The document discusses whether police violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in obtaining Ms. Hasty's cell phone location data and questioning her. Regarding the Fourth Amendment, it argues Ms. Hasty did not have a subjective or reasonable expectation of privacy in her location data given she voluntarily used a smartphone and posted location on social media. It also argues no trespass occurred as police obtained the data from her provider, not directly from her phone. Regarding the Fifth Amendment, it argues Ms. Hasty was not in custody during questioning at school as she voluntarily went to the principal's office, was not restrained, and was free to leave at any time. Therefore, neither her Fourth nor Fifth Amendment rights were violated.

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ARGUMENT
Issue I
Whether or not the police conducted a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment when
they obtained Horizon’s business records containing Ms. Hasty’s cell phone locational
data?
The police did not conduct a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment when they
obtained Horizon’s business records containing Ms. Hasty’s cell phone locational data. The
Fourth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution states that we guarantee, “The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause...” This right
protects the privacy and freedom of the people by limiting the government from making arbitrary
intrusions. Over the years the interpretation of this Amendment and its exceptions have changed
and because of this it is now up to the courts to determine what searches and seizures constitute
as violations of your Fourth Amendment right . The issue today lies in, whether or not the police
conducted a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment when they obtained a cell phone
service provider’s business records containing a user’s cell phone locational date. Ultimately we
must decide which test is appropriate to use in determining this issue, Katz’s two part test or the
Trespassory Test in Jones. In 1967, a test was created in Katz v. United States to determine
whether or not a search was reasonable or not. What must be determined in this test is: 1.) the
subjective intent/the person’s subjective expectation of privacy, and 2.) the societal expectation
of privacy; whether or not society is willing to accept this expectation, or lack, of privacy. In
2012, the Trespassory Test was created in United States v.s. Jones. This test intends to look at
the search done by a government in the light of a trespass; when the government tries to gain
information through an unlawful trespass on “persons, houses, papers, and effects”, probable

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cause or a search warrant is needed to lawfully conduct that search. We must apply both of these
tests in determining the issue at hand, it must pass both tests in order for the search to be
constitutional.
1. Ms. Hasty did not exhibit a subjective expectationof privacy.
In 1967, a test was created in Katz v. United States to determine whether or not a search was
reasonable or not. What must be determined in this test is: 1.) the subjective intent/the person’s
subjective expectation of privacy, and 2.) the societal expectation of privacy; whether or not
society is willing to accept this expectation, or lack, of privacy.
A. Ms. Hasty chose to own a smartphone as opposed to another type of cell phone.
The first test that we should apply is the Subjective Test from Katz. We must first look at the
subjective expectation of privacy in the locational data by Taylor Hasty. Ms. Hasty allegedly
graffitied multiple buildings and in her act she posted several photographs. The police did not
violate Hasty’s right by obtaining the phone’s locational records as she chose to have a
smartphone with this feature. She voluntarily waived her right to privacy of location in choosing
to have a smartphone that communicates on a frequent basis with cell phone towers. It is a well-
known concept that cell phones are connected to towers provided by cell phone companies and
in the use of the cell phone locational data is given up at a far greater frequency.
B. Ms. Hasty constantly carried and used this smartphone.
Ms. Hasty constantly carried and used her smartphone and as a result she waived her
expectation of privacy knowing that the use of her cell phone would ping off of the cell phone
towers Horizon had set up providing the service to her.

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C. Ms. Hasty actively posted on social media using her cell phone and did not
take any affirmative steps to show she manifested an expectation of privacy in her
locational data.
Although Ms. Hasty had her account of “private” all of the followers and friends she had on
her social media account were able to see her location when she willingly posted them on the
social media sites. We must also keep in mind that Ms. Hasty was a very popular individual at
her school and as a result she must have had a greater range of other students she had allowed to
access what she posted on social media.
D. Ms. Hasty also geotags her social media posts.
Along with the use of her phone, Hasty made several social media posts with geo-tags that
allowed her followers to see the location in which the posts were made. During the seventy-five
day period Hasty’s locational records were tracked, she made 198 calls; 14,175 text; posted
several times on social media; and as a over this span of time the police were able to retrieve
18,753 locational data points. Therefore, Taylor Hasty did not foster a subjective expectation of
privacy.
2. Ms. Hasty’s expectationof Privacy is NOT one societyis willing to
recognize as reasonable.
A. Society does not recognize an expectation of privacy in data recording public
movements.
In the case that it is found that Hasty did foster a subjective expectation of privacy, we must
also look at too see if society is willing to recognize the locational data on phones as having a
reasonable expectation of privacy.In United States v. Davis, the court found that society does
not recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy of records that are owned or given to a third

