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![M. Barczentewicz | 20 grudnia 2017
Relacja prawa krajowego i prawa UE
• Dualizm po brytyjsku –
Factortame, HS2 i Pham
• Potrzeba ustawowej bramy do
stosowania prawa
międzynarodowego
• European Communities Act 1972
ELIZABETH II
European Communities
Act 1972
c. 68
1972 CHAPTER 68
An Act to make provision in connection with the
enlargement of the European Communities to include
the United Kingdom, together with (for, certain
purposes) the Channel Islands, the Isle of an and
Gibraltar. [17th October 1972]
BE IT ENACTED by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/2017-171221105403/75/Brexit-problemy-prawne-UK-grudzien-2017-3-2048.jpg)
![M. Barczentewicz | 20 grudnia 2017
Relacja prawa krajowego i prawa UE
• Dualizm po brytyjsku – Factortame, HS2 i Pham
• Factortame (No. 2) [1991] 1 A.C. 603 (per Lord Bridge of Harwich)
659
1 A.C. Reg. v. Transport Sec., Ex p. Factortame Ltd. (No. 2) (H.L.(E.)) '^f^JSig
A joined the Community. Thus, whatever limitation of its sovereignty
Parliament accepted when it enacted the European Communities Act
1972 was entirely voluntary. Under the terms of the Act of 1972 it
has always been clear that it was the duty of a United Kingdom court,
when delivering final judgment, to override any rule of national law
found to be in conflict with any directly enforceable rule of Community
law. Similarly, when decisions of the European Court of Justice have
° exposed areas of United Kingdom statute law which failed to
implement Council directives, Parliament has always loyally accepted
the obligation to make appropriate and prompt amendments. Thus
there is nothing in any way novel in according supremacy to rules of](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/2017-171221105403/75/Brexit-problemy-prawne-UK-grudzien-2017-4-2048.jpg)
![M. Barczentewicz | 20 grudnia 2017
Relacja prawa krajowego i prawa UE
• Dualizm po brytyjsku – Factortame, HS2 i Pham
• HS2 v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] 1 W.L.R. 324 (per Lord Reed)
challenge the substantive or procedural legality of decisions, acts or
omissions subject to the public participation provisions of this Directive.ÕÕ
The Secretary of StateÕs argument
77 On behalf of the Secretary of State, it was contended that the court
could not determine in advance whether the quality of the parliamentary
proceedings would meet the requirements of article 1(4) of the EIA
Directive, as construed by the Court of Justice. In view of the requirements
of SO 27A and SO 224A, the hybrid Bill procedure was in principle capable
of meeting those requirements. The claimantsÕ contentions to the contrary
were based merely on assertion. Whether Members of Parliament had in fact
A
B
349
R (Buckinghamshire County Council) v Transport Secretary (SCR (Buckinghamshire County Council) v Transport Secretary (SC(E))(E))[2014] 1 WLR[2014] 1 WLR
Lord Reed JSCLord Reed JSC
Constitutional issues
78 The argument presented on behalf of the claimants as to the
implications of the EIA Directive, if well founded, impinges upon long-
established constitutional principles governing the relationship between
Parliament and the courts, as reßected for example in article 9 of the Bill of
Rights 1689, in authorities concerned with judicial scrutiny of
parliamentary procedure, such as Edinburgh and Dalkeith Railway Co v
Wauchope (1842) 8 Cl & F 710, Lee v Bude and Torrington Junction
Railway Co (1871) LR 6 CP 576, Pickin v British Railways Board [1974] AC
765 and Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2) [2004] 1 AC 816, and in
other cases concerned with judicial scrutiny of decisions whether to
introduce a Bill in Parliament, such as R (Wheeler) v O–ce of the Prime
Minister [2008] EWHC 1409 (Admin); [2008] ACD 281. Neither the Bill of
Rights nor any of the authorities I have mentioned was however referred to
in the partiesÕ printed cases; nor was this issue mentioned before us until it
was raised by the court. Nevertheless, it follows that the claimantsÕ
contentions potentially raise a question as to the extent, if any, to which
these principles may have been implicitly qualiÞed or abrogated by the
European Communities Act 1972.
