The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine observed ongoing fighting around Donetsk airport and Shyrokyne despite measures to implement the Minsk agreements. At Donetsk airport, the SMM heard heavy weapons fire and assessed mortar shelling was taking place. In Shyrokyne, the SMM saw damage from fighting including a vehicle hit by a missile. The SMM also facilitated talks between Ukrainian and separatist commanders to discuss a local ceasefire to assess the humanitarian situation in Shyrokyne, including a damaged school.
Between 22 January and 4 February, the security situation in eastern Ukraine remained tense. In terms of the overall number of ceasefire violations recorded by the OSCE SMM along the contact line, little changed bet
Between 5 and 18 February, the security situation in eastern Ukraine remained volatile. Periods of relative calm were interrupted by sudden violent flare-ups, in particular in the Svitlodarsk-Debaltseve area, in the west of Luhansk region and in areas east and north-east of Mariupol.
Between 22 January and 4 February, the security situation in eastern Ukraine remained tense. In terms of the overall number of ceasefire violations recorded by the OSCE SMM along the contact line, little changed bet
Between 5 and 18 February, the security situation in eastern Ukraine remained volatile. Periods of relative calm were interrupted by sudden violent flare-ups, in particular in the Svitlodarsk-Debaltseve area, in the west of Luhansk region and in areas east and north-east of Mariupol.
As Europe's leading economic powerhouse and the fourth-largest hashtag#economy globally, Germany stands at the forefront of innovation and industrial might. Renowned for its precision engineering and high-tech sectors, Germany's economic structure is heavily supported by a robust service industry, accounting for approximately 68% of its GDP. This economic clout and strategic geopolitical stance position Germany as a focal point in the global cyber threat landscape.
In the face of escalating global tensions, particularly those emanating from geopolitical disputes with nations like hashtag#Russia and hashtag#China, hashtag#Germany has witnessed a significant uptick in targeted cyber operations. Our analysis indicates a marked increase in hashtag#cyberattack sophistication aimed at critical infrastructure and key industrial sectors. These attacks range from ransomware campaigns to hashtag#AdvancedPersistentThreats (hashtag#APTs), threatening national security and business integrity.
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Our comprehensive report delves into these challenges, using a blend of open-source and proprietary data collection techniques. By monitoring activity on critical networks and analyzing attack patterns, our team provides a detailed overview of the threats facing German entities.
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Explore our comprehensive data analysis project presentation on predicting product ad campaign performance. Learn how data-driven insights can optimize your marketing strategies and enhance campaign effectiveness. Perfect for professionals and students looking to understand the power of data analysis in advertising. for more details visit: https://bostoninstituteofanalytics.org/data-science-and-artificial-intelligence/
Adjusting primitives for graph : SHORT REPORT / NOTESSubhajit Sahu
Graph algorithms, like PageRank Compressed Sparse Row (CSR) is an adjacency-list based graph representation that is
Multiply with different modes (map)
1. Performance of sequential execution based vs OpenMP based vector multiply.
2. Comparing various launch configs for CUDA based vector multiply.
Sum with different storage types (reduce)
1. Performance of vector element sum using float vs bfloat16 as the storage type.
Sum with different modes (reduce)
1. Performance of sequential execution based vs OpenMP based vector element sum.
2. Performance of memcpy vs in-place based CUDA based vector element sum.
3. Comparing various launch configs for CUDA based vector element sum (memcpy).
4. Comparing various launch configs for CUDA based vector element sum (in-place).
Sum with in-place strategies of CUDA mode (reduce)
1. Comparing various launch configs for CUDA based vector element sum (in-place).
Chatty Kathy - UNC Bootcamp Final Project Presentation - Final Version - 5.23...John Andrews
SlideShare Description for "Chatty Kathy - UNC Bootcamp Final Project Presentation"
Title: Chatty Kathy: Enhancing Physical Activity Among Older Adults
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Discover how Chatty Kathy, an innovative project developed at the UNC Bootcamp, aims to tackle the challenge of low physical activity among older adults. Our AI-driven solution uses peer interaction to boost and sustain exercise levels, significantly improving health outcomes. This presentation covers our problem statement, the rationale behind Chatty Kathy, synthetic data and persona creation, model performance metrics, a visual demonstration of the project, and potential future developments. Join us for an insightful Q&A session to explore the potential of this groundbreaking project.
