2016 828 post hearing sanctions brief, George Sansoucy, GES

IN THE OHIO BOARD OF TAX APPEALS
United Local Schools Board ofEducation, ) BTA CASE NO. 2016-828
)
Appellant, (REAL PROPERTY VALUE)
)
)
vs.
)
)
Columbiana County Board ofRevision, et al.
)
)
Appellees.
Post Hearing Sanctions Brief of Appellee Utica East Ohio Midstream LLC
Anthony L. Ehler (0039304)
Jeffrey Allen Miller (0072702)
Steven L. Smiseck (0061615)
Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP
52 East Gay Street
P.O. Box 1008
Columbus, Ohio 43216-1008
Gary T. Stedronsky (0079866)
Eimis Britton Co., L.P.A.
1714 West Galbraith Road
Cincinnati, Ohio 45239
(513)421-2540
gstedronskv@ennisbritton.com
Counselfor Appellant
UnitedLocal School District Bd. ofEdn.
Counselfor Appellee, Utica East Ohio
Midstream LLC
Krista R. Peddicord (0089117)
Columbiana County Assistant Prosecutor
105 South Market Street
Lisbon, OH 44432
(330) 420-0140
kpeddicord@,colcoprosecutor.net
Shawn J Organ (0042052)
David J. Twombly (0092558)
Organ Cole LLP
1330 Dublin Road
Columbus, Ohio 43215
DJTwomblv@,organcole.com
Counselfor Witness
George E. Sansoucy, PE
Counselfor Appellees
Columbiana County Auditor andBoard of
Revision

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Summary ofthe Case and Questions Before the Board 1
I.
The Board’s Power To Sanction a Witness 5
II.
The Board’s has power to bar an unreliable witness from testifying as a
sanction....................................................................................................
A.
5
Mr. Sansoucy has no constitutionally protected “right to testify
The Board should sanction an expert witness when it is clear that witness
deliberately testified falsely.........................................................................
The Board should sanction any witness when it is clear the witness
perjured himselfunder Ohio law.....................................................
Knowingly making a false statement” for purposes ofthe Ohio
perjury statute includes making statements where the witness is
consciously ignorant ofthe truth ofthe statement...........................
When is false testimony material?...................................................
The Method Followed in This Briefwith Regard To Addressing Mr. Sansoucy’s
False Testimony.......................................................................................................
The Work Mr. Sansoucy Claimed To Have Performed...........................................
Despite purporting to be a report of expert testimony on engineering facts,
the Sansoucy report does not set forth any facts relevant to the real versus
personal property question...........................................................................
Work Mr. Sansoucy claimed to have performed to support his conclusions
Mr. Sansoucy claimed in his report to have done an enormous
amount ofwork to support his real versus personal property
determinations..................................................................................
99
7
B.
C.
10
1.
13
2.
14
17
3.
III.
18
19
IV.
A.
20
24
B.
1.
24
Mr. Sansoucy testified to enormous amounts ofreview and study
ofKensington documents and that analysis was the basis ofhis real
versus personal property determinations..........................................
Sansoucy’s false testimony specific to piping systems.....................
Made up testimony regarding non-existent fire water
system and pilot gas systems................................................
2.
26
34
3.
a.
43
1

Made-up testimony regarding non-existent sanitary drain
system...................................................................................
Made up testimony regarding nitrogen rejection unit...........
Made up testimony regarding tanks at Kensington storing non
existent products made by non-existent equipment..........................
False testimony regarding deethanizers and tanks to store
ethane at Kensington.............................................................
False testimony regarding pure butane being stored in tanks
at Kensington........................................................................
False testimony regarding propane being extracted as a
pure product at Kensington, stored in tanks at Kensington,
and shipped in a non-existent “pure propane” pipeline........
Mr. Sansoucy’s testimony regarding ethane, butane and
propane as products at Kensington is not rationally
explainable............................................................................
Mr. Sansoucy’s False Testimony Regarding Piping System Quantity Survey
Method Costing.........................................................................................................
b.
48
52
c.
4.
56
a.
61
b.
62
c.
64
d.
68
V.
69
84
Conclusion
VI.
87
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
11

Siimmary of the Case and Questions Before the Board.
I.
At the inception, Appellee Utica East Ohio (“UEO”) acknowledges that it filed a lengthy
sanctions motion. It is procedurally unusual at the Board to have both pre- and post-hearing
briefs. UEO will clarify then that this brief is intended to supersede its original motion. In that
regard, this briefrepeats some ofthe factual assertions and arguments made in that motion.
Thus, the Board can rely entirely upon UEO’s post-hearing briefs to establish its position. That
said, UEO is not aware of any misstatements offact or law in that original Motion and stands by
it in its entirety.
The pending Sanctions Motion arose from a tax year 2015 case involving two primary
questions associated with real property tax at the natural gas processing facility in Kensington,
Ohio. First, there was a plain vanilla valuation dispute regarding the real property shown on the
County Auditor’s property record card. Second, there was an allegation that the County Auditor
failed to correctly classify real property. Mr. Sansoucy’s report assigned $16,633,394 in value to
the real property set forth on the property record card. See Appellant’s Exh. 1 at 81. His report
assigned a value of $56,259,606 to property that he claimed was real property but which he
alleged was misclassified as personal property. The total value he claimed for the Kensington
site was $72,893,000. Appellee’s own appraisers opined that the property on the record card was
undervalued. Thus, there was not a large difference between the County Auditor’s 2016
valuation and Appellee’s own appraisers. The controversy mainly centered on property
classification.
The 2015 dispute ultimately was settled at $12,665,500 in value. This amount was the
County Auditor’s 2016 value which was established well prior to delivery ofMr. Sansoucy’s
report. The settlement addressed only the valuation ofthe real property listed on the property

record card as prepared by the County Auditor. No property at Kensington was reclassified
from personal to real as a result of the settlement.
Nearly all ofMr. Sansoucy’s questionable testimony occurred with reference to the $56M
misclassification issue and that issue was conceded by Appellant in its entirety in settlement.
Thus, despite opposing counsel’s attempt to characterize Mr. Sansoucy’s efforts as having been
instrumental in achieving settlement, the settlement was reached in spite ofMr. Sansoucy and
was based on the County Auditor’s property classification and value certified prior to the
Sansoucy report. It is self-evident that an appraisal ofthe real property on the property record
card at the site should not cost nearly $400,000, which is the amount Mr. Sansoucy invoiced the
school district. Appellee was able to retain an expert appraiser for that purpose for about
$10,000. Mr. Sansoucy’s property classification effort was a superfluous add-on to the actual
real property valuation case. Had he been truthful with his own client from the inception, much
or all ofproperty classification issue would not have been raised. It certainly would have not
have encompassed $56M of assets including process piping, tanks and electrical equipment. Mr.
Sansoucy’s claim that the Columbiana County Auditor simply ignored property classification at
Kensington was always baseless.
A***we found no indication that the auditor did anything ofthe sort.
Q. In your estimation, he misclassified as nontaxable?
A. He just didn't do it.
Q. Didn't do it?
A. Yeah. We found no indication that he got $393 million worth ofproperty inventory
and went through and broke out the real property or tried to break out the real property.
We found no indication that any ofthat existed.
2

Appellee UEO’s Exh. 2 at 173 (Sansoucy Deposition); see also H.R. Vol. 1: 9. (“***there's
certainly no evidence that the Auditor's Office had done any ofthis work, so we have done the
1
work to separate it out.”).
As a result oftestimony given by Mr. Sansoucy at the Board’s hearing conducted on the
tax merit appeal, UEO filed its Motion for Sanctions against expert witness George Sansoucy.
The record establishes that Mr. Sansoucy (1) failed to perform the work he claimed to have
performed, (2) testified falsely regarding items of equipment, piping systems and products that
do not exist, and (3) made flagrantly false representations regarding his quantity survey method
of costing piping systems. Much ofthe false testimony UEO identified has been conceded to be
incorrect either by Mr. Sansoucy, his counsel, or both. Counsel for Mr. Sansoucy argues
primarily that it is impossible to know Mr. Sansoucy’s intent when he offered the incorrect
testimony. To opposing counsel, sanctions are not appropriate because it is impossible to read
Mr. Sansoucy’s mind to determine ifhe purposefully misrepresented the truth. Even ifMr.
Sansoucy intentionally provided false testimony, opposing counsel argues that the
misrepresentations were not material (and thus presumably not worthy of sanction).^
Alternatively, opposing counsel proposes that even ifthe false testimony was material, the Board
lacks authority to issue a decision pointing out the resulting lack oftestimonial reliability and bar
him from testifying in the future on that basis as a sanction.
' There are two hearing transcripts that will be referenced in this brief. These are the original merits hearing record,
and the Board’s sanction hearing record. These records will be referenced herein as “H.R.” and “S.R.” respectively.
Likewise, exhibits from the Board’s merits hearing record will be referenced using the same nomenclature they had
in the original hearing. Exhibits offered at the Board’s sanctions hearing will be referenced as “Sanctions Exhibits.”
2 UEO notes that Appellant School District indicated in its Response to UEO’s Motion for Sanctions that “it first
became apparent during the hearing that Mr. Sansoucy’s appraisal report contained material errors and that some of
the testimony elicited by Utica from Mr. Sansoucy on cross examination undermined statements and conclusions in
Mr. Sansoucy’s appraisal report.” Thus, the issue ofmateriality has been conceded by the party that offered Mr.
Sansoucy’s testimony. That concession highlights the procedural awkwardness ofelevating Mr. Sansoucy to the
status ofa party. The authority to concede the materiality ofthe testimony ofa witness lies with the party that
offered the testimony to the Board, not the professional witness who testified.
3

