50592447 5-coverage-of-estrada-case

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A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC June 29, 2001
HERNANDO PEREZ, ET AL. vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, ET AL.
EN BANC
[A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC. June 29, 2001.]
RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE
PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG
PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners,
vs.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositors.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J p:
The travails of a deposed President continue. The Sandiganbayan reels to start hearing the criminal
charges against Mr. Joseph E. Estrada. Media seeks to cover the event via live television and live radio
broadcast and endeavors this Court to allow it that kind of access to the proceedings. aICHEc
On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing
duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter 1
requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other
criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to
assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." 2 The
request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 05 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still
later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. EcASIC
On 17 April 2001, the Honorable Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the instant petition, 3
submitting the following exegesis:
"3. The foregoing criminal cases involve the previous acts of the former highest official of the land,
members of his family, his cohorts and, therefore, it cannot be over emphasized that the prosecution
thereof, definitely involves a matter of public concern and interest, or a matter over which the entire
citizenry has the right to know, be informed and made aware of.

"4. There is no gainsaying that the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern, as in the instant cases, can best be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing the live
radio and television coverage of the concomitant court proceedings.
"5. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual
purpose of ensuring the desired transparency in the administration of justice in order to disabuse the
minds of the supporters of the past regime of any and all unfounded notions, or ill-perceived attempts on
the part of the present dispensation, to 'railroad' the instant criminal cases against the Former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada." 4
Public interest, the petition further averred, should be evident bearing in mind the right of the public to
vital information affecting the nation.
In effect, the petition seeks a re-examination of the 23rd October 1991 resolution of this Court in a case
for libel filed by then President Corazon C. Aquino. The resolution read:
"The records of the Constitutional Commission are bereft of discussion regarding the subject of cameras
in the courtroom. Similarly, Philippine courts have not had the opportunity to rule on the question
squarely.
"While we take notice of the September 1990 report of the United States Judicial Conference Ad Hoc
Committee on Cameras in the Courtroom, still the current rule obtaining in the Federal Courts of the
United States prohibits the presence of television cameras in criminal trials. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure forbids the taking of photographs during the progress of judicial proceedings or
radio broadcasting of such proceedings from the courtroom. A trial of any kind or in any court is a matter
of serious importance to all concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment. To so treat it
deprives the Court of the dignity which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious quest for
truth for which our judicial proceedings are formulated. cIHSTC
"Courts do not discriminate against radio and television media by forbidding the broadcasting or
televising of a trial while permitting the newspaper reporter access to the courtroom, since a television or
news reporter has the same privilege, as the news reporter is not permitted to bring his typewriter or
printing press into the courtroom. cDTCIA
"In Estes vs. Texas, the United States Supreme Court held that television coverage of judicial proceedings
involves an inherent denial of the due process rights of a criminal defendant. Voting 5-4, the Court
through Mr. Justice Clark, identified four (4) areas of potential prejudice which might arise from the
impact of the cameras on the jury, witnesses, the trial judge and the defendant. The decision in part
pertinently stated:
"'Experience likewise has established the prejudicial effect of telecasting on witnesses. Witnesses might
be frightened, play to the camera, or become nervous. They are subject to extraordinary out-of-court
influences which might affect their testimony. Also, telecasting not only increases the trial judge's
responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the defendant, it may as well affect his own performance.
Judges are human beings also and are subject to the same psychological reactions as laymen. For the
defendant, telecasting is a form of mental harassment and subjects him to excessive public exposure and
distracts him from the effective presentation of his defense.
'The television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused
and his case in the eyes of the public.'
"Representatives of the press have no special standing to apply for a writ of mandate to compel a court to
permit them to attend a trial, since within the courtroom, a reporter's constitutional rights are no greater
than those of any other member of the public. Massive intrusion of representatives of the news media into
the trial itself can so alter or destroy the constitutionally necessary judicial atmosphere and decorum that
the requirements of impartiality imposed by due process of law are denied the defendant and a defendant

in a criminal proceeding should not be forced to run a gauntlet of reporters and photographers each time
he enters or leaves the courtroom.
"Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process as well as to the fair and orderly
administration of justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the people
to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio
and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video footages of court hearings for
news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties
and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or photographs
shall be permitted during the trial proper.
"Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the
participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved
to PROHIBIT live radio and television coverage of court proceedings. Video footages of court hearings
for news purposes shall be limited and restricted as above indicated."
Admittedly, the press is a mighty catalyst in awakening public consciousness, and it has become an
important instrument in the quest for truth. 5 Recent history exemplifies media's invigorating presence,
and its contribution to society is quite impressive. The Court, just recently, has taken judicial notice of the
enormous effect of media in stirring public sentience during the impeachment trial, a partly judicial and
partly political exercise, indeed the most-watched program in the boob-tubes during those times, that
would soon culminate in EDSA II. aECTcA
The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the
fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to
control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. 6
When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence 7 tells us that the right of the accused must be
preferred to win.
With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an accused, it behooves
all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict solely on the basis of a just and
dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come only after the presentation of credible evidence
testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether open or subtle, in
proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free
from improper influence, 8 and decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by running
emotions or passions.
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that
is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of public's attention 9 and where the
conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence 10 but only by evidence and
argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded. SEIaHT
Witnesses and judges may very well be men and women of fortitude, able to thrive in hardy climate, with
every reason to presume firmness of mind and resolute endurance, but it must also be conceded that
"television can work profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on." 11 Even while it may
be difficult to quantify the influence, or pressure that media can bring to bear on them directly and
through the shaping of public opinion, it is a fact, nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so many ways
and in varying degrees. The conscious or unconscious effect that such a coverage may have on the
testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not
at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it. 12 It might be farcical to build around them an
impregnable armor against the influence of the most powerful media of public opinion. 13

To say that actual prejudice should first be present would leave to near nirvana the subtle threats to justice
that a disturbance of the mind so indispensable to the calm and deliberate dispensation of justice can
create. 14 The effect of television may escape the ordinary means of proof, but it is not far-fetched for it
to gradually erode our basal conception of a trial such as we know it now. 15
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where
his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with
and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of
long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must
be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and
observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a
reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness
negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then
be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings. 16
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public
information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive
means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public with the judicial process
in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of
the accused to due process 17 which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional
proportions. Justice Clark thusly pronounced, "while a maximum freedom must be allowed the press in
carrying out the important function of informing the public in a democratic society, its exercise must
necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial process." 18
This Court, in the instance 19 already mentioned, citing Estes vs. Texas, 20 the United States Supreme
Court holding the television coverage of judicial proceedings as an inherent denial of due process rights of
an accused, also identified the following as being likely prejudices: STaCIA
"1. The potential impact of television . . . is perhaps of the greatest significance. . . . From the moment
the trial judge announces that a case will be televised it becomes a cause célèbre. The whole community, .
. . becomes interested in all the morbid details surrounding it. The approaching trial immediately assumes
an important status in the public press and the accused is highly publicized along with the offense with
which he is charged. Every juror carries with him into the jury box these solemn facts and thus increases
the chance of prejudice that is present in every criminal case. . . .
"2. The quality of the testimony in criminal trials will often be impaired. The impact upon a witness of
the knowledge that he is being viewed by a vast audience is simply incalculable. Some may be
demoralized and frightened, some cocky and given to overstatement; memories may falter, as with anyone
speaking publicly, and accuracy of statement may be severely undermined. . . .. Indeed, the mere fact that
the trial is to be televised might render witnesses reluctant to appear and thereby impede the trial as well
as the discovery of the truth.
"3. A major aspect of the problem is the additional responsibilities the presence of television places on
the trial judge. His job is to make certain that the accused receives a fair trial. This most difficult task
requires his undivided attention. . .
"4. Finally, we cannot ignore the impact of courtroom television on the defendant. Its presence is a
form of mental — if not physical — harassment, resembling a police line-up or the third degree. The
inevitable close-up of his gestures and expressions during the ordeal of his trial might well transgress his
personal sensibilities, his dignity, and his ability to concentrate on the proceedings before him —
sometimes the difference between life and death — dispassionately, freely and without the distraction of
wide public surveillance. A defendant on trial for a specific crime is entitled to his day in court, not in a

