This document is a petition filed with the Supreme Court of the Philippines challenging the constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) established by the Department of Budget and Management. The petitioners argue that the DAP violates the Constitution and other laws by realigning public funds appropriated by Congress for other purposes, including purposes not included in the annual budget. The petitioners include legislators, activists, and taxpayers seeking to restrict the executive branch's spending of public funds only on appropriated items and to prohibit "pork barrel" spending. They request the Court issue injunctions against the continued implementation of the DAP and related lump sum appropriations.

1. 1
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO,
Chairperson, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan,
JUDY M. TAGUIWALO, Professor,
University of the Philippines Diliman, CoChairperson, Pagbabago, HENRI KAHN,
Concerned Citizens Movement, REP. LUZ
ILAGAN, Gabriela Women’s Party
Representative, REP. TERRY L. RIDON,
Kabataan Partylist Representative, REP.
CARLOS ISAGANI ZARATE, Bayan Muna
Party-list Representative, RENATO M.
REYES, JR., Secretary General of BAYAN,
MANUEL K. DAYRIT, Chairman, Ang
Kapatiran Party, VENCER MARI E.
CRISOSTOMO, Chairperson, Anakbayan,
VICTOR L. VILLANUEVA, Convenor, Youth
Act Now,
Petitioners,
-versus-
GR No. ________
Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Application
for a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III,
President of the Republic of the Philippines,
PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR., Executive
Secretary, and FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management,
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------------x
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION
WITH PRAYER FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
AND/OR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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Petitioners, by counsels, unto the Honorable Supreme Court,
most respectfully state that:
PREFATORY
"For the love of money is the root of all evil: ..." and money belonging
to no one in particular, i.e. public funds, provide an even greater
temptation for misappropriation and embezzlement. This, evidently,
was foremost in the minds of the framers of the constitution in
meticulously prescribing the rules regarding the appropriation and
disposition of public funds as embodied in Sections 16 and 18 of
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. Hence, the conditions on the
release of money from the treasury [Sec. 18(1)]; the restrictions on
the use of public funds for public purpose [Sec. 18(2)]; the prohibition
to transfer an appropriation for an item to another [See. 16(5) and the
requirement of specifications [Sec. 16(2)], among others, were all
safeguards designed to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public
funds. (Demetria v. Alba, G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987)
PARTIES
Petitioners
_________
1.
All of the petitioners are of legal age and Filipinos, and
suing in their capacity as concerned citizens, taxpayers and
legislators, to wit:
a. MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO is the Chairperson of
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN);
b. JUDY M. TAGUIWALO is a Professor of the University of
the Philippines Diliman and also the Co-Chairperson of
Pagbabago;
c. HENRI KAHN is a member of the Concerned Citizens
Movement;
d. REP. LUZ ILAGAN is Gabriela Women’s Party
Representative for the 16th Congress;
e. REP. TERRY L. RIDON is Kabataan Partylist
Representative for the 16th Congress;
f. REP. CARLOS ZARATE is Bayan Muna Party-list
Representative for the 16th Congress;
g. MANUEL K. DAYRIT is the Chairman, of the Ang
Kapatiran Party;
h. VENCER MARI E. CRISOSTOMO is the Chairperson of
Anakbayan;
i. VICTOR L. VILLANUEVA is the Convenor of Youth Act
Now.
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2.
All petitioners may be served notices, orders, and other
processes of this Honorable Court at the address of the undersigned
counsels.
3.
As taxpayers, Petitioners are filing this Petition against
Public Respondents in accordance with this Honorable Court’s ruling
in Paguia vs. Office of the President (621 SCRA 600) that taxpayers’
contributions to the state’s coffers entitle them to question
appropriations for expenditures which are claimed to be
unconstitutional or illegal.
4.
Petitioners Ilagan, Ridon and Zarate are also suing as
Members of the House of Representatives, possesses locus standi,
which is defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
Public Respondents
_________________
5.
Public Respondent BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III,
President of the Republic of the Philippines. His office is at the Office
of the President, New Executive Building, Malacanang Palace, J.P.
Laurel St., San Miguel, Manila, where he may be served notices,
orders, and other processes of this Honorable Court.
6.
Public Respondent PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR., Executive
Secretary, is the primary alter ego of the President who is the head of
the executive department with the duty to implement the laws of the
land. His office is at the Office of the Executive Secretary, New
Executive Building, Malacanang Palace, J.P. Laurel St., San Miguel,
Manila, where he may be served notices, orders, and other
processes of this Honorable Court.
7.
Public Respondent FLORENCIO B. ABAD is the
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management under the
executive department. His office is at General Solano St., San
Miguel, Manila, where he may be served notices, orders, and other
processes of this Honorable Court.
NATURE OF THE PETITION
8.
This is a special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition,
with application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction, brought under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
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9.
In filing this Petition, Petitioner is not only invoking the
power of this Honorable Court to strike down acts that violate the
Constitution, but also the judicial power of this Honorable Court under
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government. (Emphasis ours)
10.
The Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) is
officially embodied in the DBM National Budget Circular No. 5411
dated July 18, 2012 which declared that due to the “under-spending
of various agencies”, the President ordered on June 27, 2012 “the
withdrawal of all unobligated allotments of all agencies with low level
of obligations as of June 30, 2012 both for continuing and current
allotment”
11.
The said “withdrawn funds” were deemed as “savings by
Pres. Benigno S. Aquino and DBM Sec. Florencio Abad and
realigned, in blatant defiance of the Constitution and the General
Appropriations Act passed by Congress, to “Augment existing
programs and projects of other agencies” and Fund priority programs
and projects not considered in the 2012 budget but expected to be
started or implemented within the current year”.
12.
Petitioners contend that said funds could not be artificially
deemed as “savings” as defined by the DBM and the General
Appropriations Act of 2012 since there could be not “savings” in the
middle of a fiscal year, especially if the projects or programs for which
these funds were allocated by law, have not been completed,
discontinued or abandoned.
13.
The resolution of the issue whether NBC Circular 541 or
the DAP violates the Constitution, the EO 292 or the Administrative
Code and the appropriations law is surely not political, because this
no longer pertains to the wisdom or discretionary act of a public
official. Rather the issue in this case is the constitutionality and
legality of withdrawing funds from duly-enacted budgetary allocations
and then realigning these funds to other budgetary items including
those that were not even provided under the General Appropriations
Act.
1
Attached
as
Annex
“A”
4