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party. In this case, the locational records of Hasty’s phone were owned and created by Horizon
(Hasty’s cell phone provider).
B. Society does not recognize an expectation of privacy in records owned by a third
party as reasonable.
The court in United States v. Miller found that in a case where information is “voluntarily
turned over to a third party” we must not have any reasonable expectation of privacy. The
information collected by Horizon were business records in a voluntary mass gathering of
information used for the services of the customer.
C. Society does not recognize an expectation of privacy in records voluntarily turned
over to a third party as reasonable.
From the beginning of the cell phone era, society has been aware of the meaning behind the
signal bars of the cell phone; marking your distance and connectivity with the nearest cellphone
tower. Because of this we are aware and allow ourselves to be subjected to the ability of our
location to be detected. Taylor Hasty knew during the period of time she was tracked that her
phone was bouncing off signal from the cell phone towers nearby.
D. Cell tower location records do not contain a user’s private communication.
In United States v. Knotts, the court found that a person has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in their movements. All of the locational data points regarding the incidents were made
in public streets and because of this society is not willing to recognize any expectation of privacy
in Hasty’s behave. We as a society have acknowledged the invasion of privacy by obtaining
smartphones and in the process we have waived a part of our expectation of privacy.

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3. The Fordham Police Departmentdid not trespass upon Mr.
Hasty’s personalpapers.
In 2012, the Trespassory Test was created in United States v.s. Jones. This test intends to
look at the search done by a government in the light of a trespass; when the government tries to
gain information through an unlawful trespass on “persons, houses, papers, and effects”,
probable cause or a search warrant is needed to lawfully conduct that search. We must apply
both of these tests in determining the issue at hand, it must pass both tests in order for the search
to be constitutional.
A. The CSLI records belonged to Horizon NOT Ms. Hasty.
Horizon collected Ms. Hasty’s CSLI in order to provide her with the cellphone service they
were paying them for. These were business records that the company used to be able to monitor
her cell phone usage and at no point was Ms. Hasty given any access to the records as they were
exclusively under the ownership of Horizon.
B. Horizon, not the police, recorded Ms. Hasty’s cell phone locational
data.
There was never a search conducted by the government as Horizon was the party tracking
Hasty to be able to provide their cell service. According to Jones, “a search occurs when the
person can claim a justifiable, reasonable or a legitimate expectation of privacy that has been
invaded by government action.” Going back to the societal recognition, Hasty has no justifiable,
reasonable or a legitimate expectation of privacy because she was out in public voluntarily
giving up her location to a third party authorized to create and keep records of it.
C. The police did not physically attach anything to Hasty’s cell phone to
constitute a trespass.

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We must determine whether or not the government tried to gain information through an
unlawful trespass on “persons, houses, papers, and effects.” The first part of the test is the
determination if the government physically occupied Hasty’s private property for the purposes of
obtaining information. This first part of this test does not apply because the government never
implanted a tracking device on Hasty’s phone or anything in that sense.

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Issue II
Whether or not Ms. Hasty was subjected to a custodial interrogation in violation of the
Fifth Amendment when she was questioned by Officer Sheeran in her principal’s office?
Ms. Hasty was not subjected to a custodial interrogation in violation of the Fifth Amendment
when she was questioned by Officer Sheeran in her principal’s office. The Fifth Amendment
states that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”
This amendment protects individuals from making criminal statements against themselves that
can be used against them at time of trial. This court in Miranda v. Arizona ruled that if a person
is in custody and they are interrogated, they should be read their rights. The police must read an
individual their Miranda rights if: (1) the individual is in custody, and (2) the individual is
subject to an interrogation. If an individual’s rights are not rest under the previous criteria, their
constitutional rights are violated and therefore any statements made are not admissible at trial
under the Exclusionary Rule. According to Stansbury v. California, an individual being in
custody is defined as “a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree
associated with a formal arrest.” The Ninth Circuit in U.S. v. Beraun-Panez further interpreted
the definition by finding that the Court must find whether a reasonable person would believe that
they were not free to leave. The Fifth Circuit found in U.S. v. Ortiz that in determining whether
an individual was in custody all factors must be considered, none of which are dispositive. When
we look at the second factor, an individual being under interrogation, we turn to Rhode Island v.
Innis that defined an interrogation as any actions or words by a police officer that “the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the target.” The Court
in Pennsylvania v. Muniz found that “general questioning of citizens in the fact finding
process” is not subject to these safeguards because routine questions are not classified as
interrogations. To determine if an officer’s statements are considered to be interrogatory

