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Politics	to	the	Extreme:	Mapping	the	Interest	Group	Universe	
Ethan	Poytress	
California	State	University	Channel	Islands	
	
Recent	years	have	witnessed	an	alarming	increase	of	ideological	polarization	in	the	US	
House	of	Representatives.	Last	October,	the	country	endured	a	16‐day	federal	government	
shutdown	that	cost	the	economy	upwards	of	6	billion	in	lost	output	and	negatively	affected	real	
GDP	growth	by	as	much	as	0.6	percent.1	Congress	passed	only	58	bills	signed	into	law	by	the	
president	in	2013:	many	of	them	“naming	post	offices	or	transferring	federal	land,”2	as	opposed	
to	substantive	legislation	such	as	taxing	and	spending	authority.	The	113th	Congress	is	on	pace	to	
be	the	least	productive	in	modern	history,	3	and	is	deeply	unpopular:	the	US	Congress	received	a	
9%	national	approval	rating	in	November	2013.4		The	success	of	the	nation	as	a	functioning	
democracy	demands	that	our	legislative	body	accomplish	what	it	is	tasked	to	do	–	legislate	
effectively	within	the	constraints	of	a	two‐party	system.		
Some	political	observers	suggest	a	possible	role	for	interest	groups.	Speaker	of	the	House	
John	Boehner	(R‐OH)	–	speaking	about	interests	and	their	influence	over	members	–	recently	
told	reporters	at	a	press	conference,	“[Groups	are]	using	our	members…	for	their	own	goals.”5		
Many	interest	groups	monitor	the	activities	of	members	of	Congress,	threatening	to	withhold	
campaign	contributions	or	even	support	primary	challengers	if	members	do	not	support	the	
																																																								
1	Office	of	Management	and	Budget,	“Impacts	and	Costs	of	the	October	2013	Federal	Government	Shutdown”	
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/reports/impacts‐and‐costs‐of‐october‐2013‐federal‐government‐
shutdown‐report.pdf		
2	David	Welna,	National	Public	Radio,	Congress	Is	On	Pace	To	Be	The	Least	Productive	Ever,	(Dec.	23,	2013)	
http://www.npr.org/2013/12/24/256696665/congress‐is‐on‐pace‐to‐be‐the‐least‐productive‐ever		
3		Gallup	Politics:	http://www.gallup.com/poll/166838/congress‐job‐approval‐starts‐2014.aspx	
4		Ibid.	
5	http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics‐news/boehner‐lashes‐out‐conservative‐groups‐budget‐deal‐v21863224
2
group’s	position.6	This	creates	a	challenge	for	congressional	members:	Either	support	the	
positions	of	powerful	interests	or	risk	being	ousted	at	the	polls.		
This	research	aims	to	accomplish	two	things:	1)	to	calculate	the	policy	ideal	points	of	
interest	groups,	and	2)	explore	whether	polarization	in	the	Congress	is	reflected	in	the	interest	
group	universe.	I	utilize	congressional	roll	call	vote	data	coupled	with	a	mathematical	algorithm	
to	map	shifting	ideological	“ideal	points”	of	interest	groups	over	time	in	one	and	two‐
dimensional	space.	I	observe	potentially	meaningful	similarity	between	movements	of	legislator	
and	interest	group	ideal	points,	wherein	interests	groups	are	treated	as	voting	members	of	the	
US	House.		
Design	and	Methodology	
Interest	groups	take	positions	on	legislation	and	“score”	individual	legislators’	votes	
based	their	support	for	the	group’s	position.		Groups	announce	their	positions,	and	their	
intention	to	score	a	vote,	in	an	attempt	to	influence	how	legislators	vote	on	a	bill.		Interest	groups	
policy	positions	disregard	the	political	constraints—for	instance,	the	need	to	compromise	or	
support	a	leadership	position—of	voting	members.		
Political	scientists	Keith	Poole	and	Howard	Rosenthal	developed	an	algorithm	(NOMINATE)	
for	mapping	the	policy	ideal	points	of	legislators	in	two‐dimensional	space.	NOMINATE	reduces	
large,	multi‐dimensional	congressional	roll	call	data	matrices	–	total	number	of	votes	taken	in	
Congress	in	a	particular	year	times	the	number	of	members	of	Congress	–	into	one	and	two‐
dimensional	spaces.	The	purpose	is	to	estimate	individual	policy	“ideal	points”	along	the	x‐axis	of	
an	x/y	graph.	The	position	of	the	ideal	point	on	the	x‐axis	represents	liberal,	moderate,	or	
conservative	ideology.	The	y‐axis	of	the	space	represents	salient	policy	issues	that	divide	
																																																								