stadium, or a city or nationwide arena. The heightened public clamor resulting from radio and television
coverage will inevitably result in prejudice."
In his concurring opinion in Estes, Mr. Justice Harlan opined that live television and radio coverage could
have mischievous potentialities for intruding upon the detached atmosphere that should always surround
the judicial process. 21
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in its Resolution of 16 April 2001, expressed its own concern on
the live television and radio coverage of the criminal trials of Mr. Estrada; to paraphrase: Live television
and radio coverage can negate the rule on exclusion of witnesses during the hearings intended to assure a
fair trial; at stake in the criminal trial is not only the life and liberty of the accused but the very credibility
of the Philippine criminal justice system, and live television and radio coverage of the trial could allow
the "hooting throng" to arrogate unto themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused, such that the
verdict of the court will be acceptable only if popular; and live television and radio coverage of the trial
will not subserve the ends of justice but will only pander to the desire for publicity of a few grandstanding
lawyers.
It may not be unlikely, if the minority position were to be adopted, to see protracted delays in the
prosecution of cases before trial courts brought about by petitions seeking a declaration of mistrial on
account of undue publicity and assailing a court a quo's action either allowing or disallowing live media
coverage of the court proceedings because of supposed abuse of discretion on the part of the judge.
En passant, the minority would view the ponencia as having modified the case law on the matter. Just to
the contrary, the Court effectively reiterated its standing resolution of 23 October 1991. Until 1991, the
Court had yet to establish the case law on the matter, and when it did in its 23rd October resolution, it
confirmed, in disallowing live television and radio coverage of court proceedings, that "the records of the
Constitutional Commission (were) bereft of discussion regarding the subject of cameras in the courtroom"
and that "Philippine courts (had) not (theretofore) had the opportunity to rule on the question squarely."
But were the cases decided by the U.S. courts and cited in the minority opinion really in point? SDaHEc
In Nebraska Press Association vs. Stewart, 22 the Nebraska State trial judge issued an order restraining
news media from publishing accounts of confession or admissions made by the accused or facts strongly
implicating him. The order was struck down. In Richmond Newspaper, Inc., vs. Virginia, 23 the trial
judge closed the courtroom to the public and all participants except witnesses when they testify. The
judge was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court which ruled that criminal trials were historically open. In
Globe Newspaper vs. Superior Court, 24 the US Supreme Court voided a Massachusetts law that required
trial judges to exclude the press and the public from the courtroom during the testimony of a minor victim
of certain sexual offenses.
Justice Stewart, in Chandler vs. Florida, 25 where two police officers charged with burglary sought to
overturn their conviction before the US Supreme Court upon the ground that the television coverage had
infringed their right to fair trial explained that "the constitutional violation perceived by the Estes Court
did not stem from the physical disruption that might one day disappear with technological advances in the
television equipment but inhered, rather, in the hypothesis that the mere presence of cameras and
recording devices might have an effect on the trial participants prejudicial to the accused." 26
Parenthetically, the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts do not allow live television and
radio coverage of their proceedings.
The sad reality is that the criminal cases presently involved are of great dimensions so involving as they
do a former President of the Republic. It is undeniable that these cases have twice become the nation's
focal points in the two conflicting phenomena of EDSA II and EDSA III where the magnitude of the
events has left a still divided nation. Must these events be invited anew and risk the relative stability that
has thus far been achieved? The transcendental events in our midst do not allow us to turn a blind eye to

yet another possible extraordinary case of mass action being allowed to now creep into even the business
of the courts in the dispensation of justice under a rule of law. At the very least, a change in the standing
rule of the court contained in its resolution of 23 October 1991 may not appear to be propitious. aEIcHA
Unlike other government offices, courts do not express the popular will of the people in any sense which,
instead, are tasked to only adjudicate justiciable controversies on the basis of what alone is submitted
before them. 27 A trial is not a free trade of ideas. Nor is a competing market of thoughts the known test
of truth in a courtroom. 28
The Court is not all that unmindful of recent technological and scientific advances but to chance forthwith
the life or liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets are
provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J ., is on leave.
Mendoza, J ., I concur in the majority opinion of Vitug, J., and join the separate opinion of Kapunan J.
Separate Opinions
KAPUNAN, J., concurring:
Of course freedom of speech and of the press are essential to the enlightenment of a free people and in
restraining those who wield power. Particularly should this freedom be employed in comment upon the
work of courts who are without many influences ordinarily making for humor and humility, twin
antidotes to the corrosion of power. But the Bill of Rights is not self-destructive. Freedom of expression
can hardly carry implications that nullify the guarantees of impartial trials. And since the courts are the
ultimate resorts for vindicating the Bill of Rights, a state may surely authorize appropriate historic means
to assure that the process for such vindication be not wrenched from its rational tracks into the more
primitive mêlée of passion and pressure. The need is great that courts be criticized but just as great that
they be allowed to do their duty. ICaDHT
— Bridges v. California
314 US 252, 284
In their separate petitions, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas and the Secretary of Justice
Hernando B. Perez would want this Court to allow live radio and television coverage of the court hearings
on the plunder and other criminal cases filed against Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al.
pending before the Sandiganbayan.
In support of their request, they invoke the constitutional guarantees on the right of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern as well as the freedoms of speech and the press including the right
to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship:
xxx xxx xxx
3. The foregoing criminal cases involve the previous acts of the former highest official of the land,
members of his family, his cohorts and, therefore, it cannot be over emphasized that the prosecution
thereof, definitely involves a matter of public concern and interest, or a matter over which the entire
citizenry has the right to know, be informed and made aware of.
4. There is no gainsaying that the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern, as in the instant cases, can best be recognized, served and satisfied by allowing the live
radio and television coverage of the concomitant court proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx 1
Mr. Estrada, in his Comment on the petitions, expressed his opposition to the proposed live television and
radio coverage of his trial arguing that such coverage would be prejudicial to his right to fair trial because

radio and television as media can be easily manipulated for propaganda purposes; such coverage will play
to the gallery; it may lead to the possibility that the trial court may be ultimately influenced by what sits
well with the public; its rulings and decisions may take into account what will please the crowd; it would
"allow live play-by-play annotation of the hearings by people on radio and television with varying degrees
of expertise and biases, in seeming mockery of the sub judice rule"; 2 and that "it was the live TV
coverage which ignited EDSA II." 3
For its part, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) likewise has taken the stand against the live
broadcast coverage of criminal proceedings for the following reasons:
1. Live TV and radio coverage will negate the rule on exclusion of witnesses during the hearings
intended to assure a fair trial.
2. At stake in the criminal trial is not only the life and liberty of the accused but the very credibility
of the Philippine criminal justice system. Live TV and radio coverage of the trial will allow the 'hooting
throng' to arrogate unto themselves the task of judging the guilt or innocence of the accused, such that the
verdict of the court will be acceptable only if popular.
3. Live TV and radio coverage of the trial will not subserve the ends of justice but will only pander
to the desire for publicity of few grandstanding lawyers. Instead of promoting the ends of justice, live TV
and radio coverage will become the very instrument to distract litigants and judges, expose the judges to
undue public scrutiny and pressure every step of the way, and undermine the integrity of the
Sandiganbayan.
xxx xxx xxx 4
I do not find merit in the petitions.
In a clash between the rights to free speech, free press and of access to information on matters of public
concern, and the right to a fair trial, the right of the accused should be the utmost concern of the Court.
TaDCEc
The instant petitions, if granted, would throw overboard a well-established. policy that considers such live
radio and television coverage not only as prejudicial to the defendant's right to due process, but also as
inimical to the fair and orderly administration of justice. In its Resolution, dated October 22, 1991, this
Court laid down the guidelines for broadcast media coverage of courtroom trials, to wit:
. . . Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process as well as to the fair and
orderly administration of justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the
people to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means,
live radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video footages of court
hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers,
the parties and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or
photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.
The restrictions set forth in our Resolution of October 22, 1991, have remained sound and valid. I cannot
find a rational basis to change the rule at this time, simply to suit the prosecution in the cases against Ex-
President Estrada.
While the rights to press freedom and to information on matters of public concern are constitutionally
protected 5 in acknowledgment of media's role as a potent catalyst in increasing public awareness and
interest in governmental affairs as well as other significant events and occurrences, including court
proceedings, 6 and of the importance of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy, these are
not absolute and must be taken hand-in-hand with other public interests. In weighing the freedoms of
speech and the press and the right to public information, on one hand, and the right of the accused to a fair
trial, on the other, the balance is never weighed against the accused. 7

