171705017 appendix-14-mi g-21-airworthiness-certification

Cover Photograph: Chris Lofting.
Back Cover Photograph: USAF.
___________________________________________________________________________________
Introduction – MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification
This document provides information to assist in the airworthiness certification and safe civil
operation of a Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21 airplane.
Attachment 1 provides a general overview of this document. Attachment 2 contains background
information on the MiG-21 aircraft. Attachment 3 lists historic airworthiness issues with the
MiG-21 for consideration in the certification, operation, and maintenance of these aircraft. The list
is not exhaustive, but includes our current understanding of risks that should be assessed during in
the certification, operation, and maintenance of these aircraft. Concerns regarding particular
issues may be mitigated in various ways. Some may be mitigated via the aircraft maintenance
manual(s) or the aircraft inspection program. Others may be mitigated via operating procedures
i.e., SOPs) and limitations, aircraft flight manual changes, or logbook entries
Not all issues in attachment 3 may apply to a particular aircraft given variations in aircraft
configuration, condition, operating environment, or other factors. Similarly, circumstances with an
aircraft may raise other issues not addressed by attachment 2 that require mitigation.
Attachment 4 includes additional resources and references. Attachment 5 provides some relevant
MiG-21 accident and incident data. Attachment 6 contains a glossary and a listing of abbreviations.

MiG-21 Airworthiness Certification Attachment 1
FAA – Airworthiness Certification Branch (AIR-230) Page 1-1
Attachment 1 – Overview of this Document
Purpose
This document is to provide all those involved in the certification, operation, and maintenance of the
MiG-21 aircraft with safety information and guidance to help assess and mitigate safety hazards for the
aircraft. The existing certification procedures in FAA Order 8130.2, Airworthiness Certification of Aircraft
and Related Products, do not account for many of the known safety concerns and risk factors associated
with many high-performance former military aircraft. These safety concerns and risk factors associated
with many high performance former military aircraft include—
• Lack of consideration of inherent and known design failures;
• Several single-point failures;
• Lack of consideration for operational experience, including accident data and trends;
• Operations outside the scope of the civil airworthiness certificate;
• Insufficient flight test requirements;
• Unsafe and untested modifications;
• Operations over populated areas (the safety of the non-participating public has not been
properly addressed in many cases);
• Operations from unsuitable airports (i.e., short runways, Part 139 (commercial) airports);
• High-risk passenger carrying activities taking place;
• Ejection seat safety and operations not adequately addressed;
• Weak maintenance practices to address low reliability of aircraft systems and engines;
• Insufficient inspection schedules and procedures;
• Limited pilot qualifications, proficiency, and currency;
• Weapon-capable aircraft not being properly demilitarized, resulting in unsafe conditions;
• Accidents and serious incidents not being reported; and
• Inadequate accident investigation data.
Research of MiG-21 Safety Data
The aircraft, relevant processes, and safety data are thoroughly researched and assessed. This
includes—
• Aviation Safety (AVS) Safety Management System (SMS) policy and guidance;
• Historical military accident/incident data and operational history;
• Civil accident data;
• Safety risk factors;
• Interested parties and stakeholders (participating public, non-participating public,
associations, service providers, air show performers, flying museums, government service
providers, airport owners and operators, many FAA lines of business, and other U.S.
Government entities);
• Manufacturing and maintenance implications; and
• Design features of the aircraft.

This Document
The document is a compilation of known safety issues and risk factors identified from the above
research that are relevant to civil operations. This document is organized into four major sections:
• General airworthiness issues (grey section),
• Maintenance (yellow section),
• Operations (green section), and
• Standard operating procedures and best practices (blue section).
This document also provides background information on the aircraft and an extensive listing of
resources and references.
How to Use the Document
This document was originally drafted as job aids intended to assist FAA field office personnel and
operators in the airworthiness certification of these aircraft. As such, some of the phrasing implies
guidance to FAA certification personnel. The job aids were intended to be used during the
airworthiness certification process to help identify any issues that may hinder the safe certification,
maintenance, or operation of the aircraft. The person performing the certification and the applicant
would to discuss the items in the job aid, inspect documents/records/aircraft, and mitigate any
issues. This information would be used to draft appropriate operating limitations, update the aircraft
inspection program, and assist in the formulation of adequate operating procedures. There are also
references to requesting information from, or providing information to the person applying for an
airworthiness certificate. We are releasing this document as drafted, with no further updates and
revisions, for the sole purpose of communicating safety information to those involved in the
certification, operation, and maintenance of these aircraft. The identified safety issues and
recommended mitigation strategies are clear and can be considered as part of the certification,
operation, and maintenance of the air aircraft.