6	Indeed,	the	most	serious	electoral	challenges	to	Republican	congressional	members	are	often	in	the	form	of	intraparty	primary	
challenges.		Thomas	E.	Mann	and	Norman	J.	Ornstein,	It’s	Even	Worse	Than	It	Looks:	How	The	American	Constitutional	System	
Collided	With	The	New	Politics	Of	Extremism	(USA,	Basic	Books,	2012)
3
legislators.	According	to	Poole	and	Rosenthal,	most	variation	in	ideal	points	are	described	by	the	
ideological	dimension	(x‐axis).	The	x‐axis	varies	from	‐1(most	liberal)	to	1	(most	conservative).	
This	research	expands	on	Poole	and	Rosenthal	by	estimating	the	policy	ideal	points	of	groups	in	
the	Washington	interest	group	universe.	By	treating	the	votes	that	the	groups	are	scoring	as	if	
the	groups	were	actual	voting	members	in	the	House,	the	NOMINATE	algorithm	can	be	used	to	
estimate	groups’	ideal	points	in	the	same	two‐dimensional	space.	This	approach	provides	an	
opportunity	to	better	understand	the	shape	of	the	interest	group	universe,	and	explore	the	
interaction	between	members	and	constellations	of	interests.	
Findings	and	Implications	
Interest	group	policy	preferences	are	similar	to	the	movement	of	individual	legislators’	
preferences.	Generally	speaking	two	things	stand	out	in	my	analysis:	1.	In	the	conservative	
hemisphere,	there	is	something	akin	to	a	“gravitational	pull”	led	by	interest	groups	“pulling”	
legislators	to	the	extreme	conservative	ideological	position;	2.	The	general	trend	across	the	x‐
axis	in	both	liberal	and	conservative	hemispheres’	is	rightward.		In	all	three	graphs	the	x‐axis	is	
the	ideological	spectrum	where	‐1	represents	the	extreme	liberal	position	and	1	represents	the	
extreme	conservative	position.	That	trend	is	reflected	in	the	interest	group	universe,	consistent	
with	the	Poole	and	Rosenthal	data	set	on	legislators’	movements,	and	suggests	that	perhaps	
interest	groups	are	exercising	a	gravitational	pull	on	legislators.	Figures	one	and	two	illustrate	
the	ideal	points	of	members	(blue	representing	Democrats	and	Red	representing	Republicans),	
along	with	the	ideal	points	of	prominent	interest	groups	that	score	congressional	votes.	The	
graphs	demonstrate	noticeable	rightward	movement	specifically	in	the	conservative	hemisphere,	
from	the	103rd	Congress	(Figure	1)	to	the	113th	Congress	(Figure	2).			 	
Figure	3	is	a	linear	representation	of	legislator	and	interest	group	movement	over	time:	
Recall	that	‐1	is	liberal,	0	is	moderate,	and	1	is	conservative	along	the	x‐axis.	Between	the	103rd
4
(1993‐1995)	and	112th	Congress	(2010‐2012),	the	figure	shows	House	Minority	Leader	Nancy	
Pelosi	move	from	a	substantially	liberal	‐.53	to	a	markedly	less	liberal	‐.40	on	the	x‐axis.	House	
Minority	Whip	Steny	Hoyer	moved	from	‐.36	to	‐.32.	For	conservatives,	House	Majority	Leader	
Eric	Cantor	moved	from	.67	to	.76	in	the	space	between	the	107th	and	112th	Congress.	In	the	
same	time	period,	House	Budget	Committee	Chair	Paul	Ryan	moved	from	.73	to	.87.	Notice	that	
conservative	leaders	in	the	House	generally	have	higher	ideological	numbers	–	those	between	‐1	
and	1	on	the	x‐axis	–	than	do	liberals.	Figures	1	and	2		uniquely	demonstrate	this	by	visualizing	
the	spread	along	the	ideological	x‐axis.	Interest	groups	in	the	conservative	hemisphere	largely	
bunch	in	the	extreme	conservative	position.		
At	minimum,	interest	group	movement	tracks	with	the	movements	of	legislators.	Interest	
groups	are	free	to	choose	their	“important	legislation”,	mostly	avoiding	the	constraints	and	
potential	contradictions	that	legislators	must	often	reconcile.	As	with	legislators’	movements,	
conservative	interest	groups	show	increasingly	rigid	ideological	extremity	over	time.	In	the	
interest	group	universe	and	on	a	scale	from	‐1	to	1,	the	liberal	Americans	for	Democratic	Action	
(ADA)	moved	from	‐.77	to	‐.74	between	the	103rd	and	111th	Congress.	The	AFL‐CIO	moved	from	a	
very	liberal	‐.75	to	a	much	less	liberal	‐.56	between	the	103rd	to	the	112th	Congress.	On	the	
conservative	side,	the	economically	oriented	Chamber	of	Commerce	(COC)	saw	rightward	
movement	from	.38	to	.47	from	the	103rd	to	the	112th	Congress	while	the	socially	oriented	
Christian	Coalition	(CC)	moved	from	.78	to	.91	over	the	same	time	period.	Most	strikingly,	the	
American	Conservative	Union	(ACU)	moved	from	.84	to	a	rigid	and	uncompromising	1	over	the	
same	time	period.	
Conclusion	
	
