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Accidental Resiliency
Small- and Medium-Sized Business
Evolution by Necessity
by Art Ocain, Vice President of Service Delivery at Airiam
ResilienCyCon
2022
art@airiam:~$ whoami
Information Security & Incident Response
• Lead Incident Response
• Sys admin background with
detours through network
admin and cloud admin
• Cybersecurity enthusiast &
evangelist
Key Points
Develop
Automation
• Redeployment Scripts
(“Shift-Left” Automation)
• Backup Remediation
• Focus on the constraint
• IT Ops → CI/CD
• Automated incident
creation
• Continuous monitoring
and correlation
• Continuous vulnerability
management & patching
• Continuous pentesting
Patching is a
Resilience Test
• Techniques:
• Redundancy
• Analytic Monitoring
• Dynamic Positioning
• Adaptive Response
(Dynamic
Reconfiguration)
Shorten
Feedback Loops
• Enable rapid feedback
loops between
• Incident Response (IR)
• Security Operations
(SOC)
• Network Operations
(NOC)
• IT Operations (Server,
Endpoint, Cloud, IAM,
etc.)
• Development / DevOps
• Risk Management
Front Line Observations
All companies
experience cyber
attack
Most companies will
experience
ransomware
Most companies
have recovery
problems
Incidents-a-Plenty
Manufacturing Company
• DoD Contracts, CMMC
• Only wanted “proactive
management & security”
on their ERP server
• Total investment in IT
and Security only
~$250/month
Incidents-a-Plenty
Manufacturing Company
• Attacked several times
• Ransomware twice in 1 year
• ERP downtime was minimal
• All other systems needed to
be completely rebuilt from
scratch EACH TIME
Incidents-a-Plenty
Manufacturing Company
• Each ransomware attack:
• ~1 month recovery time
• ~$1M lost revenue
• ~$.5M cyber legal,
forensics, and recovery
costs
Vivian: Put an image on this side
with stock image of someone
who is broke /
Empty pockets turned out
Back to the Drawing Board
Change Client
Perspectives
• Pain alone is not enough for
people to change bad clients
Create Resilient
Solutions
• We need to create resilience even
when the client is in their own way
Use Incidents
As R&D
• Use every failure we see on an
incident to improve our solution
Back to the Drawing Board
Security
software and
tooling cost $.
We can’t do
everything for
everyone for
free.
Client budget is the constraint.
Incidents-a-Plenty
SaaS Software Company
• Called on Friday
afternoon
• 1000s of servers
• 100% encrypted with
ransomware
• No uncorrupted backups
Incidents-a-Plenty
SaaS Software Company
• No segmentation
• No monitoring
• No security automation
• No detection and response capability
• Unpatched Windows Servers w/ IIS
Incidents-a-Plenty
SaaS Software Company
• Created containment to protect recovery
• Prioritized systems, focusing on
critical assets first
MITRE|CREF Navigator™
→Constrain
→→Segmentation
MITRE|CREF Navigator™
→Strategic Design Principle
→→Focus on common critical assets
Incidents-a-Plenty
SaaS Software Company
• We scripted:
• eradication, recovery and
redeployment
• Client was back up and running on
Monday
MITRE|CREF Navigator™
→Reconstitute
→→Adaptive Response
Preparation
Detection &
Analysis
Containment,
Eradication
& Recovery
Post-Incident
Activity
Incident Response vs Cyber Resilience Engineering Framework
NIST SP 800-61 r2 NIST SP 800-160 v2 r1
Back to the Drawing Board
Evolution
Problem Identified
• No segmentation
• No monitoring
• No security
automation
• No detection &
response capability
• Unpatched servers
Solution
• Microsegmentation
• Full SIEM monitoring
• DevSecOps
management system
• Deployed EDR and
XDR
• Daily patching
Evolution for our
MSP Clients
• Microsegmentation
• Full SIEM monitoring
• DevSecOps
management system
• Deployed EDR and
XDR
• Daily patching
Back to the Drawing Board
Evolution
Evolution for our
MSP Clients
• Microsegmentation
• Full SIEM monitoring
• DevSecOps
management system
• Deployed EDR and
XDR
• Daily patching
MITRE|CREF Navigator™
→Constrain
→→Segmentation
MITRE|CREF Navigator™
→Constrain & Understand
→→Analytic Monitoring
MITRE|CREF Navigator™
→Prevent or Avoid, Prepare & Re-Architect
→→Coordinated Protection
Back to the Drawing Board
• Automation:
• workstation/server/network maintenance
• deployment (Terraform, Puppet, Microsoft WDS)
• backup fixes (auto-remediation)
• Pushed to all of our clients:
• vulnerability management
• security patches and fixes: WE PATCH DAILY!