At the Board’s sanctions hearing, Appellee presented the testimony of Grant Hammer.
Mr. Hammer is an expert on natural gas processing and has responsibility over UEO’s operation
ofits Kensington, Harrison and Leesville, Ohio natural gas processing facilities. Mr. Hammer
provided testimony regarding the actual operation ofthe Kensington facility, what the
Kensington documents and drawings prove (or disprove), and the products made by, stored at.
and shipped from the Kensington facility. Mr. Hammer also addressed the reasonableness or
rationality ofvarious statements made by Mr. Sansoucy. Mr. Hammer’s testimony was
consistent with and supported by Kensington engineering drawings and facility documents.
As discussed in detail below, in addition to providing evidence addressing the false
testimony raised in its original motion, UEO provided evidence at the sanctions hearing that Mr.
Sansoucy testified falsely about equipment, and tanks and products that he asserted existed at
Kensington that, in fact, do not exist. Some ofthat non-existent equipment would be more than
150 feet tall and; would occupy an aggregate space as large one square mile. UEO showed that
Mr. Sansoucy testified repeatedly and in detail about the existence ofnon-existent products made
by giant non-existent equipment. For example, he testified about non-existent “deethanizers”
which he claimed were located “at the front ofthe train.” He claimed those non-existent pieces
of equipment produced non-existent ethane which was stored somewhere onsite in non-existent
tanks for that purpose. Mr. Sansoucy testified that pure propane was produced at Kensington
and that there is a “pure propane” product line from Kensington to Harrison (37 miles) when, in
fact, there is no such product made at Kensington. Kensington has no equipment to produce
propane.
UEO’s Motion set forth many specific allegations oftestimonial misconduct. Although
that caused the Motion to be lengthy, the sheer volume ofthe false testimony was material and
4

also bore strongly on the question ofintent. Thus, the length ofthe Motion was necessary. Yet,
despite Mr. Sansoucy’s plea to be treated as a party and permitted to participate at hearing on the
Motion, he failed to appear at hearing to try to explain any ofthe false testimony set forth in the
Motion. Indeed, opposing counsel offered no evidence ofits own that might cast Mr. Sansoucy’s
false testimony in a more favorable light.
The Board’s Power To Sanction a Witness.
II.
The Board’s has power to bar an unreliable witness from testifying as a
sanction.
A.
R.C. 5703.02(D) provides that the Board may adopt and “enforce all rules relating to the
procedure ofthe board in hearing appeals it has the authority or duty to hear.” Ohio Adm. Code.
5717-15(0) provides that the Board swears its witnesses. It has the statutory authority to
administer that oath. R.C. 5703.03. The oath certainly “relat[es] to the procedure ofthe board in
hearing appeals.” It follows that the Board has authority, based in statute, to enforce that oath.
Indeed, Ohio Adm. Code 5717-1-15(A)(15) expressly provides for a sanction of “denial
or suspension of appearing and qualifying as an expert witness in designated matters before the
Board.” Thus, the Board’s rule already specifies the Board’s sanction remedy to enforce the oath
it administers. Opposing counsel’s argument that the Board lacks authority to sanction an expert
witness is necessarily an argument that the Board’s own rule lacks statutory authority to underpin
it. That is a very heavy legal lift. R.C 5703.02(D) very plainly authorizes the Board’s rule.
Exclusion of an expert witness in future proceedings is well settled as a remedy to
address false testimony by an expert witness. A tribunal’s remedies for addressing unscrupulous
expert witnesses has been succinctly addressed as:
The absolute protection ofthe privilege [witness immunity from being sued by the
parties for testimony provided] does not empower a witness to violate his oath
5

Tribunals can disqualify unscrupulous witnesses
with impunity, however,
from appearing in future proceedings.
Day V. Johns Hopkins Health Sys. Corp., 907 F.3d 766, 773 (4^'^ Cir. 2018). The Board’s own
rule barring witnesses from future proceedings as a sanction for misconduct is consistent with
such authority.
It is error to phrase the question ofthe “power to sanction” in general terms rather than
specifically addressing the specific sanction requested by UEO. For example, a tribunal’s power
to extract a monetary sanction is a very different inquiry from the question ofits power to
exclude a witness. The first question is addressed to the power ofthe tribunal to deprive the
sanctioned entity ofproperty. However, the second question is addressed to the core statutory
functions ofthe tribunal, i.e., enforcing core hearing procedure (i.e., the witness oath) and
determining the reliability of a witness. Likewise, sanctions aimed at depriving a person of
property are subject to due process limitations that do not exist for procedural sanctions such as
barring a witness from testifying.
In truth, the power the Board would exercise to issue the “sanction” requested in this case
(suspension ofthe privilege of appearing as an expert witness) would be the same power it
routinely exercises when it issues an evidentiary ruling regarding the reliability and admissibility
of expert testimony. It is illogical for the Board to have the power to exclude testimony of a
witness for lack ofreliability on evidentiary grounds such as bias, but lack the authority to bar an
unreliable witness as a sanction for false testimony. In either case, the reliability ofthe witness
is compromised. Mr. Sansoucy’s argument undermines the Board’s authority to determine the
credibility and admissibility ofwitnesses before it. It cannot function at all without that power.
The Board’s authority to determine the reliability oftestimony to be offered and
determine whether or not to allow such testimony is “power” the Board exereises routinely. Mr.
6

Sansoucy’s argument that the Board is powerless to stop him from testifying before it, even ifhe
flagrantly provides false testimony, is notable for its coneeit. It highlights Mr. Sansoucy’s view
that the Board is merely a vehicle to support his vocation as a professional witness (i.e., the
Board assists him, not vice versa).
Mr. Sansoucy has no constitutionally protected “right to testify”
Mr. Sansoucy’s counsel has argued that he has a constitutionally protected due process
right to testify before the Board such that the Board must afford him notice and a hearing before
that “right to testify” is infringed. The Board laudably tried to act quickly on the eve ofhearing
to answer the question ofMr. Sansoucy’s participation in the sanctions matter. Thus, the
question had little briefing from the parties to assist the Board. Unfortunately, the Board erred
when it overrode its own rules and prior decision and transformed Mr. Sansoucy from a mere
B.
paid witness into a party.
Appellee did not quibble over that decision because the Board’s error was and is harmless
to Appellee (other than the additional expense of addressing Mr. Sansoucy’s brief). The record
overwhelmingly establishes that Mr. Sansoucy intentionally provided false testimony for days at
a time on many subjects, and no amount of “lawyering” for Mr. Sansoucy will change that
record. Indeed, Mr. Sansoucy’s failure to show up and testify at the Board’s sanction hearing to
explain himselfmakes that point more eloquently than any argument in his defense.
Nonetheless, for the sake ofprocedural clarity, (i.e., identifying the true parties in this
sanctions proceeding). Appellee wishes to assert that Mr. Sansoucy has no constitutionally
protectable interest of any kind in the Board’s decision to bar him from testifying. The Board
controls who testifies before it. The Board will never be required to afford a witness the right to
contest his own exclusion (nor will any quasi-judicial orjudicial tribimal in the State of Ohio be
forced to elevate witnesses to the role ofparty with the right to argue their own credibility or
7

admissibility). Unless monetary sanetions (i.e., a property interest) are proposed against a
witness, the witness does not have any eonstitutionally proteetahle interest in the Board’s
findings on issues of eredibility and reliability.
Due proeess rights to notice and a hearing come into play where there is deprivation of a
life, liberty or property interest. A future expectation to testify before the Board as a paid expert
witness is not a life, liberty or property interest. Testifying before the Board for a fee is not a
vocation that is protected by the constitution. The Board is not Mr. Sansoucy’s employer. The
Board’s decision to bar a witness from testifying before it does not prevent that witness from
pursuing his or her true vocation. The Board is not stopping Mr. Sansoucy from being a licensed
engineer or an appraiser or whatever vocation he chooses. The Board does not have to bend its
procedure to protect Mr. Sansoucy’s perceived “righf’ to testify as a paid witness. Otherwise,
every court in the state would have to provide expert witnesses their own separate hearing before
they could he excluded on reliahility grounds. It is absurd to elevate the alleged “constitutional
right” ofthe professional witness to testify above the actual case in which the witness was called
to testify such that additional hearings with counsel for the witness are required to protect that
“right.”
Mr. Sansoucy’s reputation is not protected by the Constitution. The 3’''* Circuit Court of
Appeals described the governing law on that subject as follows:
Clark’s contention and the jury’s finding that he had a liberty interest in
his reputation which served as the predicate for his due process claim must
surmount the formidable barrier imposed by Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 47 L.
Ed. 2d 405, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976). In that case, the United States Supreme Court
held that reputation alone is not an interest protected by the Due Process Clause.
held that financial harm resulting from the loss of clients “is insufficient to
transform a reputation interest into a liberty interest.
we
8

The possible loss of future employment opportunities is patently insufficient to
satisfy the requirement imposed by Paul that a liberty interest requires more than
mere injury to reputation.
Clark V. Falls, 890 F.2d 611, 619-620, (3'''* Circuit Ct. ofApp. 1989).
UEO has searched but found no authority granting expert witnesses constitutional rights
to protect their reputation from adverse decisions addressing their credibility such that they must
be granted notice and a hearing before a decision on that topic can be issued. To be clear, the
Board could relegate Mr. Sansoucy’s brief on this sanctions matter to the trash can and refuse to
hear him at all, and the Constitution would not be offended in any fashion. He simply has no
interest at stake that is protected by the Constitution and he will have no appealable right from
any decision the Board makes on the Sanctions Motion.
UEO does not raise this issue to exclude Mr. Sansoucy’s counsel from participating.^
Rather, UEO raises the issue to advise the Board ofMr. Sansoucy’s position in relation to the
Board’s decision on sanctions. Mr. Sansoucy argues that he has the rights of a party in the
sanction matter now before the Board (and yet he is only a paid witness and the only sanction
requested is to bar him from testifying), while he simultaneously argues that the Board’s own
power to weigh reliability and admissibility of evidence is diminished to the point that it cannot
stop him from appearing before it even ifhe offers intentionally false and misleading testimony.
Mr. Sansoucy grossly overstates his own “rights” in this matter. At the same time, he grossly
understates the Board’s own statutory power to control and administer its own hearing
procedures and address reliability ofwitnesses.
In fact, the opposite is true. The zenith ofthe Board’s powers are realized when it is
evaluating evidence and witnesses before it. The Supreme Court of Ohio itself defers to the
^ UEO is ofthe opinion that the Board would be wise as a policy matter to clarify that Mr. Sansoucy, like all
witnesses, has no due process protected “right” to testify before the Board and to the extent that its prior decision
appeared to say that, upon further consideration it disavows that position.
9

