This report summarizes findings from 2,690 cases of occupational fraud investigated between 2016-2017 in 125 countries. Key findings include: - Total losses exceeded $7 billion, with a median loss of $130,000 per case. 22% of cases caused losses over $1 million. - Asset misappropriation was the most common fraud, while financial statement fraud had the highest median loss of $800,000. - Tips from employees and management review were the most common detection methods, detecting over half of cases. Organizations with hotlines detected more fraud from tips. - Small businesses with fewer than 100 employees lost almost twice as much per scheme as larger companies. - Internal control weaknesses were a

1. REPORT TO THE NATIONS
2018 GLOBAL STUDY ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE

2. Foreword Report to the Nations2
With the publication of the 2018 Report to the Nations, I am
struck by how this study, like the Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners itself, is in many ways a tribute to the vision and
dedication of our founder and chairman, Dr. Joseph T. Wells,
CFE, CPA. When Dr. Wells created the ACFE, he did so because
he recognized there was a fundamental flaw in how organiza-
tions were attempting to prevent, detect, and investigate fraud.
His goal in founding our association was to establish a body of
knowledge and training that would help anti-fraud professionals
reduce the incidence of fraud and white-collar crime.
One thing Dr. Wells came to recognize in the early days of the
ACFE was that the anti-fraud profession suffered from a glaring
weakness: we simply did not know enough about the crimes we
were trying to fight. So, with the aid of ACFE researchers John
Warren and Andi McNeal, he set out to address the problem by
commissioning the first Report to the Nation in 1996.
The 2018 report is the 10th edition of Dr. Wells’ study, and the Re-
port to the Nations remains the most comprehensive and widely
quoted source of occupational fraud data in the world. Based
on information from real fraud cases as reported by CFEs from
around the globe, the report continues to be a tremendous re-
source for those interested in how occupational fraud is commit-
ted, how it is detected, who commits it, and how organizations
can protect themselves from it.
On behalf of the ACFE, I am proud to present the 2018 edition of
the Report to the Nations.
Bruce Dorris, J.D., CFE, CPA
President and CEO,
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners
FOREWORD
Bruce Dorris, J.D., CFE, CPA
President and CEO,
Association of Certified
Fraud Examiners

3. Contents Report to the Nations 3
Key Findings 4
Introduction 6
The Cost of Occupational Fraud 8
Projecting Total Fraud Losses Based on Imperfect Data 8
The Fraud Costs We Know 8
How Occupational Fraud Is Committed 10
Categories of Occupational Fraud 10
Spotlight: Corruption 13
Duration of Fraud Schemes 14
Spotlight: Concealing Fraud 14
Detection 16
Initial Detection of Occupational Frauds 16
Tip Sources 17
Median Loss and Duration by Detection Method 18
Spotlight: Hotlines and Reporting Mechanisms 19
Victim Organizations 20
Type of Organization 20
Size of Organization 21
Spotlight: Fraud in Small Businesses 22
Industry of Organization 24
Anti-Fraud Controls at the Victim Organization 26
Perpetrators 33
Perpetrator’s Position 33
Perpetrator’s Tenure 34
Spotlight: Fraud Committed by Owners and Executives 34
Perpetrator’s Department 36
Perpetrator’s Gender 39
Perpetrator’s Age 41
Perpetrator’s Education Level 41
Collusion by Multiple Perpetrators 42
Perpetrator’s Criminal Background 42
Perpetrator’s Employment History 43
Behavioral Red Flags Displayed by Perpetrators 43
Spotlight: The Red Flags of Fraud 44
Non-Fraud-Related Misconduct by Perpetrators 46
Human Resources-Related Red Flags 46
Case Results 47
Internal Action Taken Against Perpetrator 47
Criminal Prosecutions and Civil Suits 48
Spotlight: When Victim Organizations are Fined 50
Spotlight: Recovering Fraud Losses 51
Methodology 52
Analysis Methodology 52
Survey Participants 54
Regional Focus 56
Asia-Pacific 56
Canada 58
Eastern Europe and Western/Central Asia 60
Latin America and the Caribbean 62
Middle East and North Africa 64
Southern Asia 66
Sub-Saharan Africa 68
United States 70
Western Europe 72
Index of Figures 74
Fraud Prevention Checklist 76
Glossary of Terminology 78
About the ACFE 79
CONTENTS

4. real cases of
occupational fraud
from
in
industry
categories
countries
2,690 IN TOTAL LOSSES
MEDIAN LOSS PER CASE
OF CASES CAUSED
LOSSES OF
$7 billion+
$130,000
$1 million+
125
23
22% MONTHS
Median duration
of a fraud scheme
Asset Misappropriation schemes
financial statement
fraud schemes
are the most common and least costly
are the least common
and most costly
$800,000
median loss
$114,000
median loss
Corruption
was the most common scheme
in every global region
�����tips
40%
����������
internal
audit
15%
management
review
13%
Tips
employees
are by far the most common
initial detection method
provide over half
of tips, and nearly
1/3 come from
outside parties
46%
30%OF CASES
DETECTED
BY TIP OF CASES
DETECTED
BY TIP
HOTLINES NO HOTLINES
Organizations with hotlines
detect fraud by tips more often
$200,000MEDIAN LOSS
$104,000MEDIAN LOSS
<100 EMPLOYEES100+ EMPLOYEES
SMALL BUSINESSES
LOST ALMOST
TWICE AS MUCH
PER SCHEME
TO FRAUD
89%
of cases
10%
of cases
Key Findings Report to the Nations4
KEY FINDINGS

5. Yet only 37% of victim organizations
implemented these controls
20182017201620152014201320122011201020092008
-16%
MEDIAN LOSS
MEDIAN LOSS
$200,000
$100,000
MORE THAN 5 YEARS’ TENURE
LESS THAN 5 YEARS’ TENURE
FRAUDSTERS WHO HAD BEEN
WITH THEIR COMPANY LONGER
STOLE TWICE AS MUCH
Owners/executives
accounted for
a small percentage
of cases
but caused a
median loss of
$850,000
Losses caused by men
were 75% larger
than losses caused by women
median losses
are far greater
when fraudsters
collude
$$$$$$$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$
1
2
3+
Only 4%OF PERPETRATORS
HAD A PRIOR
FRAUD CONVICTION
TOP REASON FOR
NON-REFERRALS WAS
FEAR OF BAD
PUBLICITY
of fraudsters
displayed at least
one behavioral
red flag
of fraud
19%of cases $74,000
$150,000
$339,000
Over the past 10 years, occupational fraud
referrals to prosecution declined 16%
INTERNAL CONTROL WEAKNESSES
WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR NEARLY
HALF OF FRAUDS
ALL 18 ANTI-FRAUD CONTROLS
ANALYZED WERE ASSOCIATED
WITH LOWER FRAUD LOSSES
AND QUICKER DETECTION
85%
A MAJORITY OF THE VICTIMS RECOVERED NOTHING
DATA MONITORING/ANALYSIS and
SURPRISE AUDITS were correlated with the
largest reductions in fraud loss and duration
�����52%
lower losses
�����58%
faster detection
�����51%
lower losses
�����54%
faster detection
Data monitoring/
analysis
Surprise
audits
Key Findings Report to the Nations 5

6. Introduction Report to the Nations6
INTRODUCTION
Fraud in general poses a tremendous
threat to organizations of all types
and sizes, in all parts of the world.
Among the various kinds of fraud that organizations
might be faced with, occupational fraud is likely the
largest and most prevalent threat. Occupational
fraud1
—fraud committed against the organization by
its own officers, directors, or employees—constitutes
an attack against the organization from within, by the
very people who were entrusted to protect its assets
and resources. Since we began tracking data on
occupational fraud cases in 1996, we have reviewed
thousands of cases in which insiders collectively
stole billions of dollars from their employers, and
those cases were merely a drop in the bucket. There
are millions of business and government organiza-
tions operating throughout the world and every one
of them, in some way, is vulnerable or potentially
vulnerable to fraud committed by their employees.
Most of those employees will never steal or abuse
the trust that has been placed in them, but the ones
who do can cause enormous damage. It is because
of this risk that we continue to study these frauds
and publish the Report to the Nations.
This study contains an analysis of 2,690 cases of
occupational fraud that were investigated between
January 2016 and October 2017. The data present-
ed herein is based on information provided by the
Certified Fraud Examiners who investigated those
cases. Their firsthand experience with these frauds
provides an invaluable resource for helping us un-
1
Occupational fraud is defined as the use of one’s occupation for per-
sonal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the
employing organization’s resources or assets.
derstand occupational fraud and the impact it has on
organizations.
The data we have gathered provides a broad and
deeply representative picture of occupational fraud’s
impact. The cases in this study include frauds com-
mitted against organizations in 23 major industry
categories. Victim organizations range from small local
businesses to multinational corporations with thou-
sands of employees. These frauds were committed by
The goal of the Report to the Nations
is to compile detailed information
about occupational fraud cases in
five critical areas:
The methods by which occupational
fraud is committed
The means by which occupational frauds
are detected
The characteristics of the organizations
that are victimized by occupational fraud
The characteristics of the people who
commit occupational fraud
The results of the cases after the frauds
have been detected and the perpetrators
identified

7. Introduction Report to the Nations 7
individuals who worked in virtually every part of the
organization, from entry-level employees to C-suite
executives.
The cases we studied occurred in 125 countries
throughout the world, which helps us develop a global
view of the costs, methods, victims, and perpetrators of
these crimes. Figure 1 shows the number of cases from
nine key geographical regions, along with the medi-
an loss per fraud in each of those regions. (Readers
should note that the number of cases per region largely
reflects the geographical distribution of ACFE mem-
bership, so this data should not be taken to mean that
fraud is more or less likely in any particular region.)
Our hope is that the findings in this report will be of
value to anti-fraud professionals, organizational man-
agers, researchers, and the public at large. Readers
will find a wealth of information about the methods,
causes, costs, and indicators of occupational fraud, as
well as important information on how to prevent and
detect it. This study is the 10th edition of the Report
to the Nations, and occupational fraud remains an
enormous threat to the global economy, just as it was
when we published the first edition in 1996. But in the
time since that first report, we have seen organiza-
tions make tremendous strides in terms of awareness,
along with significant advancements in their ability to
combat these crimes. Such advances are only possi-
ble when there is a true understanding of the nature
and extent of the threat that must be dealt with. We
publish this 2018 Report to the Nations hoping it will
advance the collective understanding and awareness
of occupational fraud risk for all those concerned.
FIG. 1 Countries with reported cases and median loss for each region2
2
Geographical information was provided in 2,092 of the cases submitted. See pgs. 56–73 for lists of cases submitted by country.
United States
MEDIAN
LOSS: $108,000
CASES: 1,000 (48%) Sub-Saharan Africa
MEDIAN
LOSS: $90,000
CASES: 267 (13%) Asia-Pacific
MEDIAN
LOSS: $236,000
CASES: 220 (11%)
Western Europe
MEDIAN
LOSS: $200,000
CASES: 130 (6%)
Latin America
and the Caribbean
MEDIAN
LOSS: $193,000
CASES: 110 (5%)
Middle East
and North Africa
MEDIAN
LOSS: $200,000
CASES: 101 (5%)
Southern Asia
MEDIAN
LOSS: $100,000
CASES: 96 (5%)
Eastern Europe and
Western/Central Asia
MEDIAN
LOSS: $150,000
CASES: 86 (4%) Canada
MEDIAN
LOSS: $200,000
CASES: 82 (4%)

8. The Cost of Occupational Fraud Report to the Nations8
THE COST OF
OCCUPATIONAL
FRAUD
How much money do
organizations lose as a
result of fraud?
Accordingly, providing a measure of the cost of fraud
is an incredibly important endeavor. It is also an
incredibly difficult one, given the number of unknown
factors required to make such an estimate. No one
knows the amount of frauds that go undetected or
unreported, and even for those frauds that do come to
light, the full amount of loss might never be calculated.
Such limitations mean that any attempts to quantify
the global amount of fraud will be imperfect.
Projecting Total Fraud Losses
Based on Imperfect Data
Even with these limitations on projecting the total
amounts lost to fraud, however, we know that such a
projection has an important place in the fight against
fraud. Consequently, we asked survey participants,
based on their professional experience, what per-
centage of revenues they believe a typical organiza-
tion loses to fraud each year. The median response
provided by these CFEs is that organizations lose 5%
of their annual revenues to fraud. While this number
is only a general estimate based on the opinions of
the CFEs who took part in our study, it represents the
collective observations of more than 2,000 anti-fraud
experts who together have investigated hundreds
of thousands of fraud cases. To place their estimate
in context, if the 5% loss estimate were applied to
the 2017 estimated Gross World Product of USD
79.6 trillion, it would result in a projected total global
fraud loss of nearly USD 4 trillion.3
To be clear, this
number is only an estimate and, given the limitations
described above, it is unlikely we will ever be able
to calculate the true cost of fraud on a global scale.
But we can be certain that the amount of damage is
incredibly large, and this estimate, provided by an-
ti-fraud professionals who work to prevent and detect
fraud on a daily basis, helps give us some insight into
just how big the problem may be.
The Fraud Costs We Know
Determining total fraud losses—whether globally, re-
gionally, by industry, or even within a specific organiza-
tion—is outside the primary scope of our study. Instead,
we focus on analyzing known data to better under-
Anti-fraud professionals know just
how devastating a fraud can be to
its victims. But they are not the only
ones who benefit from insight into
the amount of damage that fraud
causes organizations and their stake-
holders. Business leaders need to
understand how much is at stake
as they assess their risks and make
resource-allocation decisions. Reg-
ulators need to determine where to
focus their enforcement efforts. In-
vestors and customers need to make
informed decisions about where
to direct their own money. And the
media desires context and direction
for helping to raise awareness of the
issue to the general public.
3
See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
xx.html (retrieved March 22, 2018).