79 Contrary to the submission made on behalf of the claimants, that
question cannot be resolved simply by applying the doctrine developed by
the Court of Justice of the supremacy of EU law, since the application of that
doctrine in our law itself depends upon the 1972 Act. If there is a conßict
between a constitutional principle, such as that embodied in article 9 of the
Bill of Rights, and EU law, that conßict has to be resolved by our courts as an
issue arising under the constitutional law of the United Kingdom. Nor can
the issue be resolved, as was also suggested, by following the decision in R v
Secretary of State for Transport, Ex p Factortame Ltd (No 2) (Case
C-213/89) [1991] 1 AC 603, since that case was not concerned with the
compatibility with EU law of the process by which legislation is enacted in
D
E
F
G
H](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/2017-171221105403/75/Brexit-problemy-prawne-UK-grudzien-2017-5-2048.jpg)
![M. Barczentewicz | 20 grudnia 2017
Relacja prawa krajowego i prawa UE
• Dualizm po brytyjsku – Factortame, HS2 i Pham
• Pham v Home Secretary [2015] 1 W.L.R. 1591 (per Lord Mance)
77 When construing a domestic statute, United Kingdom courts apply a
strong presumption that Parliament intends legislation enacted to implement
this countryÕs European treaty obligations to be read consistently with those
obligations: see e g Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2012] 2 AC
471. But it is not axiomatic that consistency is either always achievable or
what Parliament intended or did achieve.
78 Advocate General Cruz Villal—nÕs recent opinion in Gauweiler v
Deutscher Bundestag (Case C-62/14) 14 January 2015, paras 30—69
suggests that (i) European law does not leave it open to any national court to
adopt a criterion or benchmark for assessing the vires of a European act
(which, presumably, would include a Court of Justice decision) di›erent
from that of the Court of Justice (para 53); (ii) any
A
B
1617
Pham v Home Secretary (SCPham v Home Secretary (SC(E))(E))[2015] 1 WLR[2015] 1 WLR
Lord Mance JSCLord Mance JSC
what Parliament intended or did achieve.
78 Advocate General Cruz Villal—nÕs recent opinion in Gauweiler v
Deutscher Bundestag (Case C-62/14) 14 January 2015, paras 30—69
suggests that (i) European law does not leave it open to any national court to
adopt a criterion or benchmark for assessing the vires of a European act
(which, presumably, would include a Court of Justice decision) di›erent
from that of the Court of Justice (para 53); (ii) any
ÔÔ Ôreservation of identityÕ, independently formed and interpreted by the
competentÑoften judicialÑbodies of the member states . . . would very
probably leave the EU legal order in a subordinate position, at least in
qualitative termsÕÕ: para 60.
79 That looks at the matter from one angle. However, Advocate
General Villal—n added (para 61) that: ÔÔa clearly understood, open, attitude
to EU law should in the medium and long term give rise, as a principle, to
basic convergence between the constitutional identity of the Union and that
of each of the member states.ÕÕ This recognises, perhaps, that Europe has not
yet reached a situation where it is axiomatic that there is constitutional
identity between the Union and its members.
80 For a domestic court, the starting point is, in any event, to identify
the ultimate legislative authority in its jurisdiction according to the relevant
rule of recognition. The search is simple in a country like the United
Kingdom with an explicitly dualist approach to obligations undertaken at a
supranational level. European law is certainly special and represents a
remarkable development in the worldÕs legal history. But, unless and until
the rule of recognition by which we shape our decisions is altered, we must
view the United Kingdom as independent, Parliament as sovereign and
European law as part of domestic law because Parliament has so willed. The
question how far Parliament has so willed is thus determined by construing
the 1972 Act.