• our XDR platform
Formed Dev{Sec}Ops Team
Created
immutable
air-gapped
backup
solution
Created
dedicated
Incident
Response
(IR) Team
Incident
Response
Managed IT
Operations
Managed
Cybersecurity
Insights
Resilience Journey
• Rapid Feedback Loops - As a
managed service provider
(MSP) for small businesses,
we adapted our IT and
Cybersecurity processes
using what we have learned
from incidents.
Incident
Response
Managed IT
Operations
Managed
Cybersecurity
Insights
Resilience Journey
Vulnerable Systems –
Business is afraid to patch
critical systems or does not
have patch plans and
automation.
PATCHING = RESILIENCE TESTING
Back to the Drawing Board
• Focus on the constraint
• IT Ops → CI/CD
• Continuous vulnerability
management & patching
• Continuous pentesting
Shift to DevOps
Back to the Drawing Board
Mindset Evolution
Be A Good MSP
Previous Desired State:
• keep clients happy
• give stellar service
• keep them fast, stable,
and productive on new
technology
Be a Great Resilience
Service Provider
New Desired State:
• manage our
heterogenous clients
as using our
automation
• be able to rapidly
redeploy a client’s
environment
anywhere, anytime
Incident
Response
Managed IT
Operations
Managed
Cybersecurity
Insights
The VEEAM Story and Threat Actors:
• Run “kill scripts” on target
hosts to disable VSS, delete
VSS snapshots
• Delete/encrypt backups
• Steal credentials for SAN
and delete SAN snapshots
• Encrypt VMware ESXi hosts
• Attack DR sites and cloud
resources over VPN from
production network
VLAN 101
I’m simple, but
flat and easy to
attack.
The VEEAM Story: Veeam (on-premises backup software and
infrastructure) was being deleted or encrypted in ransomware
attacks.
• Outcome: All servers, backup infrastructure, and storage is
accessible to attacker and encrypted/deleted in ransomware
attack. VLAN 101
I’m simple, but
flat and easy
to attack.
VLAN 101 VLAN 102
1 3
2 4
5
6
7
8
PWR
FAN
ALM
STS
HA
TMP
MGT CONSOLE USB
9 11 13 15
10 12 14 16
17
18
HA1
HA2
PA-3060
Firewall: Block inter-VLAN traffic for 101
and 102.
Hole punched
into VLAN for
admin access.
MITRE|CREF Navigator™
→Re-Architect
→→Predefined Segmentation
The VEEAM Story:
• We disjoined Veeam Backup
Server from domain (so
attacker cannot access it by
compromising Active
Directory).
• We segmented the network.
• Outcome: Improved
restorability, but
administrative access to
VLAN102 can still be
compromised if attacker
compromises admin PC.
VLAN 101 VLAN 102
1 3
2 4
5
6
7
8
PWR
FAN
ALM
STS
HA
TMP
MGT CONSOLE USB
9 11 13 15
10 12 14 16
17
18
HA1
HA2
PA-3060
Firewall: Block inter-VLAN
traffic for 101 and 102.
Hole
punched
into VLAN
for admin
access.
MITRE|CREF Navigator™
→Re-Architect
→→Predefined Segmentation
VLAN 101 VLAN 102
1 3
2 4
5
6
7
8
PWR
FAN
ALM
STS
HA
TMP
MGT CONSOLE USB
9 11 13 15
10 12 14 16
17
18
HA1
HA2
PA-3060
Firewall: Block inter-VLAN traffic for
101 and 102.
AWS
Azure
MITRE|CREF Navigator™
→Reconstitute → Redundancy
→→Protected Backup & Restore
The VEEAM Story:
• We added immutable
cloud storage for
Veeam scale sets.
• Outcome: If on-
premises
infrastructure is
completely
compromised, we still
have a recovery path.