Board’s credibility findings unless those findings have no support in the record at all. It would
be strikingly odd ifthe Board were forced to receive testimony from a witness that it knows has
lied to it in the past because the right ofthe witness to falsely testify exceeds the Board’s duty
and power to stop it. A sanction barring a lying witness from testifying in future
proceedings is basically a ruling that the witness has demonstrated sueh a personal
reliability deficit that his testimony will he deemed inadmissible as an evidentiary matter
going forward for the time specified by the sanction.
The Board easily could make such admissibility rulings addressed to the reliability of a
one would question its authority to do
proposed witness pursuant to motions to exclude and no
Similarly, ifthe Board determines that Mr. Sansouey lied to it, of course it has the authority
so.
to bar him from testifying in future proceedings as a sanction. Such an action would simply
avoid piecemeal rulings on motions to exclude on evidentiary grounds in the future (i.e., that the
witness is demonstrably unreliable because he has lied under oath in the past). In either event,
the Board is exercising the same power to exelude an expert witness for the same reason
(questions ofreliability). As a policy matter, ifthe reliability problem exists, Ohio counties and
school districts should know that as soon as possible (i.e., before the witness is hired rather than
after he takes the stand as in the instant case). The Board’s own rule provides express authority
act to protect Ohio taxpayers and taxing authorities from known unscrupulous witnesses rather
than keeping that institutional knowledge to itself and allowing the problem to persist.
The Board should sanction an expert witness when it is clear that witness
deliberately testified falsely.
All deliberate false testimony is criminal misconduct. Ifit is material it is perjury and a
felony. Ifit is not material it is “falsification” and a misdemeanor. That said, sanction requests
against witnesses are rare. Counsel for UEO has 75 years oflegal practice between the three of
to
C.
10

them. In that time, they have filed exactly two sanctions request against a witness. In both
cases, that person was Mr. Sansoucy. In both cases Mr. Sansoucy offered false testimony best
described as being “made up,” and offered it for days at a time on multiple subjects. It was
embarrassingly clear in both cases that he had little to no idea what he was talking about.
In both cases, rural Ohio counties were misled and received little or nothing in return for
large fee expenditures. In both cases, Ohio taxpayers paid enormous sums in expert witness and
legal fees to correct an evidentiary record that Mr. Sansoucy deliberately distorted. In both
Mr. Sansoucy argued that the Board should overlook his false testimony because the
taxpayer’s counsel was a “vicious” bad guy for pointing out his testimonial misconduct. He
argued in both cases that it was his tremendous effectiveness rather than his false testimony that
the real reason for the sanctions motion. In both cases, his testimony and report was the
opposite of effective, it achieved nothing for his client. His false testimony simply made the
Board’s proceeding extremely expensive for the parties involved (and made Mr. Sansoucy richer
at their expense). It now has happened twice at the Board with the same witness. The Board
should not allow a third iteration.
Witnesses usually are extended the benefit ofthe doubt with regard to the question of
cases.
was
whether a limited amount oftestimonial errors were intentional. This practice is good public
errors is somewhat self-correcting. These types of
policy because the result ofumeasonable
strongly damage the credibility ofthe witness. For that reason, counsel calling that witness
error
tries hard to avoid them.
The nature ofMr. Sansoucy’s “errors” are fundamentally different than the normal case
before the Board. It is apparent horn the Appellant School District’s pleadings that Mr.
Sansoucy was not truthful with his own client’s legal counsel. It was apparent at the Board’s
11

hearing that counsel for Appellant was surprised and dismayed when cross examination shed
light on Mr. Sansoucy’s outlandishly false testimony. Likewise, the sheer volume ofthat
outlandishly false testimony on technical matters could not have been anticipated by the School
Board’s counsel. Unfortunately, attorneys are ill equipped to catch flagrantly false testimony on
technical matters from their own expert witness. Cormsel for the school district did not have the
benefit of company engineering experts pointing out Mr. Sansoucy’s bizarrely false claims. He
had only Mr. Sansoucy. In that regard, UEO will once again make clear that it does not lay any
blame for Mr. Sansoucy’s misbehavior upon either counsel for the school district or the school
district itself Should the Board issue a decision sanctioning Mr. Sansoucy, it would be
appropriate to make clear therein that neither the school district nor its counsel bears any blame
for Mr. Sansoucy’s misconduct. Indeed, they were victims.
The Board should recognize that testifying before it can be very lucrative. Mr. Sansoucy
invoiced an Ohio school district over $400,000 for his “work” in this case. Because witnesses
have absolute immunity from lawsuit for the testimony they provide, the unscrupulous expert
witness can thumb his nose at the parties injured. UEO has no means to seek recourse in an Ohio
court for the false testimony Mr. Sansoucy offered against it. Americanjurisprudence lays the
ponsibility of addressing false testimony on the tribunal where the testimony was offered.
The Board should balance the public policy value of extending the benefit ofthe doubt to
witnesses, with the public policy value of ensuring professional witnesses do not use the Board’s
forum to perpetrate frauds on Ohio taxpayers and public officials. The public policy need for
truthful testimony outweighs affording the witness the benefit ofthe doubt in appropriate cases.
That case is before the Board
res
12

1. The Board should sanction any witness when it is clear the witness
perjured himself under Ohio law.
A principal question the Board must resolve is how to diseem when the false testimony
has gone beyond the benefit ofthe doubt. UEO is eonfident that like Justiee Potter Stewart
explaining how he defined “obseenity,” i.e., “I know it when I see it,” the Board can use its
to weigh competing polieies and deeide when to sanetion a witness that testified
falsely. However, it should be manifest to the Board that in cases where a witness eommitted
felony perjury, such testimony should not be overlooked. Similarly, the Board should eonsider
the volume ofwitness misconduet. Was it a one-off statement that might be overlooked, or was
it pervasive? Indeed, ifthere is a high volume of false testimony, that speaks to the question of
intent. The more something happens, the less likely it is that it was aecidental.
Ohio law addressed to perjury is a useful guide for the Board in this ease. At a bare
minimum, ifperjury oceurred, that is a serious abuse ofthe tribunal and the parties, and the
Board should address it. Beeause false testimony is the issue before the Board, it is also
instructive to review Ohio judieial authority regarding the questions of intent and materiality of
the false testimony. Those questions are pertinent to the sanetions request ofUEO.
R.C. 2921.11 provides in pertinent part:
2921.11 Perjury.
(A) No person, in any offieial proeeeding, shall knowingly make a false statement
under oath or affirmation, or knowingly swear or affirm the truth of a false
statement previously made, when either statement is material.
(B) A falsification is material, regardless ofits admissibility in evidenee, if it ean
affeet the eourse or outeome ofthe proeeeding. It is no defense to a charge under
this seetion that the offender mistakenly believed a falsifieation to be immaterial.
common sense
Mr. Sansouey admitted that his testimony on a number oftopics was false. Likewise, all ofthe
aetual parties to the tax dispute before the Board are in agreement that material “errors” exist in
13

his testimony and report. However, as argued in his pretrial statement, Mr. Sansoucy claims he
did not knowingly make the false statements. He asserts his errors were made in good faith. Mr.
Sansoucy argues that he only made false statements with regard to personal property to which he
did not assign a value. Presumably, this latter argument is intended to support the premise that
his false testimony was not material. Appellee will address each ofthese claims.
“Knowingly making a false statement” for purposes of the Ohio
perjury statute includes making statements where the witness is
consciously ignorant of the truth of the statement.
State V. Bayless, 14 Ohio App. 2d 11, *14, (4* Dist. 1968), is the seminal case in Ohio
addressing the question ofthe mental state required to support a perjury conviction. In that case,
the court rejected the defense argument that because the witness was not absolutely certain ofthe
falseness ofthe testimony to be offered he was “innocent” of suborning perjury. The court
rejected this argument and explained its decision as follows:
In 70 Corpus Juris Secundum 473, Perjury, Section 17b(l), the author says:
Under the rule that in order to constitute perjury a false statement must be
knowingly false, it must appear that the accused knew his statement to be false or
was consciously ignorant of its truth. (Emphasis added).
2.
* *
Likewise, the court cited with approval language from a survey of court cases on the subject.
The court, in the first paragraph ofthe syllabus in People v, Agnew, 77 Cal. App.
2d 748, 176 P. 2d 724, said:
* * *A reckless statement [in a judicial proceeding] which is not known to be
true is ‘perjury’ if in truth such averment is false. (Emphasis added).
In Butler v. McKey, 138 F. 2d 373, 3 77, the court said:
The argument is not tenable that a perjury charge cannot be sustained
against an affiant who sets forth hearsay matter as a fact. In a situation
where no specific information has been imparted to him, if a man swears
that he has received such information, and ifhe swears that because of
such information, a defendant could not with due diligence be found or a
defendant was concealing himselfto avoid service, he subjects himselfto
14

liability for perjury, for he has corruptly made a positive statement. *
(Emphasis added).
Thus, a reckless statement (i.e., an affirmative statement made where the declarant was in fact
consciously ignorant ofthe truth ofthat statement) will support a conviction for perjury in Ohio.
This means that a witness does not get to make positive averments offact as ifhe knows what he
is talking about, when the truth is that the witness is making up the testimony (i.e., it may or may
not be true but the witness is consciously ignorant ofthe truth). Those are corrupt positive
statements. The truthful answer in such a situation is obvious, “I don’t know.” It is clear in Mr.
Sansoucy’s case that he repeatedly made up outlandishly false statements offact to support his
conclusions. He knew he was making up his testimony and at best he had no idea whether the
testimony was true or false. At worst, he knew it was false. Either fact pattern is perjury under
Ohio law. In that regard, the Board need not determine which ofthese corrupt fact patterns was
the one that happened at the Board.
Making up facts to convince someone to act to her detriment on that erroneous
understanding ofthe facts is a universally bad act. The same “conscious ignorance” mental state
that supports a criminal charge ofperjury also would support a civil fraud case ifthe false
statement was made to induce entrance into a contract. Note the following treatise explication of
the difference between a “mistake” for contract law purposes and “fraud.”
Restatement ofRestitution, §6 (1937)
c. There may be ignorance of a fact without mistake as to it, since mistake imports
advertence to facts and one is ignorant ofmany facts as to which he does not
advert. However, mistake is always based upon ignorance which leads to a belief
in the existence ofnon-existing things or the non-existence of existing things.
This is true even though there is no advertence to the particular facts which, if
known, would prevent the mistake. Thus where a person makes a second
payment of a debt which previously had been paid by his agent, his payment is
mistaken, whether or not he adverts to the possibility of a prior payment, since he
is mistaken in believing in the continued existence ofthe debt. On the other hand.
H: *
15

one who knows that he is ignorant is not mistaken since he has no belief as to
the existence or non-existence of facts. (Emphasis added).
Section 8 ofthe same Restatement carries that notion forward to explicate the difference between
a “mistake” and actionable “fraud” for contract law purposes as follows:
c. Fraud. A misrepresentation is fraudulent ifit is made to another with
loiowledge that it is untrue and with the intention that the other shall act
thereon. Likewise, it is fraudulent for a person with a like intention to
make an untrue statement if he realizes that he does not know whether or
not it is true. (Emphasis added).
Whether it be civil or criminal law, Americanjurisprudence uniformly looks askance at actors
pretending they know something they do not in order to convince others to act on that bad
information to their detriment. Thus, ifthe Board determines Mr. Sansoucy was “consciously
ignorant” ofthe truth ofhis testimony (i.e., he was making it up), sanctioning that bad act is
warranted.
Aside firom the fact that conscious ignorance does not excuse false testimony, there is
another more fundamental problem with Mr. Sansoucy’s “empty head and pure heart” defense.
To support his conclusions, Mr. Sansoucy claimed to have performed an enormous amount of
study ofthe equipment and drawings ofthe Kensington facility. It was this work and study that
justified his six figure fees. IfMr. Sansoucy actually had performed the amount ofwork he
claimed, he would have known the testimony he was providing was false (i.e., he emphasized for
days in his testimony the hundreds ofhours he spent studying to make his head full, not empty).
Thus, ifhe was actually ignorant regarding the truth ofhis false statements about non-existent
equipment, non-existent products, etc., that means he testified falsely regarding the extent and
nature ofthe study he said he performed. He cannot have it both ways.
16