81 Sections 2(1) and 3(1) of the 1972 Act, as amended by sections 3 and
B
C
D
E
F](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/2017-171221105403/75/Brexit-problemy-prawne-UK-grudzien-2017-6-2048.jpg)
Uploaded byMikolaj Barczentewicz
Brexit: problemy prawne (UK) - grudzień 2017
This document discusses several legal issues related to Brexit under UK law. It outlines the British model of relations between EU law and domestic law, noting key cases like Factortame that established the supremacy of EU law. It then examines the UK's EU Withdrawal Bill, which seeks to preserve continuity of laws by copying existing directly applicable EU law and maintaining transposed legislation. However, this raises questions about the status of this "retained EU law." The bill also aims to preserve some general principles of EU law but excludes the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Finally, the bill grants the government broad delegated powers to make technical changes to legislation in the Brexit process.
Law◦
Brexit: problemy prawne (UK) - grudzień 2017
- 1.
- 2. M. Barczentewicz | 20 grudnia 2017 O czym będzie mowa • Brytyjski model relacji między prawem UE aprawem krajowym (w skrócie) • Problem zapewnienia ciągłości prawnej po wyjściu z UE • Rozwiązania przyjęte w EU (Withdrawal) Bill • Negocjacje, okres przejściowy, przyszły traktat z UE27, ustawowe wdrożenie postanowień traktatu
- 3. M. Barczentewicz | 20 grudnia 2017 Relacja prawakrajowego i prawa UE • Dualizm po brytyjsku – Factortame, HS2 i Pham • Potrzeba ustawowej bramy do stosowania prawa międzynarodowego • European Communities Act 1972 ELIZABETH II European Communities Act 1972 c. 68 1972 CHAPTER 68 An Act to make provision in connection with the enlargement of the European Communities to include the United Kingdom, together with (for, certain purposes) the Channel Islands, the Isle of an and Gibraltar. [17th October 1972] BE IT ENACTED by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and
- 4. M. Barczentewicz | 20 grudnia 2017 Relacja prawakrajowego i prawa UE • Dualizm po brytyjsku – Factortame, HS2 i Pham • Factortame (No. 2) [1991] 1 A.C. 603 (per Lord Bridge of Harwich) 659 1 A.C. Reg. v. Transport Sec., Ex p. Factortame Ltd. (No. 2) (H.L.(E.)) '^f^JSig A joined the Community. Thus, whatever limitation of its sovereignty Parliament accepted when it enacted the European Communities Act 1972 was entirely voluntary. Under the terms of the Act of 1972 it has always been clear that it was the duty of a United Kingdom court, when delivering final judgment, to override any rule of national law found to be in conflict with any directly enforceable rule of Community law. Similarly, when decisions of the European Court of Justice have ° exposed areas of United Kingdom statute law which failed to implement Council directives, Parliament has always loyally accepted the obligation to make appropriate and prompt amendments. Thus there is nothing in any way novel in according supremacy to rules of
- 5. M. Barczentewicz | 20 grudnia 2017 Relacja prawakrajowego i prawa UE • Dualizm po brytyjsku – Factortame, HS2 i Pham • HS2 v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] 1 W.L.R. 324 (per Lord Reed) challenge the substantive or procedural legality of decisions, acts or omissions subject to the public participation provisions of this Directive.ÕÕ The Secretary of StateÕs argument 77 On behalf of the Secretary of State, it was contended that the court could not determine in advance whether the quality of the parliamentary proceedings would meet the requirements of article 1(4) of the EIA Directive, as construed by the Court of Justice. In view of the requirements of SO 27A and SO 224A, the hybrid Bill procedure was in principle capable of meeting those requirements. The claimantsÕ contentions to the contrary were based merely on assertion. Whether Members of Parliament had in fact A B 349 R (Buckinghamshire County Council) v Transport Secretary (SCR (Buckinghamshire County Council) v Transport Secretary (SC(E))(E))[2014] 1 WLR[2014] 1 WLR Lord Reed JSCLord Reed JSC Constitutional issues 78 The argument presented on behalf of the claimants as to the implications of the EIA Directive, if well founded, impinges upon long- established constitutional principles governing the relationship between Parliament and the courts, as reßected for example in article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689, in authorities concerned with judicial scrutiny of parliamentary procedure, such as Edinburgh and Dalkeith Railway Co v Wauchope (1842) 8 Cl & F 710, Lee v Bude and Torrington Junction Railway Co (1871) LR 6 CP 576, Pickin v British Railways Board [1974] AC 765 and Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2) [2004] 1 AC 816, and in other cases concerned with judicial scrutiny of decisions whether to introduce a Bill in Parliament, such as R (Wheeler) v O–ce of the Prime Minister [2008] EWHC 1409 (Admin); [2008] ACD 281. Neither the Bill of Rights nor any of the authorities I have mentioned was however referred to in the partiesÕ printed cases; nor was this issue mentioned before us until it was raised by the court. Nevertheless, it follows that the claimantsÕ contentions potentially raise a question as to the extent, if any, to which these principles may have been implicitly qualiÞed or abrogated by the European Communities Act 1972. 