· Answer the following questions in a 100- to 150 word response:
· Describe the role of policing in relationship to juvenile justice.
· Discuss the different discretionary actions police officers may take in relation to juveniles they encounter.
· Describe the effects of gangs on juveniles.
· Compare community policing strategies regarding law enforcement’s role in relation to juveniles.
· Distinguish between educational, prevention, and community programs for juveniles:
· What are juvenile probation camps? What is meant by intensive aftercare? Are such alternative sanctions effective at reducing recidivism? Why or why not?
·
· Summarize the history of police–juvenile relationships.
· Summarize juveniles’ attitudes toward the police.
· Describe police discretion and the factors that influence discretion.
· Summarize how police process juveniles.
· Describe how police agencies are structured to deal with juvenile crime.
· Summarize developing trends in how police deal with juveniles.
· Outline the development of gangs in the United States.
· Describe the types and activities of gangs.
· Summarize efforts to prevent and control gangs
·
UNCLASSIFIED
Generic SCADA Risk
Management Framework
For
Australian Critical Infrastructure
Developed by the
IT Security Expert
Advisory Group (ITSEAG)
(Revised March 2012)
Disclaimer: To the extent permitted by law, this document is provided without any liability
or warranty. Accordingly it is to be used only for the purposes specified and the reliability
of any assessment or evaluation arising from it are matters for the independent judgement
of users. This document is intended as a general guide only and users should seek
professional advice as to their specific risks and needs.
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 2 of 48
Document Change History
Version Change Description
1.0a Initial version for internal review
1.0b Incorporated internal review feedback
1.1 Final changes for ITSEAG presentation
1.2 Incorporated monitoring cycle into section 3.7.
2.0 Added preface and addressed final review comments.
2.1 Reviewed and updated to latest standards – Dec 2011
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 3 of 48
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Background ...................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Scope ............................................................................................................................... 5
1.3 Key Terms and Definitions ................................................................................................ 6
1.4 References ....................................................................................................................... 7
1.5 Acknowledgements .........................
This document provides a generic risk management framework (RMF) for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems used in critical infrastructure. The framework was developed by the IT Security Expert Advisory Group (ITSEAG) to help owners and operators of SCADA systems assess and manage security risks. The RMF outlines a methodology based on international risk management standards. It includes steps to establish the risk management context, identify risks, analyze risks, evaluate risks, treat risks, and monitor risks over time. The document also provides examples of generic SCADA system components and processes to assess, a sample threat and risk assessment, and a risk treatment plan.
This document provides an overview of threats to industrial control systems (ICS) in 2015-2016. It finds that ICS incidents increased significantly, with 295 reported in 2015 alone. The main targets were critical manufacturing, energy, water and dams, and transportation systems. Nation-states, cybercriminals, and insiders engaged in attacks that disrupted operations and in some cases caused physical damage. Going forward, the threats are expected to grow as adversaries develop new tactics like ransomware targeting ICS and insider threats continue to be a problem. Organizations must take steps to strengthen ICS security through measures like secure network architecture and incident response planning.
Dr Dev Kambhampati | Electric Utilities Situational AwarenessDr Dev Kambhampati
This document is a draft of a NIST special publication providing guidance on situational awareness solutions for electric utilities. It includes an executive summary, approach, architecture, and security characteristics for implementing situational awareness. The publication describes a challenge electric utilities face in gaining comprehensive visibility across separate IT, operational technology, and physical security systems. It then outlines a solution developed by NIST to integrate these systems using commercial and open source tools to improve detection of cybersecurity incidents and support regulatory compliance. The benefits of the solution include improved cybersecurity, faster incident response, and more effective risk management.
NIST Guide- Situational Awareness for Electric UtilitiesDr Dev Kambhampati
This document is a draft of a NIST special publication providing guidance on situational awareness solutions for electric utilities. It includes an executive summary, approach, architecture, and security characteristics for implementing situational awareness. The publication describes a NCCoE project that developed an example solution to converge monitoring across IT, operational technology, and physical access systems in order to improve utilities' ability to detect cyberattacks and security incidents. The solution is presented as a modular guide to help utilities implement standards-based technologies in a risk-based manner to gain efficiencies in monitoring, identification, and response to cyber incidents.
This document provides a framework for technology governance and risk management for financial institutions in Pakistan. It outlines guidelines for establishing an IT governance structure, developing IT and digital strategies, defining roles and responsibilities, implementing policies and standards, and managing information security, IT operations, projects, and business continuity. The framework is intended to help financial institutions strengthen technology risk management and align IT with business objectives.
Analyze:
1. Foreign Stock
a. Samsung Electronics LTD. (Korean Stock Exchange)
b. Focus on phone explosions
*Monitor their performance throughout the semester (begin: 9/15/2016, end: 12/2/2016), reflecting on the performance of each at the end of the semester, and providing a forward looking discussion of their prospects as of end of the semester.
→ what happened, why, recommendation/opinion (hold, sell), future performance
*the more graphs/data the better!!
Grading of the project will be based on the following criteria: (1) the neatness of the written report, (2) the extensiveness and relevance of research information gathered regarding each asset, (3) the inclusion of your own opinions and observations in the report
Fill this out:
Price Information on Holdings
Foreign Stock
Ticker
Beginning Value on __/__/___
in Local Currency
Exchange Rate of Local Currency with USD on __/__/____
Beginning Value on __/__/___
in USD
Ending Value on __/__/___
in Local Currency on __/__/____
Exchange Rate of Local Currency with USD on __/__/____
Ending Value on __/__/___
in USD
Percentage Change in the Value of Local Currency
Percentage Change in the Value of Stock in Local Currency
Percentage Change in the Value of Stock in USD
Framework for Improving
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity
Version 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology
February 12, 2014
February 12, 2014 Cybersecurity Framework Version 1.0
Table of Contents
Executive Summary .........................................................................................................................1
1.0 Framework Introduction .........................................................................................................3
2.0 Framework Basics...................................................................................................................7
3.0 How to Use the Framework ..................................................................................................13
Appendix A: Framework Core.......................................................................................................18
Appendix B: Glossary....................................................................................................................37
Appendix C: Acronyms .................................................................................................................39
List of Figures
: Framework Core Structure .............................................................................................. 7
Figure 1
Figure 2: Notional Information and Decision Flows within an Organization .............................. 12
List of Tables
Table 1: Function and Category Unique Identifiers ..................................................................... 19
Table 2: Framework Core ..................................................................................................
The International Association of Risk and Compliance Professionals (IARCP) today announced a major revision of the Certified Information Systems Risk and Compliance Professional (CISRCP) certification program.
This document provides an overview of NIST SP 800-37, Revision 1, which establishes a risk management framework (RMF) for federal information systems. The RMF is a six-step process for managing risk to systems: (1) categorize the system, (2) select security controls, (3) implement controls, (4) assess controls, (5) authorize the system, and (6) monitor controls continuously. The RMF aims to integrate security into system development lifecycles and provide near real-time risk management through continuous monitoring. It also links system-level risk management to the organizational level through a risk executive function.
This document provides a generic risk management framework (RMF) for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems used in critical infrastructure. The framework was developed by the IT Security Expert Advisory Group (ITSEAG) to help owners and operators of SCADA systems assess and manage security risks. The RMF outlines a methodology based on international risk management standards. It includes steps to establish the risk management context, identify risks, analyze risks, evaluate risks, treat risks, and monitor risks over time. The document also provides examples of generic SCADA system components and processes to assess, a sample threat and risk assessment, and a risk treatment plan.
This document provides an overview of threats to industrial control systems (ICS) in 2015-2016. It finds that ICS incidents increased significantly, with 295 reported in 2015 alone. The main targets were critical manufacturing, energy, water and dams, and transportation systems. Nation-states, cybercriminals, and insiders engaged in attacks that disrupted operations and in some cases caused physical damage. Going forward, the threats are expected to grow as adversaries develop new tactics like ransomware targeting ICS and insider threats continue to be a problem. Organizations must take steps to strengthen ICS security through measures like secure network architecture and incident response planning.
Dr Dev Kambhampati | Electric Utilities Situational AwarenessDr Dev Kambhampati
This document is a draft of a NIST special publication providing guidance on situational awareness solutions for electric utilities. It includes an executive summary, approach, architecture, and security characteristics for implementing situational awareness. The publication describes a challenge electric utilities face in gaining comprehensive visibility across separate IT, operational technology, and physical security systems. It then outlines a solution developed by NIST to integrate these systems using commercial and open source tools to improve detection of cybersecurity incidents and support regulatory compliance. The benefits of the solution include improved cybersecurity, faster incident response, and more effective risk management.
NIST Guide- Situational Awareness for Electric UtilitiesDr Dev Kambhampati
This document is a draft of a NIST special publication providing guidance on situational awareness solutions for electric utilities. It includes an executive summary, approach, architecture, and security characteristics for implementing situational awareness. The publication describes a NCCoE project that developed an example solution to converge monitoring across IT, operational technology, and physical access systems in order to improve utilities' ability to detect cyberattacks and security incidents. The solution is presented as a modular guide to help utilities implement standards-based technologies in a risk-based manner to gain efficiencies in monitoring, identification, and response to cyber incidents.
This document provides a framework for technology governance and risk management for financial institutions in Pakistan. It outlines guidelines for establishing an IT governance structure, developing IT and digital strategies, defining roles and responsibilities, implementing policies and standards, and managing information security, IT operations, projects, and business continuity. The framework is intended to help financial institutions strengthen technology risk management and align IT with business objectives.
Analyze:
1. Foreign Stock
a. Samsung Electronics LTD. (Korean Stock Exchange)
b. Focus on phone explosions
*Monitor their performance throughout the semester (begin: 9/15/2016, end: 12/2/2016), reflecting on the performance of each at the end of the semester, and providing a forward looking discussion of their prospects as of end of the semester.
→ what happened, why, recommendation/opinion (hold, sell), future performance
*the more graphs/data the better!!
Grading of the project will be based on the following criteria: (1) the neatness of the written report, (2) the extensiveness and relevance of research information gathered regarding each asset, (3) the inclusion of your own opinions and observations in the report
Fill this out:
Price Information on Holdings
Foreign Stock
Ticker
Beginning Value on __/__/___
in Local Currency
Exchange Rate of Local Currency with USD on __/__/____
Beginning Value on __/__/___
in USD
Ending Value on __/__/___
in Local Currency on __/__/____
Exchange Rate of Local Currency with USD on __/__/____
Ending Value on __/__/___
in USD
Percentage Change in the Value of Local Currency
Percentage Change in the Value of Stock in Local Currency
Percentage Change in the Value of Stock in USD
Framework for Improving
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity
Version 1.0
National Institute of Standards and Technology
February 12, 2014
February 12, 2014 Cybersecurity Framework Version 1.0
Table of Contents
Executive Summary .........................................................................................................................1
1.0 Framework Introduction .........................................................................................................3
2.0 Framework Basics...................................................................................................................7
3.0 How to Use the Framework ..................................................................................................13
Appendix A: Framework Core.......................................................................................................18
Appendix B: Glossary....................................................................................................................37
Appendix C: Acronyms .................................................................................................................39
List of Figures
: Framework Core Structure .............................................................................................. 7
Figure 1
Figure 2: Notional Information and Decision Flows within an Organization .............................. 12
List of Tables
Table 1: Function and Category Unique Identifiers ..................................................................... 19
Table 2: Framework Core ..................................................................................................
The International Association of Risk and Compliance Professionals (IARCP) today announced a major revision of the Certified Information Systems Risk and Compliance Professional (CISRCP) certification program.
This document provides an overview of NIST SP 800-37, Revision 1, which establishes a risk management framework (RMF) for federal information systems. The RMF is a six-step process for managing risk to systems: (1) categorize the system, (2) select security controls, (3) implement controls, (4) assess controls, (5) authorize the system, and (6) monitor controls continuously. The RMF aims to integrate security into system development lifecycles and provide near real-time risk management through continuous monitoring. It also links system-level risk management to the organizational level through a risk executive function.
The document discusses cyber crimes and IT risk management. It provides a list of common cyber crimes and notes that India ranks 11th in the world for share of malicious computer activity. It also discusses the extent of cyber crimes according to various reports. The document outlines reasons why cyber attacks are possible and provides an overview of solutions to combat cyber crimes, including implementing security systems and processes. It also discusses various IT security frameworks and standards.
The document discusses cyber crimes and IT risk management. It provides a list of common cyber crimes and notes that India ranks 11th in the world for share of malicious computer activity. It also discusses the extent of cyber crimes according to various reports. The document outlines reasons why cyber attacks are possible and provides solutions to combat cyber crimes, including implementing security systems and processes. It discusses various IT security frameworks and standards such as ISO 27000, COBIT, and NIST.
The digital transformation in physical security Paolo Sciarappa
To fully understand the digital transformation of Physical Security, it is necessary to analyze the context in which it has evolved by retracing the phases of its evolution and its relations with other sectors of security. Through this analysis I will illustrate the profound changes it has undergone, the new opportunities and its new role in security.
The document discusses the CIS Critical Security Controls and provides the following key points:
1) The CIS Critical Security Controls are a recommended set of actions for cyber defense that provide specific ways to stop today's most dangerous attacks. They are developed and supported by a large community of security experts.
2) The Controls prioritize and focus on a smaller number of high-impact actions with the goal of an immediate "must do first" approach. They serve as the basis for immediate high-value cybersecurity actions.
3) The U.S. Federal Reserve audit community uses the Controls as a framework to coordinate and prioritize their cybersecurity audits across the different regional banks. This allows them to comprehensively assess
Risk Mitigation Plan Based On Inputs ProvidedTiffany Graham
1. The access control policy outlines how access control methodologies will secure information systems through authorization and access restriction. A reference monitor will enforce access controls based on authorizations in an administrator-managed database.
2. Discretionary access control allows flexible user-defined access permissions but increases security risks if data is made too accessible. Mandatory access control uses a hierarchy approach where the system administrator centrally controls all resource access settings.
3. The policy will employ both discretionary and mandatory access control. Discretionary control allows flexibility while mandatory control provides centralized administration of access to increase security overall. Together these methods balance usability with strict
Cisco 2017 Midyear Cybersecurity Report
Executive Summary
Executive Summary
For nearly a decade, Cisco has published comprehensive cybersecurity reports that are designed to keep security teams and the businesses they support apprised of
cyber threats and vulnerabilities—and informed about steps they can take to improve security and cyber-resiliency. In these reports, we strive to alert defenders to the
increasing sophistication of threats and the techniques that adversaries use to compromise users, steal information, and create disruption. Go to www.esgjrconsultinginc.com to learn more about Software/Network Engineering Solutions.
1973-16 Tackling the challenges of cyber security_19_03_15shed59
The document discusses cyber security risks facing the energy and utilities industry. It outlines several high-profile attacks from 2010-2014 targeting energy companies. These companies are seen as valuable targets due to the critical infrastructure they support and valuable operational/customer data held. The industry is increasingly reliant on digital technologies like smart grids, which increases security risks. The document recommends establishing governance, improving skills, understanding business risks, managing third parties, implementing secure architectures, and establishing response capabilities to address challenges in a 7-step process. It also describes PA's Industrial Control System Security Health Check for assessing risks.
Cybersecurity of Smart Cities is a controversial topic today. Researchers and professionals are debating the viability and sustainability of a large complex environment, which heavily relies on the digital infrastructure, especially from a cybersecurity perspective. Smart cities continuously deploy and update information and communication technology (ICT) to enhance the quality of life for citizens.
This document provides a playbook for responding to denial of service (DoS) attacks with objectives, activities, and stakeholders for preparation, detection, remediation, and post-incident phases. The playbook outlines initial containment activities such as requesting traffic drops from internet service providers, filtering traffic, and patching vulnerabilities. It also describes reporting, investigation, containment, eradication, and post-incident review and reporting requirements.
This document discusses how applying process safety best practices can improve operational technology (OT) cybersecurity. It outlines the five independent protection layers (IPLs) for process safety - inventory and configuration management, automatic process controls, human intervention, safety instrumented systems, and physical protection. Applying best practices to each IPL layer improves OT cybersecurity by making any operational changes from cyber attacks more apparent so they can be addressed quicker. Effective configuration management and change control are especially important, as the Stuxnet attack showed how undetected changes could damage equipment over time. Overall, following process safety practices enhances control performance, alarms, interfaces, and system resilience while countering modern cyber threats.
Critical Infrastructure Protection against targeted attacks on cyber-physical...Enrique Martin
This White Paper looks the higher impact (and therefore riskier) attacks on cyber-physical systems in critical infrastructure control networks and propose protection by making some changes on organizations structures and procedures and new technologies of intrusion detection based on analysis behavior of control protocols and correlation of operational events.
This document provides a Cyber Incident Response Plan (CIRP) for an organization. It outlines the roles and responsibilities for responding to cyber incidents, including establishing a Cyber Incident Response Team (CIRT) and Crisis Management Team. The CIRP describes an 8-step incident response process that includes preparing, identifying, analyzing, containing, eradicating, recovering from, reporting on, and learning from incidents. It also provides guidance on communications, updating the plan, and includes appendices on forensic imaging, contact information for response teams, and abbreviations.
Cyber security white paper final PMD 12_28_16Dave Darnell
The document discusses cyber security concerns in the energy industry based on surveys and reports. A 2015 survey of over 150 IT professionals in the energy sector found that 75% saw successful cyber attacks increase over the last 12 years, over 75% of attacks came from external sources, and over 80% believed a cyber attack could cause physical infrastructure damage within a year. The document also outlines cyber security standards and frameworks established by organizations like FERC, NERC, and DOE for the energy industry. It provides an overview of the company Systrends and their cyber security credentials and services available to help organizations improve their cyber security profile and preparedness.
Biznesa infrastruktūras un datu drošības juridiskie aspektiebuc
Biznesa infrastruktūras un datu drošības juridiskie aspekti. Carlos Trigoso, EY Eiropas, Vidējo Austrumu, Indijas un Āfrikas reģiona vadības konsultāciju centra Informācijas drošības virziena vecākais projektu vadītājs.
The document is the user's guide for the FFIEC Cybersecurity Assessment Tool. It provides an overview of the tool and guidance for institutions on how to complete the assessment. The assessment consists of two parts - an Inherent Risk Profile to identify inherent cyber risks, and a Cybersecurity Maturity assessment across five domains to determine preparedness levels. It describes how to determine risk levels for inherent risk factors and maturity levels for controls. The goal is to help institutions measure cybersecurity risks and preparedness over time to enhance risk management.
