1. Blake Thompson PS493A Sample
A Critical Analysis of Intelligence Failure (Writing Sample)
Question 1: Can there be a single theory of intelligence failure? Why or why not? Which theory comes
closest, and why is thattheory the mostcompletetheory? Which theory is the worsttheory?
I struggledwiththisquestionall semester. Istherea single theory of intelligence failure? I don’t
believeso. As the essaypromptitself states,Ibelievethatthere are only‘more complete theories’. In
the relationshipbetweenintelligence andpolicy-making,theoriesandpredictionsare reallyasgoodasit
gets. There are no ‘right’answers;there are choicesandprobabilitiesbasedonlimitedorincomplete
intelligence. Similarlythere are amultitude of educatedtheoriesthatcanbestbe appliedtoany
particularintelligence ‘failure’. Evenwhenyoubelieveyouhave foundatheorythatcompletely‘fits’,a
little bitof pessimismmixedwithsome critical thinkingcanusuallypoke holesineventhe most
‘complete’theories. The theoryof intelligence failure canbe endlesslycomplex,aswe have seenthis
semester. Inpart,because oftenintelligence failuresare aproduct of failedinstitutional relationships,
whetheritisbetweenaninstitutionandanindividual,aninstitutionanditself,oraninstitutionand
anotherinstitution. These failedrelationshipsleadtoissuessuchaspsychological problems,ideological
problems,the misunderstandingof intentionsorcapabilities,non-receptive policymakers,inept
intelligence organizations,disjointedmilitaries,etc.
So,naturally,whenIwasaskedto decide whatI feltwasthe ‘mostcomplete’theory,Ihesitated.
I firstthoughtaboutour class theory,whichisthatthere isa distinctionbetweenintelligence failure,
policyfailure,andimplementation/militaryfailure. Soif there isa distinction,itisn’ttoounorthodoxto
alsopropose thatthere is a relationship,acertaincause andeffectbetweenthe three. However,and
thisiswhere the theoryof intelligencefailure getscomplex,that‘cause andeffect’relationshipis
reciprocal. Forexample,itcouldbe claimedthatina particularfailure thatanintelligencefailure caused
a policyfailure. Inanotherparticularfailure itcouldbe claimedthata policyfailure causedan
intelligence failure. Itisthisconstant which-is-whatquestionthatpreventsasingle theoryof
intelligence fromreigningsupreme. Itisalmostasif youhave to analyze the failure fromthe bottomup,
and as you’re doingthatalsounderstandwhathappenedfromthe topdowntocreate the eventsfrom
the bottomup.

2. Blake Thompson PS493A Sample
In anycase, I combinedthree theoriestoformmy‘mostcomplete theory’. Imentionedthe
hybridtheoryourclass hasbeendiscussingbecause itwasthe inspirationforwhere Ipulledmythree
theories. The firsttheoryIchose to incorporate wasBetts. Hisideasaboutinevitableintelligence
failuresandsharedideologyneedtobe addressedwithina‘most complete theory’. Sharedideology,
while notalwaysthe sole explanationforfailure,hascome upinrelationtomany case studiesthis
semester. Forexample,bothinthe AmericanNavy’sinabilitytoforesee Pearl Harborasa possible
target andin MacArthur/Washington’sinabilitytoforesee China’sbackingof Koreaonce UN forces
pushednorthto the 38th
. Secondly,Ithinkitisimportantto note ina theoryof failure thatintelligence
failuresare inevitable. Youjustcan’taccount for everything,especiallyif youare activelybeing
deceived. Thisisimportantnotonlyto understandingthe nature of failure,butalsoinmaintaining
morale onan individual level throughoutthe differentinstitutionsinvolved(policy,intelligence,and
military).
The largestreasonI believethatintelligencefailuresare inevitable isbecauseof Wohlstetter’s
signal tonoise ratiotheory. Wohlstetteristhe secondadditiontomy‘mostcomplete theory’. While
hersignal-to-noiseratiotheorymaybe perceivedasbasic,itseemstooverwhelminglydescribe,atleast
inpart, a major reasonfor intelligence failures. He claimsthatsometimesthere are asmany‘noises’as
there are ‘significantsounds’(Wohlstetter,pg278). What she meansisthat sometimesfailuresare
causedbecause the ‘significantsounds’are notalwaysseparatedfromthe ‘noise’. The abundance of
informationincreasesthe probabilitythattheywill slipbyananalystunnoticed. Wohlstetteralso
discussesanotherimportantideathatisimportantto intelligence failure,andthatisthe ideathat there
isa distinctionbetweenintelligence failuresandbureaucratic/policyfailures. She understoodthat
sometimeswhattheoristsare perceivingasintelligence failureswere actuallycomingaboutbecause of
problems/failuresatthe policylevel,suchasnon-receptive politiciansandmiscommunicationof
intelligence,intentions,orcapabilities. She believedthatthiswaslargelybroughtaboutbecause no
single agencyorindividualhasaccessto the total mass of information. There isno‘distributioncenter’
for Americanintelligence,sosometimesrelevantintelligence doesnotgetfromwhere itisintroducedto
where itneedstobe. This isan example of the failedinstitutional relationshipsIwastalkingaboutin
the openingparagraphs. Itcan leadtoa multitude of in-housemiscommunicationsandmisconceptions.
These,obviously,canaccountfor all three of the type of failuresIhave beendiscussing:
implementation/military,intelligence,and/orpolicy.