When is false testimony material?
False testimony is material when it could affect the outcome ofthe proceeding.
R.C. 2921.11(b). Thus, testimony from Mr. Sansoucy addressed to taxable real property that he
believed would require Appellee to pay a higher tax bill is material. False testimony offered by a
witness to buttress his own credibility is material under Ohio law. For example, a witness has
been successfully prosecuted for perjury where he told a tribunal he passed a polygraph exam
when he knew he did not. State v. Irvin, 2015-Ohio-798, 2015 Ohio App. LEXIS 802 (Ohio Ct.
App., Wood County 2015). Obviously, credibility of an expert witness can affect the outcome of
the proceeding.
3.
In fact, the credibility and reliability of an expert witness is particularly material. It
forms the basis for the ability to offer opinion testimony and have that testimony treated as
factual evidence rather than rank speculation. For that reason, before the Board can address the
credibility ofthe testimony it must first address both the reliability ofthe expert himself, and the
reliability ofhis report as a matter of admissibility under Evid. R. 702. Ifthe expert lies about
his experience or the work he said he did, that testimony obviously is material to the case
because it forms the basis upon which his opinion testimony is admitted into evidence.
Mr. Sansoucy offered reams oftestimony regarding: (1) non-existent piping systems,
(2) non-existent equipment (some ofit fifteen stories tall), (3) the function ofthat non-existent
equipment, (4) non-existent products and how those non-existent products are stored in tanks he
declared to be taxable real property; (5) claimed expertise in designing and preparing bids for
piping systems, and having prepared a “reproduction cost new” valuation ofpiping systems,
when he admittedly cannot read American National Standard piping specifications necessary to
identify the type ofpiping he is costing; (6) enormous amounts ofwork performed to study
17

drawings and texts to give him very granular understanding of everything at Kensington. All this
testimony intentionally painted a picture of a very experienced and knowledgeable witness with
specific expertise concerning the function and operation ofKensington. That narrative, iffalse,
is inarguably material because it bears upon Mr. Sansoucy’s credibility and the reliability ofhis
entire report and testimony.
In fact, the record establishes that Mr. Sansoucy made up that testimony to persuade the
Board that he and his report were credible and correct. His false testimony often directly
supported conclusions he had offered (e.g., the 56 piping systems false testimony supported his
15/56 fraction for classifying helical piles and piping racks) that were themselves pure
guesswork. This false testimony was material; it was not offered by accident. The sheer volume
and nature ofit is conclusive.
The Method Followed in Thi.s Briefwith Regard To Addressing Mr. Sansoucy’s
False Testimony.
UEO will follow a simple model in the remainder ofthis brief It will address Mr.
Sansoucy’s claims regarding the amount and nature ofwork he purported to perform in
informing himselfabout the Kensington property. UEO then will set forth one or more related
false statements made by Mr. Sansoucy. Finally, UEO will identify the evidence in the record
that exposes Mr. Sansoucy’s statements and claims as intentionally false.
The question in each instance will be “whether there is any rational basis for the false
statement(s)?” A related question in each instance will be, “what work did Mr. Sansoucy claim
he did that would have provided him knowledge to avoid the false testimony ifthe work
actually done?” For example, if a piece of equipment, a piping system, or a product ofthe
facility does not exist, and Mr. Sansoucy testified that it does, and every document attached to
his own report refutes his claim, it should be clear then that he did not read or understand those
III.
was
18

report documents. Ifhe claimed he studied those documents for hundreds ofhours, he lied.
Likewise, where there is no rational basis for the false statement (e.g., non-existent equipment or
a non-existent product), that statement is also perjurious because at best he was consciously
ignorant ofthe truth ofthe statement but made corrupt positive statements offact while hiding
his true lack ofknowledge.
The Board’s record establishes that Mr. Sansoucy’s false testimony was not a few one-off
statements. It happened over and over again. The sheer volume ofit removes any benefit ofthe
doubt about Mr. Sansoucy. He made the strategic decision in this sanctions matter to rest on the
record and not open himselfto additional questioning. Mr. Sansoucy did not appear at the
sanction hearing because it is not possible to explain his testimony. There are no reasonable
excuses he could offer on such a multiplicity ofmaterial misstatements. He could not possibly
have believed everything he said when there was no rational basis for it. Further testimony could
not have helped him in the sanctions matter, but certainly could have hurt him. Ifhe testified at
the sanctions hearing and told the truth he would be forced to concede. Ifhe did not tell the
truth, he would further expose himselfto civil and/or criminal sanction. Thus, the strategic
decision not to testify was really his only option.
The Work Mr. Sansoucy Claimed To Have Performed.
To evaluate whether Mr. Sansoucy’s false testimony was due to a reasonable mistake it is
IV.
necessary to review and evaluate his claims about the work he performed to support that
testimony. In other words, if a witness claims to have performed exhaustive study of a subject to
credibility, then the witness cannot also claim
support his conclusions and buttress his own
ignorance on that subject as a shield against allegations offalse testimony. The two positions are
mutually exclusive.
19

From the beginning Mr. Sansoucy portrayed himself as possessing an enormous amount
of experience and familiarity with “everything that’s at Kensington.” He stated in direct voir
dire examination:
Q. You testified earlier that Kensington is kind of a conglomeration of different
pieces and parts. Is there any piece ofproperty, whether real or personal, at
Kensington that you haven’t seen before?
A. I’ve seen everything that’s at Kensington. Whether we valued everything at
Kensington identical, no, we haven’t, because they’re all brand new, it’s state of
the art. But I’ve seen every type of facility that’s at Kensington elsewhere in
its individual nature or in its conglomeration. There’s nothing unusual
about this collection of assets; it’s just how they put them together to do what
they need to do. (Emphasis added).
H.R. Vol. I: 156. Thus, during voir dire Mr. Sansoucy portrayed himselfas a person with
preexisting vast knowledge who then studied drawings, process flow diagrams and vendor
documents to become an expert on the Kensington plant. He professed great familiarity and
experience with every asset at Kensington both individually and in its conglomeration before
he ever got to the drawings. He had seen “every type of facility that’s at Kensington.” He also
clearly testified that he knew exactly what assets existed at Kensington or how else could he
claim to have seen “everything” and that there was “nothing unusual about this collection of
assets”?
very
A. Despite purporting to be a report of expert testimony on engineering facts,
the Sansoucy report does not set forth any facts relevant to the real versus
personal property question.
Mr. Sansoucy’s report purported to address two subjects, property classification (i.e., real
personal), and valuation. The vast bulk ofthe tax dollars in dispute involved the legal
issue ofproperty classification. UEO did not obtain or present valuation evidence for the $56
million worth ofproperty Mr. Sansoucy claimed was improperly classified because his
misclassification was flatly wrong as a matter of law and fact. The major dispute between the
versus
20

parties was the real versus personal property classifieation question. Aeeordingly, the faets and
law pertinent to that question form the great majority ofthe Board’s evidentiary reeord.
There are a few crueial facts relevant to the legal question ofproperty classification as
real or personal property that one would expect to be set forth in detail in an expert report
addressed to that question. They are: (1) how the property is physically attached to the real
estate; and (2) whether the property primarily benefits the real estate generally or the particular
business being conducted on the real estate? Mr. Sansoucy purported to address both ofthose
inquiries for all ofthe property on the site. See Sansoucy Report at 55 and 60. However, Mr.
Sansoucy’s report does not explicate those pertinent facts for any ofthe property he claimed to
classify.
Instead, Mr. Sansoucy’s report consists ofrepeated uncorroborated claims about the sheer
volume ofwork he did or what he sources he reviewed to answer these questions followed by his
bare legal conclusions on property classification. The relevant facts on the classification
question to which he purportedly applied Ohio law are absent from the report. The Board will
not find a section in the report where Mr. Sansoucy sets forth how the items ofproperty are
attached to the real estate. The Board will not find a section in the report where Mr. Sansoucy
sets forth the facts on how particular items ofproperty benefit either the real estate generally or
the specific business conducted. He purports to have done this investigatory work for hundreds
and hundreds ofitems. Yet, he does not set forth in his report those facts for even one item. His
report relies upon his uncorroborated claims of a “detailed” investigation he performed as a
substitute for showing the results ofthe purported investigation.
Mr. Sansoucy did not produce any contemporaneous notes addressing that real versus
personal analysis despite the fact that page 14 ofhis report asserts that he prepared “detailed
21