79 Contrary to the submission made on behalf of the claimants, that question cannot be resolved simply by applying the doctrine developed by the Court of Justice of the supremacy of EU law, since the application of that doctrine in our law itself depends upon the 1972 Act. If there is a conßict between a constitutional principle, such as that embodied in article 9 of the Bill of Rights, and EU law, that conßict has to be resolved by our courts as an issue arising under the constitutional law of the United Kingdom. Nor can the issue be resolved, as was also suggested, by following the decision in R v Secretary of State for Transport, Ex p Factortame Ltd (No 2) (Case C-213/89) [1991] 1 AC 603, since that case was not concerned with the compatibility with EU law of the process by which legislation is enacted in D E F G H
- 6. M. Barczentewicz | 20 grudnia 2017 Relacja prawakrajowego i prawa UE • Dualizm po brytyjsku – Factortame, HS2 i Pham • Pham v Home Secretary [2015] 1 W.L.R. 1591 (per Lord Mance) 77 When construing a domestic statute, United Kingdom courts apply a strong presumption that Parliament intends legislation enacted to implement this countryÕs European treaty obligations to be read consistently with those obligations: see e g Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2012] 2 AC 471. But it is not axiomatic that consistency is either always achievable or what Parliament intended or did achieve. 78 Advocate General Cruz Villal—nÕs recent opinion in Gauweiler v Deutscher Bundestag (Case C-62/14) 14 January 2015, paras 30—69 suggests that (i) European law does not leave it open to any national court to adopt a criterion or benchmark for assessing the vires of a European act (which, presumably, would include a Court of Justice decision) di›erent from that of the Court of Justice (para 53); (ii) any A B 1617 Pham v Home Secretary (SCPham v Home Secretary (SC(E))(E))[2015] 1 WLR[2015] 1 WLR Lord Mance JSCLord Mance JSC what Parliament intended or did achieve. 78 Advocate General Cruz Villal—nÕs recent opinion in Gauweiler v Deutscher Bundestag (Case C-62/14) 14 January 2015, paras 30—69 suggests that (i) European law does not leave it open to any national court to adopt a criterion or benchmark for assessing the vires of a European act (which, presumably, would include a Court of Justice decision) di›erent from that of the Court of Justice (para 53); (ii) any ÔÔ Ôreservation of identityÕ, independently formed and interpreted by the competentÑoften judicialÑbodies of the member states . . . would very probably leave the EU legal order in a subordinate position, at least in qualitative termsÕÕ: para 60. 79 That looks at the matter from one angle. However, Advocate General Villal—n added (para 61) that: ÔÔa clearly understood, open, attitude to EU law should in the medium and long term give rise, as a principle, to basic convergence between the constitutional identity of the Union and that of each of the member states.ÕÕ This recognises, perhaps, that Europe has not yet reached a situation where it is axiomatic that there is constitutional identity between the Union and its members. 80 For a domestic court, the starting point is, in any event, to identify the ultimate legislative authority in its jurisdiction according to the relevant rule of recognition. The search is simple in a country like the United Kingdom with an explicitly dualist approach to obligations undertaken at a supranational level. European law is certainly special and represents a remarkable development in the worldÕs legal history. But, unless and until the rule of recognition by which we shape our decisions is altered, we must view the United Kingdom as independent, Parliament as sovereign and European law as part of domestic law because Parliament has so willed. The question how far Parliament has so willed is thus determined by construing the 1972 Act. 81 Sections 2(1) and 3(1) of the 1972 Act, as amended by sections 3 and B C D E F
- 7. M. Barczentewicz | 20 grudnia 2017 Problemy zapewnieniaciągłości • Rozwiązania przyjęte w EU (Withdrawal) Bill • ’skopiowanie’ bezpośrednio stosowanego prawa UE, • utrzymanie w mocy krajowych aktów wdrażających, • utrzymanie w mocy orzecznictwa krajowego i UE (sprzed daty wyjścia), • utrzymanie niektórych zasad ogólnych (np. pierwszeństwo prawa UE), • szeroka delegacja kompetencji legislacyjnej na rzecz rządu. • Przedmiot obecnych negocjacji z UE27: • okres przejściowy, • przyszłe umowy z UE27, • ustawowe wdrożenie postanowień umów z UE27 w UK.