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Arizona v. Mauro found that the suspect’s perception and the officer’s intent must be taken into
count in determining whether an interrogation existed. It was found in Miranda that if an
individual is in custody and is subject to an interrogation, their rights must be read to them. If
their rights are read to them then any and all statements made are admissible at the day of trial.
When considering whether Taylor was in custody when she spoke to Officer Sheeran we must
look at the following factors: (1) whether she entered the principal's office compelled or
voluntary, (2) whether she spoke voluntarily in the office, (3) whether she was physically
restrained, (4) whether she was psychologically restrained, (5)whether she was asked to leave,
(6) whether she was told she could leave, (7) whether the location was familiar or at least neutral,
(8) whether fifteen minutes was too long, (9) whether she was immediately arrested following
the questioning, and (10) whether the atmosphere inside the principal’s office that day was police
dominated. After considering all of these factors you will find that Ms. Hasty was not in custody.
1. Ms. Hasty was NOT in custody.
A. Ms. Hasty entered the principal's office voluntarily.
The Court in U.S. v. Kim found that “a suspect is not in custody if she voluntarily approaches
or accompanies law enforcement.” Ms. Hasty was asked by her Principal if she would take a
moment to talk in his and she said that although her friend were waiting for her, that she would
make time for the principal. Upon the Principal’s request Hasty considered, feeling that she had
the ability to decline his request, whether she would go into the office to speak with him. This
was a voluntary action and she vocally expressed that she chose to speak with him although her
friends were waiting for her. This court ruled in Innis that “a suspect is not in custody if she
voluntarily approaches or accompanies law enforcement. Unlike in U.S. v. Jackson, Hasty was

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not forcibly brought into the room to speak with Officer Sheeran, she was given the choice and
she entered the room voluntarily.
B. Ms. Hasty spoke voluntarily in the office.
Once Hasty was in the room Principal Closs began the conversation by asking her about her
classes for the semester and cheerleading. For the majority of the conversation Ms. Hasty was
being asked about her academics and extracurricular activities. When the Officer asked her about
the roles she takes on in school, she began to list her positions. If Ms. Hasty felt pressured into
speaking with the Officer she would not have gone into elaborate answer in regards to her
schooling. Ms. Hasty told Officer Sheeran about the roles she takes on at school, her
motivations, and even the fact that she wanted to become a lawyer. This similar the case United
States v. Courtney where officers went to speak with the lady at her job and the court found the
interview to be constitutional. A person feeling forced to talk would make their answers quick
and concise.
C. Ms. Hasty was not physically restrained.
This court concurred in J.B.D. v. North Carolina with their previous decision in Oregon v.
Mathiason that any police interview of an individual suspected of a crime has ‘coercive aspects
to it.’ Only those interrogations that occur while a suspect is in police custody, however,
‘heighte[n] the risk” that statements obtained are not the product of the suspect’s free choice.’”
In this case Ms. Hasty had free choice and was not physically restrained. Being that she entered
the office voluntarily and informed the principal that her friends were waiting for her, Hasty was
free to leave at any given moment that she wished. Unlike in Kim, the door to the principal’s
office was never locked, therefore the officer never gained control of the scene of the scene. Ms.
Hasty was never forced to sit and stay during the duration of her time in the office, nor was she