Increasingly	the	US	House	of	Representatives	is	a	dysfunctional	institution	characterized	
by	ideological	polarization	and	an	inability	to	fulfill	its	Constitutional	responsibilities.		Political
5
observers	suggest	that	interest	groups	contribute	to	the	current	gridlock.	This	research	seeks	to	
establish	a	means	of	mapping	the	interest	group	universe,	laying	the	foundation	for	
understanding	the	role	of	groups.	By	treating	interest	groups	as	legislators	I	used	an	established	
algorithm	to	calculate	policy	ideal	points	for	interest	groups.	The	results	suggest	several	things:	
1)	NOMINATE	can	successfully	be	used	to	characterize	the	policy	ideal	points	of	interest	groups;	2)	
That	the	interest	group	universe	has	changed	over	this	period,	with	interest	groups	migrating	to	
the	left	and	right,	with	the	rightward	movement	of	conservative	groups	being	more	pronounced;	
3)	Initial	results	suggest	that	Republican	members	have	been	particularly	responsive	to	the	
rightward	movement	of	the	conservative	constellation	of	interests.	
These	findings	have	important	implications	for	understanding	of	legislative	gridlock.		The	
movements	we	witnessed	are	generally	away	from	a	“pragmatic	center”	and	toward	extreme	
ideological	positions.	Interest	groups	are	protected	by	the	First	Amendment’s	protection	of	
speech,	and	the	right	of	the	people	to	petition	government.	We	cannot	restrict	attempts	by	
groups	to	influence	the	legislative	process.		Thus,	the	remedy	to	curbing	their	influence	likely	lies	
in	electoral	reform.	California	recently	amended	election	rules	to	prevent	partisans	from	
redrawing	electoral	districts	for	strategic	advantage.	This	tactic	makes	it	more	likely	that	
Democrats	and	Republicans	will	be	competitive	in	districts	previously	drawn	for	partisan	gain.	
Non‐partisan	electoral	redistricting	may	be	a	potential	solution	to	this	problem.	With	this	
research,	I	hope	to	make	strides	in	illuminating	the	power	of	interest	groups	in	the	hope	it	will	
translate	into	positive	electoral	reform.	From	here,	I	seek	to	extend	this	research	back	in	time,	
and	incorporate	the	US	Senate,	in	the	hope	that	a	large	body	of	research	on	the	increasingly	
powerful	role	of	interest	groups	will	garner	the	attention	it	deserves.
6
	
Figure	1:	Interest	Group	and	Legislator	Ideal	Points,	103rd	House	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
FCNL
PPAC
PCCW
LCV
ADA
ACU
AFL CIO
NEA
ACLU
USCoC
NFIB
NARAL
NRLC
FRC
CC
ASCASC
AAUW
NCSJL
103 House
1.0 0.5 0.5 1.0
1.0
0.5
0.5
1.0
7
	
Figure	2:	Interest	Group	and	Legislator	Ideal	Points,	112th	House	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
FCNL
PPAC
LCV
SEIU
ADA
ACU
AFL CIO
CAGW
NEA
Eagle
ACLU
CfG
USCoC
NAM
NFIB
NARAL
NRLC
FRC
JBS
CC
HRC
PA
ASC
CSP
Sierra
ASC
AAUW
NCSJL
AFSCME
GOA
ARA
PopConn
CGS
112 House
1.0 0.5 0.5 1.0
1.0
0.5
0.5
1.0
8
	
	
Figure	3:	Ideological	Movement	of	Legislators	and	Interest	Groups,	103rd	to	112th	
Congress

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