9. 9
stand the risks posed by occupational fraud. To
that end, we examined the losses incurred in the
actual cases of fraud reported to us to learn about
how fraud affects its victims.
The total loss caused by the cases in our study
exceeded USD 7.1 billion.4
While we do not know
the total number of cases of fraud that occurred
globally during our study period, it is safe to as-
sume that the 2,690 cases included in our study
represent only a tiny fraction of the frauds com-
mitted against organizations worldwide during
that time. Thus, the USD 7.1 billion in known loss-
es—while staggering on its own—does not come
close to representing the total amount lost to
fraud. The true global cost of fraud is likely mag-
nitudes higher, especially when factoring in the
indirect costs, such as reputational harm and loss
of business during the aftermath of a scandal.
The mean, or average, loss due to the frauds in
our study was USD 2.75 million,5
which is also an
enormous amount when considering how much
damage such a loss represents to most organi-
zations. However, due to the presence of several
very large frauds in our data, this amount likely
does not illustrate the typical fraud case. Conse-
quently, throughout this report we use median
loss calculations, rather than mean, to provide
a more accurate representation of how fraud
typically affects organizations.
The median loss for all cases in our study was
USD 130,000. Figure 2 shows the loss distribution
of the cases. While 55% caused less than USD
200,000 in financial damage, more than one-fifth
resulted in a loss of at least USD 1 million.
Throughout this report, we further examine
these losses through different lenses, based
on the specific schemes, victim organizations,
perpetrators involved, and other factors.
We hope that our research into and analysis of these cases
helps shed additional light on the way that fraud impacts
the global business community and its stakeholders.
4
The total losses represented in our study were actually signifi-
cantly higher than USD 7.1 billion. However, our survey results
included a few cases with losses so large that including them in the
total loss figure may have enabled them to be identified. To avoid
compromising the confidentiality of our survey participants, we
winsorized the top and bottom 1% of the data used in this total loss
calculation (i.e., assigned all cases in the top 1% and bottom 1% the
same value as the 99th percentile and 1st percentile, respectively).
While including those cases would increase the total loss amount
figure substantially, we believe it prudent to both ensure those
cases remain unidentified and conservatively report loss amounts.
5
As with the total loss figure, the top and bottom 1% of the data
were winsorized for purposes of the average loss calculation.
The Cost of Occupational Fraud Report to the Nations
Less than $200,000
$200,000–$399,999
$400,000–$599,999
$600,000–$799,999
$800,000–$999,999
$1 million or more
55%
11%
7%
3%
2%
22%
FIG. 2 How much does an occupational fraud cost
the victim organization?

10. How Occupational Fraud Is Committed Report to the Nations10
One of the goals of the first Report to the
Nation was to examine the methods by
which fraudsters commit their schemes,
and we have continued this line of study in
every subsequent report. Over the last two
decades, even with tremendous technolog-
ical development and numerous changes in
the global business and regulatory environ-
ments, our research shows that occupation-
al fraud falls into several time-tested cate-
gories. The taxonomy of these categories
is illustrated in the Occupational Fraud and
Abuse Classification System, also known as
the Fraud Tree, as depicted in Figure 4.
HOW
OCCUPATIONAL
FRAUD IS
COMMITTED
What methods do
fraudsters use to
commit their schemes?
Categories of Occupational Fraud
Of the three primary categories of occupational fraud,
asset misappropriations are by far the most common,
occurring in 89% of the cases in our study. However,
they are also the least costly, causing a median loss of
USD 114,000. Corruption schemes are the next most
common form of occupational fraud; 38% of the cases
in our study involved some form of corrupt act. These
schemes resulted in a median loss to the victim organi-
zations of USD 250,000. The least common and most
costly form of occupational fraud is financial statement
fraud, which occurred in 10% of the cases and caused a
median loss of USD 800,000.
FIG. 3 How is occupational fraud committed?
89%
38%
10%
$114,000
$250,000
$800,000
Asset
misappropriation Corruption
Financial
statement fraud
PERCENTOFCASESMEDIANLOSS

11. Corruption
Conflicts of
Interest
Cash
Theft of Cash
on Hand
Theft of Cash
Receipts
Fraudulent
Disbursements
Inventory and All
Other Assets
Purchasing
Schemes
Sales
Schemes
Bid Rigging
Skimming Cash Larceny
Misuse Larceny
Asset
Requisitions
and Transfers
False Sales
and Shipping
Purchasing
and Receiving
Unconcealed
Larceny
Sales
Unrecorded
Write-Off
Schemes
Lapping
Schemes
Unconcealed
Understated
Receivables
Refunds
and Other
Billing
Schemes
Payroll
Schemes
Expense
Reimbursement
Schemes
Check and
Payment
Tampering
Register
Disbursements
Forged Maker False Voids
False Refunds
Forged
Endorsement
Authorized
Maker
Altered Payee
Mischaracterized
Expenses
Ghost
Employee
Commission
Schemes
Overstated
Expenses
Fictitious
Expenses
Multiple
Reimbursements
Falsified
Wages
Shell
Company
Non-
Accomplice
Vendor
Personal
Purchases
Invoice
Kickbacks
Timing
Differences
Fictitious
Revenues
Improper
Asset
Valuations
Concealed
Liabilities and
Expenses
Timing
Differences
Understated
Revenues
Improper
Asset
Valuations
Overstated
Liabilities and
Expenses
Improper
Disclosures
Improper
Disclosures
Illegal Gratuities Economic
ExtortionBribery
Net Worth/
Net Income
Overstatements
Net Worth/
Net Income
Understatements
Asset Misappropriation Financial Statement Fraud
Report to the Nations How Occupational Fraud Is Committed 11
FIG. 4 Occupational Fraud and Abuse Classification System (the Fraud Tree)6
6
The definitions for many of the categories of fraud schemes in the Fraud Tree are found in the Glossary of Terminology on pg. 78. In previous reports, the category
check and payment tampering was referred to simply as check tampering. However, to better reflect the increasing shift toward electronic payment methods, we
have changed the category title.
How Occupational Fraud Is Committed Report to the Nations

12. How Occupational Fraud Is Committed Report to the Nations12
When assessing an
organization’s fraud risks
and designing anti-fraud
controls, it is important to
remember that fraudsters
typically seize whatever
opportunity arises when
committing their schemes.
Thus, many frauds—
including nearly one-third
of the cases in our study,
as illustrated in Figure
5—involve more than one
form of occupational fraud.
Asset Misappropriation
Sub-Schemes
Within the category of
asset misappropriation,
our research shows that
there are several dis-
tinct sub-categories of
schemes. The heat map
in Figure 6 illustrates the
relative frequency and cost
of each of these scheme
types. The schemes falling
in the darkest area of the
heat map—check and pay-
ment tampering,7
billing,
and theft of noncash as-
sets—rank among the most
common and the costliest
scheme types and thus
typically pose the greatest
risk to organizations.
FIG. 5 How often do fraudsters commit more than one type of occupational
fraud?
7
In previous reports, this category
was referred to simply as check
tampering. However, to better
reflect the increasing shift toward
electronic payment methods, we
have changed the category title to
check and payment tampering.
FIG. 6 What asset misappropriation schemes present the greatest risk?
Asset
misappropriation
Corruption
Financial
statement fraud
Asset misappropriation and corruption
Asset misappropriation and financial statement fraud
Financial statement fraud only
Corruption, asset misappropriation, and financial statement fraud
23%
Corruption only 9%
Asset misappropriation only 57%
3%
1%
Corruption and financial statement fraud 1%
4%
L E S S R I S K M O R E R I S K
Register disbursements
$29,000 (3%)
Payroll
$63,000 (7%)
Cash larceny
$75,000 (11%)
Check and payment tampering
$150,000 (12%)
Billing
$100,000 (20%)
Noncash
$98,000 (21%)
Skimming
$50,000 (11%)
Expense reimbursements
$31,000 (14%)
Cash on hand
$20,000 (15%)

13. CORRUPTION
Corruption represents one of the most significant fraud risks for organizations in many
industries and regions. Understanding the specific factors involved in corruption schemes
can help organizations effectively prevent, detect, and investigate them.
70%someone in a POSITION OF AUTHORITY
38%
32%
MANAGER
OWNER/
EXECUTIVEOTHER
EMPLOYEE27%
3%
of corruption cases were perpetrated by
82%
Industries with highest
proportion of
CORRUPTION CASES:
Percent of cases involving corruption
40%
30%
62%
60%
51%
51%
49%
36%
of corruption cases were
committed by males
18%of corruption cases were
committed by females
WHILE ONLY
TOP RED FLAGS
in corruption cases
43%
34%
23%
21%
Living beyond means
Unusually close association with vendor/customer
Financial difficulties
“Wheeler-dealer” attitude
49%
53%ENERGY
51%MANUFACTURING
50%GOVERNMENT
AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION
were detected
by a tip
50%
OF CORRUPTION CASES
EASTERN EUROPE AND
WESTERN/CENTRAL ASIA
SOUTHERN
ASIA
ASIA-PACIFIC
MIDDLE EAST AND
____NORTH AFRICA
SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA
LATIN AMERICA
AND THE
CARIBBEAN
CANADA
UNITED STATES
WESTERN
EUROPE
13How Occupational Fraud Is Committed Report to the Nations

14. CONCEALING FRAUD
An act of fraud typically involves not only the commission of the scheme itself, but also efforts
to conceal the misdeeds. Understanding the methods fraudsters use to cover their crimes can
help organizations better design prevention mechanisms and detect the warning signs of fraud.
Created fraudulent
physical documents
Altered physical
documents
Created fraudulent
transactions in the
accounting system
Altered transactions
in the accounting
system
Altered electronic
documents or files
Destroyed physical
documents
Created fraudulent
electronic
documents or files
Created fraudulent
journal entries
TOP 8 CONCEALMENT METHODS USED BY FRAUDSTERS
55% 48% 42% 34% 31% 30% 29% 27%
14 How Occupational Fraud Is Committed Report to the Nations
Duration of
Fraud Schemes
Examining how long frauds
tend to last can also provide
insight into how they affect
their victims. The median
duration for all of the fraud
cases in our study was 16
months. However, it stands
to reason that the longer a
fraud goes undetected, the
larger the scheme will grow.
Figure 7 shows that frauds
that last over 60 months are
more than 20 times as costly
as those that are caught in the
first six months. Our data also
indicates that fraudsters tend
to start small and increase
their frauds rapidly over
the first three years. Thus,
it is incredibly important for
organizations to implement
proactive fraud detection
mechanisms to catch frauds
quickly and minimize their
damage (see pg. 18).
FIG. 7 How does the duration of a fraud relate to median loss?
27%
$30,000
$75,000
$125,000
$200,000
$400,000
$425,000
$500,000
$715,000
19%
10%
13%
11%
5%
6%
8%
6 months
or less
7–12
months
13–18
months
19–24
months
25–36
months
37–48
months
49–60
months
More than
60 months
PERCENTOFCASESMEDIANLOSS

15. DID NOT
involve
any attempts
to conceal
the fraud
3%
ONLY
OF CASES
�����80%Created fraudulent
evidence
�����80%Altered existing
evidence
�����43%Deleted or
destroyed evidence
How to Conceal:
Create, Alter, or Destroy?
what to Conceal:
physical or electronic evidence?
21% 12%63%
ELECTRONIC
EVIDENCE
PHYSICAL
EVIDENCE
BOTH
All of these
unconcealed
cases were
committed
by owners/
executives
Owners/executives are
more likely to create
or delete evidence.
Manager-level
fraudsters are more
likely to alter evidence.
15How Occupational Fraud Is Committed Report to the Nations
FIG. 8 How long do different occupational fraud schemes last?We also examined the duration
of the cases reported to us
based on the type of scheme
involved. Figure 8 shows the
result of this analysis. The
payroll schemes in our study
tended to last the longest,
with a median duration of 30
months, while schemes involv-
ing cash on hand and register
disbursements were both
typically uncovered one year
after they began.
30 months
24 months
24 months
24 months
24 months
24 months
22 months
18 months
18 months
12 months
12 months
Payroll
Check and payment tampering
Financial statement fraud
Expense reimbursements
Billing
Cash larceny
Corruption
Skimming
Noncash
Register disbursements
Cash on hand

16. Detection Report to the Nations16
Initial Detection of
Occupational Frauds
Figure 9 shows that the leading detection
methods are tips, internal audit, and man-
agement review. This finding is not surpris-
ing, as these have been the three most com-
mon means of detecting occupational fraud
in every edition of the report since 2010.
Collectively, these three detection methods
were cited in 68% of the cases in our current
study. Tips were by far the most common
means of detection at 40% of cases—more
than internal audit (15%) and management
review (13%) combined.
DETECTION
How are fraud schemes
initially detected?
Understanding the methods by
which occupational frauds are
detected is critical for both investi-
gating schemes and implementing
effective prevention strategies. We
asked survey participants to tell us
how the frauds they investigated
were initially detected, which helps
us understand how organizations
are most likely to discover frauds
in the future. This data also shows
how organizations can take steps
to detect fraud proactively, rather
than passively.

17. 17
FIG. 9 How is occupational fraud initially detected?
Detection Report to the Nations
Since tips are the most common detection method,
it is important to understand where those tips come
from. Figure 10 shows that slightly more than half
of all tips (53%) were provided by employees of the
victim organizations. Meanwhile, nearly one-third
(32%) of the tips that led to fraud detection came
from people outside the organization: customers,
vendors, and competitors. Active cultivation of tips
and complaints, such as the promotion of fraud
hotlines, is often geared primarily toward employees,
but this data suggests organizations should also
consider promoting reporting mechanisms to outside
parties, especially customers and vendors. Addition-
ally, 14% of tips came from an anonymous source,
demonstrating that a significant portion of those who
reported fraud did not want their identities known.
Whistleblowers often have a fear of being identified
or retaliated against, which is why it is important that
they be able to make reports anonymously where
such practice is legally permissible.
Tip Sources
FIG. 10 Who reports occupational fraud?
Tip
Internal audit
Management review
By accident
Other
Account reconciliation
Document examination
External audit
Surveillance/monitoring
Notified by law enforcement
IT controls
Confession
40%
15%
13%
7%
6%
5%
4%
4%
3%
2%
1%
1%
Anonymous
14%
Other
5%
Competitor
3%
Shareholder/owner
2%
Employee
53%
Customer
21%
Vendor
8%
Internal source External source Other

