to build and operate a broadband network, it must determine whom to serve.
Will it limit operations to municipal functions only? Many public sector entities build networks that only
serve publicly owned buildings and property. Other municipal networks provide the communications
capabilities to operate streetlights, traffic and/or safety cameras, or parking meters. Public safety
6
Null, “Municipal Broadband: History’s Guide,” 56–58.

14. 13
agencies like police, fire, and emergency medical services often use municipal networks for
communications. Sometimes, networks provide free wifi access to the public in publicly owned parks
and plazas.
All networks (both public and private) face design, technical, and sometimes political challenges
associated with pre-construction regulatory requirements. However, publicly owned networks that limit
public access to publicly owned buildings and open spaces, and limit network access outside those areas
to public employees and/or publicly owned equipment, usually experience fewer legal challenges.
These networks do not pose a significant threat to private telecommunications providers’ profits. In this
scenario, the ISP loses one very lucrative customer (the municipality), instead of multiple customers.
Legal challenges are therefore limited. Municipal broadband networks that choose to sell broadband to
customers directly, however, compete with private-sector telecommunications firms and thus incur
legal challenges more frequently.
Business Model Selection
Municipalities that sell service to customers can face many decisions about their business model. Will
the network pursue a wholesale model and sell broadband to intermediaries that resell services to end
users? Or will the network sell directly to customers? If it chooses this approach, will it limit itself to
business customers, residents, or serve both? Alternatively, will the municipality pursue a hybrid model
that involves the provision of both wholesale and retail services?
These questions are not merely academic. There are different factors to consider when providing
wholesale and retail broadband service.
 What type of service can the municipality provide per state laws?
 What types of service are in demand in their municipality or planned coverage area?
 What services will the municipality provide? Will it sell cable TV and/or voice services or limit
itself to data services only?
The riskier approach, competing with private-sector telecommunications providers, offers possible
benefits to consumers and the economy that make this method worthwhile for some public-sector
entities. The increased competition due to the availability of a municipal broadband alternative usually
results in lower prices and/or faster and more reliable service within the area with duplicative (public
and private) services. Other benefits cited by proponents include
 improved public-sector worker productivity and internal operations;
 reduction in number of people who can’t access the internet due to financial considerations;
 increased ability of local businesses to participate in national and international markets;
 expanded job market access for local workers who can work for employers in distant locations;
and
 expanded labor market access for local employers who can hire employees in distant locations.7
7
“Municipal Broadband,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Municipal_broadband, accessed September 2013.

15. 14
Trends in Municipal Provision of Broadband
Clearly, there are other benefits not discussed. Nevertheless, one final benefit is worth mentioning.
Wresting control of broadband access, which has become a basic utility in developed nations, from
telecommunications firms allows a municipality to control its daily operations and plan its future.
Indeed, “city government ownership over [a broadband telecommunications] network means the city
controls the reins, can oversee the network, and can ensure that the network embodies the
government’s vision, including subscription rate, upgrades, and network neutrality.”8
Recognizing this
fact, many municipalities are issuing RFPs for broadband services. Among these are major cities,
including Baltimore, MD; Raleigh, NC; and Los Angeles, CA.
For communities that want to improve municipal provision of services via better broadband and/or
improve broadband access for underserved residents within their communities, provision of municipal
broadband is a “best practice” endorsed by the Federal Communications Commission in 2000.9
During the past 20 years, many small, rural municipalities have built and operated broadband networks
to benefit their government operations and their residents. Large cities, which received better service
from the private telecommunications firms, typically did not resort to building and operating their own
networks.
Besides the availability of better service from private providers in larger cities, a stronger distrust of
government among residents of large cities also may contribute to the relatively few attempts to build
and operate large municipal broadband networks. Because telecoms earn their highest returns in cities
where customers cluster together (thereby reducing infrastructure costs), these firms are more likely to
oppose municipal networks in cities. Officials there understand that they are more likely to face
stringent opposition if they attempt to build and operate a municipal broadband network than their
rural counterparts. The fear of this opposition has kept many large cities from attempting the same
outcome that approximately 300 smaller ones have accomplished—the construction and operation of a
municipally owned broadband network.10
In recent years, several larger cities have attempted to build and operate a municipal network as
discussed in this report, the remainder of which summarizes the experiences of various cities, states,
provinces, and nations that have built and operated a government broadband network.
Because many countries have average broadband speeds faster than the United States, this research
includes international examples, too. As of 2010, these included Canada, Belgium, Switzerland, Iceland,
Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Switzerland,
Romania, Latvia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.11
The next sections provide observations from the case studies, and examples of best practices, while the
final section summarizes the experiences of individual communities.
8
Null, “Municipal Broadband: History’s Guide,” 22.
9
“Municipal Broadband,” Wikipedia.
10
Emily Badger, “Why Are There No Big Cities with Municipal Broadband Networks?” Atlantic Cities Place Matters, March 4, 2013,
http://www.theatlanticcities.com/technology/2013/03/why-are-there-no-big-cities-municipal-broadband-networks/4857/, accessed
September 2013.
11
“Broadband Speeds,” CNN, http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2010/03/tech/map.broadband.speeds/index.html, accessed November 2013.

16. 15
Observations from Case Studies
Similar Commitment and Challenges, Different Decisions
Building a government-owned and/or operated broadband network is a long process.
It can take 10 years or longer to complete a publicly owned broadband network, due to need to
overcome technical, regulatory, political, legal, and other hurdles. This is true regardless of whether the
project involves fiber or various wireless technologies, and regardless of whether the government is a
local, state, provincial, or national government. The need for long-term commitment is consistent for
projects in North America, Europe, Asia, or Oceania.
Broadband networks overseas face similar challenges to those faced by their US counterparts.
Differing historical and current political realities have led to different decisions regarding regulation,
government subsidy, open access, and other factors in overseas networks. The result is an environment
that supports the development of financially viable high-speed broadband networks more readily than
the US environment. Therefore, other nations often enjoy faster average broadband speeds than the
United States. Even so, public- and private-sector entities overseas face similar obstacles as their US
counterparts because they must address technical, financial, regulatory, political, and legal challenges.
Overseas governments do more to promote broadband competition government entities in the
United States; their consumers benefit.
Although some nations built or subsidized the construction of broadband networks, many nations have
faster broadband because their national governments enacted legislation to force competition. These
nations faced and overcame challenges from incumbents because their leaders exercised political will.
For example, the UK broadband market used to be similar to the US market. British homes had two
options for broadband service: the incumbent telephone company, British Telecom (BT), or a cable
provider. Prices were high, service was slow, and Britain was falling behind its European neighbors in
international rankings of broadband service.12
Beginning in 2000, the government required BT to allow other broadband providers to deliver service
over its lines. BT resisted. However, 10 years later, the number of Britons served by multiple broadband
providers had increased from 12,000 to 6M. As of 2011, the post office and supermarket chains offer
broadband and a consortium of broadband providers had approached BT to request access to its
infrastructure to build their own fiber network.13
The Netherlands follows this pattern, too. The Dutch national government did not build a broadband
network. However, it created an environment that allowed the City of Amsterdam to collaborate with
private- and public-sector partners to build a fiber network. After a partial buyout by a private
partnership, the City of Amsterdam has only a minority share in the region’s fiber network. To
encourage competition, the Amsterdam network contracts with many wholesalers to provide service to
end users. Competition between these wholesalers results in better prices for Dutch consumers.
Like many European nations, both South Korea and Japan require internet service providers to allow
other ISPs to offer service via their networks for a fee. The result is that both Seoul and Tokyo have
12
Rick Karr, “Why is European broadband faster and cheaper? Blame the government,” Engadget, June 28, 2011,
http://www.engadget.com/2011/06/28/why-is-european-broadband-faster-and-cheaper-blame-the-governme/, accessed November 2013.
13
Ibid.

17. 16
many major ISPs, while most American cities are served by two major ISPs. Singapore also has many ISPs
offering service on its two fiber networks.
The Municipal Experience
Municipalities are the level of government most likely to build a broadband network.
While nations and large political subdivisions like states or provinces often develop broadband plans
with lofty goals, they very rarely build networks. The most notable exception is Australia, which is
building a nationwide broadband network and Alberta, Canada, which is building a provincial broadband
network. National governments are more likely to devise policies that encourage the private sector to
provide adequate broadband than to build a national network. Nations that successfully encouraged
their private sector to improve broadband include Singapore, Japan, and South Korea.
The research revealed that municipal government is more likely to build a network to address residents’
broadband access deficiencies than state, provincial, or national government. Therefore, this report
contains many more case studies detailing actions taken by local government to address their
community broadband needs.
Municipalities with incumbent broadband providers face greater challenges in improving broadband.
Most American municipalities have internet service. The smallest communities may have access only to
dialup, but larger communities typically have access to cable or DSL broadband for residential
consumers. Access to fiber, the fastest broadband technology, typically is limited to business users able
to pay premium fees of several thousand dollars per month for access. Therefore, most municipalities
are “brownfield” markets where slower DSL and cable internet service is already available to residents.
Unfortunately, the bandwidth offered and the prices for the service are unappealing.
For these communities, the decision to “overbuild” private network(s) owned and operated by
incumbent(s) to provide a redundant community-owned option is one that requires a deep
understanding of their local high-speed internet market, as well as leaders who are willing to commit
political capital, staff time, and funding to the broadband project.
To justify involvement, the municipality likely will require significant price reductions and economic and
social benefits for its residents and businesses. Because incumbent internet service providers are more
likely to launch legal challenges to “brownfield” municipalities, these places must be prepared to
weather the political and monetary costs of lengthy legal challenges. As discussed herein, Lafayette, LA;
Bristol, VA; Burlington, VT; Chattanooga, TN; and Amsterdam in the Netherlands encountered legal
challenges during efforts to build and operate community fiber networks.
In a 2006 memorandum to a client, the Tennessee Broadband Coalition, the Baller Herbst Law Group, a
law firm specializing in broadband and telecommunications issues, stated that it had been involved in
most of the previous decade’s leading public communications projects. The memo then states, “In
almost all of these projects, the incumbent telephone and cable companies have rejected or ignored the
locality’s invitation to join in cooperative efforts that would benefit all concerned, and have instead
mounted massive media and lobbying campaigns [to oppose] the proposed public network. Often, the
incumbents have funded support from industry ‘experts’ and artificial ‘grassroots’ groups….”14
The incumbents’ campaigns have included “emotional appeals to private-enterprise ideology, flawed
statistics, complaints about supposedly unfair advantages that municipalities have over the private
14
Jim Baller and Casey Lide, “The Case for Public Fiber-to-the-User Systems,” (case study report, Washington, DC, March 4, 2006), 1.

18. 17
sector, attacks on the motives and competency of public officials, and false or incomplete, misleading,
and irrelevant examples.”15
Brownfield municipalities and their residents also must understand that the operation of a community
network presents a new set of challenges and rewards beyond those encountered during planning and
construction. People must understand that the presence of a community network affects prices offered
by incumbent providers. They also should understand that the community network’s failure to generate
enough revenue may require infusions of tax dollars, depending on the financing model used. Should
the community network disappear, people should expect their bills to return to the duopoly levels.16
Smaller cities seem to experience more success building and operating a network; larger cities tend to
attract partnerships.
Based on the examples, smaller cities have been more successful completing and operating community
broadband networks than larger cities. Examples include Olds in Alberta, Canada; Burlington, VT; and
Bristol, VA. This may be due to a belief by people in small towns that the telecoms are less likely to
upgrade their service, so small towns truly must do it themselves. Likewise, once they encounter
determination to create a community-owned network, telecoms may be more willing to concede with a
small town than they are in a major city, where the telecom risks losing more customers.
Larger cities have been more successful attracting private-sector entities as partners, even if the
partnerships have varied in success. Cities that attracted private-sector partners include Fort Wayne,
Philadelphia, Kansas City, Chicago, Seattle, Austin, and Provo. Fort Wayne’s partnership with Verizon
improved broadband access for a short while, but the sale of Verizon’s fiber customers to another
carrier resulted in increased prices for high-speed internet in the city. Likewise, Philadelphia’s venture
with EarthLink failed because EarthLink did not earn acceptable returns on its investment and the
service was not fast or reliable enough to meet user needs.
Municipalities pursuing the public-private partnership model more recently have preferred to work with
well-capitalized firms that profess goals beyond profits. For example, both Google Fiber and Gigabit
Squared stated that they want to expand broadband access to those who lack it. As of June 2014,
Google’s partnerships with Austin, Provo, and Kansas City seemed to be viable efforts to provide
affordable high-speed broadband to residents of those cities. Unfortunately, Gigabit Squared’s
partnerships with Seattle and Chicago collapsed quickly, leaving those cities looking for new avenues to
improve affordable residential broadband access.
Working with Private Telecoms
Collaborating with the private sector requires acknowledgement of its profit motive.
One main benefit of collaboration with the private sector is that a municipality may be able to improve
the reliability and speed of broadband in its community without acquiring debt. However, the major
drawback of working with the private sector is that the government entity may not own the network,
and therefore still may lack the clout to impact broadband speed, reliability, and pricing in the target
area over the long term. While Fort Wayne’s collaboration with Verizon to obtain high-speed FiOS
initially seemed successful, the telecom’s subsequent decision to sell its FiOS customers to another
service provider left the city without high-speed broadband once again.
15
Ibid.
16
Christopher Mitchell, “Learning from Burlington Telecom: Some Lessons for Community Networks,” via Community Broadband Networks,
http://www.muninetworks.org/reports/learning-burlington-telecom-some-lessons-community-networks, August 2011, accessed January 2015,
11.

19. 18
To encourage competition, communities can require their partners to allow other ISPs to use the
network. Both Corpus Christi and Philadelphia required their partner, EarthLink, to allow competitors to
use the network. However, this requirement, and other contract terms, prevented EarthLink from
earning an acceptable return on investment from either network. This situation ultimately doomed both
projects to failure. The pressure on private entities to make short-term profits is a huge challenge for
this model. Municipalities must acknowledge this profit motive when requesting concessions from
for-profit partners, especially if those partners have had to incur expenses to build a network.
On the other hand, if the municipal partner has undertaken the expense of building the network and the
private-sector partner is responsible only for operations, the community may be able to request more
from its partner.
Most communities focused on improving access for residents and businesses.
Calgary, Alberta, Canada, is unique among the communities studied in that it focused exclusively on
serving business customers. In California, Burbank and Santa Monica focused primarily on business
customers, but both communities provide free wireless broadband in some public places. However,
most communities focused on improving broadband access for both residents and businesses.
The presence of private-sector firms with a professed public mission like Google and Gigabit Squared
is changing expectations of what is acceptable broadband.
With firms like Google and Gigabit Squared collaborating with municipal government to provide
residents with faster internet at lower prices than currently available internet packages, these firms are
raising expectations for broadband service. Government officials contemplating action to improve their
communities’ broadband must consider current and future bandwidth offerings from these firms, as
well as the incumbent ISPs, when determining which strategies may be successful in improving
broadband for their residents and businesses.
The introduction of a municipal broadband network often improves the bandwidth and price of
broadband options in a community.
Research by the federal government’s General Accountability Office (GAO) suggests that the presence of
a municipal or federally funded broadband network in a community improves the broadband options for
that community’s consumers. The GAO compared bandwidth availability and pricing for 14 federally
funded or municipal broadband networks paid for without federal funding with other broadband
networks within the community and with broadband networks in nearby communities.17
In 9 out of 14 communities with a federally funded or municipal broadband network, the federally
funded or municipal network offered greater bandwidth than other networks in the same community
and networks in nearby communities. Prices charged by federally funded or municipal networks tended
to be slightly less than prices charged by comparable networks for similar speeds.18
For example, for 4 to
6 mbps of bandwidth, federally funded and municipally operated networks charged an average of $11
less per month than non-federally funded networks in the same community, and about $20 less per
month than networks in comparison communities.19
In every bandwidth category, more communities with a federally funded or municipal network had at
least one provider offering that level of bandwidth than communities without a federally funded or
municipal option. At levels of 51 mbps and higher, the GAO observed pronounced differences. Six
17
“Telecommunications: Federal Broadband Deployment Programs and Small Business,” GAO-14-203, US General Accountability Office,
February 2014, Executive Summary.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid., 14.

20. 19
communities with a federally funded or municipal provider had at least one provider offering service at
that level. Only three communities without a federally funded or municipal provider had at least one
provider offering service at a level of 51 mbps or greater.20
Furthermore, in 9 out of 14 communities, the
federally funded or municipal network offered the highest advertised top speeds.21
Benefits of Community Broadband
The introduction of municipal broadband can spur incumbents to improve service and/or lower prices.
With the advent of Google’s gigabit fiber networks in Kansas City, Austin, Provo, and the announcement
of plans to lay fiber networks in nine other metro areas, incumbent internet service providers AT&T,
Cox, C Spire, and CenturyLink have announced plans to upgrade their networks in several metro areas.22
Likewise, in Tacoma, WA, the presence of muni-provider, Click, prompted incumbents Qwest and
Comcast to upgrade their networks. Furthermore, Comcast prices in Tacoma are approximately 50
percent of their prices in nearby Seattle, which lacks a municipal broadband provider.
Communities can derive significant economic benefits by building a municipal fiber network.
One benefit is that broadband subscribers realize significant cost savings regardless of whether they
switch to the new, less expensive municipal provider or pay lower prices to an incumbent eager to retain
customers. This leaves residents, businesses, nonprofits, and municipal government itself with extra
money to save or spend on other priorities. In many instances, people and organizations choose to
spend some of their savings. Generally, during the five years following deployment of a municipal
network, residents and businesses collectively save an amount equivalent to the amount of money
invested by the municipality in the network.23
Another benefit is that the municipality often attracts new
businesses. The summaries of Tacoma, WA and Bristol, VA explicitly discuss the economic benefits
municipal fiber networks generated for these communities.
In response to changes in consumer sentiment, smaller broadband providers concentrate on providing
data services rather than phone, data, and video packages.
Prior to 2012, conventional wisdom dictated that small broadband providers, including municipalities,
had to imitate large telecoms (e.g., AT&T, Cox, Comcast, Verizon, Time Warner Cable, etc.) and offer a
triple-play package consisting of phone (voice), data (internet), and video (cable TV) services to lure
customers. For most customers, the most important telecom service was cable television with its
specialty channels that offered either higher-quality or commercial-free programming.
Invariably, cable companies developed different packages. Each package offered a specific group of
channels; packages that included more channels, or included “premium” channels, often cost
significantly more than the lowest cost option. This resulted in customers paying money for channels
they did not watch to gain access to specific channels they did watch. When small operators or
municipalities built and operated a broadband network that served the public, they often offered triple-
play packages to lure customers with access to lower-cost cable.
The introduction and rapid expansion of online subscription services such as Hulu and Netflix, which
allow users to watch television over the internet, now allows television watchers to access favorite
20
Ibid, 12.
21
Ibid, 13.
22
Denise Linn, “Small Cities Don’t Need Google Fiber to Get Gigabit Connectivity,” Next City, June 25, 2014,
http://nextcity.org/daily/entry/google-fiber-cities-available-high-speed-internet-municipal-options, accessed January 2015
23
Eric Lampland, Lookout Point Communications, Interview, June 10, 2014.

21. 20
shows without a cable subscription. As of 2014, an increasing number of customers no longer watch
broadcast or cable television, preferring to access television shows and other information on the
internet. For these customers, the most important telecom service is no longer cable television, but data
(internet) service. This change in consumer mentality means that smaller internet service providers,
including municipal networks, no longer have to offer triple-play packages to stay financially solvent.
Now, internet service providers can avoid the cost and hassle of negotiating with content providers.
For example, Ringgold Telephone Co. in Georgia and BTC Broadband in Bixby, Oklahoma no longer offer
television. Other companies are going part way. Suddenlink Communications is eliminating all Viacom
programming, including MTV and Nickelodeon.24
This development bodes well for communities that
want to build and operate a municipal network, as many will be able to take advantage of this trend and
avoid the difficulties and costs associated with developing and providing triple-play packages.
Municipalities can overcome challenges and be successful broadband internet providers. There is no
one-size-fits-all solution. Rather, there are many pathways to municipal broadband success.
This document summarizes the experiences of multiple cities (and a few states, provinces, and nations)
in expanding broadband access to residents and business. Municipalities have been successful using
many of the models described previously, and a few that were not. No formula guarantees success in all
contexts. Rather, each entity must carefully develop goals, create an action plan to reach those goals,
and then execute the plan, adapting to unforeseen circumstances. Each municipality must design the
network and develop the business model and governance structure that meet its needs.
24
“Small cable companies dropping TV in favor of Internet,” Speedmatters, October 2, 2014, http://www.speedmatters.org/blog/archive/small-
cable-companies-dropping-tv-in-favor-of-
internet/?utm_medium=email&utm_source=speedmatters&utm_campaign=20141006WeeklyUpdate.