Attachment 2 – Background Information on the MiG-21
The Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21 (Russian: Микоян и Гуревич МиГ-21; NATO reporting name Fishbed) is
a supersonic jet fighter aircraft, designed by the Mikoyan-Gurevich Design Bureau (OKB) in the Soviet
Union. The MiG-21 was the mainstay of Soviet fighter aviation during the 1960s and 1970s. In the
Vietnam War, the MiG-21 extensively used by the North Vietnamese Air Force against US air strikes.
Although American forces lost about 50 aircraft to North Vietnamese MiG-21s, the U.S. Air Force shot
down 68 MiG-21s in air combat. In the 1991 Gulf War, Iraqi Air Force MiG-21s were also engaged in
combat operations, and at least two were shot down by U.S. Navy F/A-18 Hornets. In addition to
Vietnam and the Gulf War, the aircraft served in numerous conflicts over the past four decades,
including several middle-east actions (1967, 1973, and 1982), Angola (1980s), the Balkan wars (1992-
1999), and the Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1999. Recently, in both the Libyan (2011) and Syrian conflicts
(2013), MiG-21s were used
operationally in the strike
role.
Early versions are
considered first and second-
generation jet fighters,
while later versions are
considered to be third and
fourth-generation versions
of the fighter. Some 50
countries over four
continents have flown the
MiG-21, and it still serves
many nations a half-century
after its maiden flight. It is
the most-produced
supersonic jet aircraft in
aviation history and the
most-produced combat
aircraft since the Korean
War. It also had the longest
production run of a combat
aircraft, 1959 to 1985 over
all variants. As of
November 2007, over 1,300
remained in service
worldwide, while that
number was reduced to 800
by late 2012. In 2013, some
North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO) countries continue to use the aircraft.
Above, an early MiG-21F- "Fishbed" in Vietnamese colors at the National Museum of the United States Air
Force. Below, a later model MiG-21 PFM in Soviet Air Force service in the 1970s. Source: USAF.

Above and below, two unusual views of a USAF MiG-21F-13. The first MiG-21 was evaluated in the US in 1968-1969. Source: USAF.

Development of what would become the MiG-21 began in the early 1950s, when the Mikoyan-Gurevich
design bureau finished a preliminary design study for a prototype designated Ye-1 in 1954. This project
was very quickly reworked when it was determined that the planned engine was underpowered; the
redesign led to the second prototype, the Ye-2. Both these and other early prototypes featured swept
wings—the first prototype with delta wings as found on production variants was the Ye-4. The Ye-4
made its maiden flight on June 16, 1955 and made its first public appearance during the Soviet Aviation
Day display at Moscow's Tushino airfield in July 1956.
In the West, due to the lack of available information, early details of the MiG-21 often were confused
with those of similar Soviet fighters of the era. The MiG-21, which entered service in March 1960 (first
production MiG-21F), was the first successful Soviet aircraft combining fighter and interceptor
characteristics in a single aircraft. It was a lightweight fighter, achieving Mach 2 with a relatively low-
powered afterburning turbojet, and is thus comparable to the American Lockheed F-104 Starfighter
and the French Dassault Mirage III. In fact, the MiG-21 has been noted to deliver “F-104-like
performance.”
A Croatian Air Force MiG-21bis photographed during take-off. Note that the landing gear is being retracted. Source: Chris Lofting.
Like many aircraft designed as interceptors, the MiG-21 had a short range. In fact, some have stated
that the fuel “emergency’ started at take-off… This deficiency continues to plague the aircraft to this
day. This was not helped by a design defect where the center of gravity shifted rearwards once two-
thirds of the fuel had been used. This had the effect of making the plane uncontrollable, resulting in an
endurance of only 45 minutes in clean condition. The issue of the short endurance and low fuel
capacity of the MiG-21F, PF, PFM, S/SM and M/MF variants—though each had a somewhat greater
fuel capacity than its predecessor—led to the development of the MT and SMT variants. These had a
range increase of 250 km (155 miles) compared to the MiG-21SM, but at the cost of worsening all
other performance figures (such as a lower service ceiling and slower time to altitude).