Project Team: Jay Requarth, Jana Avery, John Andrews, Dr. Dick Davis II, Nee Buntoum, Nam Yeongjin & Mat Nicholas
Techniques to optimize the pagerank algorithm usually fall in two categories. One is to try reducing the work per iteration, and the other is to try reducing the number of iterations. These goals are often at odds with one another. Skipping computation on vertices which have already converged has the potential to save iteration time. Skipping in-identical vertices, with the same in-links, helps reduce duplicate computations and thus could help reduce iteration time. Road networks often have chains which can be short-circuited before pagerank computation to improve performance. Final ranks of chain nodes can be easily calculated. This could reduce both the iteration time, and the number of iterations. If a graph has no dangling nodes, pagerank of each strongly connected component can be computed in topological order. This could help reduce the iteration time, no. of iterations, and also enable multi-iteration concurrency in pagerank computation. The combination of all of the above methods is the STICD algorithm. [sticd] For dynamic graphs, unchanged components whose ranks are unaffected can be skipped altogether.
1. Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine
based on information received as of 18:00 (Kyiv time), 30 March 2015
KYIV 31 March 2015
This report is for media and the general public.
The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the Implementation of the Minsk
agreements”. The SMM, based on its monitoring – which was restricted by third parties and by security
considerations* – observed that fighting continued in areas around Donetsk airport and Shyrokyne.
(* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions on SMM access and freedom
of movement” for further information.)
While in the area of Donetsk airport* (“Donetsk People’s Republic”- “DPR”-controlled, 11km north-west of
Donetsk city centre), from 11:20 to 13:00hrs, the SMM heard 32 incoming and outgoing explosions, heavy-
machine-gun fire and small-arms fire from a distance of between 300m and 4km in a direction north and north-
north-west of its position. Based on the sound the SMM assessed that the explosions had been caused by
automatic-grenade-launcher fire and mortar shelling. From 12:13 to 12:23hrs, the SMM heard three explosions at
a distance of about 3.5km west of its position. From 12:34 to 12:45hrs, the SMM heard the sound of what it
assessed to be three outgoing mortar rounds from a distance of about 1.5km east of its position. At 13:04hrs the
SMM heard three explosions at a distance of about 4.5km south-east of its position.
The SMM monitored the airport area from a location at the new terminal parking lot, where human remains in an
unidentifiable military-style uniform still remained at the same position as previously observed (see SMM Daily
Report 30 March 2015).
The SMM went to School No. 21 in the Kuibyshevskyi district of Donetsk (“DPR”-controlled, 2.5km south of
Donetsk airport and 8.5km north of Donetsk city centre). The school director told the SMM that the school had
reopened on 16 March. According to the director 100 pupils, aged six to 17, have returned to school – down from
a pre-conflict enrolment of 500 children. He said currently all 38 teachers, mostly women, are working and were
last paid in November 2014, by “DPR” structures.
The SMM accessed Shyrokyne (“DPR”-controlled, 20km east of Mariupol) travelling initially south-west from
Donetsk and subsequently west through the village Sakhanka (1km east of Shyrokyne). At the “DPR” checkpoint
at the northern edge of Shyrokyne, the SMM were forced to wait 25 minutes for a “DPR” escort vehicle* before
being allowed to proceed. Further into the village the SMM observed a small Toyota pick-up truck, painted in
camouflage scheme without registration plates and estimated that the vehicle was hit at the front from a westerly
direction, by a wire-guided anti-tank missile. The SMM found the base and wire spool of the missile. Later, at
approximately one kilometre east of the incident site, the SMM found an anti-tank guided missile wire draped
over power lines, originating from the west, from a probable firing position located on an elevated ridge
overlooking the E58 highway. The SMM saw the remains of one person. According to the “DPR”, after the
incident, the vehicle blocked the road and therefore it was moved to the roadside. The SMM observed blood near
the vehicle’s original location.
The SMM then was able to proceed into Shyrokyne*, where it observed new damage. The SMM observed a lot of
shrapnel on the roads and more unexploded ordnances (UXOs) than during the last visit to the area. The SMM
monitored the eastern edge of the village, and also succeeded this time to proceed into the southern part of the
2. village, although debris and fallen power lines blocked some roads. The SMM also observed the state of the
village school. Its westerly facing wall had been destroyed by direct fire and shelling, which had caused the roof
to collapse.
The SMM facilitated an encounter on highway E58 between the Ukrainian Armed Forces commander and the
“DPR” “commander” in charge of Shyrokyne area. They had a conversation during which they discussed a
possible local ceasefire at battalion level in order to assess the humanitarian situation in the village, including the
damaged southern part and the local school.
Whilst at an observation point at the eastern outskirts of Berdianske (government-controlled, 1.5km west of
Shyrokyne, 19km east of Mariupol), the SMM heard from 13:35 to 13:55hrs mortar shelling outgoing from east of
its location towards a northerly direction. At 15:00hrs the SMM monitored small arms fire and three incoming
explosions, most likely mortar shells impacting in Shyrokyne, east of the SMM’s location. At 15:15hrs the SMM
monitored sporadic exchanges of fire which from 15:20hrs turned into an intense exchange of fire, including at
least 15 tank shells, heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, as well as what sounded like mortar shelling from
west of the SMM’s location. The SMM estimated that the fire originated most likely from a 128mm multiple-
launch rocket system (MLRS). From 16:20hrs the exchanges of fire and shelling intensified, until at least around
17:00hrs when the SMM left.