18. Detection Report to the Nations18
In addition to determining the most common meth-
ods of detection, we also analyzed the median loss
and duration of fraud schemes based on how they
were uncovered. Our results indicate that there is a
correlation between the way in which occupational
fraud schemes are detected and the severity of the
fraud. More importantly, the data points to steps or-
ganizations can take to detect fraud proactively and,
in doing so, mitigate losses.
Figure 11 portrays the median loss and median dura-
tion for all cases, based on the method by which they
were detected. We grouped each of these detection
methods into three categories: active, passive, or
potentially active or passive. Active detection methods
(shaded teal) involve a deliberate search for miscon-
duct from someone within the organization or an inter-
nal control designed to detect fraud. Passive detection
methods (shaded black) refer to cases in which the
organization discovers the fraud by accident, confes-
sion, or unsolicited notification by another party. We
classified tips and external audit as potentially active or
passive detection methods because those mechanisms
might or might not involve proactive efforts specifically
to identify fraud, depending on the circumstances.
Our findings show that median duration and median
loss were relatively low in frauds that were detected
by active methods. Frauds detected passively tended
to last much longer and have larger median losses.
For instance, frauds detected actively by IT controls
tended to last five months and cause a median loss of
USD 39,000, compared to schemes detected passive-
ly through notification from law enforcement, which
tended to last two years and cause a median loss of
almost USD 1 million. The key takeaway from this data
is that organizations can reduce the impact of fraud
by pursuing internal controls and policies that actively
detect fraud, such as thorough management review,
account reconciliation, and surveillance/monitoring.
Organizations that do not actively seek out fraud are
likely to experience schemes that continue for much
longer and at a higher cost.
Median Loss and Duration
by Detection Method
FIG. 11 How does detection method relate to fraud duration and loss?
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
MEDIANMONTHSTODETECTION
ITcontrols
Surveillance/monitoring
Accountreconciliation
Internalaudit
Managementreview
Documentexamination
Tip
Externalaudit
By
accident
ConfessionNotifiedbypolice
$39,000
5 months
$50,000
6 months
$52,000
11 months
$108,000
12 months
$110,000
14 months
$126,000
18 months
$130,000
18 months
$150,000
24 months$250,000
23 months
Active detection method
Passive detection method
Potentially active or passive detection method
$186,000
24 months
$935,000
24 months

19. HOTLINES AND REPORTING MECHANISMS
The presence of a hotline or other reporting mechanism affects
how organizations detect fraud and the outcome of the case.
LOREM IPSUM
DOLOR SIT
of victim
organizations
had hotlines63%
Fraud losses were
50% SMALLER
at organizations
with hotlines
than those without
$100,000
$200,000
46%
30%OF CASES
DETECTED
BY TIP OF CASES
DETECTED
BY TIP
HOTLINES NO HOTLINES
Organizations without hotlines were
more than TWICE AS LIKELY to detect
fraud by accident or by external audit
Organizations
with hotlines
detected fraud by
tip more often
Corruption is particularly likely
to be detected by tip
Corruption
Asset
Misappropriation
Financial
Statement Fraud
�����38%
�����50%
�����38%DETECTED
BY TIP
DETECTED
BY TIP
DETECTED
BY TIP
42% 26% 23%
16% 9% 1%
NOT ALL TIPS COME
THROUGH HOTLINES
When a reporting mechanism is not
used, whistleblowers are most likely
to report to:
DIRECT SUPERVISOR 32%
EXECUTIVE 15%
FRAUD INVESTIGATION TEAM 13%
COWORKER 12%
INTERNAL AUDIT 10%
Telephone hotline Email
Web-based/
online form
Mailed letter/form FaxOther
Telephone hotlines are most popular, but
whistleblowers use various reporting mechanisms
19Detection Report to the Nations

20. Victim Organizations Report to the Nations20
Type of Organization
As shown in Figure 12, more than 70% of
the frauds in our study occurred at for-prof-
it organizations, with 42% of the victim
organizations being private companies and
29% being public companies. The private
companies in our study suffered the greatest
median loss, at USD 164,000. Not-for-profit
organizations were the victim in only 9% of
frauds and had the smallest median loss of
USD 75,000; however, for many not-for-profit
entities, financial resources are extremely
limited and a loss of USD 75,000 can be
particularly devastating.
Level of Government Organization
Resources and operations vary greatly by
level of government, meaning that fraud can
affect these organizations differently. Con-
sequently, we broke down the government
fraud cases in our study based on the level
of government agency involved. While there
was not a large variation in the percentage
of schemes that occurred at local, state/
provincial, and national levels, the frauds at
national-level agencies tended to be much
larger, causing a median loss approximately
twice as large as the losses experienced by
local and state/provincial governments (see
Figure 13).
FIG. 12 What types of organizations are victimized by
occupational fraud?
FIG. 13 What levels of government are victimized
by occupational fraud?
VICTIM ORGANIZATIONS
How are different kinds of organizations
affected by occupational fraud?
To better understand the victim organizations in our study, we asked
participants to provide information about the organizations’ type, size,
and industry, as well as the mechanisms that the organizations had in
place to prevent and detect fraud at the time the scheme occurred.
38+31+26+5+FNational: 38%
($200,000*)
Local: 31%
($92,000*)
State/provincial: 26%
($110,000*)
Other: 4%
($58,000*)
*Dollar amounts are median loss.
Private
company
Not-for-profitGovernment
Public
company Other
$164,000
T Y P E O F V I C T I M O R G A N I Z AT I O N —
F R E Q U E N C Y A N D M E D I A N L O S S
16%
42%
29%
9%
4%
MEDIANLOSS
$117,000 $118,000
$75,000
$120,000
PERCENTOFCASES

21. 21
FIG. 14 How does an organization’s size relate to its occupational fraud risk?
Size of Organization
The size of an organization’s staff can directly affect both the opportunity for
fraud and the ability to enact certain anti-fraud mechanisms. Larger entities
typically have more resources to invest in their anti-fraud programs, as well as
a greater ability to separate duties among staff members to help prevent fraud;
however, the large staff size can also mean more potentially dishonest employ-
ees who might attempt schemes and more complex processes and transac-
tions, which can increase the risk of fraud.
To provide some insight into the relative risks of fraud for organizations of
various sizes, we analyzed the cases reported to us based on the number of
employees at the victim organization. Figure 14 shows that small organiza-
tions (those with fewer than 100 employees) both experienced the greatest
percentage of cases in our study (28%) and suffered the largest median loss
(USD 200,000). See “Fraud in Small Businesses” on pgs. 22–23 for more
information about how fraud affects these organizations.
<100
employees
10,000+
employees
1,000–9,999
employees
100–999
employees
$200,000
26%
28%
22%
24%
MEDIANLOSS
$100,000 $100,000
$132,000
PERCENTOFCASES

22. FRAUD IN SMALL BUSINESSES
Fraud can be especially devastating to small businesses. These organizations typically have
fewer resources to both prevent and recover from a fraud, and they often require an increased
level of trust in employees due to a lower ability to implement robust anti-fraud controls.
<
100 EMPLOYEE
S
42% 25%Frauds caused by
lack of internal controls:
Frauds perpetrated by
an owner/executive:
SMALL BUSINESSES
LOSE ALMOST
TWICE AS MUCH
PER SCHEME TO
OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD
29% 16%
Median loss:
$200,000 $104,000
100+ EMPLOYEE
S
29% 44%Frauds detected by tip:
Median loss:
22 Victim Organizations Report to the Nations

23. Small businesses
typically have fewer
anti-fraud Controls
than larger organizations,
leaving them more
vulnerable to fraud
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
External audit of financial statem
ents
Code
of conduct
M
anagem
ent review
M
anagem
ent certification
of financial statem
ents
External audit of internal controls over financial reporting
Internal audit departm
ent
Independent audit com
m
ittee
Hotline
Em
ployee
support program
s
Anti-fraud
policy
Fraud
training
for em
ployees
Fraud
training
for m
anagers/executives
Surprise
audits
Proactive
data m
onitoring/analysis
Form
al fraud
risk assessm
ents
Dedicated
fraud
departm
ent, function, or team
Job
rotation/m
andatory vacation
Rewards for whistleblowers
<100 Employees
100+ Employees
Small businesses face
DIFFERENTRISKS
than larger organizations
0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
Register
disbursements
Payroll
Cash larceny
Financial
statement fraud
Noncash
Cash on hand
Skimming
Expense
reimbursements
Check and
payment tampering
Billing
Corruption
PERCENT OF CASES
<100 Employees
100+ Employees
32%
43%
29%
18%
22%
8%
20%
8%
21%
11%
20%
14%
16%
22%
16%
7%
14%
9%
13%
5%
3%
2%
23Victim Organizations Report to the Nations

24. Victim Organizations Report to the Nations24
Industry of Organization
In addition, we examined the cases reported to us based on the industry of the victim organization. The greatest num-
ber of cases in our study occurred in the banking and financial services, manufacturing, and government and public
administration sectors. Readers should note that this data likely represents the industries that most often employ
CFEs, rather than the industries that are most susceptible to fraud. However, information about occupational fraud in
various industries can be useful for benchmarking purposes.
FIG. 15 How does occupational fraud affect organizations in different industries?
17+83+R 10+90+R
5+95+R
9+91+R
Insurance
Manufacturing
14%366
Cases
4+96+R
7+93+R
4+96+REducation
Health care
83
Cases
2+98+R
3+97+R3+97+R3+97+RTechnology Religious, charitable,
or social services
Services (professional)
Arts, entertainment,
and recreation
4+96+R
5+95+R
4+96+ROther
Retail
Food service and hospitality
84
Cases
76
Cases
1+99+R
1+99+R
1+99+RMining
Utilities
Wholesale trade
Telecommunications Real estate
Agriculture, forestry,
fishing, and hunting
4+96+R
1+99+R2+98+R2+98+R
90
Cases
Construction
7%
Government and
public administration
Banking and
financial services
Transportation and
warehousing
4+96+REnergy
1+99+R1+99+RServices (Other) Communications and
publishing
MEDIAN LOSS:
$110,000
MEDIAN LOSS:
$240,000
MEDIAN LOSS:
$125,000
MEDIAN LOSS:
$100,000
212
Cases
201
Cases
158
Cases
MEDIAN LOSS:
$50,000
MEDIAN LOSS:
$153,000
MEDIAN LOSS:
$68,000
MEDIAN LOSS:
$300,000
94
Cases
97
Cases
101
Cases
108
Cases
MEDIAN LOSS:
$227,000
MEDIAN LOSS:
$70,000
MEDIAN LOSS:
$140,000
MEDIAN LOSS:
$90,000
58
Cases
60
Cases
51
Cases
68
Cases
MEDIAN LOSS:
$150,000
MEDIAN LOSS:
$90,000
MEDIAN LOSS:
$258,000
MEDIAN LOSS:
$88,000
MEDIAN LOSS:
$100,000
MEDIAN LOSS:
$180,000
MEDIAN LOSS:
$136,000
MEDIAN LOSS:
$150,000
50
Cases
35
Cases
32
Cases
29
Cases
28
Cases
27
Cases
24
Cases
24
Cases
MEDIAN LOSS:
$82,000
MEDIAN LOSS:
$208,000
MEDIAN LOSS:
$525,000
MEDIAN LOSS:
$110,000

25. Victim Organizations Report to the Nations 25
Most Common Schemes by Industry
Understanding the frequency of specific fraud schemes within different industries can help organizations assess
and design controls to guard against the schemes that pose the most significant threats. Figure 16 provides a heat
map showing the relevant risk for each category of occupational fraud in every industry that had at least 50 report-
ed cases in our study. Boxes are shaded from light to dark red based on the respective level of occurrence, with
darker boxes indicating higher-frequency schemes.
FIG. 16 What are the most common occupational fraud schemes in various industries?
Cases
Billing
Cashlarceny
Cashonhand
Checkandpayment
tampering
Corruption
Expensereimbursements
Financialstatementfraud
Noncash
Payroll
Registerdisbursements
Skimming
I N D U S T R Y
Banking and financial
services
338 11% 14% 23% 12% 36% 7% 8% 11% 2% 3% 9%
Manufacturing 201 27% 8% 15% 12% 51% 18% 10% 28% 5% 3% 7%
Government and public
administration
184 15% 11% 11% 9% 50% 11% 5% 22% 7% 2% 11%
Health care 149 26% 7% 13% 13% 36% 16% 11% 19% 17% 1% 12%
Retail 104 20% 10% 19% 9% 28% 8% 12% 34% 5% 13% 13%
Education 96 23% 19% 19% 6% 38% 18% 6% 19% 6% 0% 14%
Insurance 87 20% 9% 3% 18% 45% 8% 7% 11% 3% 1% 11%
Energy 86 20% 2% 10% 12% 53% 10% 3% 27% 7% 2% 10%
Construction 83 37% 12% 8% 19% 42% 23% 16% 23% 14% 1% 13%
Transportation and
warehousing
79 25% 8% 8% 9% 46% 15% 8% 28% 3% 3% 13%
Food service and
hospitality
75 17% 16% 20% 11% 29% 12% 12% 24% 7% 0% 23%
Technology 62 26% 5% 10% 8% 42% 21% 16% 32% 8% 0% 6%
Religious, charitable, or
social services
58 40% 9% 22% 19% 34% 29% 10% 19% 22% 3% 17%
Services (professional) 54 26% 17% 15% 26% 17% 30% 13% 13% 15% 0% 15%
Arts, entertainment,
and recreation
50 14% 20% 36% 6% 32% 12% 8% 18% 4% 8% 28%
L E S S R I S K M O R E R I S K

26. Victim Organizations Report to the Nations26
As noted in Figure 16 on pg. 25, corruption poses
a significant risk to several industries, with the most
common occurrence of corruption schemes in the
energy, manufacturing, and government and public
administration sectors. Skimming schemes were also
notably more common in the arts, entertainment, and
recreation and the food service and hospitality indus-
tries than elsewhere, while payroll schemes occurred
more frequently in the religious, charitable, or social
services and the health care sectors. Interestingly, the
cases that occurred in religious, charitable, or social
services organizations also tended to involve the most
crossover between scheme types, meaning the perpe-
trators in these cases used many different schemes to
defraud the victims, rather than limiting their frauds to
one specific area.
Anti-Fraud Controls
at the Victim Organization
The presence of a robust system of anti-fraud con-
trols can be a powerful deterrent, as well as a proac-
tive prevention and detection mechanism, in the fight
against fraud. Thus, organizations can benefit from
knowing which anti-fraud controls are commonly
used by their peers, as well as which tend to be the
most effective. To help explore this information, we
provided survey respondents with a list of 18 enti-
ty-level, anti-fraud controls and asked which, if any,
were present at the victim organization at the time
the fraud occurred. As noted in Figure 17, 80% of the
organizations had a code of conduct and underwent
external financial statement audits, while 73% had
internal audit departments, and 72% had company
management certify the financial statements. On the
other end of the spectrum, 19% of organizations had
policies requiring job rotation or mandatory vacation,
and only 12% provided rewards for whistleblowers.
Effectiveness of Anti-Fraud Controls
Demonstrating the return on investment in anti-fraud
initiatives can be a difficult task, as it is nearly impos-
sible to measure the amount of fraud prevented by a
specific control. However, many anti-fraud profession-
als find themselves needing to make a business case
to justify additional fraud prevention and detection
initiatives. To provide some visibility into the relative ef-
fectiveness of various anti-fraud controls, we compared
the losses experienced by the victim organizations that
had specific controls in place against the losses experi-
enced by those that had not implemented each control.
The results of this analysis are provided in Figure 18
on pg. 28. Interestingly, the presence of every control
we analyzed was correlated with lower fraud losses.
For example, the use of proactive data monitoring and
analysis and surprise audits was associated with a
more than 50% reduction in fraud losses.
We similarly analyzed the duration of fraud schemes
based on the presence or absence of each anti-fraud
control (see Figure 19 on pg. 29). Data monitoring and
analysis and surprise audits were correlated with the
most significant reductions in fraud duration; as these
two controls were also associated with some of the
largest loss reductions, our data indicates that they are
among the most useful tools in the fight against fraud.