- 8.
- 9. M. Barczentewicz | 20 grudnia 2017 EU (Withdrawal) Bill ’Skopiowanie’ bezpośrednio stosowanego prawa UE i utrzymanie w mocy krajowych aktów wdrażających – nowa kategoria ‘retainedEU law’. Źródło: Explanatory Notes to the EU (Withdrawal) Bill
- 10. M. Barczentewicz | 20 grudnia 2017 EU (Withdrawal) Bill ’Skopiowanie’ bezpośrednio stosowanego prawa UE i utrzymanie w mocy krajowych aktów wdrażających – nowa kategoria ‘retainedEU law’. Niektóre zagadnienia: • Jaki status prawny ma mieć ‘retained EU law’ – czy będzie to poziom ustawy, czy poziom aktu podustawowego? • Dyrektywy są pominięte – czy rzeczywiście do ciągłości wystarczy utrzymanie w mocy aktów implementujących?
- 11. M. Barczentewicz | 20 grudnia 2017 EU (Withdrawal) Bill Utrzymanie w mocy orzecznictwa krajowego i UE (sprzed daty wyjścia) – art. 6 EU(W)B Korzystanie z orzeczeń sądów UE wydanych po dacie wyjścia: •Brak mechanizmu pytań prejudycjalnych. • Brak obowiązku brania orzecznictwa unijnego pod uwagę ale uprawnienie (‘may do so if it considers it appropriate to do so’).
- 12. M. Barczentewicz | 20 grudnia 2017 EU (Withdrawal) Bill Utrzymanie niektórych zasad ogólnych (np. pierwszeństwo prawa UE). • Utrzymanie zasad wykładni prawa UE oraz Marleasing. •Tylko te zasady ogólne, które TSUE uznał w swoim orzecznictwie (Schedule 1, para 2) – np. proporcjonalność, nieretroaktywność. • Wyłączenie Francovich (ogólna odpowiedzialność odszkodowawcza państwa). • Nie będzie w prawie UK przysługiwało żadne powództwo lub skarga wyłącznie na gruncie pogwałcenia zasady ogólnej (Schedule 1, para 3). • Zasada pierwszeństwa prawa UE ma być utrzymana w mocy wobec aktów prawa UK sprzed daty wyjścia (art. 5 EU(W)B) • Karta Praw Podstawowych Unii Europejskiej nie będzie częścią prawa UK (art. 5 EU(W)B). • Oparte na teorii, że Karta nie przyniosła żadnej nowości normatywnej. Prawa podmiotowe i zasady ogólne są utrzymane w mocy w takim stopniu w jakim mają dziś podstawy inne niż Karta.
- 13. M. Barczentewicz | 20 grudnia 2017 EU (Withdrawal) Bill Szeroka delegacja kompetencji legislacyjnej na rzecz rządu. • Włącznie z ‘Henry VIII powers’. •Przykłady z Explanatory Notes do czego ta kompetencja ma być użyta: • techniczne usuwanie z tekstów prawa krajowego odniesień typu: ‘member states other than the United Kingdom’, czy ‘EU law’ – zmieniając ‘other EEA states’ na ‘EEA states’, itd.; • usunięcie proceduralnych wymogów konsultacji z Komisją Europejską (np. przy niektórych inwestycjach); • alokowanie funkcji administracji publicznej (regulacyjnych) obecnie sprawowanych przez organy UE. • W rezultacie przegranego przez rząd głosowania w Izbie Gmin część tych kompetencji (do wdrożenia ‘withdrawal agreement’) będzie dopiero dostępna gdy Parlament uchwali ustawę akceptującą ‘withdrawal agreement’.