22. 21
Best Practices
Segment Broadband Expansion into Manageable Steps
Although the case study communities pursued various approaches to expand broadband, successful
projects exhibited common traits. First, successful communities decided upon goals and then developed
concrete steps to achieve the goals. In other words, they broke the project into manageable steps.
For example, Santa Monica, CA first pursued broadband to serve the needs of city government. It was
only after mastering the basics of building and running a network for its own use that Santa Monica
began to serve private customers—first, large businesses, and eventually mid-sized and small
businesses. Eventually, Santa Monica opted to provide free wifi in select areas, as well as service to
public housing complexes. Although Santa Monica ultimately decided to serve lower-income residents
and the public, these services are limited. The core mission of the Santa Monica network remains the
service of enterprise customers.
Likewise, Bristol, VA began its foray into broadband provision by serving the internet needs of
government. For Bristol, the second step was service expansion to business customers, followed by
service to residential customers. Once Bristol had successfully implemented community broadband
within the municipality, it then expanded service to surrounding counties.
Corpus Christi, TX began its broadband expansion by building a mesh wifi network for electronic meter
reading. Then, the city extended its use of the wifi network to other city government functions. The City
eventually decided to offer free wifi service to the public in parks, libraries, community centers, and
sports complexes.
In each of the examples above, the municipality chose to build and operate an institutional network
exclusively for government use first. Once the municipality was comfortable serving internal customers,
it expanded the network’s scope to serve businesses, residents, or both. Businesses often use a strategy
of gradual market expansion; smart municipalities adapt this tactic to their objectives. In this manner,
the publicly owned network can uncover and fix problems while serving internal customers (government
employees). This allows the network to have a better product/service when it finally expands to external
customers, who may have less tolerance for problems with service.
Ensure that Private-Sector Partners Have Adequate Resources
Although public entities built and operated the first successful municipal networks, recently many
municipalities have chosen to collaborate with a private-sector partner to bring additional financial and
technical resources to their projects. In doing so, governments also should structure projects to meet
both municipal and private-sector goals.
For example, during the mid 2000s, Philadelphia, Corpus Christi, and New Orleans each attempted to
provide free and/or low-cost wireless service via a public-private partnership with EarthLink.
Unfortunately, by 2008, all three networks had failed because EarthLink could not earn adequate profit
to justify its continued involvement in the projects.
More recently, Chicago and Seattle created partnerships with Gigabit Squared. By January 2014, the
Seattle Gigabit Squared project had failed. Observers cite Gigabit Squared’s apparent lack of technical

23. 22
expertise and debt owed to the City as factors in the project’s failure.25
As of March 2014, the Chicago
Gigabit project was experiencing significant challenges, including allegations of misspent funds.26
Unlike the Gigabit Squared projects, Google’s partnerships with Kansas City (MO and KS), Austin, TX, and
Provo, UT to expand residential broadband access in those cities seem viable as of summer 2014. One
positive factor for the Google partnerships is the fact that Google has strong cash reserves, unlike
Gigabit Squared. Therefore, the Google partnerships are less dependent on other entities for funds
needed to sustain the project through its early, non-revenue generating phases.
The troubles of the EarthLink and Gigabit Squared ventures underscore the need for cities to vet their
partners carefully and to manage the terms under which they pursue broadband public–private
partnerships to allow all involved parties to achieve their objectives. Likewise, the newness of the
Google partnerships makes it impossible to render a final evaluation on this approach.
Therefore, while public–private partnerships may be a viable model for cities seeking to expand
broadband access, it is clear that project success depends on cities carefully vetting their partners,
defining key project terms, and managing the project to allow partners to earn enough profit while also
ensuring broadband access for a wider group of people.
Collaborate, Share Best Practices, and Promote Access to
Affordable Broadband
The research revealed that many jurisdictions have built and operated municipally owned broadband
with varying degrees of success. Furthermore, municipalities continue to pursue this option when faced
with incumbent providers that refuse to upgrade service to 21st
-century standards. Because
municipalities face many of the same challenges, it would be appropriate for municipalities to begin
collaborate with one another on common challenges. Municipalities at the early stages of the quest for
affordable broadband access can and should learn from cities with finished networks. Likewise,
municipalities face common legal challenges from incumbents. They may be able to work together to
oppose unfavorable legislation and draft and promote favorable legislation. They also may be able to
collaborate on efforts to build public support for municipal broadband.
For example, New Orleans could consider supporting New York State’s efforts to mandate minimum
internet speeds. Even if support is only a letter, it still signals the telecoms that it is unacceptable to
provide slow internet service that no longer meets customer needs. Opportunities for collaboration are
many and the time to begin is now.
Conclusion
The next section of the report describes the efforts of approximately 40 communities to improve the
quality and price of available broadband. Each case study contains
 a description of how the community pursued its broadband objectives,
 a summary of key lessons from the community’s experience, and
 contact information.
25
Colin Wood, “What Happened to Seattle’s Gigabit Network?” Government Technology, January 22, 2014,
http://www.govtech.com/network/What-Happened-to-Seattles-Gigabit-Network.html.
26
Sandra Guy, “State wants Gigabit Squared to return $2 million grant,” Chicago Sun-Times, March 27, 2014,
http://www.suntimes.com/26484032-420/state-wants-gigabit-squared-to-return-2-million-grant.html#.U1_hyFVdUZQ.

24. 23
Case Study Summaries
Seattle, WA
The City of Seattle (2010 population 612,000) often opts to provide services when it feels private options
are lacking. In 1986, Seattle installed fiber for an internal telephone network because it was cheaper
than buying from the local provider. Lawsuits followed, but the court ruled that Seattle could build its
own telephone network, as long as it did not offer commercial telephone service.27
For the next 20
years, Seattle worked with the University of Washington, King County, Seattle Public Schools,
Washington State ferries, and other government agencies to build 500 miles of fiber. This network
serves government agencies, libraries, schools, colleges, and fire stations, etc.28
In 2004, Seattle began to focus on ensuring broadband access for homes and small businesses. The
mayor and city council commissioned a task force to determine how Seattle should ensure access to
broadband for its residents. In 2005, the task force recommended pursuing a fiber-to-the-premises
(FTTP) network as a long-term solution to providing the 100 mbps upload/download speeds that
residents and businesses would need in the future. The task force recommended that the city
government encourage private providers to build a network while preparing to build a network itself, if
the private sector would not do so.29
Because Washington state law requires municipal networks to use the wholesale model if they serve the
public, Seattle would need to work with a private firm in its efforts to bring faster broadband to
residents and businesses, regardless of whether it convinced a firm to build a network or built the
network itself and delegated operations to a firm.30
In 2006, Seattle invited Requests for Information (RFIs) from private providers to build a FTTP network.
Incentives included access to the city's available fiber, underground conduit, utility poles, and staff.
Private companies were interested in the network, but they did not provide financing information in
their RFIs.
In 2007, Seattle studied the financial feasibility of building a network itself and resident demand for city-
provided internet. The survey found that more than 60 percent of Seattle households would buy city-
provided fiber services, if offered at lower prices. At that time, the cost estimate to build a system was
$500M, with an estimated repayment period of 20 years.31
The study also analyzed three possible
business models for a city-owned network; each required different market shares to be successful:
 A network using the retail model would need 25 percent market share to be break even.
 A network using the wholesale model would need 33 percent market share to break even.
 A retail–wholesale hybrid network would allow the city to provide service for five to seven
years, and then open the network to other providers afterwards.32
27
Tina Trenkner, “Seattle Tackles Broadband,” Governing, August 2010, http://www.governing.com/topics/technology/seattle-tackles-
broadband.html, accessed September 2013.
28
Taylor Soper, “Mayor Mike McGinn announces plan to develop ‘ultra-fast broadband network,’” GeekWire, December 13, 2012,
http://www.geekwire.com/2012/live-mayor-mike-mcginn-announces-plan-develop-ultrafast-broadband-network/, accessed September 2013.
29
Trenkner, “Seattle Tackles Broadband.”
30
Christopher Mitchell, “Legislation alert: Washington State considers community broadband bill on ‘reclaim the media’,” Reclaim the Media,
January 1, 2012, http://www.reclaimthemedia.org/communications_rights/legislation_alert_washington_s1202, accessed September 2013.
31
Trenkner, “Seattle Tackles Broadband.”
32
Ibid.

25. 24
As of 2010, three internet service providers offered Seattleites broadband with download speeds of 12,
20, and 50 mbps. Generally, the ISPs offer slower upload speeds. The ISPs claim that the demand for
high-speed internet is low, which contradicts what Seattleites said in a 2009 survey: 75 percent of
Seattle households have broadband, and 75 percent of those broadband households said they would
find faster internet speeds valuable.33
The City of Seattle also spoke with Seattle City Light and Seattle Public Utilities, the electric and sewage–
water utilities, respectively to learn about their interest in smart grid applications and smart metering.34
In 2005, Seattle launched a 5-year pilot program to provide free wifi in portions of the city. The total
estimated cost of the program was $115,000. That included $65,000 for equipment paid for by the
city's Department of Information Technology and the Office of Economic Development. The University
of Washington sponsored the service in the University District. Homesight and the Atlantic Street
Center funded the service in Columbia City.35
By May 2012, citing high maintenance costs, Seattle had shuttered the 7-year old SeattleWiFi, its free
community wireless network, which had served Columbia City, the University District, and four
downtown parks. The popular service had contributed to Columbia City’s revitalization.36
By May 2012,
Seattle also had leased a 4-block stretch of Pioneer Square conduit to Comcast, bringing fiber to more
than 50 new customers.37
In December 2012, Seattle announced an agreement with Gigabit Squared and the University of
Washington to operate a high-speed fiber network, dubbed Gigabit Seattle, via unused city fiber. The
project purpose was to generate public benefits, rather than to earn profit. The proposed project
involved fiber to the premises, a wireless cloud for mobile access in select neighborhoods, and
broadband connections to multi-family housing and offices in locations outside target neighborhoods.38
As originally contemplated, Gigabit Seattle fiber initially would pass 6,000 to 10,000 homes in 12
neighborhoods. The desired uptake rate was 8 to 12 percent of adjacent households. Gigabit Seattle
hoped to offer the service to 100,000 residents by the end of 2014.39
By October 2013, the Gigabit
Seattle website offered residential customers three plans:
Plan A:
 5 mbps download/1 mbps upload: No charge for 60 months
 5/1 mbps services are transferrable to new renters or owners
 After 60 months, renters or owners can convert to a 10 mbps download/10 mbps upload service
plan for only $10 per month
Plan B:
 100 mbps download/100 mbps upload for $45 per month
 No installation charge with one-year contract
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
35
Kathy Mulady, “Seattle launches test of free Wi-Fi service,” SeattlePi, May 18, 2005, http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Seattle-launches-
test-of-free-Wi-Fi-service-1173775.php, accessed September 2013.
36
Mari Sibley, “Seattle ends free Wi-Fi,” SmartPlanet, May 8, 2012, http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/thinking-tech/seattle-ends-free-wi-
fi/11546, accessed September 2013.
37
Goldy, “Mayor McGinn’s New Broadband Strategy Isn’t New,” Slog News & Arts, May 15, 2012,
http://slog.thestranger.com/slog/archives/2012/05/15/mayor-mcginns-new-broadband-strategy-isnt-new, accessed September 2013.
38
Soper, “Mayor Mike McGinn announces plan to develop ‘ultra-fast broadband network.”
39
Ibid.

26. 25
Plan C:
 1000 download/1000 upload mbps for $80 per month
 No installation charge with one-year contract40
As of October 2013, Gigabit Seattle planned to begin service in 14 neighborhoods, selected in
conjunction with the city government and the University of Washington based on market research, and
aggregate demand from specific areas.41
Unfortunately, by January 2014, Seattle’s agreement with Gigabit Squared had ended, leaving the city
with $52K in debt from the firm. At that time, Gigabit had not built any part of the proposed network.
Research into Gigabit Squared by Seattle technology advocacy group, Upping Technology for
Underserved Neighborhoods (UPTUN), could not find evidence Gigabit Squared ever completed a
project. The firm’s expertise seemed concentrated in sales and venture capital rather than the technical
aspects of broadband according to UPTUN leader, Robert Kangas.42
Newly elected Seattle Mayor Ed Murray has stated that Seattle seeks other companies with a “more
realistic financing mechanism” to lease the fiber and move forward with the project. He also stated that
he views broadband as a utility and that the city should consider hybrid business models to improve
broadband affordability. Seattle’s interest in continuing the project with a different partner has
prompted a statement of interest from the CEO of Wave Broadband.43
Summary and Lessons Learned in Seattle
Seattle’s nascent collaboration with the University of Washington and Gigabit Squared to form a public–
private partnership that would serving residential and business customers via a retail model failed, just
as the city’s previous free wifi network failed. Many factors contribute to Seattle’s difficulty attracting
and retaining private partners, including
 Seattle’s inability to provide timely, accurate information about its fiber;
 regulations that make it hard for ISPs to install cabinets in the public right-of-way; and
 regulations that make it difficult to install fiber on existing utility poles.44
As of spring 2014, Seattle was in the process of adjusting its plans for broadband expansion.
Contact Information
Sabra Schneider, City of Seattle, Interim Chief Technology Officer
doitreceptionist@seattle.gov
206-684-0600
Tacoma, WA
In the late 1990s, Tacoma, WA (2010 population 198,397) decided to build a municipal broadband
network because its sole cable TV provider, TCI (now Comcast), and its phone provider, US West,
refused to upgrade their obsolete systems. TCI’s CEO at the time, a Tacoma native, traveled to Tacoma
to attempt to convince the city council not to pursue a municipal network. When he was unsuccessful,
40
Gigabit Seattle, http://gigabitseattle.com/residential/, accessed October 2013.
41
Gigabit Seattle, : http://gigabitseattle.com/areas/, accessed October 2013.
42
Colin Wood, “What Happened to Seattle’s Gigabit Network?” Government Technology, January 22, 2014,
http://www.govtech.com/network/What-Happened-to-Seattles-Gigabit-Network.html.
43
Emily Parkhurst, “Seattle’s fiber-network deal with Gigabit Squared is dead,” Puget Sound Business Journal, January 7, 2014,
http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/blog/techflash/2014/01/seattles-fiber-deal-with-gigabit.html?page=all.
44
Susan Crawford, John Connolly, Melissa Nally, Travis West, “Community Fiber in Washington, D.C., Seattle, and San Francisco,” Research
Publication No. 2014-9, The Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University, May 27, 2014, 19-21.

27. 26
he reportedly called them “stupid” and stormed out of the room. As Tacoma built its network, TCI used
the city’s design documents and construction schedules—which are required to be publicly available to
promote government transparency—to purchase materials that Tacoma needed, in order to delay the
building of the network. Even in the face of this harassment, the “Click!” network had its first cable
subscriber by 1998 and its first internet user by 1999.45
Click! is a division of Tacoma Power, which has provided the community’s electricity for more than 100
years. Three independent service providers—Rainier Connect, Advanced Stream, and Net-Venture—
offer up to 100 mbps broadband on the Click network.46
Rainier Connect offers cable and DSL
broadband internet, cable TV, and digital and analog phone service for residential customers; and cable
and DSL broadband internet for commercial customers.47
Advanced Stream and Net-Venture offer
similar services to business and residential customers. Low-income and senior customers get a 20
percent discount.48
As of 2012, Click! served approximately 18,000 customers out of a customer base of 110,000. Click!’s
inability to provide broadband directly to retail customers means that customers contract directly with
Click! for cable TV, but must contract with one of the three independent service providers to get
internet. This hybrid wholesale–retail arrangement results in Click!’s lack of a triple-play option (bundled
phone, cable, and internet), which is inconvenient to customers. This situation has prevented Click! from
attracting as many subscribers as it could have.49
Despite many challenges, Tacoma does benefit from its municipal network. Thanks to the presence of
the Click! alternatives, Comcast charges Tacoma customers half the amount they charge Seattle
customers,50
with Tacoma residents paying about $30 per month.51
Furthermore, Click! created the
market for high-speed internet in Tacoma, which spurred the incumbents, Qwest and Comcast, to
upgrade their networks, compete, and gain new revenue. Comcast later publicly thanked Tacoma Power
for its role in precipitating improvements that benefited Comcast’s bottom line.52
It seems apparent that
Click!’s presence resulted in faster and cheaper broadband offerings for Tacoma residents.
Other benefits include nearly $700K in annual savings by providing the internet to city government
buildings,53
and the location of 100 companies and 700 jobs in Tacoma during the 18 months following
the introduction of Click!54,55
Additionally, Click! established a mutually beneficial partnership with the Tacoma School of the Arts
(SOTA), which offers a curriculum centered on music, visual arts, and theater. Using a few pages of notes
containing key phrases and messages, SOTA songwriting students created a jingle to celebrate Click!’s
10th
anniversary. Impressed with the jingle, Click! asked SOTA students to create a video to go with it.
45
Matthew Halverson, “Disbanded: No Broadband Utility for Seattle,” Seattle Met, June 20, 2012, http://www.seattlemet.com/arts-and-
entertainment/articles/disbanded-no-broadband-utility-for-seattle-july-2012/, accessed September 2013.
46
lgonzalez, “Tacoma's Click! Introduces 100 Mbps; CenturyLink Lies to Steal Click! Business,” Community Broadband Networks, Institute for
Local Self-Reliance, August 22, 2012, http://www.muninetworks.org/content/tacomas-click-introduces-100-mbps-centurylink-lies-steal-click-
business, accessed September 2013.
47
RanierConnect, http://www.rainierconnect.com, accessed September 2013.
48
christopher, “Schrier Stays in Seattle, Fiber Network to Follow?,” Community Broadband Networks, Institute for Local Self-Reliance, July 12,
2010, http://www.muninetworks.org/content/10-years-later-tacoma-and-lagrange, accessed September 2013.
49
Halverson, “Disbanded: No Broadband Utility for Seattle.”
50
christopher, “Schrier Stays in Seattle, Fiber Network to Follow?”
51
Halverson, “Disbanded: No Broadband Utility for Seattle.”
52
christopher, “Schrier Stays in Seattle, Fiber Network to Follow?”
53
Halverson, “Disbanded: No Broadband Utility for Seattle.”
54
christopher, “Schrier Stays in Seattle, Fiber Network to Follow?”
55
Conversation with Carrie Harding, sales and marketing manager at Click!, March 21, 2014. According to Harding, the businesses community’s
dramatic response to the introduction of Click! in 1998 was partly because Click!’s 15- to 30-day wait for a new telephone line was a dramatic
improvement over the 12- to 18-month wait with the incumbent telephone provider.

28. 27
Since then, SOTA students have provided music, artwork, and short films as content for Click!’s local on-
demand channel, and an adaption of Click!’s logo for its anniversary year. Click! benefited by getting
“exclusive, creative, local content to meet their business and marketing needs.” SOTA students gained
valuable experience working with clients and exposure to a much wider audience.56
Summary and Lessons Learned in Tacoma
Tacoma’s Click! is a wholesale provider for internet and a retail provider for cable. Click!’s presence has
led to faster and cheaper broadband for city residents and attracted new companies to the city. In
addition, Click! has provided direct savings to the city from being its own internet service provider, and
offered benefit to the community through its partnership with the School of the Arts.
Contact Information
Click!: 253-502-8900 or 1-800-752-6745
Tacoma Public Utilities253-502-8606
Commercial Customer Service: comsvcs@cityoftacoma.org
Chris Gleason, Community & Media Services Manager: 253-502-8222
Nora Doyle, Community Relations Specialist: 253-502- 8117
Burlington, VT
Burlington, VT (2012 population 42,282) offers broadband internet, telephone, and video to the
community via Burlington Telecom (BT).57
Burlington officials and activists had considered a community network long before they developed a
plan to build one. Dissatisfied with the services of the incumbent phone and cable companies, the local
public power company, Burlington Electric Department (BED), a initiated a public–private partnership
that was abandoned in 2001 when the private partner failed to fulfill its obligations. Burlington then
tapped Tim Nulty to build a city‐owned fiber-to‐the‐premises network. Nulty was a local with significant
experience, including stints as Chief Economist of the US Senate Commerce Committee and the US
House Energy and Commerce Committee, overseer for the World Bank’s telecom projects, and
telecommunications entrepreneur in Eastern Europe.58
By 2003, BT decreased city telecom expenses by replacing the leased broadband and voice lines of the
schools and city departments with city‐owned fiber. In 2006, BT began connecting its first residential
customers, quickly capturing 20 to 40 percent of subscribers in many neighborhoods. Lawsuits by hated
incumbent cable provider, Adelphia, did delay this milestone, costing BT money and preventing
adherence to its business plan. By August 2007, BT owed $33.5M to Citi Financial (Citi).59
During this time, Nulty was making agreements to expand service to nearby towns. The towns would
finance their fiber infrastructure and BT would provide the service. At this time, revenue covered
operations, but did not cover debt service or the capital costs of connecting new subscribers. When the
mayor ordered Nulty to cease plans to expand outside Burlington, he resigned.60
Consultants suggested that BT focus on commercial sales and marketing. Instead, BT focused on
upselling to existing customers. Due to the 2008 financial crisis, BT could not refinance its debt and
56
Mary Boone, “Tacoma’s Click! Forges Beneficial Partnership,” NATOA Journal, Spring 2009, 23–24.
57
Burlington Telecom, http://www.burlingtontelecom.net/, accessed September 2013.
58
Christopher Mitchell, “Learning from Burlington Telecom: Some Lessons for Community Networks,” Institute for Local Self-Reliance, August
2011, 2.
59
Mitchell, “Learning from Burlington Telecom,” 2–3, 10.
60
Mitchell, “Learning from Burlington Telecom,” 3.