It must be made clear that there is no curtailment nor substantial diminution of the rights to free press and
to information on matters of public concern brought about by the prohibition on live radio and television
coverage of court proceedings. These rights remain amply protected even with the existence of such
prohibition. In the criminal cases against Mr. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan, the press can still report
on the proceedings being conducted therein. Media outfits can send their representatives to the trials and
make their reports and comments thereon to their viewers or listeners. What is not allowed is for them to
bring inside the courtroom their broadcasting equipment that would tend to hamper the orderly
administration of justice. As aptly observed by Chief Justice Warren in his concurring opinion in Estes: 8
Television is one of the great inventions of all time and can perform a large and useful role in society. But
the television camera, like other technological innovations, is not entitled to pervade the lives of everyone
in disregard of constitutionally protected rights. The television industry, like other institutions, has a
proper area of activities and limitations beyond which it cannot go with its cameras. That area does not
extend into an [American] courtroom. On entering that hallowed sanctuary, where the lives, liberty and
property of people are in jeopardy, television representatives have only the rights of the general public,
namely, to be present, to observe the proceedings, and thereafter, if they choose, to report them. 9
It bears emphasizing that the right to a public trial belongs first and foremost to the accused. Said right
requires that proceedings be open to the public to ensure that the accused is fairly dealt with and not
unjustly condemned. 10 The openness of a trial safeguards against attempts to employ the courts as
instruments of persecution since it induces all the participants therein, e.g. judge, lawyers, witnesses, to
perform their duties conscientiously, and provides the public with an opportunity to observe the events
therein. 11 However, a public trial is not to be equated with a "publicized trial," one characterized by
pervasive adverse publicity that violates the accused's constitutional right to due process. ASTcaE
That the live broadcast coverage of the criminal proceedings may undermine the right of the accused to a
fair trial cannot be ignored. Undoubtedly, television is one of the most powerful sources of information
and news in our society. However, it is also one of the most manipulative. 12 It can, intentionally or
inadvertently, destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of the public. 13 It cannot deny the accused of
his right to due process, including the right to a fair trial. 14
Television does not simply mirror or reflect events as they unfold. The images transmitted onscreen are
the end products of a series of technical modifications employed by television editors and cameramen.
Editors may eliminate or cut certain scenes of a trial in order to appeal to a mass audience. Cameramen
may also manipulate what the public sees through the use of space, camera angles, lighting, juxtaposition,
and editing techniques, thereby limiting the public's perception of the events being covered. Sadly, the
public in general lack an understanding of how these tools work and more often than not fail to realize the
distorting effects of these devices executed by an experienced cameraman. 15
The negative effects that live television coverage of criminal proceedings may have thereon may even
exceed those resulting from the biases created in the mind of the viewers from watching the images
appearing onscreen. It is not unlikely that the television stations may decide that the trial itself does not
contain sufficient drama to sustain an audience and thus provide "expert commentary" on the proceedings
by hiring persons with legal backgrounds to anticipate possible trial strategy, in the same manner as a
basketball expert anticipates plays for his audience. 16 Arguably, this may be beneficial in the sense that
the viewing public is offered guidance in understanding the events that transpire at a court proceeding.
However, it cannot be denied that such live commentaries may intensify the biases shaped by the images
of the trial on television, or worse, create wrong impressions in the viewers' minds. The same might also
subvert our sub judice rule that media should refrain from publishing or airing comments regarding a
pending case.

The transmission of edited images on television or the accompanying commentaries are not the only
possible sources of bias which may unduly influence the outcome of a trial. The mere presence of the
television camera inside the courtroom also inevitably affects the proceedings being covered for television
can work profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on. 17
A study explained the effects of the presence television cameras inside the courtroom on the witnesses in
this wise:
The marketing consciousness of witnesses increases with the awareness of being on national or global
television. There is a risk that a witness will alter his story in order to appeal to the television audience
instead of fulfilling his evidentiary role. His testimony becomes more important for its entertainment
value which may cause embellishment of certain aspects of his testimony. Many people dream of
becoming a celebrity, and for many witnesses, this may be their only opportunity to shine in the limelight.
This consciousness poses a danger of improper and inaccurate testimony. . . . 18
Even the behavior of lawyers may be influenced by the fact that their case is being covered by live
television:
In addition, cameras pose a risk that lawyers will modify their roles. In a televised trial, the public
becomes an extrajudicial audience that they must persuade. Lawyers may become preoccupied with the
cameras which interferes with their devoting full attention to the fact-finder at trial. As a result, some-
lawyers direct at least part of their case to the television viewers instead of fully representing their clients
to the presiding judge and the jury. Lawyers are motivated to present themselves well in they eyes of the
public. In a highly televised trial, the marketing consciousness of lawyers may be affected. There is a
danger that the media's production of the trial may transform into an excellent opportunity for the lawyers
to gain free personal advertisement. 19
The presence of television cameras inside the courtroom also places additional responsibilities on the trial
judge. In addition to his duties of listening to the testimonies of the witnesses, receiving documentary and
object evidence, ruling on motions and objections and ensuring that the accused receives a fair trial, he
must also supervise the television crew present in his courtroom 20 to make sure that they do not disrupt
the proceedings. Even the behavior of the judges themselves may be unduly influenced by such media
presence, for although they are supposed to be more impervious to external pressures with respect to the
cases pending before them, they still experience the same psychological reactions as laymen.
Judges and justices are also human beings. They cannot remain oblivious to the pressures that media can
bear on them both directly and in the shaping of public opinion. Thus, any occasion that would give the
impression that in rendering judgment, the judge was swayed by public opinion or any other factor
extraneous to the evidence at hand should be avoided. As Chief Justice Taft in Tumey vs. Ohio 21
eloquently put it: ADHcTE
. . . the requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not satisfied by the argument that men
of the highest honor and the greatest self-sacrifice could carry it on without danger of injustice. Every
procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man . . . to forget the burden of proof
required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true
between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law. 22
Further, the negative impact of live broadcast media coverage of the trial on the accused is not
inconsequential:
. . . Its presence is a form of mental — if not physical — harassment, resembling a police line-up or the
third degree. The inevitable close-ups of his gestures and expressions during the ordeal of his trial might
well transgress his personal sensibilities, his dignity, and his ability to concentrate on the proceedings
before him — sometimes the difference between life and death — dispassionately, freely and without the