notes.” He did not bring any notes to hearing as a referenee when asked questions about function
attachment of various items ofproperty. Instead, he repeatedly tried (and failed) to find
references to various items of equipment at hearing in the indexes of generic textbooks. Thus,
the Sansoucy report was grossly anomalous from the start. Ifthe investigatory and analytical
work had been performed with regard to the key facts ofproperty attachment, function and
benefit, it is reasonable to expect that analytical work and supporting facts to be plainly visible in
the report or at least in his working notes. Yet, there is nothing.
Mr. Sansoucy’s report is devoid of facts and has only legal conclusions on the real versus
personal property question. This technique precluded any meaningful ability to determine ifhe
correctly discerned the facts he claimed to rely upon prior to hearing. His failure to include the
relevant facts on the classification question in the report shifted emphasis to Mr. Sansoucy’s
testimony. Counsel for Mr. Sansoucy has complained that Mr. Sansoucy was kept on the stand
for an inordinate amount oftime. However, the length oftime Mr. Sansoucy was cross-
examined was a direct result ofhis failure to include the facts in his report, a report which
purported to have reclassified $56 million of equipment at Kensington. It was Mr. Sansoucy’s
effort to preclude meaningful review ofhis conclusions prior to hearing by failing to include
relevant facts in his report that was the direct cause ofhis multiple days on the stand.
Mr. Sansoucy’s strategy was to show up at hearing and backfill facts via his own
testimony to support his classification conclusions. His report very often pointed generally to the
entire body ofplant drawings as “support” for his conclusions without specifying any. In some
cases, a specific drawing was referenced that said the opposite ofMr. Sansoucy’s claims. He
had no specific notes to refer to during the hearing, and he did not produce any during discovery.
It became clear as the Board’s hearing proceeded that Mr. Sansoucy was simply making up facts
or
own
22

support his conclusions, and that had been his intention all along. He presumed that the lack
ofnotice ofhis made up factual claims would preclude effective cross-examination.
However, the things he was saying under oath directly contradicted all available
documentary evidence including the facility drawings he claimed to have studied for hundreds of
hours. To an expert actually familiar with the Kensington facility, it was abundantly clear that
Mr. Sansoucy had no idea what existed there, much less how the property functioned or how it
attached to the real estate. For example, Mr. Sansoucy blithely stated that all transformers at
affixed to the realty” without providing any evidence to corroborate
that statement. H.R. Vol. 2: 416. Grant Hammer indicated that to his knowledge, none ofthe
transformers are attached to the concrete pads they rest on, and that he had specific knowledge
that the four very large step down transformers (which was about $15 million ofthe total) were
definitely not attached because he had been involved in replacing one ofthose transformers.
S.R. Vol. 2: 237-238. This fact by itselfwould be dispositive ofthe real versus personal
question for transformers that were not bolted to the concrete pads they rested upon. See
American National Can Co. v. Tracy, 72 Ohio St. 3d 150,153 (1995) (addressing the question of
whether a very large transformer sitting on a concrete pads like those at Kensington were real or
personal property and concluding:
The record shows that this transformer, a large piece of equipment, was neither bolted nor
otherwise affixed to the concrete slab upon which it rested. Am-Nat admits that it could
be moved with a crane. It was, therefore, free-standing and not a structure or part ofreal
property.).
Once again Mr. Sansoucy simply made up the facts (transformers affixed to concrete pads) that
he believed supported his classification conclusion. As shown below, Mr. Sansoucy repeatedly
made up testimony to support either his own credibility or his conclusions (or both) with
rational basis to support it.
to
was
59
the site were “structures
no
23

Work Mr. Sansoucy claimed to have performed to support his conclusions.
Mr. Sansoucy claimed in his report to have done an enormous amount
of work to support his real versus personal property determinations.
Mr. Sansoucy indicated in his report that the “problem to be solved” was the “separation”
of real property and personal property, the “identification and quantification” of the taxable real
property, and the valuation ofthat property. See Appellant’s Ex. 1, (Sansoucy Appraisal Report)
at 8. Likewise, Mr. Sansoucy described the scope of his services as including “analysis
necessary to develop credible assignment results, and research required to understand the
physical interrelated characteristics of the property and improvements.” Id. At pages 8 to 10 of
his report, Mr. Sansoucy set forth many tasks he reportedly performed to support his conclusion.
Among those tasks he set forth were:
• Detailed review and education of modern natural gas cryogenic processing
facilities through various textbooks, articles and publications;
• Review of Ohio law regarding the taxability and classification of property similar
to the Kensington tangible assets and tangible property;
• Create the process for determining whether an item is real or personal property
under Ohio tax law as it applies to the Kensington faeility;
• Review law and case law decisions in Ohio regarding the taxability of eertain
types of property as real, personal, or business related nontaxable tangible
property or a business fixture;
• Develop a final methodology for determining the real property criteria for
inventory ofthe Kensington facility;
• Preparation of a detailed construction take-off ofthat portion of the Kensington
Facility determined to be taxable real property based on the actual Kensington
engineering drawings, including a review of nearly all of the engineering
drawings in Kensington for their designation and property type;
• Tabulation and sorting ofthe real property portion of the Kensington Facility into
specific taxable areas ofreal property; (Emphasis added).
B.
1.
24

Appellant’s Ex. 1 at 9. Mr. Sansoucy emphasized that he considered “detailed construction and
engineering plans and specifications” to support his work. Id. at 13. Mr. Sansoucy
claimed that he reviewed “nearly all ofthe engineering drawings in Kensington.” Id. at 9.
On page 4 ofhis report, Mr. Sansoucy described his competency for the Kensington
also
assignment as follows:
For purposes ofthis appraisal, I have striven to increase my competency related to
the valuation of Kensington. I believe that I have adequately become competent
for the valuation of this facility, for which, at this point, there is no other of this
operating magnitude in Ohio,
provided, in this appraisal, a detailed list and summary of documents and
information considered. I considered 4 or 5 separate text book sources and did
a complete overview of each of these texts. I performed a detailed site tour,
took a number of photographs with my associate, asked a number of questions,
prepared detailed notes, and compared this facility with the remaining other
facilities of its type, although not as extensive, in the State of Ohio. I have
reviewed 1,500 -2,000 detail drawings as neeessary for the real property
portion of the plant, including the overview drawings of the plant. (Emphasis
added.)
Mr. Sansoucy claimed that he received 15,000 plant drawings, which he “reordered” into a 1497
workbook, then from that set of 1497 drawings he “isolated those drawings which related to
the criteria outlined earlier in this report.” Id.
As part of my additional self-learning, I have
page
directly to the real property improvements based
at 66. Those selected 520 drawings formed Appendix L of his report. In addition to the 15,000
on
drawings, Mr. Sansoucy indicated that he reviewed 85 boxes of cost records which included
additional “business equipment and machinery drawings” that Mr. Sansoucy referred to as “work
files.” Id. Indeed, Mr. Sansoucy asserted that:
In addition to the drawings, we asked for, and received, the ability to review all of
the purchase orders, vendor bills, cost ledgers, slips and vendor submissions,
which in and of themselves, include the balance of the engineering drawings,
when supplied by an individual vendor.
25

Id. at 69. Thus, Mr. Sansoucy claimed in his report that he comprehensively reviewed “all”
Kensington drawings and cost records, and that the cost records themselves included additional
drawings which he also reviewed.
Mr. Sansoucy testified to enormous amounts of review and study of
Kensington documents and that analysis was the basis of his real
versus personal property determinations.
At hearing, Mr. Sansoucy’s repeated his claims ofwork performed. But, his testimonial
claims differ markedly depending upon which day the claim was made. From days one through
five, Mr. Sansouey professed to have reviewed everything Kensington. He attested to having
prehensive knowledge. When Mr. Sansouey discovered over the weekend between days five
and six ofthe hearing that over half ofthe 56 piping systems he claimed to have studied did not
aetually exist, he changed his earlier testimony. For the first time he admitted that he had not
reviewed drawings for those systems he had classified as personal property. Instead, his new
position was that he made his real versus personal determination for those piping systems
knowing nothing more than their names.
These later declarations cannot be reconciled with the prior claims and claims made in
the report regarding comprehensive understanding ofhow all ofthe property at Kensington
“physically interrelates,” and his study of engineering documents and process flow diagrams to
confirm his classification of all 56 systems (both real and personal). Likewise, the later claims
cannot support a claim of good faith (e.g., how does one go about making a good faith
determination that property is real or personal if one’s “review” ofthe facts is so lacking that one
does not even know whether the property exists?). Thus, Mr. Sansoucy’s attempted excuse
2.
eom
leaves a great deal to be desired with regard to excusing his conduct.
At his deposition, Mr. Sansouey testified that Kensington was a collection of assets and
‘understand what was there and what did they do.” Appellees Ex. 2:
his “first objective” was to
26

71; See also S.R. Vol. 1: 95. Notably, he did not take this opportunity to indicate that he had not
reviewed the drawings for more than half ofthe 56 piping systems that he repeatedly testified
existed. Neither did he explain that he made no effort to ascertain what did or did not exist at
Kensington (which was where his testimony ultimately was going to go).
In addition to the work claims within his report, Sansoucy testified repeatedly through the
first five days ofhearing about the analysis and work that he did to separate Kensington assets
into real property and personal property, which he then assigned a cost to the real property he
identified. He testified that he alone made the decisions “on what property was real or personal.”
H.R. Vol. 1:16.'^ Sansoucy testified that he and his staffperformed extraordinary amounts of
study ofplant drawings and cost records:
On the engineering drawings I told you what I did.
drawings on a drive and the table of contents. We went into the 15,000
drawings on the drive, and through the table of contents, we extracted
those areas that might be categories ofreal property. We eliminated areas
that might or probably likely were categories ofpersonal property. ***
We got 15,000
[S]o we got the 15000, we got the table of contents, and we reduced that to
1490 or 1500 drawings. We looked at every single drawing and collected
from the 1500 and came up with about 500 plus that we were going to use
for the quantity takeoff and everything else. The entire process of
selecting the drawings, going through all of those drawings, took at
least 100 hours. Probably took 2-1/2 man-weeks in my estimate. So that
would be at least 100 hours on that before we start taking off stuff. Just
selecting, finding, reading, and coming up with potentially real property.
See H.R. Vol. I, at 127-128; See also Vol. II, at 300-301 (Sansoucy stating that he identified
1,497 drawings to be used in his report from total of 15,000 drawings). Mr. Sansoucy elaborated
UEO noted the suggestion at the Board’s sanction hearing that Mr. Sansoucy was somehow mislead by his
employees. Aside from the fact that Mr. Sansoucy made clear that he alone did the property classification work, he
did not take the stand to claim as a factual matter that somehow he was misled by his employees. He never said
even one time on the record that he was misled by his employees. When he was caught in his false testimony, his
repeated defense was to claim the false testimony was “not germane,” or simply that he had never said anything to
the contrary, not that his employees deceived him. Thus, as a factual matter in the record, he was not misled.
27

make clear that this 100+ hours of studying both drawings and the “table of contents” for the
drawings was exclusive of additional time spent in determining cost (i.e., the “2 14 man-weeks”
ofwork was all addressed to study offimction and benefit ofthe systems). Id. at 130-131.
Mr. Sansoucy also testified that his firm went through “85 banker s boxes of cost
records and vendor drawings in Houston that was in addition to that 100+ hours of staring at the
drawings and the index for same. Id. at 132-135. That was an additional 260 hours of document
analysis and review for a total of at least 360 hours. Id. at 128-129.
Mr. Sansoucy testified that he had advised Mr. Stedronsky for “all of the property on the
site” on the issue of classification:
advised Mr. Stedronsky on the technical and physical characteristics of
all of the property on the site that is primarily related to the realty and
property on the site that is primarily processing property. And the property
gray in the middle. As an engineer in layman’s terms.”
H.R. Vol. 3: 481. He did not testify at this point on day three that he had not reviewed property
he considered to be personal at all without reviewing drawings and without even determining ifit
existed (which was his desperation position on day 6 of the hearing). He very clearly testified
that he advised as to “technical and physical characteristics” of all of it, real, personal and “gray
in the middle.”
to
Mr. Sansoucy testified under direct examination that in order to be credible in his
report he had to have done the “research required to understand the physical interrelated
characteristics of the property and the improvements” and that “ifyou don’t research it, it’s
not going to be credible; starting with what constitutes real and what’s personal.” H.R.
Vol. I, at 192. At no point did Mr. Sansoucy testify in those first five days ofhearing that he had
classified dozens of systems and items of equipment as personal property that he believed existed
at Kensington (1) without even looking for drawings of those systems or equipment and
28