29. 28
became dependent on Burlington’s cash pool. To keep financial information out of the public eye, where
BT’s competitors could access it, the Board of Finance avoided discussing the financial difficulties with
the city council.61
By late 2009, it was public knowledge that BT had about $50M in debt ($33M to Citi and $17M to the
city). At this time, the administration requested approval for a $63M loan from Piper Jaffrey. The city
council declined the request and demanded an investigation.62
The investigation revealed that borrowing $17M from the City of Burlington for a period longer than 60
days violated BT’s Certificate of Public Good, the city charter, and Vermont state law. The investigation
also said that BT would not break even on its existing customer base. A consultant began to manage BT
and research ways to restructure the debt.63
Investigations by the state Department of Public Service and the FBI followed. However, the Chittenden
County prosecutor did not file charges due to uncertainty about meeting evidence burdens for trial.64
In early 2010, BT ceased making payments to Citi as required by the municipal lease agreement and
began to negotiate with Citi to amend the terms. When Burlington failed to appropriate funds for the
lease in FY 2011, the lease terminated. By cancelling the lease, BT no longer owed $33M to Citi.
However, BT also no longer had access to assets that allow it to operate a high-speed network. The
negative attention resulted in a decline in the number of subscribers.65
Around this time, BT increased its fees to Burlington. Whereas previously, it had charged Burlington the
amount it cost to provide service, Burlington Telecom increased charges to 90 percent of fair market
value.66
In 2012, faced with the prospect that BT could be sold to an out-of-state private owner, some Burlington
citizens began exploring options to turn the network into a for-profit cooperative. Keep BT Local collects
both equity and loan pledges.67
As of October 2013, according to their website, Keep BT Local had
received 51 percent of the $250K target for equity pledges and 68 percent of the target for loan pledges.
Members include individuals, families, and businesses. Keep BT Local aimed to meet its fundraising and
membership goals by February 2014.68
As of October 2013, BT’s website showed three high-speed internet plans for residents:
 40 mb for $84.99/month with 12 month commitment or $100/month with no commitment
 100 mb for $109.99/month with 12 month commitment or $149.99/month with no
commitment
 1 gb for $144.99/month with a 12 month commitment or $199.99/month with no
commitment69
In addition, BT offers other bundled and unbundled options for residents to customize service to their
needs, including a significantly reduced price ($9.99 or $19.99/month) for families with at least one child
in free or reduced-cost lunch programs.70
61
Mitchell, “Learning from Burlington Telecom,” 3–4.
62
Ibid.
63
Ibid.
64
Mitchell, “Learning from Burlington Telecom,” 1–2.
65
Mitchell, “Learning from Burlington Telecom,” 4–5.
66
Mitchell, “Learning from Burlington Telecom,” 9.
67
lgonzalez, “Burlington Telecom Coop Effort Moving Ahead,” Community Broadband Networks, Institute for Local Self-Reliance, March 18,
2013, http://www.muninetworks.org/content/burlington-sells-burlington-telecom-continues-operate-network, accessed October 2013.
68
Keep BT Local, http://www.keepbtlocal.com/, accessed October 2013.
69
Burlington Telecom, http://www.burlingtontelecom.net/, accessed October 2013.

30. 29
BT also offers bundled packages geared to the needs of business customers and landlords who want to
install broadband in their rental properties. Landlords with at least four properties pay a reduced rate
for service. However, they can charge tenants the regular rate and earn a profit by offering the service.71
Burlington Telecom also offers free wifi at hotspots throughout the city, local customer service and
technical support, a 2-hour installation window, and PC repair and service for residential and small
business customers.72
As of November 2014, Burlington had reached an agreement with Citi to resolve the bank’s $33M
lawsuit. Burlington and its law firm codefendant agreed to pay Citi $10.5M and a share of BT’s future
value. Burlington will pay its obligations using BT revenues, net cash flow, insurance, and bridge
financing from Blue Water LLC, a local firm that bought network for $6M. In return, Burlington agreed to
pay $560K annually for five years to lease the network. After five years, the City and Blue Water hope to
find a buyer for the network.73
Ideally, the future sale of the network will allow Blue Water to recoup its
investment and Burlington to pay its debt to Citi.
Summary and Lessons Learned in Burlington:
Burlington Telecom follows a retail model, providing direct service to the residents and businesses.
Despite numerous challenges, BT has positive attributes and offers many benefits to Burlington.
 Superior network: Because each subscriber has its own fiber strand to the distribution hub, the
head end can support 100,000 users—five times as many as it would serve if every Burlington
household subscribed.74
Therefore, BT has extra capacity and the ability to earn outside revenue.
 Revenue contribution to Burlington via payments in lieu of taxes: BT’s PILOT for 2008 to 2010
($837K) exceeded the total amount paid by Comcast and FairPoint ($298K), the private-sector
internet service providers.75
 Direct cost savings: Burlington spent approximately $1.5M less on telecommunications because
BT did not mark up the price of its services.
 Indirect savings to residents and businesses: BT’s entry into the broadband and cable markets
lowered costs for subscribers as the incumbents decreased prices to remain competitive.
 Multiplier effect: Because money earned by BT is spent locally, it circulates through the local
economy, benefiting more individuals and the city as a whole.
 Improved customer service helped businesses avoid problems with their internet: BT made a
commitment to Burlington. It hired locals who cared about the service they provided to their
neighbors. BT treated Burlington’s businesses as partners rather than customers.76
 Innovation: BT’s program for multi-property owners offers landlords a chance to earn more
money from their rental properties and helps to expand BT’s subscriber base. It also offers other
ancillary services like PC repair.
Importantly, other municipalities can learn many lessons from BT’s experience.
70
Ibid.
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid.
73
lgonzalez, “Burlington Sells Burlington Telecom, Continues to Operate the Network,” Community Broadband Networks, Institute for Local
Self-Reliance, December 9, 2014, http://muninetworks.org/content/burlington-sells-burlington-telecom-continues-operate-network.
74
Mitchell, “Learning from Burlington Telecom,” 8.
75
Ibid.
76
Mitchell, “Learning from Burlington Telecom,” 8–10.

31. 30
 Define goals: Will the network serve residential or business customers or both? Serving
residents allows the network to compete against fewer incumbents than it does for commercial
clients. Once successful with residents, networks can pursue business customers.77
 Define success: Because community networks exist to promote the public good, these do not
have to earn a profit. New jobs generated and costs avoided are part of the public good.
However, these networks must meet costs and repay debts, so breaking even is important.
 Governance structure should insulate the network from daily local politics: BT’s head reported
to the clerk-treasurer, who reported to the mayor. This hindered BT officials from running the
organization. Typically, a separate public power utility oversees a community network.78
 Community networks need some relief from ordinary procurement and personnel policies: The
need to create a civil service position for a commission salesperson and obtain approval of the
position’s salary hurt BT’s ability to be entrepreneurial.79
 Be transparent: To keep information from incumbents, the administration did not share with the
city council, which was ill‐equipped to evaluate anything shared by the mayor.80
Due to public
records laws, incumbents had access to the information; the lax oversight allowed BT to
accumulate debt and violate state and local laws.
 Price service to cover operating costs and debt service: Rather than charge rates that covered
only costs, BT could have charged the City of Burlington slightly above cost. Likewise, although
customers decry promotional pricing, they respond to it. To provide transparency, BT did not
offer promotional pricing, unlike the incumbents, to its detriment.81
 Avoid over or understaffing to meet service and cash flow objectives.
 Use professional marketers and utilize local support: The first 20 to 40 percent of subscribers
switch to a municipal network because they hate incumbents and love the idea of a local option.
Attracting more customers requires creating a brand and selling the benefits of a local provider.
Great campaigns involve locals who love the network and understand its benefits as shown by
Keep BT Local’s efforts to prevent sale to an out-of-state firm.82
Responding to incumbents’
marketing requires revisiting strategy monthly or quarterly rather than annually.83
 Have a strong collections plan to deal with delinquent payers: In areas of high churn (e.g. college
campuses), many customers disappear without paying the bill.84
Contact Information
marketing@burlingtontelecom.net
802-540-0007 or 802-540-0000
Chattanooga, TN
In Chattanooga, TN (estimated 2013 population 171,279), Electric Power Board Fiber Optics, known as
EPB, offers electricity, phone, internet, video, fiber-to-the-premises (FTTP), and co-location services to
approximately 170,000 subscribers in the city of Chattanooga, nine Tennessee municipalities, and two
77
Mitchell, “Learning from Burlington Telecom,” 14.
78
Mitchell, “Learning from Burlington Telecom,” 16.
79
Ibid.
80
Mitchell, “Learning from Burlington Telecom,” 7.
81
Mitchell, “Learning from Burlington Telecom,” 15.
82
Mitchell, “Learning from Burlington Telecom,” 11–12.
83
Mitchell, “Learning from Burlington Telecom,” 17.
84
Mitchell, “Learning from Burlington Telecom,” 16.

32. 31
Georgia municipalities in a 600-square mile area.85
Project funding for the roughly $300M project
included a $111M stimulus grant and $200M in bond money.86,87,88
EPB originally offered electricity and later added fiber to connect its substations. The smart grid allows
EPB to reroute power instantly during storms, remotely start/end service at a location, send a precise
amount of voltage to a distribution line, and limit truck runs to locations experiencing a power outage.89
In pursuit of economic development goals, EPB originally tried to collaborate with the private sector to
expand fiber to homes and businesses. Because the return on investment was insufficient to entice
firms, EPB decided to offer phone, then internet, and finally FTTP without the telecoms’ involvement.90
In 2012, EPB offered maximum speeds of 1 gbps upload/download for $34.99 per month.91
As of
February 2014, EPB was advertising 1 gbps service at $70 per month on its website.92
Thanks to the expansion of EPB’s fiber network, Chattanooga and the surrounding area have
experienced significant economic and social benefits. By 2006, researchers estimated the value of EPB’s
network to Hamilton County as follows:
 Economic benefits (2006 dollars): $352.4M
 Social benefits (2006 dollars): $252.5M93
After deducting $167.1M in capital costs (2006 dollars), the net incremental value of the network was
$437.8M and an additional 2,638 jobs.94
Furthermore, the network has helped Chattanooga to attract
venture capital, which has grown from close to zero in 2009 to more than five organized funds with
more than $50M in investable capital in 2014.95
EPB and its partners in the FTTP project, the City of Chattanooga and the Lyndhurst Foundation, faced
significant challenges from incumbent providers. Tennessee’s cable industry trade group and Comcast
sued several times to delay the project. Comcast also aired 2,600 TV ads and created a website urging
citizens to ask their elected officials to vote against the plan. Instead, the Tennessee legislature passed
laws specifically allowing municipal electric companies to offer telecom services and laws allowing the
electricity division to loan money to the newly formed telecom division. These were the opposite of laws
passed in other states to limit the ability of public utilities to expand into telecommunications.96
As of June 2014, Tennessee law prohibited adjoining communities, some of which have no broadband
service, from joining Chattanooga’s network.97
85
Christopher Mitchell, “Broadband at the Speed of Light,” Institute for Local Self-Reliance, April 2012, http://ilsr.org/broadband-speed-light/.
86
James O’Toole, “Chattanooga’s super-fast publicly owned Internet,” CNN Money, May 20, 2014,
http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/20/technology/innovation/chattanooga-internet/index.html?hpt=hp_t3.
87
Ian Hoppe, “Municipal priorities: Let’s talk about a fiber-optic network in Birmingham: opinion,” AL.com, August 30, 2014,
http://www.al.com/opinion/index.ssf/2014/08/municipal_priorities_lets_talk_1.html, accessed September 2, 2014.
88
Steven D, “Fastest Internet in US? It’s Chattanooga, TN, Thanks to Local and Fed $$$ (Ps. Big Cable Very Angry),” Daily Kos, August 30, 2014,
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/08/30/1325887/-Fastest-Internet-in-US-It-s-Chattanooga-TN-Thanks-to-Local-and-Fed-Ps-Big-Cable-Very-
Angry?detail=email.
89
Christopher Mitchell, “Broadband at the Speed of Light,” Institute for Local Self-Reliance, April 2012, http://ilsr.org/broadband-speed-light/.
90
Ibid.
91
Ibid.
92
EPB, https://epbfi.com/gigsupport/, accessed February 2014.
93
Bento J. Lobo, PhD, Andy Novobilski, PhD, Soumen Ghosh, PhD, “The Impact of Broadband in Hamilton County, TN,” March 20, 2006, iii.
94
Ibid.
95
Steven D, “Fastest Internet in US? It’s Chattanooga, TN, Thanks to Local and Fed $$$ (Ps. Big Cable Very Angry),” Daily Kos, August 30, 2014,
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/08/30/1325887/-Fastest-Internet-in-US-It-s-Chattanooga-TN-Thanks-to-Local-and-Fed-Ps-Big-Cable-Very-
Angry?detail=email.
96
Mitchell, “Broadband at the Speed of Light.”
97
Tom Wheeler, FCC Chairman, Official FCC Blog, June 10, 2014, http://www.fcc.gov/blog/removing-barriers-competitive-community-
broadband, accessed June 11, 2014.

33. 32
Summary and Lessons Learned in Chattanooga
EPB follows a retail model, providing direct service to the residents and businesses.
 EPB made strategic decisions that contributed to its success. First, EPB Telecom & Broadband
operated as separate company to learn the technology and business aspects of the
telecommunications industry. EPB later applied lessons learned from its telecommunications
work to improve operations in other business units providing different services.98
 When expanding to a new area, EPB offered services first to businesses (which cluster in specific
areas) to cut costs and then expanded to serve residences. Therefore, EPB collected revenue
from higher-paying business customers to use to connect remaining customers.99
 EPB developed a strategy to build support for the project. Staff identified 23 business and
government leaders and scheduled the first meeting with the person most likely to oppose the
project. Staff also educated the EPB Board and discussed the project with the public during a
year-long community engagement process. EPB also described the worst-case scenario in terms
easily understandable to the public. They explained that if EPB wasted every penny borrowed,
approximately $200M,100
the average ratepayer would see a $2 to $3 per month increase. This
explanation helped residents accurately assess the risk involved with the project.101
 EPB supplies customers with yard signs saying “We’ve got the power! EPB Fiber‐Optics.” This
decision wisely includes customers in the marketing strategy.102
Direct benefits of the project include:
o $300M savings from reduced outages during the first 10 years of smart grid operations;
o Increased coverage in site-selection magazines;
o 2,600 new jobs and $350M in increased tax receipts from new employment now that
only Hong Kong’s network can match Chattanooga’s internet speed (talent,
entrepreneurs, and investors nationwide flock to Chattanooga rather than Seattle, San
Francisco, or New York where it may be costlier to launch a business);103,104
and
o Comcast’s $15M investment to provide Chattanooga with Xfinity video-on-demand and
internet, resulting in the unexpected consequence that a municipal fiber network has
spurred improvement of the competing private-sector options.105
Contact Information
423-648-1EPB (1372)
98
Mitchell, “Broadband at the Speed of Light.”
99
Ibid.
100
Charles M. Davidson and Michael J. Santorelli, “Head of the Class: Broadband in the United States,” (presentation at New York Law School’s
Advanced Communications Law & Policy Institute, Spring Forum, May 3, 2013), 9,
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/standcomm/scenvir/santorelli_may3.pdf.
101
Mitchell, “Broadband at the Speed of Light.”
102
Mitchell, “Learning from Burlington Telecom,” 13.
103
Mitchell, “Broadband at the Speed of Light.”
104
“Broadband Drives Economic Development,” EfficientGov, February 18, 2014, http://efficientgov.com/blog/2014/02/18/broadband-drives-
economic-development/.
105
Mitchell, “Broadband at the Speed of Light.”

34. 33
Lafayette, LA
Lafayette (2010 population 120,600) offers video, internet, and phone service under the auspices of LUS
Fiber, which itself is part of Lafayette Utilities System (LUS), the electric, water, and sewer utility.106107
Both LUS and LUS Fiber are departments within the Lafayette City–Parish Consolidated Government.
Initially, LUS wanted to build a 12-strand fiber optic ring to connect its substations and add re-routing
capability in the event of a fiber cut. This project had an estimated cost of $3M. Instead, LUS opted to
build 96 rings for $3.6M to provide future capacity and the ability offer service to municipal buildings
and wholesale service to ISPs serving businesses customers. LUS Fiber later expanded its offerings to
include direct service to residential and commercial customers. As such, LUS Fiber follows a hybrid
wholesale–retail model.108
To expand its network to residential and business customers, Lafayette
borrowed approximately $100M.109
Lafayette pursued its own fiber network because city leaders wanted to improve the quality of their
internet service and stabilize costs. Cox had raised prices six times in four years and Cox and BellSouth
had refused to build a fiber-to-the-premises network for Lafayette.110
Lafayette encountered resistance from its incumbent providers as described below.
 BellSouth and Cox rewrote previously introduced legislation banning local government and
public power authorities from building networks. LUS hired a national expert to rework the bill
into a compromise that BellSouth, Cox, and the City of Lafayette could accept.
 As LUS proceeded according to the terms of the legislation, BellSouth launched lawsuits,
including one saying that LUS had to hold a referendum before issuing bonds.
 The telecoms used misleading "push polls" to disseminate distorted information in the form of
fake surveys and other dirty advertising.
 BellSouth and private citizens initiated lawsuits once voters approved bonds to pay for fiber.
 Cox made frequent public records requests to impose additional administrative costs and
undermine LUS’ market-penetration strategy.
 Higher-than-expected costs for video when initially denied entry to the National Cable Television
Coop (video is needed to provide cable service, and broadband providers needed to offer cable
to earn enough revenue to pay debt at the time that LUS expanded service to residents).
 Cox increased rates in other parishes to recoup revenue lost in Lafayette due to competition.111
Lafayette’s leaders countered incumbent lawsuits and misinformation campaigns as described below.
 Lafayette Parish Republican and Democratic parties both encouraged voters to approve the
bond issue and support fiber.
 Lafayette Coming Together, a grassroots organizer, began educating citizens early. Tools
included informative websites, weekly newspaper ads listing fiber supporters, email lists,
YouTube videos, and publicizing the names of those paying for anti-fiber efforts.
106
LUS, http://lus.org/site.php, accessed November 2013.
107
LUS Fiber, http://www.lusfiber.com/, accessed November 2013.
108
Mitchell, “Broadband at the Speed of Light.”
109
Davidson and Santorelli, “Head of the Class: Broadband in the United States.”
110
Mitchell, “Broadband at the Speed of Light.”
111
Ibid.

35. 34
 LUS Fiber deployed the network in high- and low-income areas simultaneously, in compliance
with recommendations from the City–Parish Digital Divide report, to try to build goodwill and
long-term customer loyalty.
 Early subscribers on the base 10/10 plan connected to the internet at 10 mbps but to other LUS
subscribers at 100 mbps to maintain equity among network users and give subscribers a reason
to encourage neighbors to join.112
Review of LUS Fiber’s website reveals that this plan is no
longer available. However, six internet plans are available; all plans offer the same upload and
download speeds. In addition, subscribers can use a tool on the website to select among various
phone, internet, and cable options and see the monthly price for their chosen services.113
Despite the intense opposition, Lafayette prevailed and successfully completed its network, the benefits
of which are below.
 Lower prices: As of spring 2012, research indicated that LUS charged about 20 percent less than
Cox. Furthermore, Cox delayed rate increases after the introduction of LUS service, which saved
Lafayette businesses and residents $4M.114
As of June 2014, LUS offered customers synchronous
1 gbps service for $70 per month, with the purchase of voice and cable. The price for 1 gbps for
internet customers purchasing two services was $90 per month; the price for people purchasing
only the gigabit internet package was $110 per month.115
 More choice in upload and download speeds and large increase in the fastest speeds available.
 Decreased internet costs for public schools.
 Increased payments by LUS to City–Parish government as "in lieu of taxes" payments.116
 Attraction of new businesses, creating more than 1,000 jobs before it began offering services.117
Summary and Lessons Learned in Lafayette
Lafayette’s LUS Fiber follows a hybrid wholesale–retail model, offering service directly to end users and
selling capacity to other ISPs for resale. Like other municipally owned systems, Lafayette built a network
to serve government needs first before expanding service to business and residential users. Another key
factor in Lafayette’s success was the bi-partisan leadership of elected officials and the early and ongoing
citizen education campaigns. Both of these enabled Lafayette to build support among voters. This
support was crucial in getting voters to approve the bonds needed to pay for the network.
Contact Information
Phone: 337-993-4237
Bristol, VA
In 1999, in response to a shutdown caused by a severe storm in Bristol (2010 population 17,835), the
municipal electricity, water, and wastewater provider, Bristol Virginia Utilities (BVU), laid fiber for
internal government use. As fiber demand increased among local businesses, BVU began to sell unused
capacity to businesses. In 2002, BVU expanded broadband service to Bristol residents and later to the
112
Ibid.
113
“Package & Pricing Guide,” LUS Fiber, http://lusfiber.com/index.php/internet/pricing-guide, accessed November 2013.
114
Mitchell, “Broadband at the Speed of Light.”
115
“Package & Pricing Guide,” LUS Fiber, http://lusfiber.com/index.php/internet/pricing-guide, accessed June 11, 2014.
116
Mitchell, “Broadband at the Speed of Light.”
117
Mitchell, “Community Owned Networks Benefit Everyone,” NATOA Journal17, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 32.