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14.
Additionally, the general issue of the constitutionality of
the “pork barrel”—both the PDAF and the lump sum funds, whether
in the budget or off-budget which are considered “Presidential
Pork”—can never be deemed a political issue as it strikes deep into
the constitutional power of Congress to approve the national budget.
We define “pork barrel” as public funds, usually in lump sum
amounts, the disposition of which is subject solely to the discretion of
the pork holder as to the selection of the projects and the
beneficiaries.
15.
Are acts of legislators in intervening in the implementation
or execution of the General Appropriations Act through the
mechanism of selection of projects and/or its beneficiaries
constitutional and legal? Petitioners contend that not only does such
intervention go beyond the constitutional mandate of Congress but
also compromise the integrity of Congress’ role as the approving
authority of the budget.
16.
Are lump sum amounts in the budget, which ceased to be
merely in the nature of a contingency fund considering that these
amounts are so substantial that these are larger than if not equal to
the regular budget of the agencies, constitutional? Lump sum
amounts in the budget not only makes it impossible for Congress to
be apprised of what items in the budget they are approving, but also,
practically grants the President the power to approve these
appropriations instead of Congress.
17.
Both these issues are not questions of wisdom (even if
Petitioners believe this kind of budgeting process is surely not wise)
but touches on the violation of the constitutional canalization of the
powers of the executive and the legislative and, the constitutional
checks and balances required in a republican system of government.
18.
Petitioners believe that this Honorable Court has the
power, and more importantly the duty, to resolve these issues if only
eliminate a scourge in the disposition of public funds that have so
long been a source of graft and corruption and patronage politics.
19.
The discussion in Daza vs. Singson (G.R. No. 86344
December 21, 1989) regarding judicial powers of this Honorable
Court is very enlightening, thus:
At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the
Constitution providing as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman,
twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of
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Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and parties
or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not
vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the
Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members.
Ruling first on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to
the respondent's assertion, the Court has the competence to act
on the matter at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is not a
discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not
be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is
involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that
chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments. That is not a political question because, as Chief
Justice Concepcion explained in Tanada v. Cuenco. 6
... the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In
other words, ... it refers "to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In the aforementioned case, the Court was asked by the
petitioners therein to annul the election of two members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal of that chamber, on the ground that
they had not been validly nominated. The Senate then consisted
of 23 members from the Nacionalista Party and the petitioner as
the lone member of the Citizens Party. Senator Lorenzo M.
Tanada nominated only himself as the minority representative in
the Tribunal, whereupon the majority elected Senators Mariano
J. Cuenco. and Francisco Delgado, from its own ranks, to
complete the nine-man composition of the Tribunal as provided
for in the 1935 Constitution. The petitioner came to this Court,
contending that under Article VI, Section 11, of that Charter, the
six legislative members of the Tribunal were to be chosen by the
Senate, "three upon nomination of the party having the largest
number of votes and three of the party having the second largest
number of votes therein." As the majority party in the Senate, the
Nacionalista Party could nominate only three members and could
not also fill the other two seats pertaining to the minority.
By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondents
contended inter alia that the subject of the petition was an
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internal matter that only the Senate could resolve. The Court
rejected this argument, holding that what was involved was not
the wisdom of the Senate in choosing the respondents but the
legality of the choice in light of the requirement of the
Constitution. The petitioners were questioning the manner of
filling the Tribunal, not the discretion of the Senate in doing so.
The Court held that this was a justiciable and not a political
question, x x x X x x
Although not specifically discussed, the same disposition was
made in Cunanan v. Tan as it likewise involved the manner or
legality of the organization of the Commission on Appointments,
not the wisdom or discretion of the House in the choice of its
representatives.
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes
even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we
were to assume that the issue presented before us was political
in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper cases, even the political question. Article VIII, Section 1,
of the Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.
x x x, we have held as early as in the Emergency Powers
Cases 7 that where serious constitutional questions are involved,
"the transcendental importance to the public of these cases
demands that they be settled promptly and definitely brushing
aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." The same policy
has since then been consistently followed by the Court, as in
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 8where we held through
Chief Justice Fernando:
Xxxx
The language of justice Laurel fits the case: "All await the
decision of this Court on the constitutional question. Considering,
therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed
and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy
demand that [its] constitutionality ... be now resolved.' It may
likewise be added that the exceptional character of the situation
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that confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the
undeniable necessity for ruling, the national elections being
barely six months away, reinforce our stand. It would appear
undeniable, therefore, that before us is an appropriate invocation
of our jurisdiction to prevent the enforcement of an alleged
unconstitutional statute. We are left with no choice then; we must
act on the matter.
20. Moreover, the Honorable Court ought to exercise judicial
review over this Petition, because the questioned executive acts are
a matter of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to
society, and of paramount public interest.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
21. On August 5, 2013 during the official budget deliberation
of the Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) and the
Department of Budget Management (DBM) Rep. Neri Colmenares of
Bayan Muna Party-list inquired from the DBM Secretary, Respondent
Florencio Abad about the nature of the DBM National Budget Circular
No. 541 (NBC 541 hereafter). Sec. Abad informed the Appropriations
Committee that NBC 541 is intended to accelerate disbursement
under a then unknown “Disbursement Acceleration Program” (DAP
hereafter) by withdrawing unobligated allotments from “underspending” agencies.
22. When asked by Rep. Colmenares whether NBC 541 is
constitutional considering that authorizes withdrawal of funds midyear
and realigns it to other projects, Sec. Abad maintained that it is only
intended to be realigned for existing projects anyway. He further
stated that if the withdrawn funds will be spent on projects not
contained in the General Appropriations Act then indeed it would be
unconstitutional.
23. When Sec. Abad was again asked how much was already
withdrawn and realigned under DAP he answered that P75 Billion
was realigned in 2011 and another P27 Billion in 2012. He confirmed
that these funds came from slow moving agencies particularly the
DENR, DPWH, DOTC, DOH, DSWD, DAR, DepEd, and the DA.
24. On September 25, 2013 Senator Jinggoy Estrada
revealed in his Privilege Speech that he and other senators, then
siting as senator-judges in the Impeachment Trial of former Supreme
Court Chief Justice Renato Corona, were offered P50 Million each in
exchange for a vote of conviction against Corona.
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25. Estrada said that after the conviction of Corona in May
2012, those who voted to convict him were allotted an additional P50
Million, as provided in a private and confidential letter memorandum
by the then Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. In his
speech, Estrada dubbed the additional amount as “incentive” for
Corona’s ouster.
26. It will be recalled that at the height of the Impeachment
Trial against Corona in February 2012, his lawyer Atty. Jose Roy,
claimed that Malacanang, through Pres. Aquino’s Executive
Secretary, Respondent Paquito Ochoa, offered senators P100 Million
worth of projects in exchange for defying the Supreme Court
temporary restraining order on the opening of bank accounts under
Corona’s name. Atty. Roy was cited for contempt and reprimanded by
the Impeachment Court for making such a claim. It turned out a year
after that there is basis for Atty. Roy’s expose.
27. On September 27, 2013, during the Plenary Deliberation
for the approval of the 2014 Budget on Second Reading, Rep. Neri
Colmenares again inquired about NBC 541 from the Office of the
President, then represented by Respondent Ochoa and on the floor
by Appropriations Committee Chairman Rep. Isidro Ungab. Rep.
Colmenares was informed by Respondent Ochoa that indeed the
Disbursement Acceleration Program exists but it was intended to
realign funds from under-spending agencies in order to accelerate
growth, thereby confirming not only that the DAP exists but also that it
was with the approval of Pres. Aquino.
28. On September 28, 2013 Sec. Abad issued a statement
through the DBM website explaining the purpose of the additional
fund releases to senators as mentioned in the speech of Sen.
Estrada and said that the same came from the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP). According to Sec. Abad these funds
were not bribes, but were necessary to “help accelerate economic
expansion”.
29. This NBC 541 was issued on July 18, 2012 by the DBM.
Pertinent provisions are as follows:
3.0 Coverage
3.1 These guidelines shall cover the withdrawal of unobligated
allotments as of June 30, 2012 of all national government
agencies (NGAs) charged against FY 2011 Continuing
Appropriation (RA No.10147) and FY 2012 Current
Appropriation (RA No. 10155)
xxx
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3.2 The withdrawal of unobligated allotments may cover the
identified programs, projects and activities of the
departments/agencies reflected in the DBM list shown as Annex
A or specific programs and projects as may be identified by the
agencies.
xxx
5.7 The withdrawn allotments may be:
5.7.1 Reissued for the original programs and projects of the
agencies/OUs concerned, from which the allotments were
withdrawn;
5.7.2 Realigned to cover additional funding for other existing
programs and projects of the agency/OU; or
5.7.3 Used to augment existing programs and projects of any
agency and to fund priority programs and projects not
considered in the 2012 budget but expected to be started or
implemented during the current year. (Emphasis theirs)
30. The DBM in its website admits, however, that in 2011,
long before the issuance of DBM National Budget Circular 541, the
Disbursement Acceleration Program has been implemented and the
Executive has been withdrawing funds and realigning appropriations
approved by Congress. The DBM website2 as well as the Official
Gazette website3 published the following information on the DAP:
Frequently Asked Questions
Acceleration Program (DAP)
A.
Disbursement
About the DAP
1.
about the
What is DAP?
The Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) is a stimulus
package under the Aquino administration designed to fast-track
public spending and push economic growth. This covers highimpact budgetary programs and projects which will be
augmented out of the savings generated during the year and
additional revenue sources. The DAP was approved by the
President on October 12, 2011 upon the recommendation of the
Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) and the
Cabinet Clusters.
2
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
available
at
http://www.dbm.gov.ph/?page_id=7362.
Last
accessed
October
11,
2013
3
Q&A
on
the
Disbursement
Acceleration
Program,
published
on
October
7,
2013,
available
at
http://www.gov.ph/2013/10/07/qa-­‐on-­‐the-­‐disbursement-­‐
acceleration-­‐program/.
Last
accessed
October
11,
2013
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2.
What was the context when DAP was introduced?
The DAP was conceptualized in September 2011 and introduced
in October 2011, in the context of the prevailing underspending
in government disbursements for the first eight months of 2011
that dampened the country’s economic growth. Such government
intervention was needed as key programs and projects, most
notably public infrastructure, were moving slowly. The need to
accelerate public spending was also brought about by the global
economic situation as well as the financial toll of calamities in
that year. While the economy has generally improved in 2012
and 2013, the use of DAP was continued to sustain the pace of
public spending as well as economic expansion.
B.
Amounts and Purposes Funded through DAP
1.
How much were the programs and projects funded
through DAP in 2011, 2012, and 2013?
For 2011-2012, a total of P142.23 Billion was released for
programs and projects identified through the DAP, of which
P83.53 Billion is for 2011 and 58.70 Billion is for 2012. In 2011,
the amount was used to provide additional funds for
programs/projects such as healthcare, public works, housing and
resettlement, and agriculture, among others. While in 2012,
these were used to augment tourism road infrastructure, school
infrastructure, rehabilitation and extension of light rail transit
systems, and sitio electrification, among others.
In 2013, about P15.13 Billion has been approved for the hiring of
policemen, additional funds for the modernization of PNP, the
redevelopment of Roxas Boulevard, and funding for the Typhoon
Pablo rehabilitation projects for Compostela Valley and Davao
Oriental.
2.
What kind of projects are funded through the DAP?
The programs and projects submitted to the DBM must meet the
following conditions:
a)
Fast-moving or quick-disbursing, e.g. the payment of
obligations incurred from premium subsidy for indigent families in
the National Health Insurance Program;
b)
Urgent or priority in terms of social and economic
development objectives, e.g. the upgrading of equipment and
facilities for specialty hospitals, rehabilitation of Light Rail Transit
and Metro Rail Transit, and the Disaster Risk and Exposure
Assessment for Mitigation (DREAM) program of DOST;
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c)
Programs or projects performing well and could deliver
more services to the public with the additional funds e.g. Training
for Work Scholarship Program of DOLE-TESDA.
Some of the items funded through the DAP are expenditures
which are mandated by law, such as capital infusion for the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (R.A. 7653, Section 2) out of the
augmented Budgetary Support to Government CorporationsOthers.
3.
How much were the programs and projects that were
endorsed by legislators?
The legislators have also endorsed programs and projects for the
social and economic benefit of their constituents, such as
medical assistance and local infrastructure projects. The
proposals were funded through DAP as they are existing
budgetary items in the GAA and compliant with the conditions
stated above.
Of the total DAP approved by OP for 2011-2012 amounting to a
total of P142.23 Billion only 9 percent was released to programs
and projects identified by legislators. These were not released
directly to legislators but to implementing agencies.
C.
Sourcing of Funds for DAP
1.
How were funds sourced?
Funds used for programs and projects identified through DAP
were sourced from savings generated by the government, the
realignment of which is subject to the approval of the President;
as well as the Unprogrammed Fund that can be tapped when
government has windfall revenue collections, e.g., unexpected
remittance of dividends from the GOCCs and Government
Financial Institutions (GFIs), sale of government assets.
2.
Where did savings come from?
Savings were sourced from:
a)
the pooling of unreleased appropriations such as
unreleased Personnel Services appropriations which will lapse at
the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of slow moving
projects and discontinued projects per Zero-Based Budgeting
findings; and
b)
the withdrawal of unobligated allotments, also for slowmoving programs and projects, which have earlier been released
to national government agencies.
In line with laws on the use of savings (see below), DBM ensured
that programs and projects funded through DAP have an
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appropriation cover; meaning, these are existing programs and
projects in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) that can be
augmented by such savings.
xxx
31.
According to Respondent Abad4, “in 2012, most releases
were made during the period October-December, based entirely on
the request submitted to us by the Senators.” He detailed the
releases to senators as follows:
Those who received releases during that period and their
corresponding amounts were: Sens. Antonio Trillanes (October
2012–P50M), Manuel Villar (October 2012–P50M), Ramon
Revilla (October 2012–P50M), Francis Pangilinan (October
2012–P30M),Loren
Legarda (October
2012–P50M), Lito
Lapid (October 2012–P50M),Jinggoy Estrada (October 2012–
P50M), Alan
Cayetano (October
2012–P50M),Edgardo
Angara (October 2012–P50M), Ralph Recto (October 2012–
P23M; December 2012–P27M), Koko Pimentel (October 2012–
P25.5M; November 2012–P5M; December 2012–P15M), Tito
Sotto (October 2012–P11M; November 2012–P39M), Teofisto
Guingona (October 2012–P35M; December 2012–P9M),Serge
Osmena (December 2012–P50M), then-Senate President Juan
Ponce Enrile(December 2012–P92M) and current Senate
President Frank Drilon(December 2012–P100M).
“There were two earlier releases made in late August of that
same
year: Greg
Honasan (P50M)
and Francis
Escudero (P99M). No releases were made in 2012 to Senators
Ping Lacson, Joker Arroyo, Pia Cayetano, Bongbong Marcos
and Miriam Defensor-Santiago. In 2013, however, releases were
made for funding requests from the office of Sen.
Arroyo (February
2013–P47M)
and Sen.
Pia
th
Cayetano (January 2013–P50M). The 24 Senator then,
Benigno S. Aquino III, was already President.
GROUNDS
THE DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION PROGRAM (DAP) AND
NBC 541 INFRINGE UPON THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW:
A. THE DAP AND THE NBC 541 VIOLATE SEC. 29 (1), ART. VI OF
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
B. NO DELEGATION OF POWER OF APPROPRIATIONS
4
Abad:
Releases
to
Senators
Part
of
Spending
Acceleration
Program.
Published
on
September
30,
2013.
Available
at
http://www.dbm.gov.ph/?p=7302.
Last
accessed
October
9,
2013.
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14. 14
C. THE DAP AND DBM 541 VIOLATE SEC. 25 (5), ART. VI OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION
D. THE DAP AND NBC 541 VIOLATE SEC. 27 ART. VI OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION
DISCUSSION
32.
This Honorable Court has previously stated, that public
funds provide an even greater temptation for misappropriation and
embezzlement.5 Thus, meticulous rules regarding the appropriation
and disposition of public funds were embodied in our Constitution.
33.
The 1987 Constitution provides for such meticulous rules.
Thus Section 25 (5), Article VI provides for an absolute prohibition
regarding transfer of appropriations, with the sole exception of
savings:
Sec. 25 (5), Article VI, 1987 Constitution
“Section 25 (5). No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer
of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”
34.
Likewise, another Constitutional safeguard provides for an
absolute prohibition regarding paying out public funds from the
national treasury – it must be made ONLY in pursuance of an
appropriation law. Thus,
Sec. 29 (1), Article VI, 1987 Constitution
“No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law”.
35.
The Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) and the
National Budget Circular No. 541 (NBC 541) both infringe on the
aforesaid Constitutional limits regarding appropriation and disposition
and public funds.
A. THE DAP AND THE NBC 541 VIOLATE SEC. 29 (1), ART. VI
OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
36.
Per the DBM website mentioned above, Respondents’
justification for the creation and implementation of the DAP are (1)
Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, (2) Sec. 49 and 38,
5
Demetria
v.
Alba,
supra
14