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ever handcuffed. Ms. Hasty was able to stand up and leave at any moment after previously
informing the principal that she had friends waiting for her. Officer Sheeran remained sitting
down on the other side of the large office and she chose her seating freely. Therefore, Taylor
Hasty was never physically restrained in the office.
D. Ms. Hasty was not psychologically restrained.
This court in J.B.D. concurred with the court in Stansbury that “in some circumstances, a
child’s age “would have affected how a reasonable person” in the suspect’s position “would
perceive his or her freedom to leave.” Although Ms. Hasty was sixteen years old at the time of
the incident, Ms. Hasty cannot be compared to the thirteen year old in J.B.D. As Officer Sheeran
learned in the office that day, Ms. Hasty had taken on several leadership roles in school,
including being the school’s President. Taking into account Ms. Hasty’s outstanding academic
achievements and her leadership roles at the time, she cannot be considered an average sixteen
year old and so her understanding of the circumstances were far greater of any average child. Ms.
Hasty was not physically restrained simply because she saw Officer Sheeran’s handcuffs.
Officers are known to carry handcuffs regularly, therefore there was no reason for her to perceive
that she was subject to an arrest. The record also does not state that Officer Sheeran was ever
carrying a weapon while he was speaking to Hasty. Ms. Hasty should have felt comfortable
having Principal Closs (a familiar figure) there during the conversation with Officer Sheeran
sitting in the well furnished room. When Hasty was asked about the vandalism occurring around
the city, she responded by calling it “awesome”. A reasonable person who would have felt
restrained would have not responded to nonchalantly. Taking all the circumstances into account.
Ms. Hasty did not feel psychologically restrained.

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E. Ms. Hasty did not ask to leave but was free to do so.
In United States v. Moya, Moya was not in custody because he never asked to leave.
Similarly. Ms. Hasty never asked the to leave the office or showed any signs of wanting to leave.
Ms. Hasty remained seated throughout the entire conversation, never being told to sit down. If
she did not want to be in the office, she would not have made herself comfortable and open in
her answers in the conversation. Hasty was never told she was being interrogated, because she
wasn’t. Just like in Oregon v. Mathiason, Hasty was voluntarily in the presence of the officer
and during the duration of the conversation she never asked or made it apparent that she wanted
to leave the office.
F. Ms. Hasty was told she could leave.
Hasty never asked to leave the office, however, Principal Closs did ask Hasty if she wanted to
head back to class. Once Officer Sheeran began to stray from the original conversation, the
principal essentially told her that she could leave. Unlike in Kim, Hasty was free to leave at any
given moment and Closs reassured her of that. Being that Hasty had informed him that she had
friends waiting for her, he was conscious that her time was limited and seeing that fifteen
minutes had passed by, Closs told her that she could leave and terminated the interview.
G. Ms. Hasty was familiar with the principal’s office.
Hasty was very familiar with the principal’s office being that she was the President of the
school and attended several meetings there with the principal. When Principal Closs approached
her to speak in the office, she was very familiar to where she was going. When she entered the
office she sat down. A reasonable individual who has never entered a room before or does not
have any familiarity with the room would not voluntarily sit down without being told to do so.
Therefore, Hasty was very familiar with the location of the interview unlike in U.S. v. Jackson

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or U.S. v. Ortiz where the statements made by the individuals were done under law enforcement
atmospheres.
H. The fifteen minute interview with Ms. Hasty was not too long.
The Fifth Circuit found in Ortiz that the defendant was not in custody in the thirty minute
interview with two officers. Hasty had a fifteen minute interview that was conducted by one
officer and her principle, a familiar figure. For the majority of the conversation the three were
discussing Hasty’s school work and extracurricular activities. This court in Mathiason found
that “ general on the scene questioning or other general questioning of the citizens in the fact
finding process is not required in context of Miranda.” The questioning about the vandalism
occurring around the city lasted a mere two minutes out of the entire fifteen she was in the office.
Officer Sheeran simply referenced the vandalism briefly and following that Hasty was free to
leave.
I. Ms. Hasty was not immediately arrested following the questioning.
The Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Manta-Carillo found that if a suspect is arrested
immediately following an interview, he/she was most likely subjected to an interrogation. In this
case, Ms. Hasty was not immediately arrested after the interview. Hasty returned to class and
was arrested after school. During the time period that she was let go and when she was arrested,
it is reasonable to assume that Officer Sheeran collected more evidence that led to her arrest.
Unlike most of the cases that have been referenced, Hasty was not arrested prior to the incident
or immediately after, there were several hours before the arrest occurred.