The delta wing, while excellent for a fast-climbing interceptor, meant any form of turning combat led
to a rapid loss of speed. However, the light loading of the aircraft could mean that a climb rate of
46,250 ft. /min was possible with a combat-loaded MiG-21bis, not far short of the performance of the
later and more modern aircraft. Given a skilled pilot and capable missiles, it could give a good account
of itself against contemporary fighters. Its G-limits were increased from +7 Gs in initial variants to +8.5
Gs in the latest variants. In the 1970s, it was replaced by the newer variable-geometry MiG-23 and
MiG-27 for ground support duties. However, not until the MiG-29 in the 1980s would the Soviet Union
ultimately replace the MiG-21 as a maneuvering dogfighter to counter new American air superiority
types.
An Egyptian Air Force F-7B on final approach in 2011. The F-7B is a popular Chinese derivative of the MiG-21F. Source: Jiri Vanek. Copyright © 2011.
The MiG-21 was exported widely and continues to be used in many parts of the world. Its low cost was
attractive, and the price of a brand new MiG-21bis in the mid-1980s was quoted at between $1.2 and
$1.5 million. In 1999, used MiG-21s were being sold for $1.3 million, depending on condition and life
remaining. The aircraft's simple controls, engine, weapons, and avionics were typical of Soviet-era
military designs. While technologically inferior to the more advanced fighters it often faced, low
production and maintenance (relative to other military aircraft, not civilian aircraft) costs made it a
favorite of nations buying Eastern Bloc military hardware. Several Russian, Israeli, and Romanian firms
have begun to offer upgrade packages to MiG-21 operators, designed to bring the aircraft up to a
modern standard, with greatly upgraded avionics and armament.
A total of 10,645 MiG-21s were built in the USSR. They were produced in three factories: GAZ 30
(3,203 aircraft) in Moscow (also known as Znamya Truda), GAZ 21 (5,765 aircraft) in Gorky and at GAZ
31 (1,678 aircraft) in Tbilisi. Generally, Gorky built single-seaters for the Soviet forces. Moscow built
single-seaters for export and Tbilisi manufactured the twin-seaters both for export and for the USSR,

though there were exceptions. The MiG-21R and MiG-21bis for export and for the USSR were built in
Gorky, 17 single-seaters were built in Tbilisi (MiG-21 and MiG-21F), the MiG-21MF was first built in
Moscow and then Gorky, and the MiG-21U was built in Moscow as well as in Tbilisi. In the 1980s, more
than 2,700 MiG-21s were flying with the Warsaw Pact forces (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany,
Hungary, Poland, and Romania). As late as 1993, Russia (Commonwealth of Independent States) still
had at least 3 fighter regiments (about 200 aircraft) equipped with the MiG-21. On the other hand, it is
believed that the last ‘MiG-21’ built, was a Chinese FT-7 trainer delivered in late 2002.
In 1968, the US was able to test fly a MiG-21 that defected to Israel. Later, the 4477th Test and
Evaluation Squadron routinely operated the type (YF-110 designation). After the fall of the Soviet Union,
many MiG-21s were imported into the US for private use. The first civil MiG-21 in the U.S. flew in 1990.
By 1996, 3 were flying sporadically in the US. Although many came in, only a few were registered, and
less became operational in civil hands. Many went to museums, but a few were acquired with the intent
of seeking airworthiness certification. One, N21MF, was converted to a drone by Tracor System, but its
operational history in that role is unknown.
A Romanian Air Force MiG-21MF Lancer C on final in July 2012. Source: Alexander St. Alexandrov. Copyright © 2012.
There are currently 44 privately owned MiG-21s in the U.S. Of these, approximately 8-10 are believed to
be operational. The only other country where a civil MiG-21 has operated is Australia, where VH-XII (a
MiG-21UM) flew at several airshows in 1995. In 2001, an ex-Czech Air Force MiG-21US carried a French
registration (F-ZAGR) while serving with the French Air Force test pilot school (EPNER). Three MiG-21s
were registered in the UK, but airworthiness certificates were never issued, in part due to safety
concerns. Two of them were eventually exported to the US. Although a late top of the line MiG-21
model is valued at about $6 million, those acquired by US operators were discarded by former Soviet
Bloc countries at rock-bottom prices (under $50,000 in some cases, and essentially scrap value) after
having reached the end of their 1,500-hours life-limit or very close to it. The difference in value is
representative of not only their condition and equipment, but operational life remaining.