15. 15
Chapter 5, Book VI of Executive Order No. 292, (3) “use of savings”
provisions found in the General Appropriation Acts for Fiscal Years
2011, 2012 and 2013.
37.
These cited provisions do not suffice to provide for the
legal bases in the creation and implementation of the DAP.
38.
No less than the Constitution mandates that public funds
will not be paid out of the national treasury exception through an
appropriation law enacted by Congress. “Congress alone can
authorize the expenditure of public funds through its power to
appropriate. The power to appropriate carries with it the power to
specify not just the amount that may be spent but also the purpose
for which it may be spent.”6
39.
In the case of DAP, no appropriation law was enacted
stating the amount that may be spent for it, as well as the purpose for
which the DAP may be spent. No appropriation law was enacted by
Congress creating DAP. The cited provisions by Respondents do not
amount to an appropriation law, but merely a futile and belated
attempt to justify an illegal appropriation and disbursement of public
funds and usurpation of the legislative’s power to appropriate public
funds.
40.
DBM 541 also suffers from this Constitutional infirmity.
41.
Tantamount to appropriating public funds, the DBM 541
authorizes the funding “priority programs and projects not considered
in the 2012 budget but expected to be started or implemented during
the fiscal year.” (5.7.3, NBC 541)
42.
Clearly, the DBM 541 is an appropriation of public funds
by the Executive, which did not originate in the House of
Representatives as mandated by Sec. 24, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution which provides:
Sec. 24, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution
“All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing the
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private
bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives,
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.”
B. NO DELEGATION OF POWER OF APPROPRIATIONS
6
Fr.
Joaquin
Bernas,
“1987
Constitution
of
the
Republic
of
the
Philippines:
Commentary”
2003
edition.
15