27. Victim Organizations Report to the Nations 27
FIG. 17 What anti-fraud controls are most common?
Code of conduct
External audit of financial statements
Management certification of financial statements
Internal audit department
External audit of internal controls over financial reporting
Management review
80%
80%
73%
72%
67%
66%
Independent audit committee
Employee support programs
Fraud training for employees
Anti-fraud policy
Fraud training for managers/executives
Dedicated fraud department, function, or team
63%
61%
54%
54%
53%
52%
41%
41%
37%
37%
19%
12%
Hotline
Formal fraud risk assessments
Surprise audits
Job rotation/mandatory vacation
Proactive data monitoring/analysis
Rewards for whistleblowers

28. Victim Organizations Report to the Nations28
FIG. 18 How does the presence of anti-fraud controls relate to median loss?
Control
Percent
of cases
Control
in place
Control not
in place
Percent
reduction
Code of conduct 80% $110,000 $250,000 56%
Proactive data monitoring/analysis 37% $80,000 $165,000 52%
Surprise audits 37% $75,000 $152,000 51%
External audit of internal controls over financial reporting 67% $100,000 $200,000 50%
Management review 66% $100,000 $200,000 50%
Hotline 63% $100,000 $200,000 50%
Anti-fraud policy 54% $100,000 $190,000 47%
Internal audit department 73% $108,000 $200,000 46%
Management certification of financial statements 72% $109,000 $192,000 43%
Fraud training for employees 53% $100,000 $169,000 41%
Formal fraud risk assessments 41% $100,000 $162,000 38%
Employee support programs 54% $100,000 $160,000 38%
Fraud training for managers/executives 52% $100,000 $153,000 35%
Dedicated fraud department, function, or team 41% $100,000 $150,000 33%
External audit of financial statements 80% $120,000 $170,000 29%
Job rotation/mandatory vacation 19% $100,000 $130,000 23%
Independent audit committee 61% $120,000 $150,000 20%
Rewards for whistleblowers 12% $110,000 $125,000 12%
$50,000
$100,000
$150,000
$200,000
$250,000
Median loss with controls
Median loss without controls
12%
20% 23%
29%
33%
35%
38%
38% 41%
43%
46% 47%
50%50%
50% 51%
52%
56%
P E R C E N T
R E D U C T I O N
Rewardsforwhistleblowers
Independentauditcommittee
Jobrotation/mandatoryvacation
Externalauditoffinancialstatements
Dedicatedfrauddepartment,function,orteam
Fraudtrainingformanagers/executives
Employeesupportprograms
Formalfraudriskassessments
Fraudtrainingforemployees
Managementcertificationoffinancialstatements
Internalauditdepartment
Anti-fraudpolicy
Hotline
Managementreview
Externalauditofinternalcontrolsoverfinancialreporting
Surpriseaudits
Proactivedatamonitoring/analysis
Codeofconduct
0

29. Victim Organizations Report to the Nations 29
FIG. 19 How does the presence of anti-fraud controls relate to the duration of fraud?
Control
Percent
of cases
Control
in place
Control not
in place
Percent
reduction
Proactive data monitoring/analysis 37% 10 months 24 months 58%
Surprise audits 37% 11 months 24 months 54%
Internal audit department 73% 12 months 24 months 50%
Management certification of financial statements 72% 12 months 24 months 50%
External audit of internal controls over financial reporting 67% 12 months 24 months 50%
Management review 66% 12 months 24 months 50%
Hotline 63% 12 months 24 months 50%
Anti-fraud policy 54% 12 months 24 months 50%
Fraud training for employees 53% 12 months 24 months 50%
Fraud training for managers/executives 52% 12 months 24 months 50%
Formal fraud risk assessments 41% 12 months 24 months 50%
Rewards for whistleblowers 12% 9 months 18 months 50%
Independent audit committee 61% 12 months 23 months 48%
Code of conduct 80% 13 months 24 months 46%
Job rotation/mandatory vacation 19% 10 months 18 months 44%
Dedicated fraud department, function, or team 41% 12 months 20 months 40%
External audit of financial statements 80% 15 months 24 months 38%
Employee support programs 54% 12 months 18 months 33%
0
5
10
15
20
25
Median duration with controls
Median duration without controls
P E R C E N T
R E D U C T I O N
Employeesupportprograms
Externalauditoffinancialstatements
Dedicatedfrauddepartment,function,orteam
Jobrotation/mandatoryvacation
Codeofconduct
Independentauditcommittee
Rewardsforwhistleblowers
Formalfraudriskassessments
Fraudtrainingformanagers/executives
Fraudtrainingforemployees
Anti-fraudpolicy
Hotline
Proactivedatamonitoring/analysis
Managementreview
Externalauditofinternalcontrolsoverfinancialreporting
Managementcertificationoffinancialstatements
Internalauditdepartment
Surpriseaudits
MEDIANMONTHSTODETECTION
58%
33%
38% 40%
44%
46%
48%
50%
50%
50%50%
50% 50%
54%
50%
50%
50% 50%

30. Victim Organizations Report to the Nations30
Background Checks
Effectively preventing fraud
begins with ensuring that
the organization hires ethical
employees. As part of our
study, we examined whether
the victim organizations ran
a background check on the
perpetrator prior to hiring him
or her, as well as whether the
background check revealed
any potential indicators of the
employee’s dishonesty. As
noted in Figure 20, 52% of the
organizations ran background
checks, while 48% did not.
Of the organizations that did
run a check before hiring the
perpetrator, 10% were alerted
to a red flag regarding the
perpetrator but chose to hire
the person anyway.
We also asked about the
types of background checks
used by the victim organiza-
tions in our study. Figure 21
shows that these organiza-
tions were most likely to look
into the individual’s employ-
ment and criminal history, with
three-quarters or more of the
background checks covering
these areas.
FIG. 20 Was a background check run on the perpetrator prior to hiring?
FIG. 21 What types of background checks were run
on the perpetrator prior to hiring?
Yes 52%
Did the check reveal
existing red flags?
No
Yes 10%
90%No 48%
Employment history
Criminal checks
Reference checks
Education verification
Credit checks
Other
75%
78%
50%
55%
4%
36%

31. Victim Organizations Report to the Nations 31
Internal Control Weaknesses that Contributed to Fraud
Understanding the factors that can lead to fraud is the foundation of preventing future occurrences. Conse-
quently, we asked survey respondents what they perceived to be the primary internal control weakness that
contributed to the fraud they reported. In 30% of cases, a simple lack of controls was the main factor that
enabled the fraud to occur, while another 19% of cases occurred because the perpetrator was able to override
the controls that had been put in place.
FIG. 22 What are the primary internal control weaknesses that contribute to occupational fraud?
Lack of clear lines of authority
Lack of independent checks/audits
2%
Lack of employee fraud education 2%
Lack of reporting mechanism 1 %
4%
Lack of internal controls 30%
Override of existing controls 19%
Lack of management review 18%
Poor tone at the top 10%
Lack of competent personnel in oversight roles 8%
Other 6%

32. Victim Organizations Report to the Nations32
We also analyzed these
control weaknesses based
on the category of fraud
involved in the scheme (see
Figure 23). Not surprisingly,
a poor tone at the top was
much more likely to be the
primary factor in financial
statement fraud and cor-
ruption cases than in asset
misappropriation cases.
However, it is interesting to
note that a lack of internal
controls is more common in
asset misappropriation and
financial statement frauds,
while corruption schemes
are more likely than other
schemes to involve an
override of existing con-
trols. In addition, a lack
of management review is
more commonly the reason
for asset misappropriation
schemes than other forms
of fraud.
FIG. 23 How do internal control weaknesses vary by scheme type?
Lack of internal controls
Lack of management review
Override of existing internal controls
Poor tone at the top
Lack of competent personnel in oversight roles
Lack of independent checks/audits
29%
Other
Lack of clear lines of authority
Lack of employee fraud education
Lack of reporting mechanism
32%
25%
15%
19%
15%
14%
18%
21%
23%
9%
18%
5%
8%
6%
8%
5%
7%
5%
4%
3%
1%
2%
3%
0%
2%
2%
1%
1%
1%
Asset misappropriation Corruption Financial statement fraud

33. Perpetrators Report to the Nations 33
FIG. 24 How does the perpetrator’s level of authority
relate to occupational fraud?
Perpetrator’s Position
As seen in Figure 24, there is
a strong correlation between
the fraud perpetrator’s level of
authority and the size of the
fraud. While owners/execu-
tives only committed 19% of the
frauds in our study, the schemes
committed by these individuals
resulted in a median loss of USD
850,000, which was nearly six
times larger than the median
loss caused by managers, and 17
times larger than the median loss
caused by low-level employees.
A significant correlation between
authority and fraud loss has
been found in every edition of
the report dating back to 1996.
This correlation likely reflects
the fact that high-level fraudsters
tend to have greater access to
an organization’s assets than
low-level personnel. They may
also have greater technical
ability to commit and conceal
fraud, and they might be able to
use their authority to override or
conceal their crimes in ways that
low-level employees cannot.
PERPETRATORS
What does a typical fraudster look like?
We asked survey respondents to provide a broad range of information about
the fraud perpetrators they investigated, including the offenders’ conditions
of employment, basic demographics, prior misconduct, and behavior that
might have been warning signs of fraudulent activity. Our goal is to identify
common characteristics and risk profiles for those who commit occupational
fraud, which can help organizations better recognize fraud perpetrators or
those at risk for engaging in fraudulent activity.
3%
$50,000
$150,000
$850,000
$189,000
44%
34%
19%
Employee Manager Owner/executive Other
PERCENTOFCASESMEDIANLOSS

34. FRAUD COMMITTED BY OWNERS AND EXECUTIVES
Occupational frauds committed by owners/executives tend to be extremely
costly. How do these cases differ from non-owner/executive frauds?
$850,000
$100,000
OWNERS/EXECUTIVES
NON-OWNERS/
EXECUTIVES
MEDIAN LOSS
34%
65%of owner/executive
frauds involved
corruption
27%of owner/executive
frauds involved financial
statement fraud
Non-ownerS/executives
6%
Non-ownerS/executives
Corruption and financial statement fraud are the
two costliest forms of occupational fraud
34 Perpetrators Report to the Nations
As Figure 26 shows, fraud losses tend to increase
based on how long the fraud perpetrator worked
for the victim organization. Perpetrators with
less than one year of tenure caused a median
loss of USD 40,000, while those with more than
ten years’ experience at the victim organization
caused a median loss of USD 241,000, more than
six times as high.
One reason frauds committed by high-level perpe-
trators are more costly could be that their schemes
tend to last longer. The median duration of a scheme
committed by an owner/executive was 24 months,
compared to 18 months for schemes committed by
managers and 12 months for those committed by
employees (See Figure 7 on pg. 14 for more informa-
tion on the correlation between fraud duration and
median loss.).
FIG. 25 How does the perpetrator’s level of
authority relate to scheme duration?
Position Median months to detection
Employee 12 months
Manager 18 months
Owner/executive 24 months
Perpetrator’s Tenure

35. 66+45
62+41
Collusion schemes tend to be more
costly than single-perpetrator frauds
Frauds detected by a third-party
auditor or law enforcement:
was most common, observed in
41% of owner/executive cases
Owners/executives
are more likely to collude
with others
Owners/executives
engaged in non-fraud-related
misconduct more often
Frauds that are not detected internally tend to be much more costly
66%
45%
owners/executives
non-owners/executives
owners/executives
non-owners/executives
of cases involved
collusion
of cases involved
collusion
62%
41%
of cases involved non-
fraud-related misconduct
of cases involved non-
fraud-related misconduct
bullying or intimidation
�����
Non-owner/executive
1 in 25
Owner/executive
1 in 8
35Perpetrators Report to the Nations
FIG. 26 How does the perpetrator’s tenure relate to occupational fraud?
Less than 1 year
1–5 years
6–10 years
More than
10 years
M E D I A N L O S SP E R C E N T O F C A S E S
$100,000
$173,000
$241,00024%
23%
44%
9% $40,000

36. Perpetrators Report to the Nations36
Figure 28 shows the frequency and median loss in
fraud cases based on where the fraudster worked
within the victim organization. This heat map provides
a visual representation of the relative fraud risks posed
by various departments. For example, we can see that
accounting and operations were each responsible for
14% of the frauds in our study, but the median loss
caused by those in the accounting department (USD
212,000) was significantly larger than the median loss
from operations (USD 88,000). Frauds committed by
those in executive or upper-management roles were
slightly less common, but much costlier.
One possible explanation for the correlation be-
tween tenure and fraud loss might be that employ-
ees who have been with an organization for long
periods of time are often promoted to positions of
greater authority. As seen in Figure 24 on pg. 33,
there is a strong correlation between authority and
fraud loss.
To test this explanation, we separated all fraud
offenders into two groups: those who had been with
their organizations five years or fewer, and those
who had been with their organizations six years or
more. We then compared the median loss for these
two groups across similar levels of authority. Inter-
estingly, at every level, the more tenured fraudsters
caused significantly larger losses than their less
tenured counterparts. This indicates that the correla-
tion between tenure and fraud loss to some extent
operates independently from the offender’s level of
authority. We believe it is likely that those with longer
tenure at a victim organization tend to have a better
understanding of the organization’s controls and
processes—including gaps or weaknesses in those
processes—which may enable them to do a better
job of committing and concealing fraud. In a sense,
these perpetrators are learning from experience how
to steal from their employers.
FIG. 27 How does the perpetrator’s tenure relate to median loss at different levels of authority?
Perpetrator’s Department
6 years or more
5 years or less
Employee
Manager
Owner/executive
$100,000
$200,000
$125,000
$1,000,000
$672,000
$35,000
M E D I A N L O S S

37. Perpetrators Report to the Nations 37
FIG. 28 What departments pose the greatest risk for occupational fraud?
*Departments with fewer than ten cases were omitted.
Department* Percent of cases Median loss
Accounting 14% $212,000
Operations 14% $88,000
Sales 12% $90,000
Executive/upper management 11% $729,000
Customer service 8% $26,000
Administrative support 8% $91,000
Other 6% $77,000
Finance 6% $156,000
Purchasing 5% $163,000
Facilities and maintenance 3% $175,000
Warehousing/inventory 3% $200,000
Information technology 3% $225,000
Marketing/public relations 2% $80,000
Manufacturing and production 2% $200,000
Human resources 1% $76,000
0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16%$0
$50,000
$100,000
$150,000
$200,000
$250,000
L E S S R I S K M O R E R I S K
Human resources
Manufacturing
and production Warehousing/inventory
Information technology
Facilities and maintenance
Purchasing
Finance
Other
Administrative support
Customer service
Sales Operations
Accounting
Marketing/public relations
Executive/upper management
$729,000
11%