VLAN 101 VLAN 102
1 3
2 4
5
6
7
8
PWR
FAN
ALM
STS
HA
TMP
MGT CONSOLE USB
9 11 13 15
10 12 14 16
17
18
HA1
HA2
PA-3060
Firewall: Block inter-VLAN
traffic for 101 and 102.
AWS
Azure
MITRE|CREF Navigator™
→Reconstitute → Redundancy
→→Protected Backup & Restore
VLAN 101 VLAN 102
1 3
2 4
5
6
7
8
PWR
FAN
ALM
STS
HA
TMP
MGT CONSOLE USB
9 11 13 15
10 12 14 16
17
18
HA1
HA2
PA-3060
Firewall: Block inter-VLAN traffic
for 101 and 102.
AWS
Azure
DRaaS
Cloud
Credential &
Key Vault
MITRE|CREF Navigator™
→Reconstitute → Redundancy
→→Protected Backup & Restore
The VEEAM Story:
• We used a key vault for
AWS and Azure storage
keys and associated creds
to prevent credential
theft. (Admins don’t keep
the passwords/keys.)
• We added alternate, slower
immutable cloud backup of
critical VMs as a failsafe.
• Outcome: Protection of
backup resources and
recovery paths.
VLAN 101 VLAN 102
1 3
2 4
5
6
7
8
PWR
FAN
ALM
STS
HA
TMP
MGT CONSOLE USB
9 11 13 15
10 12 14 16
17
18
HA1
HA2
PA-3060
Firewall: Block inter-VLAN
traffic for 101 and 102.
AWS
Azure
DRaaS
Cloud
Credential &
Key Vault
MITRE|CREF Navigator™
→Reconstitute → Redundancy
→→Protected Backup & Restore
Wrapping Up
The Problem
Threat actors are
focused on SMB/SME
companies.
What would the
world be like if:
Enterprises could
recover quickly from
ransomware attack
What would the
world be like if
Medium-sized
business could
recover quickly from
ransomware attack
What would the
world be like if
Small business could
recover quickly from
ransomware attack

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Accidental Resiliency - MITRE ResilienCyCon 2022-draft-PRE-MARKETING -grey.pptx

  • 1. Accidental Resiliency Small- and Medium-Sized Business Evolution by Necessity by Art Ocain, Vice President of Service Delivery at Airiam ResilienCyCon 2022
  • 2. art@airiam:~$ whoami Information Security & Incident Response • Lead Incident Response • Sys admin background with detours through network admin and cloud admin • Cybersecurity enthusiast & evangelist
  • 3. Key Points Develop Automation • Redeployment Scripts (“Shift-Left” Automation) • Backup Remediation • Focus on the constraint • IT Ops → CI/CD • Automated incident creation • Continuous monitoring and correlation • Continuous vulnerability management & patching • Continuous pentesting Patching is a Resilience Test • Techniques: • Redundancy • Analytic Monitoring • Dynamic Positioning • Adaptive Response (Dynamic Reconfiguration) Shorten Feedback Loops • Enable rapid feedback loops between • Incident Response (IR) • Security Operations (SOC) • Network Operations (NOC) • IT Operations (Server, Endpoint, Cloud, IAM, etc.) • Development / DevOps • Risk Management
  • 4. Front Line Observations All companies experience cyber attack Most companies will experience ransomware Most companies have recovery problems
  • 5. Incidents-a-Plenty Manufacturing Company • DoD Contracts, CMMC • Only wanted “proactive management & security” on their ERP server • Total investment in IT and Security only ~$250/month
  • 6. Incidents-a-Plenty Manufacturing Company • Attacked several times • Ransomware twice in 1 year • ERP downtime was minimal • All other systems needed to be completely rebuilt from scratch EACH TIME
  • 7. Incidents-a-Plenty Manufacturing Company • Each ransomware attack: • ~1 month recovery time • ~$1M lost revenue • ~$.5M cyber legal, forensics, and recovery costs Vivian: Put an image on this side with stock image of someone who is broke / Empty pockets turned out
  • 8. Back to the Drawing Board Change Client Perspectives • Pain alone is not enough for people to change bad clients Create Resilient Solutions • We need to create resilience even when the client is in their own way Use Incidents As R&D • Use every failure we see on an incident to improve our solution
  • 9. Back to the Drawing Board Security software and tooling cost $. We can’t do everything for everyone for free. Client budget is the constraint.
