Annurev lawsocsci-102209-152904

LS06CH02-Brisbin ARI 4 October 2010 15:4
Resistance to Legality
Richard A. Brisbin, Jr.
Department of Political Science, West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia
26506-6317; email: Richard.Brisbin@mail.wvu.edu
Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 2010. 6:25–44
First published online as a Review in Advance on
June 21, 2010
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Key Words
conﬂict, law, litigation, subversion, transgression
Abstract
The contingency of legality creates opportunities for individuals and
collective associations to oppose its norms and requirements. This arti-
cle examines the context and dimensions of resistance or opposition to
legality, why resistance occurs, the strategies and tactics used to conduct
resistance, the outcomes of acts of resistance, and whether resistance is
a meaningful social and political activity.
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INTRODUCTION
The legal historian Pierre Legendre (1997,
p. 97) has written, “Someone who passes to
the other side, who passes above the space
humanised by legality, by speech and other
signs, is someone who is mad.” The person
who resists legality might not be insane, but
she appears so angry as to violate a widespread
assumption among the people of most modern
regimes. The assumption is that legality—the
texts of the law, the interpretation and en-
forcement of them by officials, and widespread
popular understandings of law and legal
practices—provides a complete, autonomous,
and neutral definition of right and wrong
(Bourdieu 1987, pp. 819–20, 842–53; Ewick
& Silbey 1998, p. 22; Shklar 1964, p. 1). This
article examines the nature of resistance or op-
position to legality, why resistance occurs, how
it is conducted, and its effect on individuals,
society, and politics.
THE CONTINGENCY
OF LEGALITY: THE FIELD
OF RESISTANCE
Resistance to legality is opposition to one or
both of two dimensions of legality: the consti-
tutive and instrumental (Brigham 1996; Ewick
& Silbey 1998, pp. 49–53, 230–33; McCann
1996, 2006b, pp. xvi–xviii; Sarat & Kearns 1993;
Silbey 2005, pp. 326–35). In liberal demo-
cratic and some authoritarian regimes, legality
constitutes the ultimate normative authority.
Because of its near-monopoly of belief, legality
is a way of thinking that constitutes how people
imagine the world to be and what it should be-
come. People respect modern legality as a sta-
ble, privileged truth that disqualifies moral and
religious values, cultural norms, and political
and economic practices that contravene mean-
ings of legal texts and practices. They simply
imagine that law is an efficacious and ethically
sufficient way to keep social peace and govern
their community (Scheingold 1974, pp. 1–22).
As an instrument or method of ordering, the
public recognizes that the application of legality
must be made within a legal complex or through
an “assemblage of legal practices, legal insti-
tutions, statutes, legal codes, authorities, dis-
courses, texts, norms, and forms of judgment”
(Rose & Valverde 1998, pp. 542–43). People ac-
cept that the legal complex is a fair and rational
set of texts, norms, and people with the power
to define right and wrong behavior. With legal-
ity embedded in human life, its power becomes
hegemonic (Silbey 2005, pp. 333–35).
Despite its hegemony in constituting the
norms of governance, in its everyday practice
legality exhibits indeterminate and contingent
qualities. It is not a system of known rules. For
example, legislators often enact laws that lack
precision, that are deliberately vague to appease
multiple constituent interests, or that gener-
ate unanticipated consequences such as litiga-
tion that modifies legislative intentions (Lovell
2003). The judicial creation of rules, especially
in common law regimes, and judicial interpre-
tations of legislation introduce variability in
the meaning of law (Levi 1948). The use of
law to resolve private conflicts depends on the
recognition of a legal dispute, the willingness
to pursue action, access to legal services, and
the resources to pursue legal relief (Miller &
Sarat 1980–81). Governmental enforcement of
the law requires that street-level bureaucrats be
committed to legal accountability, be knowl-
edgeable of law, and be professionally commit-
ted to its enforcement. However, bureaucrats
will still often have to adjust the enforcement
of legal requirements and rules to the partic-
ular contexts they encounter (Hawkins 1984;
Lipsky 1980, pp. 81–156). Also, local informal
rules supplement the formal law, and the force
of these rules depends on the willingness of per-
sons to recognize local traditions such as the use
of a chair to control the use of a parking space
on a public street (Ewick & Silbey 1998, p. 21).
The contingency and indeterminate author-
ity of legality afford the opportunity for con-
flict about the meaning and application of the
hegemonic power of legality and define a space
or a field for thought and action that chal-
lenges its constitutive or instrumental power
(Abu-Lugod 1990; Bourdieu 1987; Fitzpatrick
26 Brisbin

2008; Hirsch & Lazarus-Black 1994, pp. 6–9;
Silbey 2005, pp. 341–46). The question there-
fore becomes: When and how will people chal-
lenge the legitimacy of legality to resolve prob-
lems and dictate appropriate behavior?
Any form of resistance in this field is a so-
ciopolitical practice that entails two require-
ments: an individual or group recognition of a
need to struggle against legal relationships and
an imagination of superior future conditions.
It is an effort to transform the grip of power
holders that is often omnipresent in the social
order. Resistance flaunts the sanctity of law and
its interpreters and the subjection of the resister
to its commands. It is iconoclastic (Ewick &
Silbey 2003, p. 1331; McCann & March 1996).
Second, resistance to legality promotes an al-
ternative vision of how the law should govern
the allocation of political or economic power.
Resisters present a new construction of reality
and voice new truths derived from subjugated
ideas about rights, justice, and social identities
such as gender or race. Through new modes
of discourse about the rights and relationships,
they try to define the contours of a social and
political order, disqualify privileged elements of
the law, and offer new norms, laws, or rights to
reconstitute power relationships.
The identification of resistance to legality
from resistance to other exercises of political
and social power is not always clear-cut. Re-
sistance to the law is not opposition to cul-
tural norms, such as the practice of separating
men and women in some religious services. It
also is not opposition to certain political lead-
ers or public policies, such as criticism or pub-
lic protest of a prime minister’s proposals for
a trade policy. Yet, in regimes in which offi-
cials claim their policies are lawful, a general
resistance to political authority often becomes
mixed with resistance to laws that support the
legitimacy of political acts. Resistance to legal-
ity is also ambiguously related to crime. Re-
sistance often induces individuals and groups
to violate the criminal law, but the distinc-
tion of resistance to legality from criminality
poses interpretive issues. The resister and the
criminal both violate rules designed to protect
established distributions of power and privilege
in a society; however, the criminal desires ma-
terial goods or personal attention, whereas the
resister desires to become included in the com-
munity governed by law or other norms (Hall
et al. 2008). Nonetheless, because of the mixed
motives of individuals, in some situations this
distinction is difficult to maintain. For example,
in Georgian England poachers violated game
laws to satisfy personal needs for food and in-
come and also to resist the privileges of property
owners (Hay 1975, Thompson 1975).
WHY DO PEOPLE
RESIST LEGALITY?
Resistance to law requires a consciousness of
how legality denies or excludes recognition of
an individual’s desires, is arbitrarily applied,
or establishes unjust distributions of power,
wealth, or status. As suggested by psycholog-
ical studies of human reasoning, consciousness
of these situations stems from emotional feel-
ings as well as from rational cognition of exter-
nal cultural objects. Psychological studies also
indicate that feelings or affective judgments of
situations often precede the cognitive process
of assessment of external situations (Murphy
& Zajonc 1993; Weiner 2006; Zajonc 1980,
1984). Studies that link emotional reactions to
acts of resistance to legality are relatively rare.
The general argument is that feelings toward
a situation, person, or organization stimulate
resistance (Goodwin et al. 2001); however, by
employing a theoretical framework of motiva-
tion proposed by Weiner (2006), it is possible
to link the diverse studies that offer insights on
why people resist legality.
Situations
Resistance begins with a situation or a set of
events. Two general situations of social, po-
litical, or economic disadvantage can moti-
vate threats from subjugated persons to legality
and the legal complex (Ewick & Silbey 1998,
pp. 233–44). First, persons can sometimes per-
ceive or gain knowledge of how the constitutive
www.annualreviews.org • Resistance to Legality 27

quality of legality disadvantages them. This oc-
curs when they identify alternative accounts
of political, economic, or social reality; recog-
nize the suppression of their ethnic, racial, or
gender identity; perceive victimization; or ac-
quire scientific or legal knowledge that chal-
lenges the cultural assumptions about individ-
ual rights and social or economic status upon
which faith in legality rests (Albiston 2006;
Kaiser & Major 2006; Kirkpatrick 2008, pp. 91–
109; Merry 1995, pp. 16–25; Valverde 2003).
Religious leaders, academics, injured activists,
or other opinion leaders often must dissemi-
nate the perception of disadvantage. In these
circumstances, people begin to assert that legal-
ity socially marginalizes their interests (Beckett
& Hoffman 2005, Marshall 2003). Also, some-
times legality is socially constituted to exclude
them or make them invisible. It casts their char-
acter, culture, or interests as out-of-law or out-
law, as with Jews in Nazi Germany or slaves in
the Americas, or as irrelevant, as with women in
some Middle Eastern regimes (Bourdieu 1987,
pp. 828–37; Young 1996, pp. 1–26). Second,
discretionary procedures by legal personnel and
imprecise legal texts mean that elements of the
legal complex can appear arbitrary. Arbitrari-
ness in the instrumental application of legal-
ity can also generate a sense of disadvantage.
Especially it can contribute to a feeling that the
legal complex has created a situation of neglect
or abuse of the interests of a group (Ewick &
Silbey 1998, pp. 189–91).
Attribution of Causes
People who chose resistance to legality next
must attribute how some aspect of legality
caused their situation of social marginality or
arbitrary treatment. They also must possess
some appreciation of the contingent power
of the legal complex, be able to recognize
opportunities to counteract its power, and
offer a vision of a better future in which they
can legally realize their emotional desires and
interests and realize an internal sense of justice
and fairness (Ewick & Silbey 2003, pp. 1336–
37). Sociolegal studies indicate that persons
who do not attribute the cause of their disad-
vantage to legality will adopt cultural norms
that influence them to repress their anxieties
(Engel 1984), find other channels for relieving
fears or disadvantages (Engel & Munger 2003,
Greenhouse 1986), or suppress or sublimate
their emotions (Bumiller 1988, Kirkland 2008).
Although no comprehensive explanation of
the attribution of disadvantage exists, following
the division of legality into constitutive and
instrumental dimensions, some authors (Ewick
& Silbey 1992, McCann 2006b, Silbey 2005)
suggest that consciousness of legal disadvantage
is a social practice that has two interconnected
dimensions: a loss of faith or psychological
commitment to law as a legitimate source of
justice and a cognitive reassessment of the
instrumental utility of laws and legal processes.
Social psychological studies of procedural
justice provide partial insight into how expe-
riences in specific legal situations affect the
depth and limits of the popular faith in the
legitimacy of the law. These studies examine
people’s normative assessments of the work of
courts and police in various situations, and they
find evidence that most people feel obligated
to obey the law and the directives of judges
and police officers. The obligation is strongest
when individuals have had experiences with
law and courts and felt that the process was fair.
For these persons, fairness has two dimensions:
They perceive the decision-making process as
offering the opportunity for their represen-
tation and influence over its determinations,
honesty and ethicality, and clarity and reason-
ableness; they also perceive fairness as attentive
or personalized treatment by court personnel.
Consequently, a person’s feeling that he or she
has experienced unfair procedures or treatment
and lacks trust in the honesty of the institutions
of the legal complex can generate resistance
(Tyler 1988, 1990; Tyler & Huo 2002).
Cognitive assessments of situations that pro-
duce outcomes that enforce social marginality
can also induce resistance. If persons calculate
that the costs of social marginality or the dis-
tributive decisions made by legal institutions
do not benefit their preferred interests or rights
28 Brisbin

claims, they might resist. In particular, some
scholars have derived from microeconomic
and public choice theory the assumption that
resistance to legality conforms to a cognitive
assessment of costs and benefits or utility max-
imization. This explanation assumes that the
severity and certainty of loss or the imposition
of coercive sanctions determines the extent
of compliance with or resistance to legality.
Therefore, persons who resist legality are
capable of collecting all necessary information,
effectively predicting all costs or benefits of
options, and making rational, unemotional
decisions that avoid the imposition of sanctions
on their resistance actions (Becker 1968,
Rodgers & Bullock 1976, Scholz 1997).
A cost-benefit or public choice theory expla-
nation of persons’ identification of the causes
of resistance is more complex and less ratio-
nal than that implied by microeconomic the-
ory, however. First, cost-benefit explanations
often neglect the inclusion of the potential
noneconomic benefits of resistance or noneco-
nomic factors that restrict the rationality of
choice (Bachman et al. 1992, Casey & Scholz
1991, Kuperan & Sutinen 1998, Scholz 1997).
Persons absolutely dedicated to a moral princi-
ple therefore often chose to ignore the real po-
tential for costs in certain contexts because of an
emotional belief in the rightness of their princi-
ple (Tyler 1990, Tyler & Huo 2002). Ambiguity
in the law, bargaining about the enforcement of
rules, cooperation in enforcement, and the be-
havior of enforcement personnel can mitigate
the realization of the costs of resistance to laws
(Edelman et al. 1991, Scholz 1997). Finally, re-
sistance might be encouraged or discouraged
by one-sided, incomplete, or hyperbolic infor-
mation about its costs or benefits (Haltom &
McCann 2004, May 2004).
Although these studies provide insights into
the role of emotional and cognitive assessments
in the identification of the causes of resistance,
in some situations people will not attribute the
cause of their disadvantage to legality. Several
studies have found that people are not conscious
of the situations in which they might choose the
alternative of resistance through or to legality.
They might lack knowledge of rights or con-
front corporations, governmental institutions,
or lawyers who impede their recognition of le-
gal subjection (Sarat 1990). Other reasons asso-
ciated with the failure to recognize a situation
of injustice and pursue resistance include self-
identity, race, gender, experiences with legality,
fear of retribution, shame, and other social and
psychological attributes of self-identification
(Albiston 2005, 2006; Bumiller 1988, pp. 98–
108; Conley & O’Barr 1990; Engel 1984;
Engel & Munger 2003; McCann 2006b; Merry
1990; Marshall 2003, 2006). However, the rel-
ative significance of these reasons for a failure
to resist appears to be rooted in a mix of histor-
ical experience, personal identity, and cultural
and other normative beliefs in varying and often
unique situations (Abu-Lugod 1990, pp. 52–53;
McCann 2008; pp. 524–25, 528–32; Sarat 1990;
Silbey 2005, pp. 351–55).
Assignment of Responsibility
and Blame
Resisters will normally assign responsibility for
the cause of their legal disadvantage to a person
or organization. Therefore, resistance becomes
not just action against legality but action against
those believed to have caused their legal dis-
advantages. Resisters name as responsible and
then blame those advantaged by legality as the
objects of resistance (Felstiner et al. 1980–81,
Coates & Penrod 1980–81, Weiner 1995). In
many regimes legal procedures create the op-
portunity for individuals and organizations to
mobilize and tell stories of legal arbitrariness.
Through the rules, procedures, and institutions
that are a part of the legal complex, in both rep-
resentative and authoritarian regimes, resisters
can present at least claims about the immoral-
ity, inequality, unfairness, or arbitrary neglect
of interests or rights by the legal complex or
the regime that controls it (Ewick & Silbey
1998, pp. 180–220; Lazarus-Black 1994; Merry
1995; Moore 1994; Moustafa 2007, pp. 136–
218; Seng 1994; Yngvesson 1993). Given the
potential contingency of legality in these situa-
tions, the likelihood of a political struggle about

who constructs and who interprets the legality
is almost inescapable.
Anger and the Choice of Resistance
Situations and attributions of legal social
marginality, outlawry, or arbitrariness can gen-
erate a variety of emotions (Polletta 2001). Fear,
shame, anxiety, or a sense of powerlessness in-
cline persons to resignation and quiescence;
people sense that they are destined to subjec-
tion (Bumiller 1988, pp. 52–77; Gilliom 2001,
pp. 69–92). For some persons the specific emo-
tional reaction is a religiously grounded fatalism
(Engel & Munger 2003, pp. 133–41, 159–65);
for others it is a decision to avoid legality, con-
stitute the world in terms of Christian harmony,
and seek the resolution of conflicts through re-
ligious practices such as prayer (Greenhouse
1986).
Anger, however, is a different emotion that
can prompt resistance to legality. Evidence in-
dicates that some people are “intuitive prose-
cutors” who are more likely to become angry
when they witness a situation of serious trans-
gression of societal and legal norms and believe
that the transgressor has escaped punishment
(Goldberg et al. 1999). Studies have also found
that anger, unlike anxiety, induces actions to
alleviate an injury or to reduce the risk of in-
jury in the future. Angry persons experience
the negative effect of their situation, associate
it with a specific legal action or condition, and
seek the reprimand or condemnation of the law
or retaliation against its perpetrators. Yet they
hold optimistic expectations about the satisfac-
tion of their desires and interests in the future.
The optimism stems from a sense of certainty
that their values are true or just and a sense
that they can control their own lives (Huddy
et al. 2007; Lerner et al. 2005; Lerner & Keltner
2001; Lerner & Tiedens 2006; Weiner 1995,
pp. 14–21, 259–66).
The angry person also engages in a search
for information and alternative paths of action.
Although a cognitive process, the angry per-
son’s choice among practices of resistance of-
ten relies on the use of heuristic methods and
features a limited assessment of alternatives.
Anger “is associated with superficial and pos-
sibly rapid decision making, a lower sensitiv-
ity to risk, and an orientation toward action”
(Huddy et al. 2007, p. 209). Studies have asso-
ciated anger with stereotypic judgments, use of
heuristics, limited searches for information, and
hostile inferences based on limited knowledge
(Huddy et al. 2007, Lerner & Keltner 2001,
Lerner & Tiedens 2006). In this respect the
prediction of the value of resistance exhibits the
boundedrationalitydepictedinstudiesofpolicy
and economic choices ( Jones 2001, Kahneman
2003, Kahneman & Tversky 1979, Tversky &
Kahneman 1973). As with other economic and
political choices, the predicted outcome of re-
sistance to legality is often based on assessments
of past events, social norms toward engagement
in conflict, and ideological biases toward the law
or rights claims (Albiston 2005). This method
of choice can ignore information about how a
decision could cascade into political outcomes
such as anarchy, violence, or more intense sub-
jugation. The miscalculation of legally empow-
ered opponents’ intentions also can occur when
the resisters regard them as less trustworthy and
more powerful than they really are—the “devil
shift” (Sabatier et al. 1987). Although the mis-
calculation and exaggeration of opponents’ in-
tentions might spur an individual or groups to
resist, alternatively the miscalculation might in-
duce quiescence. Finally, available knowledge
of locales, spaces, or institutional contexts, such
as courts, legislatures, public places, or media
that permit the interaction among resisters or
the expression of resisters’ claims, also can in-
fluence the choice to resist or how to resist
(Beckett & Hoffman 2005; Hoffmann 2003;
Marshall 2005, 2006; Nielsen 2006).
THE PRACTICE OF RESISTANCE
TO LEGALITY
Once a choice to resist is made, there are two
general strategies that resisters of legality might
adopt to convey their claims of social marginal-
ity or arbitrariness. An “inside” resistance
strategy features resisters acting through legal
30 Brisbin

institutions to voice challenges to the interpre-
tation or application of law. Often the adoption
of this strategy means that resisters use legal
institutions to argue about a denial of rights,
an erroneous interpretation of the law, or the
flawed enforcement of law. There is no denial
of the legitimacy of the regime or its insti-
tutions that constructed and enforced the law
(Fitzpatrick 2008, pp. xi–xv). Instead, the legal-
ity and the legal process become a means of
empowerment. An “outside” resistance strat-
egy rejects the use of legality and violates the
constitutive power relations ensconced within
it. Often with reference to moral, religious, or
cultural arguments, outside resisters seek eman-
cipation from legality and, often, an exit from
the regime that devised the law.
In many situations resisters will mix these
strategies and shift among them over time as
they search for an effective means of chang-
ing their circumstances. To facilitate each strat-
egy, they can employ a mix of specific tactics in
an attempt to communicate a subversive story
about the power of legality. Their story is a so-
cial practice that conveys how the hegemony of
law or the legal complex has fomented social
marginality or inflicted economic, social, psy-
chological, or physical injuries on the resisters.
In telling their story, resisters also will argue for
a transformation of their legal status. In many
instances, a person’s story transcends the par-
ticular and attempts to mobilize other persons
to resist legality (Ewick & Silbey 1995, 2003,
pp. 1340–49).
When choosing how to communicate their
resistance stories, several factors shape resisters’
choice of tactics. Resisters must first determine
how to proceed. If socially isolated or lack-
ing knowledge of similarly situated persons,
they might resist alone. Alternatively, they can
seek out alliances, patrons, and mass support
for their cause (McCann 1994, pp. 108–24).
Resisters’ choice of tactics depends, second,
on cultural frames of reference rooted in his-
tory and any collective experiences. In partic-
ular, shared experiences and symbols of a reli-
gious, racial, or gendered nature and common
knowledge of the successes and failures of past
protests can affect the choice of tactics ( Jasper
1997, pp. 69–99, 322–34). Third, the presence
of policy entrepreneurs or movement leaders
who convert personal feelings of anger toward
situations of marginality or arbitrariness into
some form of organized resistance practices can
influence the choice of resistance. Policy en-
trepreneurs identify, characterize, and draw at-
tention to cultural, social, political, or economic
biases within legality or the operations of the
legal complex. They also prioritize the aims of
their resistance, devise stories to communicate
their cause, offer incentives or disincentives to
expand support for their resistance, and divide
support for the interpretation and enforcement
of legality (Lichbach 1995, pp. 167–76; Lipsky
1970, pp. 163–82; McCann 1994, pp. 86–88,
124–34). Finally, resisters need to identify the
opportunities and to acquire the resources nec-
essary for legal change. They require an aware-
ness of the availability of access to institutions
for advancing their interests such as courts,
knowledge of what legal and other forms of
protest action might produce, and the resources
to promote their interests (money, time, mem-
bership, access to media) (McAdam 1999;
McCann 1994, pp. 48–86; Pedriana 2004).
Inside Strategy and Tactics
The inside strategy for resistance requires an in-
vestment in tactics that pit legality against itself.
This form of resistance treats legality as a legiti-
mate resource that resisters mobilize to present
stories about the social marginality or the arbi-
trariness they experience in legalized contexts.
Through stories expressed in legal language,
they try to use legality as an instrument to
leverage concessions from legal institutions to
relieve their disadvantage and achieve their as-
pirations (Epp 2008; McCann 1994, pp. 138–
79, 2006a, 2008; Zemans 1982). These stories
suggest that a variety of tactics effectuate an in-
side strategy of resistance.
Complaint and threat by individuals. In-
dividuals can deploy the indeterminate and
contingent qualities of law or its provision of

expressive rights to resist legality. For example,
persons can offer stories to lie to or attempt
to mislead law enforcers, can question their
interpretation of legal rules, can dispute their
claims of authority, or can physically occupy
space or file documents and formal complaints
that critique legal authority (Gilliom 2001;
Ewick & Silbey 2003, pp. 1350–63). Individ-
uals especially can use these tactics in contacts
with police officers, inspection agents, and
other street-level law enforcers. Complaints
addressed face-to-face to police personnel,
inspection agents, legislators, and firms can
express an individual’s resistance to their uses
of their legal authority and discretion. Letters
to officials can express a vision of justice and law
that challenges official legal interpretations and
enforcement decisions (Lovell 2006). Foot-
dragging is another form of individualized
resistance. For example, after a divorce one of
the parents can subvert the enforcement of the
divorce decree by delays in the payment of child
support or disputes about child visitation rights
to voice dissatisfaction with the divorce decree.
Threat of litigation is another form of re-
sistance. An individual experiencing workplace
discrimination because of a disability or racial
or gender discrimination can engage in im-
plicit threat of the invocation of legal action.
Responding to the uncertainty that the threat
of litigation poses, employers will make ad-
justments to serve the employee’s interests or
adopt an interinstitutional process to alleviate
the threat of lawsuits that resist the claims of
legal authority (Edelman 1990, Edelman et al.
1993, Marshall 2005). Threatening legal ac-
tion also can induce persons, nonprofit organi-
zations, businesses, and governments to adopt
policies to settle conflicts through negotiation
or to avoid latent legal threats and potential
use of the legal complex for resistance (Barnes
& Burke 2006, Epp 2009, Ross & Littlefield
1978). Despite the opportunity for these forms
of resistance, they usually are not collective
efforts designed by policy entrepreneurs who
challenge faith in legality. Rather, they aim at
relief of individuals from arbitrary applications
of the law.
Litigation by individuals. Litigation affords
individuals the opportunity to resist interpreta-
tions and the application of legality by lawyers
and legal institutions. Individuals, often poor
and female, can use pretrial negotiated settle-
ments or the courtroom as opportunities to tell
their stories about their subordinate identity
and social position. However, because these in-
dividuals usually lack collective or professional
support for the construction of their story of
events, lawyers and judges can often nudge their
tales into legal form and issue legally based
rulings that reinforce the disadvantaged status
of the litigant (Ewick & Silbey 1992; Lazarus-
Black 1994; McCann 1994, pp. 118–71; Merry
1995, pp. 18–23; Moore 1994; Seng 1994;
White 1990; Yngvesson 1993). Also, as illus-
trated in a study conducted in the Netherlands,
should they win a victory, individuals have
difficulty in securing damages (Van Koppen
& Malsch 1991). However, these instances of
resistance still reveal that litigation can serve as
a tactic for exacting revenge and gaining power
against parties advantaged by legality.
Expressive actions by social movements and
interest groups. Collective efforts can be crit-
ical in framing complaints of disadvantage in
legal terms. Complaints about legality and le-
gal institutions can develop into collective law-
ful practices such as organized letter-writing
campaigns; publications and commentary in the
media; appearances on talk shows; marches, pa-
rades, boycotts, and other demonstrations; the
lobbying and provision of political campaign as-
sistance to legislators; and litigation (Beckett
& Hoffman 2005, Espeland 1994, Jasper
1997). Political entrepreneurs can develop so-
cial movements into organized interest groups
to direct and maintain the resistance, build al-
liances and influence public officials, and uti-
lize resources, especially legal rights of expres-
sion. In many of these actions resisters employ
a culturally based story of a denial of rights or
seek to encourage people to make rights claims
and participate in efforts to secure their rights
(McCann 2006a, Polletta 2000).
32 Brisbin

Another way for movements or groups to
resist is through the creation of institutions
that can escape laws and legal interpretations
that marginalize their social identity. Alterna-
tive educational institutions such as parochial
and Christian schools convey resistance to U.S.
judicial decisions that exclude Bible reading,
prayer, religious instruction, and creation sci-
ence in the public schools. After the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the constitutional
right to privacy did not encompass homosexual
sodomy (Bowers v. Hardwick 1986), the group
Queer Nation organized alternative practices
such as the Queer Shopping Network, Queer
Nights Out, and queer bars to signal their re-
sistance to the rejection of their right to sexual
privacy (Bower 1994).
Litigation by collectivities. Social move-
ments can also lawfully engage in resis-
tance through litigation. In regimes that allow
some popular participation in politics, social
movements have litigated conditions of social
marginality and arbitrariness by constructing a
story of a denial of rights (Epp 1998). However,
litigation is becoming more common as a tactic
of resistance in authoritarian regimes (Moustafa
2007, Tezcur 2009) and transnational contexts
(Boyle & Thompson 2001, Holzmeyer 2009).
The incentive to engage in collective litiga-
tion as an act of resistance lies in its relatively
low cost and its ability to provide judgments
that change the law or convey a message about
the legal identity and rights of disadvantaged
groups.
A disadvantaged movement or group is most
effective when it possesses a consciousness of a
claim of disadvantage that can be framed as a
denial of legal rights plus access to adjudicatory
institutions and a support structure. A support
structure includes interest groups or move-
ments dedicated to changing law or rights that
can assist in locating and funding litigation
costs and professional legal expertise over the
long run (Epp 1998). Numerous studies have
detailed how resistance movements in demo-
cratic and authoritarian regimes rely upon
the support of “political” and “cause” lawyers
dedicated to resistance litigation (Halliday
et al. 2007; Sarat & Scheingold 1998, 2001,
2005, 2006; Scheingold & Sarat 2004). These
attorneys provide litigants with legal arguments
that challenge previous judicial interpretations
of the law or file friend-of-the-court briefs with
appellate courts in support of changes in legal
doctrines (Epp 2008, pp. 598–600; Epstein
& Kobylka 1992). Often resistance litigation
requires a planned campaign to secure a specific
law or a legal interpretation from an appellate
court, so the resistance groups must locate
forums with judges or rules favorable to their
claims and political institutions that might
enforce their victories (Epp 1998, pp. 200–4,
2008, pp. 597–98). Disadvantaged groups also
can engage in publicity campaigns and legisla-
tive lobbying to mobilize their allies to support
legislation or constitutional amendments that
would change a pattern of judicial decisions. In
the United States such groups have supported
candidates for judicial elections or appointment
in order to create a judiciary receptive to their
attack on doctrine. Other tactics have included
campaign contributions to elected officials
who oppose a judicial action that affirms a
condition of disadvantage, financial support for
a continuation of litigation by a disadvantaged
party, and the release of negative publicity
about a court decision or a judge hostile to the
claims of a disadvantaged group (Brisbin 2009,
pp. 218–19, 223–24; Miller 2009, pp. 105–33).
Resistance by public officials. Most of the
resistance to legality by public officials is di-
rected at judicial interpretations of legislation.
Such resistance is common in regimes such
as the United States in which constitutionally
separated powers and federalism create interin-
stitutional political competition. For example,
criticism of judicial decisions by U.S. legislators
often occurs when they think their response will
encourage support for their reelection or policy
agenda from voters and campaign contribu-
tors. They denounce or support a law, judicial
decision, or other action of the legal complex
in speeches, media interviews, and press
releases or introduce legislation or propose

constitutional amendments that have little
chance of passage. Legislative efforts to reverse
judicial decisions are uncommon and usually
focus on unpopular decisions about individual
rights or are a result of an invitation by the
court for the legislature to consider the con-
stitutionality of a law that it previously passed.
However, legislators can pressure the judiciary
through legislation that reduces funding for
the courts, changes its jurisdiction, or changes
the selection of its members (Brisbin 2009,
pp. 219–21, 223; Canon & Johnson 1999,
pp. 116–27; Miller 2009, pp. 15–104, 134–84).
Executives also can resist judicial actions. As
with legislators, such resistance is not common
and is usually confined to cases in which the
announcement of a response might create a
political advantage. Beyond public statements
of resistance or support, executives in some
regimes can try to change some future decisions
by nominating political allies to the bench or
by directing their law enforcement agencies to
undertake certain criminal or civil cases or by
appearing as a friend of the court to inform ap-
pellate judges of the executive’s views (Brisbin
2009, pp. 219–21, 223; Canon & Johnson
1999, pp. 68–89, 128–31). Besides complaint,
executive bureaucrats also have legal means to
resist legality. Despite the commands of laws
they swore to uphold, police officers, prosecu-
tors, inspectors, and providers of government
services can use their lawful discretion to arrest
or cite for civil offenses, drop criminal charges
or civil citations, plea bargain, treat persons
differently because of the circumstances of their
crime or violation of civil regulations, or deny
certain government services (Flemming 1990,
Hawkins 1984, Lipsky 1980). An account of lit-
igation brought to curtail the abuse of prisoners
in Arkansas and Texas describes how state offi-
cials used various legal tactics and bureaucratic
practices to delay or frustrate the implemen-
tation of court-ordered reform of prison man-
agement (Feeley & Rubin 1999, pp. 51–95).
Finally, the judges of lower courts can re-
sist appellate court interpretations of legality.
This activity can occur when an appellate court
opinion contains ambiguous or vague state-
ments, multiple opinions, and inconsistent use
of precedents, when the appellate court lacks
the coercive political authority to enforce its
judgments on trial court judges, or when local
political and social pressures and ideological bi-
ases can encourage lower-court judges to resist
the full implementation of an appellate ruling
(Canon & Johnson 1999, pp. 29–57). As with
other forms of political efforts to resist legality,
these actions by the lower judiciary are quite
rare.
Outside Strategies and Tactics
As a challenge to power relationships in a
regime, an outside strategy rejects the faith in
legality and the legitimacy of the legal com-
plex. The challenge consists of stories and ac-
tions that transgress the constitutive dimen-
sion of the regime’s legality. Consequently, this
resistance strategy often features a “discursive
breakdown” (Wagner-Pacifici 1994, pp. 143–
45). The resisters either cannot express their
disadvantage or legal arbitrariness in legal lan-
guage or they use a language with an ideolog-
ical, religious, or normative logic that rejects
the constitutive assumptions of state legality
(Brisbin 2002, pp. 208–18; Gilly 1998, pp. 314–
27; Speed 2008, pp. 161–73). Often commu-
nicated as rights claims, outside tactics reject
the power of the institutions and texts of le-
gality that protect people and institutions that
socially marginalize or arbitrarily regulate re-
sisters’ lives. Resisters can adopt several tactics
as part of an outside strategy of resistance.
Subversion by individuals. Even in repressive
regimes individuals and groups find space to ex-
press resistance to the legitimacy of legality, es-
peciallytheprivilegesitaffordstothewealthyor
the authority it assigns to governmental officials
(Scott 1990, pp. 136–82). The homeless can
defy the legal control of property by squatting
and expose the support of their social marginal-
ity by legality. Grumbling about governmental
authority or procedures in ordinary conversa-
tions is often an expression of a cultural hos-
tility based on nonlegal values (Gilliom 2001,
34 Brisbin

pp. 69–92). Canadian and U.S. television fiction
and some reality and talk shows convey folk-
tales about criminals commonly “getting off”
on “technicalities” and imply the illegitimacy
of judicial interpretations of rights and propose
retaliation against an outlaw class (Doyle 2003).
Lawyer jokes expose the arbitrariness of the le-
gal process (Galanter 2005).
Outright violation of the law by individual
resisters who express a rejection of the norma-
tive aspects of legality can occur. Articulating
ethical or religious justifications in the United
States, cancer sufferers sometimes violate drug
laws by using marijuana for medicinal purposes,
polygamists ignore bans on their domestic rela-
tionships, and persons withhold taxes that fund
wars. More commonly, persons resist laws or
judicial decisions that affect their economic sta-
tus. For example, the poor violate legal rules
on the receipt and use of government benefits
to earn income for food, clothing, and shel-
ter (Gilliom 2001, pp. 89–90). In contract, per-
sonal injury, or divorce cases, the losing person
or firm continues to resist payment of legally
awarded remedies and frustrate the interests of
the legally advantaged party (Van Koppen &
Malsch 1991).
Collective subversion: civil disobedience.
Social movements and interest groups can
step outside legality to criticize it or bypass its
constitutive authority. Civil disobedience or
collective nonviolent violations of the civil and
criminal law based on moral or religious values
have long served as a tactic of resistance to le-
gality (Thoreau 2004). Examples include illegal
strikes, sit-ins, sleep-ins, and other illegal occu-
pations of space, illegal parades and demonstra-
tions, and other random illegal protests against
the symbols of legality, law enforcement
officials, or legally empowered organizations
(Brisbin 2002, pp. 142–89; Jasper 1997,
pp. 251–66; Lipsky 1970; Thompson 1975). In
these instances, the resisters chose to violate
the law in a peaceful fashion to draw attention
to their cause and encourage positive political
responses to alleviate their disadvantage.
Law-breaking by public officials. Author-
itarian political regimes, regimes that divide
authority among distinctive institutions, and
regimes in which top officials confront limita-
tions in their control of subordinate bureaucrats
afford opportunities for resistance to published
law and rights. In authoritarian regimes, the law
is sometimes manipulated by political elites to
quell lawful actions of political opponents such
as demonstrations. The authoritarian elites of-
ten use a subservient judiciary as an instru-
ment for the control of political parties, social
movements and groups, religions, or govern-
mental subordinates’ discretion. Through the
judiciary, the symbolism of the rule of law re-
mains in place while the elites restrict claims of
rights or lawful public actions (Ginsburg 2008,
Magaloni 2008, Moustafa 2008, Pereira 2008).
In regimes that divide authority among distinc-
tive institutions, public officials can resist legal-
ity, especially when the judiciary defines legal
rules in a way that does not serve the political
interests of the officials. For example, despite
U.S. Supreme Court rulings, local school offi-
cials have ignored its rulings banning prayers
in schools. Finally, superior officials confront
limitations in their control of subordinate bu-
reaucratic agents’ willingness to follow the law.
For example, it is difficult for superior officials
to control the use of force, corruption, racial
profiling, and other illegal acts that police offi-
cers can use to resist constitutional, statutory,
and administrative law and structure the social
and political order to suit their interests.
Violence. Persons can choose to engage in vi-
olence as resistance in several ways. Individuals
can act alone or in small groups against laws
they consider unjust. For example, to protest
legalized abortion, Eric Rudolph bombed the
Atlanta Olympic Park and abortion clinics
between 1996 and 1998. To protest labor
laws and injunctions during a coal strike,
some persons engaged in unorganized acts of
intimidation of company managers and strike-
breakers, and promoted the use of explosives,
assaults, and gunfire against company property
and strikebreakers (Brisbin 2002, pp. 190–207).

Organized efforts to replace unjust or inef-
fective legal authorities, such as vigilantes and
lynch mobs, also can employ violence to chal-
lenge legality (Kirkpatrick 2008, pp. 39–90).
Mass insurrections against political author-
ity often include violent resistance against le-
gality. For example, land and labor laws and
legal practices in Chiapas, Mexico, long im-
posed a marginal status upon indigenous Indian
peoples (Gilly 1998, pp. 261–90). In 1992, the
Mexican government changed the constitution
and other laws in ways that further adversely
disadvantaged indigenous people by ending
land reform, diminishing rural subsidies, and
opening communal lands to privatization. Al-
though since 1983 the Zapatista Party (EZLN)
had opposed the government and landowners,
the legal changes by the government spurred
the willingness of indigenous people to as-
sist the EZLN and other indigenous peoples’
groups. The Zapatista leaders seized upon the
discontent with the law to develop a military
arm and establish autonomous governments
and popular legality in rural towns. In their
appeal to supporters, the Zapatistas and other
groups drew upon a mix of Catholic natural law,
liberation theology, customary rights, global
human rights discourse, Marxist theory, and
state law to voice the claims for legal recogni-
tion of the collective cultural rights of indige-
nous people and the rights of women. When
EZLN guerilla forces seized three large towns
in 1994, armed conflict with the Mexican army
ensued that resulted in 145 deaths. Although
negotiations between the Zapatistas and the
government produced a cease-fire, low-level
acts of violence continued between resisters and
paramilitary forces reputedly allied with the
government. However, after years of delay the
government finally enacted laws that addressed
some of the rights claims of the indigenous pop-
ulation (Gilly 1998; Harvey 1998, pp. 169–245;
Speed 2008; Speed et al. 2006).
Exit. If a resister finds legal options closed and
outside strategies ineffective or unpalatable, a
final tactic is simply to leave the geographical
space controlled by legality or a legal complex.
For example, during the Vietnam conflict some
Americans resisted compulsory military service
laws by leaving the country (Hagan 2001). Laws
that penalize or tax religious dissidents also
have long encouraged the immigration of these
groups to regimes tolerant of their beliefs.
THE OUTCOMES
OF RESISTANCE
What can resistance to legality achieve? No
comprehensive theory or methodology exists
to assess the outcomes of resistance. Indeed,
significant methodological debates about the
identification of the variable of effective or
meaningful outcomes and about the use of
interpretive and positivist measurement or
assessment of outcomes continue to occur
(Handler 1978, pp. 34–41; McCann 1996;
Rosenberg 1996). What is known?
Most studies examine resistance in which
people act within the law and employ the lit-
igation tactic. Although many case studies tout
tangible victories against the powerful by those
who used litigation and held fast to their con-
viction to resist, the durability of these victo-
ries is little examined. Studies also argue that,
as a tactic of resistance, litigation can produce
a range of outcomes (Epp 1998, 2008). Some
studies suggest that litigation has an educa-
tive effect. It can broaden consciousness of in-
equities and arbitrariness inherent in legality,
succeed in placing some problems of the disad-
vantaged on the political agenda, and pressure
administrators to enforce laws fairly (McCann
1994, pp. 180–93, 2006a, pp. 30–34). Litigation
can serve as a catalyst that encourages a disad-
vantaged movement or group to seek political,
economic, or social gains in other institutional
arenas and encourages proactive institutional
responses to accommodate the implications of
the decision (McCann 1994, pp. 278–88, 307–
9). It can change the perceptions of legislators
and regulators toward issues that affect a disad-
vantaged class (Mather 1998), result in changes
in government administrative practices (Feeley
& Rubin 1999), or allow the disadvantaged ac-
cess to political institutions (Cichowski 2004).
36 Brisbin

With a support structure, policy entrepreneur-
ship, and opportunities, resistance movements
can win victories in their cases, initiate a series
of cases that reshape legality, and induce legisla-
tors to enact laws that propagate new policy al-
ternatives or readings of the meaning of the law.
For example, fear of civil liability actions has
stimulated governments to impose new stan-
dards on legalized accountability that require
their agencies to protect disadvantaged groups
such as racial minorities, women, and children
(Epp 2009).
Resistance through litigation can mobilize
people for other forms of resistance, such
as complaint, boycotts, or demonstrations. It
can create a new awareness of both disadvan-
tage and rights that can strengthen a resis-
tance movement (Polletta 2000). Through me-
dia coverage of litigation in particular, people
can acquire knowledge of harms or disadvan-
tage, a prerequisite to mobilization into a polit-
ical movement (Haltom & McCann 2009). Suc-
cessful resistance litigation can stimulate other
disadvantaged individuals and encourage them
to mobilize, develop an organization, and lit-
igate the legality that treats them as socially
marginal or with arbitrariness. It can broaden
public awareness of disadvantaged groups and
encourage public officials to place the prob-
lems confronting these groups on the political
agenda (Handler 1978, pp. 209–22; McCann
1994, pp. 227–77). These changes keep alive
the “myth of rights” or the belief that legal ac-
tion can foster a more legitimate, democratic,
and just politics (Scheingold 1974, pp. 3–79).
However, Rosenberg (2008) has contended
that even visible litigation campaigns by African
Americans, prochoice women, and gays pro-
duced little direct improvement in the con-
dition of disadvantage they faced. Although
scholars have offered evidence that challenges
Rosenberg’s general thesis on the ineffective-
ness of litigation as a means for the empower-
ment of disadvantaged groups (McCann 1996,
Epp 2009), resisters who engage in litigation
face significant barriers to the alleviation of
their disadvantages. Some barriers arise from
conditions inside a collective resistance move-
ment. Because resistance to legality depends in
part on organized leadership, leaders who use
collective action for personal gain, who can-
not control internal discord or factionalism in
the resistance movement or group, who cannot
maintain zeal and voluntarism by members, or
who cannot build and maintain alliances with
other movements or groups can undermine re-
sistance to legality (Lichbach 1995, pp. 263–
72). Internal discord above all can allow extrem-
ists to separate themselves from other resisters
andadopttacticsthataffectexternalperceptions
of the entire resistance movement ( Jasper 1997,
pp. 344–66).
Resistance through litigation can also face
struggles with external interests and unantici-
pated consequences that limit its effectiveness
(Epp 2008, pp. 602–7). Opponents of the
decision or others adversely affected by the de-
cision can frustrate the victory through a range
of counterresistance or “backlash” actions. Be-
cause judges normally assume that people will
obey the law, resisters might not anticipate the
barriers to achieve their objectives. The parties
negatively affected by judicial decisions in favor
of resisters can choose the paths of actively
refusing to comply, passively not complying
(perhaps because of a lack of knowledge of the
decision), or superficially complying. In other
situationsoflegalchange,institutionalpractices
and norms might encourage partial compliance
or noncompliance with the law by a corpora-
tion or government agency (Kelly 2010). The
negatively affected parties can also modify their
behavior to evade full compliance, escape from
the effects of the decision, or thwart successful
resisters (Barnes & Burke 2006; Gould 2001;
McCann 1994, pp. 193–206). For example,
during the late 1950s and early 1960s many
communities reacted to U.S. school desegrega-
tion orders with official refusals to comply with
court rulings. Because they did not face liti-
gation of legislative pressures to desegregate,
many district officials remained passive and did
not comply. A few districts chose the path of
superficial desegregation by devising plans that
admitted only a few black children to formerly
all-white schools or modified attendance

policies to limit judicial desegregation man-
dates. In urban areas unanticipated white flight
and judicial decisions restricting the geographic
range of desegregation remedies limited the
victory of black children. Finally, opponents
of desegregation used protests and acts of
violence in a series of confrontations with
officials and minorities who won desegregation
of schools (McAdam 1999, Marable 2007).
Other illustrations of variations of these forms
of backlash to successful resistance litigation
appear in studies of reactions to U.S. Supreme
Court decisions in favor of women, minorities,
and criminal defendants (summarized in Canon
& Johnson 1999, pp. 74–87, 106–11).
Among the forms of backlash to resisters,
perhaps the form of most significance is
the organization of groups in opposition to
resisters’ legal victories. In the United States,
this has occurred as conservative, libertarian,
and religious groups mobilized to oppose
judicial decisions requiring school desegrega-
tion, affirmative remedies for disadvantaged
minorities, protections for consumers and the
environment, rights for women and gays and
lesbians, and restrictions on religious practice
in public places. The opposition groups also
engaged in lawsuits, supported legislative
changes, and proposed constitutional amend-
ments by referenda that would restrict the use
of litigation as a tactic of resistance by dis-
advantaged persons and social and economic
reformers (Hatcher 2005, Pring & Canan
1996, Southworth 2008, Teles 2008, Witt &
McCorkle 1997). The backlash thus produced
a broader policy conflict about claims of rights.
Other than litigation, the outcome of re-
sistance strategy and tactics still needs much
more attention. For the poor, for social out-
casts, for the ill-educated, for persons without
organized leaders, resources, help from others,
or access to attorneys, and for persons with lim-
ited knowledge of legality and resistance tac-
tics, it appears that resistance as lawful com-
plaint or outsider tactics of subversion creates
a struggle that can end in frustration (Gilliom
2001). Although individuals can improve their
circumstances through actions against the law,
such as complaint, subversion, and the litiga-
tion of personal problems, these acts produce
isolated and uncoordinated benefits for the re-
sister. However, if officials perceive a pattern
of complaints that might threaten their author-
ity or if firms experience the pattern, they can
devise practices and procedures to ameliorate
the source of resistance (Edelman et al. 1993).
Often these alternative dispute-resolution prac-
tices displace the disadvantages and anger of po-
tential resisters rather than address their con-
cerns (Cobb 1997, Harrington & Merry 1988).
Additionally, no systematic analysis exists
of the effectiveness of individual and collective
subversion and civil disobedience in the inau-
guration of changes in legality. Such practices
apparently can raise the consciousness of the
plight of the legally disadvantaged. Scholars
have credited civil disobedience by Mahatma
Gandhi and the India Congress Party with dis-
crediting laws imposed by British colonialists
(Weber 1997). However, the association of
law-breaking and violence of abolitionist mobs,
strikers, revolutionary movements, and parties
often results in backlash as opponents portray
the resisters as abnormal, evil, terroristic, or
posing other threats to public safety (Brisbin
2002, pp. 218–29; Kirkpatrick 2008, pp. 91–
109). The result can be criminal penalties for in-
dividuals or the suppression of the law-breaking
by resisters through negotiated settlements
that revise legal relations between the resisters
and the regime (Brisbin 2002, pp. 235–59).
CONCLUSION
Many facets of resistance to legality require
further study. Although there are many case
studies of resistance activity, the role of specific
situations, individual attributions of blame, the
genesis of anger, and the choice of individual or
collective responses to associations of legality
with social marginality and arbitrariness need
further theoretical development and empirical
analysis. As revealed by the case studies of
the practice of resistance, the creativity of the
human imagination is the primary limitation
on the strategies and range of tactics and stories
38 Brisbin

that resisters can deploy against legality ( Jasper
1997, pp. 11–13). When coupled with the pen-
chant of resisters to shift tactics over time and
employ multiple tactics to confront legality,
the dynamism and complexity of resistance
strategies have made it difficult to offer a firmly
grounded explanation of why an angry resister
will choose a particular strategy or tactic. Ad-
ditionally, for those who resist ethnic discrim-
ination, environmental destruction, warfare,
economic injustice, surveillance, and the sub-
jection of women to male authority, the political
legitimacy of resistance and the myth of rights
will continue to generate new challenges to
legality and new evidence for analysis. As with
previous acts of resistance, the outcome of these
actions will be difficult to assess. Nonetheless,
some of the resisters would agree with United
Mine Workers President Cecil Roberts.
During a strike that violated laws and judicial
decisions protecting coal mine operators, he
remarked, “There is nothing wrong with going
to jail when you are trying to change an unjust
system or an unjust law” (Brisbin 2002, p. 217).
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The author is not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings that might
be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.
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LS06-frontmatter ARI 29 September 2010 12:22
Annual Review of
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Science
Volume 6, 2010Contents
Law and Society: Project and Practice
Richard L. Abel p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 1
Resistance to Legality
Richard A. Brisbin, Jr. p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p25
Specters of Foucault in Law and Society Scholarship
Mariana Valverde p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p45
Law and Cognitive Neuroscience
Oliver R. Goodenough and Micaela Tucker p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p61
The Law’s Use of Brain Evidence
Jay D. Aronson p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p93
Psychological Syndromes and Criminal Responsibility
Christopher Slobogin p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 109
On the Politics of Imprisonments: A Review of Systematic Findings
David Jacobs and Aubrey L. Jackson p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 129
Social Historical Studies of Women, Crime, and Courts
Malcolm M. Feeley and Hadar Aviram p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 151
The Nexus of Domestic Violence Reform and Social Science:
From Instrument of Social Change to Institutionalized Surveillance
Kristin Bumiller p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 173
Law and Culture in a Global Context: Interventions to Eradicate
Female Genital Cutting
Elizabeth Heger Boyle and Amelia Cotton Corl p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 195
The Law and Economics of Bribery and Extortion
Susan Rose-Ackerman p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 217
The Politics of Crime, Punishment, and Social Order in East Asia
David Leheny and Sida Liu p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 239
Human Rights and Policing: Exigency or Incongruence?
Julia Hornberger p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 259
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South African Constitutional Jurisprudence: The First Fifteen Years
D.M. Davis p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 285
After the Rights Revolution: Bills of Rights in the Postconﬂict State
Sujit Choudhry p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 301
The Gatehouses and Mansions: Fifty Years Later
Richard A. Leo and K. Alexa Koenig p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 323
The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Decisions
Lee Epstein and Tonja Jacobi p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 341
Environmental Law and Native American Law
Eve Darian-Smith p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 359
The Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Lesbian and Gay Rights
Daniel Chomsky and Scott Barclay p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 387
Happiness Studies and Legal Policy
Peter Henry Huang p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 405
Insurance in Sociolegal Research
Tom Baker p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 433
The Debate over African American Reparations
John Torpey and Maxine Burkett p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 449
Comparative Studies of Law, Slavery, and Race in the Americas
Alejandro de la Fuente and Ariela Gross p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 469
Understanding Law and Race as Mutually Constitutive: An Invitation
to Explore an Emerging Field
Laura E. G´omez p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 487
The Comparative Politics of Carbon Taxation
Kathryn Harrison p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 507
Capitalism, Governance, and Authority: The Case of Corporate Social
Responsibility
Ronen Shamir p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 531
Toward a New Legal Empiricism: Empirical Legal Studies and New
Legal Realism
Mark C. Suchman and Elizabeth Mertz p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 555
Empirical Legal Scholarship in Law Reviews
Shari Seidman Diamond and Pam Mueller p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 581
Bureaucratic Ethics: IRBs and the Legal Regulation of Human
Subjects Research
Carol A. Heimer and JuLeigh Petty p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 601
vi Contents

Conﬂict Resolution in Organizations
Calvin Morrill and Danielle S. Rudes p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 627
On Law, Organizations, and Social Movements
Lauren B. Edelman, Gwendolyn Leachman, and Doug McAdam p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 653
Indexes
Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 1–6 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 687
Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 1–6 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 689
Errata
An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Law and Social Science articles may be
found at http://lawsocsci.annualreviews.org
Contents vii

AR392-FM ARI 30 September 2009 19:8
Annual Review of
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Science
Volume 5, 2009Contents
Morality in the Law: The Psychological Foundations of Citizens’
Desires to Punish Transgressions
John M. Darley p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 1
Experimental Law and Economics
Rachel Croson p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p25
The Challenge of Empirical Research on Business Compliance
in Regulatory Capitalism
Christine Parker and Vibeke Nielsen p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p45
Welfare, Workfare, and Citizenship in the Developed World
Joel F. Handler p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p71
Willpower and Legal Policy
Lee Anne Fennell p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p91
More Religion, Less Crime? Science, Felonies, and the
Three Faith Factors
John J. DiIulio, Jr. p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 115
The Political Economy of Prosecution
Sanford C. Gordon and Gregory A. Huber p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 135
Lineups and Eyewitness Identiﬁcation
Amy-May Leach, Brian L. Cutler, and Lori Van Wallendael p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 157
Punitive Damages
Neil Vidmar and Matthew W. Wolfe p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 179
Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?
Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins, and Justin Blount p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 201
The New Legal Pluralism
Paul Schiff Berman p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 225
Global Legal Pluralism
Ralf Michaels p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 243
Recursivity of Global Normmaking: A Sociolegal Agenda
Terence C. Halliday p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 263
v

AR392-FM ARI 30 September 2009 19:8
Rethinking Sovereignty in International Law
Antony Anghie p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 291
Does Torture Work? A Sociolegal Assessment of the Practice
in Historical and Global Perspective
Lisa Hajjar p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 311
The Empirical Study of Terrorism: Social and Legal Research
Gary LaFree and Gary Ackerman p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 347
Public Support for Civil Liberties Pre- and Post-9/11
John L. Sullivan and Henri¨et Hendriks p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 375
The Expanding Purview of Cultural Properties and Their Politics
Rosemary J. Coombe p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 393
Indexes
Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 1–5 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 413
Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 1–5 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 415
Errata
An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Law and Social Science articles may be
found at http://lawsocsci.annualreviews.org
vi Contents

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