38. Perpetrators Report to the Nations38
Schemes Based on Perpetrator’s Department
Overall, 77% of the occupational frauds in our study came from eight departments: accounting, operations,
sales, executive/upper management, customer service, administrative support, finance, and purchasing. Figure
29 shows the relative frequency of various fraud schemes in each of those departments. Boxes are shaded
from light to dark red based on the frequency for each particular scheme, with darker boxes indicating higher
levels of risk. This data should be useful for organizations to assess risk and develop effective anti-fraud
controls in the departments most likely to be occupational fraud hotspots.
L E S S R I S K M O R E R I S K
FIG. 29 What are the most common occupational fraud schemes in high-risk departments?
Cases
Billing
Cashlarceny
Cashonhand
Checkandpayment
tampering
Corruption
Expensereimbursements
Financialstatementfraud
Noncash
Payroll
Registerdisbursements
Skimming
I N D U S T R Y
Accounting 290 29% 14% 17% 30% 23% 12% 13% 7% 14% 2% 19%
Operations 266 15% 8% 15% 8% 36% 11% 4% 20% 5% 2% 11%
Executive/upper
management
223 35% 14% 16% 15% 62% 29% 30% 20% 12% 3% 9%
Sales 216 10% 12% 12% 6% 34% 13% 6% 25% 2% 5% 14%
Customer service 155 5% 16% 31% 8% 19% 4% 1% 15% 3% 5% 14%
Administrative support 147 33% 7% 21% 14% 26% 22% 8% 19% 13% 3% 14%
Finance 110 17% 15% 21% 16% 37% 13% 16% 15% 6% 2% 10%
Purchasing 94 18% 5% 6% 5% 77% 10% 3% 31% 3% 2% 4%

39. �
����
�
����
Male Female
69%
31%
92%
8%
Western Europe
Canada
United States
Middle East
and North Africa
Asia-Pacific
Southern Asia
Sub-Saharan AfricaLatin American
and the Caribbean
Eastern Europe and
Western/Central Asia
�����
84%
16%
�����
73%
27%
�����
88%
12%
�����
76%
24%
�����
77%
23%
�����
21%
79%
�����58%
42%
39Perpetrators Report to the Nations
Figure 30 shows that a sizeable majority
of the fraudsters in our study (69%) were
males. Men also caused much larger medi-
an losses (USD 156,000) than females (USD
89,000). This is consistent with our past
studies, which have all shown males to be
responsible for between 65% and 70% of
frauds along with a significant disparity in
fraud loss.
Perpetrator’s Gender Based on Region
The gender distribution of occupational
fraudsters varies significantly by region.
As seen in Figure 31, in the United States
men accounted for 58% of all occupational
frauds, whereas in the Middle East and
North Africa this figure was 92%.
FIG. 30 How does the perpetrator’s
gender relate to occupational fraud?
FIG. 31 How does the gender distribution of
perpetrators vary by region?
Perpetrator’s Gender
$89,000
$156,000
31%
69%
Male Female
PERCENTOFCASESMEDIANLOSS

40. Perpetrators Report to the Nations40
Position of Perpetrator
Based on Gender
One possible reason that fraud
losses caused by men are larger
than those caused by women
could be related to levels of
authority. As shown in Figure 24
on pg. 33, fraudsters with high
levels of authority (e.g., execu-
tives and owners) tend to cause
much larger losses than those
with low authority (e.g., rank-
and-file employees).
Figure 32 shows that the pro-
portion of male fraudsters rises
with the perpetrators’ level of
authority. At the employee level,
only 58% of fraudsters were
male, but that number increased
to 73% for managers and 86%
for owners/executives. Given
that there were far more men
than women in higher levels
of authority in our dataset, we
would expect the median loss
for males to be larger.
But interestingly, even when
we account for authority
level, males still tend to cause
significantly larger losses than
females in managerial and
owner/executive roles. Male
owners/executives caused a
median loss of USD 1 million,
as opposed to a median loss
of USD 295,000 caused by
female owners/executives.
Among managers there was
also a gender discrepancy in
median loss, although not nearly
as large. At the employee level,
male and female median losses
were equal.
FIG. 32 How does gender distribution and median loss vary based on
the perpetrator’s level of authority?
86%
73%
58%
$50,000 $50,000
$165,000
$128,000
$295,000
$1,000,000
42%
27%
14%
Owner/executiveManagerEmployee
Male Female
PERCENTOFCASESMEDIANLOSS

41. Perpetrators Report to the Nations 41
Perpetrator’s Age
The age distribution of
occupational fraudsters
is roughly bell-shaped, as
seen in Figure 33. Losses,
however, tend to rise with
the age of the fraudster.
The largest median losses
in our study were caused
by fraudsters in the oldest
age ranges (56 and older),
while those who were 30
or younger caused a much
smaller amount of damage.
FIG. 33 How does the perpetrator’s age relate to occupational fraud?
FIG. 34 How does the perpetrator’s education
level relate to occupational fraud?
Figure 34 shows there is also a correlation between the
fraudster’s education level and the size of the fraud.
Those with a postgraduate degree caused a median
loss of USD 230,000 and those with a university degree
caused a median loss of USD 160,000. Both of these fig-
ures were much higher than the median loss of schemes
by fraudsters with a high school degree or less.
This data might indicate that highly educated fraudsters
have superior technical abilities or knowledge that make
them more effective at committing fraud, but it is also
probably influenced by the fraudster’s position of au-
thority. More highly educated individuals tend to occupy
higher positions within an organization. For example, in
our study approximately 68% of those with a university
or postgraduate degree were either managers or own-
ers/executives.
Perpetrator’s Education Level
15%
10%
5%
$200,000
$40,000
$23,000
$100,000 $100,000
$250,000 $237,000
$480,000
$355,000
19% 19%
14%
9%
6%
3%
26 26–30 31–35 36–40 41–45 46–50 51–55 56–60 60
PERCENTOFCASESMEDIANLOSS
High school
graduate or less
Postgraduate
degree
University
degree
Some
university
47%
24%
15% 14%
$75,000
$160,000
$130,000
$230,000
PERCENTOFCASESMEDIANLOSS

42. Perpetrators Report to the Nations42
Collusion by Multiple
Perpetrators
Approximately half of the cases
in our study involved multiple
perpetrators who colluded with
one another to commit fraud. As
Figure 35 illustrates, fraud losses
rose significantly when more
than one fraudster was involved
in a scheme. One likely explana-
tion for this finding is that many
anti-fraud controls work on the
principles of separation of duties
and independent checks. When
multiple perpetrators conspire in
a fraud scheme, they can circum-
vent the system of independent
verification that might otherwise
detect fraud.
Perpetrator’s
Criminal Background
The vast majority of occupational
fraudsters have no prior history
of criminal fraud convictions.
Only 4% of the perpetrators in
our 2018 study had previously
been convicted of a fraud-related
offense, which is consistent with
our findings in every study dating
back to 1996. This suggests that
most occupational fraudsters are
first-time offenders. However, ac-
cording to Figure 43 on pg. 49,
between 58% and 69% of occu-
pational fraud cases in our past
studies were never referred to
law enforcement, which indicates
that the actual number of repeat
offenders is probably higher than
what can be identified through
conviction records.
FIG. 35 How does the number of perpetrators in a scheme relate to
occupational fraud?
FIG. 36 Do perpetrators tend to have prior fraud convictions?
�����
�����
�����
ONE
PERPETRATOR
TWO
PERPETRATORS
THREE OR MORE
PERPETRATORS
$74,000
$150,000
$339,000
52%
Median
loss
of cases
19%of cases
30%of cases
Median
loss
Median
loss
Never charged or convicted (89%)
Charged but not convicted (6%)
Had prior convictions (4%)
Other (1%)

43. 43Perpetrators Report to the Nations
Perpetrator’s Employment History
Figure 37 shows that 85% of occupational fraud
perpetrators had never been punished or termi-
nated for fraud-related conduct prior to the crimes
in this study. This also tends to indicate that most
occupational fraudsters are first-time offenders,
but as with criminal conviction data discussed
earlier, this data might understate the real number
of repeat offenders. According to Figure 41 on pg.
47, 28% of fraudsters in our study either received
no punishment from their employers, were permit-
ted to resign, or entered into private settlement
agreements (which are typically confidential).
Therefore, the true number of repeat offenders
may be higher than what is indicated by employ-
ment background checks.
FIG. 37 Do perpetrators tend to have prior
employment-related disciplinary actions for fraud?
Behavioral Red Flags
Displayed by Perpetrators
Individuals who are engaged in occu-
pational fraud schemes often exhibit
certain behavioral traits or warning
signs associated with their illegal activ-
ity. We presented survey respondents
with a list of 17 common behavioral red
flags and asked them to tell us which,
if any, of these red flags had been
displayed by the perpetrator before the
fraud was discovered.
Figure 38 on pg. 45 shows the fre-
quency of behavioral red flags in our
2018 cases. The six most common
behavioral indicators of occupational
fraud were: (1) living beyond means; (2)
financial difficulties; (3) unusually close
association with a vendor or customer;
(4) excessive control issues or unwill-
ingness to share duties; (5) recent
divorce or family problems; and (6) a
general “wheeler-dealer” attitude in-
volving shrewd or unscrupulous behav-
ior. These six red flags have been the
six most common behavioral indicators
in every report since we began tracking
this data in 2008. (See “The Red Flags
of Fraud” on pg. 44.)
Never punished or terminated (85%)
Previously terminated (9%)
Previously punished (6%)
Other (1%)

44. THE RED FLAGS OF FRAUD
Understanding and recognizing the behavioral red flags displayed by fraud perpetrators
can help organizations detect fraud and mitigate losses.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
“Wheeler-dealer”
attitude
Divorce/
family problems
Control issues,
unwillingness
to share duties
Unusually close
association with
vendor/customer
Financial
difficulties
Living beyond
means
2018
2016
2014
2012
2010
2008
Red flags varied by
PERPETRATOR’S POSITION
OWNER/
EXECUTIVE EMPLOYEE
Control issues, unwillingness to
share duties
16%
11%
35%
10%
9%
8%
24%
4%
23%
18%
22%
21%
Unusually close association with
vendor/customer
Financial difficulties
Complained about inadequate pay
“Wheeler-dealer” attitude
Irritability, suspiciousness, or
defensiveness
have been the most common in
every one of our studies dating
back to 2008, with a remarkably
consistent distribution
behavioral
red flags
These
Red flags varied by
PERPETRATOR’S GENDER
Financial difficulties
Divorce/family problems
Instability in life circumstances
39%
3%
6%
11%
6%
20%
24%
8%
16%
24%
2%
11%
Unusually close association with
vendor/customer
“Wheeler-dealer” attitude
Excessive pressure from within
the organization
fraudsters displayed at least85%
50%
OF CASES
IN
OF CASES
one behavioral red flag
AND IN
they exhibited
multiple red flags
44 Perpetrators Report to the Nations

45. 45
FIG. 38 How often do perpetrators exhibit behavioral red flags?
Living beyond means
Financial difficulties
Unusually close association with vendor/customer
No behavioral red flags
Control issues, unwillingness to share duties
Divorce/family problems
“Wheeler-dealer” attitude
Irritability, suspiciousness, or defensiveness
Addiction problems
Complained about inadequate pay
Excessive pressure from within organization
Social isolation
Past legal problems
Refusal to take vacations
Past employment-related problems
Complained about lack of authority
Excessive family/peer pressure for success
Other
Instability in life circumstances
41%
29%
20%
15%
15%
14%
13%
12%
10%
9%
7%
7%
6%
6%
6%
5%
4%
4%
3%

46. Perpetrators Report to the Nations46
Non-Fraud-Related
Misconduct by Perpetrators
We presented survey respondents with a list of com-
mon non-fraud workplace violations and asked them
to identify any that the fraudster had been engaged
in prior to or during the time of the fraud. As Figure
39 shows, 45% of fraud offenders had committed
some form of non-fraud workplace violation, which
could potentially indicate a link between occupational
fraud and other forms of workplace misconduct. The
most common non-fraud violation was bullying or
intimidation, which was observed in 21% of all cases.
Human Resources-Related Red Flags
In some circumstances, negative events surrounding
a person’s conditions of employment (such as poor
performance evaluations, loss of pay or benefits, fear
of job loss, etc.) can cause financial stress or resent-
ment toward the employer, which might play a role
in the decision to commit fraud. We refer to these
events as “human resources-related red flags.” As
Figure 40 shows, 39% of fraudsters had experienced
some form of HR-related red flags prior to or during
the time of their frauds. The most common of these
were negative performance evaluations (14% of cas-
es) and fear of job loss (13%).
FIG. 39 Do fraud perpetrators also
engage in non-fraud-related misconduct?
FIG. 40 Do fraud perpetrators experience negative
HR-related issues prior to or during their frauds?
Yes 45% No 55%
Bullying or intimidation (21%)
Excessive absenteeism (14%)
Excessive tardiness (10%)
Excessive Internet browsing (7%)
Sexual harassment (4%)
Visiting inappropriate websites (4%)
Other (4%)
Yes 39% No 61%
Poor performance evaluations (14%)
Fear of job loss (13%)
Actual job loss (5%)
Cut in benefits (4%)
Other (4%)
Cut in pay (3%)
Demotion (3%)
Involuntary cut in hours (3%)

47. 47
CASE RESULTS
How do organizations react after a fraud has been
discovered?
We asked our respondents about what happened after the fraud was deter-
mined to have occurred. This data is valuable for developing expectations
about the remedies that are available to organizations, as well as evaluating
the common punitive actions taken against fraud perpetrators. The common
theme in this data is that while it is often worthwhile to pursue remedial ac-
tion against perpetrators, victims will usually not be made whole.
FIG. 41 How do victim organizations punish fraud perpetrators?Internal Action
Taken Against
Perpetrator
Survey respondents pro-
vided information about
how perpetrators were
internally punished or
dealt with. Not surprisingly,
termination was the most
common disciplinary ac-
tion taken in occupational
fraud cases (65%). It is
noteworthy that over one-
third of perpetrators were
not terminated as a direct
result of committing fraud.
In some cases the victim
organization imposed
lighter punishments such
as permitting the offender
to resign (10% of cases)
or placing him or her on
probation (8% of cases),
while in 6% of cases the
fraudster received no
punishment at all.
Termination
Settlement agreement
Perpetrator was no longer with organization
Permitted or required resignation
Probation or suspension
No punishment
Other
65%
12%
11%
10%
8%
6%
4%