(2) without even determining whether that equipment aetually existed at Kensington. When he
would falsely testify as to the existenee or funetion of that non-existent equipment, he never
disclosed any uncertainty. He always testified in terms of concrete fact. Similarly, he would
explain how he determined the non-existent piping systems (of which there were 29)
physically interrelated” with the 27 piping systems that did exist. Of course, ifhe actually had
never
determined how the systems interrelated one with another, he would not have testified there were
more than twice as many systems as there actually were. The non-existent systems related to and
interfaced with nothing at Kensington. Any real study would have disclosed that glaring fact.
Sansoucy claimed to have applied the legal flowchart process outlined in his report “to
Id. at 96. He described his flow
determine the distinction between real and personal property,
chart at page 58 of his report as the methodology “to look at each system back and forth***”.
Likewise, Mr. Sansoucy testified that he made his real versus personal property determinations
as follows:
Q. Before you go on, I just want to clarify, how did you determine or how did you
make that initial determination ofthose things that were clearly personal and then
those things that might not be clearly personal?
A. I went through the drawings and we did the site tour, we saw them. Went
through the drawings. We researched as much of the public record as we
could. So for example, this particular Figure 12 comes out ofthe company’s
records, and they are public records, and it outlines, for example, the primary
components ofthe site to help me identify what all ofthese various components
were. And in identifying those I then immediately made a decision - I say
“immediately” -1 made a decision if they were, without a doubt to me,
personal property, and moved them aside. Then I went to the drawings to
look at the flow charts in those drawings, the process flow diagrams, to see if,
number one, any of those might have intersected their operation with the real
property, per se, or did I in fact make reasonable decisions on moving them
out of the real property category and intro the personal property in the first
instance by virtue ofwhat they are. So I went back through, looked at the
process flow diagrams, and especially on, you know, beginning the process of
identifying what’s out and what’s in the gray.
29

H.R. Vol. 4: 714-715. Thus, contrary to his day six testimony when he claimed that he made
personal property determinations without reviewing anything at all, he very clearly testified
previously that he studied drawings for all of the property at Kensington. He specifically and
repeatedly indicated that he studied the process flow diagrams to form his conclusions on
classifications for the 56 piping systems. His foregoing elaim that he studied the
property
Kensington documents for those systems he determined were personal to see if his initial
conclusion was correct cannot possibly have occurred for even one of the 29 non-existent
piping systems. Otherwise, he certainly would have noticed 29 missing systems out of 56
possible (yet he failed to find any).
Mr. Sansoucy went onto describe examples ofhow he applied that analysis of function to
discrete items of property at Kensington as small as individual C02 detectors and various other
equipment at the site. Id. at 271 (compressor buildings); Id. at 273-275 (C02 detectors); Id. at
276-278 (flare piping system); Id. at 279-282 (Sansouey’s phrase, “cryogenic towers”).
Sansoucy indicated that his analysis was to determine whether the component at issue benefited
See Id. at 280 (explaining his view that the “cryogenic towers^
personal property because “ifs there to benefit the process”); 281 (“by all rights ifs a fixture but
it’s there to benefit the process.”).
Mr. Sansoucy testified throughout the first five days ofhearing that his review and study
ofthe Kensington drawings were the basis ofhis conclusions; “[t]he first and most important
step in determining real property is to determine how the property is designed, built and affixed
the ground, and that’s what the engineering documents show you.” Id. at 31. He said, “we
looked carefully at the drawings on the use and the affixation to the land, et cetera.
are
the site or the “process.’
to
Id. at
197-198.
30

Sansoucy summarized the description ofhis real versus personal property analysis:
So this starts the process of how we developed the individual units and
quantities and developed the difference between the real and the personal,
and we went into that particular category, such as piping, how did we
develop - which piping is taxable, which is not taxable, and then how did
develop the quantities ofthe taxable portion ofthat particular category,
for example.
Id. at 298. Sansoucy made clear that the plant drawings allowed him to “see the property” and
the intent ofthe owner” for the equipment at Kensington.
The best method to do—if you can. If you’ve got a new property or an
aged property that has engineering drawings, the best way to establish the
first partial inventory, fractional inventory of property is if you have
engineering drawings, so you can actually see the all of the
property.***But if you do have a new property and you do have
drawings, you can now go through and start isolating those portions
of the seven criteria to develop what part of that is real, because you
can actually see—you can see the property. You can see the intent of
the owner. ***So having the drawings is very beneficial, but getting the
drawings on a site ofthis size and weeding through them to identify the set
of categories is tedious. It’s not ultimately hard. It’s tedious. =^**We
provided a chip, a flash drive of all of the drawings for the site,
15,000 pages of engineering drawings, and the index. (Emphasis added.)
we
see
were
Id. at 299-300.
Mr. Sansoucy testified that he also reviewed “shop drawings” prepared by vendors in the
“85 banker’s boxes” ofmaterials that was in addition to the 15,000 drawings. Id. at 300-301. He
indicated that from the 15,000 drawings he whittled it down to 1,497 drawings to be used in his
report:
So that’s the 1,497 drawings. What we did is went through and colored
those 1,497 drawings from what we believed was real property based on
the seven categories. We colored the portion that we felt was real. And
then the 520 drawings that constitute Appendix L is a copy of those
colored drawings that are in the 1,497.
Id. at 302. Mr. Sansoucy described his real versus personal determination process as involving
much “study” ofthe drawings.
31

Q. What was the general process?
A. Exactly what you just said. We went on a site tour. We valued the
property. We looked at the drawings. We studied and we debated,
studied the drawings again, and then made a decision as to which we
felt business - business fixtures versus real property.
H.R. Vol. V, at 1052.
It is worth noting that in addition to this comprehensive study ofthe drawings regarding
property classification (i.e., use, function, benefit and affixation to the ground), Sansoucy
claimed that he also determined whether the property at Kensington suffered from any functional
depreciation. He said that he performed research to ascertain whether there was any functional
H.R. Vol. 2: 329.^ Of course, the
depreciation at Kensington, “we researched, we found none.'
facts uncovered by this purported research were missing from the report. To perform functional
depreciation analysis one must be fully aware ofthe particular assets that are employed to
perform a particular function to compare those assets to current state ofthe art technology.
Not surprisingly, Mr. Sansoucy failed to appear at the Board’s sanction hearing to explain
how he performed his alleged functional depreciation “research” without actually knowing what
equipment existed at the site and apparently suffering under beliefs that multiple non-existent
products were made by non-existent equipment. For example, how did Mr. Sansoucy research
and determine that the non-existent deethanizer or non-existent nitrogen rejection unit he
described in his testimony did not suffer from any functional depreciation? As is explained more
fully below, a nitrogen rejection unit is completely unnecessary to process Kensington gas. Mr.
Sansoucy’s claimed research into fiinctional depreciation would have disclosed that no one
would pay for that giant useless asset he believed existed ... had he actually performed such
research.
^ Functional depreciation: Decline in the productive or service ability of a capital asset due to obsolescence. See
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/functional-depreciation.html
32

Mr. Sansoucy’s day six testimony that he determined property was personal without
actually finding and reviewing the property in the Kensington documents, and without
determining ifthe property existed, cannot he reconciled with his previous claims to having
achieved an understanding ofhow all ofthe systems and equipment at Kensington interrelate
with each other, his “first objective” of determining “what was there,” and the enormous amount
oftestimony in which he claimed that all ofhis real versus property classification decisions were
made from his study and review ofthe drawings. At no point during the first five days ofthe
merits hearing or in his report did Mr. Sansoucy state that he made real versus personal
classification decisions without reviewing Kensington documents. To the contrary, he testified
that he looked at process flow diagrams and engineering drawings to confirm his classification of
property as real or personal. H.R. Vol. IV: 714-715; Vol. V, at 1052; quoted with emphasis,
supra. When shaping his own narrative about work and study allegedly performed, Mr.
Sansoucy certainly did not disclose that he failed to even determine the existence ofmore than
half ofthe piping systems listed in a general legend. Appellant’s Ex. 1, Appendix L at Bates
383. Such an admission, although true, would have fatally undermined his reliability.
The claims Mr. Sansoucy made in his report and during that first five days ofhearing
concerning work performed are starkly inconsistent with (1) his claims on day six and (2) those
in his Prehearing Statement filed prior to the sanctions hearing after he realized his previous false
testimony was known and untenable. The claims made from days one through five regarding
work done cannot be reconciled with the new day six and seven claims. The nature ofMr.
Sansoucy’s statements are such that they cannot spring from honest error. Mr. Sansoucy knew
he hadn’t studied the Kensington documents to confirm his classification conclusions, yet he
peatedly testified under oath that he had. In those first five days oftrial, these statements were
re
33

concocted purposefully to bolster credibility and support conclusions. Those statements were
false. Mr. Sansoucy offered them to mislead the Board
later proven impossible. They
about the work he performed. The inescapable conclusion is that they were lies offered in some
were
cases to bolster his eredibility as an expert and in others to directly support his conclusions.
Sansoucy’s false testimony specifie to piping systems.
It was within the context of his elaimed of study of the property at Kensington that Mr.
Sansoucy purposefully offered his opinion thaf certain types of property at the facility were
partially real property. For pipe racks and helical piles (steel foundations screwed into bedrock),
Sansoucy determined a eost and then applied a fraetion in order to cost the rmdivided portion of
eaeh piece of steel in what he classified as a real property strueture. See Appellants Ex. 1,
Appendix F. The fraction he applied was 15/56. The notes to the report indicate that the 15/56
fraetion was derived by taking the 15 piping systems Sansoucy had determined were real
ratio of all 56 piping systems he elaimed existed on the site. H.R., Vol. II, at 380-
3.
property as a
383 (“You’ll see pipelines on the legend, pipe rack. This is what’s carrying pipelines, 56 total
pipeline systems”). See, also. Appellant’s Ex. 1, Appendix F, at Bates 7, and 10 at note 2
(referencing Appendix J, Bates 146 “structural working notes”).
Mr. Sansoucy testified under direct examination that he determined there were 56 piping
systems at Kensington:
Q. Okay. How did you determine, one, that there were 56 total at
Kensington and, two, you would use 15 ofthose?
A. In the piping portion of the appendix on the tables, F-3, that’s going to
be second to last. That’s going to be Table F-6. The piping portion ofthe
drawings starts on Bates 381, and you ean see on table F-6 that the piping
goes all the way through to Bates 379 to 517. Within the drawings in
piping, on Bates 383, there is a piping legend, and that piping legend
provides a list of all of the various piping systems.
Q. Did you color those?
34