36. 35
eight counties to the north (the “Virginia Coalfield region”). With 250 miles of fiber backbone and 675
total miles of fiber plant infrastructure, BVU provides 1 gbps service.118
Unsurprisingly, BVU fought numerous legal battles, incurring $2.5M in fees. In 2001, Virginia law banned
municipalities from providing telecom services. BVU sued the state to repeal the law; it won. Afterward,
BVU convinced the legislature to pass a bill affirming Bristol’s ability to provide telecom services.119
Then, Charter Communications, the cable incumbent, sought and won an injunction preventing BVU
from supplying its cable service. Virginia legislators intervened, passing a law authorizing BVU to offer
cable TV services. Sprint, a telephone incumbent, filed a petition with the Virginia State Corporation
Commission to stop BVU from offering phone services claiming that BVU was subsidizing its telephone
rates. The Commission denied Sprint’s request.120
Despite opposition, BVU transformed itself from a provider of network services to government into a
broadband, cable TV, and telephone purveyor serving Bristol and southwest Virginia residents and
businesses.121
Absent BVU, southwest Virginia might not have 4G service; private firms were unlikely to
expand broadband there. The primary actor to meet community need was the municipality itself.122
BVU offers multiple plans, including a telephone, cable video-on-demand television, and broadband
internet “triple-play” package. For broadband-only customers, BVU offers different speeds and prices.
BVU offers free wifi at Bristol’s mall and in government buildings. The wifi signal reaches some homes.123
Approximately 70 percent of Bristol’s residents and businesses (about 11,750 people) subscribe to BVU.
Bristol originally invested $21M through bonds and federal grants; it should recoup the investment in 12
to 15 years.124
Already, Bristol and the region have benefited. Northrop Grumman, CGI, and AT&T
moved to nearby Lebanon, bringing more than 600 high-paying jobs to southwestern Virginia.125
Many
of the new jobs were software development positions that paid between $60K and $80K per year,
substantially more than existing local jobs. Local residents filled 30 percent of the positions.126
In addition to the fiber network, the county and the state of Virginia provided incentives to attract
employers, like assistance with site location and workforce training. As of March 2014, at least five firms
have brought more than 1,000 jobs to the 4-county region with a population of approximately 100,000
people.127
Furthermore, BVU’s services helped keep coal giant, Alpha Natural Resources, in Bristol.128
BVU created BVU FOCUS (Finding Opportunities for Communities throughout the United States), to offer
advanced IT consulting, operations, and management services to municipal entities globally.129
BVU is expanding its fiber network to 388 miles and upgrading to 10 gbps maximum speeds. The
expansion will enable the network to reach 120 anchor institutions (schools, libraries, hospitals, clinics,
and major government facilities). It will also provide last-mile service for 18,000 homes and 500
118
Eric Null ,“Municipal Broadband: History’s Guide,” I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, 26.
119
Null, “Municipal Broadband: History’s Guide.” 30.
120
Ibid.
121
Null, “Municipal Broadband: History’s Guide,” 31.
122
Null, “Municipal Broadband: History’s Guide,” 29.
123
Null “Municipal Broadband: History’s Guide,” 26–27.
124
Null “Municipal Broadband: History’s Guide,” 27–28.
125
Debra McCown, “Despite new buildings, no quick fix for Lebanon’s economic malaise,” TriCities.com, posted October 17, 2010; updated
December 24, 2012, http://www.tricities.com/news/article_4d8d8283-4c97-533b-8c46-16d958fd17e3.html, accessed March 2014.
126
Null, “Municipal Broadband: History’s Guide,” 27–28.
127
Conversation with Jim Baldwin, Board Member, Virginia Coalfield Economic Development Authority, March 28, 2014.
128
Null “Municipal Broadband: History’s Guide,” 27–28.
129
Null “Municipal Broadband: History’s Guide,”. 31.

37. 36
businesses. Approximately $22M from the 2009 stimulus bill and $5M from the Virginia Tobacco
Commission will help pay for the project.130
Summary and Lessons Learned in Bristol, VA
BVU follows a retail model, providing direct service to the residents and businesses. Benefits of the
network include the following:
 BVU has led to creation and retention of jobs, as described previously.
 Social benefits: Wellmont Health System uses the network for its cardiac telehealth system.
Patients in eight health centers can send test results to experts at the Tennessee Medical
Center. Because doctors and patients can video conference, patients don’t have to travel
between hospitals. The hospitals use municipal internet access to help attract employees.131
 Increased localism: BVU employs local citizens who want to assist customers, thereby providing
better customer service than for-profit telecoms. BVU invests heavily in employee training.
Customer service representatives in its 24/7 call center were cross-trained in broadband, cable
TV, and telephone in addition to the utility services already offered by BVU.132
Contact Information
BVU: Residential Customer Service: 276-821-6100
BVU: Residential Technical Support: 276-821-6169
BVU: Commercial Customer Service: 276-821-6200
BVU: Commercial Technical Support: 276-821-6170
BVU: Network Management: customerservice@bvu-optinet.com or 276-669-4112
BVU FOCUS: info@BVUFOCUS.com or 866-623-6287 or 276-821-6209
Bristol, TN
Bristol, TN (2010 population 26,702) lies just across the border from Bristol, VA. Its utility, Bristol
Tennessee Essential Services (BTES), offers electricity as well as phone, internet, and cable television
service via fiber optic connections. BTES began offering electricity in 1945. Seeing the success of BVU
Fiber in providing the region’s Virginia residents voice (phone), data (internet), and video (cable
television), BTES began offering the region’s Tennessee residents internet and cable service in 2005 and
phone service in 2006. BTES also offers data center services.133
BTES is a department within the City of
Bristol, TN with authority to operate under Tennessee statute without city council approval.
Summary and Lessons Learned in Bristol, TN
BTES follows a retail model, providing direct service to the residents and businesses. In contrast to other
networks profiled in this report, there is very little information on the web about the history of BTES’s
efforts to build a fiber network and provide service to the public. Therefore, it is impossible to
determine if the decision to provide the public with fiber internet as contentious or if anyone or any
telecom objected.
BTES’s decision to provide voice, data, and video services to Tennessee residents only three years after
BVU first offered these services to Virginia residents demonstrates both the perceived value of the
Virginia network and the fact that Tennessee residents and BTES wanted to enjoy broadband’s benefits
130
Null “Municipal Broadband: History’s Guide,” 28.
131
Null “Municipal Broadband: History’s Guide,” 28–29.
132
Null “Municipal Broadband: History’s Guide,” 29.
133
BTES website: http://www.btes.net/index.php/about-us/ (accessed January 12, 2016).

38. 37
like their Virginia neighbors. The close proximity of BVU’s network allowed BTES staff and residents of
the BTES service area many opportunities to experience BVU Fiber service while visiting friends, family,
and businesses in the Virginia portion of the region. Likewise, BTES staff benefited from their BVU
counterparts’ recent and ongoing experience with fiber network design, construction, and operations.
The BTES example suggests that the time needed for a community to make the decision to build and
operate a fiber network and then follow through on that decision can be shortened when the its
network planners can benefit from the expertise on a nearby community that is further along in the
process.
Contact Information
Main phone: 423-968-1526
Economic Development: April Eads: 423-793-5532 or aeads@GigabitCommunity.com
Staunton, VA
Staunton, (2012 population 24,000) added wireless edge solutions components to its pre-existing wired
network, a 30-mile fiber optic backbone installed two years earlier to replace the city's leased lines.
Staunton had collaborated with another organization to build the initial fiber network, which links
approximately 30 government locations, at a cost savings. During an upgrade, Staunton added free wifi
to benefit the public.134
The Enterasys architecture allows integrated wired and wireless architecture through a OneFabric
control center. Traffic from the public wifi access points is separate from the city network on private
segments. Firewalls protect city resources. These features allow Staunton's IT department to manage all
wireless access points centrally rather than manually changing each access point. Staunton avoids
competing with private carriers by grooming access point signals to keep them within public parks.135
Summary and Lessons Learned in Staunton
Staunton follows a retail model, providing direct service to residents and businesses. Because Staunton
has limited service to the public to free wifi in public spaces, it avoids directly competing with incumbent
telecoms. Staunton realizes reduced telecom costs from operating its own network.
Contact Information
City of Staunton IT Department: 540-332-3823
Kurt Plowman, Chief Technology Officer: plowmanks@ci.staunton.va.us
Arlington, VA
In 2012 to 2013, Arlington County took advantage of previously planned projects to create an
institutional fiber network to serve government and schools. Connect Arlington laid additional fiber
beside fiber installed as part of other projects:
 upgrades to the County Intelligent Traffic System,
 connection of six public safety radio towers to replace the microwave emergency system,a nd
134
William Jackson, “Public Wi-Fi finds a home in Viriginia city,” GCN, December 13, 2012, http://gcn.com/articles/2012/12/13/public-wifi-
staunton-virginia.aspx, accessed October 2013.
135
Ibid.

39. 38
 grid upgrades from Dominion Power.136
Arlington County and Arlington Public Schools own the network, a series of overlapping fiber rings that
provide redundancy via multiple data travel paths. The network helped Arlington to reduce its
dependence on Comcast in case the cable provider decided to discontinue a free institutional network
for the county and schools during recent franchise agreement renegotiation.137
Besides connecting government buildings and schools, the network allows police and fire fighters to set
up command villages for events by turning traffic signals into routers, and to improve incident response
time by allowing responders to alter routes to avoid congested areas.138
In 2014, Connect Arlington announced plans to expand service to businesses; a consultant would
manage dark fiber leasing to multiple ISPs. As currently contemplated, starting in 2015, the network also
will serve universities, research centers, and federal agencies.139
Summary and Lessons Learned in Arlington
Arlington built an institutional network. Recently, the county decided to expand service to businesses via
a wholesale model. Like Staunton, Arlington benefited from a less hostile legal–political environment,
thanks to legal battles won by Bristol, VA during its efforts to build and expand its municipal network.
Like other municipalities discussed in this report, Arlington County worked with another public sector
entity, in this case the school system. Unlike others, Arlington’s partners also include federal agencies.
Contact Information
Department of Technology Services: 703-228-3220 or cio@arlingtonva.us
Corpus Christi, TX
Corpus Christi (2012 population 312,195) launched its successful municipal wireless program after a dog
attack on a meter reader convinced city leaders to implement a new way to read meters. In 2002,
Corpus Christi invested $7.1M in a 147-square-mile mesh wifi network covering the entire city.140
The
new network, completed in 2006,141
allowed electronic meter reading. EarthLink bought the network for
$5.2M, intending to sell subscription internet service for $20 per month. Realizing that it would not
make a profit, EarthLink returned the network to Corpus Christi with $2.5M in upgrades and equipment.
In return, Corpus Christi abated the unpaid portion of EarthLink’s purchase price. Because meter-reading
required 10 percent of network capacity, the municipal Corpus Christi Digital Community Development
Corporation (CCDCDC) was formed to ensure that new uses of the network serve the public interest.142
CCDCDC, later renamed ConnectCC, developed e-government applications to increase the wifi network’s
appeal and promote the internet to more people.143
Uses of the network expanded to include these
features:
136
lgonzalez, “Fiber Optic ConnectArlington Moving Forward in Virginia,” Community Broadband Networks, Institute for Local Self-Reliance,
June 28, 2012, http://www.muninetworks.org/content/fiber-optic-connectarlington-moving-forward-virginia, accessed April 2014.
137
Ibid.
138
Tanya Roscorla, “3 Reasons Arlington County, Va., Started Building a Fiber Network,” Government Technology, March 1, 2012,
http://www.govtech.com/wireless/3-Reasons-Arlington-County-Started-Building-Fiber.html, accessed April 2014.
139
lgonzalez, “Fiber Optic ConnectArlington Moving Forward in Virginia.”
140
Null ,“Municipal Broadband: History’s Guide,” 31–32.
141
ConnectCC, http://www.connectcc.com/government.html, accessed October 2013..
142
Null ,“Municipal Broadband: History’s Guide,” 32–33.
143
Null ,“Municipal Broadband: History’s Guide,”. 33.

40. 39
 tracking emergency vehicles so the closest one can respond to an incident;
 wirelessly sending architectural plans to computers in fire trucks to aid fire fighters and improve
their safety;
 monitoring traffic and public safety, especially during the busy spring break season; and
 Unexpectedly, tracking the progress of Hurricane Alex in June 2010.144
Other additional uses of the network include:
 data analytics on twice-daily water and gas meter readings to detect leaks and manage the
system;145
 car-to-car messaging for police, fire, and emergency management front-line vehicles and in
vehicle access to network resources, sex offender databases, automated vehicle location, crime
analysis, computer aided dispatching, mugshots, records management, wireless field reporting,
and viewing satellite imagery and pictometry;
 emergency medical service applications such as WebEOC, Safetypad, and Cardiac Alert;
 the Mobile Maximo work order and asset management system used by the water, wastewater,
stormwater, gas, streets, and parks departments, the customer call center, and GIS technicians;
and
 web-based and interactive telephone voice response applications that allow contractors to
schedule inspections and obtain inspection results wirelessly.146
ConnectCC provides wifi in parks, libraries, community centers, and sports complexes; the ConnectCC
website has a map showing hotspot locations.147
ConnectCC also partnered with the Corpus Christi
Independent School District to establish a pilot program at one middle school. Students and teachers
received laptops to access the network on campus. The eChalk application that allows parents
password-protected access to their children’s grades, progress and attendance reports, schoolwork, and
other information has been successful. It received more than 550,000 hits in the first two days after its
launch.148
Summary and Lessons Learned in Corpus Christi
Corpus Christi follows a retail model in providing free wifi directly to the public. Because publicly
available service is limited to public places, the City avoids direct competition with telecoms. The use of
the network to improve delivery of government services should save $50M over 20 years. As of 2010,
Corpus Christi had at least 30 hotspots available to the public, allowing the network to provide the
public with extra benefits beyond the direct monetary savings.149
Contact Information
John Sendejar, ConnectCC Acting General Manager: john@cctexas.com or 361-826-3867.
Fort Wayne, IN
Fort Wayne (2011 estimated population 255,824) took advantage of Indiana’s 2006 state franchise
reform, which allowed new competitors to enter a market without spending months negotiating a
144
Null ,“Municipal Broadband: History’s Guide,”34.
145
ConnectCC.
146
“Wi-Fi Done Right Part 2: Wireless Application Showcase,” September 2007, http://www.connectcc.com/WirelessAppSummary200802.pdf,
accessed October 2013.
147
ConnectCC.
148
Ibid.
149
Null “Municipal Broadband: History’s Guide,” 35.

41. 40
franchise agreement with a local authority, to entice Verizon to invest $100M to launch its FiOS fiber-to-
the-premises system in Fort Wayne. Understanding that broadband is a business rather than a service,
Fort Wayne’s leaders were respectful of Verizon’s cash flow and profit requirements.150
Fort Wayne’s mayor, who negotiated the agreement with Verizon, advised municipalities to look beyond
phone and cable companies and seek large firms in other industries who would benefit immediately
from fiber’s large bandwidth. In this case, Fort Wayne worked with Raytheon, healthcare providers, and
the local chamber of commerce. That consortium contributed $1M to the project because the partners
needed better data networking solutions.151
Summary and Lessons Learned in Fort Wayne
Fort Wayne did not build a municipal network. Instead, it collaborated with local businesses to entice a
private telecom to build the network. While this undoubtedly saved the City of Fort Wayne money, it
also means that the city does not own its fiber. Therefore, Fort Wayne, its residents, and businesses are
at the mercy of Verizon and any successor firm that acquire the Verizon. As of January 2011, Verizon had
sold its Fort Wayne FiOS customers to Frontier, which increased the prices charged to customers.152
Contact Information
City of Fort Wayne main number: 260-427-8311
South Bend, IN
In South Bend, IN (2012 population 101,000) and neighboring Mishawaka and St. Joseph County, the
100-mile community owned open-access fiber network, Metronet Zing, serves businesses, government,
and educational facilities.153
St. Joe Valley Metronet uses a hybrid retail–whole sale model to provide
service. Metronet itself directly serves government and education clients while a separate, for-profit
entity, SJVM, Inc., handles business clients. Metronet does not serve residential customers. As of
September 2013, 19 carriers provided service via the network.154
Summary and Lessons in South Bend
Several communities have adopted a hybrid retail–wholesale business model to providing broadband
services on community-owned infrastructure. In those instances, the government entity served the
same clients as the other ISPs sharing its network. South Bend took a unique approach in choosing to
retain service to government and education clients for itself, while sharing the responsibility of serving
businesses with other ISPs. South Bend is also unique in creating a separate, for-profit entity to serve
businesses.
Contact Information
St. Joe Valley Metronet, 121 S. Michigan Street, South Bend, IN 46601
Phone: 574-968-5353
Technical Support: 574-360-7812
150
Steve Titch, “Cities Seek New Fiber-to-the-Home Funding Models,” June 1, 2008, http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-
article/2008/06/01/cities-seek-new-fiber-home-funding-models, accessed October 2013.
151
Ibid.
152
Christopher, “Fort Wayne, Indiana: What Happens When You Beg,” Community Broadband Networks, Institute for Local Self-Reliance,
January 27, 2011, http://www.muninetworks.org/content/fort-wayne-indiana-what-happens-when-you-beg, accessed October 2013.
153
Igonzalez, “Metronet Zing’s Dark Fiber Saves Big Bucks in South Bend” Community Broadband Networks, Institute for Local Self-Reliance,
September 13, 2013, http://www.muninetworks.org/content/metronet-zings-dark-fiber-saves-big-bucks-south-bend, accessed March 2014..
154
Ibid.

42. 41
Email: info@metronetzing.org
Website: http://www.MetronetZing.org
Kansas City, KS and Kansas City, MO
In November 2012, Kansas City (2012 MO population 464,310 and KS population 146,000) and Google
Fiber launched a fiber network. Google requires potential customers to pre-register for service. Once
the number of registrants for a neighborhood surpasses a pre-determined threshold, usually between 5
and 25 percent of homes, Google begins laying the fiber in the neighborhood. Maximizing the number of
homes connected during the first bulk deployment allows Google to reduce the number of times it
dispatches trucks and technicians, thereby saving money.155
Google also manufactures its own gear to avoid paying hundreds of thousands of dollars for specialty
equipment built for ISPs, thereby saving money. Additionally, Google’s assembly of custom devices
allows it to control all network infrastructure.156
As of September 2013, Google offered three plans.
 Free Option: Max speeds:5 mbps download / 1mbps upload; No data caps; Includes Network
Box; Free for seven years
 $70/month Option: Max speeds: 1 gbps upload and download; No data caps; Includes Network
Box; 1 year contract; $300 waived construction fee
 $120/month Option: Max speeds: 1 gbps upload & download; No data caps; Includes Network
Box & Storage Box; 1 TV Box & full channel TV lineup; two-year contract157
As of February 2014, Google was laying fiber in city neighborhoods and had plans to lay fiber in nearby
suburbs. Google also said it was developing a 10 gbps service for businesses.158
Some residents have complained about damaged lawns, cut utility connections, and unannounced
construction workers in the yard as undesirable construction impacts from a project that requires
burying and stringing wire across the metro area. Google’s attempt to build a network in a few years,
rather than decades like the telecoms, increases the number of people experiencing disruptions at any
given time. Complaints to City Hall prompted Google to pressure contractors to address issues in a more
timely fashion. In addition, Google established a 24-hour complaint hotline. While Kansas City officials
and other utilities give Google high marks for its response to complaints, many residents have
complained that Google’s contractors do a poor job repairing damage to sidewalks, driveways, and
lawns.159
AT&T has said that it is contemplating building a similar service in Kansas City.160
If AT&T does improve
its offerings, then the advent of Google Fiber will have succeeded in providing Kansas City with better-
quality broadband and with increasing competition in that broadband market.
155
Stacey Higginbotham, “The economics of Google Fiber and what it means for US broadband,” Gigaom, July 26, 2012,
http://gigaom.com/2012/07/26/the-economics-of-google-fiber-and-what-it-means-for-u-s-broadband/, accessed February 2014.
156
Ibid.
157
Google Fiber, https://fiber.google.com/about/, accessed September 2013.
158
Mark Hachman,“Google Fiber ‘contest’ open up to 34 more cities, including San Francisco Bay Area,” PC World, February 19, 2014,
http://www.pcworld.com/article/2099005/google-fiber-contest-opens-up-to-34-more-cities-including-san-francisco-bay-area.html, accessed
February 2014..
159
Scott Canon, “Complaints mount as Google Fiber extends its reach in Kansas City,” The Kansas City Star, June 23, 2014,
http://www.kansascity.com/news/business/technology/article604534.html.
160
Ibid.

43. 42
Google also plans to introduce fiber to Austin, TX and Provo, UT.161
In anticipation of expanding fiber
access in other regions, Google has indicated that it may work with up to 34 more cities spread across
nine regions recognized as tech hubs:
 Portland, OR
 San Jose, CA
 Salt Lake City, UT
 Phoenix, AZ
 San Antonio, TX
 Atlanta, GA
 Charlotte, NC
 Raleigh–Durham, NC
 Nashville, TN162
Summary and Lessons Learned in Kansas City
Like Fort Wayne, Kansas City enticed a private operator to build its fiber network rather than building a
community-owned network. Therefore, Kansas City faces the same risk—that the private operator will
raise prices. However, Google Fiber, unlike Verizon, has a publicly stated mission to bring high-speed
broadband to communities at affordable prices. Therefore, it is less likely that Kansas City will face the
same steep price increases that Fort Wayne did in the short term. However, because Google is a private
firm with a mission to maximize profit, there is always a risk that Google could raise prices in the future
if their business model changes or in response to shareholder demand for more profit.
Google’s experience with complaints indicates that there will be many impacts from the construction of
an entirely new fiber network. Any entity that pursues such an ambitious undertaking should employ a
strong public education campaign to inform residents of the type and length of disruptions and develop
procedures to address inevitable complaints before construction begins.
Contact Information
Alana Karen Director of Service Delivery for Google Fiber:@GFiberAlana
General phone number: 866-777-7550
Provo, UT
In the late 1990s, a community task force on telecommunications recommended that Provo (2012
population 112,488) build a fiber-to-the-premises network using a phased approach. Fiber had emerged
as the best technology to meet Provo’s need for reliable broadband. Because the incumbent carriers
indicated that bringing fiber to Provo was a low priority, it decided to build its own network.163
 Phase I: construction of three fiber rings throughout the city for internal city purposes
 Phase II: a FTTP demonstration project area launched in one neighborhood
 Phase III: a city-wide deployment to every resident and business in Provo164
161
Google Fiber, https://fiber.google.com/about/, accessed September 2013.
162
Hachman,“Google Fiber ‘contest’ open up to 34 more cities…” “Google Fiber ‘contest’ open up to 34 more cities, including San Francisco Bay
Area,” PC World, Mark Hachman, February 19, 2014, http://www.pcworld.com/article/2099005/google-fiber-contest-opens-up-to-34-more-
cities-including-san-francisco-bay-area.html (accessed February 2014).
163
“Provo,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IProvo, accessed September 2013.
164
Ibid.