Guidelines on Security and Privacy in Public Cloud ComputingDavid Sweigert
Uploaded as a courtesy by:
Dave Sweigert
CEH, CISA, CISSP, HCISPP, PCIP, PMP, SEC+
Abstract
Cloud computing can and does mean different things to different people. The common characteristics most interpretations share are on-demand scalability of highly available and reliable pooled computing resources, secure access to metered services from nearly anywhere, and displacement of data and services from inside to outside the organization. While aspects of these characteristics have been realized to a certain extent, cloud computing remains a work in progress. This publication provides an overview of the security and privacy challenges pertinent to public cloud computing and points out considerations organizations should take when outsourcing data, applications, and infrastructure to a public cloud environment.
Citation: Special Publication (NIST SP) - 800-144
WHITE PAPER - The Importance of CIP in the Energy Sector v2.0.pdfFas (Feisal) Mosleh
NERC CIP outline for energy utilities. The growing energy sector must understand how to improve its critical infrastructure protection as outlined by the NERC CIP standards in North America.
https://youtu.be/EbFj7I_K37Q
This document provides information packages to help small and medium enterprises select and apply suitable risk assessment and risk management methods for information security. It first explains why managing IT security risks is important for businesses. The document then gives an overview of risk assessment and risk management processes and defines some key terms. It also provides examples of typical business processes, IT systems, and risk profiles for two sample SMEs. Finally, it presents some risk assessment and risk management methods that could work well for SMEs given their typical profiles and resource constraints.
This document is a SafeAssign originality report for a student paper on implementing cybersecurity in the energy sector. The report indicates a 29% match on average between the student paper and existing sources. Specifically, the highest match was 29% with a final research paper in the institutional database. The student paper had an average word count of 3,304 words.
1 Network Analysis and Design This assignment is.docxoswald1horne84988
1
Network Analysis and Design
This assignment is worth 30%.
Deadline: Mon, Week 12
Part A: HQ LAN Upgrade (35%)
Background:
ABC is a big company in the US. ABC has employed you as the IT officer of the company.
Your job is to analyse the performance of the HQ LAN, suggest changes to improve the
network performance and provide a report to your boss.
Settings:
Run all simulations for 30 minutes to simulate a working day.
The graphs should be time averaged
Duplicate scenario for each possible setup
Tasks:
1. Analyse the current performance of the HQ LAN for each level and comment on it.
You are required to show all relevant graphs. The graphs for each level can be
overlaid. (10%)
2. Some staffs are unhappy about the speed of the network. Anything that takes more
than 1 second is not desirable. You have decided to try the following to improve the
network performance. Show the relevant graphs and comment on the results: (5%)
a. Increase the link speeds of
i. HQ_Router1 to HQ_Router3 from 1 Gbps to 10 Gbps and
ii. HQ_Router2 to HQ_Router3 from 1 Gbps to 10 Gbps
b. Increase the LANs for level 1, 2 and 3 from 100 Mbps to 1 Gbps
c. Try out 1 other way that meets the requirement.
3. After meeting the requirement, the company has decided to purchase an Ethernet
Server and placed it in the HQ LAN. (10%)
a. Rename it to HQ Server
b. Use a 1Gbps link
c. Set Application: Supported Services to All
d. Set statistics to view the following:
i. Server DB Task Processing Time (Heavy)
ii. Server Email Task Processing Time (Heavy)
iii. Server HTTP Task Processing Time (Heavy)
iv. Server Performance Task Processing Time
e. Show the performance of the HQ Server with the required graphs and
comment on the results
f. Justify the location of the server
g. State at least 3 security measures you will take to protect the HQ LAN from
malicious attacks
4. What would you do so that all the 4 statistics of the HQ server are less than 0.025 s?
Show all relevant graphs. (3 marks)
2
5. Prepare a report and state the additional amount of money that is needed for the
changes you have made to meet the additional requirements. Refer to the given price
list in the Appendix. (7%)
a. Your report should include a content page, a summary of the addressed issues,
objectives, budgeting, proposed solutions and conclusion.
Part B: Network Design (65%)
Background:
Due to your excellent work in the analysis of the HQ LAN, you are now assigned the new
task of designing the LAN for one of ABC’s client, XYZ. The company XYZ is made up of 4
sections and the number of people in each section is as shown below.
1. Research – 20
2. Technical – 10
3. Guests – 4
4. Executives – 2
Set up the following staff profile:
1. Research: file transfer (light), web browsing (heavy) and file print (light)
2. Technical: Database Access (heavy), telnet (heavy) and email (light)
3. Guests: Em.
1 Name _____________________________ MTH129 Fall .docxoswald1horne84988
1
Name: _____________________________
MTH129 Fall 2018 - FINAL EXAM A
Show all work neatly on paper provided. Label all work. Place final answers on the answer sheet.
PART I: Omit 1 complete question. Place an “X” on the problems & answer space you are omitting.
1. Find the inverse of the following functions:
a. 𝑓(𝑥) = 2𝑥 − 3
b. 𝑓(𝑥) =
3𝑥 +1
𝑥−2
2. If 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑥 2 − 2𝑥 + 3 and 𝑔(𝑥) = −3𝑥 + 4, find the following:
a. (𝑓°𝑔)(𝑥) b. (𝑓°𝑔)(2)
3. Find the domain for the following expression:
a) √𝑥 + 5 𝑏) 7𝑥 2 + 3𝑥 − 1 𝑐)
𝑥 2+4
𝑥 2−9
4. Find the radian measures of the angles with the given degree measures.
a) 81°
Find the degree measures of the angles with the given radian measures.
b)
13𝜋
6
5. Solve the following equations:
a) (5t) = 20
b) 6000 = 40(15)t
6. Expand the following logarithmic expressions:
a. log(𝐴𝐵2 )
b. ln(
4
√3
)
7. Describe how the graph of each function can be obtained from the graph f
a. 𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥) − 8
b. 𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥 + 4) − 5
8. A real number t is given 𝑡 =
2𝜋
3
a. Find the reference number for t.
b. Find the terminal point P(x,y) on the unit circle determined by t
c. The unit circle is centered at __________________ and has a radius of _________________
PART II: Omit 1 complete question. Place an “X” on the problems & answer space you are omitting.
2
1. A sum of $7,000 is invested at an interest rate of 4
1
2
% per year, compounding monthly. (round all answers to
the nearest cent)
a. Find the amount of the investment after 2
1
2
years.
b. How long will it take for the investment to amount to $12,000?
c. Using the information in part (a), find the amount of the investment if compounded quarterly.
2. When a company charges price p dollars for one of its products, its revenue is given by
𝑅 = 𝑓(𝑝) = 500𝑝(30 − 𝑝)
a. Create a quadratic function for price with respect to revenue.
b. What price should they charge in order to maximize their revenue?
c. What is the maximum revenue?
d. What would be the revenue if the price was set at $10?
e. Sketch a rough graph – indicate the intercepts and the maximum coordinates.
3. The charges for a taxi ride are an initial charge of $2.50 and $0.85 for each mile driven.
a. Write a function for the charge of a taxi ride as a linear function of the distance traveled.
b. What is the cost of a 12 mile trip?
c. Find the equation of a line that passes through the following points: (1,-2) , (2,5) Express in 𝑦 =
𝑚𝑥 + 𝑏 form
d. Graph part ( c )
4. a. Divide the following polynomial and factor completely.
𝑃(𝑥) = 3𝑥 4 − 9𝑥 3 − 2𝑥 2 + 5𝑥 + 3; 𝑐 = 3
b. Given polynomial−𝑥 2 + 5𝑥 − 6, state the end behavior of its graph.
c. Using the polynomial on part ( c ), would this g
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The document discusses cyber crimes and IT risk management. It provides a list of common cyber crimes and notes that India ranks 11th in the world for share of malicious computer activity. It also discusses the extent of cyber crimes according to various reports. The document outlines reasons why cyber attacks are possible and provides an overview of solutions to combat cyber crimes, including implementing security systems and processes. It also discusses various IT security frameworks and standards.
The document discusses cyber crimes and IT risk management. It provides a list of common cyber crimes and notes that India ranks 11th in the world for share of malicious computer activity. It also discusses the extent of cyber crimes according to various reports. The document outlines reasons why cyber attacks are possible and provides solutions to combat cyber crimes, including implementing security systems and processes. It discusses various IT security frameworks and standards such as ISO 27000, COBIT, and NIST.
The digital transformation in physical security Paolo Sciarappa
To fully understand the digital transformation of Physical Security, it is necessary to analyze the context in which it has evolved by retracing the phases of its evolution and its relations with other sectors of security. Through this analysis I will illustrate the profound changes it has undergone, the new opportunities and its new role in security.
The document discusses the CIS Critical Security Controls and provides the following key points:
1) The CIS Critical Security Controls are a recommended set of actions for cyber defense that provide specific ways to stop today's most dangerous attacks. They are developed and supported by a large community of security experts.
2) The Controls prioritize and focus on a smaller number of high-impact actions with the goal of an immediate "must do first" approach. They serve as the basis for immediate high-value cybersecurity actions.
3) The U.S. Federal Reserve audit community uses the Controls as a framework to coordinate and prioritize their cybersecurity audits across the different regional banks. This allows them to comprehensively assess
Risk Mitigation Plan Based On Inputs ProvidedTiffany Graham
1. The access control policy outlines how access control methodologies will secure information systems through authorization and access restriction. A reference monitor will enforce access controls based on authorizations in an administrator-managed database.
2. Discretionary access control allows flexible user-defined access permissions but increases security risks if data is made too accessible. Mandatory access control uses a hierarchy approach where the system administrator centrally controls all resource access settings.
3. The policy will employ both discretionary and mandatory access control. Discretionary control allows flexibility while mandatory control provides centralized administration of access to increase security overall. Together these methods balance usability with strict
Cisco 2017 Midyear Cybersecurity Report
Executive Summary
Executive Summary
For nearly a decade, Cisco has published comprehensive cybersecurity reports that are designed to keep security teams and the businesses they support apprised of
cyber threats and vulnerabilities—and informed about steps they can take to improve security and cyber-resiliency. In these reports, we strive to alert defenders to the
increasing sophistication of threats and the techniques that adversaries use to compromise users, steal information, and create disruption. Go to www.esgjrconsultinginc.com to learn more about Software/Network Engineering Solutions.
1973-16 Tackling the challenges of cyber security_19_03_15shed59
The document discusses cyber security risks facing the energy and utilities industry. It outlines several high-profile attacks from 2010-2014 targeting energy companies. These companies are seen as valuable targets due to the critical infrastructure they support and valuable operational/customer data held. The industry is increasingly reliant on digital technologies like smart grids, which increases security risks. The document recommends establishing governance, improving skills, understanding business risks, managing third parties, implementing secure architectures, and establishing response capabilities to address challenges in a 7-step process. It also describes PA's Industrial Control System Security Health Check for assessing risks.
Cybersecurity of Smart Cities is a controversial topic today. Researchers and professionals are debating the viability and sustainability of a large complex environment, which heavily relies on the digital infrastructure, especially from a cybersecurity perspective. Smart cities continuously deploy and update information and communication technology (ICT) to enhance the quality of life for citizens.
This document provides a playbook for responding to denial of service (DoS) attacks with objectives, activities, and stakeholders for preparation, detection, remediation, and post-incident phases. The playbook outlines initial containment activities such as requesting traffic drops from internet service providers, filtering traffic, and patching vulnerabilities. It also describes reporting, investigation, containment, eradication, and post-incident review and reporting requirements.
This document discusses how applying process safety best practices can improve operational technology (OT) cybersecurity. It outlines the five independent protection layers (IPLs) for process safety - inventory and configuration management, automatic process controls, human intervention, safety instrumented systems, and physical protection. Applying best practices to each IPL layer improves OT cybersecurity by making any operational changes from cyber attacks more apparent so they can be addressed quicker. Effective configuration management and change control are especially important, as the Stuxnet attack showed how undetected changes could damage equipment over time. Overall, following process safety practices enhances control performance, alarms, interfaces, and system resilience while countering modern cyber threats.
Critical Infrastructure Protection against targeted attacks on cyber-physical...Enrique Martin
This White Paper looks the higher impact (and therefore riskier) attacks on cyber-physical systems in critical infrastructure control networks and propose protection by making some changes on organizations structures and procedures and new technologies of intrusion detection based on analysis behavior of control protocols and correlation of operational events.
This document provides a Cyber Incident Response Plan (CIRP) for an organization. It outlines the roles and responsibilities for responding to cyber incidents, including establishing a Cyber Incident Response Team (CIRT) and Crisis Management Team. The CIRP describes an 8-step incident response process that includes preparing, identifying, analyzing, containing, eradicating, recovering from, reporting on, and learning from incidents. It also provides guidance on communications, updating the plan, and includes appendices on forensic imaging, contact information for response teams, and abbreviations.
Cyber security white paper final PMD 12_28_16Dave Darnell
The document discusses cyber security concerns in the energy industry based on surveys and reports. A 2015 survey of over 150 IT professionals in the energy sector found that 75% saw successful cyber attacks increase over the last 12 years, over 75% of attacks came from external sources, and over 80% believed a cyber attack could cause physical infrastructure damage within a year. The document also outlines cyber security standards and frameworks established by organizations like FERC, NERC, and DOE for the energy industry. It provides an overview of the company Systrends and their cyber security credentials and services available to help organizations improve their cyber security profile and preparedness.
Biznesa infrastruktūras un datu drošības juridiskie aspektiebuc
Biznesa infrastruktūras un datu drošības juridiskie aspekti. Carlos Trigoso, EY Eiropas, Vidējo Austrumu, Indijas un Āfrikas reģiona vadības konsultāciju centra Informācijas drošības virziena vecākais projektu vadītājs.
The document is the user's guide for the FFIEC Cybersecurity Assessment Tool. It provides an overview of the tool and guidance for institutions on how to complete the assessment. The assessment consists of two parts - an Inherent Risk Profile to identify inherent cyber risks, and a Cybersecurity Maturity assessment across five domains to determine preparedness levels. It describes how to determine risk levels for inherent risk factors and maturity levels for controls. The goal is to help institutions measure cybersecurity risks and preparedness over time to enhance risk management.
Guidelines on Security and Privacy in Public Cloud ComputingDavid Sweigert
Uploaded as a courtesy by:
Dave Sweigert
CEH, CISA, CISSP, HCISPP, PCIP, PMP, SEC+
Abstract
Cloud computing can and does mean different things to different people. The common characteristics most interpretations share are on-demand scalability of highly available and reliable pooled computing resources, secure access to metered services from nearly anywhere, and displacement of data and services from inside to outside the organization. While aspects of these characteristics have been realized to a certain extent, cloud computing remains a work in progress. This publication provides an overview of the security and privacy challenges pertinent to public cloud computing and points out considerations organizations should take when outsourcing data, applications, and infrastructure to a public cloud environment.
Citation: Special Publication (NIST SP) - 800-144
WHITE PAPER - The Importance of CIP in the Energy Sector v2.0.pdfFas (Feisal) Mosleh
NERC CIP outline for energy utilities. The growing energy sector must understand how to improve its critical infrastructure protection as outlined by the NERC CIP standards in North America.
https://youtu.be/EbFj7I_K37Q
This document provides information packages to help small and medium enterprises select and apply suitable risk assessment and risk management methods for information security. It first explains why managing IT security risks is important for businesses. The document then gives an overview of risk assessment and risk management processes and defines some key terms. It also provides examples of typical business processes, IT systems, and risk profiles for two sample SMEs. Finally, it presents some risk assessment and risk management methods that could work well for SMEs given their typical profiles and resource constraints.
This document is a SafeAssign originality report for a student paper on implementing cybersecurity in the energy sector. The report indicates a 29% match on average between the student paper and existing sources. Specifically, the highest match was 29% with a final research paper in the institutional database. The student paper had an average word count of 3,304 words.
Similar to · Answer the following questions in a 100- to 150 word response .docx (20)
1 Network Analysis and Design This assignment is.docxoswald1horne84988
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Network Analysis and Design
This assignment is worth 30%.
Deadline: Mon, Week 12
Part A: HQ LAN Upgrade (35%)
Background:
ABC is a big company in the US. ABC has employed you as the IT officer of the company.
Your job is to analyse the performance of the HQ LAN, suggest changes to improve the
network performance and provide a report to your boss.
Settings:
Run all simulations for 30 minutes to simulate a working day.
The graphs should be time averaged
Duplicate scenario for each possible setup
Tasks:
1. Analyse the current performance of the HQ LAN for each level and comment on it.
You are required to show all relevant graphs. The graphs for each level can be
overlaid. (10%)
2. Some staffs are unhappy about the speed of the network. Anything that takes more
than 1 second is not desirable. You have decided to try the following to improve the
network performance. Show the relevant graphs and comment on the results: (5%)
a. Increase the link speeds of
i. HQ_Router1 to HQ_Router3 from 1 Gbps to 10 Gbps and
ii. HQ_Router2 to HQ_Router3 from 1 Gbps to 10 Gbps
b. Increase the LANs for level 1, 2 and 3 from 100 Mbps to 1 Gbps
c. Try out 1 other way that meets the requirement.
3. After meeting the requirement, the company has decided to purchase an Ethernet
Server and placed it in the HQ LAN. (10%)
a. Rename it to HQ Server
b. Use a 1Gbps link
c. Set Application: Supported Services to All
d. Set statistics to view the following:
i. Server DB Task Processing Time (Heavy)
ii. Server Email Task Processing Time (Heavy)
iii. Server HTTP Task Processing Time (Heavy)
iv. Server Performance Task Processing Time
e. Show the performance of the HQ Server with the required graphs and
comment on the results
f. Justify the location of the server
g. State at least 3 security measures you will take to protect the HQ LAN from
malicious attacks
4. What would you do so that all the 4 statistics of the HQ server are less than 0.025 s?
Show all relevant graphs. (3 marks)
2
5. Prepare a report and state the additional amount of money that is needed for the
changes you have made to meet the additional requirements. Refer to the given price
list in the Appendix. (7%)
a. Your report should include a content page, a summary of the addressed issues,
objectives, budgeting, proposed solutions and conclusion.
Part B: Network Design (65%)
Background:
Due to your excellent work in the analysis of the HQ LAN, you are now assigned the new
task of designing the LAN for one of ABC’s client, XYZ. The company XYZ is made up of 4
sections and the number of people in each section is as shown below.
1. Research – 20
2. Technical – 10
3. Guests – 4
4. Executives – 2
Set up the following staff profile:
1. Research: file transfer (light), web browsing (heavy) and file print (light)
2. Technical: Database Access (heavy), telnet (heavy) and email (light)
3. Guests: Em.
1 Name _____________________________ MTH129 Fall .docxoswald1horne84988
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Name: _____________________________
MTH129 Fall 2018 - FINAL EXAM A
Show all work neatly on paper provided. Label all work. Place final answers on the answer sheet.
PART I: Omit 1 complete question. Place an “X” on the problems & answer space you are omitting.