A. And then we colored those that we felt were site utilities that
related to the use of the real estate and not the property. They were
basic site utilities being used, and that gives us the 15. Now, on an
absolute basis -- yeah, it’s 15. When you go to the notes, you’ll find
other piping systems that we were also adding up in the notes. But as
we worked through those, we dropped them off as being more likely
related to the personal property than the real property. So what you see in
the notes is gone from the table, but this is what’s in the table, is shown on
the legend.
Q. Okay. We’ve got the legend on the board, and those are your colors
you added?
A. Yes, they are.
Q. And ifwe look through the drawings of all the pipes, will we see those
colors?
A. Ifyou go through the pipe drawings, you’ll see those colors.
H.R. Vol. II: 383-384; see also Id. at 426 (“we selected from the 56 systems that we believe are
real property systems that serve the utility ofthe property***.”).
Mr. Sansoucy testified that he applied his real versus personal property analysis to every
single one ofthe 56 piping systems he had identified.
Q. Then when you made these cuts did you actually go through and apply
your methodology on page 59 to each of these systems to just double
check yourself?
A. You can apply it ifyou wish.
Q. No, I was asking if you did that?
A. I do - did.
Q. Did you?
A. Yeah.
Q. In applying that flow chart, did you also consider or at least review
from the documents the function of each of the 56 piping systems?
A. Yes.
35

Q. Do you believe you have the expertise for purposes of this appraisal to
evaluate the function of each of those piping systems?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And you did that?
A. Yes.
H.R. Vol. V: 1044. Likewise, he claimed that he had looked at all ofthe piping systems in the
Kensington engineering drawings. H.R. Vol. IV: 720 (Q: But ifyou didn’t see them you at least
looked at them in the drawings? A: That is correct.).
Similarly, Mr. Sansoucy testified that in creating his 15/56 fraction, he actually “counted”
piping systems “on the pipe racks.”
***So if you look down at the next series of calculations which are
footnoted on Table F-3, and what we did is we then went to the pipeline
legend and we used the pipeline legend in the first instance to determine
the taxability of, say, the structural pipe rack. So we did the full cost of
the structural pipe rack, and then we counted up the number of taxable
systems on the pipe rack versus the number of nontaxable systems on
the pipe rack. And that number came up to 56 pipeline systems total,
only of which 15 we believed are taxable as real property. That ratio
was 26.7 percent, so we used 27 percent on the structures for taxability.
H.R. Vol. V: 1023. He testified that when he made the initial real versus personal deeision on
the 15 systems marked at his Appendix L page 383 that he then studied those piping systems in
the drawings and tabulated them within those drawings:
Q. But did you look at the drawings for each ofthe systems?
A. Once we selected those, we then went to the drawings to find them and
tabulate them.
Q. And you found the drawings for all these and you looked at them?
A. In the 1,500 drawings, pretty much they are all - it’s all there, you know.
H.R.V0I.IV: 718.
36

Of course, it was later revealed that 29 ofthe 56 systems did not exist. Indeed, three of
the systems he marked as real property did not exist. This self-promoting testimony about going
to the drawings to “find them and tabulate them” and to confirm conclusions by checking
process flow diagrams was plainly false. His testimony about having “counted up the number of
taxable systems on the pipe rack verses the number ofnontaxable systems on the pipe rack” was
impossibly false. The claim that “it’s all there you know” (in the drawings) also was false. Ifhe
actually looked, he would have discovered 29 non-existent piping systems. One cannot count
piping systems on raeks when those systems do not exist.
Mr. Sansoucy testified that the drawings supported his conelusion to weigh all ofthe
piping systems equally in his 15/56 fraetion as follows:
Q. Do you believe that each ofthe piping systems, the 56 that we have been
talking about, do you believe they each burden the pipe racks to an equal degree?
A. No, of eourse not.
Q. Then why did you weight them equally in your formula?
A. Beeause they each could use it, not use it. Some ofthem will be more taxable
versus nontaxable on a raek, and some sections will be more taxable versus - the
entire pipe rack system carries all of them.
So in the - in the big picture on a total dollar basis, we believe our weighting
is very realistic. But in any given ten feet, no, and it is absolutely unnecessary
in preparing an estimate for appraisal to get into the detail where you’re counting
the number oftaxable versus nontaxable pipes on every ten-foot steel section.
Q. So it’s accurate to say that not all 56 ofthe pipe systems are on all ofthe raek
systems?
A. That’s an aceurate statement.
Q. Is it accurate to say that all ofthe 56 piping systems are on some ofthe raeks?
A. No, not entirely accurate. A lot of them, if not most of them — but there
may be some that never make it to a rack, there may be some that all ofthem do
make it to a raek at a eertain spot.
37

There may be some that don’t, and the raeks now are just not piping. Remember,
you’ve got all the eleetrieal earrying capacity, too, for the taxable electrical parts
that don’t enter into the 56 — the 15 divided by 56. They also carry taxable
electrical.
Q. If some of them didn’t touch the racks why would they be in the
formula?
A. Because at some places they may touch the racks.
Q. That’s why I asked. I’mjust asking, are all 56 piping systems touching the
racks at some point?
A. I don’t know the answer to that. There are systems there that we selected and
threw out the first instance. It might be underground. And then you got the ‘
ofwhether or not they’re real estate in the first instance. But I don’t know the
answer to that, if every last piping system is on racks.
Q. It’s fair to say that your ratio doesn’t take that into account ifthey are not on
the racks?
A. It does not. Most of the piping systems, when you go through the pipe
drawings, are on the racks.
H.R., Vol. V: 1054-1056; see also, Id. at 1044 (claiming to have studied the fiinction of all 56
systems). The last statement in the excerpt above is entirely false. Mr. Sansoucy did not
possibly have knowledge in his head that “most ofthe piping systems” being discussed at that
point in the hearing “are on the racks.” More than halfofthem do not exist. He made that up to
support the correctness ofthe 15/56 fraction he applied. Likewise his claim that “the pipe
drawings” supported his conclusion as to the location ofthe piping systems (on the racks) was
wholly false. That false statement was also concocted to support the correctness ofhis 15/56
fraction. Only 27 ofthose piping systems actually existed and appeared in the drawings at all,
much less being located on the pipe racks. Mr. Sansoucy was making up facts and work
performed to support the correctness ofthe 15/56 fraction that he applied. There was no rational
basis for any ofthis testimony.
issue
38

On day 6 ofthe hearing, after having a weekend to actually review the drawings that he
claimed already to have exhaustively studied for “hundreds” ofhours, Mr. Sansoucy returned to
hearing and recanted much ofthe foregoing testimony. He testified that over the weekend (when
he apparently reviewed the Kensington drawings for the very first time), he had come to the
conclusion that there were only 26 (close to the actual number, 27) piping systems.
Q. Did you testify previously in this hearing that you looked at drawings at
Kensington for facilities or pipes - rather pipe systems that you now conclude do
not exist at Kensington?
A. You know, how can you answer that question when -
MR. EHLER: Your Honor, can you instruct the witness -
HEARING EXAMINER: Mr. Sansoucy -
THE WITNESS: ITl answer, but your Honor, how can you answer a question I
just answered when he said that I looked at drawings for things that didn’t exist?
I had to look at the drawings to determine they didn’t exist.
By Mr. Ehler:
Q. But, Mr. Sansoucy, you testified you looked at the drawings.
A. Yes.
Q. You looked at those systems on the drawings?
A. No, I didn’t say I looked at the systems. I didn’t say we looked at the
systems.
Q. You said those systems touched the racks, didn’t you?
A. No - then which systems?
Q. Yeah, there’s the rub, isn’t it?
A. Which system?
Q. When you mislead everybody you can’t remember.
A. No, you’re going to have to tell me which systems.
Q. The record will tell.
39