48. Case Results Report to the Nations48
From the perspective
of ethics and fair-
ness, there might be
no reason to treat a
high-level fraud perpe-
trator more leniently
than an entry-level
employee. However,
our data shows that
punishment is substan-
tially dependent on the
perpetrator’s position
at the organization.
While employees and
mid-level managers
are more likely than
not to be terminated
(72% and 67%, respec-
tively), fewer than half
of owners/executives
were terminated (44%).
Generally, the higher up
the perpetrators were
at the organization, the
more likely they were to
receive lighter punish-
ments (e.g., permitted or
required resignation) or
no punishment at all.
FIG. 42 Does the perpetrator’s position affect the punishment for fraud?
After a fraud has been discovered and investigated,
the case might proceed to prosecution, civil litiga-
tion, both, or neither. There are many factors that can
affect this result, such as the amount of the financial
loss, the strength of evidence, and prosecutorial
discretion. Figure 43 shows the percent of cases
that were referred to law enforcement or resulted in
a civil suit being filed for each of our studies dating
back to 2008. This chart illustrates that the rate of
criminal referrals has gradually decreased over that
time, from 69% in 2008 to 58% in 2018. In contrast,
the rate at which civil suits are filed has stayed
consistent, ranging from 22% to 24% within the same
timeframe.
Criminal Prosecutions and Civil Suits
72%
67%
44%
10%
12%
18%
10%
12%
15%
Termination
Settlement agreement
Perpetrator was no longer with organization
8%
11%
16%
Permitted or required resignation
8%
8%
7%
Probation or suspension
3%
5%
12%
No punishment
Owner/executive Manager Employee

49. 49
FIG. 43 How often is litigation pursued against occupational
fraud perpetrators?
FIG. 44 What were the results of criminal referrals? FIG. 45 What were the results of civil suits?
Results of Criminal or Civil Litigation
We also asked respondents about the
results of any litigation pursued; this
data is shown in Figures 44 and 45. On
the criminal side, most cases that were
referred to law enforcement ended in a
plea agreement or a conviction at trial
(73% combined). If a case referred to law
enforcement did not end in a conviction,
it was most likely because law enforce-
ment declined to prosecute (18%). The
results suggest that once law enforce-
ment decides that it will proceed with
prosecution, it has an overwhelming
chance of securing a conviction; only 1%
of defendants obtained an acquittal.
In addition, more than half of judg-
ments in civil suits were favorable to
victims, with an additional 27% of cases
being settled. Perpetrators obtained a
favorable judgment in only 15% of civil
cases that went to trial.
Case Results Report to the Nations
201820162014201220102008 201820162014201220102008
22% 23% 23%23%
24%
22%
61%
59%
58%
65%
64%
69%
Referred to law enforcement
Civil suit filed
AcquittedOtherDeclined
to prosecute
Convicted
at trial
Pleaded
guilty/no
contest
53%
20%
18%
7%
1%
OtherJudgment
for perpetrator
SettledJudgment
for victim
53%
27%
15%
5%

50. WHEN VICTIM ORGANIZATIONS ARE FINED
In addition to the direct cost of the fraud, some organizations receive monetary fines from
authorities for having inadequate controls or allowing the fraud to occur.
�����$10,000
14% �����$10,000–$99,999
34% �����$100,000–$999,999
31% �����$1,000,000+
20%$100,000
the median fine was
OF FINES
OF FINES
OF FINES
OF FINES
Financial statement fraud schemes
were the most likely to result in a fine
to the victim organization
8%11%17% Asset
misappropriationCorruption
Financial
statement fraud
50 Case Results Report to the Nations
FIG. 46 Why do organizations decide not to refer cases to law enforcement?Reasons for Not
Referring Cases to
Law Enforcement
We know that the rate
of victim organizations
reporting occupational
fraud to law enforce-
ment has decreased in
recent years (see Figure
43 on pg. 49). There
are many reasons why
organizations might
decline to refer cases
for prosecution. In our
study, the top cause
cited was fear of bad
publicity (38%), followed
by internal discipline be-
ing sufficient (33%) and
costliness (24%).
Fear of bad publicity
Internal discipline sufficient
Too costly
Private settlement
Lack of evidence
Other
Civil suit
Perpetrator disappeared
38%
33%
24%
21%
12%
12%
4%
2%

51. RECOVERING FRAUD LOSSES
After a fraud has been detected, the victim might try to recover its losses from the fraudster or
other sources. Our data shows that victims are rarely made whole.
53%
Recovered
NOTHING
32%
MaDe a Partial
Recovery
15%
Recovered
ALL LOSSES
The more victims lose,
the less likely they are
to make a FULLRECOVERY ����� ����� ����� �����
$10,000
LOST
$10,000–$100,000
LOST
$100,001–$1,000,000
LOST
$1,000,000+
30% 16% 13% 8%
LOST
RECOVER
ALL LOSSES
RECOVER
ALL LOSSES
RECOVER
ALL LOSSES
RECOVER
ALL LOSSES
51Case Results Report to the Nations

52. Methodology Report to the Nations52
Respondents were then presented
with 76 questions to answer regard-
ing the particular details of the
fraud case, including information
about the perpetrator, the victim
organization, and the methods of
fraud employed, as well as fraud
trends in general. (Respondents
were not asked to identify the per-
petrator or the victim.) We received
7,232 total responses to the survey,
2,690 of which were usable for
purposes of this report. The data
contained herein is based solely on
the information provided in these
2,690 survey responses.
Analysis Methodology
In calculating the percentages
discussed throughout this re-
port, we used the total number of
complete and relevant responses
for the question(s) being analyzed.
Specifically, we excluded any blank
responses or instances where the
participant indicated that he or
she did not know the answer to a
question. Consequently, the total
number of cases included in each
analysis varies.
In addition, several survey ques-
tions allowed participants to select
more than one answer. Therefore,
the sum of percentages in many fig-
ures throughout the report exceeds
100%. The sum of percentages in
other figures might not be exactly
100% (i.e., it might be 99% or 101%)
due to rounding of individual cate-
gory data.
METHODOLOGY
Who contributed to our survey?
The 2018 Report to the Nations is based on
the results of the 2017 Global Fraud Survey, an
online survey opened to 41,573 Certified Fraud
Examiners (CFEs) from July 2017 to October
2017. As part of the survey, respondents were
asked to provide a narrative description of the
single largest fraud case they had investigated
since January 2016. Additionally, after com-
pleting the survey the first time, respondents
were provided the option to submit information
about a second case that they investigated.
Cases submitted were required to
meet the following four criteria:
1. The case must have involved occupa-
tional fraud (defined as fraud committed
by a person against the organization for
which he or she works).
2. The investigation must have occurred
between January 2016 and the time of
survey participation.
3. The investigation must have been com-
plete at the time of survey participation.
4. The respondent must have been
reasonably sure the perpetrator(s) was
(were) identified.

53. 53
Unless otherwise indicated, all loss
amounts discussed throughout the
report are calculated using median
loss rather than mean, or average,
loss. Average losses were skewed by
a limited number of very high-dollar
frauds. Using median loss provides a
more conservative—and we believe
more accurate—picture of the typical
impact of occupational fraud schemes.
Additionally, we excluded median loss
calculations for categories for which
there were fewer than ten responses.
Because the direct losses caused by
financial statement frauds are typically
spread among numerous stakehold-
ers, obtaining an accurate estimate for
this amount is extremely difficult. Con-
sequently, for schemes involving finan-
cial statement fraud, we asked survey
participants to provide the gross
amount of the financial statement mis-
statement (over- or under-statement)
involved in the scheme. All losses
reported for financial statement frauds
throughout this report are based on
those reported amounts.
Methodology Report to the Nations

54. Methodology Report to the Nations54
FIG. 47 What was the primary occupation of survey participants?Primary Occupation
As noted in Figure 47,
37% of survey respon-
dents indicated that their
primary occupation is as
a fraud examiner/inves-
tigator, followed by 22%
who indicated they are
internal auditors.
Survey Participants
To provide context for the survey responses and to understand who investigates cases of occupational fraud,
we asked respondents to provide certain information about their professional experience and qualifications.
Fraud examiner/investigator
Internal auditor
Accounting/finance professional
Law enforcement
Compliance and ethics professional
Risk and controls professional
External/independent auditor
Consultant
Other
Corporate security and loss prevention
Attorney
Private investigator
Bank examiner
IT/computer forensics specialist
Educator
37%
22%
9%
7%
5%
4%
4%
4%
3%
3%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%

55. Methodology Report to the Nations 55
Nature of Fraud Examination Role
More than half of the CFEs who participated
in our study work in-house, conducting fraud
examinations on behalf of a single company
or agency. Twenty-seven percent work for a
professional services firm that conducts fraud
examinations for client organizations, while 18%
work in law enforcement and conduct fraud ex-
aminations under the authority of their agency.
Experience
The CFEs who participated in our study had a
median 11 years of experience in the fraud ex-
amination field, with over 30% having more than
15 years of experience.
Respondents also provided information on the
total number of fraud cases they worked on
in the prior two years. As shown in Figure 50,
one-quarter investigated more than 20 cas-
es, while 41% investigated five or fewer cases
during that time.
FIG. 48 What was the professional role
of the survey participants?
FIG. 49 How much fraud examination
experience did survey participants have?
FIG. 50 How many fraud cases have survey
participants investigated in the past two years?
���������In-house
examiner
53%
Professional
services firm
27%
Law
enforcement
18%
Other
2%
�����������6–10 years
28%
5 years
or fewer
22%
More than
20 years
19%
11–15 years
18%
16–20 years
13%
5 or fewer cases (41%)
6–10 cases (20%)
11–15 cases (7%)
16–20 cases (7%)
More than 20 cases (25%)

56. Asia-Pacific Report to the Nations56
FIG. 52 How is occupational fraud initially
detected in the Asia-Pacific region?
FIG. 51 What are the most common occupational
fraud schemes in the Asia-Pacific region?
REGIONAL FOCUS
ASIA-PACIFIC
Tip
Internal audit
Management review
External audit
Other
Document examination
Account reconciliation
Surveillance/monitoring
Notification by law enforcement
IT controls
Confession
47%
16%
10%
8%
4%
By accident
4%
3%
3%
2%
1%
1%
1%
Corruption
Noncash
Expense reimbursements
Billing
Financial statement fraud
Check and payment tampering
Cash larceny
Skimming
Payroll
Register disbursements
51%
25%
17%
14%
13%
Cash on hand
13%
8%
8%
7%
4%
3%

57. 57Asia-Pacific Report to the Nations
FIG. 55 Cases by country in the
Asia-Pacific region
Country Number of cases
Australia 38
Cambodia 2
China 49
East Timor 1
Hong Kong 10
Indonesia 29
Japan 4
Macau 1
Malaysia 14
Myanmar (Burma) 1
New Zealand 8
Papua New Guinea 1
Philippines 25
Singapore 17
South Korea 6
Taiwan 6
Thailand 3
Vietnam 5
Total cases: 220
FIG. 54 How does the perpetrator’s level of authority
relate to occupational fraud in the Asia-Pacific region?
FIG. 53 What anti-fraud controls are the most common in
the Asia-Pacific region?
Control Percent of cases
External audit of financial statements 93%
Code of conduct 87%
Internal audit department 80%
Management certification of financial statements 79%
Hotline 74%
External audit of internal controls over financial reporting 73%
Management review 71%
Independent audit committee 69%
Anti-fraud policy 60%
Fraud training for employees 59%
Fraud training for managers/executives 57%
Employee support programs 49%
Dedicated fraud department, function, or team 42%
Formal fraud risk assessments 37%
Surprise audits 34%
Proactive data monitoring/analysis 32%
Job rotation/mandatory vacation 16%
Rewards for whistleblowers 11%
Employee Manager Owner/executive
30%
41%
26%
$58,000
$323,000
$1,000,000
MEDIANLOSSPERCENTOFCASES
MEDIAN LOSS:
usd 236,000
�����220
CASES
11%
OF ALL CASES

58. Canada Report to the Nations58
FIG. 56 What are the most common occupational
fraud schemes in Canada?
FIG. 57 How is occupational fraud initially
detected in Canada?
REGIONAL FOCUS
CANADA
Corruption
Billing
Noncash
Financial statement fraud
Skimming
Expense reimbursements
Check and payment tampering
Payroll
Register disbursements
Cash larceny
40%
20%
18%
14%
13%
Cash on hand
13%
11%
10%
6%
3%
3%
Tip
Internal audit
Management review
Other
Surveillance/monitoring
Account reconciliation
Document examination
By accident
IT controls
32%
21%
15%
7%
6%
External audit
5%
5%
4%
4%
1%

59. 59Canada Report to the Nations
FIG. 59 How does the perpetrator’s level of authority
relate to occupational fraud in Canada?
FIG. 58 What anti-fraud controls are the most common in
Canada?
Control Percent of cases
Code of conduct 80%
External audit of financial statements 72%
Internal audit department 71%
Employee support programs 71%
Management review 68%
Management certification of financial statements 67%
Independent audit committee 61%
Hotline 57%
External audit of internal controls over financial reporting 54%
Fraud training for managers/executives 51%
Fraud training for employees 51%
Anti-fraud policy 44%
Proactive data monitoring/analysis 38%
Formal fraud risk assessments 35%
Dedicated fraud department, function, or team 33%
Surprise audits 28%
Job rotation/mandatory vacation 15%
Rewards for whistleblowers 10%
Employee Manager Owner/executive
47%
27%
23%
$156,000
$205,000
$600,000
MEDIANLOSSPERCENTOFCASES
MEDIAN LOSS:
usd 200,000
�����82
CASES
4%
OF ALL CASES

60. Eastern Europe and Western/Central Asia Report to the Nations60
FIG. 61 How is occupational fraud initially
detected in Eastern Europe and Western/
Central Asia?
REGIONAL FOCUS
EASTERN EUROPE
AND WESTERN/
CENTRAL ASIA
FIG. 60 What are the most common occupational
fraud schemes in Eastern Europe and Western/
Central Asia?
Tip
Internal audit
Management review
By accident
Other
Surveillance/monitoring
IT controls
Notification by law enforcement
External audit
Document examination
40%
20%
16%
7%
6%
Account reconciliation
3%
2%
2%
1%
1%
1%
Corruption
Noncash
Billing
Expense reimbursements
Cash larceny
Cash on hand
Check and payment tampering
Skimming
Register disbursements
Payroll
60%
30%
15%
11%
10%
Financial statement fraud
10%
9%
5%
4%
4%
2%