distraction of wide public surveillance. A defendant on trial for a specific crime is entitled to his day in
court, not in a stadium, or a city or nationwide arena. . . 23
There are those who believe that live media coverage would enhance the fair and orderly administration
of justice. However, this belief ignores the fact that the behavior of the participants of the proceedings,
e.g., lawyers and witnesses, may be unnaturally affected by their knowledge that their actions and
testimonies are recorded on live television and radio. This was particularly observed by a law professor in
the O.J. Simpson criminal trial in the United States:
Within the Simpson criminal trial, most of the media's participant-observer glitches were attributable to
the real-time electronic media broadcast of the proceedings on a gavel-to-gavel basis, especially by
television camera. As Ellis Cose opined, "Many journalists and others idealistically believed that televised
trials would enhance the quality of justice and increase general knowledge about the courts by providing
public oversight not previously available. Unfortunately, this was not the case. Television did not deter
lying witnesses; instead it rendered many truthful ones nervous and inarticulate.
Television provided the temptation, and the opportunity, for media-savvy lawyers and a media-conscious
judge to sell their respective cases not merely to the jury, but literally to the world. The camera in this
case and in this courtroom proved to be a world class platform for rhetorician, a snare for the unwary, a
seducer and mirror to the vain, an indiscriminate and often harsh recorder of humor, wit, guile, trickery,
and lies, and the transmitter to the world of both excellent and poor lawyering on both sides. 24
It is argued that the ruling in Estes vs. Texas 25 that radio and television coverage infringes upon the
accused's right to a fair trial has been abandoned in Chandler vs. Florida 26 where the U.S. Supreme
Court said:
An absolute constitutional ban on broadcast coverage of trials cannot be justified simply because there is a
danger that, in some cases, prejudicial broadcast accounts of pre-trial and trial events may impair the
ability of jurors to decide the issue of guilt or innocence uninfluenced by extraneous matter. The risk of
juror prejudice in some cases does not justify an absolute ban on news coverage of trials by the printed
media; so also the risk of such prejudice does not warrant an absolute constitutional ban on all broadcast
coverage. The appropriate safeguard against such prejudice is the defendant's right to demonstrate that the
media's coverage of his case — be it printed or broadcast — compromised the ability of the particular jury
that heard the case to adjudicate fairly. 27
It should be pointed out that there are no television cameras permitted in federal courts in the United
States 28 despite experiments with their use. In contrast, there is no constitutional impediment to the use
of television cameras in state courts, provided they do not distract the jurors and witnesses, or unduly
burden the judge, thereby depriving the defendant of a fair trial. 29
It is evident that our policy banning live radio and television coverage of criminal proceedings is the same
as that provided in U.S. federal courts. There is no convincing reason that the practice in some state courts
is better than that followed in the federal courts concerning the banning of such radio and television
coverage. CcaASE
In any event, Chandler would necessarily imply that if the defendant's right to fair trial is compromised by
the broadcast coverage, then the ban should be imposed. Here, the fears expressed by Mr. Estrada and the
IBP should live radio and television be allowed to cover his trial are not without bases. The pervasive
radio and television coverage of Mr. Estrada's impeachment hearing and of his arrest appear to have
moved the crowd to march in the so-called EDSA II and EDSA III mass actions that toppled a
government and tried to topple another.
With due respect, I doubt the efficacy of the measures suggested by the dissenting opinions to ensure fair
trial in a criminal proceeding covered by live radio and television. These are: (1) no witness can be
compelled to have his testimony televised; (2) the cameras and other equipment must be placed in the

courtroom in such a manner as to be unobtrusive, possibly only a single fixed camera be installed in the
courtroom to feed the broadcast stations; (3) no film, videotape, photography and audio reproductions
may be used for advertising and commercial purposes, and (4) the radio and television broadcasters
should give a balanced coverage of the prosecution and the defense. 30
It is not merely the obtrusive location in the courtroom of the cameras or their effects on the decorum,
solemnity and dignity of the court that impinges on the accused's right to a fair trial. It is the beaming of
or transmission of all events, testimonies and faces inside the courtroom directly to the viewing public,
including, the milling crowd outside the court's premises, coupled with the running accounts of the
proceedings by the radio and television networks, which may be slanted or distorted by bias, self-interests
and hate, thus whipping up passion and rage among the viewers, that offends the right of the accused to a
fair trial. Depending upon the mood of the crowd, whether approving or threatening, witnesses may
exaggerate, hesitate, backtrack or cower.
The judge has no immediate-control over how the film, videotapes, etc. are used, whether for advertising
or commercial purposes, although he may later on impose sanctions for their misuse, but then the
deleterious effects to a fair trial are beyond recall.
Further, how can the court enforce guidelines that radio and television broadcasts should give a balanced
coverage of the prosecution and the defense? Even if the courts rulings over the proposed guidelines are
promptly made, they are subject to appeal, thus possibly delaying the court proceedings over collateral
matters. And even if the trial should proceed and the accused convicted pending appeal on the court's
rulings, the accused may seek the reversal of said conviction on the ground of mistrial due to the
deprivation of his right to due process. The damage then to all concerned is irreparable.
I believe that the present prohibition on the live radio and television coverage of court proceedings strikes
the balance between the rights to free speech and press and to information on matters of public concern,
and the accused's right to a fair trial, and remains to be the practical rule on the matter.
Finally, as I have earlier stressed, recent history has shown that television broadcasts of significant
national events have a strong tendency to incite pent-up emotions and feelings of an emotional populace.
Undeniably, the events that occurred on January 16, 2001 which led to the abrupt conclusion of Mr.
Estrada's impeachment trial, witnessed by thousands of viewers on their television screens, triggered
EDSA II. In the same manner, the broadcast coverage of Mr. Estrada's arrest caused pro-Estrada groups to
express their outrage at EDSA III. caSEAH
It is not unlikely that the televised coverage of Mr. Estrada's trial would induce either or both of these
groups to again resort to demonstrations aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to come up with a verdict
favorable to them. Any attempt to pressure or interfere with the judicial process should be avoided, for
court proceedings are not like elections, to be won through the use of the meeting hall, the radio, and the
newspaper. 31 The nature of judicial proceedings requires that the conclusions to be reached in a case will
be induced only by evidence, and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence. 32
Our nation has only begun the reconciliation process between the pro- and anti-Estrada groups.
Broadcasting Mr. Estrada's trial would only ignite the spark that brought forth EDSA II and EDSA III and
resurrect the division between these groups.
I vote to DENY the petitions.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., concurring:
The ponencia of Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, and that of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, to which I
concur, easily join the rank of the well-written opinions in Constitutional law. Incisive in their analysis,
realistic in their approach, and instructive in their rationalization, there is so much in them to which any
concurrence may easily yield.

Enshrined in our Constitution is the mandate that "[N]o person shall be deprived of his life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law." 1
This stands as a guaranty to every man's civil liberties regardless of his race, sex, character, station in life,
and reputation. 2
I believe that to allow the live television coverage of Mr. Joseph Ejercito Estrada's trial in the
Sandiganbayan will violate his right to equal protection of the law, to due process and to a fair and
impartial hearing. Not even the other constitutionally-guaranteed rights, such as the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern, to free speech and to a free press, can serve as more weighty
justifications. HSaEAD
Equal protection is afforded in a criminal proceeding where the trial is conducted fairly and impartially in
the same manner and under the same procedure as all other people are tried within the state. 3 In the
myriad of criminal cases that passed our trial courts, this is only the second time that the issue of the
propriety of a televised trial is directly raised. In the first instance, this Court prohibited the live radio and
television coverage of a criminal proceeding in order to protect the parties' right to due process, to prevent
the distraction of the proceedings and to avoid a miscarriage of justice. 4 I see no reason why the case of
Mr. Estrada should be treated differently.
I do not discount the claim of the proponents of the televised trial that the people has the right to
information on matters of public concern. But I am convinced that such right cannot be given preference
over the right of an accused to a fair and impartial trial. To my mind, the fair administration of criminal
justice cannot be subordinated to the people's right to information, particularly in the present case, where
what at stake is the life of an individual.
The job of the judiciary is not to teach the public of its inner workings but to preserve fairness within the
system. 5 No empirical evidence exists which indicates that televised criminal proceedings broaden the
public's understanding of the judiciary. 6 The New York University conducted a study following an
enactment of legislation prescribing an eighteen-month experimental period of televising criminal trials. 7
The results indicated that viewing criminal trials had virtually no effect on the level of the public
understanding of even the most rudimentary aspects of court proceedings.
The fact that the accused held the highest position in the land is significant. As a matter of fact, his stature
strongly justifies the denial of the request for a televised trial. To be sure, even before the camera starts
moving, the case would have already achieved a sensational status. When a case is sensationalized, there
is a greater difficulty in safeguarding the rights of the accused, particularly, his right to due process, which
basically requires that the court trying the case should be impartial, 8 free from outside pressure and
interference. The presence of news media can deny a defendant that " judicial serenity and calm" which
due process of law guarantees. This should not be allowed. Every person accused of a crime is entitled to
a fair and impartial trial in which his legal rights are protected, 9 that is, a trial of facts, in accordance with
the law and the evidence before an unbiased tribunal, in an atmosphere free from harmful error and from
any extraneous influence that might be to his prejudice. The Supreme Court of the United States gives this
right a ringing tone of support in its numerous decisions. Thus, in Irvin v. Dowd, 10 the defendant was
convicted of murder following intensive and hostile news coverage. On review, the Court vacated the
conviction and death sentence and remanded the case to the court a quo to allow a new trial for "[w]ith his
life at stake, it is not requiring too much that petitioner be tried in an atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a
wave of public passion . . . " Similarly. in Rideau v. Lousiana 11 , the Court reversed the conviction of a
defendant whose staged, highly emotional confession had been filmed with the cooperation of local police
and later broadcast on television for three days while he was awaiting trial holding: "[a]ny subsequent
court proceedings in a community so pervasively exposed to such a spectacle could be but a hallow
formality. "