The SMM spoke in government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk city) at a Ukrainian
Armed Forces checkpoint with personnel from the Aidar volunteer battalion. According to them they were
targeted by small arms fire during the night between 29 and 30 March, during which two battalion members had
sustained injuries. The SMM observed blood trails on the ground.
The SMM met with the local police commander in government-controlled Svatove (127km north-west of
Luhansk), who said that his police station covers five districts that are currently under “Lugansk People’s
Republic” (“LPR”) control. According to him, in these districts, there were 300 cases of car thefts reported to the
police (no specific time period was indicated). Concerning organized crime, the police commander emphasized
that the most significant case solved recently has been the arrest of 12 members of the so-called "Philat gang".
Some of those arrested, he said, were members of the Aidar volunteer battalion. According to the interlocutor, the
members of the mentioned criminal group are suspected of having committed three murders in Starobilsk
(government-controlled, 84km north of Luhansk), abducted a number of businessmen for ransom and been in
possession of a large amount of weapons and explosives.
The SMM monitored one “DPR” holding area of heavy weapons and had to wait* approximately 40 minutes for
the “DPR” “commander” in charge. This was the SMM’s first visit to this holding area. The SMM recorded the
heavy weapons present. The SMM went to a second “DPR” heavy weapons holding area, which it had first visited
on 27 March, but was denied access by the “DPR”.*
In Kharkiv the SMM followed up on media reports about an explosion that occurred at 00:30hrs on 30 March.
According to reports one man was killed. The SMM went to the spot, but was unable to observe the site as it was
under the control of the Security Services of Ukraine (SBU) as an active crime scene. According to information
provided by the SBU, the explosion was caused by an explosive device targeting a diesel fuel tank. The SBU has
classified the event as a terrorist act.
3. The SMM followed up on media reports about an explosion that occurred on 28 March inOdessa. The SMM went
to the site at Staroportofrankivska Street and observed damage to several windows of a building. The SMM saw a
gas pipe close to the site of the explosion, but it was not damaged. The SMM entered the building and saw two
police officers guarding the site. They confirmed to the SMM that the explosion had happened on 28 March
around 22:30hrs, and that there was only minor material damage. The building administrator informed the SMM
that the building housed a “centre for assistance to the military in the ATO”. In a telephone conversation, the
centre co-ordinator informed the SMM that the centre was created about a month ago and was meant as a
rehabilitation place (including psychological rehabilitation) for soldiers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the
National Guard.
The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Dnepropetrovsk, Kherson, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk,
Lviv and Kyiv.
* Restrictions on SMM access and freedom of movement:
The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by third parties and security
considerations including the lack of information on whereabouts of landmines.
The security situation in Donbas is fluid and unpredictable and the cease-fire does not hold everywhere. For this
reason, the SMM requires security guarantees from “DPR” and “LPR” which are not always provided. Where
such guarantees are limited to escorted movements, and escorts are not provided for all planned patrols or are
delayed, this also represents a restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement.
In particular during the reporting period:
-For five patrols, the SMM was escorted by the “DPR”.
- Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel manning a checkpoint in the vicinity of government-controlled Raihorodka
(34km north-west of Luhansk) insisted to be informed about the nationalities of SMM monitors in the vehicle. The
SMM was stopped for 15mins and allowed to pass the checkpoint after informing about the nationalities of the
monitors.
- The SMM was stopped at a temporary Ukrainian Armed Forces road block in the vicinity of Luhanske
(government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and were not allowed to pass. The initial reason given was
ongoing repair work on the bridge ahead, but it was later confirmed that the Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel
were under orders not to let vehicles through. The SMM did not use alternative routes due to security concerns
and were therefore unable to access Luhanske.
-Upon reaching Shyrokyne, at a “DPR” checkpoint, the SMM was temporarily delayed by 25 minutes, waiting for
the “DPR” commander to arrive to allow the SMM entry to the village.
- The SMM had to wait 20-25 minutes at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in government-controlled
Volnovakha (52km south-west of Donetsk), where it was asked by Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers about
citizenships of patrol members.
- At a “DPR” holding area of heavy weapons the SMM had to wait 40 minutes for the “DPR” commander in
order to be allowed to access the building.
Contacts
Michael Bociurkiw
Spokesperson
OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine
26 Turgenevska Street