61. 61Eastern Europe and Western/Central Asia Report to the Nations
Country Number of cases
Bulgaria 3
Czech Republic 3
Georgia 1
Hungary 1
Kazakhstan 4
Kosovo 2
Latvia 2
Lithuania 1
Macedonia 2
Montenegro 1
Poland 5
Romania 11
Russia 15
Serbia 9
Slovakia 4
Slovenia 4
Tajikistan 1
Turkey 13
Ukraine 3
Uzbekistan 1
Total cases: 86
FIG. 64 Cases by country in Eastern
Europe and Western/Central Asia
FIG. 63 How does the perpetrator’s level of authority
relate to occupational fraud in Eastern Europe and
Western/Central Asia?
FIG. 62 What anti-fraud controls are the most common in
Eastern Europe and Western/Central Asia?
Control Percent of cases
External audit of financial statements 95%
Internal audit department 91%
Code of conduct 83%
Management certification of financial statements 79%
Management review 76%
Hotline 75%
External audit of internal controls over financial reporting 75%
Independent audit committee 73%
Anti-fraud policy 66%
Fraud training for employees 58%
Dedicated fraud department, function, or team 57%
Fraud training for managers/executives 56%
Formal fraud risk assessments 46%
Surprise audits 40%
Proactive data monitoring/analysis 36%
Employee support programs 27%
Job rotation/mandatory vacation 17%
Rewards for whistleblowers 5%
Employee Manager Owner/executive
39%
33%
28%
$28,000
$155,000
$3,700,000
MEDIANLOSSPERCENTOFCASES
MEDIAN LOSS:
usd 150,000
�����86
CASES
4%
OF ALL CASES

62. Latin America and the Caribbean Report to the Nations62
FIG. 65 What are the most common occupational
fraud schemes in Latin America and the Caribbean?
FIG. 66 How is occupational fraud initially
detected in Latin America and the Caribbean?
REGIONAL FOCUS
LATIN
AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN
Corruption
Noncash
Cash on hand
Financial statement fraud
Skimming
Billing
Payroll
Check and payment tampering
Register disbursements
Expense reimbursements
51%
22%
17%
14%
12%
Cash larceny
11%
11%
9%
8%
3%
1%
Tip
Internal audit
Management review
Surveillance/monitoring
Other
Account reconciliation
By accident
Document examination
Confession
IT controls
49%
14%
10%
5%
5%
External audit
5%
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%

63. 63Latin America and the Caribbean Report to the Nations
FIG. 69 Cases by country in Latin
America and the Caribbean
Country Number of cases
Antigua and Barbuda 1
Argentina 8
Bahamas 3
Belize 1
Brazil 22
Chile 8
Colombia 10
Costa Rica 1
Curaçao 2
Grenada 1
Haiti 1
Honduras 1
Jamaica 6
Mexico 29
Nicaragua 3
Peru 5
Saint Kitts and Nevis 1
Trinidad and Tobago 7
Total cases: 110
FIG. 68 How does the perpetrator’s level of authority
relate to occupational fraud in Latin America and the
Caribbean?
Control Percent of cases
Internal audit department 89%
External audit of financial statements 86%
Code of conduct 81%
Management certification of financial statements 73%
Management review 71%
External audit of internal controls over financial reporting 70%
Hotline 68%
Independent audit committee 61%
Employee support programs 51%
Anti-fraud policy 50%
Fraud training for employees 50%
Fraud training for managers/executives 48%
Dedicated fraud department, function, or team 44%
Formal fraud risk assessments 40%
Surprise audits 35%
Proactive data monitoring/analysis 32%
Job rotation/mandatory vacation 26%
Rewards for whistleblowers 6%
FIG. 67 What anti-fraud controls are the most common in
Latin America and the Caribbean?
Employee Manager Owner/executive
40% 40%
19%
$100,000
$150,000
$900,000
MEDIANLOSSPERCENTOFCASES
MEDIAN LOSS:
usd 193,000
�����110
CASES
5%
OF ALL CASES

64. Middle East and North Africa Report to the Nations64
FIG. 71 How is occupational fraud initially
detected in the Middle East and North Africa?
REGIONAL FOCUS
MIDDLE EAST
AND NORTH
AFRICA
FIG. 70 What are the most common occupational
fraud schemes in the Middle East and North Africa?
Tip
Internal audit
Management review
Other
Account reconciliation
By accident
Document examination
Notification by law enforcement
External audit
38%
20%
16%
9%
5%
Surveillance/monitoring
4%
2%
2%
2%
2%
Corruption
Cash on hand
Noncash
Cash larceny
Billing
Expense reimbursements
Check and payment tampering
Payroll
Financial statement fraud
Register disbursements
49%
23%
19%
15%
15%
Skimming
13%
9%
8%
4%
4%
2%

65. 65Middle East and North Africa Report to the Nations
FIG. 74 Cases by country in the Middle
East and North Africa
Country Number of cases
Algeria 1
Bahrain 2
Cyprus 5
Egypt 8
Iraq 1
Israel 4
Jordan 10
Kuwait 5
Lebanon 2
Oman 4
Qatar 8
Saudi Arabia 16
Syria 1
United Arab Emirates 34
Total cases: 101
FIG. 73 How does the perpetrator’s level of authority
relate to occupational fraud in the Middle East and North
Africa?
FIG. 72 What anti-fraud controls are the most common in
the Middle East and North Africa?
Control Percent of cases
External audit of financial statements 93%
Internal audit department 85%
Management certification of financial statements 81%
Code of conduct 78%
External audit of internal controls over financial reporting 69%
Management review 68%
Independent audit committee 67%
Hotline 59%
Surprise audits 59%
Anti-fraud policy 54%
Fraud training for managers/executives 47%
Fraud training for employees 47%
Dedicated fraud department, function, or team 44%
Formal fraud risk assessments 40%
Proactive data monitoring/analysis 40%
Employee support programs 33%
Job rotation/mandatory vacation 23%
Rewards for whistleblowers 9%
Employee Manager Owner/executive
41%
33%
23%
$105,000
$175,000
$1,250,000
MEDIANLOSSPERCENTOFCASES
MEDIAN LOSS:
usd 200,000
�����101
CASES
5%
OF ALL CASES

66. Southern Asia Report to the Nations66
REGIONAL FOCUS
SOUTHERN
ASIA
FIG. 75 What are the most common occupational
fraud schemes in Southern Asia?
FIG. 76 How is occupational fraud initially
detected in Southern Asia?
Corruption
Noncash
Billing
Expense reimbursements
Skimming
Cash on hand
Cash larceny
Check and payment tampering
Payroll
Register disbursements
62%
20%
13%
13%
12%
Financial statement fraud
10%
9%
8%
7%
3%
1%
Tip
Internal audit
Management review
Surveillance/monitoring
Other
By accident
Account reconciliation
Notification by law enforcement
Document examination
Confession
IT controls
53%
13%
10%
4%
3%
External audit
3%
3%
3%
2%
2%
2%
1%

67. 67Southern Asia Report to the Nations
FIG. 79 Cases by country in Southern Asia
Country Number of cases
Afghanistan 6
Bangladesh 3
India 72
Maldives 2
Pakistan 13
Total cases: 96
FIG. 78 How does the perpetrator’s level of authority
relate to occupational fraud in Southern Asia?
FIG. 77 What anti-fraud controls are the most common in
Southern Asia?
Control Percent of cases
External audit of financial statements 90%
Internal audit department 88%
Code of conduct 88%
Management certification of financial statements 85%
External audit of internal controls over financial reporting 77%
Independent audit committee 76%
Management review 76%
Hotline 63%
Anti-fraud policy 58%
Fraud training for employees 56%
Surprise audits 53%
Fraud training for managers/executives 53%
Dedicated fraud department, function, or team 49%
Employee support programs 43%
Formal fraud risk assessments 42%
Proactive data monitoring/analysis 35%
Job rotation/mandatory vacation 25%
Rewards for whistleblowers 9%
Employee Manager Owner/executive
31%
46%
19%
$50,000
$100,000
$350,000
MEDIANLOSSPERCENTOFCASES
MEDIAN LOSS:
usd 100,000
�����96
CASES
5%
OF ALL CASES

68. Sub-Saharan Africa Report to the Nations68
REGIONAL FOCUS
SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA
FIG. 80 What are the most common occupational
fraud schemes in Sub-Saharan Africa?
FIG. 81 How is occupational fraud initially
detected in Sub-Saharan Africa?
Corruption
Cash on hand
Noncash
Billing
Check and payment tampering
Expense reimbursements
Skimming
Financial statement fraud
Payroll
Register disbursements
49%
21%
18%
17%
15%
Cash larceny
14%
12%
10%
9%
6%
2%
Tip
Internal audit
Management review
Account reconciliation
By accident
Document examination
External audit
Surveillance/monitoring
Notification by law enforcement
IT controls
Confession
40%
19%
12%
7%
6%
Other
4%
4%
2%
2%
1%
1%
1%

69. 69Sub-Saharan Africa Report to the Nations
Country Number of cases
Angola 3
Botswana 1
Cameroon 1
Central African Republic 1
Chad 3
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 3
Congo, Republic of the 1
Cote d’Ivoire 5
Equatorial Guinea 1
Gambia 1
Ghana 8
Guinea 1
Kenya 34
Liberia 8
Madagascar 2
Malawi 3
Mali 4
Mauritania 1
Mauritius 2
Mozambique 1
Namibia 4
Nigeria 55
Rwanda 1
Senegal 1
Somalia 2
South Africa 87
Sudan 1
Swaziland 1
Tanzania 5
Uganda 11
Zambia 5
Zimbabwe 10
Total cases: 267
FIG. 84 Cases by country in Sub-Saharan
Africa
FIG. 83 How does the perpetrator’s level of authority
relate to occupational fraud in Sub-Saharan Africa?
FIG. 82 What anti-fraud controls are the most common in
Sub-Saharan Africa?
Control Percent of cases
External audit of financial statements 90%
Code of conduct 89%
Internal audit department 87%
Management certification of financial statements 81%
Independent audit committee 73%
External audit of internal controls over financial reporting 72%
Hotline 70%
Management review 69%
Anti-fraud policy 60%
Fraud training for employees 55%
Fraud training for managers/executives 52%
Employee support programs 50%
Formal fraud risk assessments 46%
Surprise audits 46%
Dedicated fraud department, function, or team 43%
Proactive data monitoring/analysis 40%
Job rotation/mandatory vacation 25%
Rewards for whistleblowers 20%
Employee Manager Owner/executive
48%
36%
14%
$55,000 $73,000
$2,716,000
MEDIANLOSSPERCENTOFCASES
MEDIAN LOSS:
usd 90,000
�����267
CASES
13%
OF ALL CASES

70. United States Report to the Nations70
FIG. 85 What are the most common occupational
fraud schemes in the United States?
FIG. 86 How is occupational fraud initially
detected in the United States?
REGIONAL FOCUS
UNITED
STATES
Corruption
Billing
Noncash
Expense reimbursements
Cash on hand
Skimming
Cash larceny
Payroll
Financial statement fraud
Register disbursements
30%
26%
21%
17%
15%
Check and payment tampering
15%
14%
11%
10%
9%
3%
Tip
Management review
Internal audit
By accident
Other
Document examination
External audit
Notification by law enforcement
Surveillance/monitoring
Confession
IT controls
37%
14%
13%
9%
7%
Account reconciliation
5%
5%
3%
3%
3%
1%
1%

71. 71United States Report to the Nations
FIG. 88 How does the perpetrator’s level of authority
relate to occupational fraud in the United States?
FIG. 87 What anti-fraud controls are the most common in
the United States?
Control Percent of cases
Code of conduct 73%
External audit of financial statements 69%
Employee support programs 62%
Management certification of financial statements 61%
Internal audit department 60%
External audit of internal controls over financial reporting 60%
Management review 59%
Hotline 56%
Fraud training for employees 50%
Fraud training for managers/executives 49%
Independent audit committee 49%
Anti-fraud policy 47%
Formal fraud risk assessments 37%
Proactive data monitoring/analysis 36%
Dedicated fraud department, function, or team 35%
Surprise audits 31%
Job rotation/mandatory vacation 15%
Rewards for whistleblowers 12%
Employee Manager Owner/executive
48%
31%
18%
$50,000
$150,000
$637,000
MEDIANLOSSPERCENTOFCASES
MEDIAN LOSS:
usd 108,000
�����1,000
CASES
48%
OF ALL CASES

72. Western Europe Report to the Nations72
FIG. 89 What are the most common occupational
fraud schemes in Western Europe?
FIG. 90 How is occupational fraud initially
detected in Western Europe?
REGIONAL FOCUS
WESTERN
EUROPE
Corruption
Billing
Noncash
Cash on hand
Expense reimbursements
Check and payment tampering
Financial statement fraud
Skimming
Payroll
Register disbursements
36%
28%
17%
15%
13%
Cash larceny
8%
8%
8%
5%
4%
1%
Tip
Management review
Internal audit
Other
Account reconciliation
Document examination
External audit
Surveillance/monitoring
Notification by law enforcement
IT controls
Confession
46%
11%
9%
6%
5%
By accident
5%
4%
4%
4%
2%
2%
1%

73. 73Western Europe Report to the Nations
FIG. 92 How does the perpetrator’s level of authority
relate to occupational fraud in Western Europe?
FIG. 93 Cases by country in Western
Europe
Country Number of cases
Austria 4
Belgium 7
Denmark 2
Finland 2
France 4
Germany 16
Greece 22
Iceland 1
Ireland 2
Italy 8
Netherlands 10
Norway 2
Portugal 1
Spain 4
Switzerland 11
United Kingdom 34
Total cases: 130
FIG. 91 What anti-fraud controls are the most common in
Western Europe?
Control Percent of cases
Code of conduct 93%
Management certification of financial statements 88%
External audit of financial statements 88%
External audit of internal controls over financial reporting 85%
Management review 83%
Internal audit department 80%
Independent audit committee 78%
Hotline 76%
Anti-fraud policy 65%
Fraud training for managers/executives 63%
Fraud training for employees 59%
Formal fraud risk assessments 53%
Dedicated fraud department, function, or team 49%
Employee support programs 48%
Surprise audits 41%
Proactive data monitoring/analysis 38%
Job rotation/mandatory vacation 22%
Rewards for whistleblowers 10%
Employee Manager Owner/executive
41%
34%
18%
$90,000
$235,000
$500,000
MEDIANLOSSPERCENTOFCASES
MEDIAN LOSS:
usd 200,000
�����130
CASES
6%
OF ALL CASES