In Estes v. Texas, 12 the Court ruled that the defendant had not been afforded due process where the
volume of trial publicity, the judge's failure to control the proceedings, the telecast of the hearing and the
trial itself "inherently prevented a sober search for the truth." It was further held that the televising of
"notorious" criminal trials is prohibited by the "due process of law." 13 Justice Harlan, supplying the
winning vote, agreed but only because the Estes trial was one of " great notoriety." He made clear that he
would reserve judgment on more routine cases. 14
In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 15 with only Mr. Justice Black dissenting, the Court ordered a new trial for the
petitioner, even though the first trial had occurred 12 years before. The Court noted that "unfair and
prejudicial news comment on pending trial has become increasingly prevalent" and issued a strong
warning, thus: aICcHA
". . . Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences.
Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity
from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never
weighed against the accused. . . . If publicity during the proceedings threatens the fairness of the trial, a
new trial should be ordered. But we must remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those
remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. The courts must take such steps by rule
and regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside interference. Neither prosecutors,
counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under the
jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its function. Collaboration between the counsel
and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation,
but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures." (Emphasis supplied)
In KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Arizona Superior Court, 16 the said US Supreme Court ruled that courts
"may insist that the only performance which goes on in the courtroom is the trial of the case at hand." The
Court said further that "the fact that media coverage has transformed events such as professional sports
contests into a framework designed to accommodate that coverage does not mean that the First
Amendment requires criminal trials to undergo the same transformation." In reaching these conclusions,
the Court addressed the importance of a trial with no outside distractions. While the Court recognizes the
media's right to freedom of the press within the First Amendment, it also recognizes the right of a court to
close its doors. The Court condemns the transformation of a criminal trial into a spectacle created by
intense media coverage.
In the Philippines, the legal aspect of prejudicial publicity through television has not yet been fully
considered. To reiterate, the last time this Court directly came across with such an issue was on October
22, 1991, in "Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquino's Libel
Case." Relying on Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the case of Estes v. Texas, this
Court issued an En Banc Resolution on the said date prohibiting the live radio and television coverage of
court proceedings.
I see no justification to modify the said Resolution. It was relevant then as it is now.
Moreover, to allow media coverage of the Estrada trial would be to open a veritable Pandora's box of
afflictions which will stymie the judiciary's efforts to make certain that the administration of justice is
effected with equanimity, speed and judiciousness. To be sure, our ruling will apply to all lower courts,
including the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Appeals. Therefore, we should not be overly swayed by the
passing passions generated by the Estrada cases into promulgating a doctrine which this Court will rue in
its supervision of lower courts and in the exercise of its own original and appellate jurisdiction.
Assuming that this Court authorizes the desired media coverage, will it be fair to the Sandiganbayan
Justices concerned to subject them to the massive and unfair scolding of what Estrada's counsel calls "a

by and large hostile and at times cruel media?" Criticism and ridicule will likely arise from members of
the media unfamiliar with the technical rules of the legal profession. ETDHSa
I submit that live TV coverage will not assist the Sandiganbayan in its duty to be temperate, attentive and
impartial during the proceedings. Quite the contrary, live TV coverage will divert the attention of the
Sandiganbayan from the testimonies of witnesses and serious arguments of counsel, thus affecting the
court's understanding of the case.
The same adverse effects are true insofar as the lawyers are concerned. The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines states that live coverage will only pander to the desire for publicity of a few grandstanding
lawyers. Ever conscious of the instant public reaction, the Sandiganbayan may hesitate to correct the
highly unprofessional conduct of a popular attorney.
More importantly, the general public is unaware of procedural rules. If the Sandiganbayan's rulings are
adverse to their expectations, this may start another massive action which may culminate to an "EDSA
IV." Needless to state, the effects are disastrous to the nation.
In sum, the theory that televising the trial ensures that justice is served is not true. With intense coverage,
the media becomes less of a defensive force against injustice and more of an offensive force by
intimidating witnesses, distracting the lawyers and distorting the unfolding drama in the courtroom. 17 It
gives rise to prejudiced opinion and publicity and creates bias and sometimes confusion among the
people. All these factors definitely render the accused's right to a fair and impartial trial illusory. Thus,
until and unless the media can secure the rights of the accused and eliminate all the adverse effects,
specifically on the general public, the television should remain outside the courtroom.
PUNO, J., dissenting:
On March 13, 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas, thru its President, Mr. Ruperto S.
Nicdao, Jr., wrote to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., "to be allowed the privileged (sic) of covering
the anticipated trials in the Sandiganbayan of the plunder cases against former President Joseph E.
Estrada." On April 3, 2001, the Court, among others, required Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena of
the Sandiganbayan to comment on the request.
On April 5, 2001, Mr. Cesar N. Sarino wrote a similar letter to the Chief Justice requesting ". . . the
Supreme Court to allow live television coverage of the trial" of former President Estrada. On April 16,
2001, Senator Renato Cayetano also prayed for the live coverage by media of the said trial subject to the
conditions that the Supreme Court may impose. On the same date, the integrated Bar of the Philippines,
thru its President, Arthur D. Lim, opposed the live radio-TV coverage of said trial.
On April 17, 2001, Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez also filed a petition "for live radio and
television coverage" of the said cases "subject to whatever guidelines the Honorable Supreme Court may
provide under the premises. The petition carried the conformity of the Honorable Aniano A. Desierto,
Ombudsman. On April 24, 2001, the same request for live media coverage was made by a group of
businessmen led by Atty. Ricardo Romulo of the Makati Business Club.
On April 30, 2001, Presiding Justice Garchitorena submitted his Comment. He informed the Court that he
sought the opinion of the other members of the Sandiganbayan. He stated that six (6) of the Justices of the
Sandiganbayan were against the radio-TV coverage while eight (8) were in favor. He submitted their
varying views for the consideration of this Court.
On May 4, 2001, the Court required former President Estrada to comment on the petition of the Secretary
of Justice. On May 21, 2001 former President Estrada, thru counsel, opposed the petition for live radio-
TV coverage of his trials in the Sandiganbayan. He cited the need to preserve the rule of law and warned
that "radio and television as media can be easily manipulated for propaganda purposes." He alleged that
"the communicative effect of live TV and radio coverage is much greater than print coverage" and "the
freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded in