- 14. M. Barczentewicz | 20 grudnia 2017 Przedmiot obecnychnegocjacji z UE27 • Zagadnienia: • okres przejściowy, • przyszłe umowy z UE27, • ustawowe wdrożenie postanowień umów z UE27 w UK. • Najnowsze postanowienia podsumowane w: • Joint report from the negotiators of the European Union and the United Kingdom Government on progress during phase 1 of negotiations under Article 50 TEU (8 grudnia 2017) • European Council (Art. 50) guidelines for Brexit negotiations (15 grudnia 2017)
- 15. M. Barczentewicz | 20 grudnia 2017 Przedmiot obecnychnegocjacji z UE27 I. Pierwsza umowa UK-EU27 (na podstawie art. 50 TUE) do zawarcia przed 29 marca 2019. II. Okres przejściowy: • Dwa lata od 29 marca 2019. • EU27 chce praktycznie wszystkich obowiązków członkostwa, bez uczestnictwa UK w instytucjach. III. Docelowa umowa/traktat UK-EU27, do zawarcia w okresie przejściowym, regulująca stosunki po zakończeniu okresu przejściowego. • UK poza unią celną i jednolitym rynkiem.
- 16. M. Barczentewicz | 20 grudnia 2017 Przedmiot obecnychnegocjacji z UE27 Joint Report z 8 grudnia 2017 ‘Legal effects of the citizens' rights Part (...) 34. Both Parties agree that the Withdrawal Agreement should provide for the legal effects of the citizens' rights Part both in the UK and in the Union. UK domestic legislation should also be enacted to this effect. 35. The provision in the Agreement should enable citizens to rely directly on their rights as set out in the citizens' rights Part of the Agreement and should specify that inconsistent or incompatible rules and provisions will be disapplied. 36. The UK Government will bring forward a Bill, the Withdrawal Agreement & Implementation Bill, specifically to implement the Agreement. This Bill will make express reference to the Agreement and will fully incorporate the citizens' rights Part into UK law. Once this Bill has been adopted, the provisions of the citizens' rights Part will have effect in primary legislation and will prevail over inconsistent or incompatible legislation, unless Parliament expressly repeals this Act in future. The Withdrawal Agreement will be binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member States from its entry into force pursuant to Article 216(2) TFEU.’
- 17. M. Barczentewicz | 20 grudnia 2017 Przedmiot obecnychnegocjacji z UE27 ’38. This Part of the Agreement establishes rights for citizens following on from those established in Union law during the UK’s membership of the European Union; the CJEU is the ultimate arbiter of the interpretation of Union law. In the context of the application or interpretation of those rights, UK courts shall therefore have due regard to relevant decisions of the CJEU after the specified date. The Agreement should also establish a mechanism enabling UK courts or tribunals to decide, having had due regard to whether relevant case-law exists, to ask the CJEU questions of interpretation of those rights where they consider that a CJEU ruling on the question is necessary for the UK court or tribunal to be able to give judgment in a case before it. This mechanism should be available for UK courts or tribunals for litigation brought within 8 years from the date of application of the citizens' rights Part.39. 39. Consistent interpretation of the citizens' rights Part should further be supported and facilitated by an exchange of case law between the courts and regular judicial dialogue. In the same vein, it is envisaged to give the UK Government and the European Commission the right to intervene in relevant cases before the CJEU and before UK courts and tribunals respectively.’
- 18. M. Barczentewicz | 20 grudnia 2017 Dziękuję • Strona internetowa: www.barczentewicz.com •Kontakt: mikolaj.barczentewicz@law.ox.ac.uk • Twitter: • @MBarczentewicz • @BarczentewiczPL