16. 16
43.
Neither was there any delegation of the power to
appropriate to Respondents.
44.
The cited laws by Respondents to justify DAP – Sec. 49
and 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of Executive Order No. 292, and the “use
of savings” provisions found in the General Appropriation Acts for
Fiscal Years 2011, 2012 and 2013 – could never be the source of
delegated powers by the Legislature to the Executive.
45.
Likewise, the cited laws to justify DBM 541 do not
constitute delegated powers. In 1.0 Rationale, the DBM mentions
Sections 38 and 39, Chapter 5 Book VI of EO 292 as the basis for the
President’s power to impound funds allotted for any agency or
expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act, as well as
the power to withdraw and pool unutilized allotment releases (See
1.0, DBM 541)
46.
Simply put, both DAP and DBM 541 harp on the power of
the President to Impound, and the Use of Savings.
47.
Section 38, Chapter 5 Book VI of EO 292 provided the
limit to the power of the President to suspend expenditure of
appropriation, that is, when such limit or restriction is provided in the
General Appropriations Act, thus
Section 38. Suspension of Expenditure of Appropriations. Except as otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act
and whenever in his judgment the public interest so requires, the
President, upon notice to the head of office concerned, is
authorized to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of
funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure
authorized in the General Appropriations Act, except for personal
services appropriations used for permanent officials and
employees.
48.
The 2012 GAA provides:
Sec. 64. Prohibition Against Impoundment of Appropriations. No
appropriations authorized under this Act shall be impounded
through retention or deduction, unless in accordance with the
rules and regulations to be issued by the DBM: PROVIDED, That
all the funds appropriated for the purposes, programs, projects
and activities authorized under this Act, except those covered
under the Unprogrammed Fund, shall be released pursuant to
Section 33 (3), Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292.
Sec. 65. Unmanageable National Government Budget Deficit.
Retention or deduction of appropriations authorized in this Act
16