newspaper and print media." The opposition was fortified by a Supplemental Comment filed on May 30,
2001.
The Court's en banc resolution of October 22, 1991 absolutely prohibits live TV and radio coverage of
court hearings. Its rationale is explained, thus: IDCcEa
"While we take notice of the September 1990 report of the United States Judicial Conference Ad Hoc
Committee on Cameras in the Courtroom, still the current rule obtaining in the Federal Courts of the
United States prohibits the presence of television cameras in criminal trials. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure forbids the taking of photographs during the progress of judicial proceedings or
radio broadcasting of such proceedings from the courtroom. A trial of any kind or in any court is a matter
of serious importance to all concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment. To so treat it
deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious quest for
truth for which our judicial proceedings are formulated.
Courts do not discriminate against radio and television media by forbidding the broadcasting or televising
of a trial while permitting the newspaper reporter access to the courtroom, since a television or news
reporter has the same privilege, as the news reporter is not permitted to bring his typewriter or printing
press into the courtroom.
In Estes vs. Texas, the United States Supreme Court held that television coverage of judicial proceedings
involves an inherent denial of the due process rights of a criminal defendant. Voting 5-4, the Court
through Mr. Justice Clark, identified four (4) areas of potential prejudice which might arise from the
impact of the cameras on the jury, witnesses, the trial judge and the defendant. The decision in part
pertinently stated:
'Experience likewise has established the prejudicial effect of telecasting on witnesses. Witnesses might be
frightened, play to the camera, or become nervous. They are subject to extraordinary out-of-court
influences which might affect their testimony. Also, telecasting not only increases the trial judge's
responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the defendant, it may as well affect his own performance.
Judges are human beings also and are subject to the same psychological reactions as laymen. For the
defendant, telecasting is a form of mental harassment and subjects him to excessive public exposure and
distracts him from the effective presentation of his defense. THCASc
The television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused
and his case in the eyes of the public.'
Representatives of the press have no special standing to apply for a writ of mandate (sic) to compel a
court to permit them to attend a trial, since within the courtroom a reporter's constitutional rights are no
greater than those of any other member of the public. Massive intrusion of representatives of the news
media into the trial itself can so alter or destroy the constitutionally necessary judicial atmosphere and
decorum that the requirements of impartiality Imposed by due process of law are denied the defendant and
a defendant in a criminal proceeding should not be forced to run a gauntlet of reporters and photographers
each time he enters or leaves the courtroom.
Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process as well as to the fair and orderly
administration of justice, and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the people
to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio
and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video footages of court hearings for
news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties
and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or photographs
shall be permitted during the trial proper." (emphasis supplied) AIaHES
In banning live radio and television coverage of criminal proceedings, the Court stressed that it weighed
"the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, the right of the public to information and the right

to public trial on one hand, and on the other hand, the due process rights of the defendant and the inherent
and constitutional power of the courts to control their proceedings in order to permit the fair and impartial
administration of justice." It also considered "the nature of media, particularly television and its role in
society and of the impact of new technologies on law."
After the lapse of ten (10) years, I respectfully submit that the 1991 resolution of this Court absolutely
banning live radio and television coverage of criminal proceedings should be re-examined to re-adjust the
balance between a free press and a fair trial in light of the continuing progress in communications
technology and to expand the right of access of the press and the public to information without, however,
impairing the right of an accused to due process.
I.
Estes case has been modified by subsequent cases
Estes vs. Texas, 1 the linchpin of this Court's 1991 resolution is a 1965 decision where the US Supreme
Court first resolved the prejudicial effects of in-court camera to the right of an accused to due process of
law. In a 5-4 decision, the conviction of the accused Estes was set aside in light of the factual finding that
television coverage infringed his right to fair trial. It found that during the preliminary hearing, "cables
and wires were snaked across the courtroom floor, three microphones were on the judge's bench and
others were beamed at the jury box and the counsel's table." 2 The Court considered the circus-like
atmosphere created by media as incongruous to the due process right of the accused. The Estes decision
resulted in most of the states completely banning cameras in the courtroom but a few others experimented
with the cameras and subjected their use to strict guidelines. Among the states that experimented was
Florida. 3
In 1981, the Florida rules allowing television coverage of criminal trials were challenged in Chandler v.
Florida. 4 The case involved a charge of burglary against two police officers of Miami Beach. Over
objections of the two accused, their trial was televised and they were convicted. On appeal, they
contended that the TV coverage infringed their right to fair trial. The US Supreme Court, through Chief
Justice Burger, affirmed their conviction. It held that the appellants "did not present empirical data
sufficient to establish that the mere presence of the broadcast media inherently has an adverse effect on
that process." 5 It ruled that appellants failed to prove specific prejudice. Chief Justice Burger observed
that since the Estes case, technological progress had allowed media to minimize the disruptive effects of
cameras in the courtroom. The Court concluded:
"An absolute constitutional ban on broadcast coverage of trials cannot be justified simply because there is
a danger that, in some cases, prejudicial broadcast accounts of pre-trial and trial events may impair the
ability of jurors to decide the issue of guilt or innocence uninfluenced by extraneous matter. The risk of
juror prejudice in some cases does not justify an absolute ban on news coverage of trials by the printed
media; so also the risk of such prejudice does not warrant an absolute constitutional ban on all broadcast
coverage. The appropriate safeguard against such prejudice is the defendant's right to demonstrate that the
media's coverage of his case — be it printed or broadcast — compromised the ability of the particular jury
that heard the case to adjudicate fairly." 6 (emphasis supplied) aIAEcD
After Estes, the US Supreme Court in a series of landmark cases also struck the proper balance between
freedom of the press and restrictions on media's access to courtrooms vis-a-vis the right of an accused to
fair trial. The first significant case is the 1976 case of Nebraska Press Association v. Stewart. 7 In this
case, the accused was charged with six (6) counts of murder. The Nebraska state trial judge issued an
order restraining the press from reporting, inter alia, on the following subjects: the existence and contents
of the accused's confession; the nature of his statements to other persons; and the contents of a note
written by the accused on the night of the crime. Reviewing the order, the US Supreme Court held that
when imposing a prior restraint on publication, a trial judge must examine "(a) the nature and extent of

pre-trial news coverage; (b) whether other measures would be likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained
pre-trial publicity; and (c) how effectively a restraining order would operate to prevent the threatened
danger." 8 It held that "pre-trial publicity — even pervasive, adverse publicity — does not inevitably lead
to an unfair trial." 9 It affirmed the right of the press to publish information concerning court proceedings
even as it held that trial judges have the major responsibility to protect the accused's right to a fair trial. 10
In 1980, the US Supreme Court decided Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 11 a murder case where
the accused's motion that the courtroom be closed to the public was granted by the trial judge. Richmond
Newspapers moved to vacate the order but its motion was denied both by the trial court and the Virginia
Supreme Court. On certiorari, the US Supreme Court reversed. Writing the plurality opinion, Chief
Justice Burger held that criminal trials were historically open; that there is an implicit right of access to
criminal trials under the first amendment guarantees of free press, free speech and freedom of assembly
and the right to publish would be negated if the press was denied access to a trial. He also opined that for
the justice system to work, the system must satisfy the appearance of justice, which is best provided by
allowing people to observe the judicial process. 12 Be that as it may, he stressed that media's right of
access is not absolute but subject to limitations. 13
In 1982 came the case of Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 14 where the US Supreme Court
reviewed a Massachusetts law that required trial judges to exclude the press and the public from the
courtroom during the testimony of a minor victim of certain sexual offenses. Writing for the majority,
Justice Brennan voided the law on the ground that it violated the first amendment. Again, the court
emphasized that criminal trials have been historically open to the public and that access to trial allows for
public scrutiny of the judicial process, which in turn enhances the integrity of the fact-finding process. 15
The Court again stressed that the right of access is not absolute. 16
II.
Objection as to ill effect on dignity and decorum has long receded
The Court resolution of 1991 absolutely banning televised trial was also premised on the disruptive effect
of cameras on the dignity and decorum in the courtroom. It should be noted, however, that this
debasement of dignity and decorum argument relied upon in Estes was due to the intolerable physical
disturbances caused by annoying equipment, cables, lighting and unsophisticated technicians in the
decade of the sixties. With the quantum leap in communications technology in the last twenty (20) years,
TV cameras are now less intrusive and disruptive. Indeed, various states have imposed rules successfully
regulating whatever interference cameras may have on the dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings.
Maryland, for example, has clear rules setting down the technical requirements for television and still
cameras and photographers, types of microphones to be used, noise limitations, placement in courtroom
and restrictions on movement of personnel and equipment. 17 More progress in audio-visual technology
can be expected in the immediate future and this objection that TV cameras in the courtroom will create
chaos in judicial proceedings will just be a part of the museum of history. 18 aHTEIA
III.
An overwhelming majority of the states now allow radio-TV coverage of criminal trials.
The absolute ban against radio-TV coverage of criminal trial has now been lifted in majority of the states
in the United States. After the 1965 decision in Estes, and for eleven (11) years, all 19 the states
prohibited TV coverage of criminal trials. 20 By 1978, however, six (6) states — Alabama, Colorado,
Georgia, New Hampshire, Texas and Washington allowed televised trials, twelve (12) states — Alaska,
California, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, West
Virginia and Wisconsin — permitted televised trial on an experimental basis. 21 After the decision in
Chandler, forty-seven (47) states now allow television coverage. 22 Only three (3) states ban cameras in
the courtroom — New York, South Dakota and Mississippi. 23