44. 43
Phased construction occurred between 2004 and 2006. By December 2006, five months after
completion of construction, the iProvo network had 8,400 customers; by September 2007, it had 10,000
customers. Except new subdivisions not included in the original contract, iProvo served the entire city.165
The community task force initially recommended that the city use a "retail model" and sell service
directly to customers. Most municipal utilities use the retail model. Because incumbent telecoms
challenged the retail model at the Utah State Legislature, iProvo adopted a "wholesale model" instead.
Under this scenario, Provo owned and maintained a network it built; two private firms provided TV,
phone, and internet to homes and businesses via the publicly owned infrastructure.166
In late 2006, the Reason Foundation, a libertarian think-tank, issued a report characterizing iProvo as
financially unstable and ineffective at lowering internet costs or raising broadband use. Provo responded
with a white paper challenging that analysis. Mired in debt, Provo sold the almost-complete network to
Broadweave Networks. The deal allowed Broadweave to finance the purchase with a loan from Provo
and allowed Provo to reclaim the network if Broadweave defaulted on payments.167
Broadweave and the many firms with which it later merged were late with loan payments. Furthermore,
there were legal disputes involving Broadweave, the UTOPIA network with whom iProvo shared
ownership of some infrastructure, and the City of Provo.168
Provo eventually reacquired the network. In 2013, it sold its network to Google for $1. Provo still must
pay $3.3M per year in bond payments on approximately $39M in debt associated with capital costs.169
In
return, Google must offer free internet to all households and businesses after a $30 setup fee (Google
also will offer two higher-tier packages). In addition, Google must run the network for seven years.170
Since that time, Comcast has introduced a 250 mbps download / 50 mbps upload package for $70 per
month.171
According to people who follow the industry, Comcast dropped its prices by approximately 60
percent after the introduction of Google Fiber.172
For people in Provo, Google Fiber’s presence has
encouraged incumbents to improve their offerings; Provo’s residents benefit.
Summary and Lessons Learned in Provo
Initially, Provo followed a wholesale model. Like Burlington, Provo built and maintained a community-
owned network. Unlike Burlington, Provo did not offer service directly to customers. Instead, ISPs
offered service on the iProvo network. Like Burlington, Provo had debt problems. To ensure service for
its residents, Provo sold its network to Google in exchange for seven years of free service. The result is
that Provo now has a privately owned and operated network, like Kansas City and Fort Wayne. Unlike
those two cities, Provo also has debt associated with building a network even though it no longer owns
its network. The major lesson from the Provo example is that municipalities must pay close attention to
the financial details if they choose to build their own network, especially if debt financing is involved.
165
Ibid.
166
Ibid.
167
Ibid.
168
Jesse, “Google Fiber: The Deal that Keeps Getting Worse,”Free Utopia, http://www.freeutopia.org/category/iprovo/, accessed September
2013.
169
Davidson and Santorelli, “Head of the Class: Broadband in the United States.”
170
Jesse, “Google Fiber: The Deal that Keeps Getting Worse,” Free Utopia, http://www.freeutopia.org/category/iprovo/, accessed September
2013.
171
Anders Bylund, “My Brother’s Internet is Way Cheaper Than Mine –and Yours,” The Motely Fool, March 25, 2014,
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/03/25/my-brothers-internet-is-way-cheaper-than-mine-and.aspx,, accessed April 2014.
172
Eric Lampland, Founder and Principal Consultant, Lookout Point Communications, Interview, June 10, 2014.

45. 44
Contact Information
Alana Karen Director of Service Delivery for Google Fiber: @GFiberAlana
General phone number: 866-777-7550
UTOPIA, UT
Utah Telecommunications Open Infrastructure Agency, or UTOPIA, owns a fiber network built to serve
15 member cities: Brigham City, Cedar City, Cedar Hills, Centerville, Layton, Lindon, Midvale, Orem,
Payson, Perry, Riverton, Tremonton, Vineyard, and West Valley City. As of September 2013, services
were not available in Cedar City, Cedar Hills, Perry, Riverton, and Vineyard.173
Each participating city
contributes money based on the number of potential customers (population) and the cost to serve
them.174
UTOPIA has a unique governance structure that gives each city two opportunities to comment upon all
decisions. The top of the governance structure is the board, which includes a representative from each
participating city. Cities send either their city manager or a city council member depending upon their
government structure. Below the board is the Utah Infrastructure Agency (UIA), which oversees
operations and seeks financing for the project. Each city also has representation on the UIA, usually a
council member or a staff person. Below the UIA is the UTOPIA organization and its workers.175
One member municipality, Brigham City, operates an electric power, water, waste treatment, waste
collection, and storm drain utility systems and was the site of the first successful co-op, established in
1865.176
This local history of coops and public provision of infrastructure may have helped area residents
feel comfortable with this arrangement and willing to pursue a community broadband network.
Utah’s Municipal Cable Television and Public Telecommunications Services Act requires community-
owned networks to operate under a wholesale model. Separate retailers must market and sell the
bandwidth, provide customer service, and handle billing.177
Therefore, UTOPIA built and owns the
network; eight private internet service providers offer service to residential and commercial
customers.178
To ensure revenue generation, UTOPIA’s business plan includes two strategies for fiber expansion. The
first calls for UTOPIA to focus on serving businesses first and expand access to residents afterward. The
second calls for UTOPIA to lay fiber in coordination with other infrastructure projects. For example, as
new streets are built or existing streets undergo major rehabilitation, UTOPIA lays its fiber to minimize
costs associated with digging up streets to install conduit. Although UTOPIA pays to lay fiber in the
street, consumers must pay to connect the fiber to their premises. UTOPIA offers consumers the option
to lease or buy their connection to the network. As of November 2013, UTOPIA was 40 to 50 percent
built out overall and 80 to 90 percent built out in some municipalities.179
UTOPIA’s customers say the service is reliable. Many noted that they actually receive advertised upload
and download speeds.180
As of November 2013, UTOPIA was generating sufficient revenue to pay its
173
UTOPIA, http://www.utopianet.org/, accessed September 2013.
174
Jason Nau, West Valley City, UT, Interview, November 20, 2013.
175
Ibid.
176
UTOPIA.
177
Tony Semerad, “UTOPIA: World-class broadband, sky-high debt,” The Salt Lake Tribune, December 2, 2012.
178
UTOPIA.
179
Jason Nau, West Valley City, UT, Interview, November 20, 2013.
180
lgonzalez, “UTOPIA, For Better And Worse, Profiled,” Community Broadband Networks, Institute for Local Self-Reliance, January 6, 2013,
http://www.muninetworks.org/content/utopia-better-and-worse-profiled, accessed September 2013..

46. 45
debt. The network has been instrumental in attracting new businesses and residents to the area. Many
of the new businesses are in the entertainment and media industries and require high-speed internet.
Likewise, many of the new residents work from home and require high-speed internet.181
Despite
UTOPIA offering affordable, high-speed broadband, experts in municipal broadband financing advise
against borrowing a lot of money to build an open-access network, as UTOPIA did.182
Some observers
claim that recent tax increases in some UTOPIA communities are due to insufficient revenue for the
network. However, it is unclear to what extent revenue shortfalls are due to UTOPIA as nearby non-
UTOPIA communities also raised taxes.183
As of July 2014, UTOPIA’s member cities were considering a proposal to collaborate with the Australian
investment bank, Macquarie Group, which has offered to invest $300M to finish network construction.
With prior experience in Taiwanese broadband networks and the ability to entice Alcatel Lucent and
Fujitsu, this proposed collaboration could bring UTOPIA the expertise it needs to operate in Utah’s
restrictive regulatory environment.184
For the UTOPIA cities, benefits of Macquarie’s proposal include ability to
 finish the network in 30 months,
 reach every address in participating cities without a connection fee,
 shift network maintenance, upgrades, and cost overruns to Macquarie,
 re-assume regional ownership at the end of a 30-year public private partnership, and
 continue receiving service from eight ISP currently operating on UTOPIA.185
Drawbacks include
 the requirement to cede control of the network to Macquarie for 30 years, and
 a proposed $18–$20 monthly utility fee on all addresses in the UTOPIA service area, regardless
of whether they are network customers, with possible discounts for multiple unit addresses,
seniors, and the indigent.186
Although UTOPIA’s opponents have depicted the utility fee as a new tax, this portrayal ignores UTOPIA’s
need to repay $500M in bonds, regardless of whether it has a network or not.187
Absent the Macquarie
proposal, UTOPIA may have to consider selling the network outright to acquire funds to repay
construction cost. At least, the Macquarie proposal would allow UTOPIA to repay its debt without
relinquishing ownership of the asset forever. To phrase it another way, the Macquarie deal would allow
the UTOPIA cities to get something for their money. The alternative is to get nothing for their money.
Summary and Lessons Learned from UTOPIA
Like its counterpart, iProvo, UTOPIA followed a wholesale model in accordance with Utah law.
Like many other community owned networks, UTOPIA suffered the effects of lawsuits from incumbents.
181
Jason Nau, West Valley City, UT, Interview, November 20, 2013.
182
Semerad, “UTOPIA.”
183
Ibid.
184
Tom Anderson, “UTOPIA at a Crossroads: Part 1,” Community Broadband Networks, Institute for Local Self-Reliance, July 14, 2014,
http://muninetworks.org/content/utopia-crossroads-part-1.
185
Tom Anderson, “UTOPIA at a Crossroads: Part 2,” Community Broadband Networks, Institute for Local Self-Reliance, July 17, 2014,
http://muninetworks.org/content/utopia-crossroads-part-2.
186
Ibid.
187
Tom Anderson, “UTOPIA at a Crossroads: Part 3,” Community Broadband Networks, July 23, 2014, http://muninetworks.org/content/utopia-
crossroads-part-3.

47. 46
As with Burlington Telecom and iProvo, funding constraints and poor planning had negative impacts on
the project. Indeed, a major lesson from the UTOPIA project is the need to pay careful attention to a
project’s financial considerations, like product pricing, cash flow, and debt service.
Contact Information
General inquiries: 801-613-3880
Business customers: 801-613-3836
New York State
To reach its goal of providing all New Yorkers access to affordable, high-speed broadband internet, New
York State has identified multiple strategies. Two of the more interesting strategies are:
 Advocating for national and state policies requiring minimum speed thresholds for households,
businesses, and institutions.
 Incentivizing providers to reduce prices for households at/below 150 percent of poverty level.188
New York State is considering strategies to stimulate demand for broadband and higher levels of usage.
One idea is to provide public internet kiosks.189
Drawbacks to this idea include the challenge of
determining where to place kiosks, how to pay maintenance expenses, and the fact that people may not
want to perform certain transactions on a public computer.
It is unclear whether municipal, state, or federal government have the legal authority to mandate
minimum internet speed.
It is also unclear how to incentivize carriers to offer discounted service to lower-income people. Does
another organization pay the difference between the regular price and the discounted price charged to
lower income individuals? Or does the carrier accept less revenue from those customers?
New York City
New York City (2012 Census-estimated population 8,336,697) has a developed a broadband plan that
addresses three main connectivity issues—last-mile connections, “Digital Deserts,” and the “Digital
Divide.”
New York City does not attempt to provide broadband itself. Rather, it has multiple programs to
encourage private operators to wire commercial and industrial buildings. One program catalogs the
broadband connectivity of individual buildings and shares that info with the public for use in business
location decisions. Another simplifies the permit process for ISPs to install broadband at a location. Yet
another program provides free computers and broadband in locations throughout New York City.
The ConnectNYC program aims to improve fiber connectivity to commercial and industrial buildings
across New York City, by inviting small and medium-sized businesses to compete for free fast-track fiber
installation at their premises. Applicants must demonstrate how improved connectivity will help them
grow their businesses.190
188
New York State Universal Broadband Strategic Roadmap, June 2009, 21.
189
New York State Universal Broadband Strategic Roadmap, June 2009, 26.
190
David Salway, “Mayor Michael Bloomberg's Broadband Plan for NYC: Five Broadband Initiatives to Expand Broadband in NYC,” About.com
Guide, http://broadband.about.com/od/legislation/a/Mayor-Michael-Bloombergs-Broadband-Plan-For-Nyc.htm, accessed September 2013.

48. 47
WiredNYC is a building certification program that catalogs and ranks more than 300 commercial
buildings based on broadband connectivity, to help businesses make location decisions and help
landlords market their properties. The NYC Broadband Connect Map will include these data and data
from fiber providers.191
Through Broadband Express, New York City will identify a point person for ISP street-operations issues
and commit to process broadband permit applications in two days.192
CitizenConnect is a program that includes the expansion of more than 100 free public computing
centers, and a competition to develop mobile applications to help residents access workforce
development, job listings, childcare, healthcare, and transportation. Because low-income people tend to
have mobile, not wireline, broadband, providing mobile access to services should eliminate some
barriers.193
LinkNYC is a program intended to replace approximately 6,400 on-street payphones with 9.5-foot tall
internet access hubs offering free, unlimited 1 gbps service to locations within 150 feet of the hotspot.
CityBridge, a consortium of private companies that will build and operate the network, will generate
revenue by selling New York City’s digital advertising space. CityBridge will share 50 percent of revenue
with New York City and will provide a minimum annual payment of at least $20M, regardless of ad sales.
In the interest of preserving history, CityBridge will maintain three payphones.194
In addition to the municipal government, other organizations are working to expand broadband access
in New York City. In 2011, the DUMBO Improvement District, the BID for the area in Brooklyn, and Two
Trees Management Company, which owns buildings in the DUMBO neighborhood, engaged the
nonprofit NYCWireless to install a neighborhood wifi network.195
Google offers free wifi in a portion of New York City's Chelsea neighborhood. This network cost about
$115K to build and will cost about $45K per year to maintain. The cost of building the network was split
between Google (2/3) and the Chelsea Improvement Company (1/3).196
This effort is independent of the
Google Fiber projects Kansas City, Austin, or Provo.
Red Hook Initiative collaborated with the Open Technology Institute to build a mesh network, the Red
Hook Initiative WiFi. It provides internet access to Red Hook, Brooklyn and serves as a platform for
developing local applications and services, putting human-centered design and community engagement
at the project’s core.197
Examples of locally developed applications include the following:
 an application to access real-time bus locations and arrival times using data from the
Metropolitan Transit Authority’s BusTime API (launched October 9, 2012);
 Stop & Frisk Survey that residents can use to document police interactions in Red Hook and
improve public safety (launched October 17, 2012); and
191
Ibid.
192
Ibid.
193
Ibid.
194
Ben Fox Rubin, “In NYC, once a payphone, soon a superfast Wi-Fi hub,” CNET, November 18, 2014, http://www.cnet.com/au/news/nyc-
plans-to-reboot-payphones-into-superfast-wi-fi-hubs/.
195
Esme Vos, “DUMBO Wireless: giant free Wi-Fi hotzone in NYC (Brooklyn),” June 2, 2011, http://www.muniwireless.com/2011/06/02/dumbo-
wireless-giant-free-wifi-hotzone-nyc-brooklyn/, accessed September 2013..
196
Esme Vos, “Free WiFi in New York City, thanks to Google,” MuniWireless, January 8, 2013, http://www.muniwireless.com/2013/01/08/free-
wifi-in-new-york-city-thanks-to-google/, accessed September 2013.
197
“Case Study: Red Hook Initiative WiFi & Tidepools,” New American Foundation, February 1, 2013,
http://oti.newamerica.net/blogposts/2013/case_study_red_hook_initiative_wifi_tidepools-78575, accessed November 2013.

49. 48
 RHI Radio, an online radio station streaming content produced by the Youth Radio Group at RHI
(under development).198
The community expanded the network significantly following Superstorm Sandy in fall 2012, to replace
communications infrastructure rendered obsolete by the storm. Text messaging was the most widely—
and in some cases the only—means of communication for neighborhood residents after the storm. OTI
developed RHI Status to allow residents to text their location and needs to a contact number, which
automatically maps the information with threaded discussion so community members can respond.199
Summary and Lessons Learned in New York City
Unlike the other cities surveyed, New York City did not pursue the construction and operation of a fiber
network, either by itself, or by a private firm, or as part of a public–private partnership. Instead, New
York City developed programs to encourage the private sector to expand broadband. In affluent areas
like Chelsea and gentrifying areas like DUMBO, these programs appear partly successful.
Although the city-sponsored programs are innovative, low-cost ways to expand broadband access, their
impact is limited and NYC residents and businesses are still at the mercy of private-sector telecom firms.
Furthermore, these programs do not seem to have prompted broadband expansion to less affluent
areas, leaving people in those areas to devise other means to acquire the broadband they need, as
shown in the Red Hook example. On the plus side, NYC’s programs are transferable to other locations.
Philadelphia, PA
Philadelphia (2012 estimated population 1,547,607) followed the public–private partnership model. It
retained EarthLink to build and operate a city-owned wifi network. Nonprofit Wireless Philadelphia
handled oversight and connected lower income residents to the network. EarthLink provided free
wireless access to government, schools, and other entities, while market-rate customers paid $20 per
month and 25,000 people in low-income households paid $10 per month. The 15-square mile proof of
concept network launched in 2005, with full build-out of a 135-square-mile citywide system planned for
completion in 2007. EarthLink never expanded the network.200
The agreement between Wireless Philadelphia and EarthLink imposed several restrictions that made it
very difficult for EarthLink to earn a profit. For example, EarthLink had to pay Wireless Philadelphia 5
percent of each subscriber fee or $1 per subscriber, whichever was greater. EarthLink had to leave its
network open for competitors to use and provide 1 mbps upload and download speeds.201
In June 2008, EarthLink ceased providing service.202
At the time, the project was 30 percent over budget,
and a functional wireless system would have required twice the access points per square mile than
planned. Eventually, EarthLink laid off more than 50 percent of its workforce, making failure
inevitable.203
In web chatter about the network soon after its demise, consumers complained about
198
Ibid.
199
Ibid.
200
Dan Meyer, “RCR Wireless News MBB Philadelphia: City continues struggle with muni Wi-Fi,” RCR Wireless News, June 29, 2011,
http://www.rcrwireless.com/article/20110629/rcrevents/rcr-wireless-news-mbb-philadelphia-city-continues-struggle-with-muni-wi-fi/,
accessed September 2013..
201
Null “Municipal Broadband: History’s Guide,” 41.
202
Ibid.
203
Null “Municipal Broadband: History’s Guide,” 42.

50. 49
difficulty acquiring and maintaining a signal. EarthLink’s plans to donate the network to a nonprofit were
unsuccessful.204
After that, a private firm, Network Acquisition Company, operated the network until its purchase by the
City of Philadelphia for $2M with plans to provide a wireless network for city operations and free
internet in some public spaces. Completion of these plans would require $15M to upgrade the
network.205
Comcast, which is headquartered in Philadelphia, saw the wireless venture as a threat. Comcast and
Verizon pushed the passage of a statewide law requiring all Pennsylvania cities, except Philadelphia, to
give local ISPs the right of first refusal in bids to supply high-speed internet service.206
Philly Keyspots, an initiative by the Freedom Rings Partnership, assists the 41 percent of residents who
lack access to the internet or basic computer skills. The 77 Keyspot locations (the Philadelphia OIC office,
recreation centers, community-based organization sites, homeless shelters, and affordable housing
sites) offer internet access and computer literacy training.207,208
Mobile Keyspots, called NOMAD (Neighborhood Opportunity through Mobile Accessible Destinations),
offer up to 40 laptops for employee training, digital literacy classes, etc. Mobile Keyspots include
internet access, projectors, and printers. These require access to one outlet for setup. The service is
available to community organizations and small businesses.209
As of 2013, this initiative is ongoing.
Summary and Lessons Learned in Philadelphia
Philadelphia’s public–private partnership with EarthLink is an example of a city contracting with a private
firm to build and operate its broadband network. This model is similar to that used by Fort Wayne in
attracting Verizon. However, Philadelphia retained more control of the project as demonstrated by the
open-access requirements and minimum upload/download speeds imposed on network, as well as the
requirement that EarthLink submit to oversight by Wireless Philadelphia. While minimum speed
requirements are helpful to ensure a quality product for consumers, and the restrictions on the network
may have been acceptable individually, the combined impact of all the restrictions killed the network.
However, unlike Fort Wayne, Philadelphia now owns a broadband network, although it needs significant
investment to be viable. One lesson from Philadelphia is that cities using the public–private partnership
model should work to ensure that the restrictions on their partners are not overly burdensome.
Contact Information
City of Philadelphia: Office of Innovation and Technology: 215-686-8101
Philly Keyspot Project Partners: https://www.phillykeyspots.org/contactus
204
“EarthLink to Discontinue Operation Of Its Municipal Wi-Fi Network in Philadelphia,” EarthLink Press Release, May 13, 2008,
http://ir.earthlink.net/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=310055, accessed September 2013.
205
Geoff Duncan, “Philadelphia Buys EarthLink’s Failed Municipal Wi-Fi Network,” Digital Trends,December 2009,
http://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/philadelphia-buys-earthlinks-failed-municipal-wi-fi-network/, accessed September 2013.
206
Mari Sibley, “Seattle ends free Wi-Fi” SmartPlanet, May 8, 2012, http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/thinking-tech/seattle-ends-free-wi-
fi/11546, accessed September 2013.
207
Kiarra Solomon, “Philly Keyspots: A new Philadelphia Broadband initiative bridging the gap,” The Philadelphia Sunday, May 6, 2012,
http://www.philasun.com/news/2957/23/Philly-Keyspots-A-new-Philadelphia-Broadband-initiative-bridging-the-gap.html, accessed September
2013.
208
Karl Bode, “Philly Forces Comcast to Broaden $10 Broadband Offer After Promising it as Condition of NBC Merger,” September 24, 2012, DSL
Reports, http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/Philly-Forces-Comcast-to-Broaden-10-Broadband-Offer-121335, accessed September 2013.
209
Solomon, “Philly Keyspots.”