17. 17
shall be effected only in cases where there is an unmanageable
national government budget deficit.
Unmanageable national government budget deficit as used in
this section shall be construed to mean that (i) the actual
National Government budget deficit has exceeded the quarterly
budget deficit targets consistent with the full-year target deficit as
indicated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of
Financing submitted by the President and approved by Congress
pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, or (ii) there
are clear economic indications of an impending occurrence of
such condition, as determined by the Development Budget
Coordinating Committee and approved by the President.
49.
Section 64 must be read together with Section 65. In
which case, Presidential power to impound can only be in exercised
in cases “unmanageable national government budget deficit”. In this
case, Respondents failed to state any instance that warrants the
existence of an unmanageable national government budget deficit.
Budgetary under-spending by government agencies cannot be
deemed an “unmanageable” budget deficit, but, on the contrary, may
even result in savings, not deficit, if said funds remain unspent at the
end of the year. This being the case, there is no justification for the
enactment of both DAP and DBM 541, considering that there exists
no unmanageable national government budget deficit that could
trigger the exercise of the power to impound.
50.
Section 39 and 49 Chapter 5 Book VI of EO 292 likewise
provided the limit with respect to the use of savings, thus
Section 39. Authority to Use Savings in Appropriations to Cover
Deficits. - Except as otherwise provided in the General
Appropriations Act, any savings in the regular appropriations
authorized in the General Appropriations Act for programs and
projects of any department, office or agency, may, with the
approval of the President, be used to cover a deficit in any other
item of the regular appropriations: provided, that the creation of
new positions or increase of salaries shall not be allowed to be
funded from budgetary savings except when specifically
authorized by law: provided, further, that whenever authorized
positions are transferred from one program or project to another
within the same department, office or agency, the corresponding
amounts appropriated for personal services are also deemed
transferred, without, however increasing the total outlay for
personal services of the department, office or agency concerned.
Section 49. Authority to Use Savings for Certain Purposes. Savings in the appropriations provided in the General
17

18. 18
Appropriations Act may be used for the settlement of the
following obligations incurred during a current fiscal year or
previous fiscal years as may be approved by Secretary in
accordance with rules and procedures as may be approved by
the President:
(1) Claims of officials, employees and laborers who died or were
injured in line of duty, including burial expenses as authorized
under existing law;
(2) Commutation of terminal leaves of employees due to
retirement, resignation or separation from the service through no
fault of their own in accordance with the provisions of existing
law, including unpaid claims for commutation of maternity leave
of absence;
(3) Payment of retirement gratuities or separation pay of
employees separated from the service due to government
reorganization;
(4) Payment of salaries of employees who have been suspended
or dismissed as a result of administrative or disciplinary action, or
separated from the service through no fault of their own and who
have been subsequently exonerated and reinstated by virtue of
decisions of competent authority;
(5) Cash awards to deserving officials and employees in
accordance with civil service law;
(6) Salary adjustments of officials and employees as a result of
classification action under, and implementation of, the provisions
of the Compensation and Position Classification Act, including
positions embraced under the Career Executive Service;
(7) Peso support to any undertaking that may be entered into by
the government with international organizations, including
administrative and other incidental expenses;
(8) Covering any deficiency in peso counterpart fund
commitments for foreign assisted projects, as may be approved
by the President;
(9) Priority activities that will promote the economic well being of
the nation, including food production, agrarian reform, energy
development, disaster relief, and rehabilitation.
(10) Repair, improvement and renovation of government
buildings and infrastructure and other capital assets damaged by
natural calamities;
(11) Expenses in connection with official participation in trade
fairs, civic parades, celebrations, athletic competitions and
cultural activities, and payment of expenses for the celebration of
regular or special official holidays;
(12) Payment of obligations of the government or any of its
departments or agencies as a result of final judgment of the
Courts; and
(13) Payment of valid prior year's obligations of government
agencies with any other government office or agency, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
18