1. Find the inverse of the following functions:
a. 𝑓(𝑥) = 2𝑥 − 3
b. 𝑓(𝑥) =
3𝑥 +1
𝑥−2
2. If 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑥 2 − 2𝑥 + 3 and 𝑔(𝑥) = −3𝑥 + 4, find the following:
a. (𝑓°𝑔)(𝑥) b. (𝑓°𝑔)(2)
3. Find the domain for the following expression:
a) √𝑥 + 5 𝑏) 7𝑥 2 + 3𝑥 − 1 𝑐)
𝑥 2+4
𝑥 2−9
4. Find the radian measures of the angles with the given degree measures.
a) 81°
Find the degree measures of the angles with the given radian measures.
b)
13𝜋
6
5. Solve the following equations:
a) (5t) = 20
b) 6000 = 40(15)t
6. Expand the following logarithmic expressions:
a. log(𝐴𝐵2 )
b. ln(
4
√3
)
7. Describe how the graph of each function can be obtained from the graph f
a. 𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥) − 8
b. 𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑥 + 4) − 5
8. A real number t is given 𝑡 =
2𝜋
3
a. Find the reference number for t.
b. Find the terminal point P(x,y) on the unit circle determined by t
c. The unit circle is centered at __________________ and has a radius of _________________
PART II: Omit 1 complete question. Place an “X” on the problems & answer space you are omitting.
2
1. A sum of $7,000 is invested at an interest rate of 4
1
2
% per year, compounding monthly. (round all answers to
the nearest cent)
a. Find the amount of the investment after 2
1
2
years.
b. How long will it take for the investment to amount to $12,000?
c. Using the information in part (a), find the amount of the investment if compounded quarterly.
2. When a company charges price p dollars for one of its products, its revenue is given by
𝑅 = 𝑓(𝑝) = 500𝑝(30 − 𝑝)
a. Create a quadratic function for price with respect to revenue.
b. What price should they charge in order to maximize their revenue?
c. What is the maximum revenue?
d. What would be the revenue if the price was set at $10?
e. Sketch a rough graph – indicate the intercepts and the maximum coordinates.
3. The charges for a taxi ride are an initial charge of $2.50 and $0.85 for each mile driven.
a. Write a function for the charge of a taxi ride as a linear function of the distance traveled.
b. What is the cost of a 12 mile trip?
c. Find the equation of a line that passes through the following points: (1,-2) , (2,5) Express in 𝑦 =
𝑚𝑥 + 𝑏 form
d. Graph part ( c )
4. a. Divide the following polynomial and factor completely.
𝑃(𝑥) = 3𝑥 4 − 9𝑥 3 − 2𝑥 2 + 5𝑥 + 3; 𝑐 = 3
b. Given polynomial−𝑥 2 + 5𝑥 − 6, state the end behavior of its graph.
c. Using the polynomial on part ( c ), would this g
1 Lab 8 -Ballistic Pendulum Since you will be desig.docxoswald1horne84988
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Lab 8 -Ballistic Pendulum
Since you will be designing your own procedure you will have two
class periods to take the required data.
The goal of this lab is to measure the speed of a ball that is fired
from a projectile launcher using two different methods. The
Projectile launcher has three different settings, “Short Range,”
“Medium Range” and “Long Range,” however you will only need to
determine the speed for any ONE of these Range settings.
Method 1 involves firing the ball directly into the “Ballistic
Pendulum” shown below in Figure 2 for which limited instructions will be provided. Method 2
is entirely up to your group. While you have significant freedom to design your own procedure,
you will need to worry about the random and systematic uncertainties you are introducing
based on your procedure. This manual will provide a few hints to help reduce a few of those
uncertainties.
The ballistic pendulum pictured in Figure 2 is important canonical problem students study to
explore the conservation of momentum and energy. The ball is fired by the projectile launcher
into a “perfectly inelastic collision” with the pendulum. The pendulum then swings to some
maximum angle which is measured by an Angle Indicator.
Caution: The pendulum has a plastic hinge and Angle Indicator which are both fragile. Be
gentle.
Study the ballistic pendulum carefully. Before we begin, here are a few things to consider and
be aware of in Figure 2:
Projectile launcher
Angle indicator (curved
black bar)
Clamp
Pendulum (can be removed
for measurements)
Figure 2: Ballistic Pendulum
Plumb bob
Firing string
Release
point
Figure 1: Projectile Launcher
Bolt for removing pendulum
2
A. Clamping the ballistic pendulum to the table will reduce random uncertainties in the
speed with which the projectile launcher releases the ball. Similarly, you should check
that the various bolts are snug and that the ball is always fully inside the launcher (not
rolling around inside the barrel of launcher).
B. If the lab bench is not perfectly horizontal the plumb bob and angle indicator will not
read zero degrees before you begin your experiment. You should fix AND/OR account
for these discrepancies.
C. In Figure 3 you will notice a tiny gap between the launcher and the pendulum. This
important gap prevents the launcher from contacting the pendulum directly as the ball
is fired. Without this gap an unknown amount of momentum is transferred from the
launcher directly to the pendulum (in addition to the momentum transferred by the
ball) significantly complicating our experiment.
Figure 3: Important gap between Launcher and Pendulum
Equipment
1 Ballistic Pendulum (shown in Figure 2)
A bag with three balls
1 loading rod
1 Clamp
1 triple beam balance scale
Safety goggles for each group member
Any equipment found in your equipment drawer.
Reasonable equipment reque.
1 I Samuel 8-10 Israel Asks for a King 8 When S.docxoswald1horne84988
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I Samuel 8-10
Israel Asks for a King
8 When Samuel grew old, he appointed his sons as Israel’s leaders.[a]2 The
name of his firstborn was Joel and the name of his second was Abijah, and
they served at Beersheba. 3 But his sons did not follow his ways. They turned
aside after dishonest gain and accepted bribes and perverted justice.
4 So all the elders of Israel gathered together and came to Samuel at
Ramah. 5 They said to him, “You are old, and your sons do not follow your
ways; now appoint a king to lead[b] us, such as all the other nationshave.”
6 But when they said, “Give us a king to lead us,” this displeasedSamuel; so
he prayed to the LORD. 7 And the LORD told him: “Listen to all that the people
are saying to you; it is not you they have rejected, but they have rejected
me as their king. 8 As they have done from the day I brought them up out of
Egypt until this day, forsaking me and serving other gods, so they are doing
to you. 9 Now listen to them; but warn them solemnly and let them
know what the king who will reign over them will claim as his rights.”
10 Samuel told all the words of the LORD to the people who were asking him
for a king. 11 He said, “This is what the king who will reign over you will claim
as his rights: He will take your sons and make them serve with his chariots
and horses, and they will run in front of his chariots. 12 Some he will assign to
be commanders of thousands and commanders of fifties, and others to plow
his ground and reap his harvest, and still others to make weapons of war
and equipment for his chariots. 13 He will take your daughters to be
perfumers and cooks and bakers. 14 He will take the best of your fields and
vineyards and olive groves and give them to his attendants. 15 He will take a
tenth of your grain and of your vintage and give it to his officials and
attendants. 16 Your male and female servants and the best of your cattle[c] and
donkeys he will take for his own use. 17 He will take a tenth of your flocks,
and you yourselves will become his slaves. 18 When that day comes, you will
cry out for relief from the king you have chosen, but the LORD will not
answer you in that day.”
https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1%20Samuel+8&version=NIV#fen-NIV-7371a
https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1%20Samuel+8&version=NIV#fen-NIV-7375b
https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1%20Samuel+8&version=NIV#fen-NIV-7386c
2
19 But the people refused to listen to Samuel. “No!” they said. “We wanta
king over us. 20 Then we will be like all the other nations, with a king to lead
us and to go out before us and fight our battles.”
21 When Samuel heard all that the people said, he repeated it before
the LORD. 22 The LORD answered, “Listen to them and give them a king.”
Then Samuel said to the Israelites, “Everyone go back to your own town.”
Samuel Anoints Saul
9 There was a Benjamite, a man of standing, whose n.
1 Journal Entry #9 What principle did you select .docxoswald1horne84988
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Journal Entry #9
What principle did you select?
I selected principle 1 of part 1, “Don’t criticize, condemn or complain”.
Who did you interact with?
For this assignment I interacted with my younger cousin.
What was the context?
I had visited my Aunty and she and her husband asked me to stay a while as I was on school
break. They accommodated me and I decided in return to help look after my cousin in the period
when he got out of school and before they got back from work. He is 5 years old and can be quite
the handful.
What did you expect?
I expected that an authoritative approach would easily compel him to follow my instructions so
that the transition from school life into home life would be easy.
What happened?
At first, I used commanding language to get him to change out of his uniform or properly store
his back pack and books before stepping out to play. The first day was difficult and the way I
deal with him were not getting through. On the 2nd day, the same was observed. On the 3rd day,
before he could drop his back pack and run out, I offered to make him a sandwich to eat before
he left to play if he would change and clean up. He rushed up stairs and freshened up. On the
next day, he came home and rushed up to change and freshen up all on his own. I had not
initially offered; but I made him a sandwich regardless.
How did it make you feel?
It made me feel good to be able to get through to my cousin. After this, if I ever needed him to
do something in a better way than previously, I would encourage him onto a different way of
accomplishing the same. I would often offer praise after adoption of the new suggested method
was adopted or offered incentive.
2
What did you learn?
I learnt that in criticizing a person’s action, it is difficult to deter their belief in their methods,
values or beliefs. This usually just gives them the will to justify or defend their positions. It is
almost an exercise in futility to attempt to effect change by complaining, condemning or
criticizing.
What surprised you?
I was surprised by how fast the change was effected after the shift in direction I took to approach
my cousin. In not criticizing his way of doing things any longer and employing a different tactic,
I was able to influence his routine as well as build good rapport with him.
Going forward, how can you apply what you learnt?
Going forward I will attempt to understand that everyone has a belief or image of their own that I
should respect. These beliefs, systems and values are crucial to their inherent dignity and to
criticize or attack this will only fuel conflict.
Running head: Physical activity project 1
Physical activity project:
A 7-day analysis and action plans
Student Name
National University
Physical activity project 2
Introduction
Physical activity (PA) has been a major component of public health since the rise of
chronic illnesses .
1
HCA 448 Case 2 for 10/04/2018
Recently, a patient was transferred to a cardiac intensive care unit (CICU) at Methodist Hospital.
Methodist is a 250-bed hospital, which is one of five hospitals in the University Health System.
The patient was a retired 72-year-old man, who recently (i.e., 25 days ago) had a mild heart
attack and was treated and released from a sister hospital, which is in the same system as
Methodist Hospital. An otherwise health individual, Mr. Charlie Johnson (a husband, father of 4,
and grandfather of 12) is in now need or lots of medication and a battery of tests. To the nurses
on shift, it appears that the entire Johnson family is in patient’s room watching the clinical staff
treated Mr. Johnson. The family overhears everything and they want to know what is being done
to (and for) their loved one. In addition, they want to know the meaning behind the various beeps
coming from the many machines attached to Mr. Johnson.
Over the past 10 years, the latest U.S. News and World report has ranked Methodist Hospital as
one of the Best Hospitals for Cardiology & Heart Surgery. However, it is important to note that
over the past few years, the unit has dropped in the rankings.
Katherine Ross RN, the patient care director of the CICU, which has 14 beds, has held this post
for two years. (See Figure) The unit has a $20 million budget. Ms. Ross has worked at Methodist
Hospital for 16 years. She spends 50 percent of her time on patient safety, 25 percent on staffing
and recruitment, and 20 percent with nurses in relation to their satisfaction with the work and
with families relative to their satisfaction with care. Ten percent of Ms. Ross’s time is spent on
administrative duties. According to Ms. Ross, “I like is working with exceptional nurses who are
very smart and do what it takes with limited resources. However, we don’t always feel
empowered, despite the existence of shared governance, a structure I help to coordinate.”
2
Relationship with Nurses on the Unit:
Nurses on the unit work a three day a week, 12 hours a shift. Ms. Ross says, “we did an
employee opinion survey that went to all employees on the unit, 50 people in all, but only 13
responded. Some of them weren’t sure who their supervisor was. The employees aren’t happy
but our patients are happy.” She adds that “my name is on the unit, not the medical director’s. If
anything goes wrong with the unit, they blame it on nursing. Yet I’m brushed off by people
whom I have to deal with outside of the unit. For example, we have a problem with machines
that analyze blood gases. I spoke with the people there about the technology. This was four
weeks ago. It’s a patient safety issue. I sent them e-mails. I need the work to get done, the staff
don’t feel empowered if I’m not empowered. This goes for other departments as well. For
example, respiratory therapy starts using a new ventilator witho.
1
HC2091: Finance for Business
Trimester 2 2018
Group Assignment
Assessment Value: 20%
Due Date: Sunday 23:59 pm, Week 10
Group: 2- 4 students
Length: Min 2500 words
INSTRUCTIONS
Students are required to form a group to study, undertake research, analyse and conduct academic
work within the areas of business finance covered in learning materials Topics 1 to 10 inclusive.
The assignment should examine the main issues, including underlying theories, implement
performance measures used and explain the firm financial performance. Your group is strongly
advised to reference professional websites, journal articles and text books in this assignment (case
study).
Tasks
This assessment task is a written report and analysis of the financial performance of a selected
listed company on the ASX in order to provide financial and investment advice to a wealthy
investor. This assignment requires your group to undertake a comprehensive examination of a
firm’s financial performance based on update financial statements of the chosen companies.
Group Arrangement
This assignment must be completed IN Group. Each group can be from 2 to maximum 4 student
members. Each group will choose 1 company and once the company has been chosen, the other
group cannot choose the same company. First come first served rule applies here, it means you
need to form your group, choose on company from the list of ASX and register them with your
lecturer as soon as possible. Once your lecturer registers your chosen company, it cannot be
chosen by any other group. Your lecturer then will put your group on Black Board to enable you
to interact and discuss on the issues of your group assignment using Black Board environment.
However, face to face meeting, discussion and other methods of communication are needed to
ensure quality of group work. Each group needs to have your own arrangement so that all the
group members will contribute equally in the group work. If not, a Contribution Statement,
which clearly indicated individual contribution (in terms of percentage) of each member, should
be submitted as a separate item in your assignment. Your individual contribution then will be
assessed based on contribution statement to avoid any free riders.
2
Submission
Please make sure that your group member’s name and surname, student ID, subject name, and
code and lecture’s name are written on the cover sheet of the submitted assignment.
When you submit your assignment electronically, please save the file as ‘Group Assignment-
your group name .doc’. You are required to submit the assignment at Group Assignment
Final Submission, which is under Group Assignment and Due Dates on Black Board.
Submitted work should be your original work showing your creativity. Please ensure the self-
check for plagiarism to be done before final submission (plagiarism check is not over 30% .
1 ECE 175 Computer Programming for Engineering Applica.docxoswald1horne84988
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ECE 175: Computer Programming for Engineering Applications
Homework Assignment 6
Due: Tuesday March 12, 2019 by 11.59 pm
Conventions: Name your C programs as hwxpy.c where x corresponds to the homework number and y
corresponds to the problem number. For example, the C program for homework 6, problem 1 should be
named as hw6p1.c.
Write comments to your programs. Programs with no comments will receive PARTIAL credit. For each
program that you turn in, at least the following information should be included at the top of the C file:
- Author and Date created
- Brief description of the program:
- input(s) and output(s)
- brief description or relationship between inputs and outputs
Submission Instructions: Use the designated Dropbox on D2L to submit your homework.
Submit only the .c files.
Problem 1 (15 points) Write a program that returns the minimum value and its location, max
value and its location and average value of an array of integers. Your program should call a
single function that returns that min and its location, max and its location and mean value of
the array. Print the results in the main function (not within the array_func function).
See sample code execution below. The declaration of this function is given below:
void array_func (int *x, int size, int *min_p, int *minloc_p, int *max_p, int *maxloc_p, double *mean_p)
/* x is a pointer to the first array element
size is the array size
min_p is a pointer to a variable min in the main function that holds the minimum
minloc_p is a pointer to a variable minloc in the main function that holds the location where the
minimum is.
max_p is a pointer to a variable max in the main function that holds the maximum
maxloc_p is a pointer to a variable maxloc in the main function that holds the location where the
maximum is.
mean_p is a pointer to a variable mean in the main function that holds the mean */
Declare the following array of integers within the main function:
Sample code execution:
int data_ar[] = { -3, 5, 6, 7, 12, 3, 4, 6, 19, 23, 100, 3, 4, -2, 9, 43, 32, 45,
32, 2, 3, 2, -1, 8 };
int data_ar2[] = { -679,-758,-744,-393,-656,-172,-707,-32,-277,-47,-98,-824,-695,
-318,-951,-35,-439,-382,-766,-796,-187,-490,-446,-647};
int data_ar3[] = {-142, -2, -56, -60, 114, -249, 45, -139, -25, 17, 75, -27, 158,
-48, 33, 67, 9, 89, 33, -78, -180, 186, 218, -274};
2
Problem 2 (20 points): A barcode scanner verifies the 12-digit code scanned by comparing the
code’s last digit to its own computation of the check digit calculated from the first 11 digits as
follows:
1. Calculate the sum of the digits in the odd-numbered indices (the first, third, …, ninth
digits) and multiply this sum by 3.
2. Calculate the sum of the digits in the even-numbered indices (the 0th, second, … tenth
digits).
3. Add the results from step 1 and 2. If the last digit of the addition result is 0, then 0 is the
check digit. .
1 Cinemark Holdings Inc. Simulated ERM Program .docxoswald1horne84988
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Cinemark Holdings Inc.: Simulated ERM Program
Ben Li, Assistant Vice President of Compliance, is assigned the responsibility of developing an ERM
program at Cinemark Holdings Inc. (CHI). Over the past year, Ben has put in place the following ERM
activities:
Risk Identification and Assessment
The risk identification and assessment process steps are as follows:
1) Conduct online surveys of the heads of the 10 business segments and their 1-2 direct reports (15
people) and their mid-level managers (80 people). Exhibit 1 shows the instructions that are
included in the online survey. Exhibit 2 shows samples of the information collected from the
online survey.
2) Each of the 10 business segments separately organizes and compiles the results of the online
survey. They typically compile a robust list of 70-80 potential key risks. Each business segment
then prioritizes their top-5 risks and reports them to Ben Li, resulting in a total of 50 key risks (a
partial sample of the top-50 risk list is shown in Exhibit 3).