  • 10. Incidents-a-Plenty SaaS Software Company • Called on Friday afternoon • 1000s of servers • 100% encrypted with ransomware • No uncorrupted backups
  • 11. Incidents-a-Plenty SaaS Software Company • No segmentation • No monitoring • No security automation • No detection and response capability • Unpatched Windows Servers w/ IIS
  • 12. Incidents-a-Plenty SaaS Software Company • Created containment to protect recovery • Prioritized systems, focusing on critical assets first MITRE|CREF Navigator™ →Constrain →→Segmentation MITRE|CREF Navigator™ →Strategic Design Principle →→Focus on common critical assets
  • 13. Incidents-a-Plenty SaaS Software Company • We scripted: • eradication, recovery and redeployment • Client was back up and running on Monday MITRE|CREF Navigator™ →Reconstitute →→Adaptive Response
  • 14. Preparation Detection & Analysis Containment, Eradication & Recovery Post-Incident Activity Incident Response vs Cyber Resilience Engineering Framework NIST SP 800-61 r2 NIST SP 800-160 v2 r1
  • 15. Back to the Drawing Board Evolution Problem Identified • No segmentation • No monitoring • No security automation • No detection & response capability • Unpatched servers Solution • Microsegmentation • Full SIEM monitoring • DevSecOps management system • Deployed EDR and XDR • Daily patching Evolution for our MSP Clients • Microsegmentation • Full SIEM monitoring • DevSecOps management system • Deployed EDR and XDR • Daily patching
  • 16. Back to the Drawing Board Evolution Evolution for our MSP Clients • Microsegmentation • Full SIEM monitoring • DevSecOps management system • Deployed EDR and XDR • Daily patching MITRE|CREF Navigator™ →Constrain →→Segmentation MITRE|CREF Navigator™ →Constrain & Understand →→Analytic Monitoring MITRE|CREF Navigator™ →Prevent or Avoid, Prepare & Re-Architect →→Coordinated Protection
  • 17. Back to the Drawing Board • Automation: • workstation/server/network maintenance • deployment (Terraform, Puppet, Microsoft WDS) • backup fixes (auto-remediation) • Pushed to all of our clients: • vulnerability management • security patches and fixes: WE PATCH DAILY! • our XDR platform Formed Dev{Sec}Ops Team Created immutable air-gapped backup solution Created dedicated Incident Response (IR) Team
  • 18. Incident Response Managed IT Operations Managed Cybersecurity Insights Resilience Journey • Rapid Feedback Loops - As a managed service provider (MSP) for small businesses, we adapted our IT and Cybersecurity processes using what we have learned from incidents.
  • 19. Incident Response Managed IT Operations Managed Cybersecurity Insights Resilience Journey Vulnerable Systems – Business is afraid to patch critical systems or does not have patch plans and automation.
  • 21. Back to the Drawing Board • Focus on the constraint • IT Ops → CI/CD • Continuous vulnerability management & patching • Continuous pentesting Shift to DevOps
  • 22. Back to the Drawing Board Mindset Evolution Be A Good MSP Previous Desired State: • keep clients happy • give stellar service • keep them fast, stable, and productive on new technology Be a Great Resilience Service Provider New Desired State: • manage our heterogenous clients as using our automation • be able to rapidly redeploy a client’s environment anywhere, anytime
  • 23.
  • 24. Incident Response Managed IT Operations Managed Cybersecurity Insights The VEEAM Story and Threat Actors: • Run “kill scripts” on target hosts to disable VSS, delete VSS snapshots • Delete/encrypt backups • Steal credentials for SAN and delete SAN snapshots • Encrypt VMware ESXi hosts • Attack DR sites and cloud resources over VPN from production network
  • 25. VLAN 101 I’m simple, but flat and easy to attack.
  • 26. The VEEAM Story: Veeam (on-premises backup software and infrastructure) was being deleted or encrypted in ransomware attacks. • Outcome: All servers, backup infrastructure, and storage is accessible to attacker and encrypted/deleted in ransomware attack. VLAN 101 I’m simple, but flat and easy to attack.