Mr. Sansoucy, is it fair to say the numerator and the denominator ofyour ratio
don’t reflect what’s at - the numerator contains systems that aren’t at
Kensington?
A. The numerator that we went into the tables with is 15 over 56. The current
numerator should be 12 over 26.
Q. And you found that out this weekend?
A. Yes, I did. That is correct. I answered your question when I told you I
would on Friday.
Q. So this weekend you finally figured out what exists at Kensington?
A. What doesn’t exist at Kensington. Not what exists, what doesn’t exist. The
table hasn’t changed, that exists at Kensington. Your question was why isn’t
treated water in the table? Why isn’t firewater in the table*
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 1175-1177. It should be noted that counsel for Mr. Sansoucy has
argued that Mr. Sansoucy corrected his ovm testimony in an honorable effort to prevent the
Board from being misled. However, it is self-evident that Mr. Sansoucy’s “correction” involved
denying that he had ever said he had seen the non-existent systems or the drawings for them
(despite the fact that the record shows he repeatedly did say those things). Thus, his “correction”
ofprior false testimony was effected by denying he ever said those things. Correcting false
testimony by offering more is hardly intended to protect the Board from being mislead.
Mr. Sansoucy testified that he finally determined the actual number ofpiping systems at
Kensington by simply reviewing his own Appendix L drawings and counting the piping systems
therein. However, he now testified under oath that he had never said he looked at any
personal property piping systems sufficiently to determine ifthose systems exist at
Kensington. Of course, this raises the question, ifhe admitted on day six that he never looked to
see ifmore than half ofthe piping systems even existed, why did he testify on days one through
five that they did exist, that he had physically seen many ofthem, and that he had confirmed his
*
40

classification by studying them in the drawings? Why did he testify that his 15/56 fraction was
correct? Why did he testify that he had counted 56 systems on the pipe racks?
When Mr. Sansoucy claimed at day six of the hearing that he had not reviewed the
drawings for property he classified to be personal (even to the point of minimally
establishing the existenee of that property), he admitted he intentionally presented false
and misleading testimony in days one through five of the hearing. He repeatedly had
testified with no equivocation that those piping systems existed. He repeatedly supported his
conclusions with statements offact that were impossible in light ofhis day six admission. He
said he had seen them in person, seen them in drawings, and that the drawings supported his
conclusion that those piping systems were on the raeks. His admission on day six and in his
pretrial statement confirm that he was at best “consciously ignoranf’ as to the existence ofthose
systems when he falsely testified about them.
Opposing counsel’s pretrial statement eoncedes perjury as well by asserting:
When he [Mr. Sansoucy] encountered a piping legend indicating the existence of
56 piping systems, he properly assumed they existed. (E.g., Trans, at 1047-48
(“There’s no systems not here. This is the listfrom the engineeringfirmfor the
systems on the siteE (emphasis added); id. at 1177-78 (“This drawing says what it
says, Mr. Ehler.”); id. at 1194-95)). Many ofthese systems he quickly
determined, based on his experienee or additional researeh, were nontaxable and
did not require further study. {See id. at 1094-95). He therefore did not search
for them in the engineering drawings because they were not relevant to his
inventory and valuation ofthe taxable property at Kensington. Had he done so, of
course, he would have learned that several ofthe piping systems were not
represented on the drawings other than on the piping legend. But to save time and
money for his client. United, Mr. Sansoucy did not undertake this analysis.
{See, e.g., id. at 674). And so when he was asked about these nontaxable systems
during the hearing, he testified on the assumption and beliefthat all 56 piping
systems existed somewhere at Kensington.
The foregoing statement cannot possibly be squared with Mr. Sansoucy’s testimony at deposition
and during the first five days ofhearing. He never stated that he did not know what existed or
did not exist at the site. He repeatedly stated as a fact that Kensington has 56 piping systems.
41

and that he correctly applied that fact in his 15/56 fraction. Ifthis was an assumption without
any investigation to support it as it is now characterized, it was not presented as such to the
Board. It was presented to the Board as a known fact by a man who claimed to have spent
hundreds of hours in the drawings confirming his findings. The pretrial statement by Mr.
Sansoucy’s counsel attempts to gloss over Mr. Sansoucy’s repeated false testimony as to other
very granular facts (e.g., seeing the non-existent fire protection system) to substantiate his
assumed existence of 56 piping systems and the correctness ofhis 15/56 fraction.
Mr. Sansoucy claimed in days one through five ofthe hearing to have studied the
Kensington documents to arrive at and confirm his conclusions. Yet, his demonstrated ignorance
to what actually exists at Kensington proves that testimony was false. If Mr. Sansoucy
performed hundreds of hours of study of the drawings that he repeatedly claimed to have
done, he could not have failed to determine that even one piping system was missing from
the 56 listed at his Appendix L page 383. This is proven by his own actions. Between days
five and six ofthe hearing, when he actually studied the documents in his own Appendix L, Mr.
Sansoucy very quickly determined that about 30 piping systems were missing. His steadfast
testimony over the first five days ofhearings that there were 56 piping systems exposes the truth.
He had not studied the documents as he claimed. Likewise, contrary to his repeated claims, the
drawings did not support his claims. They categorically contradicted them. Yet he repeatedly
made outlandishly false statements on very basic facts such as what exists at the site and what
the documents show. He repeatedly made those statements as ifhe had no doubt at all. At best
he was consciously ignorant as to the truth ofthe claims he made regarding non-existent
equipment. But, conscious ignorance regarding his claims of exhaustive review ofdrawings was
not possible. He knew very well that he had not performed that work.
as
42

Sansoucy repeatedly perjured himselfthroughout the Board’s hearing. There is no other
rational explanation. He charged an Ohio school district hundreds ofthousands of dollars to
perform work that he did not do. His sham claims were intended to mislead the Board and
defraud Appellee. His argument that the Board now lacks authority to do anything about it adds
insult to injury.
Made up testimony regarding non-existent fire water system
and pilot gas systems.
In addition to global claims of the existence of 56 systems, having counted them on the
racks and confirming their function by reviewing them in drawings et cetera, Mr. Sansoucy
offered even more granular testimony on individual systems...systems that actually do not exist
a.
at Kensington.
Remarkably, even some of the 15 piping systems Sansoucy classified as taxable real
property did not exist at Kensington. This inconsistency is more than inconvenient when placed
into context. Mr. Sansoucy’s excuse of convenience offered on day six of the hearing was that
he deliberately failed to study those systems he initially classified as personal property based
upon name alone of those systems. Yet, he also failed to ascertain that even systems he had
marked as real property did not exist. His desperate, after-the-fact excuse offered on day six of
the hearing fails to explain how property he had marked as real property on Appellant’s Ex. 1,
Appendix L, page 383 did not exist. Likewise, it fails to explain why he repeatedly falsely
testified about those non-existent systems as ifthey did exist.
Mr. Sansoucy marked both the pilot gas and firewater systems as real property on
Appellant’s Ex. 1, Appendix L, page 383. Mr. Sansoucy offered false testimony at hearing on
both ofthose systems.
Q. With ~ andjust two more piping service designations. We also have fire
water on that list that you coded?
43

A. Yes.
Q. How did you determine that the fire water system was real property?
A. It’s basically a site utility, fire water, and for that purpose it’s an
improvement to the entire property.
H.R.,Vol. IV: 782-783.
Q. Let’s move to pilot gas. This is the last one. How did you determine that the
pilot gas lines were real property?
A. Pilot gas lines were in the same category that we felt fuel gas lines were,
which was site gas for serving the entire site for operation, whatever. It was
wanted for the real of the personal property as a site utility, and therefore
an improvement to the site.
Q. Do you think these were on the racks?
A. Pilot gas? Yes, I do.
Q. Did you look at drawings? Do you recall looking at drawings for either
the fire water or the pilot gas?
A. They are all in the drawings. They are all on the drawings. I’ve seen
them on various drawings, you know. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 783-784.
The truth is neither pilot gas nor firewater piping systems exist at Kensington.
There are no drawings of these systems at Kensington. Mr. Sansoucy’s declarations that the
pilot gas system is an improvement to the site, that it is on the piping racks, and that the
Sansoucy saw it in the drawings are all false. It is not possible that Sansoucy studied those
systems at Kensington to classify them as real property because there is nothing to review; no
engineering drawings, no process flow diagrams, no invoices, no pipes on the racks to count...
nothing. He did not actually determine that fire water is a “site utility” at Kensington because it
does not exist.
44

Note the following testimony from Mr. Sansoucy in which he falsely testified that he
definitely studied the engineering drawings for the 15 systems (including fire water and pilot
gas) he had marked as real property on Appendix L, page 383:
A. Well, the drawings are J&om an engineering firm.
Q. Right.
A. And they are from Utica East Ohio.
Q. But you used 56?
A. Okay. There are 56 systems for this processing plant. 1 consulted my
textbooks because some ofthe systems I did not understand, and I attempted to
educate myself on; some ofthem 1 did understand.
Q. No, I’m sorry.
A. The majority ofthem I understood.
Q. I’m sorry, I thought you said there were some systems not there.
A. There’s no systems not here. This is the list from the engineering firm for
the systems on the site.
Q. Okay. I misunderstood.
So that combination of activity, would you say that at the very least with
respect to the ones that are colored, you studied the engineering drawings?
A. Yes.
H.R. Vol. V: 1047; see also H.R. Vol. W: 720 (Sansoucy stated that he had physically seen the
“fire protection” system on site and also had seen it in the drawings despite the fact that no fire
protection system exists onsite).
At day 6 ofthe hearing, and contrary to the foregoing testimony, Sansoucy admitted that
he had looked at his own Appendix L over the weekend and determined that the firewater and
pilot gas systems do not exist at Kensington:
Q. Is your designation with a colored mark on the piping systems in 383 a
determination that those systems were real property?
45

A. No. They are a determination ofthe ones that we selected to test for real
property. As I said, I think all last week, some ofthose dropped out at the end of
the day as personal property - as business fixture.
Q. Which ones dropped out?
A. Lube oil dropped out.
Q. Wait a minute. Was lube oil colored and then dropped out? When did it drop
out?
A. It dropped out in the analysis. It wasn’t colored, so that didn’t make it down
this far. Three systems dropped out. They were utility water piping, the only
piping that - there was no fire water on-site.
We didn’t find any fire water. So when we tested it - Let’s see, item F. No
fire water was found installed at Kensington. Even though it’s on this list, in this
drawing, it was not there at Kensington. So we didn’t find any in the
drawings.
Now, maybe we missed it, but we didn’t find it. So fire water dropped out.
So pilot gas was out, PG. Double-check that. Yeah, PG, we didn’t find any
pilot gas as a separate system built on-site, although it’s on this list. So this
list is not quite what one would think it should be or is based on the drawing.
an eye Mr. Sansoucy now did a
H.R. Vol. VI: 1156-1157. Interestingly, without blinking
complete about face on the non-existence of assets he had previously testified existed, that he
had testified he had actually seen, and testified he had seen in the drawings. He did not indicate
he was contradicting and recanting his prior testimony although that very clearly was the import
of what he was saying. Perhaps he hoped no one would notice.
Sansoucy’s prior testimony that he saw pilot gas and fire water in the drawings and process flow
diagrams (and actually physically seeing the “fire protection system”) was simply made up to
support his other made-up conclusion that there were 56 piping systems with 15 of them being
It follows also that Mr.
real property.
-1 didn’t
The true answer to all of these questions was “I don’t know. I didn’t look.-
Mr. Sansoucy cannot possibly have truthfully thought he saw a fire
study the documents.
46

2016 828 post hearing sanctions brief, George Sansoucy, GES

2016 828 post hearing sanctions brief, George Sansoucy, GES

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