3) A consensus meeting is conducted where the 50 risks are shared with the top 10 members of
senior management in an open-group setting at an offsite one-day event. The 50 risks are each
discussed one at a time, after which the facilitator has the group collectively discuss and score
them for likelihood and severity. The risk ranking is calculated as the likelihood score plus the
severity score; the control effectiveness score is used to determine if there is room to improve
the controls and is used in the risk decision making process step. The top-20 risks are identified
as the key risks to CHI and are selected for additional mitigation and advanced to the risk
decision making stage. A Heat Map (see Exhibit 4) is provided to assist in this effort.
4) The 30 risks remaining from the 50 discussed at the consensus meeting are considered the non-
key risks, and these are monitored with key risk indicators to see if, over time, either the
likelihood and/or severity is increasing to the level which would result in one of these being
elevated to a key risk.
Risk Decision Making
Ben Li formed a Risk Committee to look at the risk identification and assessment information and to
define CHI’s risk appetite and risk limits, which were defined as follows:
Risk Appetite
CHI will maintain its overall risk profile in a manner consistent with our mission and vision and with the
expectations of our shareholders.
Risk Limits
CHI will also avoid any individual risk exposures deemed excessive by its Risk Committee; the individual
risk exposures will be determined separately for each key risk. CHI has zero tolerance for risks related to
internal fraud or violations of the employee code of conduct.
2
Ben Li expanded the role of the Risk Committee to also select and implement the risk mitigation for each
of the 20 key risks, at the same time as the committee determines the risk limits. .
1 Figure 1 Picture of Richard Selzer Richard Selz.docxoswald1horne84988
This essay summarizes and analyzes Richard Selzer's personal account of witnessing an abortion for the first time as a doctor. The essay describes Selzer's observations of the abortion procedure and his reaction to seeing the fetus struggle against the needle, which he found unexpectedly disturbing. The essay provides context about Selzer's background and qualifications and sets up his first-hand experience witnessing the abortion as the focus of the piece.
1 Films on Africa 1. A star () next to a film i.docxoswald1horne84988
1
Films on Africa
1. A star (*) next to a film indicates that portions of that film might be shown in class in the course of
the semester.
2. All films are in DVD format, unless indicated otherwise.
3. Available: at the Madden and Fresno County Public Libraries, via Netflix, Blackboard or on-line.
4. For the on-line films, you can click on the link and this will lead you directly to the film.
5. Please be advised that a few films have the following notice: Warning: Contains scenes which some
viewers may find disturbing. You decide whether you want to watch them or not.
6. Some films are available on-line via VOD.
7. Let your instructor know if a link is no longer working.
The Africans (9 VHS films – each 60 min or 5 DVDs – each 120 min): Co-
production of WETA-TV and BBC-TV. Presented by Ali A. Mazrui. 1986.
Available at Madden Media & Fresno Public Libraries
Vol. 1 – The Nature of a continent*
Summary: Examines Africa as the birthplace of humankind and discusses
the impact of geography on African history, including the role of the Nile
in the origin of civilization and the introduction of Islam to Africa through its Arabic borders.
Vol. 2 – A Legacy of lifestyles*
Summary: This program explores how African contemporary lifestyles are influenced by
indigenous, Islamic and Western factors. It compares simple African societies with those that
are more complex and centralized, and examines the importance of family life.
Vol. 3 – New gods
Summary: This program examines the factors that influence religion in Africa, paying particular
attention to how traditional religions, Islam, and Christianity co-exist and influence each other.
Vol. 4 – Tools of exploitation
Summary: The impact of the West on Africa and the impact of Africa on the development of the
West are contrasted with an emphasis on the manner in which Africa's human and natural
resources have been exploited before, during, and after the colonial period.
Vol. 5 – New conflicts
Summary: Explores the tensions inherent in the juxtaposition of 3 African heritages, looking at
the ways in which these conflicts have contributed to the rise of the nationalist movement, the
warrior tradition of indigenous Africa, the jihad tradition of Islam, and modern guerilla warfare.
Vol. 6 – In search of stability
Summary: Gives an overview of the several means of governing in Africa. Examines new social
orders to illustrate an Africa in search of a viable form of government in the post-independence
period.
1.
2
Vol. 7 – A Garden of Eden in decay?
Summary: Identifies the problems of a continent that produces what it does not consume and
consumes what it does not produce. Shows Africa's struggle between economic dependence
and decay.
Vol. 8 – A Clash of cultures*
Summary: Discusses the conflicts and compromises which emerge from the coexistence of
many African traditions and modern life. Explores the question of whet.
1 Contemporary Approaches in Management of Risk in .docxoswald1horne84988
1
Contemporary Approaches in Management of Risk in Engineering Organizations
Assignment-1
Literature review
Student name: Hari Kiran Penumudi
student id: 217473484
Table of Contents
2
INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………3-4
OBJECTIVES & DELIVERABLES…………………………………………………....4
REVIEW OF LITERATURE…………………………………………………………....5-13
Risk and Risk Management………………………………………………………5-6
Risk Management Frameworks……………………………………………….....6-10
Importance of Risk Management in Engineering………………………….........10-13
GENERAL PROBLEM STATEMENT…………………………………………………13-14
RESEARH STRATEGY…………………………………………………………………14-15
RESOURCES REQUIREMENTS……………………………………………………….16
PROJECT PLANNING…………………………………………………………………..16
REFERNCES…………………………………………………………………………….17-19
Contemporary Approaches in Management of Risk in Engineering Organizations
3
Introduction
The term, ‘risk’ as defined by the Oxford English dictionary is a possibility to meet with any
kind of danger or suffer harm. Risk is a serious issue that every organization has to deal with in
their everyday operations. However, nature and magnitude of risks largely vary from
organization to organization and often depend on the type of the organization. Therefore,
organizations irrespective of their type of operations keep a risk management team that looks
after every risk to which an organization is vulnerable. Organizations in the field of engineering
also have to come across some inherent risks that negatively impact their operations. Engineering
may be defined as the process of applying science to practical purposes of designing structures,
systems, machines and similar things. Therefore, like every other organization, risk assessment
and management is also an integral part of engineering organizations. Since the task of
engineering is mostly complex, the risks in this area are also very complicated. If risks in
engineering field are not mitigated effectively it may produce long-term danger that may affect
both the organizational services and the society in whole. Hence, the activity of risk management
within engineering organizations must be undertaken seriously and measured thoroughly in order
to reduce the threat of risks. Amyotte et al., (2006) simply puts it like within the engineering
practice, an inbuilt risk is always present. Studies have found that despite the knowledge of
inherent risks within the field and activity of engineering, organizations are not very aware in
imparting knowledge about risk management to their engineers. From this the need of education
regarding the risk management approaches arises. Therefore, this paper tries to find out
approaches to management of risks and importance of these approaches within the area of
engineering. Bringing on the contemporary evidence from the literature review related to risk
management approaches, the paper examines how those approaches can be helpful for
4 .
1
Assignment front Sheet
Qualification Unit number and title
Pearson BTEC Levels 4 and 5 Higher
Nationals in Health and Social Care (RQF)
HNHS 17: Effective Reporting and Record-keeping in
Health and Social Care Services
Student name Assessor name Internal Verifier
B. Maher F. Khan
Date issued: Final Submission:
12/10/2018 18/01/2019
Assignment title
Effective Reporting and Record-keeping in Health and Social
Care services
Submission Format
This work will be submitted in 2 different formats:
Assessment 1 should be submitted as a word-processed report document in a standard report
style, which requires the use of headings, titles and appropriate captions. You may also choose
to include pictures, graphs and charts where relevant to support your work. The recommended
word count for this assignment is 1500–2000 words, though you will not be penalised for
exceeding this total.
Assessment 2 requires the submission of evidence from a mock training event on record-
keeping. This will include a set of materials used in the event, to include an electronic
presentation, evidence of your own record-keeping across a range of types of records, as well as
where you will demonstrate you have evaluated the effectiveness of your own completion of
relevant records. The recommended word count for the presentation is 1000–1500 words
(including speaker notes), though you will not be penalised for exceeding this total.
For both assessments, any material that is derived from other sources must be suitably
referenced using a standard form of citation. Provide a bibliography using the Harvard
referencing system.
Unit Learning Outcomes
LO1 Describe the legal and regulatory aspects of reporting and record keeping in a care setting
LO2 Explore the internal and external recording requirements in a care setting
Assignment Brief and Guidance
2
Purpose of this assignment:
The purpose of the assignment is to assess the learner firstly in relation to both the legal and
regulatory aspects of reporting and record keeping in a care setting through producing an internal
evaluative review of record keeping in their own care setting. Secondly, the learner will be
assessed on the internal and external recording requirements in a care setting. Thirdly, the learner
will be assessed on Review the use of technology in reporting and recording service user care in a
care setting and fourthly the learner will demonstrate how to keep and maintain records in own care
setting in line with national and local policies.
Breakdown of assignment:
Assignment:
You need to produce one written piece of work of 2,500 words (+/- 10%) covering all the
assessment criterion in LO1-LO4 as one document.
Unit Learning Outcomes
LO1 Describe the legal and regulatory aspects of reporting and record keeping in a care
setting
LO2 Explore the internal and external recording.
1 BBS300 Empirical Research Methods for Business .docxoswald1horne84988
1
BBS300 Empirical Research Methods for Business
TSA, 2018
Assignment 1
Due: Sunday, 7 October 2018,
23:55 PM
This assignment covers material from Sessions 1-4 and is worth 20% of your total mark
of BBS300. Your solutions should be properly presented, and it is important that you
double-check your spelling and grammar and thoroughly proofread your assignment
before submitting. Instructions for assignment submission are presented in
the “Assignment 1” link and must be strictly adhered to. No marks will be
awarded to assignments that are submitted after the due date and time.
All analyses must be carried out using SPSS, and no marks will be awarded
for assignment questions where SPSS output supporting your answer is not
provided in your Microsoft Word file submitted for the Assignment.
Questions
In this assignment, we will examine the “Real Estate Market” dataset (described at the
end of the assignment ) and “Employee Satisfaction” dataset. Before beginning the
assignment, read through the descriptions of these dataset and their variables carefully.
The “Real Estate Market” dataset can be found in the file “realestatemarket.sav,” and
the “Employee Satisfaction” dataset can be found in the file “employeesatisfaction.sav.”
You will need to carefully inspect both SPSS data files to be sure that the
specification of variable types is correct and, where appropriate, value
labels are entered.
1. (12 marks)
2
Use appropriate graphical displays and measures of centrality and dispersion
to summarise the following four variables in the “Real Estate Market” dataset. For
graphical displays for numeric data, be sure to comment on not only the shape of
the distribution but also compliance with a normal distribution. Be sure to
include relevant SPSS output (graphs, tables) to support your answers.
(a) Price.
(b) Lot Size.
(c) Material.
(d) Condition.
2. (8 marks)
Again consider the variable Price, which records the property price (in AUD). It
is of interest to know if this is associated with the distance of the property is
located to the train station. It i s al so of i nter e st t o kn o w if th e p rop ert y
pri ce s are a sso ciate d with di st an ce to t h e ne ar e st b u s sto p. Carry out
appropriate statistical techniques to assess whether there is a significant
association between the property price and distance to the nearest train (To train)
station and the nearest bus stop (To bus). Be sure to thoroughly assess the
assumptions of your particular analysis, and be sure to include relevant SPSS
output (graphs, tables) to support your answers.
3. (7 marks)
Consider the “Employee Satisfaction” dataset, which asked participants to provide their
level of regularity to a series of thirteen statements. Conduct an appropriate analysis
to assess the reliability of responses to these statements. If the reliability will
increa.
1 ASSIGNMENT 7 C – MERGING DATA FILES IN STATA Do.docxoswald1horne84988
1
ASSIGNMENT 7 C – MERGING DATA FILES IN STATA
Download the world development data covering the years 2000-2016 from the website
“http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=World-Governance-Indicators” for the
following upper-middle-income countries.
Countries of Interest:
Albania Ecuador Montenegro
Algeria Equatorial Guinea Namibia
American Samoa Fiji Nauru
Argentina Gabon Panama
Azerbaijan Grenada Paraguay
Belarus Guyana Peru
Belize Iran, Islamic Rep. Romania
Bosnia and Herzegovina Iraq Russian Federation
Botswana Jamaica Samoa
Brazil Kazakhstan Serbia
Bulgaria Lebanon South Africa
China Libya St. Lucia
Colombia Macedonia, FYR St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Costa Rica Malaysia Suriname
Croatia Maldives Thailand
Cuba Marshall Islands Tonga
Dominica Mauritius Turkey
Dominican Republic Mexico Turkmenistan
Tuvalu
Venezuela, RB
Variables of Interest
Control of Corruption: Estimate
Government Effectiveness: Estimate
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism:
Estimate
Regulatory Quality: Estimate
Rule of Law: Estimate
Voice and Accountability: Estimate
2
STEP 1 - Download the data from the World-Governance-Indicators database as shown below
STEP 2 - Check the variables of interest
3
Please make sure you are checking the variables with “Estimates”.
TO VIEW THE DEFINITIONS OF THE VARIABLES
4
Step 3 – Select countries of interest
5
Step 4 – Click on “Time” and select the “year range” you are interested in (2000-2016)
6
Step 5 – Click on the “Layout” as shown below
Change the time layout to “Row,” series to “Column” and Country to “Row.”
Next, click on the “apply changes.”
Step 6 – Click on the “Download option” and select “Excel” as shown below
7
STEP 7: Using Excel, Replace the Missing Values With “.” (See previous assignments)
STEP 8: SAVE THE EXCEL DATA FILE ON YOUR COMPUTER PREFERABLY IN A
FOLDER
STEP 9: IMPORT YOUR DATA INTO STATA AND NAME YOUR DATA SET
“WORLD_GOVERNANCE_INDICATORS.” (See previous assignments for steps)
8
STEP 10; RENAME THE VARIABLES AS SHOWN BELOW (See previous assignments for
steps)
Using stata, merge the data set from “ASSIGNMENT 3B” with this dataset
VERY IMPORTANT Note: Merging two datasets requires that both have at least one variable in
common (either string or numeric).
This statement requires that the variable name for “Time” and “Country” should be the same in the two
data set
MERGING THE DATASET FROM “ASSIGNMENT 3” WITH THE DATA FROM THE
WORLD GOVERNANCE INDICATORS
Merging data files in stata
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EV-5PztbHs0
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uh7C0mlhB3g&t=54s
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2etG_34ODoc
I will strongly encourage you to watch these videos before merging
I will also strongly recommend you read the notes in the link below before you star.
1 Assessment details for ALL students Assessment item.docxoswald1horne84988
1
Assessment details for ALL students
Assessment item 3 - Individual submission
Due date: Week 12 Monday (1 Oct 2018) 11:55 pm AEST
Weighting:
Length:
50% (or 50 marks)
There is no word limit for this report
Objectives
This assessment item relates to the unit learning outcomes as stated in the unit profile.
Enabling objectives
1. Analyse a case study and identify issues associated with the business;
2. Develop and deploy the application in IBM Bluemix;
3. Evaluate existing and new functionalities to address business problems;
4. Prepare a document to report your activities using text and multimedia (for example screenshots, videos).
General Information
The purpose of this assignment is to create a cloud based simulating environment which will help to
identify/understand the problem stated in the given case study using analysis tools available in IBM
Bluemix. In assignment three, you are working individually. By doing this assignment, you will
learn to use skills and knowledge of emerging technologies like cloud computing, IoT, to simulate a
business scenario to capture operational data and share with a visualization tool. You will acquire a
good understanding of smart application design in a cloud environment for efficient application
configuration and deployment.
What do you need to do?
The assignment requires you to do the following -
• Download the ‘Starter_Code_For_Assignment_Three.rar’ given in week 8 to
configure, and deploy a cloud based smart/IoT (Internet of Things) application to
simulate the business case.
• Choose a case study out of given two below and analyse the case study to
understand the business problem and design a solution for those problems.
• Deploy the starter source code in your Bluemix account and modify it to address
all required milestones mentioned in your chosen case study.
• Finally prepare a report according to given format and specifications below and
submit it in Moodle.
2
Report format and specifications -
You are required to submit a written report in a single Microsoft Word (.doc or .docx)
document. There is no word limit but any unnecessary information included in the report
may result in reduced marks.
The report must contain the following content (feel free to define your own sections,
as long as you include all the required content):
o Cover page/title page and Table of contents
o URL of the app and login details of the IBM Bluemix account
o Introduction
o Case study analysis which will report –
o Business problems you have identified in the case study
o Possible solutions for each and how do these solutions address the
business problems?
o What are the solutions you implemented in the application?
o The step by step process you have followed to configure and deploy the smart app
for business case simulation. You may choose to use screenshots and notes to
enrich your report but you must have a video of the pr.
1
CDU APA 6th
Referencing Style Guide
(February 2019 version)
2
Contents
APA Fundamentals .......................................................................................... 3
Reference List ................................................................................................... 3
Citing in the text ............................................................................................... 5
Paraphrase ................................................................................................... 5
Direct quotes................................................................................................. 5
Secondary source .......................................................................................... 6
Personal communications............................................................................. 6
Examples .......................................................................................................... 7
Book .............................................................................................................. 7
eBook ............................................................................................................ 7
Journal article with doi ................................................................................ 7
Journal article without doi ........................................................................... 7
Web page ...................................................................................................... 7
Books - print and online ................................................................................... 8
Single author ................................................................................................ 8
eBook/electronic book ................................................................................ 11
Journal articles, Conference papers and Newspaper articles ........................ 13
Multimedia ..................................................................................................... 16
YouTube or Streaming video ..................................................................... 16
Online images ................................................................................................. 17
Web sources and online documents ................................................................ 20
Web page .................................................................................................... 20
Document from a website ........................................................................... 21
Legislation and cases ...................................................................................... 23
Common abbreviations .................................................................................. 24
Appendix 1: How to write an APA reference when information is missing .. 25
Appendix 2: Author layout.
1
BIOL 102: Lab 9
Simulated ABO and Rh Blood Typing
Objectives:
After completing this laboratory assignment, students will be able to:
• explain the biology of blood typing systems ABO and Rh
• explain the genetics of blood types
• determine the blood types of several patients
Introduction:
Before Karl Landsteiner discovered the ABO human blood groups in 1901, it was thought that all blood was the
same. This misunderstanding led to fatal blood transfusions. Later, in 1940, Landsteiner was part of a team
who discovered another blood group, the Rh blood group system. There are many blood group systems known
today, but the ABO and the Rh blood groups are the most important ones used for blood transfusions. The
designation Rh is derived from the Rhesus monkey in which the existence of the Rh blood group was
discovered.
Although all blood is made of the same basic elements, not all blood is alike. In fact, there are eight different
common blood types, which are determined by the presence or absence of certain antigens – substances that
can trigger an immune response if they are foreign to the body – on the surface of the red blood cells (RBCs
also known as erythrocytes).
ABO System:
The antigens on RBCs are agglutinating antigens or agglutinogens. They have been designated as A and B.