19. 19
51.
According to the DBM website, DAP is sourced from
savings generated by the government. These savings were sourced
from “(a) the pooling of unreleased appropriations such as
unreleased Personnel Services appropriations which will lapse at the
end of the year, unreleased appropriations of slow moving projects
and discontinued projects per Zero-Based Budgeting findings; and (b)
the withdrawal of unobligated allotments, also for slow-moving
programs and projects, which have earlier been released to national
government agencies.”
52.
DBM 541 covers the “withdrawal of unobligated
allotments as of June 30, 2012 of all national government agencies
(NGAs) charged against FY 2011 Continuing Appropriation (R.A. No.
10147) and FY 2012 Current Appropriation (R.A. No. 10155)”. (3.0,
DBM 541)
53.
These funds that the DAP and the DBM 541 call as
“savings” – the unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments
– are not actually savings following the strict formulation of the
General Appropriation Laws passed by Congress through the years,
thus
Sec. 53. Meaning of Savings and Augmentation. Savings refer to
portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act
free from any obligation or encumbrance which are: (i) still
available after the completion or final discontinuance or
abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the
appropriation is authorized; (ii) from appropriation balances
arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to
vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii)
from appropriation balances realized from the implementation of
measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and
thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required or
planned targets, programs and services approved in this Act at a
lesser cost. xxx (GAA for FY 2013; The same definition is also
provided in the GAA for FY 2012 [see Sec. 54] and FY 2011 [see
Sec. 60])
54.
Following the above definition, there is no justification for
the DAP and DBM 541, simply because there are no savings in both
cases.
C. THE DAP AND DBM 541 VIOLATE SEC. 25 (5), ART. VI OF
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
55.
Section 25 (5) Article VI of the 1987 Constitution prohibits
transfer of appropriations. This simply means that once Congress
19

20. 20
passes the General Appropriation Act (GAA) or any appropriation
law, with or without any veto from the President, the same remains
unalterable and must be executed to the letter.
56.
The appropriations law becomes the law of the land, a
product of the collective effort of the representatives of the people
and the different government agencies. Not even Congress who
passed it can alter the same, without under going the same tedious
process of enacting a law. Such is the wisdom of our Constitution.
57.
As a limited grant nevertheless, the Constitution allows
the President, President of the Senate, Speaker of the House, Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions, to transfer of appropriations ONLY in specific
circumstances: (1) if there is a law; (2) if there are savings; and (3)
only to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices.
58.
The creation and implementation of the DAP and the NCB
541 violate the above-stated provision.
a. THERE IS NO APPROPRATION LAW CREATING THE
DAP
THERE IS NO LAW AUTHORIZING THE WITHDRAWAL
AND
TRANSFER
OF
UNRELEASED
APPROPRIATIONS
AND
UNOBLIGATED
ALLOTMENTS
59.
There is no appropriation law mandating the DAP.
60.
Based on the DBM website the DAP is a “stimulus
package” under the AQUINO administration. It was “approved by the
President on October 12, 2011 upon the recommendation of the
Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) and the
Cabinet Clusters.”
61.
While being peddled as a “stimulus package”, the DAP is
actually an appropriation law which seeks to set aside public funds for
public use. As discussed above, Sec. 24 Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution requires that all appropriation bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives. The DAP, not being
initiated by the House of Representatives, is unconstitutional.
62.
Neither is there any law that authorizes Respondents to
withdraw and transfer appropriations.
20

21. 21
63.
Respondents claim that the provisions of EO 292 and
GAA for FY 2012 and 2013 on impoundment and use of savings are
sufficient legal basis for the creation and implementation of DAP and
NBC 541. They are wrong.
64.
Regarding the authority to impound, the GAA restricts the
exercise of impoundment, and only allows it in case of the existence
of an “unmanageable national government budget deficit”.
Sec. 64. Prohibition Against Impoundment of Appropriations. No
appropriations authorized under this Act shall be impounded
through retention or deduction, unless in accordance with the
rules and regulations to be issued by the DBM: PROVIDED, That
all the funds appropriated for the purposes, programs, projects
and activities authorized under this Act, except those covered
under the Unprogrammed Fund, shall be released pursuant to
Section 33 (3), Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292.
Sec. 65. Unmanageable National Government Budget Deficit.
Retention or deduction of appropriations authorized in this Act
shall be effected only in cases where there is an unmanageable
national government budget deficit.
Unmanageable national government budget deficit as used in
this section shall be construed to mean that (i) the actual
National Government budget deficit has exceeded the quarterly
budget deficit targets consistent with the full-year target deficit as
indicated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of
Financing submitted by the President and approved by Congress
pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, or (ii) there
are clear economic indications of an impending occurrence of
such condition, as determined by the Development Budget
Coordinating Committee and approved by the President.
65.
In this case, there was no actual budget deficit which has
“exceeded the quarterly budget deficit targets” nor “clear economic
indications of an impending occurrence of such condition” which
would justify DAP and NBC 541.
b. THERE ARE NO SAVINGS WHATSOEVER
66.
Respondents claim that the DAP and the NBC 541 pertain
to funds coming from “savings”. The funds that the DAP and the DBM
541 call as “savings” – the unreleased appropriations and unobligated
allotments – are not actually savings and could never become
savings.
21