Above, a Serbian Air Force MiG-21UM two-seater photographed in 2011. Source: Alexander St. Alexandrov. Copyright © 2012. Below, a Bulgarian Air
Force MiG-21bis taxing in October 2012. Source: Dimo Vichev.

Dave Sutton, a well-know civil MiG operator notes when comparing the MiG-21 to other former military
aircraft, that “the MiG-21 is a completely different beast…They [MiG-21s] are a lot more complex to
maintain, but can be done with some care. The flying characteristics are fairly straightforward, but I do
not consider them to be "pleasant" to fly. The pilot really works, and the thing [aircraft] is just not happy
below Mach-1. Look at the wing loading and you'll see why. It has very short range, and when the
engine is started you are basically in a fuel emergency situation before you launch. I am glad that I have
had the opportunity to fly the 21, but it would not be the first one out of the hanger for a Sunday flight.”
The MiG-21 does not have a good safety record. This is not uncommon with many second generation
single-engine fighters.
An Indian Air Force MiG-21U during take-off. Note the flap position, the extended periscope for the pilot in the aft cockpit, and the afterburner. Also visible
on the tips of the horizontal stabilizers are the anti-flutter weights. Source: Indian Air Force.
Above, an Indian Air Force MiG-21 Bison (upgraded type) during take-off. Below, the same aircraft type in flight displaying a light-attack configuration
consisting of two external 490-liter fuel tanks and two S-24 heavy unguided air-to-ground rockets. Source: Indian Air Force.

It is a difficult aircraft to operate in terms of maintenance and operational oversight. It certainly does
not compare to trainers like the L-39. For example in operational service with the Finnish Air Force, a
highly professional and respected entity, the MiG-21 required about 50 hours of maintenance per flight
hour. As a by-product of its design, manufacturing, and operational philosophy, the MiG-21
incorporates many compromises between safety and operational flexibility. One issue that has always
had an impact is the overall low life-limit of the aircraft, its engine(s), and many components and
systems. Combined with a chronic shortage of spare parts, poor manufacturing techniques, high
operating costs ($4,000- $6,000 per hour in 2001), and age-related low reliability, this characteristic of
the aircraft can have serious safety implications. Many of these factors undermine the aircraft’s
suitability for civil operations unless adequately mitigated. The aircraft operational history illustrates
these deficiencies, namely in terms of mechanical failures. Many were engine fires. Loss of control,
mainly due to pilot inexperience or inattention, is another critical issue. The aircraft had mediocre slow
speed handling characteristics and high pilot workload.
The largest operator of the type outside of the former Soviet Union and China is India. Between 1966
and 1984, India acquired or built 830 MiG-21s. Over half those aircraft were lost to accidents. In March
2002, India’s Public Accounts Committee (PAC) (similar to the US’ General Accountability Office)
released a report to Parliament noting that between 1991 and 2000, a total 221 MiG-21 aircraft (some
reports indicate a total of 250) of several versions were lost with 100 pilots killed. Between 1997 and
2000, 55 MiG-21 crashed with the loss of 21 pilots, while in 2000 alone, of the 18 fighters lost in
accidents, 10 were MiG-21s.
Some data indicate that between 1990 and 1997, the average accident rate of the MiG-21 was 23.7 per
100,000 hours. Other data, presented by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) released
in June 2000, argues that the MiG-21 accident rates have indeed shown a steady downward trend. As