Antibodies against antigens A and B begin to build up in the blood plasma shortly after birth. A person
normally produces antibodies (agglutinins) against those antigens that are not present on his/her erythrocytes
but does not produce antibodies against those antigens that are present on his/her erythrocytes.
• A person who is blood type A will have A antigens on the surface of her/his RBCs and will have
antibodies against B antigens (anti-B antibodies). See picture below.
• A person with blood type B will have B antigens on the surface of her/his RBCs and will have antibodies
against antigen A (anti-A antibodies).
• A person with blood type O will have neither A nor B antigens on the surface of her/his RBCs and has
BOTH anti-A and anti-B antibodies.
• A person with blood type AB will have both A and B antigens on the surface of her/his RBCs and has
neither anti-A nor anti-B antibodies.
The individual’s blood type is based on the antigens (not the antibodies) he/she has. The four blood groups
are known as types A, B, AB, and O. Blood type O, characterized by an absence of A and B agglutinogens, is
the most common in the United States (45% of the population). Type A is the next in frequency, found in 39%
of the population. The incidences of types B and AB are 12% and 4%, respectively.
2
Table 1: The ABO System
Blood
Type
Antigens on
RBCs
Antibodies
in the Blood
Can GIVE Blood
to Groups:
Can RECEIVE
Blood from Groups:
A A Anti-B A, AB O, A
B B Anti-A B, AB O, B
AB A and B
Neither anti-A
nor anti-B
AB O, A, B, AB
O
Neither A nor
B
Both anti-A.
1
Business Intelligence Case
Project Background
Mell Industries is a national manufacturing firm that specializes in textiles based out of
Chicago. Starting out as a small factory in Warrenville, Illinois, the firm experienced a period of steady
growth over the past twenty-four years. Steadily opening new warehouses and factories in the
surrounding areas in Michigan and Indianapolis until eventually moving their base of operations to
Chicago. Due to this expansion, Mell Industries is at the height of its production and hopes to avoid any
interferences or deceleration of growth.
In recent years, the firm has been under heavy media scrutiny for supposedly compensating its
female staff unfairly lower compared to male counterparts. This was initiated when a disgruntled
employee leaked the company payroll allegedly showcasing an unjust gap of income between the
female employee and her male counterpart. This type of gender pay gap is highly criticized and as a
precaution, Mell Industries has hired Cal Poly Pomona to conduct research to determine the validity of
these claims. Mell Industries has provided Cal Poly Pomona with a data set of a sample population of
747 employees. Mell Industries has also offered Cal Poly Pomona compensation for any promising
information gathered. Mell Industries may use information gathered from this project in future
employee compensation decisions.
The initial dataset has been given to you in the form of an excel spreadsheet titled
Case_dataset.xlsx consisting of 12 columns labeled:
● Column A - Employee ID
● Column B - Gender
● Column C - Date of Birth
● Column D - Date of Hire
● Column E - Termination Date
● Column F - Occupation
● Column G - Salary
● Column H to L - Employee Evaluation Metrics
In addition, Mell Industries provided the latest annual employee performance review evaluation
results rating each employee in various performance categories. They have turned over this information
separately and as a consultant, it is your task to provide Mell Industries with the most accurate and
relevant information in a digestible form. Furthermore, using excel skills learned during the course, you
will manipulate and analyze the data set in order to make appropriate managerial decisions. You will
utilize excel functions highlighted in this project as well as a pivot table and chart to form a decision
support system in order to answer the critical thinking questions.
Project Objective
The purpose of this project is to perform a methodical data analysis to assist the company make
an informed decision. This could also serve as a basis for implementing critical adjustments to certain
business aspects if necessary. Illustrate the business process by condensing a large set of data, to
present relevant information with data visualization. We will be utilizing Microsoft Excel 2016 to
complete this project.
2
TA.
ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 42001, and GDPR: Best Practices for Implementation and...PECB
Denis is a dynamic and results-driven Chief Information Officer (CIO) with a distinguished career spanning information systems analysis and technical project management. With a proven track record of spearheading the design and delivery of cutting-edge Information Management solutions, he has consistently elevated business operations, streamlined reporting functions, and maximized process efficiency.
Certified as an ISO/IEC 27001: Information Security Management Systems (ISMS) Lead Implementer, Data Protection Officer, and Cyber Risks Analyst, Denis brings a heightened focus on data security, privacy, and cyber resilience to every endeavor.
His expertise extends across a diverse spectrum of reporting, database, and web development applications, underpinned by an exceptional grasp of data storage and virtualization technologies. His proficiency in application testing, database administration, and data cleansing ensures seamless execution of complex projects.
What sets Denis apart is his comprehensive understanding of Business and Systems Analysis technologies, honed through involvement in all phases of the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC). From meticulous requirements gathering to precise analysis, innovative design, rigorous development, thorough testing, and successful implementation, he has consistently delivered exceptional results.
Throughout his career, he has taken on multifaceted roles, from leading technical project management teams to owning solutions that drive operational excellence. His conscientious and proactive approach is unwavering, whether he is working independently or collaboratively within a team. His ability to connect with colleagues on a personal level underscores his commitment to fostering a harmonious and productive workplace environment.
Date: May 29, 2024
Tags: Information Security, ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 42001, Artificial Intelligence, GDPR
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Find out more about ISO training and certification services
Training: ISO/IEC 27001 Information Security Management System - EN | PECB
ISO/IEC 42001 Artificial Intelligence Management System - EN | PECB
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) - Training Courses - EN | PECB
Webinars: https://pecb.com/webinars
Article: https://pecb.com/article
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For more information about PECB:
Website: https://pecb.com/
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/pecb/
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/PECBInternational/
Slideshare: http://www.slideshare.net/PECBCERTIFICATION
How to Setup Warehouse & Location in Odoo 17 InventoryCeline George
In this slide, we'll explore how to set up warehouses and locations in Odoo 17 Inventory. This will help us manage our stock effectively, track inventory levels, and streamline warehouse operations.
Philippine Edukasyong Pantahanan at Pangkabuhayan (EPP) CurriculumMJDuyan
(𝐓𝐋𝐄 𝟏𝟎𝟎) (𝐋𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐨𝐧 𝟏)-𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐥𝐢𝐦𝐬
𝐃𝐢𝐬𝐜𝐮𝐬𝐬 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐄𝐏𝐏 𝐂𝐮𝐫𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐮𝐥𝐮𝐦 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐏𝐡𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐩𝐩𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐬:
- Understand the goals and objectives of the Edukasyong Pantahanan at Pangkabuhayan (EPP) curriculum, recognizing its importance in fostering practical life skills and values among students. Students will also be able to identify the key components and subjects covered, such as agriculture, home economics, industrial arts, and information and communication technology.
𝐄𝐱𝐩𝐥𝐚𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐍𝐚𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐩𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐚𝐧 𝐄𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐞𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐧𝐞𝐮𝐫:
-Define entrepreneurship, distinguishing it from general business activities by emphasizing its focus on innovation, risk-taking, and value creation. Students will describe the characteristics and traits of successful entrepreneurs, including their roles and responsibilities, and discuss the broader economic and social impacts of entrepreneurial activities on both local and global scales.
LAND USE LAND COVER AND NDVI OF MIRZAPUR DISTRICT, UPRAHUL
This Dissertation explores the particular circumstances of Mirzapur, a region located in the
core of India. Mirzapur, with its varied terrains and abundant biodiversity, offers an optimal
environment for investigating the changes in vegetation cover dynamics. Our study utilizes
advanced technologies such as GIS (Geographic Information Systems) and Remote sensing to
analyze the transformations that have taken place over the course of a decade.
The complex relationship between human activities and the environment has been the focus
of extensive research and worry. As the global community grapples with swift urbanization,
population expansion, and economic progress, the effects on natural ecosystems are becoming
more evident. A crucial element of this impact is the alteration of vegetation cover, which plays a
significant role in maintaining the ecological equilibrium of our planet.Land serves as the foundation for all human activities and provides the necessary materials for
these activities. As the most crucial natural resource, its utilization by humans results in different
'Land uses,' which are determined by both human activities and the physical characteristics of the
land.
The utilization of land is impacted by human needs and environmental factors. In countries
like India, rapid population growth and the emphasis on extensive resource exploitation can lead
to significant land degradation, adversely affecting the region's land cover.
Therefore, human intervention has significantly influenced land use patterns over many
centuries, evolving its structure over time and space. In the present era, these changes have
accelerated due to factors such as agriculture and urbanization. Information regarding land use and
cover is essential for various planning and management tasks related to the Earth's surface,
providing crucial environmental data for scientific, resource management, policy purposes, and
diverse human activities.
Accurate understanding of land use and cover is imperative for the development planning
of any area. Consequently, a wide range of professionals, including earth system scientists, land
and water managers, and urban planners, are interested in obtaining data on land use and cover
changes, conversion trends, and other related patterns. The spatial dimensions of land use and
cover support policymakers and scientists in making well-informed decisions, as alterations in
these patterns indicate shifts in economic and social conditions. Monitoring such changes with the
help of Advanced technologies like Remote Sensing and Geographic Information Systems is
crucial for coordinated efforts across different administrative levels. Advanced technologies like
Remote Sensing and Geographic Information Systems
9
Changes in vegetation cover refer to variations in the distribution, composition, and overall
structure of plant communities across different temporal and spatial scales. These changes can
occur natural.
How to Make a Field Mandatory in Odoo 17Celine George
In Odoo, making a field required can be done through both Python code and XML views. When you set the required attribute to True in Python code, it makes the field required across all views where it's used. Conversely, when you set the required attribute in XML views, it makes the field required only in the context of that particular view.
· Answer the following questions in a 100- to 150 word response .docx
1. · Answer the following questions in a 100- to 150 word
response:
· Describe the role of policing in relationship to juvenile
justice.
· Discuss the different discretionary actions police officers may
take in relation to juveniles they encounter.
· Describe the effects of gangs on juveniles.
· Compare community policing strategies regarding law
enforcement’s role in relation to juveniles.
· Distinguish between educational, prevention, and community
programs for juveniles:
· What are juvenile probation camps? What is meant by
intensive aftercare? Are such alternative sanctions effective at
reducing recidivism? Why or why not?
·
· Summarize the history of police–juvenile relationships.
· Summarize juveniles’ attitudes toward the police.
· Describe police discretion and the factors that influence
discretion.
· Summarize how police process juveniles.
· Describe how police agencies are structured to deal with
juvenile crime.
· Summarize developing trends in how police deal with
juveniles.
· Outline the development of gangs in the United States.
· Describe the types and activities of gangs.
· Summarize efforts to prevent and control gangs
·
2. UNCLASSIFIED
Generic SCADA Risk
Management Framework
For
Australian Critical Infrastructure
Developed by the
IT Security Expert
Advisory Group (ITSEAG)
(Revised March 2012)
Disclaimer: To the extent permitted by law, this document is
provided without any liability
or warranty. Accordingly it is to be used only for the purposes
specified and the reliability
of any assessment or evaluation arising from it are matters for
the independent judgement
of users. This document is intended as a general guide only and
users should seek
professional advice as to their specific risks and needs.
3. UNCLASSIFIED
Page 2 of 48
Document Change History
Version Change Description
1.0a Initial version for internal review
1.0b Incorporated internal review feedback
1.1 Final changes for ITSEAG presentation
1.2 Incorporated monitoring cycle into section 3.7.
2.0 Added preface and addressed final review comments.
2.1 Reviewed and updated to latest standards – Dec 2011
8. Preface
SCADA systems have traditionally been viewed as being
isolated and therefore
‘safe’ and less exposed to remote cyber attacks. Risk
assessment and
management methodologies, correspondingly, have largely been
directed at
legacy SCADA systems in which underlying protocols were
designed without
modern security requirements in mind.
Business drivers for SCADA integration with enterprise
management systems,
load management and smart grid environments has meant that
SCADA
systems have become interconnected with corporate business
networks,
customer premises and directly or indirectly with the Internet.
This, together
with the rapid advancement of technology, shifting threat
landscape and the
changing business environment, is increasing the exposure of
SCADA systems
9. to network vulnerabilities and Internet security threats.
Recent incidents such as Aurora and Stuxnet demonstrate that a
directed cyber
attack can cause physical harm to critical infrastructure.
Traditional threat
sources have evolved to now include focused foreign nation
cyber intrusions
and industrial espionage capabilities.
Such changes and attitudes require a new all hazards approach
to risk
management – one that takes into account Industrial Control
Systems, IT,
Communications, physical security, supply chains and services
and the
interconnection of SCADA systems with corporate, partner and
service provider
networks and the Internet. Organisations are encouraged to
foster a culture of
security for SCADA system management, operations and
procedures.
The SCADA Community of Interest, an Information Technology
Security Expert
Advisory Group
10. 1
(ITSEAG) working group, has identified risk management as a
key issue in maintaining continuity of business and in
protecting Australia’s
critical infrastructure.
1
The ITSEAG is part of the Trusted Information Sharing
Network (TISN) for critical infrastructure
resilience which enables the owners and operators of critical
infrastructure to share vital information on
security issues. The TISN consists of a number of Sector
Groups (SGs) and Expert Advisory Groups
(EAGs) which are overseen by the Critical Infrastructure
Advisory Council (CIAC). One of the expert
advisory groups is the ITSEAG providing advice to the TISN on
IT security issues relating to critical
infrastructure. The ITSEAG consists of academic specialists,
vendors and government representatives
who are leaders in the information technology/e-security field.
More information on the TISN can be found
at http://www.tisn.gov.au. For more information on the
ITSEAG, please contact the Secretariat in the
Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital
Economy (DBCDE) on (02) 6271 1595 or
11. [email protected]
http://www.tisn.gov.au/
mailto:[email protected]
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 5 of 48
The Generic SCADA Risk Management Framework (RMF) is a
high-level
document that provides a cross-sector approach to identifying
and assessing
risks for owners and operators of SCADA systems. The RMF
can be tailored to
suit a particular sector or organisation and also contains advice
on how
information security risks can be simplified, included in
existing corporate risk
management frameworks and presented to senior management.
1 Introduction
12. 1.1 Background
1.1.1 The Australian Government Critical Infrastructure
Advisory Council (CIAC)
oversees a number of expert advisory and sector groups and
advises the
Attorney General’s Department on matters associated with the
national
approach to Critical Infrastructure Resilience (CIR).
1.1.2 Sector Groups (SGs), cover key industry sectors across
Australia. The IT
Security Expert Advisory Group (ITSEAG) advises all SGs on
IT Security
matters affecting all industry sectors.
1.1.3 This report has been commissioned via the ITSEAG’s
SCADA working
group that contributes to the TISN objective of enhancing the
resilience of
critical infrastructure (CI) and systems of national importance
by assisting
with the assessment and implementation of security for SCADA
systems
across industry sectors.
13. 1.2 Scope
1.2.1 The scope of this report is to detail an industry-wide
framework whereby
owners and operators of key SCADA systems can assess
security risk
exposures of these systems and implement security controls to
mitigate
and manage these risk exposures within acceptable limits.
1.2.2 SCADA systems considered within the scope of the report
comprise
distributed control systems designed to deliver essential and
stabilising
services within the Australian economy.
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Page 6 of 48
14. 1.3 Key Terms and Definitions
Term Description
ISM 2012 The Australian Government Information Security
Manual
published by DSD containing minimum information security
standards for Commonwealth Government organisations and
often used as a reference by other Australian organisations.
ISM 2012 is available from DSD at:
http://www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/ism/index.htm
DSD Defence Signals Directorate.
All hazards approach A risk assessment approach intended to
identify generic risks
common to most, if not all, SCADA systems.
AV Antivirus.
BCP Business Continuity Plan.
COTS Commercial Off The Shelf – a term used to describe
software
and devices that can be purchased and integrated with little or
no customisation.
DR Disaster Recovery – a component of business continuity
management.
DRP Disaster Recovery Plan.
ITSEAG Information Technology Security Expert Advisory
Group.
NII National Information Infrastructure.
OS Operating System.
PSPF Australian Government Protective Security Policy
Framework –
15. published by the Australian Attorney General’s Department
PSPF is available from AGD at:
http://www.ag.gov.au/pspf
ISMP Australian Government Information Security
Management
Protocols specify information security controls to be used in
Commonwealth Government organisations and often used as a
reference by other Australian organisations.
ISMP is available from AGD at:
Information Security Management Protocols
QoS Quality of Service.
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition.
SRMS SCADA Security Risk Management System.
TRA Threat and Risk Assessment.
RTP Risk Treatment Plan.
Current risk exposure The level of risk associated with an asset
before the application
of any risk mitigation measures.
Treated risk exposure The level of risk associated with an asset
after the application of
risk mitigation measures.
Controlled risk Level of risk posed to system assets after
specific/additional risk
mitigation controls are implemented to address current risk
exposure.
Residual risk Level of risk remaining after additional risk
treatment.
17. Considerations.
– 101 to 104 Telecontrol Equipment and
Systems – Transmission
Protocols.
– Principles and
Guidelines, Standards
Australia.
Standards
Australia.
Management systems
requirements, Standards Australia.
information security
management, Standards Australia.
2010, Attorney
General’s Department, June 2010.
Protocols and
guidelines 2011, Attorney General’s Department, July 2011.
18. – Industrial Control Systems,
National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), Version 1.0.
-Sector Roadmap for Cyber Security of Control
Systems, 30
September, 2011(developed by the Industrial Control Systems
Joint Working
Group (ICSJWG), with facilitation by the US Department of
Homeland Security’s
National Cybersecurity Division (NCSD)).
1.5 Acknowledgements
Saltbush would like to acknowledge those who contributed to
the 2012 review of
this framework:
iat: Chris Marsden, Peter Webb
19. http://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/pdf/Cross-
Sector_Roadmap_9-30.pdf
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 8 of 48
2 Tailoring the Risk Management Framework
2.1.1 When tailoring this Generic SCADA RMF to suit a
particular sector or
organisation, the following points should be noted:
functions of a
distributed SCADA system. Organisation and sector-specific
risks will need
to be evaluated, and if necessary, incorporated into SCADA risk
management frameworks at the sector or organisational level.
Management and
Security Frameworks in place it is important that this SCADA
risk framework
aligns with the corporate frameworks to ensure organisational
consistency.
20. realisation, and the
matrix in which risk is calculated at a National Information
Infrastructure
level is given in Section 3.5 and Section 3.6. It is recommended
that
organisations align these values to their internal corporate risk
parameters.
risk
management activities, Figure 3-2 should be assessed and
possibly refined
as appropriate to the applicable sector or organisation – this
will also lead to
a re-evaluation and update of SCADA process enablers as
shown in
Figures 3-2, 4-1 and Table 4-1.
incident
impacting multiple organisations (for instance with supply
chains and
business partners) should be considered.