Television is today 24 arguably the most powerful medium of communication. Its communicative
influence is qualitatively different and is distinctively unique. For this reason and more, there is clear
growing body of literature from known legal scholars postulating that an absolute ban on televised trials
constitutes a violation of the press and public right of access. 25
The principal arguments favoring televised trial are well laid out and can hardly be refuted.
Firstly, an open trial has a great value. In Press Enterprise v. Superior Court, 26 it was underscored:
"The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have confidence that
standards of fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance
that established procedures are being followed and that deviations will become known. Openness thus
enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public
confidence in the system." (emphasis supplied) EcICSA
In Richmond Newspaper, 27 it was rightly out that openness is more important in the trial of high profile
cases because of its prophylactic effect, viz:
"When a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows . . .
Thereafter, the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for
community concern, hostility and emotion. Without an awareness that society's responses to criminal
conduct are underway, natural human reactions of outrage and protest are frustrated and may manifest
themselves in some form of vengeful "self help," as indeed they did regularly in the activities of vigilante
"committees" on our frontiers. . . It is not enough to say that results will alone will satiate the natural
community desire for "satisfaction." A result considered untoward may undermine public confidence, and
where trial has been concealed from public view an unexpected outcome can cause a reaction that the
system at best has failed and at worst has been corrupted. To work effectively, it is important that
society's criminal process "satisfy the appearance of justice" . . . and the appearance of justice can best be
provided by allowing people to observe it." (emphasis supplied)
Without doubt, television can convey more completely and accurately the substance and subtleties of
judicial proceedings to the public. As pointedly observed by Gardner, "unlike the print medium, television
has the capability to cover a trial in its entirety — every word, every sentence and every gesture." 28
Thus, it has been perceptively opined that the "pervasiveness of television makes a superior device to
disseminate information about a trial." 29
Second. It is a truism that an educated, enlightened and vigilant citizenry makes democracy works. The
need for the citizenry to comprehend how its government fulfills its task of efficiently serving the people
cannot be overemphasized. Again, Richmond emphasized the educative effect of televised trials to the
people, viz:
"When a criminal trial is conducted in the open, there is at least an opportunity both for understanding the
system in general and its workings in a particular case. The educative effect of public attendance is a
material advantage. Not only is respect for the law increased and intelligent acquaintance acquired with
the methods of government, but a strong confidence on judicial remedies is secured which could never
have been inspired by a system of secrecy." 30 (emphasis supplied)
Of the three branches of government, the judiciary is the least known to the public because its nature does
not allow total transparency. Thus, testimonies which can compromise national security are given in
closed sessions, court deliberations are traditionally not open to the public, etc. Public, open trials of
criminal cases under regulated conditions furnish rare opportunities for the people to understand and
appreciate the business of the courts. In the same vein, they give the courts the chance to gain the people's
faith and confidence on the system of justice. As well put by Justice Frankfurter, "the public confidence in
the judiciary hinges on the public's perception of it, and that perception necessarily hinges on the media's
portrayal of the legal system. 31

Third. In a very informative article, Lassiter has revealed that empirical studies show that cameras in the
courtroom do not have any negative effect on judicial proceedings, viz: 32
"Several states have conducted studies on the potential impact of electronic media coverage on courtroom
proceedings, particularly focusing on the effect cameras have upon courtroom decorum and upon
witnesses, jurors, attorneys and judges. In all of these states, the courts permitted electronic media
coverage in both civil and criminal proceedings, although the majority of coverage was in criminal cases.
The results from the state studies were unanimous: the impact of electronic media coverage of courtroom
proceedings, whether civil or criminal, shows few side effects.
In September 1990, the Judicial Conference of the United States implemented what was to be a three year
pilot program that permitted electronic media coverage in civil proceedings in six federal district courts
and two circuit courts. The Federal Evaluation indicated, among other things, that:
• overall, attitudes of judges towards electronic media were neutral and became more favorable after
experience under the experimental program; EHaCID
• generally, judges and attorneys who had experience with electronic media coverage reported
observing small or no effects on camera presence on proceedings participants, courtroom decorum, or the
administration of justice;
• overall, judges and court personnel reported that the media were very cooperative and complied
with program guidelines and other restrictions that were imposed.
Indeed, the Federal Judicial Center's "Summary of Findings" concluded that no negative impact resulted
from having cameras in the courtroom. In 1994, the Federal Judicial Center specifically found that results
from state court evaluations of the effects of electronic media on jurors and witnesses indicate that most
respondents believe electronic media presence has minimal or no detrimental effects on jurors or
witnesses. As with the handful of state surveys, the federal survey found that "[m]ost participants [say]
electronic media presence has no or minimal detrimental effects on jurors or witnesses." (emphasis
supplied)
Fourth. Televised trial helps the press fulfill its role of exposing miscarriage of justice. In Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 33 the Court acknowledged this checking power of the press when it held that "the press does
not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the
police, prosecutors and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism."
It should, however, be stressed that televising trial is still not without its danger to the constitutional right
of an accused to fair trial. Today, the greatest of these remaining dangers is its adverse effect on the right
of the accused to have access to evidence, a right firmly anchored on the constitutional rights to
compulsory process and due process. Doubtless, the presence of television in the courtroom can affect a
witness. The accuracy of his testimony may be compromised. His physical demeanor, so important to trial
judges to determine his credibility, may become less natural under the klieglight. More importantly, the
fear of too much public exposure may cause reticent witnesses not to testify. Any of these circumstances
will prejudice the right of an accused to a fair trial just as it will frustrate the discovery of truth which is
the objective of judicial trial. But these probable dangers are not insurmountable as other jurisdictions
have demonstrated that they can be minimized if not avoided by appropriate rules regulating televised
trials. An example will be a rule which will not compel the televised testimony of any witness for the
accused upon his objection thereto. Such a rule will also meet the objection that cameras in the courtroom
cause psychological intimidation to witnesses.
IV.
On a case to case basis, televising criminal trials should be addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
judge.

Live radio-TV coverage of a criminal trial cannot be demanded as a matter of right but its absolute denial
is also constitutionally suspect. It is therefore respectfully submitted that the matter of whether or not the
proceedings in a criminal trial should be televised, totally or partially, should be addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial judge on a case to case basis. The exercise of this discretion will depend on the facts
of each case and will involve the delicate balancing of the constitutional right of the accused to fair trial
and due process of law, the press and the public right of access to trials in criminal cases, the right of the
state to prosecute crimes effectively and the duty of courts to ensure the fair and orderly administration of
justice. To be able to reasonably exercise his discretion, the trial judge has to hear a party's motion
seeking to televise the proceedings or any portion thereof to determine, among others, the standing of the
movant, the factual and legal bases of his asserted right and the opposition thereto.. No witness, especially
a witness for the accused, upon his written objection, should be compelled to have his testimony televised.
In balancing the above rights, the judge should deny the motion to televise trial upon specific proof of
prejudice and of reasonable likelihood that the right to fair trial of the accused will be endangered.
Additionally, it shall be the duty of the trial judge to provide and impose the necessary rules and
regulations to assure that the televised trial will not detract from the solemnity, decorum and dignity of the
court. Among others, the rules and regulations should insure that: (1) the television cameras and related
equipments must be unobtrusive, must not produce distracting sounds and shall not in any manner
interfere with the proceedings; (2) the media representatives shall present a neat appearance in keeping
with the dignity of the proceedings and should not move unnecessarily about the court while it is in
session; (3) no film; videotape, photography and audio reproductions may be used for advertising or
commercial purpose; (4) only a single fixed camera set-up shall be installed in the courtroom and the
audio-video output of the fixed set-up will be fed only to broadcast stations to avoid too many
photographers and TV camera crew in the courtroom; and (5) that radio-television broadcasters should
give a balanced coverage of the prosecution and the defense. The trial judged should be given the power
at any time to terminative the televised proceedings upon a showing that the right to a fair trial of the
accused is being prejudiced by its continuance.
EPILOGUE
With due respect, the majority has struck the balance between free press and fair trial much too much to
the prejudice of the press and public right to information. It has unduly sustained former President
Estrada's generalized grievance that cameras in the courtroom will bring about the collapse of the rule of
law and the hypothetical fear that they will psychologically intimidate witnesses. It is all too obvious that
the fear is a mere figment of imagination for former President Estrada has not named any witness with a
phobia against publicity. Indeed, the myth that television intimidates witnesses has long been shattered to
smithereens by empirical studies. For not even requiring former President Estrada to show actual
prejudice to his right to fair trial, the majority has modified our ruling case law on the matter. The
unjustified change to favor the former President will cause undeserved damage to values we revere. It
will, to a large degree, throttle the right of the press to access to information and choke the flow of
knowledge to the people. It is the people who govern in a democracy and they can only govern well if
they are fully informed. A people kept in the dark by the blindfold of ignorance will only govern with
mistakes. Let it be stressed that the right of the people to know is strongest in times of turbulence for it is
when the stakes to the State are high that they cannot afford to err due to ignorance.
The majority refuses to see that the revolution on communications technology is still going on. We have
radio, TV, telephones, cables, satellites, computers, wireless communications, faxes, the internet, etc.
Even our rules of court now allow certain witnesses to testify in and off the court via video
teleconferencing. By outlawing television in the trial of former President Estrada, the majority has denied
our people the opportunity to know completely and accurately whether or not his trial will be fair and