74. Index of Figures Report to the Nations74
Age of Perpetrator
How does the perpetrator’s age relate to occupational fraud? 41
Anti-Fraud Controls
How do internal control weaknesses vary by scheme type? 32
How does the presence of anti-fraud controls relate to median loss? 28
How does the presence of anti-fraud
controls relate to the duration of fraud? 29
What anti-fraud controls are most common? 27
Based on region 57–73
What are the primary internal control weaknesses
that contribute to occupational fraud? 31
Behavioral Red Flags of Perpetrator
Do fraud perpetrators also engage in non-fraud-related misconduct? 46
Do fraud perpetrators experience negative
HR-related issues prior to or during their frauds? 46
How often do perpetrators exhibit behavioral red flags? 45
Spotlight: The red flags of fraud 44
Case Results
Does the perpetrator’s position affect the punishment for fraud? 48
How do victim organizations punish fraud perpetrators? 47
How often is litigation pursued against
occupational fraud perpetrators? 49
Spotlight: Recovering fraud losses 51
What were the results of civil suits? 49
What were the results of criminal referrals? 49
Spotlight: When victim organizations are fined 50
Why do organizations decide not to refer cases to law enforcement? 50
Concealment of Fraud Schemes
Spotlight: Concealing fraud 14–15
Criminal and Employment
Background of Perpetrator
Do perpetrators tend to have prior employment-
related disciplinary actions for fraud? 43
Do perpetrators tend to have prior fraud convictions? 42
Was a background check run on the perpetrator prior to hiring? 30
What types of background checks were
run on the perpetrator prior to hiring? 30
Demographics of Survey Participants
How many fraud cases have survey participants
investigated in the past two years? 55
How much fraud examination experience did survey participants have? 55
What was the primary occupation of survey participants? 54
What was the professional role of the survey participants? 55
Department of Perpetrator
What are the most common occupational
fraud schemes in high-risk departments? 38
What departments pose the greatest risk for occupational fraud? 37
Detection Method
How does detection method relate to fraud duration and loss? 18
How is occupational fraud initially detected? 17
Based on region 56–72
Who reports occupational fraud? 17
Spotlight: Hotlines and reporting mechanisms 19
Distribution of Losses
How much does an occupational fraud cost the victim organization? 9
Education Level of Perpetrator
How does the perpetrator’s education
level relate to occupational fraud? 41
Gender of Perpetrator
How does gender distribution and median loss
vary based on the perpetrator’s level of authority? 40
How does the gender distribution of perpetrators vary by region? 39
How does the perpetrator’s gender relate to occupational fraud? 39
INDEX OF FIGURES

75. Index of Figures Report to the Nations 75
Geographical Region of
Victim Organization
Countries with reported cases and median loss for each region 7
How does the gender distribution of perpetrators vary by region? 39
Regional focus (most common schemes, detection, anti-fraud
controls, perpetrator’s level of authority, and cases by country) 56–73
Asia-Pacific 56–57
Canada 58–59
Eastern Europe and Western/Central Asia 60–61
Latin America and the Caribbean 62–63
Middle East and North Africa 64–65
Southern Asia 66–67
Sub-Saharan Africa 68–69
United States 70–71
Western Europe 72–73
Industry of Victim Organization
How does occupational fraud affect
organizations in different industries? 24
What are the most common occupational
fraud schemes in various industries? 25
Number of Perpetrators
How does the number of perpetrators in a
scheme relate to occupational fraud? 42
Position of Perpetrator
How does gender distribution and median loss
vary based on the perpetrator’s level of authority? 40
How does the perpetrator’s level of
authority relate to occupational fraud? 33
Based on region 57–73
How does the perpetrator’s level of
authority relate to scheme duration? 34
How does the perpetrator’s tenure relate
to median loss at different levels of authority? 36
Spotlight: Fraud committed by owners and executives 34–35
Scheme Duration
How does detection method relate to fraud duration and loss? 18
How does the duration of a fraud relate to median loss? 14
How does the perpetrator’s level of authority relate to scheme duration? 34
How does the presence of anti-fraud
controls relate to the duration of fraud? 29
How long do different occupational fraud schemes last? 15
Scheme Type
How do internal control weaknesses vary by scheme type? 32
How is occupational fraud committed? 10
How long do different occupational fraud schemes last? 15
How often do fraudsters commit more than
one type of occupational fraud? 12
Occupational Fraud and Abuse Classification System (the Fraud Tree) 11
Spotlight: Corruption 13
What are the most common occupational
fraud schemes in high-risk departments? 38
What are the most common occupational
fraud schemes in various industries? 25
What are the most common occupational
fraud schemes based on region? 56–72
What asset misappropriation schemes present the greatest risk? 12
Size of Victim Organization
How does an organization’s size relate to its occupational fraud risk? 21
Spotlight: Fraud in small businesses 22–23
Tenure of Perpetrator
How does the perpetrator’s tenure relate to
median loss at different levels of authority? 36
How does the perpetrator’s tenure relate to occupational fraud? 35
Type of Victim Organization
What levels of government are victimized? 20
What types of organizations are victimized? 20

76. Fraud Prevention Checklist Report to the Nations76
1. Is ongoing anti-fraud training provided to all
employees of the organization?
❑❑ Do employees understand what constitutes
fraud?
❑❑ Have the costs of fraud to the company and
everyone in it — including lost profits, adverse
publicity, potential job loss, and decreased
morale and productivity — been made clear
to employees?
❑❑ Do employees know where to seek advice
when faced with uncertain ethical decisions,
and do they believe that they can speak
freely?
❑❑ Has a policy of zero-tolerance for fraud been
communicated to employees through words
and actions?
2. Is an effective fraud reporting mechanism in
place?
❑❑ Have employees been taught how to com-
municate concerns about known or potential
wrongdoing?
❑❑ Is there a reporting channel, such as a
third-party hotline, available to employees?
❑❑ Do employees trust that they can report sus-
picious activity anonymously and/or confiden-
tially (where legally permissible) and without
fear of reprisal?
❑❑ Has it been made clear to employees that
reports of suspicious activity will be promptly
and thoroughly evaluated?
❑❑ Do reporting policies and mechanisms extend to
vendors, customers, and other outside parties?
3. To increase employees’ perception of detec-
tion, are the following proactive measures
taken and publicized to employees?
❑❑ Is possible fraudulent conduct aggressively
sought out, rather than dealt with passively?
❑❑ Does the organization send the message
that it actively seeks out fraudulent conduct
through fraud assessment questioning by
auditors?
❑❑ Are surprise fraud audits performed in
addition to regularly scheduled audits?
❑❑ Is continuous monitoring software used to
detect fraud and, if so, has the use of such
software been made known throughout the
organization?
4. Is the management climate/tone at the top one
of honesty and integrity?
❑❑ Are employees surveyed to determine the
extent to which they believe management
acts with honesty and integrity?
❑❑ Are performance goals realistic?
❑❑ Have fraud prevention goals been incorpo-
rated into the performance measures that are
used to evaluate managers and to determine
performance-related compensation?
❑❑ Has the organization established, implement-
ed, and tested a process for oversight of
fraud risks by the board of directors or others
charged with governance (e.g., the audit
committee)?
FRAUD PREVENTION
CHECKLIST
The most cost-effective way to limit fraud losses is to prevent fraud from occurring. This checklist is designed
to help organizations test the effectiveness of their fraud prevention measures. Additional guidance, resourc-
es, and tools for managing organizational fraud risk can be found at ACFE.com/fraudrisktools.

77. Fraud Prevention Checklist Report to the Nations 77
5. Are fraud risk assessments performed to pro-
actively identify and mitigate the company’s
vulnerabilities to internal and external fraud?
6. Are strong anti-fraud controls in place and
operating effectively, including the following?
❑❑ Proper separation of duties
❑❑ Use of authorizations
❑❑ Physical safeguards
❑❑ Job rotations
❑❑ Mandatory vacations
7. Does the internal audit department, if one
exists, have adequate resources and authority
to operate effectively and without undue influ-
ence from senior management?
8. Does the hiring policy include the following
(where permitted by law)?
❑❑ Past employment verification
❑❑ Criminal and civil background checks
❑❑ Credit checks
❑❑ Drug screening
❑❑ Education verification
❑❑ References checks
9. Are employee support programs in place to
assist employees struggling with addiction,
mental/emotional health, family, or financial
problems?
10. Is an open-door policy in place that allows
employees to speak freely about pressures,
providing management the opportunity to
alleviate such pressures before they become
acute?
11. Are regular, anonymous surveys conducted to
assess employee morale?

78. Glossary of Terminology Report to the Nations78
Asset misappropriation: A scheme in which an employee
steals or misuses the employing organization’s resourc-
es (e.g., theft of company cash, false billing schemes, or
inflated expense reports)
Billing scheme: A fraudulent disbursement scheme in which
a person causes his or her employer to issue a payment by
submitting invoices for fictitious goods or services, inflated
invoices, or invoices for personal purchases (e.g., employee
creates a shell company and bills employer for services not
actually rendered; employee purchases personal items and
submits an invoice to employer for payment)
Cash larceny: A scheme in which an incoming payment is
stolen from an organization after it has been recorded on
the organization’s books and records (e.g., employee steals
cash and checks from daily receipts before they can be
deposited in the bank)
Cash-on-hand misappropriations: A scheme in which the
perpetrator misappropriates cash kept on hand at the victim
organization’s premises (e.g., employee steals cash from a
company vault)
Check or payment tampering scheme8
: A fraudulent
disbursement scheme in which a person steals his or her
employer’s funds by intercepting, forging, or altering a
check or electronic payment drawn on one of the organiza-
tion’s bank accounts (e.g., employee steals blank company
checks and makes them out to himself or herself or an
accomplice; employee re-routes an outgoing electronic
payment to a vendor to be deposited into his or her own
bank account)
Corruption: A scheme in which an employee misuses his or
her influence in a business transaction in a way that violates
his or her duty to the employer in order to gain a direct or
indirect benefit (e.g., schemes involving bribery or conflicts
of interest)
Employee support programs: Programs that provide
support and assistance to employees dealing with personal
issues or challenges, such as counseling services for drug,
family, or financial problems
Expense reimbursements scheme: A fraudulent disburse-
ment scheme in which an employee makes a claim for reim-
bursement of fictitious or inflated business expenses (e.g.,
employee files fraudulent expense report, claiming personal
travel, nonexistent meals)
Financial statement fraud: A scheme in which an employee
intentionally causes a misstatement or omission of material
information in the organization’s financial reports (e.g., re-
cording fictitious revenues, understating reported expens-
es, or artificially inflating reported assets)
Hotline: A mechanism to report fraud or other violations,
whether managed internally or by an external party
Management review: The process of management review-
ing organizational controls, processes, accounts, or transac-
tions for adherence to company policies and expectations
Noncash misappropriations: Any scheme in which an
employee steals or misuses noncash assets of the victim
organization (e.g., employee steals inventory from a ware-
house or storeroom; employee steals or misuses confiden-
tial customer information)
Occupational fraud: The use of one’s occupation for
personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or
misapplication of the employing organization’s resources or
assets
Payroll scheme: A fraudulent disbursement scheme in
which an employee causes his or her employer to issue
a payment by making false claims for compensation (e.g.,
employee claims overtime for hours not worked; employee
adds ghost employees to the payroll)
Primary perpetrator: The person who worked for the victim
organization and who was reasonably confirmed as the
primary culprit in the case
Register disbursements scheme: A fraudulent disburse-
ment scheme in which an employee makes false entries on
a cash register to conceal the fraudulent removal of cash
(e.g., employee fraudulently voids a sale on his or her cash
register and steals the cash)
Skimming: A scheme in which an incoming payment is
stolen from an organization before it is recorded on the
organization’s books and records (e.g., employee accepts
payment from a customer but does not record the sale and
instead pockets the money)
GLOSSARY OF
TERMINOLOGY
8
In previous reports, this category was referred to simply as check tam-
pering. However, to better reflect the increasing shift toward electronic
payment methods, we have changed the category title to check and
payment tampering.

79. About the ACFE Report to the Nations 79
Founded in 1988 by Dr. Joseph T. Wells, CFE, CPA, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) is the
world’s largest anti-fraud organization and premier provider of anti-fraud training and education. Together with
nearly 85,000 members in more than 180 countries, the ACFE is reducing business fraud worldwide and pro-
viding the training and resources needed to fight fraud more effectively. The ACFE provides educational tools
and practical solutions for anti-fraud professionals through events, education, publications, networking, and
educational tools for colleges and universities.
Certified Fraud Examiners
The ACFE offers its members the opportunity for professional certification with the Certified
Fraud Examiner (CFE) credential. The CFE is preferred by businesses and government entities
around the world, and indicates expertise in fraud prevention and detection. CFEs are anti-fraud
experts who have demonstrated knowledge in four critical areas: Financial Transactions and
Fraud Schemes, Law, Investigation, and Fraud Prevention and Deterrence.
Membership
Members of the ACFE include accountants, internal auditors, fraud investigators, law enforcement officers,
lawyers, business leaders, risk/compliance professionals, and educators, all of whom have access to expert
training, educational tools, and resources. Whether their career is focused exclusively on preventing and de-
tecting fraudulent activities or they just want to learn more about fraud, the ACFE provides the essential tools
and resources necessary for anti-fraud professionals to accomplish their objectives.
To learn more, visit ACFE.com or call (800) 245-3321 / +1 (512) 478-9000.
Contact
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners
Global Headquarters
716 West Ave | Austin, TX 78701-2727 | USA
Phone: (800) 245-3321 / +1 (512) 478-9000
ACFE.com | info@ACFE.com
TERMS OF USE:
The Report to the Nations and any accompanying charts, graphs, PowerPoint slides, or related content (collectively “the Materials”)
are available for use free of charge as a public service of the ACFE. You may download, copy and/or distribute the Materials for
personal or business use on the following conditions:
1. No portion of the Materials may be sold or otherwise licensed, shared or transferred to any party for a fee, or included in any
work that is to be sold, licensed, shared or transferred to any party for a fee, without the express written consent of the ACFE.
The foregoing notwithstanding, you are permitted to use the materials as part of a speech or presentation for which an admis-
sion fee is charged.
2. The Materials must be properly attributed to the ACFE, including the name of the publication. An example of proper attribution
is: “2018 Report to the Nations. Copyright 2018 by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, Inc.”
ABOUT THE ACFE

80. ACFE.com/RTTN
© 2018 Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, Inc. “ACFE,” “CFE,”
“Certified Fraud Examiner,” “CFE Exam Prep Course,” “Fraud Magazine,”
“Association of Certified Fraud Examiners,” “Report to the Nations,” the
ACFE seal, the ACFE logo and related trademarks, names and logos are
the property of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, Inc., and are
registered and/or used in the U.S. and countries around the world.