2.1.2 In accordance with the definitions in Section 3.4, the
‘Current Risk’ columns in
the Section 6 TRA will need to be updated should these values
be altered.
2.1.3 Treatment options in Section 7 (RTP) are in some cases
opportunistic. A
21. significant goal of this RTP is to highlight the ‘desirable’
requirements of a
secure SCADA system, and it is recommended that each of the
RTP security
controls be used when determining the most appropriate
information security
configuration for a secure SCADA system.
2.1.4 Finally, the determination of information security risk
exposures, and the level
to which they are reported to senior management, often results
in the
confusion of security issues with technical and operational
details. Section 8 of
this framework suggests a mechanism by which such
information can be
summarised and presented.
UNCLASSIFIED
22. Page 9 of 48
3 Risk Management Methodology
3.1 Overview
3.1.1 The methodology is adopted for the generic SCADA risk
management
process is detailed in the following subsections.
3.1.2 The methodology is compliant with recognised standards
including
000:2009 Risk Management – Principles and
Guidelines.
Systems
Requirements.
Security
Management.
3.1.3 Of note is that the risk management methodology
encompasses an all
hazards approach to risk management for SCADA systems and
can be
23. used to identify and analyse the risk exposures presented
through a wide
variety of potential security vulnerabilities.
3.2 Framework
3.2.1 The RMF is based on traditional standards based risk
management
frameworks, as described in ISO/IEC 31000 - Risk Management
and
ISO/IEC 27005 – Information Security Risk Management
standards and
shown in the following figure.
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 10 of 48
Figure 3-1 Risk Management Framework ISO 31000 and
ISO27005
24. 3.2.2 Establishment of the context for the Generic SCADA RMF
involves
defining the framework scope and identifying the assets that are
potentially at risk.
3.2.3 Identification, analysis and evaluation of risks together
comprise the
Threat & Risk Assessment (TRA) component of the framework.
3.2.4 The risk treatment component comprises the development
of a Risk
Treatment Plan to address the risk exposure to the assets
identified in the
threat and risk assessment process.
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 11 of 48
3.2.5 There are two Risk Decision points that ensure sufficient
and accurate
25. information has been obtained or that another iteration of risk
assessment
or risk treatment is initiated.
3.2.6 The risk acceptance activity ensures that residual risks are
explicitly
accepted by the SCADA stakeholders and senior management of
the
organisation.
3.2.7 During the whole security risk management process it is
important that
communication and consultation with stakeholders and
operational staff
associated with the secure implementation and operation of the
SCADA
system under consideration.
3.2.8 The monitor and review component of the process
comprises the controls
put in place specifically to ensure that the Generic SCADA
RMF operates
effectively over time.
3.3 Establish Context
3.3.1 The scope of the Generic SCADA RMF encompasses the
core
26. components of a distributed SCADA network that would be
expected to be
found in the majority of critical infrastructure service provider
organisations.
3.3.2 This comprises the process components as shown in
Figure 3-2.
Centralised SCADA Management and Control
Data Communications
Front-End Processing
Field Monitoring and Control
Organisational Management and Oversight
Figure 3-2 Generic SCADA Processes
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Page 12 of 48
27. 3.3.3 The assets that are likely to be threatened can therefore be
derived by
considering the enablers
2
that allow the identified processes in Figure 3-2
to occur.
3.3.4 These enablers can be derived by identifying the people,
the places, and
the products required to ensure the processes can be carried out.
3.3.5 Each enabler is owned. The owner is the responsible
authority within
operational sections of the organisation for ensuring that
mitigating
controls are appropriately implemented.
3.3.6 The typical authority responsible for the enablers is
contained in the
“Owner” column; however each organisation using this guide
ultimately
determines who the responsible authority is.
3.3.7 The owner and description should be modified to suit the
positions in each
organisation.
28. 3.3.8 Examples of typical owners:
Owner Description
CEO Chief Executive Officer – Head of organisation
CIO
Chief Information Officer – IT infrastructure and
architecture
HR
Human Resource Executive – personnel and
contracting
SA
Security Advisor – covering physical and
environmental enablers
ITSA
Information Technology Security Advisor – covering
information security and logical access controls
CFO
Chief Financial Officer – covering asset
purchasing/disposal and financial delegation
Senior Engineer Senior Engineer – Manager of technical
services
Table 3-1 Owners of Enablers
2 Enablers are those assets that support the delivery of in-scope
business processes
29. UNCLASSIFIED
Page 13 of 48
3.3.9 Each organisation should identify their internal asset
“owners”.
3.3.10 Section 4 of this framework identifies example generic
enablers through
the analysis of the generic SCADA processes.
3.4 Identify Risks
3.4.1 Having identified the assets required to enable generic
SCADA processing
to occur, the next activity is to identify the vulnerabilities to
which each
asset is exposed.
3.4.2 Vulnerabilities to assets can be identified through
consideration of the
potential threats, whether they are malicious, accidental, natural
30. or
environmental, to the:
3.4.3 Threat Sources
3.4.4 A threat is defined as an action perpetrated by a threat
agent. While such
sources are often people, natural and environmental factors can
also
contribute to the realisation of a threat. In addition, not all
threat sources
will attempt to enact a threat with malicious intent.
3.4.5 The following subsections list the general categories for
threat sources
that may lead to the realisation of a threat to the identified
assets under
consideration.
Trusted Sources with Malicious Intent – T1
3.4.6 Such sources comprise individuals or organisations with
which the system
31. owner shares some level of trust, but wish to deliberately cause
harm to
the in-scope control system.
3.4.7 Examples could include a disgruntled systems
administrator or user,
criminal elements within a partner organisation such as a
business peer,
or a subcontractor unhappy about the impending termination of
their
contract.
Trusted Sources without Malicious Intent – T2
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Page 14 of 48
3.4.8 Sources will generally be individuals or business partners
with whom the
system owner shares some level of trust, but who unknowingly
cause
32. harm to the in-scope system.
3.4.9 Examples could include an error by a control system
administrator or user,
a business partner being unable to supply critical system
services, or a
procedural operating error that leads to an undesirable system
state or
inappropriate information disclosure.
External Sources with Malicious Intent – T3
3.4.10 These sources are typically individuals or organisations
that have a
desire to threaten the in-scope system, but do not share an
implicit trust
relationship with the control system owner.
3.4.11 Examples could include industrial spies, hackers, activist
groups, criminal
elements, foreign government agencies.
External Sources without Malicious Intent – T4
3.4.12 Such sources will have neither an implied level of trust
within the in-
scope assets nor the desire to cause harm to the system.
33. 3.4.13 Examples could include users of communications
infrastructure and
suppliers of services on which the control system indirectly
depends.
Environmental – T5
3.4.14 Such sources are usually disruptive natural events, or
significant man-
made accidents such as an aircraft crash, or oil refinery
explosion.
3.4.15 Examples could include fire, flood or storm and
additionally the potential
effect on control system assets from dangerous goods (e.g. a
nearby
chemical factory) and epidemics (bird flu, swine flu etc).
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Page 15 of 48
34. 3.5 Analyse Risks
3.5.1 Having identified vulnerabilities to assets, they should be
analysed to
determine the asset’s current risk exposure with current controls
in terms
of:
ence; and
3.5.2 Each of these parameters is to be determined in
accordance with
appropriate scales suited to the organisation’s internal risk
management
framework. The scales used in this generic framework are
shown in
Tables 3-2 and 3-3, and correspond to those used by the
Australian
Government NII agencies.
3.5.3 Likelihood of Occurrence – Example
Likelihood
Descriptor
Likelihood Description Statements
35. Almost Certain The event is EXPECTED to occur in most
circumstances.
Likely
The event will PROBABLY occur in most circumstances and is
expected at some time.
Possible The event MIGHT occur at some time but is not
expected.
Unlikely The event COULD occur at some time.
Rare The event MAY occur in exceptional circumstances.
Table 3-2 Likelihood of Occurrence
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Page 16 of 48
3.5.4 Consequence of Realisation - Example
Consequence
Descriptor
37. enquiry
Removal of CEO
Loss of operating
licence or
directors/senior
management charged
and convicted
Major
Possible loss
$16M - $40M
Permanent injury
/stress
Failure of one or more key
organisational objectives
leading to major disruption
Supply disrupted >
1,000,000 customers
Major Failure to parts of
the Grid
Heavy media coverage;
government
embarrassment or loss
of public support.
38. Inquest in to business
resulting in an
enforcement order fine
and court conviction
Moderate
Possible loss
$4M - $16M
Injury requiring
medical treatment
/
long term
incapacity.
No threat to achievement
of objectives but could
result in some moderate
disruption
Supply disrupted >
200,000 customers
From a single event
Customer comments
escalated to
management; minor
media coverage.
Likely fine or
prosecution.
39. Administrative
undertaking
Minor
Possible loss
$1M - $4M
Injury requiring
first aid treatment /
temporary loss of
time.
Minor reduction in
effectiveness and
efficiency for a short period
Supply disrupted to <
1000 customers for less
than 1 week
Adverse customer
comments
Warning issued by
regulator
Insignificant
Possible loss
<$1M
Injury resulting in
40. no loss of time
Negligible impact to
effectiveness and
efficiency
Supply disrupted to <
100 customers for less
than 1 day
Manageable adverse
customer comments
No legal or regulatory
consequence.
Table 3-3 Consequence of Realisation
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Page 17 of 48
3.6 Evaluate Risk
3.6.1 Risk Matrix - Example
41. 3.6.2 Current risk exposure, in terms of likelihood and
consequence values, can be
determined using the risk matrix table below:
Consequence
Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic
L
ik
e
li
h
o
o
d
Rare Low Low Low Medium Medium
Unlikely Low Medium Medium Medium High
Possible Low Medium High High High
Likely Medium Medium High High Extreme
Almost
Certain
Medium High High Extreme Extreme
42. Table 3-4 Risk Calculation Matrix
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Page 18 of 48
3.6.3 Risk Exposure & Risk Acceptance - Example
3.6.4 Risk exposure levels and responsibility for acceptance or
residual risk are as
follows:
Risk
Rating
Responsibility for
Risk Acceptance
Action
Extreme
Board;
CEO
43. Would be expected to seriously damage the organisation’s
ability to continue to operate with the confidence of its
customer base or corporate owners. Could result in serious
social or economic damage and may affect the
organisation’s ability to continue operations.
High
CEO;
Executive;
Risk Manager
Would be expected to have a significant impact on corporate
budgets and organisational reputation. Could lead to
extended service disruption and seriously inconvenience or
have health impacts on a wide section of the customer base.
Medium
Risk Manager
Senior Manager
Likely to result in short term, localised, disruption to services
and require escalation through line management. Could
44. generate localised adverse media comment and moderate
penalties or costs unable to be borne via normal operational
budgets.
Low
Risk Manager
Senior Manager
Unlikely to have an impact that could not be satisfactorily
dealt with via normal operational procedures.
Table 3-5 Risk Exposure Levels & Risk Acceptance
3.7 Treat the Risk
3.7.1 Once risk exposure has been determined all risks must be
treated. Treatment
options include:
a) Accept: - do nothing and accept the current level of evaluated
risk;
b) Avoid: - cease doing the business activity that brings about
the possibility of
the threat occurring;
c) Transfer: - pass the responsibility for implementing
mitigating controls to
another entity. Responsibility for threat and risk management
45. remains the
responsibility of the organisation, and
d) Reduce: - implement controls to reduce risk to an acceptable
level.
3.7.2 The risk table provided in Section 5 contains a column for
recording risk
treatment. It also contains a cross-reference to the Risk
Treatment Plan (RTP)
which is shown in Section 6.
3.7.3 This plan details the controls that may be used to reduce
risk to an acceptable
level. Organisations may interpret these controls for their own
use – and
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 19 of 48
provide additional controls if required. The cross-reference in
the RTP points to
where the identified threat has been addressed.
46. 3.7.4 The RTP provides for a reassessment of risk, once
controls have been
selected and implemented. The RTP can also act as a
management plan to
provide a “status” of implementation.
3.7.5 An example work through is provided in Section 4,
illustrating the process flow
used in this risk framework.
3.8 Communication and Consultation
3.8.1 This environment comprises the identification and
involvement of all
stakeholders involved in the operation of the SCADA network
and the
management of corporate risk across the organisation.
3.8.2 In addition to the day-to-day operation of the SCADA
system(s), it is important
to ensure that risk information is communicated through the
organisation’s
management and is highlighted (generally in summarised form)
to the
executive forum charged with overall organisational risk
management.
47. 3.8.3 The manner in which this environment is implemented
will be highly dependent
on the operation of each affected organisation, and is therefore
considered to
be outside the scope of this report, however suggested
management reporting
techniques are included in section 8.
3.9 Monitor and Review
3.9.1 The monitoring and review component needs to be
implemented to ensure that:
a) Risk exposures are monitored, re-evaluated and revised as
appropriate over
time;
b) Risk exposures are updated in a timely fashion in response to
significant
events such as changes to the organisation’s operations and
influencing
external events;
c) Ensuring that identified remediation controls are effective
and efficient in both
design and operation;
d) Identification of emerging risks; and
48. e) The risk management framework itself is operating
effectively.
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Page 20 of 48
3.9.2 As with the communications and consultation
environment, the mechanism(s)
used to implement this component of the risk management
framework need to
be implemented within current organisational management and
monitoring
processes.
3.9.3 The following diagram and table provides a guide to
successful implementation
and ongoing effectiveness.
Design of
SRMF
Continual
49. Improvement of
SRMF
Monitor and
review the SRMF
Implement and
operate the
SRMF
Plan
ActDo
Check
Interested
Parties
SCADA
Security Risk
Requirements
And expectations
Managed
SCADA
50. Security
Interested
Parties
Management Mandate and
Committment
Figure 3-3 PDCA model applied to SCADA Security Risk
Management System
ISO 27001
Information Security
Management System Process
(ISMS)
SCADA Security Risk Management System
Plan
Establish SCADA Security Risk Management Framework,
applicable
policies, objectives, processes and procedures relevant to
managing
risk and improving security to deliver results in accordance with
an
organisation’s overall policies and objectives.
Do
51. Implement and operate the SCADA Security Risk Management
Framework policy, controls, processes and procedures.
Check
Assess and, where applicable, measure process performance
against
SCADA Security Risk Management Framework policy,
objectives and
practical experience and report the results to management for
review.
Act
Take corrective and preventative actions, based on the results of
the
internal audit and management review or other relevant
information to
achieve continual improvement of the SCADA Security Risk
Management Framework.
Table 3-6 SRMS Management and Monitoring Guide
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52. 3.10 Risk Assessment Terms and Conventions
3.10.1 Terms
Risk levels referred to throughout this Generic SCADA
RMF(and which are
recommended for use in any Security risk management plans)
are:
existing and
implemented risk mitigation controls;
ntrolled Risk is the level of risk posed to system assets
after
specific/additional risk mitigation controls are implemented to
address current
risk exposures; and
risk treatment.
3.10.2 Conventions – Risk Assessment
The following table describes the abbreviations used within the
Risk Assessment
below.
Term Value Description
53. Threat Type C Confidentiality – refers to unauthorised
disclosure
I Integrity – refers to unauthorised alteration
A Availability – refers to unauthorised loss or destruction
Risk Rating E Extreme Risk
H High Risk
M Medium Risk
L Low Risk
Table 3-7 Conventions of Risk Assessment
3.10.3 Conventions – Risk Treatment Plan
The following table describes the abbreviations used within the
Risk Treatment Plan
to demonstrate the effective implementation of controls
documented.
Term Value Description
Controls Legend Proposed security control or mitigation
strategy
Proposed security control that has been rejected by
management
Security control that is not implemented and effective
54. Security control that is only partially implemented and
effective
Security control that is fully implemented and effective
Table 3-8 Conventions Risk Treatment Plan
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 22 of 48
4 Generic SCADA Assets
4.1 Generic SCADA Process Model
4.1.1 The following diagram illustrates the generic nature
whereby the SCADA-
related processes have been decomposed in order to implement
a generic risk
management framework.
4.1.2 This facilitates the identification of affected
organisational SCADA assets
through the identification of the enablers associated with these
55. processes.
Inputs
q Data
q Communications / Gateway
q People
q Human Management
Interface
q SCADA Application
Outputs
q SCADA Operations
q Data
Input Output
Assets
People
Product
Processes
Reputation
Management
SCADA Control
Monitoring
Policy
Process
56. q Front End Processing
q Device Control
q Real Time Units
q PLC’s
Figure 4-1 Generic SCADA Process Model
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 23 of 48
4.2 Generic SCADA Enablers - Example
4.2.1 As partially identified in the previous subsection, the
following table identifies
the enablers likely to be found in a generic SCADA system:
Category Enabler Owner Asset ID
People Users and operators of the SCADA system HR Mgr Pe.1
Products
Buildings and Sites Property Mgr P.1
Communications and Networks CIO P.2
57. SCADA Application Software Senior Engineer P.3
SCADA Hardware and Operating System (OS) Senior Engineer
P.4
SCADA Field Devices Senior Engineer P.5
Supporting Utilities CIO P.6
Processes
Management Control and Feedback CEO Pr.1
Information Management CIO Pr.2
Reputation Corporate Reputation CEO Re.1
Table 4-1 Generic SCADA Process Enablers
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 24 of 48
5 Worked Example of Threat and Risk Assessment Framework
Step 1 – Identify what process we are protecting – in this
instance it is SCADA system
Step 2 – We identify the enablers that make this process occur –
in this example we will select “Application Software”.
58. Category Enabler Owner Asset ID Notes
Product
SCADA Application
Software
P.3 SCADA Application that monitors and manages SCADA
assets
Step 3 – Threat and Risk Assessment – Assess risk against the
threat of the “Loss of Confidentiality, Availability or Integrity”.
This gives the Current Risk,
which is the level of risk with existing and implemented
controls in place. (NB: only loss of confidentiality is
demonstrated in this example.)
Asset ID
Common potential points of failure and known vulnerabilities
Threat
Type
Threat
sources
Current Risk Treatment
Option &
reference Con-
59. sequence
Likeli-
hood
Risk
Rating
P.3
(SCADA
Application
Software)
Lack of security hardening C T1,T2, T3,T4 Moderate Likely
High
Reduce
F1
Step 4 – Risk Treatment Plan – as the current risk rating in this
example is “High”, treat the risk by selecting the “Reduce”
option. How this risk reduction is
realised is detailed in the “Risk Treatment Plan” at “C2”. An
extract from the RTP is provided below
R
e
f Control
Objectives
60. Selection of controls to achieve objectives
Controls
Controlled Risk
R
e
s
id
u
a
l
R
is
k
Con-
sequence
Likeli-
hood
UNCLASSIFIED
61. Page 25 of 48
F1
To ensure software
can withstand
unauthorised access
Attempts
Secure SCADA software configuration aligned with (ISO
27002), (CIP Standards) Moderate Unlikely Medium
Table 5-1: linkage between the Asset Register, TRA and RTP
Step 5 – once the control can be proven to be in place, the
controls are assessed for effectiveness and the risk level for that
threat can be re-evaluated. In
this example, risk has been reduced from “High” to “Medium”
because the likelihood has been reduced from “Likely” to
“Unlikely”.