per CAG report, the overall MiG-21 accident rate of the Indian Air Force (IAF) for the period 1991-92 to
1996-97 was down from 35.3 to 18.9 per 100,000 hours. Another analysis issued by the IAF in July 2003
shows that between 1993 and 2002, 98 MiG-21s were lost in 533,000 sorties or approximately 400,000
hours. This results in an accident rate of 24.56 per 100,000 hours.
A North Vietnamese MiG-21 deploys its drag chute during landing during the Vietnam War. The drag chute is an essential safety item for the operations of
MiG-21 aircraft. Source: USAF.
Several factors contribute to the IAF’s high MiG-21 accident rate: (1) aging aircraft of the 1970s vintage
with design limitations difficult to overcome (in 2005, 70 older MiG-21s were retired because they had
reached their design life-limit), (2) direct exposure of inexperienced pilots to highly unforgiving
supersonic aircraft with limited transitional training, (3) the absence of flight simulators to train pilots on
how to effectively handle emergencies, and (4) poor maintenance and inadequate quality control on
spares and rotables. The operational experience by the IAF with the MiG-21 cannot be underestimated,
not just because of the number of aircraft in service and their length of service, but also because the IAF
is relatively transparent and its accidents are investigated and made public. In addition, the IAF
publishes critical flight safety data as part of its operational programs. The availability of such data is not
easily obtainable from former Warsaw Pact countries during the Cold War.
The IAF is not the only entity that has had problems with the MiG-21. For example, between 1964 and
1999, the Czech Air Force (before 1993, the Czechoslovakian Air Force) lost 112 MiG-21s from a total of
about 400 aircraft that entered service. The East German Air Force had a similar experience with 131
MiG-21s lost out of a total of 443, for an attrition rate of 29%-33% depending on the version of the
aircraft. When combined with an estimated 500,000 hours flown, the Czech Air Force accident rate is
about 22.4 per 100,000 hours. Between 1963 and 1990, the Bulgarian Air Force MiG-21 fleet flew for
about 180,000 hours. About 40 aircraft were lost in accidents, which equates to an accident rate of 22
per 100,000 hours. This rate may have been reduced to 17.9 per 100,000 for the period 1990-1999,
but the data is unclear with regards to aircraft accidents where the aircraft was not destroyed outright.

While acquiring operational MiG-21 data while serving with the Soviet Air Force (the largest MiG-21
operator) is rather difficult, there is data that indicates that the accident rate for early MiG-21 (i.e., MiG-
21F) types ranged from 31 to 38 per 100,000 hours, with the majority being engine related. However,
there is data that suggest that there were operational periods where the accident rate for the MiG-21 in
Soviet Air Force service may have been below 15 per 100,000 hours, but this is difficult to verify. Against
this background, there is data to suggest that the Finnish Air Force, which operated the MiG-21 from
1963 until 1998, may have achieved the lowest MiG-21 accident rate, at around 13 per 100,000 hours
(11 losses, about 80,000 hours).
Recently, other operators have had issues with the aircraft. For example, in 2010, Romania, now a
NATO member and long-time MiG-21 operator grounded the aircraft because of concerns over its
maintainability. One of the issues with the Romanian Air Force accidents is that it operates possibly
the most modern MiG-21s, the Lancer. Despite of this, in 25,000 hours flown by the upgraded MiG-21
fleet since 1996, 12 aircraft have been lost, which equates to an accident rate of 48 per 100,000 hours.
The rate had been computed at 30.76 at the 13,000-hour mark. The Romanian AF accident rate is
likely to be higher if aircraft not destroyed are included. Relevant is the fact that although the
Romanian MiG-21s are upgraded, they retain several of the MiG-21’s weaknesses, including long take-
off and landing distances, difficult low speed handling, and high approach speeds.
Low pass of a Serbian Air Force MiG-21 UM during an airshow in 2012. