The document discusses the theories of John Boyd, a US Air Force colonel known for developing the OODA Loop model of decision making. It summarizes that Boyd placed great importance on the human role and on using time as an advantage over adversaries. By making decisions and acting faster through the OODA Loop of Observe, Orient, Decide, Act, one can get inside an opponent's decision cycle and generate confusion. Boyd's theories emphasize agility, initiative, and compressing one's own time while expanding an opponent's, in order to collapse an adversary's ability to resist.

1. “To act freely, it is to retake control of one’s life, to put it into a new dimension unconstrained by time” - Henri Bergson
John Boyd: timeless reflections
On the 1st of June, the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA), the French War Col-
lege and the Hautes Etudes de Commerce (HEC) Paris conjointly organized a symposium:
“Acting in the midst of uncertainty – what role for a decision-maker’s vision and risk-
taking?” This question is pertinent to all decision-makers, be they civilians or military, in
the public or private domain. While the fog of economic competition grows thicker by
the day, the principal challenge remains the same: making good decisions and taking an
appropriate amount of risk – all within an ever shorter time horizon. In this regard, the
works of Col John R. Boyd (1917-1997), USAF retired, remain pertinent. For a large
number of managers, consultants and social scientists, his name evokes the well-known
“OODA Loop” (Observe, Orient, Decide and Act). Boyd’s theory is simply a concrete
application of a much larger conflict theory, which applies to both civilian and military
domains. An explanation follows.
General Charles Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1995 - 1999,
was quite clear: From John Boyd, we learned about competitive decision making on
the battlefield – compressing time, using time as an ally. Robert Coram, Boyd’s biographer,
was even more precise: America has dominated the skies for the past 30 years because of John
Boyd. After he retired, he developed a theory of combat that, according to Vice President Dick
Cheney who was Secretary of Defense at the time, was responsible for America’s swift and
decisive victory in the Gulf war. Why did John Boyd’s works have such an influence, even
within the civilian world? Why are they still applicable? Two essential elements of his
strategic approach seem to contribute to their influence. First of all, the attention he gives
to the human’s role, contrary to today’s dominating obsession with technology. Secondly,
the importance of the time factor in determining success – whether attacking an enemy
or entering a new market. This was anything but an ethereal concept to Boyd, who, as a
young fighter pilot, engaged in aerial combat at the end of the Korean War. Serge Gadal,
head of research at the Institut de Stratégie Comparée, explains how this experience was
fundamental. He would later analyze the results and notably conclude that the reason for the
American superiority in aerial combat was essentially due to the capacity of the F-86 Sabre to
transition from one aerial maneuver to another faster than it’s adversary, the MIG-15. This
intuition is directly at the heart of the “OODA Loop” theory.
John Boyd reserves an essential place for the human and his capacity to act and
adapt. As early as the 1960’s, during an assignment at the Pentagon, he conceived the idea
of constructing a lightweight fighter jet which favored maneuverability and agility – what
would eventually become the F-16. Since then, over 4000 F-16’s have been produced,
and John Boyd is considered its “father” along with the Chief Engineer for General Dy-
namics, Harry Hillaker. Later, in the 70’s, Col Boyd actively participated in the Defense
Reform movement, which, contrary to the era’s quantitative approach, pushed to qualita-
tively improve the efficiency of the armed forces. Theoretical works such as Destruction
and Creation (1976) and Patterns of Conflict (1997-1986) attest to his willingness to put
the human back at the heart of strategic thinking: Machines don’t fight wars.Terrain doesn’t
fight wars. Humans fight wars. You must get into the minds of humans.That’s where battles
are won. This conviction puts at the highest place the ability to maneuver, particularly in
an intellectual and psychological sense. For Serge Gadal, Patterns of Conflict constitutes
a veritable theory of a war of movement. If John Boyd drew from strategic classics like
Weekly
06.201206.2012 n°33n°33
In Greek mythology, the
eagle ( , AETOS) is one
of the attributes of Zeus.
Solar icon, an expression of
combativeness and victory,
master of the air and time,
it goes “higher, faster and
farther” and thus incarnates
the attributes of airpower.
The goal of the CESA
publication is to be a catalyst
for intellectual and personal
exchanges between airmen
and all Defense Department
personnel, as well as decision-
makers from all walks of life,
both public and private.
www.cesa.air.defense.gouv.fr

2. Sun Tzu, Jomini and Clausewitz, he also drew inspiration from the Mongolian and Napoleonic
campaigns, and especially the German Blitzkrieg of the Second World War. In a majestic fashion,
he demonstrates the importance of initiative, incertitude, surprise, and operational rhythm in war.
Drawing from a solid understanding of Physics and Chaos Theory, he describes the subtle interac-
tive mechanism between belligerents, formalized in A Discourse on Winning and Losing. This work
encapsulates a series of briefings created in 1977 and then improved upon over the next 10 years,
presented over 1500 times to both civilian and military audiences. As noted in the French defense
magazine Défense et Sécurité Internationale (DSI): Boyd reintroduces Clausewitz, the Prussian who,
above all, was a specialist before the time of non-linear action (through concepts such as the Law of Reci-
procal Action and the fog and friction of war). A champion of mental and organizational agility, the
American airman was able to conceptually get to the core of what determines success.
Time, the key factor to success. The ability to think and act faster than the adversary is the
main idea of John Boyd’s works – and in particular the concept of the “OODA Loop.” Modeled
after aerial combat, the image is that of two adversaries, both continuously implementing their own
OODA loops – the winner being the one who can accomplish the loop faster – thus one speaks of entering
into the adversary’s decision making cycle. (Gadal). Harry Hillaker confirms this: Time is the dominant
parameter. The pilot who goes through the OODA cycle in the shortest time prevails because his opponent
is caught responding to situations that have already changed. Contrary to what certain critics have
written, or interpretations that are too strict, emanating in particular from within the American
military and the 4th
Generation Warfare concept (William Lind), Boyd’s method adapts itself to the
increasing complexity and acceleration of the time factor in the digital age. Time is not a succession
of moments or sequences, but rather how they join together; likewise, the present doesn’t separate
the past from the future, it unites the two. Thus, the different phases proposed by Boyd (Observe,
Orient, Decide, Act) are not connected in a mechanical, indivisible and continuous fashion, but
rather organically, through permanent interaction between the phases and their environment. Agile
individuals and organizations are those who can quickly cross-check and multi-task – no matter
how many “OODA Loops” they are facing head-on.
John Boyd remains a reference for all who have to act in the midst of uncertainty. For those
few who do not make time a constraint to be mastered, but an ally to domesticate. As conceived by
Friedrich Nietzsche in Untimely Meditations: Active thinking involves being able to act outside of the
present, thus against time, and thus acting on time itself, to the benefit (I hope) of the future.
For further reading: Science, Strategy and War. The strategic theory of John Boyd, by Francis P.B. Osinga,
Routledge (London), 328 p., 32,44 €; Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, by Robert Coram,
Back Bay Books (New York), 504 p., 13,61 €; Certain to Win. The Strategy of John Boyd Applied to Business,
by Chet Richards, Xlibris (Bloomington, USA), 187 p., 16,25 €; John Boyd : de l’énergie spécifique à la guerre
de manoeuvre, by Serge Gadal, Fiche Stratégie n°8 du CESA, http://www.cesa.air.defense.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/
John_Boyd_.pdf
The OODA cycle
adapts itself to
the complexity
and acceleration
of the time factor
in the digital age.
Extracts
The Importance of a Faster Tempo. Need a fighter that can both lose energy and gain energy more
quickly while out-turning an adversary. In other words, suggests a fighter that can pick and choose enga-
gement opportunities - yet has fast transient (“buttonhook”) characteristics that can be used to either force
an overshoot by an attacker or stay inside a hard turning defender. Idea of fast transients suggests that, in
order to win, we should operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries - or, better yet, get inside
adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action time cycle or loop. Why? Such activity will make us
appear ambiguous (unpredictable) thereby generate confusion and disorder among our adversaries - since
our adversaries will be unable to generate mental images or pictures that agree with the menacing as
well as faster transient rhythm or patterns they are competing against. (John Boyd, Patterns of Conflict,
http://www.dnipogo.org/boyd/patterns.ppt)
The Art of Success. Appear to be an unsolvable cryptogram while operating in a directed way to
penetrate adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses in order to isolate him from his allies, pull him apart,
and collapse his will to resist. Yet shape or influence events so that we not only magnify our spirit and
strength but also influence potential adversaries as well as the uncommitted so that they are drawn toward
our philosophy and are empathetic toward our success. (ibid.)
To be ‘Certain to Win’. Compress own time and stretch-out adversary time; Generate unequal
distributions as basis to focus moral-mental-physical effort for local superiority and decisive leverage;
Diminish own friction (or entropy) and magnify adversary friction (or entropy); Operate inside adversa-
ry’s observation-orientation-decision-action loops or get inside his mind-time-space; Penetrate adversary
organism and bring about his collapse; Amplify our spirit and strength, drain-away adversaries’ and
attract the uncommitted. (ibid.)
AETOS
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The importance
of initiative,
incertitude,
surprise, and
operational
rhythm in war...