impartial. All these because the majority has persisted in the primitive belief that the courtroom is limited
to the pad and pencil reporters. The majority will bring about new Rip Van Winkles in this age of
electronic media — We. I dissent.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I respectfully submit that the absolute ban on televising criminal trials be lifted
and the petitions of the Secretary of Justice, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas, Mr. Cesar
Sariño, Atty. Ricardo Romulo, et al., and Senator Renato Cayetano, to televise the trial of the plunder
cases against former President Joseph E. Estrada as well as the oppositions of former President Estrada
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines thereto, be remanded to the Sandiganbayan for proper
disposition in accordance with the suggested guidelines set forth above.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Melo and Quisumbing, JJ ., dissents.
PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting:
With due respect, I dissent from the majority's ruling, written by Justice Jose C. Vitug, absolutely banning
live media coverage of judicial trials.
In justifying this proscription, the majority relies mainly on an en banc Resolution dated October 22,
1991, 1 in which this Court resolved to totally prohibit live radio and television coverage of court
hearings, mainly because of "the prejudice it poses (1) to defendant's right to due process, (9) and to the
fair and orderly administration of justice;" (3) while pointing out, on the other hand, that "the right of the
people to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means."
That was in 1991. Today in 2001, I respectfully submit that it is technologically possible to uphold the
right of the people to public information without violating the right of the accused to due process and
without impeding the orderly administration of justice. It is now feasible to satisfy the people's right to
information "by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means."
At bottom, I would like to believe that media and the judiciary are natural partners, because they are
bound together by the same reasons for being — the search for truth, the protection of the peoples rights,
and the defense of the basic norms of society. By proscribing live coverage of trials and hearings, the
Court has lost an indispensable teammate in discovering, processing and reporting the raw, unadulterated
and unvarnished truth. Why is the majority afraid of the truth? More pointedly, why is it fearful of the
whole truth and nothing but the unedited truth? Does it not believe that the "truth shall set us free?"
Basic Premise: Free,
Open and Public Hearing
The basic premise of this Dissent is that, as a general rule, everyone has a right to attend and witness a
trial or hearing, especially if criminal in nature, under the constitutional principles of transparency, and of
free, open and public hearings of cases. 2 However, given the limitations of time and space in a
courtroom, it is not always possible to physically accommodate all persons interested in witnessing a
court hearing. That is why court salas have been enlarged. Moreover, microphones equipped with
electronic amplifiers, and sometimes with closed circuit television, have in the past been used to project
the proceedings to the immediate vicinity of the courtroom via radio speakers, TV monitors and
projection screens. In this manner, people outside have been able to listen to and watch the proceedings,
as if they were inside the courtroom.
As the 21st century dawns, it is now possible to use even more advanced technology to enable more
people to watch judicial proceedings in the privacy of their homes and offices without causing prejudice
to the rights of the accused or to the integrity of orderly justice.
Mechanics of Opening Court
Hearings to Media Coverage
Indeed, a single fixed camera under the control of the court, could catch, live, the incidents in the trial.
The audio-video output of the camera could be flashed on big, wide TV monitors or projection screens

inside and outside the courtroom. This will also enable TV and radio crews outside the courtroom to beam
the output to their respective stations for broadcasting to the public, without the ubiquitous and
intimidating wiring, lights or media cameras inside the courthouse.
The video camera will be placed in the rear of the courtroom and its position shall be locked to wide-
angle, so that only a "stationary audience view" is attained. There will be no other cameras, lights or other
media equipment, which can cause nervousness or anxiety to witnesses, lawyers and other personalities
directly involved in a judicial trial.
No Prejudice to
the Accused
Needless to state, this method will prevent editorializing or sensationalism, which the Court in 1991
feared. In this matter, there will be no unwelcome camera focusing, probing, angling, panning or other
kinds of manipulation. HcSETI
Radio and TV reporters, by patching their connectors to the distribution amplifiers, will be able to do live
broadcasts of the proceedings without hustling the judges, lawyers, parties or witnesses. They will be able
to broadcast only such matters as a spectator in the courtroom can see and hear.
After a long and serious reflection on this matter, I think that the setting up of a single fixed camera inside
the courtroom, to which broadcast stations could connect, is the answer to the opposing positions of the
parties and the intervenors in the present matter. To repeat, this single fixed camera will give its viewers
the chance to be similarly situated as a spectator inside the court who can see, watch and hear the
unfolding drama of the court proceedings. Surely, the recipients of the TV signals beamed by broadcast
stations cannot interfere and prejudice the fair and orderly administration of justice, for the simple reason
that they are outside the vicinity of the courtroom. Thus, they cannot by any means be the "hooting
throng" that the IBP scorns and fears, thinking they would destroy the constitutionally recognized judicial
atmosphere and decorum.
Proper Balancing of
Conflicting Interests
A trial must be public and transparent, because openness is vital to the effective administration of criminal
justice in a democracy. Not only does it safeguard the rights of the accused; it likewise ensures public
trust in the conduct of the trial.
Therefore, after balancing the interests of the parties concerned — the constitutional rights of the accused
and the requirements of orderly procedures vis-a-vis the people's fundamental freedom of expression and
right to information on matters of public concern — I respectfully submit that live coverage via a single
fixed camera inside the courtroom, through which the media can access and therefore broadcast the
proceedings to the entire nation and to the world, is the best technological and legal solution to the
concerns raised by the Court in 1991 and to the objections now aired by the accused (former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada) and the IBP.
Epilogue
A new world order brought about by the information highway and the influx of new technology in
communications is dawning. And yet the Court, by its Decision today, has turned its back and refused to
march in cadence with the music created by the chimes of changing technology. Our people, long
awakened from the dark ages in Philippine history, are now clamoring to be veritable witnesses to the
truth, and this clamor can be answered technologically by giving them a firsthand view of how the justice
system operates. To keep public trust and esteem, transparency and accountability were cornerstones of
this Court's avowed policies as it celebrated its centenary on June 11, 2001. What better proof that it is
sincere in realizing its goal of judicial renaissance than by opening up its proceedings without, however,
compromising the rights of the accused and the integrity of orderly justice.

Indeed, in a free society where transparency and accountability are the desirable standards of public
office, 3 this Court can no longer totally prohibit live media coverage of trials and hearings, given the
reality that the technology of modern communications has adequately overcome the obsolete reasons for
the ban.
These advances in communication facilities have now made it possible to satisfy the people's
constitutional right to information without violating the constitutional right of the accused to a fair trial
and without subverting the orderly administration of justice. Indeed, it is now technologically feasible to
give people in their homes and offices the same access to trials as spectators inside the courthouse.
DCIEac
Let the light of truth be beamed to all the people through the advances of science and technology in the
21st century!
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the request of the KBP and the Petition of the justice secretary, subject
to the safeguards prescribed above.

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