51. 50
Santa Monica, CA
Santa Monica City NetSM
provides the city government of Santa Monica (2010 population 89,736) with
cost savings and revenue. It also offers cost savings and competitive advantages to local businesses.210
City Net follows a hybrid model that serves both the wholesale and business-to-business retail markets.
The network offers cable, data, voice, wireless, video, and two-way video. City Net serves businesses
directly and through other ISPs via a fiber network that serves downtown multi-tenant office buildings
with speeds up to 10 gbps. Santa Monica also offers dark-fiber leasing for organizations with high
bandwidth requirements, under standard annual leasing options and co-location facilities with full rack
or one-unit rack options. These facilities include controlled environments with fire detection and
suppression, security monitoring for both typical and disaster risks, redundant UPS on AC, on-site diesel
generator, and battery backup accompanied by 24/7 service support.211
In most cities, the municipal electric utility has been the entity responsible for planning and later
overseeing a new municipal fiber network. In Santa Monica, the Information Systems department
planned and now manages the fiber network.212
The history of City Net spans more than two decades. In 1989, Santa Monica created the first
municipally owned and operated Public Electronic Network (PEN) to improve access to government
services and help control operating costs for internal communications. The PEN provided email,
schedules of city events, and a discussion board. Within the first two weeks, 500 residents became
users; two years later, the PEN had 4,000 users.213
After the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Santa Monica hoped that competition in the
telecommunications field would reduce its data access costs. When discussions with internet service
providers did not yield offers for more affordable data services, Santa Monica set up a task force to
research the use of public assets for telecommunications, the coordination of city telecom systems, and
universal access to broadband. Santa Monica considered the needs of public safety agencies, parks,
libraries, the school district and the local college when developing its network.
By 2002, Santa Monica was paying more than $1.3M per year to maintain a patchwork of servers, data
centers, a few interconnecting networks, and leased voice and data lines.214
For two years, a
Telecommunications Working Group, comprised of nine prominent local citizens, worked with a
consulting firm and 15 city employees to investigate ways to control municipal communications costs.215
Their 1998 telecommunications master plan identified three options:
1. Do nothing and continue to rely upon existing providers.
2. Build a municipal fiber ring to connect city sites; lease to others where feasible.
210
Masha Zager, “Santa Monica City Net: How to Grow a Network,” Broadband Communities,
http://www.bbpmag.com/MuniPortal/EditorsChoice/0511editorschoice.php, accessed October 2013.
211
“Santa Monica City NetSM
,” City of Santa Monica Information Systems, http://www.smgov.net/departments/isd/smcitynet.aspx, accessed
October 2013.
212
Christopher Mitchell and Eric Lampland, “Santa Monica City Net: An Incremental Approach to Building a Fiber Optic Network,” Institute for
Local Self Reliance, March 5, 2014, http://ilsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/santa-monica-city-net-fiber-2014-2.pdf, accessed March 2014,
Executive Summary.
213
Mitchell and Lampland, “Santa Monica City Net ,” 2.
214
Ibid.
215
Mitchell and Lampland, “Santa Monica City Net,” 3.

52. 51
3. Build a full-service hybrid fiber-coaxial network to offer video, data, and voice to residents and
businesses.216
Interestingly, the Working Group recommended building an institutional fiber network.217
The likelihood
of increasing prices for telecommunications services made the “do nothing” option unattractive.
Likewise, the expected $35M price tag, 10-year timeframe to break even, and the challenge of
competing with incumbent ISPS made the full-service network unattractive.218
Therefore, the Working
Group recommended the “middle of the road” option.
The Telecommunications Master Plan predicted it would take 10 years to recoup the fiber network’s
$2M cost. The plan also recommended building the fiber network over three years and coupling
expansion with other capital projects to reduce costs by an estimated 30 to 55 percent or $30K to $100K
per mile. With conduit itself costing $2K to $9K per mile, it is clear that the main cost of fiber installation
is digging and repairing the streets.219
While Santa Monica fleshed out the details on its long-term goal of building its own fiber network, staff
also advanced an interim plan to reduce their costs and their dependency on ISPs in the near term.
When Santa Monica renewed the local cable operator’s franchise, it agreed to lease from that operator
an institutional fiber network that connected 43 municipally owned buildings, the school district, and a
local college. Santa Monica paid $530K in construction costs but shared operations and maintenance
costs with the school district and the college. Operation of a network itself rather than use of purchased
bandwidth from ISPs has reduced telecom costs dramatically.220
In the first year of the leased network’s
operation, Santa Monica’s telecom operating costs dropped from $1.3M to $700K, allowing the City to
recoup its investment in the first year.221
However, this network, which went live in 2002, could not serve the private sector. Therefore, in the
years since 2002, Santa Monica reinvested savings from the leased network to build its own 10 gbps
network on which it could serve non-municipal users.222
The Information Systems department mapped
key locations targeted for fiber installation and then installed the fiber in coordination with other capital
projects to save money on trenching costs.223
The incumbent cable operator provided reasonable residential service, and, with the city’s
encouragement, Verizon was completing its FiOS network in Santa Monica. However, the city’s business
community lacked affordable high-speed access; 100 mbps bandwidth cost $3,500 per month. In 2006,
the city began leasing dark fiber to businesses. Because the monthly fees for fiber access were relatively
low, businesses with more than 2000 employees gladly paid to build fiber connections from the
backbone to their buildings, thus extending the network at no cost to the city. The city owns the
216
Mitchell and Lampland, “Santa Monica City Net,” 4.
217
Zager, “Santa Monica City Net: How to Grow a Network.”
218
Christopher Mitchell and Eric Lampland, “Santa Monica City Net: An Incremental Approach to Building a Fiber Optic Network,” Institute for
Local Self Reliance, March 5, 2014, http://ilsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/santa-monica-city-net-fiber-2014-2.pdf, accessed March 2014,
4.
219
Mitchell and Lampland, “Santa Monica City Net,” 5,12.
220
Masha Zager, “Santa Monica City Net: How to Grow a Network,” Broadband Communities,
http://www.bbpmag.com/MuniPortal/EditorsChoice/0511editorschoice.php, accessed October 2013.
221
Mitchell and Lampland, “Santa Monica City Net,” 8.
222
Zager, “Santa Monica City Net: How to Grow a Network.”
223
Mitchell and Lampland, “Santa Monica City Net,” Executive Summary.

53. 52
extensions to the premises. Businesses recoup the installation fee via lower monthly telecom costs
within two to three years. This arrangement is unusual in the United States.224
However, the market did not serve small and medium businesses, nor could they afford to connect to
the public network. These businesses requested that Santa Monica provide internet connectivity at
speeds between 100 mbps to 1 gbps, which it decided to do in 2009. To reduce the cost of internet
access, Santa Monica leased a 15-mile fiber connection to a Los Angeles colocation center where
approximately 270 internet providers interconnect their networks. Leasing the line was a challenge.
Because internet providers knew the city planned to serve businesses, the providers viewed the
arrangement as a threat to their offerings in Santa Monica. Eventually, one company agreed to provide
the transport and Santa Monica began advertising its services to businesses. To make broadband more
affordable, enhance customer understanding of the products, and simplify product/service
administration, Santa Monica offered three download speeds and standard contract terms with no
service-level agreements. These “lit services” meet the needs of small and medium-sized organizations
that don’t have the staff and skillset to run their own networks using City Net dark fiber.225
Thanks to low internet connection costs and simple contracts, City Net business customers typically
obtain 10 times the broadband speed for about the same price they once paid for non-fiber services.
The cost of a 100 mbps connection dropped from $3,500 to $500 per month. City Net has had 100
percent customer retention. Competing ISPs have lowered their bandwidth prices by 20 percent.226
Although Santa Monica sells internet access directly to businesses, City Net is also open to ISPs. Initially,
the incumbents did not use Santa Monica’s network. Eventually, two ISPs opted to utilize it. City Net
uses $300K in annual revenue to pay for operations and maintenance and wifi hotspots throughout the
city. The City of Santa Monica uses $190K in remaining capital funds as a revolving capital improvement
project account. This account funds construction for network expansion, which customers repay as the
network is extended to their premises. The downside of requiring customers to pay for their
connections is that some potential customers cannot afford the fee. Because Santa Monica did not
receive a broadband stimulus to pay for network expansions, the policy of expanding the network based
on demand will remain for the future.227
After 16 years, City Net has built 90 percent of its planned network. All public entities are connected;
City Net now focuses on bringing service to one final commercial corridor.228
In addition, City Net
provides free wifi in 32 hot zones and along commercial corridors as an amenity for all residents and
visitors. Other public benefits of the network include the ability to synchronize 80 percent of traffic
signals, to deploy 500+ public safety video cameras, and to provide real-time parking information.229
As of 2014, City Net generates approximately $1.6M annually in revenue, more than enough to cover
the $1M in annual operations costs. Operating costs include wages and salaries for four employees.230
City Net’s future plans include providing broadband to several multiple-dwelling-unit buildings with
affordable housing, and potentially providing consulting and help desk functions to business.231
224
Zager, “Santa Monica City Net: How to Grow a Network.”
225
Ibid.
226
Ibid.
227
Ibid.
228
Mitchell and Lampland, “Santa Monica City Net,” 18.
229
Mitchell and Lampland, “Santa Monica City Net,” Executive Summary.
230
Mitchell and Lampland, “Santa Monica City Net,” 15.
231
Ibid., 18.

54. 53
Summary and Lessons Learned in Santa Monica
Santa Monica owns and operates a fiber network for government use and sells service to business
customers directly and through third-party providers, following a wholesale–retail hybrid model. Santa
Monica also offers free wireless in select public locations.
Santa Monica made many strategic decisions that contributed to the success of its fiber network. A
simplified timeline for the City Net project looks similar to this:
 Step 1: Lease fiber network for government use only.
 Step 2: Use monetary savings from Step 1 to build city-owned network.
 Step 3: Expand city-owned network to serve large businesses; provide free wifi in public spaces.
 Step 4: Expand city-owned network to small and medium businesses, and wifi to more public
spaces.
 Step 5: Expand network to serve low-income residents.
Santa Monica’s decision to serve the needs of city government first was crucial. Once Santa Monica had a
functional network for city needs, it then expanded to serve the business community.
A second example of Santa Monica’s incremental approach was the decision to lease a network first. Santa
Monica saved money compared to what it had paid for commercial broadband service. It used the
accumulated savings to defray the cost of building its own network. In fact, Santa Monica avoided the use
of debt financing entirely.232
A third example of Santa Monica’s incremental approach was the decision to serve large businesses first.
Because large businesses could recoup the cost of connecting their premises to the network quickly, Santa
Monica leveraged this ability to extend the network to more premises at lower cost to itself. It then could
use the revenue from monthly fees paid by large businesses to defray the costs of expanding broadband
access to small and medium businesses.
Santa Monica’s incremental approach allowed it to master how to serve one type of client before tackling
the next. Also instrumental was Santa Monica’s willingness to collaborate with other public-sector entities
and the business community to develop products to serve their needs.
City Net allows Santa Monica businesses to compete. Fairmont Hotel Santa Monica’s 100 mbps
broadband allows the hotel to position itself as suitable for technology conventions and media
production. Film directors shooting in Los Angeles can stay at the Fairmont, receive footage via internet
daily, review the footage, and forward approved sequences to studios and postproduction companies.
This is more efficient than the standard method of copying dailies to hard drives and sending the hard
drives by courier to studios and by leased private jet to postproduction facilities.233
The incremental approach and focus on customer needs allowed Santa Monica to save money and
generate revenue to support network expansion. It even created a revolving capital improvement account.
A comprehensive marketing campaign to entice small and medium businesses involved ads on buses,
collaborating with the Chamber of Commerce, real estate agents, and property management firms, and
Facebook and Twitter.234
Also, Santa Monica is unique in that it does not have a municipal power provider; therefore, its
Information Systems Department runs City Net.235
232
Mitchell and Lampland, “Santa Monica City Net.”
233
Zager, “Santa Monica City Net: How to Grow a Network.”
234
Ibid.

55. 54
Although it may not follow the exact same steps that Santa Monica did, New Orleans should consider
adapting its incremental approach when developing a strategy to expand broadband access.
The success of Santa Monica City Net inspired nearby communities of Burbank and Long Beach to launch
similar projects; the three cities are considering a regional network that would initially serve
collaborative IT projects by city government with later use by businesses possible.236
Contact Information
City of Santa Monica Information Systems: http://www.smgov.net/departments/isd/smcitynet.aspx
310-458-8411
Burbank, CA
Through its municipal utility, Burbank Water and Power, Burbank (2010 population 103,340), provides
broadband service directly to businesses. The service, branded as Optical Network Enterprise Burbank237
or ONEBurbank, uses Burbank Water and Power’s existing fiber ethernet infrastructure to offer several
features:
 point-to-point dark fiber connections for Burbank-based companies,
 dedicated internet access at speeds from 20 mbps to 1 Gbps with 24-hour monitoring,
 virtual private LAN services with 24-hour monitoring,
 wave Lambda services for bandwidth intensive or latency sensitive applications up to 10G
capacity with 24-hour monitoring, and
 communication transport services to offer multiple types of video service.238
ONEBurbank allows the utility to obtain revenue from under-utilized capacity on its Smart Grid
communications network.239
In 2012, ONE Burbank extended service to the Burbank Unified School
District; the 1 gbps connection represents a 700 percent increase in bandwidth for the school district.240
The network allows Burbank to attract and retain many media conglomerates as employers, including
ABC Television, Bravo, Cartoon Network, Clear Channel Communications, Nickelodeon, The Walt Disney
Company, Warner Bros. Entertainment, and Warner Music Group241
thereby cementing Burbank’s status
as media capital of the world.
In addition to retail broadband for business customers, Burbank was one of the first municipalities in the
Los Angeles area to offer a wireless hotspot network. The free network covers a 34-block area with
approximately 30K employees.242
Although the wireless network does not serve residential areas, it is
available to anyone in the downtown area, making it an amenity for residents and visitors.
235
Lisa Gonzalez,“Santa Monica City Net: An Incremental Approach to Building a Fiber Optic Network,” Institute for Local Self-Reliance, March 5,
2014, http://ilsr.org/santa-monica-city-net/, accessed March 2014.
236
Masha Zager, “Santa Monica City Net: How to Grow a Network,” Broadband Communities,
http://www.bbpmag.com/MuniPortal/EditorsChoice/0511editorschoice.php, accessed October 2013.
237
“Services,” Burbank Water and Power, http://www.burbankwaterandpower.com/one-burbank-new/one-services, accessed October 2013.
238
Ibid.
239
“About OneBurbank,” Burbank Water and Power, http://www.burbankwaterandpower.com/one-burbank-new/about-oneburbank, accessed
October 2013.
240
Ibid.
241
MRV, “Case Study: Burbank,” http://www.mrv.com/sites/default/files/case_studies/us_pdfs/mrv-cs-burbank.pdf, accessed January 2015, 1.
242
Cheris Carpenter, “Digital Dystopia: Overcoming Digital Deprivation in the United States,” 12.

56. 55
Summary and Lessons Learned in Burbank
Burbank owns and operates a fiber network for government use and sells service to business customers
directly, following a retail model. It also offers free wireless in select public locations.
For a city that wishes to ensure very fast broadband is available to all its residents, businesses, nonprofits,
and to government employees, the limited approach taken by Burbank may be good start to expanding
broadband access, but it is not the end goal.
Contact Information
Main phone: 818-238-3700
Long Beach, CA
Thanks to a collaboration between the city’s Economic Development Bureau, local companies, and
internet providers, Long Beach, CA (2012 population 467,892) has offered wireless internet to part of its
downtown since 2002. The network’s design allows users to roam the District without losing
connectivity because the antenna locations and access points prevent gaps and dead zones.243
The system incorporates a specialized web portal that automatically loads when a visitor first logs on.
The portal links to websites for Long Beach events, businesses, and organizations. The portal also
incorporates a real-time events calendar; merchants and organizations can list upcoming events, sales,
specials, entertainment, or other services. Merchants also may purchase impulse advertising.244
Based on the success of the downtown Hot Zone project, Long Beach opted to provide a wireless
network in the airport.245
Although the objective is to maximize the visitor experience by teaching them
about Long Beach, the network also benefits businesses by helping them reach customers.
Summary and Lessons Learned in Long Beach
Via a public–private partnership, Long Beach offers a downtown wireless network with free access to the
public. The network serves businesses, residents, and visitors. Because Long Beach does not leverage its
network for internal operations, it does not experience cost savings from its ownership of a wireless
network. One consideration from the experience of Long Beach and other communities that offer free
downtown wireless networks to others, while omitting internal government operations, is whether the
short-term cost savings from the more limited offering outweigh the loss in long-term cost savings from
not serving internal government operations.
Contact Information
Main phone: 562-570-6455
Santa Cruz, CA
Santa Cruz, CA (2011 population 60,049), under the auspices of the Santa Cruz Redevelopment Agency,
joined an initiative led by Joint Venture Silicon Valley (JVSV). The initiative proposed a 1,500-square mile
regional wireless broadband network from South San Francisco to Santa Cruz. 246
243
“City of Long Beach offers free wireless internet,” M-Travel, January 7, 2003, http://www.longbeachportals.com/press-clippings/m-
Travel2/m-Travel2-1-7-03.htm, accessed October 2013.
244
Ibid.
245
“About the Long Beach Airport Wireless Hotzone,” Long Beach Portals Hotzone, http://www.longbeachportals.com/wireless/airport/ap-
about_us.htm, accessed October 2013.

57. 56
In December of 2005, the Wireless Silicon Valley (WSV) task force, a subset of JVSV, hired Intel Solution
Services to develop common minimum requirements and draft a RFP for participating entities, which
included over 33 communities and counties and Stanford University Residential Leaseholders. Although
not formally involved in the project, University of California Santa Cruz Information Technology
representatives participated in WSV forums.247
During fiscal year 2007, JVSV received proposals and selected a vendor for the pilot project. The pilot
project involved a 1-square mile network launched in Palo Alto and San Carlos. Depending on the pilot
project’s success and the proposed funding model for future rollout, the City of Santa Cruz can evaluate
whether this wireless initiative is feasible.248
As of November 2013, there was insufficient information
available online to determine what, if anything, has happened since 2007.
Los Angeles, CA
Los Angeles (population 3.5M) has set a goal of bringing fiber to all of its residents and businesses. In
December 2013, the city planned to solicit a vendor to connect fiber to every residence, business, and
government entity “within the city limits of Los Angeles" according to Los Angeles Information
Technology Agency GM Steve Reneker. As of November 2013, plans called for the network to offer free
5 mbps service, paid access in tiers up to 1 gbps, and free wifi hotspots in public areas.249
The expected cost of the project is $3B to $5B. The winning bidder would not be required to offer
landline telephone or cable TV service, but seem likely to include the other two services so they can
offer more lucrative triple-play packages. The winning bidder would be required to sell wholesale access
to other internet service providers, who would then resell to the public. The winning bidder also should
be willing to donate home broadband equipment to nonprofits for distribution to needy residents.250
Los Angeles would favor companies that can offer cellular service and data center hosting, too, because
it has 24 distributed data centers that it would like to modernize and consolidate while boosting disaster
recovery and replication. Thus, the data center component alone would be lucrative.251
Summary and Lessons Learned in Los Angeles
Los Angeles is just beginning to pursue municipal broadband; therefore, it is too early to summarize
lessons learned.
Contact Information
Los Angeles Information Technology Agency
Steve Reneker, General Manager
Main phone: 213-978-3311
246
Santa Cruz Redevelopment Agency Annual Report: Fiscal Year 2007, 21.
247
Ibid..
248
Ibid.
249
Jon Brodkin, “Bigger than Google Fiber: LA plans citywide gigabit for homes and businesses,” Ars Technica, November 5, 2013,
http://arstechnica.com/business/2013/11/bigger-than-google-fiber-la-plans-citywide-gigabit-for-homes-and-businesses/, accessed November
2013.
250
Ibid.
251
Ibid.

58. 57
Chicago, IL
With 2.715M in 2013, Chicago also some of the world’s fastest internet access in its downtown, due to
the presence of commodities and futures exchanges. Technology firms locate in the River North area to
take advantage of downtown’s high-speed network. Chicago wants to expand broadband access via
many initiatives, including the conversion of industrial zones to technology zones wired with fiber, the
provision of free wifi in select public spaces citywide, and fiber build-out in underserved
neighborhoods.252
To foster affordable broadband access in seven commercial areas, termed Innovation Zones, Chicago
issued a Request for Information (RFI) in fall 2012 to collect input from companies and the public. Ideas
from 24 responses to the RFI were then used to develop a Request for Qualifications (RFQ) to invite
companies to demonstrate their technical, financial, and strategic capacity and interest in collaborating
with Chicago to offer affordable gigabit access in the Innovation Zones. Chicago would provide no- or
low-cost access to infrastructure such as city-owned fiber, public building rooftops, sewers, freight
tunnels, light poles, and more to decrease the cost of service provision and thereby enable its partner(s)
to sell the service to the public at an affordable price. The RFQ will result in the selection of a pool of
candidates that will be eligible to respond to a subsequent Request for Proposal (RFP).253
To facilitate fiber expansion to underserved neighborhoods, Chicago planned to collaborate with Gigabit
Squared, like Seattle. Gigabit Squared committed $5M to the project and the City of Chicago committed
to provide fiber and regulatory assistance.254
Other partners were the State of Illinois ($2M funding
committed), the University of Chicago ($1M funding committed), and community organizations (planned
$1M funding to be solicited by the University of Chicago).255
The project aimed to deploy Chicago’s excess fiber in a fiber-to-the-premises (FTTP) network and an
accompanying wireless network to serve nine Mid-south neighborhoods near the University of Chicago.
The project goal was to spur health care, education, and public safety advancements and encourage
business growth. Ultimately, the project hoped to serve 210K residents and 10K businesses.256
Gigabit Squared Chicago advertised the following service levels:
 Up to 20 mbps upload/download
 Up to 50 mbps upload/download
 Up to 100 mbps upload/download
 Up to 250 mbps upload/download
 Up to 500 mbps upload/download
 Up to 1 gbps upload/download
 Metro Ethernet Forum compliant enterprise services at speeds up to 1 gbps (100 gbps on an
individual case basis)
 Wireless service to complement the FTTP and enterprise networking services257
252
Kevin Fitchard, “Inspired by Google, Chicago pursues gigabit broadband,” September 24, 2012, Gigaom,
http://gigaom.com/2012/09/24/inspired-by-google-chicago-pursues-gigabit-broadband/, accessed October 2013.
253
City of Chicago, Press Release, February 9, 2013, accessed February 2014.
254
Gigabit Squared,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gigabit_Squared, accessed October 2013.
255
Fitchard, “Gigabit Squared plans fiber broadband for Chicago’s south side.”
256
Gigabit Chicago, http://gigabit-chicago.com/, accessed October 2013.
257
Ibid.