22. 22
67.
A study of the definition of savings in our appropriations
law through the years would show that the interpretation of
Respondents is so flawed and so contrary to the definition of savings
that it amounts to bad faith and malice.
Sec. 53. Meaning of Savings and Augmentation. Savings refer
to portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this
Act free from any obligation or encumbrance which are: (i) still
available after the completion or final discontinuance or
abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the
appropriation is authorized; (ii) from appropriation balances
arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining
to vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii)
from appropriation balances realized from the implementation
of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and
thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required or
planned targets, programs and services approved in this Act at
a lesser cost. xxx (GAA for FY 2013; The same definition is
also provided in the GAA for FY 2012 [see Sec. 54] and FY
2011 [see Sec. 60])
68.
In essence, savings could only happen when the project
for which the fund was appropriated was ACTUALLY implemented –
whether the same was completed, discontinued or abandoned later
on. The important element is the actual execution of the project.
69.
In the case of unreleased appropriations and unobligated
allotments, the project for which the funds was appropriated was
never executed or was deferred, making it impossible for the
department or agency to realize savings through that project.
70.
Further, savings can never be realized with certainty at
the middle of fiscal year, or even before the end of the fiscal year.
This interpretation is even seconded and acknowledged by the Office
of the President during the budget deliberation of the said Office for
its 2014 budget in the House of Representatives in September 2013.
c. THE TRANSFER OF “SAVINGS” WILL BE TO
AGENCIES/DEPARTMENTS OTHER THAN THE
AGENCIES/DEPARTMENTS
ACCUMULATING
THE SAVINGS IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE
CONSTITUTION
71.
Section 25(5) Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution is explicit
and categorical when it states the limitations on transfer of
appropriations.
22

23. 23
72.
As an exception, “the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”
73.
What this provision only allows is “augmentation” 7 and
only within the respective “offices”8 of the President, President of the
Senate, etc. Thus, AQUINO can only augment from savings derived
by the Office of the President the items also of the Office of the
President. He cannot give it to other departments or agencies.
74.
This interpretation is supported by the Supreme Court
decision in the case of Demetria v. Alba, which struck down as
unconstitutional Sec. 44 of PD 1177 empowering the President to
indiscriminately transfer funds. The questioned provision states
“The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund,
appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and
agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the
General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of
any department, bureau, or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.”
75.
The Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional the
above provision saying
The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and
conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e.
transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item
and such transfer may be made only if there are savings from
another item in the appropriation of the government branch or
constitutional body.
7
Sec.
53
Meaning
of
savings
and
augmentation.
xxx
Augmentation
implies
the
existence
in
this
Act
of
a
program,
activity,
or
project
with
an
appropriation,
which
upon
implementation
or
subsequent
evaluation
of
needed
resources,
is
determined
to
be
deficient.
In
no
case
shall
a
non-­‐existent
program,
activity,
or
project,
be
funded
by
augmentation
from
savings
or
by
the
use
of
appropriations
otherwise
authorized
in
this
Act.
(GAA
for
FY
2013;
The
same
definition
is
also
provided
in
the
GAA
for
FY
2012
[see
Sec.
54]
and
FY
2011
[see
Sec.
60])
8
Sec.
2
Introductory
Provisions
(9)
Office
refers,
within
the
framework
of
governmental
organization,
to
any
major
functional
unit
of
a
department
or
bureau
including
regional
offices.
It
may
also
refer
to
any
position
held
or
occupied
by
individual
persons,
whose
functions
are
defined
by
law
or
regulation.
(EO
292)
23

24. 24
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends
the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the
President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department,
bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be
transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same
are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose
of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It
does not only completely disregard the standards set in the
fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of
legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.
Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in
question null and void.
76.
DAP and NBC 541 utter fail to comply with the
constitutional limits with respect to the use of savings. DAP and NBC
541 allow “savings” to augment budget items outside the “respective
offices” from which the savings were realized, and worse, to fund new
budget items not considered in the previous GAA.
77.
The DBM website informs us
What kind of projects are funded through the DAP?
The programs and projects submitted to the DBM must meet the
following conditions:
a)
Fast-moving or quick-disbursing, e.g. the payment of
obligations incurred from premium subsidy for indigent families in
the National Health Insurance Program;
b)
Urgent or priority in terms of social and economic
development objectives, e.g. the upgrading of equipment and
facilities for specialty hospitals, rehabilitation of Light Rail Transit
and Metro Rail Transit, and the Disaster Risk and Exposure
Assessment for Mitigation (DREAM) program of DOST;
c)
Programs or projects performing well and could deliver
more services to the public with the additional funds e.g. Training
for Work Scholarship Program of DOLE-TESDA.
Some of the items funded through the DAP are expenditures
which are mandated by law, such as capital infusion for the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (R.A. 7653, Section 2) out of the
augmented Budgetary Support to Government CorporationsOthers. (Frequently Asked Questions about DAP)
24

25. 25
78.
While the 5.7.3 of the NBC 541 authorizes the funding of
“priority programs and projects not considered in the 2012 budget
but expected to be started or implemented during the current year.”
79.
Verily, transfer or realignment of “savings” to these kinds
of programs and projects not considered in the 2012 budget are in
utter violation of the constitution. It is tantamount to an appropriation
law which is clearly a legislative mandate and not the function of
Respondents.
D. THE DAP AND NBC 541 VIOLATE SEC. 27 ART. VI OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION
80.
Before the GAA becomes a law, the Constitution
mandates that the same be presented to the President, who has the
power to veto any particular item or items in the appropriation bill. If
the President exercises the veto power, Congress is given the
opportunity to override the veto.
Sec. 27, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution
(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a
law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same
he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the
same with his objections to the House where it originated,
which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and
proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, twothirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass
the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the
other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if
approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it
shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each
House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names
of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its
Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill
to the House where it originated within thirty days after the
date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if
he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular
item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the
veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not
object.
81.
The President is given the power to item-veto the
particulars, details, the distinct and severable parts of the
appropriation bill.
82.
However, item-veto is available to the President only
before an appropriation bill becomes a law. If the President does not
exercise the item-veto and the appropriation bill becomes a law, then
25