A reference to a control identified in a standard is included to
demonstrate compliance and linkage to the standard.
62. UNCLASSIFIED
Page 26 of 48
6 Example SCADA Threat and Risk Assessment
Asset ID Common potential points of failure and known
vulnerabilities
Threat
Type
Threat
sources
Current Risk
Treatment
Option &
reference
Con-
sequence
Likeli-
hood
Risk
63. Rating
Pe.1
People
Social Engineering – obtaining information on system layout
and on those who
manage it. Known to have occurred
C
T1, T2, T3
Moderate Likely High Reduce A1
Employee vetting – employees with access to SCADA control
systems do not have
the appropriate background checking conducted prior to
engagement resulting in
possible data leakage, data corruption, damaged reputation and
business
relationships
T1, T2
Account management – sharing of passwords by employees
leading to poor chain of
evidence and/or information compromise
T1, T2
Information security breaches - past employees or service
providers freely disclose
information to unauthorised persons
64. T1, T2
Disgruntled Staff including contractors – who subsequently lose
their integrity in
relation to job performance
I
T1, T2
Moderate Likely High Reduce A2
3
rd
Party dependencies – where the integrity of the 3
rd
party is essentially unknown T1, T2
Ineffective security awareness training - leads to the
introduction of malicious code or
viruses, disclosure/ theft of information via portable storage
devices
T1,T2
Issue-motivated interference – leading to biased or one
dimensional thinking which
affects job performance
T1, T2
Loss of Key Personnel and/or Corporate Knowledge
A
65. T1, T2
Moderate
Almost
Certain
High Reduce A3
Lack of skills / knowledge – leads to accidental issues with
irregular data modification T1, T2
Industrial relations breakdown – leading to staff not being
available for long periods of
time or to perform critical functions. Legal activity may result.
T1, T2
Health related event – absenteeism T1, T2
Pr.1
(Management
Inappropriate management structure, lack of security
framework, poor allocation of
security roles and responsibilities
C
T1, T2, T3,
T4, T5
Catastrop
hic
Likely Extreme Reduce B1
66. UNCLASSIFIED
Page 27 of 48
Asset ID Common potential points of failure and known
vulnerabilities
Threat
Type
Threat
sources
Current Risk
Treatment
Option &
reference
Con-
sequence
Likeli-
hood
Risk
67. Rating
Control &
Feedback)
Ineffective change/configuration/release management –
introduction of unapproved,
untested hardware or software
T1, T2, T3,
T4, T5
Ineffective management forum/committee, limited stakeholder
participation or
leadership, poor corrective and preventative actions for security
issues, increased
severity of incidents
I
T1, T2, T3,
T4, T5
Catastrop
hic
Likely Extreme Reduce B2
Ineffective or lack of defined service level agreements (SLA’s)
with business owners,
ICT Teams and service providers
T1, T2, T3,
T4, T5
68. Incident management – poor evidence gathering, preservation
and inability to identify
that a compromise has actually occurred
T1, T2, T3,
T4, T5
Business functionality driven initiatives verses security -
introduce vulnerable systems
and applications
T1, T2
Failure in duty of care, lack of security policy and direction
T1, T2, T3,
T4, T5
Project management – lack of security and/or system
considerations during project
planning, implementation, operation and review resulting in
avoidable issues and/or
incidents
A
T1, T2, T3,
T4, T5
Catastrop
hic
Likely Extreme Reduce B3
Business Continuity Management (BCM) – lack of resiliency
and redundancy, lack of
identification of Maximum Acceptable Outage, Recovery Point
69. Objectives, Recovery
Time Objectives resulting in variable business continuity
responses
T1, T2, T3,
T4, T5
Ineffective and/or one-way communication – no security
committee to manage and
provide oversight of security
T1, T2, T3,
T4, T5
P.1
Building / Site
Degraded security environment through site isolation C T1, T2
Minor Possible Medium Reduce C1
Vandalism
I
T1, T2
Minor Possible Medium Reduce C2 Poor maintenance T1, T2
Environmental disaster T1, T2
Natural disaster
A
T1, T2
Moderate Unlikely Medium Reduce C3
70. DR process failure T1, T2
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 28 of 48
Asset ID Common potential points of failure and known
vulnerabilities
Threat
Type
Threat
sources
Current Risk
Treatment
Option &
reference
Con-
sequence
Likeli-
hood
71. Risk
Rating
Accidental damage - environmental impact resulting in loss of
service, damage to
servers, infrastructure, possible harm to employees
T1, T2
Sabotage and wilful damage T1, T2
OH&S non-compliance T1, T2
Poor design & Planning – lack of input concerning physical and
protective security
resulting in unsafe and/or insecure buildings and sites.
T1, T2
Pr.2
Information
Management
Inappropriate access control – Overuse of Local administrative
privileges
C
T1, T2
Moderate
Almost
Certain
72. High Reduce D1
Inappropriate equipment disposal – No sanitisation T1, T2
Account management – accounts not deactivated resulting in
unauthorised access by
past employees/service providers. Weak password policies
leading to easy access to
systems, accounts and infrastructure by unauthorised actors
T1, T2
Lack of security controls in contractual agreements T1, T2
Poor version control and data quality
I
T1, T2
Moderate
Almost
Certain
High Reduce D2
Lack of information ownership and information classification
T1, T2
Lack of monitoring and audit processes. T1, T2
Too much information T1, T2
Lack of documentation T1, T2
73. Incorrect documentation T1, T2
Untested procedures (Back-up etc.)
A
T1, T2
Moderate
Almost
Certain
High Reduce D3
Lack of capacity planning T1, T2
Change/Configuration/Release management – introduction of
unapproved, untested
hardware or software
T1, T2
P.2
Communications &
Networks
Unauthorised disclosure via 3rd party carrier services
C
T1, T2
Minor Likely Medium Reduce E1
Open communication protocols are used
74. T1, T2
Mis-configuration leading to unauthorised access and disclosure
T1, T2
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 29 of 48
Asset ID Common potential points of failure and known
vulnerabilities
Threat
Type
Threat
sources
Current Risk
Treatment
Option &
reference
Con-
75. sequence
Likeli-
hood
Risk
Rating
Security holes in protocols and equipment
T1, T2
Data path over shared networks resulting in uncontrolled access
to data
T1, T2
Failure to segment network – allowing entire network
compromise T1, T2
Unsecured wireless networks – allowing unauthorised access,
network compromise T1, T2
Lack of diversity in communication paths lead to
communication failure
I
T1, T2
Moderate
Almost
76. Certain
High Reduce E2
Data path interference – redirections, man-in-the-middle
attacks, eavesdropping T1, T2
Irregular system log analysis - resulting in information security
incidents not being
analysed to further improve information security
T1, T2
Poor or non-existent software patch management –
vulnerabilities to communications
equipment routers, switches, firewalls
T1, T2
Lack of monitoring capacity planning and QoS issues
A
T1, T2
Moderate
Almost
Certain
High Reduce E3 No redundancy / false redundancy T1, T2
Interference from other transmissions T1, T2
Vendor pricing or service level changes T1, T2
77. P.3
SCADA Application
Software
Lack of security hardening C T1, T2 Moderate Likely High
Reduce F1
Poor or non-existent software patch management –
vulnerabilities to operating
systems and/or applications
I
T1, T2, T3,
T4
Major Likely High Reduce F2
Loss of provider and no escrow agreement T1, T2
Off shoring – vendor / service provider moves offshore or sub
contracts application
support
T1, T2
Takeovers and mergers T1, T2
Change management and lack of flexibility to adapt to changing
requirements and
lack of user acceptance testing process
T1, T2
Technology changes – leading to software being outdated T1,
78. T2
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 30 of 48
Asset ID Common potential points of failure and known
vulnerabilities
Threat
Type
Threat
sources
Current Risk
Treatment
Option &
reference
Con-
sequence
Likeli-
hood
79. Risk
Rating
System complexity T1, T2
Unaware of implications in implementing security controls T1,
T2
Lack of visibility and access to source code
A
T1, T2
Major Likely High Reduce F3 Lack of scalability in software
solutions T1, T2
SCADA Application failure T1, T2
Vested interests in particular products T1, T2
P.4
SCADA Hardware
including operating
System
Obsolete equipment or Operating System – unable to be patched
C
T1, T2
80. Moderate
Almost
Certain
High Reduce G1
Lack of hardening – system open to vulnerabilities. T1, T2
Poor Patch Management – Operating Systems
T1, T2,
T3,T4
Inappropriate access controls T1, T2
Improper patch management / change management
I
T1, T2
Moderate Likely High Reduce G2
Incompatibility with the application T1, T2
Vested interests in particular products
A
T1, T2
Moderate
Almost
Certain
High Reduce G3
Equipment failure T1, T2
81. Environmental failure such as air conditioning, UPS T1, T2
Damage as a result of lack of electrical isolation T1, T2
Malicious software T1, T2
Lack of capacity monitoring and planning T1, T2
Lack of redundancy hardware T1, T2
No spares management T1, T2
P.5
SCADA Field
As for SCADA HW, SW App
C T1, T2 Moderate Likely High Reduce H1
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 31 of 48
Asset ID Common potential points of failure and known
vulnerabilities
Threat
Type
83. T1, T2
Default security configuration – retention of default user names
and passwords T1, T2
Lack of security hardening – also inability to security harden
T1, T2
As for SCADA HW, SW App
I
T1, T2
Minor Likely Medium Reduce H2
Dependency and use of COTS devices.
T1, T2
Introduction of open technology field devices (inc unstable
operating Systems, less
robust hardware)
T1, T2
As for SCADA HW, SW App
A
T1, T2
Moderate
84. Almost
Certain
High Reduce H3
Failure to operate - dependence on communications links
(Denial of Service)
T1, T2
More vulnerable to physical damage
T1, T2
Lacking in remote management capability T1, T2
P.6
Supporting Utilities
Breach of confidentiality when power fails C T1, T2 Minor
Possible Medium Reduce I1
Lack of power & air-conditioning Quality and reliability
I
T1, T2
Moderate Likely High Reduce I2
Loss of power supply – leads to equipment shutdown and loss of
availability T1, T2
Loss of air-conditioning – Leads to equipment overheating,
shutdown and loss of
availability
85. A
T1, T2
Major Likely High Reduce I3
Lack of backup power – No alternative supply or generator
installed
T1, T2
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 32 of 48
Asset ID Common potential points of failure and known
vulnerabilities
Threat
Type
Threat
sources
Current Risk
Treatment
86. Option &
reference
Con-
sequence
Likeli-
hood
Risk
Rating
Lack of UPS, generator maintenance results in power failure
T1, T2
Non-diversity of supply leads to failure due to external
influences in grid.
T1, T2
Damage to supporting utilities due to Lightning, Fire etc. T1,
T2
Lack of capacity planning – to cover peak loads T1, T2
UNCLASSIFIED
87. Page 33 of 48
7 Example SCADA Risk Treatment Plan (RTP)
Ref Control Objectives
Selection of controls to achieve objectives
(Control Reference)
Controlled Risk
R
e
s
id
u
a
l
R
is
k
Con-
sequence
Likeli-
88. hood
A1
People
Confidentiality
To ensure that people
maintain the
confidentiality of sensitive
SCADA information
Confidentiality Agreements in employment contracts
Include survivability clauses and obtain legal advice on drafting
(ISO 27002 – Section 6.1.5
Confidentiality agreements).
Moderate Unlikely Medium
Confidentiality Provisions in 3
rd
Party and outsourcing contracts
Mandate security briefing for new providers who are working in
critical areas to highlight obligations
ISO 27002 – Section 6.2.3 Addressing security in third party
agreements.
Position applicant references and referees are checked and
reasonable care is taken to ensure the
background of the applicant prior to employment. This includes
a police background check to confirm
suitability (ISO 27002 – Section 8.1.2) (ISM 0434) (PSPF
Persec-01).
89. SCADA security training at induction and ongoing awareness
training including security incident
reporting.
Incident reporting should define alert levels and timely
reporting of critical incidents (ISO 27002 –
Section 13 Information Security Incident Management, ISM –
Information Security Awareness
Training) (PSPF Gov-1).
A2
People
Integrity
To ensure that SCADA
resources are
appropriately trained,
motivated and are
trustworthy
Personnel vetting
The Australian Government PSPF Personnel Security Protocol
provides guidance on vetting (ISO
27002 – section 8 Human resources security).
Moderate Unlikely Medium
Concise job descriptions in. (ISO 27002 – section 8 Human
resources security).
On-going training and assessment in operating SCADA systems
(ISO 27002 – 8.2.2 Information
security awareness, education and training, ISM – Information
Security Awareness and training).
90. Privileged accounts are not shared, uniquely identifiable for
each user, approved only on a “need-to-
have” basis, and used for administrative purposes only. A
general user account is to be used for
business as usual access. (ISM 0444).
Privileged accounts are audited in accordance with the security
calendar to confirm access is required
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 34 of 48
Ref Control Objectives
Selection of controls to achieve objectives
(Control Reference)
Controlled Risk
R
e
s
id
u
a
l
91. R
is
k
Con-
sequence
Likeli-
hood
and account use is within the information security policy
requirements. (ISO 27002 Section 11.2 User
access management).
Defined Entry and Exit procedures.
Different levels of briefing/interviews depending on the job
performed. Exit interviews are particularly
important for staff & management in operational areas (ISO
27001 – 8.3 Termination or change of
employment, ISM Personnel Security).
A3
People
Availability
To ensure that
appropriate resources are
available to manage and
operate SCADA systems
92. Fully documented operating procedures.
Operating procedures should be in place to supplement training
and reduce the risk of accidents.
Training environments should be established to support learning
objectives (ISO 27001 10.1
Operational procedures and responsibilities, ISM System
Security Plans, Standard Operating
Procedures). Moderate Unlikely Medium
Implement a combination of resource types – including
contractors, 3
rd
parties.
Have a different type of resource to backup primary resourcing.
Implement cross-skilling for critical areas.
B1
Management
Control &
Feedback
Confidentiality
To control SCADA
Management information
Develop Security Framework – set security direction,
objectives, allocate roles and responsibilities,
reporting requirements, steering committee to provide oversight
of security (ISO27001 Section 4.2.1).
Minor Unlikely Low
93. Establish a data classification schema - (ISO 27002 – 7.2
Information Classification, ISM – Media
Security)
Develop and implement change and configuration management
process ISO27001 12.5.1 change
control procedures. - (ITIL – Change Management), NIST 800-
128.
Formal procedures for publication of SCADA management
information.
Information is often incorrectly published to web sites when it
should be for internal use only – often as
a result of confusing internal “unclassified” documents with
information intended for the general public
-.(ISO 27001 Section 7.2 Information Classification).
B2
Management
Control &
Feedback
Integrity
To provide correct and
controlled access to
SCADA information
Controlled repository for SCADA related information.
An information/knowledge management system may assist with
achieving a controlled and secure
storage - (ISO 27002 Section 10.1.1 Documented operating
procedures). Minor Unlikely Low
To provide incident
94. response and readiness
Formal Incident response and readiness procedures are
developed and implemented - NIST SP800-
61 Incident handling guide.
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 35 of 48
Ref Control Objectives
Selection of controls to achieve objectives
(Control Reference)
Controlled Risk
R
e
s
id
u
a
l
R
is
95. k
Con-
sequence
Likeli-
hood
processes Forensic readiness is the ability of an organisation to
maximise its evidence collection capability whilst
minimising the cost of doing so. (draft ISO 27037
identification, collection, acquisition and preservation
of digital evidence) – (Aus Standards HB – 171 Management of
IT Evidence)
To provide competent
and effective
management support
Documented Management Outcomes
These should be endorsed with executive support (ISO 27002
Section 6 Organisation of Information
Security)
To assess management
effectiveness
Establish Key Performance Indicators for Management
These should be reportable, repeatable and achievable (ISO
27001 Section Management review of
the Information Management System ISMS) (ISO 27001 Section
0.2b)
96. B3
Management
Control &
Feedback
Availability
To ensure that required
management controls are
defined
Approved and documented Roles and Responsibilities for
Management (ISO 27001 Management
Responsibility) (ISM Roles and Responsibilities)
Moderate Unlikely Medium
Approved Management Framework and Charter
Quality Management procedures provide guidance on how a
management framework should function
(ISO 27001 Section 4.2 Establishing and managing ISMS)
To provide dedicated and
effective Management
support for SCADA
systems
Documented SCADA management policies and procedures
These document should be brief and not change significantly
over time (ISO 27001 Section 4.3
Documentation Requirements) (ISM Information Security
Documentation)
97. C1
Building / Site
Confidentiality
To prevent compromise
of assets and interruption
to business activities
Equipment site standards for remote devices
Suitable racks/cabinets may be identified for remote
servers/switches. Do not allow unprotected, live
network access points (ISO 27002 Section 9 Physical and
Environmental Security) (ISM Physical
Security)
Minor Unlikely Low
C2
Building / Site
Integrity
To minimise impact of
Site loss and damage
Disaster Recovery and Business Continuity Plans
These site specific strategies should be aligned with the whole
of organisation DR strategy
(ISO 27002 Sections 13 Security Incident Management, 14
Business Continuity Management) (ISM
Incident Response and Emergency Procedures)
Minor Unlikely Low
98. C3
Building / Site
Availability
To prevent loss of assets
and interruption to
SCADA operations
Defined security perimeters
Restrict access to sites – do not allow broad access simply for
convenience (ISO 27002 Section 9
Physical and Environmental Security) (ISM Physical Security)
Moderate Unlikely Medium
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 36 of 48
Ref Control Objectives
Selection of controls to achieve objectives
(Control Reference)
Controlled Risk
R
e
99. s
id
u
a
l
R
is
k
Con-
sequence
Likeli-
hood
Redundant power supply
Consider Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) or alternate
power supply for key sites.