59. 58
To meet community development objectives, the project included data and job-training centers. The
data center would employ 30 full-time people. At 99th Street and Halsted Avenue, Gigabit Squared
planned to connect its fiber to the South Suburban Mayors and Managers Associations fiber network.258
To expedite deployment of high-speed service in areas that lack fiber, Gigabit Squared Chicago planned
to use secure, licensed radio spectrum to bridge service gaps. The partnership hoped to launch service
by December 2014 to neighborhoods based on the amount of interest from residents and businesses.259
As of May 2012, Gigabit Squared had raised $200M to support initial plans to collaborate with Gig U to
bring broadband to six college communities, including the area near University of Chicago. One goal was
to prove that providing affordable gigabit level broadband can be profitable.260
As of March 2014, the Gigabit Squared Chicago project was facing challenges. The State of Illinois was
seeking the return of $2M in grants awarded to the firm. The state claimed the company lied repeatedly
and misspent funds. In the meantime, South Side community groups, whose efforts to bring broadband
to their area pre-date the Gigabit Squared project, seem committed to launching planned pilot projects
in Woodlawn in spring 2014, regardless of the outcome of the larger undertaking.261
Summary and Lessons Learned in Chicago
Like Seattle, Chicago formed a public–private partnership with Gigabit Squared and a local university to
create a retail network to serve residential and business customers. As with Seattle, Chicago’s venture with
Gigabit Squared experienced major challenges. Although the venture with Gigabit Squared failed, it is too
early to judge the success of Chicago’s other efforts to expand broadband access.
Contact Information
info@gigabit-chicago.com
224-678-0325
Urbana–Champaign, IL
Urbana (2012 population 41,581) and Champaign (2012 population 82,517) led a nonprofit consortium
that used federal grant money and local matching funds to construct a fiber network, Urbana–Champaign
Big Broadband (UC2B). Initially, construction and service focused on low-income and low-adoption areas.
In May 2014, UC2B, which is both a fiber network and an internet service provider, announced that it will
work with Illinois-based ISP, iTV-3, to expand service to more residents, businesses, and institutions.262,263
Summary and Lessons Learned in Urbana–Champaign
Urbana–Champaign formed a nonprofit consortium to build a municipal fiber network serving residents
and businesses. Compared with other communities, unique aspects of the UB2B story include the
formation of a nonprofit consortium to build and operate the network and the decision to serve areas
where incomes are low and fewer people have access.
258
Sandra Guy, “The South Side Gets $150M Worth of Fiber Internet and Other Tech,” Chicago Grid, http://www.chicagogrid.com/news/south-
side-150m-worth-fiber-internet-tech/, accessed October 2013.
259
Gigabit Chicago, http://gigabit-chicago.com/, accessed October 2013.
260
Stacey Higginbottom, “Meet the startup that wants to speed up U.S. broadband,” Gigaom, May 23, 2012,
http://gigaom.com/2012/05/23/meet-the-startup-that-wants-to-speed-up-u-s-broadband/, accessed October 2013.
261
Sandra Guy, “State wants Gigabit Squared to return $2 million grant,” Chicago Sun-Times, March 27, 2014,
http://www.suntimes.com/26484032-420/state-wants-gigabit-squared-to-return-2-million-grant.html#.U1_hyFVdUZQ.
262
Denise Linn, “Small Cities Don’t Need Google Fiber to Get Gigabit Connectivity,” Next City, June 25, 2014,
http://nextcity.org/daily/entry/google-fiber-cities-available-high-speed-internet-municipal-options.
263
“About,” Urbana–Champaign Big Broadband Not For Profit, http://uc2b.net/about/, accessed July 11, 2014.

60. 59
With the planned partnership with iTV-3, UC2B will follow the path of other communities into a
partnership with the private sector.
Contact Information:
info@uc2b.net
217-366-8222
Pittsburgh, PA
Pittsburgh (population 306,211) has a few programs to improve internet access for low-income residents.
Funded through the Broadband Technology Opportunity Program, Pittsburgh CONNECTS (Creating an
Organized Neighborhood Network to Enhance Community Technology Services) provides free access to
laptops, printers, broadband, education, and training at public computer centers.264
The centers, which
are open seven days a week from 8 or 9 a.m. to 9 or 10 p.m., provides a casual environment where
registered Pittsburghers can become more comfortable using technology to access information on
employment, education, and health. Pittsburgh CONNECTS collaborates with community organizations
to develop job skills and locate employment opportunities.265
Since 2006, WiFi Downtown Pittsburgh, powered by US Wireless, has offered two hours of free wifi per
day for registered users. WiFi Downtown Pittsburgh can be accessed anytime outdoors in downtown
Pittsburgh. The WiFi 802.11b/g access may work in some downtown buildings, but isn't guaranteed to
work indoors.266
A map on the service’s website shows wifi access points and advertisements for local
business and cultural attractions. The network’s homepage also links to the City of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh
Downtown Partnership, and Visit Pittsburgh websites.267
Summary and Lessons Learned in Pittsburgh
Like Long Beach, Pittsburgh provides a free wireless network for public use downtown. The network is
useful for businesses, residents, and visitors. However, because the city does not leverage its network for
internal operations, it does not realize cost savings from the wireless network.
As discussed in the section on Long Beach, communities that offer free downtown wireless to others while
not serving internal government operations risk relinquishing long-term cost savings.
Contact Information
http://www.wifipittsburgh.com/
412-661-6001
264
Amy Crawford, “Pittsburgh CONNECTS: Public Computer Centers Offer Broadband Technology to Low-Income Communities,” To the Point,
October 26, 2011, http://old.gfem.org/node/8733, accessed October 2013.
265
Ibid.
266
“WiFi Downtown Pittsburgh – Free Wireless Access,” About.com, http://pittsburgh.about.com/od/downtown/a/free_wifi.htm, accessed
October 2013.
267
Downtown Pittsburgh Wifi, http://www.wifipittsburgh.com/, accessed October 2013.

61. 60
Maryland
The One Maryland Broadband Network (OMBN) will install 1,294 miles of new fiber and leverage more
than 2,400 miles of existing fiber to create a network to link 1,006 government facilities and community
institutions in every county in the state, while connecting and extending three independent networks:268
 networkMaryland, the statewide high-speed network operated by Maryland’s Department of
Information Technology (DoIT) for public sector use;269
 the Inter-County Broadband Network (ICBN), a consortium of nine central Maryland counties
and cities that collaborate to provide high-speed internet access to community institutions,
businesses, residents, and ISPs by providing middle-mile capacity in their service area;270
and
 the Maryland Broadband Cooperative (MDBC), a member-owned and operated, nonprofit carrier
focused on providing last-mile fiber to rural consumers by leasing fiber and offering co-location
services, with funding from the Maryland Rural Broadband Coordination Board.271
OMBN involves building approximately 650 miles of new fiber in rural areas. Project funding includes
$115,240,581 in federal Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP) grant funding awarded in
September 2010 and $43 M in cash and in-kind contributions from the state and participating local
jurisdictions. OMBN will allow local internet service providers to utilize its open network.272
Summary and Lessons Learned in Maryland
Maryland is expanding and connecting publicly owned and operated networks to serve residents,
businesses, government, and institutions. OMBN will utilize a wholesale model whereby ISPs will use its
network to serve retail customers. It is unclear whether OMBN also will offer service directly to customers.
Because the project is in the initial phases, it is too early to review successes and failures.
Contact Information
Maryland Department of Information Technology: 877-634-6361
Ann Arbor, MI
Ann Arbor (2010 population 113,934) provides free wifi in some of its parks,273
and an online listing of
free wifi locations.274
Because it was not chosen for a Google Community Fiber network, Ann Arbor
decided to pursue a gigabit broadband network in with the University of Michigan.275
However, very
little information on this joint venture was available online as of October 2013.
268
“Maryland Department of Information Technology: One Maryland Broadband Network (OMBN), BroadbandUSA, National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, http://www2.ntia.doc.gov/grantee/maryland-department-of-information-technology,
accessed October 2013.
269
“networkMaryland™, Department of Information Technology, Maryland.gov,
http://doit.maryland.gov/support/Pages/networkMaryland.aspx, accessed October 2013.
270
The One Maryland: Inter-County Broadband Network (ICBN), http://www.mdbroadband.com/, accessed October 2013.
271
MDBC website: http://mdbc.us/ (accessed October 2013).
272
“Maryland Department of Information Technology: One Maryland Broadband Network (OMBN), BroadbandUSA, National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, http://www2.ntia.doc.gov/grantee/maryland-department-of-information-technology,
accessed October 2013.
273
City of Ann Arbor, Parks and Recreation Guide 2014, http://www.a2gov.org/departments/Parks-
Recreation/Documents/2014_spring_summer_2014_parksguide_WEB.pdf#search=wifi, accessed January 2015.
274
“Ann Arbor Dextor WiFi Internet Locations,” a2 WiFi, http://a2wifi.com/, accessed October 2013.
275
“U-M and city of Ann Arbor team up to pursue gigabit broadband networks,” Concentrate, August 17, 2011,
http://www.concentratemedia.com/devnews/gig.u0161.aspx, accessed October 2013.

62. 61
Washington, DC
The DC Community Access Network (DC-CAN) provides affordable fiber to 250+ health, education, public
safety, and community anchor institutions in Washington DC (2012 population 632,323). DC-CAN is also
an open access, middle-mile network that internet service providers can use to serve residents and
businesses citywide.276
DC-CAN is an extension of DC-NET, the fiber network used by the District of Columbia’s public safety
agencies. To build DC-NET, the District installed fiber downtown in Verizon’s underground conduit and
overlashed fiber onto Comcast’s aerial network outside the city core. The District of Columbia took
advantage of obscure laws and the telecoms’ past business decisions to force the unwilling telcos to
provide access to their infrastructure for DC-NET.277
To gain access to Verizon’s network, the city took advantage of a 1902 federal statute requiring
companies with conduit under city streets to furnish space in those conduits for fire alarm or police
patrol wires or cables. Between the 1890s and 1970s, the District used this underground space for
thousands of miles of wire for police and fire call boxes and a private phone network and exercised
control over those wires.278
Therefore, existing law, decades of conduit-sharing by Verizon and the
District, and DC-NET’s public safety purpose convinced the court to force Verizon to let the District
government install fiber in Verizon’s conduit.
The District used Comcast’s failure to provide it with an institutional network (as promised since the
1980s in franchise agreements) to force Comcast to allow its poles to be used for DC-NET. In both
instances, the District agreed not to sell or lease fiber directly to homes and businesses.279
The DC-NET network possesses many advantages. To ensure it can fulfill its public safety purpose, the
network avoids creating single points of failure with the inclusion of several redundant fiber rings,
redundant power backups at each site, and the ability to detect the precise location of line breaks or
other failures. In addition, DC-NET is its own “middle mile,” bypassing Comcast and Verizon to connect
to the internet backbone directly via Level 3.280
In 2010, the District of Columbia received a $17.5M federal grant to expand its existing 293-mile DC-NET
fiber network. The District added over 170 miles of new fiber with speeds up to 10 gbps, to create DC-
CAN. The project was a collaboration involving six city government agencies, the public library, the
charter school board and several charter schools, a few higher education institutions, and several
private telecommunications firms.281
With the construction of DC-CAN, the District of Columbia
expanded beyond government to add institutions to its client list.
Since 2010, the District of Columbia has worked to bring DC-CAN to more people. Unfortunately, Verizon
and Comcast extracted agreements from the District government not to sell service directly to
businesses and residents at the time of DC-NET’s construction years ago. Because the goal was
completing a government-only, public safety network, the decision probably seemed harmless at that
time. However, that decision now makes it very difficult for DC-NET to transform itself from an
institutional network into a municipal network.
276
DC-CAN, http://dc.gov/DC/DCNET/DC-CAN, accessed October 2013.
277
Susan Crawford, John Connolly, Melissa Nally, and Travis West, “Community Fiber in Washington, D.C., Seattle, and San Francisco,” Research
Publication No. 2014-9, The Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University, May 27, 2014, 3,6.
278
Ibid, 6.
279
Ibid, 5.
280
Ibid, 7.
281
Project Fact Sheet: http://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/broadbandgrants/applications/factsheets/5116FS.pdf (accessed October 2013).

63. 62
Although DC-CAN serves institutions directly, it cannot serve businesses and residents directly. Instead,
DC-CAN has to work with ISPs to serve residents indirectly via a wholesale model.282
As a community network focused on underserved communities, DC-CAN already serves five lower-
income and moderate-income wards. As of October 2013, the three remaining higher-income wards
were slated for buildout.283
Internet service providers that cover traditionally underserved Wards 5, 7,
and 8 get discounts to encourage them to serve these areas.284
Businesses and nonprofits located in the
District with federal tax identification can qualify as last-mile providers.
However, the multiple levels of redundancy that make DC-NET a great network also increased
construction costs. Because DC-NET and DC-CAN must break even, network operators must price service
accordingly. Therefore, DC-CAN offers much faster and slightly more expensive broadband than DC’s
private ISPs—Verizon, Comcast, and RCN. DC-CAN’s service attracts many of the District’s larger
institutions, like hospitals, which require the high-level security inherent in DC-NET/DC-CAN. However,
many smaller nonprofits cannot afford to pay for the service, which exceeds their bandwidth needs and
budgets by a large margin. Consequently, subscription for smaller institutions lags. As of May 2014, DC-
CAN was exploring ways to alter their service to lower prices to a level affordable for smaller
institutions. One idea is to offer a shared-bandwidth, asymmetrical broadband option akin to that
typically purchased by residents and small businesses.285
Summary and Lessons Learned in Washington, DC
Washington, DC has a municipally owned and operated network that serves government and institutions
via a retail model. Unfortunately, prior agreements with incumbent telecoms not to serve residents and
businesses directly force the District to use a wholesale model for those customers.
One positive aspect of DC-CAN is the focus on bringing broadband to lower-income people as shown by
the fact that construction began in low-income areas, and the inclusion of incentives for ISPs to offer
service in low-income areas.
The experiences of Washington, DC highlight the importance for municipalities to establish clear goals and
develop a viable plan to achieve those goals early in the broadband planning process. Because the District
did not anticipate serving residents and businesses in the future, it agreed not to directly serve residents
and businesses to gain access to the telecoms’ infrastructure. Now it must deal with the repercussions of
this ill-advised concession, and use a wholesale model to provide service to residents and businesses
because the retail model is forbidden.
Besides a need for better initial planning at the outset of efforts to improve broadband access, Washington
DC’s experience highlights the considerable benefits a municipality could gain by owning the conduit or, at
a minimum, being a savvier negotiator. If Washington, DC had owned conduit and utility poles, it would
not have needed to use infrastructure owned by the telecoms. If Washington, DC had been better at
negotiation, it may have been able to avoid agreeing to such blatantly unfavorable terms.
The requirement to use the wholesale model to serve residents and businesses, along with the break-even
requirement, force DC-CAN to charge unaffordable prices. While it is laudable that DC-CAN showed a
desire to serve low-income people by beginning construction in low-income areas (which is unusual) and
creating incentives for ISPs to serve low-income areas, it was the District’s short-sighted prior decisions
that made these special actions necessary.
282
Crawford, et al., “Community Fiber in Washington, D.C., Seattle, and San Francisco,” 3–8.
283
DC-CAN, http://dc.gov/DC/DCNET/DC-CAN, accessed October 2013.
284
“Last Mile Providers,” DC-NET Citywide Communications Network,DC.gov, http://dcnet.dc.gov/page/last-mile-providers, accessed October
2013.
Crawford, et al., “Community Fiber in Washington, D.C., Seattle, and San Francisco,” 11–12.

64. 63
Because the District cannot directly serve residents and businesses, it cannot subsidize service for lower-
income people. Instead, the District must try to incentivize ISPs to serve the its most vulnerable people.
It appears that the District began construction without knowing the financial feasibility of serving low-
income areas first (with their lower number of subscribers). It may have been more prudent for DC-CAN to
serve wealthier areas first, to generate revenue, and then expand to lower-income areas. Washington DC’s
experience also shows the importance of understanding the financial side of network operations.
Additionally, it would be interesting to know if ISPs receiving discounts shared the savings with lower-
income residents.
Contact Information
DC-CAN: dccan@dc.gov
Wilmington, NC
In January 2012, as part of its “Smart City” initiative, Wilmington, NC (2012 population 109,922)
launched its TV white space (TVWS) network in partnership with database operator, Spectrum Bridge.
The TVWS provides broadband access for government operations like monitoring traffic cameras,
wetlands, and public spaces in the interest of citizen and property security. The network also provides
public access in parks and serves other communities in New Hanover County.286
Spectrum Bridge employs a proprietary database-driven spectrum and bandwidth allocation technology
to access available TV white spaces, and to manage the network by dynamically assigning non-
interfering frequencies to white-space devices.287
The presence of wetlands and dense foliage increased the complexity and cost of extending the network
into some residential areas.288
As of 2013, Wilmington and New Hanover County were using the network
as planned. As part of the project, Wilmington helped develop new white-space devices that started to
reach the market in August 2013.289
Summary and Lessons Learned in Wilmington
Wilmington uses its publicly owned network primarily for government operations, and provides limited
free access in a few public places. Depending on the outcome of the Smart City project, Wilmington can
decide if it wants to serve business and/or residential customers.
One idea from Wilmington that New Orleans may want to consider is the possibility of offering to test
devices or technology to attract broadband investment from some of the private organizations devoted to
expanding broadband access. New Orleans also may want to speak with Wilmington about how the TVWS
performs in wetland areas with dense foliage, because New Orleans has similar terrain in parts of the city.
Contact Information
Port City Wifi: http://www.wilmingtonnc.gov/information_technology/port_city_wifi
910.341.7800 or 910.341.7843
286
Amar Toor, “North Carolina launches FCC-approved TV White Space network in Wilmington” engadget, January 30, 2012,
http://www.engadget.com/2012/01/30/north-carolina-launches-fcc-approved-tv-white-space-network-in-w/, accessed October 2013.
287
“TV White Spaces Powering Smart City Services — The First Database Driven TV White Spaces “Smart City,” Spectrum Bridge,
http://www.spectrumbridge.com/ProductsServices/WhiteSpacesSolutions/success-stories/wilmington.aspx, accessed October 2013.
288
Ibid.
289
“Wilmington, NC helps pioneer ‘white space’ network products,” Government Technology, http://www.govtech.com/health/Whatever-
Happened-To--White-Space-Network-Products-LAs-Gmail-Contract-Fingerprint-ID-Program.html, accessed October 2013.

65. 64
Claudville, VA
In 2009, Claudville (population 916) launched the US’ first TV white-space network. The community
obtained an “experimental license” from the FCC, network infrastructure from Spectrum Bridge, and
equipment that Dell, Microsoft, and the TDF Foundation contributed to the local school and computer
center. The network gives the community options besides dial-up and satellite internet.290
The broadband network has had a significant impact on Claudville. According to Jerry Whitlow,
Administrator of the Trinity School in Claudville, teachers are incorporating distance learning into the
curriculum. The business area is also benefiting as residents who travel downtown to use wifi
capabilities will also stay and patronize local businesses.291
Summary and Lessons Learned in Claudville
Aside from the information just summarized, there is little information about Claudville’s TV white-space
network. It is not possible to determine whom the network serves or whether it offers service using a
wholesale or retail model.
Contact Information
Spectrum Bridge: 407-792-1570
Twin Cities, MN
The Twin Cities region has advanced many projects to improve broadband access. The Broadband Access
Project (BAP) is a $3.6M initiative of the University of Minnesota's Urban Research and Outreach-
Engagement Center (UROC) to improve broadband access, awareness, and use in four federally
designated poverty zones in Minneapolis (2012 population 392,880) and St. Paul (2012 population
290,770). The project supports two new computer centers and enhancements to nine existing computer
centers for underserved populations. The BAP also would create 24 apprentice jobs.292
The City of Minneapolis collaborated with a local, private firm, US Internet, to develop the privately
owned Wireless Minneapolis wifi network to serve government, businesses, and residents in the city.
Beginning in 2004, government technology experts began working with representatives from business,
education, nonprofits, and the community to develop a plan to improve wireless options. Minneapolis’s
leadership determined that a public–private partnership was the most cost-effective approach. More
than 90 vendors expressed interest; 20 vendors registered as prime contractors. Nine vendors
submitted proposals.293
Minneapolis’s government became the network “anchor tenant” at $1.25M per year for 10 years, giving
the provider incentive to develop a good network.294
The network was completed in 2009; it covers all
59 square miles of the city.295
Residents and businesses also can get service on the network. US Internet
290
Donald Melanson, “First ‘white space’ network hits Claudville, Virginia,” engadget, October 21, 2009,
http://www.engadget.com/2009/10/21/first-white-space-network-hits-claudville-virginia/, accessed October 2013.
291
“Improving Access to High Speed Broadband,” Spectrum Bridge,
http://www.spectrumbridge.com/ProductsServices/WhiteSpacesSolutions/success-stories/claudville.aspx, accessed November 2013.
292
“Broadband Access Project,” University of Minnesota Urban Research and Outreach Engagement Center,
http://www.uroc.umn.edu/programs/bap.html, accessed November 2013.
293
“Wireless Minneapolis History,” USI Wireless, http://www.usiwireless.com/service/minneapolis/history.htm, accessed November 2013.
294
Craig Aaron, “The Promise of Municipal Broadband,” The Progressive, August 2008, http://www.progressive.org/mag/aaron0808.html,
accessed November 2013.
295
“Wireless Minneapolis History,” USI Wireless.