3. Blake Thompson PS493A Sample
Deceptionisincreasinglycomplex,aswe learnedfromthe Holtreading. Itisthe third andfinal
theorythat I chose to incorporate intomy‘mostcomplete theory’. Provingdeceptionisanothertask
entirely. Nonetheless,deceptiondeservestobe inany‘complete’theoryof failure. The ideathatour
failureswere the cause of another’sactionsmayseemlikeacop-out,butithas undoubtedlybeenthe
case inat leastsome circumstances. However,the problemisindetermining which circumstances
resultedasa productof another’sactions. The verynature of deceptionshieldsthe individualfrom
beingable todetermine whetherornottheyare beingdeceived. Are theybeingdeceived,orare they
beingdeceivedintothinkingthattheyhave beendeceived? IbelieveitwasbestsummedupbyHolt
himself,“Deceptionislike insurance. If yourhouse didnotburn downlastyear,you ‘wasted’the money
youspenton premiums,butyoudon’tknow thatuntil the endof the year”(Holt,pg 97). Evenso, did
youreally‘waste’moneyonthose premiums? Whatif yourhouse burneddownandyoudidn’thave
insurance? Aswiththe majority of intelligence theory,deceptionisequally(if notmore) complex.
I chose to combine Holt,Wohlstetter,andBettsbecause Ibelievedthattogethertheycombined
to create the ‘mostcomplete theory’. Theycoverimplementation,militaryactivity,bureaucratic
relationships,psychological barriers,andanumberof otherimportantvariablesthatcanhelpto
explain/predictfailures of all three types(policy,intelligence,andimplementation/military).Iintendto
use those three theoristsinthe secondpartof thisexamso I can furthertestmy claimthat they
combine toformthe ‘mostcomplete theory’. Asa side note,if Ihad to mentionanothertheoryI
wantedtoinclude itwouldbe Rovner’sdomesticpolitics. Itisimportanttobrieflynote thatIdo believe
domesticpoliticscaninfluencefailure atall three levels,amongmanyotherthings. Rovnerwouldbe
the ‘missingpiece’tothe hybridtheoryIhave proposedabove.
If I hadto choose whatI wouldconsidertobe the ‘leastcompletetheory’itwouldprobablybe
Kam. Hisfocuson psychological factorswasimportant,butitreallyonlylaidthe groundworkfor
explainingfailure. Atthe beginningof mypaperIstatedthat, “itis almostas if youhave to analyze the
failure fromthe bottomup,and as you’re doingthatalsounderstandwhathappenedfromthe top
downto create the eventsfromthe bottomup.” Kam givesusa large part of the psychological reasons
for failure,whichIbelieve isalarge part of the ‘bottom-up’theoryforunderstandingfailure. However,
it wasmy feelingthatBettstookthose psychological factorsandmore effectivelytheorizedthematthe
institutional level. Hisideaof sharedideologyincorporatedthe mostimportantof Kam’sideasbutalso
introducedanother‘level’tothe problemof failure:the ideathatbureaucratic/policyfailuresare
relatedtobut distinctfromintelligencefailures.

4. Blake Thompson PS493A Sample
Works Cited
Betts,Richard. 2007. Enemiesof Intelligence:KnowledgeandPowerinAmericanNationalSecurity. NY,NY:
ColumbiaUniversityPress. Chapter2 (“PermanentEnemies:WhyIntelligence Failuresare Inevitable”)
Cohen,EliotandGooch, John. 1990. MilitaryMisfortune:The Anatomyof Failure inWar. New York,NY: The
Free Press. Chapter7 (“Aggregate Failure:The Defeatof the AmericanEighthArmyinKorea,November
– December1950”)
Dahl,Erik. 2013. IntelligenceandSurprise Attack:Failure andSuccessfromPearl Harborto 9/11 and
Beyond. WashingtonDC:GeorgetownUniversityPress. Chapter2 (“Pearl Harbor:Challengingthe
ConventionalWisdom”).
Dahl,Erik. 2013. IntelligenceandSurprise Attack:Failure andSuccessfromPearl Harborto 9/11 and
Beyond. WashingtonDC:GeorgetownUniversityPress.Chapter7(“The 9/11 Attacks:A New
Explanation”)
Holt,Thaddeus. The Deceivers:AlliedMilitaryDeceptioninthe SecondWorldWar. Skyhorse Publishing:NY,
NY. Chapter2 (“The Art of Deception”,pg.52 – 98).
Holt,Thaddeus. The Deceivers:AlliedMilitaryDeceptioninthe SecondWorldWar. Skyhorse Publishing:NY,
NY. Chapter13 (“Quicksilver,”pg.521 – 591)
May, Ernest(Editor). 1986. KnowingOne’sEnemies:Intelligence AssessmentBefore the TwoWorldWars.
PrincetonUniversityPress;Princeton,NJ. Chapter10(“FrenchMilitaryIntelligence andNazi Germany,
1938 – 1939” by Young)
Rovner,Joshua. 2011. Fixingthe Facts:National Securityandthe Politicsof Intelligence. Ithaca,NY:Cornell
UniversityPress.Chapter7(“Intelligence,Policy,andthe War inIraq”).
Wohlstetter,Roberta. 1962. Pearl Harbor: Warningand Decision. Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversityPress.
Chapter1 (“SignalsforHonolulu”),Chapter 4(“Signalsand Noise atHome”)
9/11 Commission. 2004. The 9/11 CommissionReport. USGovernmentDocument.8(“The Systemwas
BlinkingRed”).