(ISO 27002 Section 9 Physical and Environmental Security)
Implementation of cabling standards
All cabling should be bundled, labelled and use proper layout
trays. (ISM Communications
Infrastructure) (ISO 27002 Section 9.2.3 Cabling Security)
D1
Information
Management
Confidentiality
100. To control access to
SCADA information
Documented SCADA access control policy
A high level access policy should be part of Information
management controls communicated to
management and users (ISO 27002 Section 11 Access Control)
(ISM Access Control)
Moderate Unlikely Medium
Formal user registration procedures in place
Registration should exist for all user types: staff, contractors,
and contracted service providers (ISO
27002 Section 11 Access Control) (ISM Access Control)
Regular audit review of access rights
Ensure that all remote and “temporary” accounts are also
reviewed (ISO 27002 Section 11 Access
Control) (ISM Access Control)
Encrypt sensitive information stored on Networks
Encryption of certain classifications should be part of an
organisational information classification
schema. (ISO 27002 – 12.3 Cryptographic Controls), (ISM –
Cryptography) (NIST FIPS encryption
standards)
D2
Information
Management
Integrity
To ensure the correct
101. operation of information
processing facilities
Documented SCADA operating procedures
To have full effect; operating procedures should be consistent,
available, clear and changes must be
efficiently applied according to proper versioning control.
Moderate Unlikely Medium
Incident management and response procedures
Should be documented and tested regularly - Available tools
include Network and Host Intrusion
Detection Systems, System Integrity Verification , Log Analysis
and Intrusion Repulsion – (ISO 27002
Section 13 Information Security Incident Management, ISM –
Section Managing Security Incidents)
Appropriate segregation of duties for information processing
tasks (ISO 27002 Section 10
Communications and operations management)
D3 To maintain the Documented and tested backup procedures
Moderate Unlikely Medium
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 37 of 48
102. Ref Control Objectives
Selection of controls to achieve objectives
(Control Reference)
Controlled Risk
R
e
s
id
u
a
l
R
is
k
Con-
sequence
Likeli-
hood
Information
Management
Availability
availability of information
103. processing
Often only certain types of systems are backed up.
Organisations should ensure that ALL critical
information is backed up and that effectiveness is tested on a
regular basis (ISO 27002 – 10.5
Backup)
Capacity monitoring and forecasting
Network monitoring and service delivery reports from vendors
may effectively provide these
controls(ISO 27002 – 10.3.1 Capacity Management)
Change Management
All SCADA systems, applications and communications
infrastructure should be subject to formal
change management control (ISO 27002 – Change Management
Sections10.1.2, 12.5.1, 13.2) (ITIL
Change Management)
E1
Communications
& Networks
Confidentiality
To protect the
transmission of SCADA
information broadcast
over Public Networks
Encrypt transmission of SCADA information
Ensure that appropriate encryption protocols are applied – (ISM
Cryptography, ISO 27001 – Section
12.3 Cryptographic controls, NIST FIP Encryption Standards)
104. Minor Unlikely Low
Perform vulnerability assessments on a periodic basis on all
access points into the SCADA network
Regular scenarios should be defined and tested to identify
network vulnerabilities (ISO 27002 – 12.6
Technical Vulnerability Management, (ISM – Vulnerability
Management)
E2
Communications
& Networks
Integrity
To verify SCADA network
configurations
Deploy network monitoring services to identify and localise
network trouble spots Moderate Unlikely Medium
E3
Communications
& Networks
Availability
To maintain SCADA
network connectivity
For key services, route communications lines via multiple
exchanges / mediums
Moderate Unlikely Medium Deploy intelligent networking
devices to handle peak loads
Routing devices and modern switching equipment can be
tailored to meet specific load patterns and
105. provide alerts for unusual activity
F1
SCADA
Application
Software
Confidentiality
To ensure that such
software utilises
recognised best practice
security mechanisms and
is able to withstand
Secure SCADA software configuration
Where possible, computerised systems should be hardened to
minimise the opportunity for
unauthorised access. Hardening should also ensure that any
vendor application software support is
maintained throughout the life of the product whilst the
underlying system is hardened.
Access control mechanisms should also exist to ensure that
centralised system access controls are
Moderate Unlikely Medium
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Ref Control Objectives
Selection of controls to achieve objectives
(Control Reference)
Controlled Risk
R
e
s
id
u
a
l
R
is
k
Con-
sequence
Likeli-
hood
unauthorised access
107. attempts.
protected in accordance with corporate password and account
usage policies.
Minimisation of user access rights
Users should only be granted the minimum access required in
order to perform their duties. Such
access, and the functionality assigned to SCADA system roles,
should also be regularly reviewed and
updated. (ISO 27002 Section Access Control)
Logging of access attempts and user actions - All access
attempts, whether they are successful or not,
should be logged to a protected audit trail.
The audit trail should be regularly backed up and kept as long
term evidence (12mths) to prevent
erasure or tampering of evidence.
In addition, significant activities (such as the changing of state
of SCADA devices and updates to
access lists) should also be logged. (ISO 27002 Section 10.10
Monitoring)
The audit trail should be periodically reviewed for suspicious
activity.
It is desirable that suspicious activity be alerted to operational
personnel in near real-time.
F2
SCADA
Application
Software
Integrity
To maintain the correct
operation of the software
108. over time.
Implement patch management process – (DSD 35 Mitigations,
ISO 27001 – Section 12.6 Technical
vulnerability management, ISM - Vulnerability Management)
Major Unlikely Medium
Vendor support arrangements
Contractual arrangements should be in place with the software
vendor to ensure that:
Software patches are made available in a timely manner
Support arrangements such as subcontracting and off-shoring do
not occur without the agreement of
all contracted parties
The customer is to be notified of any takeover or merger
activities that may affect the level or manner
in which the vendor support arrangements are provided (ISO
27002 Section 6.2 External Parties)
Critical software escrow arrangements
Where a SCADA system comprises a vendor-specific software
package, an escrow agreement should
be entered into with the vendor to ensure product availability
should the vendor organisation fail to be
able to support the product into the future. (ISO 27002 Section
10.8.2 Exchange agreements)
F3
SCADA
Application
Software
109. Capacity planning
SCADA systems should be designed to provide scalability for
future growth and information storage
requirements. Collection and retention of audit trails should
also be addressed.
(ISO 27002 Section 10.3.1 Capacity Management)
Major Unlikely Medium
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Ref Control Objectives
Selection of controls to achieve objectives
(Control Reference)
Controlled Risk
R
e
s
id
u
a
l
110. R
is
k
Con-
sequence
Likeli-
hood
Availability Capacity monitoring
SCADA functionality should include a function to allow for
potential bottlenecks such as CPU, memory,
disk and communications usage to be monitored and analysed.
(ISO 27002 Section 10.3.1 Capacity Management)
Acceptance testing
Acceptance testing procedures and criteria should be developed
for all changes to SCADA software.
These procedures should encompass software updates, bug fixes
and security patches.
In cases where emergency security patching is required,
Business Continuity Plans should allow for
the implementation of such patches and the recovery from failed
operational implementations.
(ISO 27002 Section 10.3.2 System Acceptance)
Use of open architectures and protocols
Where possible, open architectures and protocols should be
adopted to prevent vendor-specific
architectures and protocols from potentially ‘hiding’ security
issues and constraining system scalability
111. and interoperability.
G1
SCADA
Hardware
including
operating
System
Confidentiality
To ensure that the
SCADA computing
platform is resilient
against unauthorised
access attempts.
Security hardening of the computing platform
Computer platforms should be hardened to remove unnecessary
services, accounts and software
packages.
Vendor support agreements should allow for basic hardening of
supported computer platforms. ( ISM -
Software Security Standard Operating Environments) (ISO
27002 Section 12 Information systems
acquisition, development and maintenance) (DHS Procurement
Guidelines)
Moderate Unlikely Medium
Operating System access controls
OS access controls should be implemented to ensure that
sensitive information is protected from
unnecessary and unauthorised disclosure
Unnecessary user accounts should also be removed and default
112. account passwords changed. (ISO
27002 Section 11 Access control)
Vendor support arrangements
Vendor support arrangements should ensure that system
hardening measures do not void support
arrangements and that measures such as timely security patching
of systems are supported.
G2
SCADA
To ensure that the
configuration of the
Formal configuration management and control procedures
There should be measures in place to ensure that the SCADA
system is in a known and approved
Moderate Unlikely Medium
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Ref Control Objectives
Selection of controls to achieve objectives
(Control Reference)
114. state, and that changes are appropriately analysed, tested and
authorised.
Vendor support arrangements
Contractual support arrangements should be in place with the
SCADA software vendor to ensure that
timely installation of security patches to supported hardware
and OS is possible.
G3
SCADA
Hardware
including
operating
System
Availability
To ensure that the
SCADA computing
platform is reliable in the
event of component
failure, environmental
disturbance, or attempted
malicious disruption.
System redundancy
Critical system components should be designed to withstand
single points of failure.
Business Continuity Plans (and/or if necessary, Disaster
Recovery Plans) should be updated and
tested to ensure that systems are able to withstand loss of single
115. physical, personnel and procedural
dependencies.
Moderate Possible High
Spares holdings
Adequate spares should be held (or covered by vendor support
arrangements) for timely recovery
from component failures.
Protection against malware
Antivirus measures should be implemented on SCADA networks
as they would with other corporate IT
environments.
Malware protection should be applied and updated in a timely
manner on SCADA server, FEP, field
device and workstation platforms.
NOTE: it is becoming increasingly common to find field
devices operating via well-known operating
systems. Any virus attack on the system can therefore also have
major repercussions on field devices
and they should therefore be brought into the corporate AV
regime.
ISO 27002 – Section 10.4 Protection against malicious and
mobile code
Capacity planning and monitoring
Measures should be in place to monitor and manage SCADA
system capacity and address potential
bottlenecks in advance of them impacting on system operations.
– (ISO 27002 – Section 10.3.1
Capacity Management)
Business Continuity Plans
BCPs and associated DRPs should be in place and tested to
116. ensure that the SCADA system can cope
with the loss of components (and potentially sites) and that the
system can be restored to normal
operations as faults are rectified. – (ISO 27002 – Section 14
Business Continuity, HB 292 – A
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Ref Control Objectives
Selection of controls to achieve objectives
(Control Reference)
Controlled Risk
R
e
s
id
u
a
l
R
is
117. k
Con-
sequence
Likeli-
hood
Practitioners Guide to Business Continuity Management, ISM
Business Continuity and Disaster
Recovery)
H1
SCADA Field
Devices
Confidentiality
To prevent unauthorised
monitoring and control of
these devices.
Encrypted data communications
Where communications with field devices occurs over a
communications line susceptible to external
interception and / or compromise, information should be
encrypted to minimise the opportunity for
external parties to compromise the communications channel. –
(ISO 27002 – Section 12.3
Cryptographic Controls, ISM – Section Cryptography, NIST
FIPS encryption standards)
118. Moderate Unlikely Medium
Deactivation of default configuration accounts – where
technically feasible default configuration
accounts should be deactivated
Private communications channels
Where possible, sensitive communications with field devices
should be performed over dedicated
leased-line services rather than using a public communications
infrastructure.
H2
SCADA Field
Devices
Integrity
To ensure that these
devices are in a stable
and known state
Periodic device polling
Field devices should be periodically polled to ensure that their
status is verified to the central control
system and, if necessary, that discrepancies are investigated and
verified.
Minor Unlikely Low
H3
SCADA Field
Devices
Availability
119. To ensure that these
devices can be monitored
and controlled as
required.
Device maintenance
A maintenance regime should be in place to ensure that all
peripheral devices are regularly tested
Moderate Unlikely Medium
Alternate communications channels
Critical field establishments and devices should be connected to
the SCADA system via redundant
communications channels.
The central control station should also be configured such that
it has control over the communications
channel(s) available to the field device. – (ISO 27002 – 9.2.2
Supporting utilities)
I1
Supporting
Utilities
Confidentiality
To ensure that power
failures do not lead to a
security compromise of
the SCADA system.
Backup power source
Critical system components should be fed through both mains
and backup power supplies. (ISO
27002 – 9.2.2 Supporting utilities)
120. Minor Rare Low
I2
Supporting
To ensure that SCADA
systems operate as
Backup power source
A medium-to-long term power supply alternative (such as a long
term diesel power unit) should be
Moderate Unlikely Medium
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Ref Control Objectives
Selection of controls to achieve objectives
(Control Reference)
Controlled Risk
R
e
s
121. id
u
a
l
R
is
k
Con-
sequence
Likeli-
hood
Utilities
Integrity
expected during power
supply disruptions.
available to power critical SCADA system components during
power interruptions.
Should core SCADA components be installed in dedicated
control environments, power supply should
also be capable of powering support environments such as air
conditioning and fire detection. (ISO
27002 – 9.2.2 Supporting utilities)
Power conditioning
System-critical devices should be connected to a conditioned
122. and uninterruptible power supply.(ISO
27002 – 9.2.2 Supporting utilities)
I3
Supporting
Utilities
Availability
To prevent disruption to
SCADA operations during
power failure conditions.
Backup power source
Critical system components should be fed through both mains
and backup power supplies.(ISO 27002
– 9.2.2 Supporting utilities)
Major Unlikely Medium
Redundant control centres
There should be redundancy built into centralised control sites
to mitigate against damage to, or loss
of availability of, critical establishments.(ISO 27001 – Section
14 Business Continuity)
Contingency planning
Contingency plans should ensure that centralised services can
be transitioned to alternative
arrangements during such interruptions and be able to be
transitioned back into service once central
sites are restored to normal operations. (ISO 27001 – Section 14
Business Continuity)
Disaster recovery testing
Contingency plans should be tested periodically. Where a
123. physical failover test is not able to be
performed, formal scenario testing should be undertaken, with
results and lessons learned
documented, analysed and actioned as appropriate. (ISO 27001
– Section 14 Business Continuity)
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8 Presentation of Results to Senior Management
8.1 Overview
8.1.1 Whilst the detailed analysis and documentation contained
within an
organisation’s full SCADA risk management plan is likely to
form a significant
report, it is suggested that measures be undertaken to summarise
the plan for
presentation to senior management.
8.1.2 Whilst detailed documentation is available to senior
management personnel, a
summarised report is more often an effective format to
124. communicate the results
to such an audience.
8.1.3 A number of organisations already use a ‘traffic light’
approach to present such
data to senior management, where each risk is assigned a green,
amber or red
status depending on the current health of risk management
measures.
8.1.4 The following subsection presents the use of a ‘radar
chart’ to display risk
management status to an organisation’s senior management. It
can be a
highly effective mechanism in cases where identified SCADA
process enablers
are not overly complex and it has a number of advantages as
follows:
graphic
diagram
by including
historical data to demonstrate the organisation’s risk profile
125. over time.
8.1.4.1 The radar chart is a standard Microsoft charting option.
Applications such as
PowerPoint or Visio can be used to create the background
colour scheme
onto which the chart can be overlayed for presentation
purposes.
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8.2 Sample Radar Chart
8.2.1 Figure 8-1 provides a sample radar chart based on the
enablers identified in
this report and arbitrary treated risk exposure data.
8.2.2 It shows on the one diagram:
The health of risk management against each of the identified
enablers;
126. and
to the profile
12 months previous (May 10).
8.3 Sample Executive Summary Risk Status Table
8.3.1 Table 8-1 provides a sample executive risk status obtained
by taking the
highest likelihood and consequence from each enabler as a high
level overview
to the current
level of risk described in section 3.10.2 Conventions – Risk
Assessment
implementation of
controls documented – see section 3.10.3 Conventions – Risk
Treatment
Plan.
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127. Page 45 of 48
Users and
Operators
Buildings
and Sites
Communications
and Networks
SCADA
Software
SCADA Hardware
and OS
SCADA Field
Devices
Power Supply
Management Control
and Feedback
Information
128. Management
Legend
May 11
May 10
Risks mitigated and being
effectively managed
Risk mitigation measures
agreed but not yet implemented
Effective risk mitigation
measures yet to be agreed and
implemented
Figure 8-1 Sample Radar Chart Presentation of Risk
Management
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129. Page 46 of 48
Asset
Current Risk Controlled Risk
Consequence Likelihood Risk Rating
Treatment
Option
Consequence Likelihood Risk Rating
Pe.1 - People Moderate Almost Certain High Reduce A1-3
Moderate Unlikely Medium
Pr.1 - Management Control &
Feedback
Catastrophic Likely Extreme Reduce B1-3 Moderate Unlikely
Medium
P.1 - Building Site Moderate Possible Medium Reduce C1-3
Moderate Unlikely Medium
Pr.2 - Information Management Moderate Almost Certain High
Reduce D1-3 Moderate Unlikely Medium
P.2 - Communication & Networks Moderate Almost Certain
Very High Reduce E1-3 Moderate Unlikely Medium
P.3 - SCADA Application Software Major Likely High Reduce
130. F1-3 Major Unlikely Medium
P.4 - SCADA Hardware including
Operating System
Moderate Almost Certain High Reduce G1-3 Moderate Possible
High
P.5 - SCADA Field Devices Moderate Likely High Reduce H1-3
Moderate Unlikely Medium
P.6 - Supporting Utilities Major Likely High Reduce I1-3 Major
Unlikely Medium
Table 8-1 Executive Summary Risk Status Table
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9 Ongoing Monitoring and Review
9.1 Overview
9.1.1 The effectiveness of a risk management approach is
dependent not only on the
methodology applied to the development of risk assessment
131. data, but also on
its continued update as influencing factors change over time.
9.1.2 Examples of such factors can include:
the
organisation
nt (e.g. the
organisation may
decide to undertake a project that brings it into conflict with an
issue-
motivated group).
9.1.3 In addition, the risk management framework itself needs
to be monitored,
measured and refined to ensure that it continues to provide
relevant information
to the organisation.
9.1.4 The subsections to follow indicate measures that are likely
to contribute to the
ongoing effectiveness of the SCADA Risk Management
Framework.
9.2 SRMF Reviews
9.2.1 The overall SCADA Security Risk Management
132. Framework should be reviewed
over time to ensure that it functions effectively. Measures that
can be
undertaken to assist in this activity include, but are not
necessarily limited to,
the following:
s
designed to monitor
SRMF processes.
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9.2.2 Where possible, it is recommended that KPIs be chosen,
and limited in
number, to an easily measurable set to minimise the impact of
process
133. monitoring on normal day-to-day activities.
9.3 Communicating Risk Exposures
9.3.1 Having measured corporate risk exposures associated with
the operation of the
SCADA system(s), Section 8 of this document provides a
suggested
management reporting tool.
9.3.2 Where the organisation implements risk management at an
organisation-wide
level (e.g. a risk and audit committee reporting directly to their
Board or senior
Executives), SCADA risk exposures should also be formally
reported to this risk
management group to allow SCADA risk exposures to be
assessed and
managed at the corporate level.
9.4 Risk Assessment Updates
9.4.1 As noted, both the internal and external threat
environment is likely to change
over time.
9.4.2 To maintain the currency of RMF deliverable(s), a
program should be put into
134. place to:
re-evaluated in response to
defining
changes (e.g. the introduction of new technologies or the
emergence of a
significant external threat source).