66. 65
agreed to provide the following community benefits to Minneapolis and its residents to help bridge the
digital divide:
 $500K to create a “digital inclusion fund” to promote affordable internet access, low-cost
hardware, local content and training and at least 5 percent of the network's net profits for
ongoing digital inclusion efforts. In total, it is expected that US Internet will contribute about
$11M will to the digital inclusion fund over the 10-year contract term.
 Free limited time service in some parks and plazas.
 Free “walled garden” level of wireless service to provide neighborhood, government, and
community services information throughout the city.296
Summary and Lessons Learned in the Twin Cities
Like Fort Wayne, Minneapolis collaborated with a private firm to develop its network. Like Fort Wayne, the
City of Minneapolis will not own its network, which is one drawback to the public-private partnership
model if the private partner insists on owning the network or the public-sector entity does not have
enough money to structure the deal so that the community owns the network.
Minneapolis’ decision to work with a small, local firm rather than a multinational ISP like Verizon, may
have given it more negotiating power than Fort Wayne had, however. For example, US Internet agreed to
provide the community with benefits to help address digital divide issues.
Cities that lease their network from a private owner may be able to mitigate some of the risk of not
owning their network by including an option to purchase the network later in the contract.
Contact Information
US Internet General Information: info@usiwireless.com or 952-253-3262
US Internet Technical Support: support@usiwireless.com or 952.253.3262 (Option 2)
City of Minneapolis Information Technology: 612-673-3190
Calgary, Alberta, CAN
In Calgary (2013 population 1,149,552), a public–private corporation, Calgary Technologies, Inc. (CTI) is
leading the effort to expand broadband access. CTI is a nonprofit agency focused on developing
Calgary’s advanced technology sector. Established in 1981 as a partnership between the City of Calgary,
the Calgary Chamber of Commerce, and the University of Calgary, CTI supports technology incubation
and commercialization, including networking opportunities, to help the technology sector grow.297
Its projects include:
 Calgary INFOPORT: a portal connecting more than 16,000 technology businesses to each other;
 Calgary Innovation Center: a full service organization offering technology transfer and business
incubator services to “advanced technology” researchers, entrepreneurs and businesses; and
 Alastair Ross Technology Center incubator: a center that offers meeting rooms, office and A/V
equipment, secure wireless hotspots, and internet terminals for use by entrepreneurs.298
296
Ibid.
297
“Innovation Alberta,” Calgary Technologies Inc., http://www.innovationalberta.com/theme_cti.php, accessed November 2013.
298
“Intelligent Community of the Year,” Intelligent Community Forum,
https://www.intelligentcommunity.org/index.php?src=gendocs&ref=ICF_Awards&category=Events&link=ICF_Awards, accessed November
2013.

67. 66
Summary and Lessons Learned in Calgary
Calgary followed a public–private partnership model to promote the advanced technology sector. As part
of that mission, the PPP addresses broadband issues, although that it not its only focus.
Contact Information
Main phone: 403-284-6400
Olds, Alberta, CAN
Elsewhere in Alberta, the nonprofit economic development corporation in the Town of Olds (population
8,500) built a fiber network. The community-owned ISP, dubbed O-Net, offers 1 gbps service. The
economic development corporation, the Olds Institute for Community and Regional Development, is a
10-year old partnership between the Town of Olds, Olds College, the Olds and District Chamber of
Commerce, and the Olds Agricultural Society.299
O-Net serves existing businesses and residents; it also helps attract technology businesses. O-Net
charges customers $57 to $90 per month; it offers internet, phone, and video services. People without
computers can access the internet at a specially built facility at the library. O-Net connects to the
intercommunity Alberta Supernet. Funding for the project came from the town and the province.300
Olds faced many challenges in its pursuit of high-speed broadband. When Olds invited large commercial
providers to offer services on the network, the ISPs refused to provide service on a network not installed
by them. Therefore, Olds decided to offer services itself. Service began in July 2012.301
As of July 2013, 60 percent of premises were connected. Upon completion in 2014, all residents and
businesses will be able to subscribe to O-Net or buy lower speed telecomm services from other firms.302
Summary and Lessons Learned in Olds
Olds became a retail broadband provider offering service to residents and businesses when its efforts to
create a public–private partnership in which private firms would offer service on the community owned
network failed.
Contact Information
Main phone: 403-556-6981
General Email: admin@olds.ca
CAO Email: legislative@olds.ca
Alberta Supernet, Alberta, CAN
The Alberta Supernet is a high-speed 13,000 km (8,000 mile) fiber network connecting more than 4,700
government facilities, including government and municipal offices, hospitals, schools, libraries, and
provincial courts. The network serves approximately 3.5M people across the province.303
299
Emily Chung, “Small Alberta town gets massive 1,000 Mbps broadband boost,” CBC News, July 18, 2013,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/small-alberta-town-gets-massive-1-000-mbps-broadband-boost-1.1382428, accessed November 2013.
300
Ibid.
301
Ibid.
302
Ibid.
303
“Alberta Supernet,” Service Alberta, http://www.servicealberta.ca/AlbertaSuperNet.cfm, accessed November 2013.

68. 67
Points of Presences (PoPs) in 429 communities (27 urban and 402 rural)304
allow ISPs to bring high-speed
service to remote areas. The network also includes about 2,000 km (1,240 miles) of wireless
connections.305
This network offers speeds ranging from 256 kbps to 800 mbps.306
The province followed the wholesale model. It contracted with Axia, a multinational firm with networks
in France, Singapore, Spain, and Massachusetts, to operate the network. In Alberta, Axia offers two
bandwidth categories, one for public sector customers and another for ISPs and business customers.307
Summary and Lessons Learned in Alberta
The Canadian province of Alberta built a fiber network; it offers service via a wholesale model. Its private-
sector partner resells broadband to public-sector and business customers as well as ISPs. Those ISPs then
serve retail customers.
Contact Information
Email: AlbertaSuperNetConsult@gov.ab.ca
Amsterdam, Netherlands
The Amsterdam Metropolitan Area plans to connect every business and household to fiber by 2015.308
In
this city of 779,808 (as of 2011), officials began planning for broadband in 2001. When they asked
incumbent telephone and cable providers about plans to deploy fiber, the telephone incumbent, KPN,
was interested, but cable providers were not. In 2004, Amsterdam municipality created a public-private
partnership (PPP) to invest in passive fiber infrastructure. In 2006, Glasvezelnet Amsterdam (GNA),
began developing a fiber-to-the-premises network, called Citynet.309
Original GNA investors were the City of Amsterdam (one-third share); private investors, ING Real Estate
and Reggefiber (one-third combined share); and five housing corporations (one-third combined share).
Some observers said that municipal involvement constituted “state aid,” which is limited by the
European Commission. A Commission review concluded that Amsterdam’s terms of participation were
those of a market investor; therefore, state aid was not involved.310
As of 2009, GNA had installed fiber connections to around 43K homes. In 2009, a KPN–Reggefiber joint
venture acquired a majority stake in GNA’s network. At that time, Reggefiber agreed to increase its
stake in GNA from 33 to 70 percent, by buying shares from the City of Amsterdam and the housing
corporations and to manage network rollout.311
As of 2011, Amsterdam’s government retained a minor
investment in the network.312
304
Ibid.
305
“What is the Alberta SuperNet?” The Alberta SuperNet,
http://www.thealbertasupernet.com/what_is_the_supernet/what_is_the_supernet.html, accessed November 2013.
306
“Alberta Supernet,” Service Alberta.
307
“What is the Alberta SuperNet?” The Alberta SuperNet.
308
Telecity Group, Telecities: Helping You to Connect to: Amsterdam, 7. http://www.telecitygroup.com/telecities/telecities-amsterdam.pdf
Accessed January 2015.
309
“Amsterdam Citynet FTTH Case Study,” Fibre to the Home Council Europe, August 2010,
http://www.ftthcouncil.eu/documents/CaseStudies/AMSTERDAM_CITYNET.pdf, accessed November 2013.
310
CityNet, http://www.citynet.nl/, accessed November 2013.
311
“KPN-Reggefiber acquire majority interest in Amsterdam FTTH network,” TeleGeography, February 5, 2009,
http://www.telegeography.com/products/commsupdate/articles/2009/02/05/kpn-reggefiber-acquire-majority-interest-in-amsterdam-ftth-
network/, accessed November 2013.
312
Rick Karr, “Why is European broadband faster and cheaper? Blame the government,” engadget, June 28, 2011
http://www.engadget.com/2011/06/28/why-is-european-broadband-faster-and-cheaper-blame-the-governme/, accessed November 2013.

69. 68
The fiber network’s first wholesale operator, BBned,313
provided open, non-discriminatory access to
retail operators, which offered video, internet, and telephone services.314
Since 2010, the network has
had multiple wholesale operators.315
Approximately, five years passed from the initial idea to laying the first fiber, as the project had to
overcome several challenges. First, it was difficult to bring fiber to each unit in multi-unit buildings
because fiber must run from the basement to upper stories. Second, bringing together the right partners
under the right conditions was a challenge. Third, the project faced legal hurdles. For example, cable
operator, UPC, challenged Citynet twice in court, and it took three years to get regulatory approval from
the European Commission.316
In addition to Citynet, the region hosts the Amsterdam Internet Exchange (AMS-IX), the world’s largest
data transport hub. ISPs, mobile operators, web hosts, content and VoIP providers, and application
specialists have located or expanded operations in the region due to the presence of AMS-IX.317
The presence of high-speed broadband allows people in the Amsterdam Metropolitan Area and
throughout the Netherlands to expand their consumption of digital products. For example, in 2010, 28%
of the Dutch owned a second mobile phone; 43% of landline telephones used a digital connection; and
55% of cable users subscribed to digital television.318
Summary and Lessons Learned in Amsterdam
Amsterdam followed the public–private partnership model to build and operate a fiber network. The
original investors were a combination of public sector (the City of Amsterdam and the housing
corporations) and private-sector entities (ING Real Estate and Reggefiber). The partnership model carried
over into network operations with GNA contracting with private-sector wholesale operators to provide
service to residents and businesses.
Contact Information
Dirk van der Woude, Program Manager FTTH and Broadband Services: dirk.vdwoude@citynet.nl
General email: info@citynet.nl
Seoul, South Korea
Seoul (2012 estimated population 10,442,426) has the world’s fastest average broadband speeds, 100 to 300
mbps.319
Three major internet service providers, KT Corporation (formerly Korea Telecom), SKBroadband,
and LGU+, provide broadband to the city.320
Mobile applications developed by the Seoul Metropolitan
Subway provide information like next bus arrival time, the location of nearby restaurants and traffic
congestion, and air and water quality data.321
313
“Amsterdam Citynet, FTTH Case Study.”
314
CityNet, http://www.citynet.nl/, accessed November 2013.
315
“Amsterdam Citynet, FTTH Case Study.”
316
Ibid.
317
“Investing in digital infrastructure,” I amsterdam, http://www.iamsterdam.com/en-GB/business/setting-up-your-business/Why-
Amsterdam/Access-to-new-markets/AMS-IX, accessed November 2013.
318
“The Netherlands is Global Number One in Broadband,” Netherlands Foreign Investment Agency, http://www.nfia.nl/nl_news/270/The-
Netherlands-Is-Global-Number-One-in-Broadband.html, accessed November 2013.
319
Darrell N. West, “Technology Lessons from Seoul, South Korea,” Brookings, September 8, 2010,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/09/08-technology-west, accessed October 2013.
320
“Internet in South Korea,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_in_South_Korea, accessed October 2013.
321
West, “Technology Lessons from Seoul, South Korea.”

70. 69
Seoul takes advantage of fast broadband to solicit ideas for improving government from residents, often
drawing more than 100,000 responses. To facilitate transparency, Seoul also places government
contract information online and lets citizens register for text alerts on contracting opportunities.322
Seoul has faster, cheaper broadband than American cities, for a variety of reasons as outlined below.
 More competition: in the US, most people only have a choice between a cable provider and a
telephone provider when selecting internet. Increasing the number of options likely would
increase competition and drive improvements in quality and decreases in price.323
 Political culture: the South Korean government encouraged broadband adoption by subsidizing
the price of connection for low-income and traditionally unconnected people to create demand
for broadband. One program gave housewives connections and taught them to use broadband
in their daily lives. Because the FCC has less regulatory power than counterparts in other
countries, it will be hard for the federal government to whet demand here.324
 Open versus closed networks: Open networks require broadband providers to share their
infrastructure with other telecoms for a fee. South Korea, Japan, and several European nations
require infrastructure sharing. Companies oppose these regulations and the US government
does not require sharing.325
Given the American political context, it will be difficult to require
sharing, but governments may devise ways to encourage sharing of infrastructure.
 Population density: South Korea averages 1,200 people per square mile, compared with 88
people per square mile in the US. In both countries, copper wires often carry broadband signals
from fiber cables to the home. Data traveling on copper wire slows with greater distance. The
short distances between nodes and homes in South Korea allow high speeds on fiber-to-the-
node networks; achieving the same speed in the US requires more expensive fiber-to-the-
premises networks. Therefore, high-speed networks in South Korea require less fiber, resulting
in cost savings.326
In addition to decreasing overall fiber costs, South Korea’s population density
allows telecoms to spread these infrastructure costs across more subscribers per mile.
 Creating and following a plan: In the 1990s, South Korea’s government decided to become a
highly connected country with high digital literacy. South Korea did not leave its goals to the
whims of the private sector.327
To that end, the national government invested $9.2B in subsidies
and other direct support between 1999 and 2003.328
Summary and Lessons Learned in Seoul
Seoul (and South Korea in general) has achieved enviable broadband speeds and adoption rates without
government entities becoming broadband providers. The private sector provides broadband.
Although government in South Korea does not provide broadband directly, government there is very
active in creating and shaping the market for broadband service. Open network requirements spur
competition, which encourages the ISPs to increase speed and reduce costs. Likewise, government
programs to subsidize broadband for people who are not likely adopters, and to educate them on how to
use broadband, can help create demand for broadband.
322
Ibid.
323
John D. Sutter, “Why Internet connections are fastest in South Korea,” CNN Online, March 31, 2010,
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/03/31/broadband.south.korea/index.html, accessed October 201).
324
Ibid.
325
Ibid.
326
Ibid.
327
Ibid.
328
Anthony E. Varona, “Toward a Broadband Public Interest Standard,” American University Washington College of Law, 2009, 90.

71. 70
Tokyo, Japan
In Tokyo and throughout the rest of Japan, the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) network carries
Hikari-Fiber. The Japanese government subsidized 33 percent of the cost of building fiber to the curb
throughout Japan; in addition, the government provided tax incentives and loans to induce carriers to
deploy to difficult to reach locations.329
Multiple internet service providers offer the service to retail
customers.330
In 2013, Sony-owned internet service provider, So-net, began offering 2 gbps download / 1 gbps upload
broadband plans to residents in Tokyo and six surrounding districts for about $51 per month. This price
includes the rental of networking hardware that can accept the high speeds. The service, named
Nuro,331
requires an initial installation fee of around $537 and a two-year contract. So-net believes that
these high data speeds make it the world's fastest for-commercial internet.332
Summary and Lessons Learned in Tokyo
In Tokyo, the private sector provides broadband service thereby demonstrating its ability to provide high-
quality internet. As with Seoul, government helped create and shape the market for broadband service.
Government paid for one-third of network construction costs and provided financial incentives to entice
ISPs to extend the network to difficult to connect locations.
Like Seoul, Tokyo provides a strong example of government helping the private sector to provide very fast
broadband service to the public at affordable prices. This is a marked contrast to the United States where
the private sector rarely provides high-speed service (and then only at high prices) in favor of providing
low-speed service at high prices. In the United States, networks that provide affordable, high-speed service
are typically publicly owned and operated.
Contact Information:
Contact information in English was unavailable as of November 2013.
Singapore
As of December 2011, Singapore (2012 population 5.312M), had a residential wired broadband
household penetration rate of 104%. Several major internet service providers serve Singapore.333
Many
ISPs offer service via a fiber network owned by OpenNet, a partnership of four telecom and media
companies in Singapore.334
SingTel owns the nation’s other fiber network.335
Singapore has been a telecommunications innovator for a long time. In 1987, the Telecom Authority of
Singapore and the UK’s GEC-Marconi launched Teleview, an interactive service for sharing information,
including photographic images via special terminals. Internet access via Teleview evolved into internet
service via personal computers. By 1998, SingaporeONE had connected the island to high-speed
329
Ibid.
330
“Internet Services in Tokyo,” Housing Japan, http://housingjapan.com/tokyo-guide/lifestyle-guide/internet-services/, accessed November
2013.
331
Rick Burgess, “World's fastest Internet arrives in Tokyo: 2Gbps for $50/mo,” Techspot, April 17, 2013,
http://www.techspot.com/news/52275-worlds-fastest-internet-arrives-in-tokyo-2gbps-for-50-mo.html, accessed November 2013.
332
Jacob Kastrenakes, “Japanese internet provider offers twice the speed of Google Fiber for less money,” The Verge, April 15, 2013,
http://www.theverge.com/2013/4/15/4226428/sony-so-net-2gbps-download-internet-tokyo-japan, accessed November 2013.
333
“Internet in Singapore,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_in_Singapore, accessed November 2013.
334
“Who We Are,” OpenNet, http://www.opennet.com.sg/about-us/who-we-are/, accessed November 2013.
335
Ryan Huang, “Singapore ISPs jointly slam SingTel’s proposed OpenNet acquisition” ZDNet, September 25, 2013,
http://www.zdnet.com/sg/singapore-isps-jointly-slam-singtels-proposed-opennet-acquisition-7000021148/, accessed November 2013.

72. 71
broadband. In 2010, Singapore’s ISPs began offering 1 gbps fiber service to the nation. Because all
Singaporeans have access to broadband, ISPs no longer offer dial-up service to residential customers,
although they do allow business users dial-up service to enable redundancy.336
As of September 2013, Singapore ISPs and the Asia Pacific Carriers Coalition remained opposed to
SingTel’s proposal to buy OpenNet’s network. Opponents of the merger note that the merger would
result in SingTel controlling all of the nation’s fiber. They fear anti-competitive behavior.337
Summary and Lessons Learned in Singapore
In Singapore, the multiple private sector ISPs provide broadband service on one of two privately owned
fiber networks. Careful government oversight has created a market where high-speed broadband is
available and affordable to most households. This situation has resulted in very high broadband household
penetration rates.
Contact Information
OpenNet: 65-6-563-4273
SingTel Main Line: 65-6-838-3388
SingTel Internet Service and Technical Support: 65-6-235-1688
SingTel Business Broadband: 65-6-796-1606 or 65-6-472-2580
Australia
Australia is developing a National Broadband Network. As originally conceived under a prior Labor
administration, the government formed a government-owned corporation, NBN Co, to design, build,
and operate a fiber-to-the-premises (FTTP) network.338
The estimated cost of the network was A$37B.
The government expected to invest A$30B with private investors covering the remainder.
As initially contemplated, the network would serve 93 percent of the population. The remaining 7
percent of people, who live in very low-density areas, would use fixed wireless or satellite technology.
However, where users or the community would pay installation costs, NBN Co would extend the fiber
network.339
Construction began with a trial rollout in Tasmania in 2010, followed by construction at challenging
mainland sites beginning in 2011. The network rollout involved passive installation. NBN Co assumed
that people wanted the service; people had to act to opt out. As NBN Co built the network, the majority
of Australians opted to allow fiber connections to their premises. A lesser percentage subscribed to the
broadband service. Ultimate completion of a 1 gbps FTTP network was targeted for 2021.340
The
network follows the wholesale model, selling access to ISPs to resell to retail customers.341
After encountering various challenges, including difficulty bringing fiber to multi-unit buildings, the
current coalition government is exploring a fiber-to-the-node network instead. This action could save
336
“Internet in Singapore,” Wikipedia.
337
Ryan Huang, “Singapore ISPs jointly slam SingTel’s proposed OpenNet acquisition” ZDNet, September 25, 2013,
http://www.zdnet.com/sg/singapore-isps-jointly-slam-singtels-proposed-opennet-acquisition-7000021148/, accessed November 2013.
338
Jake Sturmer, “NBN Co representatives seek answers on fast Internet at Broadband World Forum in Amsterdam,” ABC News, October 23,
2013, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-10-23/nbn-broadband-forum-amsterdam-dutch-fibre-optic/5039668, accessed November 2013.
339
“National Broadband Network,”Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Broadband_Network, accessed November 2013.
340
Ibid.
341
Ibid.

73. 72
money and accelerate network completion.342
Due to ongoing government deliberations over possible
changes to network design, as of November 2013, the NBN Co website stated the following:
“This website is currently under review, pending the introduction of new Government policy. Some
content may not be current. You should not rely solely on this information.”343
Summary and Lessons Learned in Australia
Australia formed a government-owned corporation to provide fiber to residents and businesses. Because
the government-owned entity contracts with wholesalers to serve end users, the Australian approach is an
example of the wholesale model.
Contact Information:
Main Line: 61-2-6271-1000
Email: media@communications.gov.au
Web: http://www.communications.gov.au/about_us/contact_us
342
Jake Sturmer, “NBN Co representatives seek answers on fast Internet at Broadband World Forum in Amsterdam,” ABC News, October 23,
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