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J. The atmosphere inside the principal’s office that day was not police
dominated.
Unlike in Kim and United States v. Cavazos, only one officer was present during Hasty’s
interview. The interview took place in the principal’s office of her school and not in an
interrogation room at the police station or the back of a cop car. Principal Closs’ presence and
involvement in the interview shows that the atmosphere was not dominated by Officer Sheeran.
Hasty was not subjected to express questioning by the Officer and the principal was there to
mediate the interview. After the officer started to make references to the vandalism and Hasty
didn’t seem to respond, Principle Closs even dismissed Hasty, ending the interview.
2. Ms. Hasty was NOT subjected to an interrogation.
A. Hasty perceived the interview to be a conversation and NOT a
questioning.
Ms. Hasty did not feel that she was being interrogated during the interview. Throughout the
duration of the interview Hasty was very elaborate with her answers. When she was asked about
the recent graffiti around the city she responded by saying that it was “awesome.” Unlike in
Jackson, Hasty was not at the police station in handcuffs being questioned by an officer. The
petitioner might argue that the handcuffs might have made Hasty feel threatened and that she
was under an interrogation but officers are known to carry handcuffs while on duty. She chose to
sit down in the office and for the majority of the time that she was in the office she was the one
speaking. Officer Sheeran was having a conversation with Hasty and she responded with ease.
B. Sheeran did not intend to interrogate Ms. Hasty.
When determining if Ms. Hasty was under interrogation the court also considers the intent of
the officer during the time the individual spoke with the officer. Officer Sheeran did not
interrogate Ms. Hasty when he interviewed her in the Principal's office. Rhode Island v. Innis
defined an interrogation as any actions or words by a police officer that “the police should know

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are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the target.” During the interview
Officer Sheeran asked Hasty about her school work and merely referenced the graffiti around the
city. If Officer Sheeran meant to interrogate Ms. Hasty he would have blantly told her what he
knows and that he wanted her cooperation, like in Jackson. In fact, during the interview Hasty
did not elicit an incriminating statement, which led Officer Sheeran to leave and arrest Ms. Hasty
when he had greater evidence.

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CONCLUSION
Issue I
In this case, Taylor Hasty v. United States of America, we must look at both the Katz and
Jones tests in determining whether or not the police conducted a search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment when they obtained a cell phone service provider’s business records containing a
user’s cell phone locational date. In implying the Katz test we have found that: 1.) Taylor Hasty
did not manifest a subjective expectation of privacy through her actions and 2.) even if she were
to have acted in the interest of her privacy, society has accepted the ramifications of having
smartphones with the capability to pinpoint the location of any individual for the conveniency of
having the devices. We also found that the Jones test does not apply because: 1.) the government
never physically occupied Hasty’s private property for the purpose of obtaining information and
2.) she had no justifiable, reasonable, or legitimate expectation of privacy that has been invaded
by actions of the government. The search in this case failed both of these tests, therefore the
retrieval of Hasty’s location points over the 75 span of time during the acts of vandalism is
constitutional and we respectfully ask that you affirm.
Issue II
In this case, Taylor Hasty v. United States of America, Ms. Hasty was not under custody or
subjected to an interrogation while being interviewed by Officer Sheeran in the principal’s
office. We have proven that: (1) she entered the principal's office voluntarily, (2) she spoke
voluntarily in the office, (3) she was not physically restrained, (4) she was not psychologically
restrained, (5)she did not ask to leave but was free to do so, (6) she was told she could leave, (7)
she was familiar with the principal’s office, (8) the fifteen minute interview was not too long, (9)
she was not immediately arrested following the questioning, and (10) the atmosphere inside the

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principal’s office that day was not police dominated. If this court finds that an individual
speaking with an officer is considered to be in custody, then individuals will be afraid to speak
with law enforcement and would hinder the investigation process of officers. Society would not
trust law enforcement or feel that they are able to speak with them without being in custody.
Taylor Hasty, under the Miranda Test, was not in custody or subjected to interrogation.
Therefore, we respectfully ask that you affirm the lower court’s decision and find that Taylor
Hasty’s Fifth Amendment right was not violated.