26. 26
he is bound to execute the law faithfully as is mandated to him by the
Constitution.
83.
The DAP and the NBC 541 are executive creations which
are noxious to this constitutional process. The funds from which the
Respondents intended to impound and transfer, or were actually
impounded and transferred, were funds appropriated by Congress
through the General Appropriations Acts for FY 2011, 2012 and 2013.
84.
The DAP and the NBC 541 are actually unilateral
executive amendments to duly enacted appropriation laws, which
Respondents have no authority or power to do. Not even Congress
can amend the appropriation laws without passing an amendatory
law in accordance with the Constitutional procedures.
CONLUSION
85.
The call to abolish the pork barrel system continue to
intensify and the people’s actions take different forms -- through court
action, mobilization, resort to people’s initiative, and if necessary
even impeachment of the President. This present Petition questioning
Respondents’ realignment of public funds amounting to billions of
pesos is also an effort contributing to the people’s call to abolish the
pork barrel system.
86.
The pork barrel system, we maintain, consists not only of
the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) currently being
litigated by this Honorable Court, but also of the bigger presidential
pork barrel amounting to at least P900 Billion. As of the filing of this
present Petition, the pork barrel system remains in the national
budget.
87.
The funds accumulated through the DAP and by virtue of
NBC 541 is also part of the presidential pork barrel, wherein AQUINO
has the sole discretion where the funds will go and used for
patronage politics. It is very apparent that the DAP was used for
patronage politics, if not graft and corruption. A concrete example of
this is how P50 Million or more was given as “incentive” to senators
who voted to impeach Corona, while the rest did not receive any.
88.
Additionally, we cannot help but comment on the sorry
state of the Philippine budget system, characterized not only to fiscal
dictatorship by the President as exemplified by the unbridled and
illegal realignment of funds discussed above, but also of fiscal hocus
pocus. Yearly, national government agencies and departments
request for hundreds of millions or billions of pesos, equipped as they
were for the grilling during the budget deliberations in Congress and
fought tooth and nail to justify their request. And yet, at the end of the
26

27. 27
fiscal year these same agencies and departments accumulate
millions and/or billions worth of savings!
89.
From the foregoing, it is necessary for this Honorable
Court to declare the illegality and unconstitutionality of the DAP and
the NBC 541.
GROUNDS FOR ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER AND/OR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
90.
Petitioners likewise move for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin
Respondents from implementing the DAP in order to protect the
substantive rights and interests of Petitioners while the case is
pending before this Honorable Court. Since Respondents already
reiterated that DAP will continue to be implemented, then there exists
an extreme necessity for the Honorable Court to issue a writ or a
TRO.
91.
Public funds have already been disbursed much to the
prejudice of the rights of Petitioners. The DBM reported a total of
P142.23 Billion spent so far under the DAP, with P83.53 Billion
spent in 2011 and another P 58.7 Billion in 2012. These huge
amounts were spent on budgetary items many of which were not in
the 2011 or 2012 GAA passed by Congress. These items include the
following:
i. 15.13 Billion was released to the DILG “for
modernization of the PNP” and “redevelopment of
Roxas Boulevard”.
ii. P4.5 Billion for MRT 3 to purchase “additional train
cars”, when in fact, according to the DOTC, there
will be no additional train cars until the end of the
term of Pres. Aquino.
iii. P1.82 Billion for the CPLA and MNLF through the
amorphous PAMANA fund.
iv. P26.9 Billion for GOCCs. These GOCCs have
Billions as budgetary support under the Special
Purpose Funds of the GAA, and another Billions in
the Unprogrammed Funds, will again be given a
huge amount under DAP. This is surely
unconscionable.
v. P8.5 Billion “stimulus fund” for ARMM on top of its
regular budget of P11.8 Billion. These additional
Billions were not found in the 2012 budget
vi. P 625 Million just to conduct a survey on farmers
and fisherfolks by DAR and DA
27

28. 28
vii. Billions given to legislators including the P50-100
Million given to Senators as incentive in the
impeachment trial of Chief Justice Renato Corona.
viii. P1.29 Billion for “Agrarian Reform Communities
Project 2 of the DAR.
92.
Petitioners were able to clearly show that they are entitled
to the issuance of an injunctive relief for having complied with the
requirement set forth by the Rules, to wit: (a) the invasion of right
sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the
complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.9
93.
Because of the usurpation by Respondents of the
legislative’s power of appropriation and transfer of appropriation
under the Constitution, Petitioners’ rights as taxpayer and legislator
have been violated. They sustained and will continue to sustain
personal and substantial injury, necessitating the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction against the
implementation of the DAP, in order to prevent further damage
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully
prayed of this Honorable Court the following:
(1) That this Petition be given due course
(2) That a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary
injunction be issued to restrain the Respondents from
implementing the Disbursement Acceleration Program and the
National Budget Circular No. 541 during the pendency of this
Petition;
(3) That after notice and hearing, a final order be issued declaring
as NULL AND VOID the Disbursement Acceleration Program
and the National Budget Circular No. 541; and permanently
enjoining Respondents from implementing the DAP and NBC
541.
Other reliefs just and equitable under the circumstances are
likewise prayed for.
Respectfully submitted. Quezon City for Manila. October 11, 20
9
PSBA
vs
Tolentino-­‐Genilo,
G.R.
No.
159277
December
21,
2004.
28

29. 29
ATTY. JOVENCIO H. EVANGELISTA
Counsel for Petitioners
No. 45 K-7 St., Brgy. West Kamias, Quezon City
email: evangelista_law@yahoo.com
PTR No. 1444212; 01.10.13; Manila
IBP No. 836618; 01.10.13; Manila
MCLE Compliance No. IV-0007340; 08.10.12
Attorney’s Roll No. 42797
th
ATTY. VANESSA QUIAMBAO MAGUIGAD
Counsel for Petitioners
No. 45 K-7 St., Brgy. West Kamias, Quezon City
Mobile No. 0906-3288104
email: anet_maguigad@yahoo.com
IBP No. 836619; 01.10.13, Manila Chapter III
PTR No. 1444212; 01.10.13, Manila
MCLE Compliance No. IV-0007341; 08.10.12
Attorney’s Roll No. 58291, 05-04-10
th
MARIA CRISTINA P. YAMBOT
Counsel for Petitioners
No. 45 K-7 St., Brgy. West Kamias, Quezon City
PTR No. 9611432/01-07-13/Rizal
IBP No. 922644/01-08-13/Rizal
Roll No. 59700
MCLE Compliance No. IV – 0016616/04-11-13
th
EXPLANATION OF SERVICE OF PETITION
THROUGH REGISTERED MAIL
The service of copies of the instant Petition is made through
registered mail, as personal service thereof cannot be made due
to distance and lack of available personnel. This explanation is
made pursuant to Rule 13, Section 11 of the Rules of Court.
MARIA CRISTINA P. YAMBOT
29