  • 27. VLAN 101 VLAN 102 1 3 2 4 5 6 7 8 PWR FAN ALM STS HA TMP MGT CONSOLE USB 9 11 13 15 10 12 14 16 17 18 HA1 HA2 PA-3060 Firewall: Block inter-VLAN traffic for 101 and 102. Hole punched into VLAN for admin access. MITRE|CREF Navigator™ →Re-Architect →→Predefined Segmentation
  • 28. The VEEAM Story: • We disjoined Veeam Backup Server from domain (so attacker cannot access it by compromising Active Directory). • We segmented the network. • Outcome: Improved restorability, but administrative access to VLAN102 can still be compromised if attacker compromises admin PC. VLAN 101 VLAN 102 1 3 2 4 5 6 7 8 PWR FAN ALM STS HA TMP MGT CONSOLE USB 9 11 13 15 10 12 14 16 17 18 HA1 HA2 PA-3060 Firewall: Block inter-VLAN traffic for 101 and 102. Hole punched into VLAN for admin access. MITRE|CREF Navigator™ →Re-Architect →→Predefined Segmentation
  • 29. VLAN 101 VLAN 102 1 3 2 4 5 6 7 8 PWR FAN ALM STS HA TMP MGT CONSOLE USB 9 11 13 15 10 12 14 16 17 18 HA1 HA2 PA-3060 Firewall: Block inter-VLAN traffic for 101 and 102. AWS Azure MITRE|CREF Navigator™ →Reconstitute → Redundancy →→Protected Backup & Restore
  • 30. The VEEAM Story: • We added immutable cloud storage for Veeam scale sets. • Outcome: If on- premises infrastructure is completely compromised, we still have a recovery path. VLAN 101 VLAN 102 1 3 2 4 5 6 7 8 PWR FAN ALM STS HA TMP MGT CONSOLE USB 9 11 13 15 10 12 14 16 17 18 HA1 HA2 PA-3060 Firewall: Block inter-VLAN traffic for 101 and 102. AWS Azure MITRE|CREF Navigator™ →Reconstitute → Redundancy →→Protected Backup & Restore
  • 31. VLAN 101 VLAN 102 1 3 2 4 5 6 7 8 PWR FAN ALM STS HA TMP MGT CONSOLE USB 9 11 13 15 10 12 14 16 17 18 HA1 HA2 PA-3060 Firewall: Block inter-VLAN traffic for 101 and 102. AWS Azure DRaaS Cloud Credential & Key Vault MITRE|CREF Navigator™ →Reconstitute → Redundancy →→Protected Backup & Restore
  • 32. The VEEAM Story: • We used a key vault for AWS and Azure storage keys and associated creds to prevent credential theft. (Admins don’t keep the passwords/keys.) • We added alternate, slower immutable cloud backup of critical VMs as a failsafe. • Outcome: Protection of backup resources and recovery paths. VLAN 101 VLAN 102 1 3 2 4 5 6 7 8 PWR FAN ALM STS HA TMP MGT CONSOLE USB 9 11 13 15 10 12 14 16 17 18 HA1 HA2 PA-3060 Firewall: Block inter-VLAN traffic for 101 and 102. AWS Azure DRaaS Cloud Credential & Key Vault MITRE|CREF Navigator™ →Reconstitute → Redundancy →→Protected Backup & Restore
  • 33. Wrapping Up The Problem Threat actors are focused on SMB/SME companies.
  • 34. What would the world be like if: Enterprises could recover quickly from ransomware attack
  • 35. What would the world be like if Medium-sized business could recover quickly from ransomware attack
  • 36. What would the world be like if Small business could recover quickly from ransomware attack

Editor's Notes

  1. Make work visible Make sure work flows in downstream Create, shorten, and amplify feedback loops Continual learning and experimentation Focus on the constraint IT Ops → CI/CD Automated incident creation Automated redeployment of servers and cloud assets Continuous monitoring and correlation Continuous vulnerability management & patching Continuous pentesting
  2. Automation: “Kill scripts” on hosts that delete volume shadow copies using vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet and disable VSS. Manually (hands on keyboards): Attackers delete snapshots on storage arrays (have seen this on EMC and Pure Storage) and disable snapshotting and replication. Manually (hands on keyboards): Attackers identify Veeam servers and Veeam backup repositories and delete/encrypt the backups. Attackers destroy Veeam servers, rendering Veeam-encrypted backups useless unless the victim has a backup copy of the encryption keys https://www.veeam.com/blog/cybercrime-attacks-against-backup-infrastructure.html Manually (hands on keyboards): Attackers identify, attack, and encrypt hot DR sites over live VPNs from the production site.
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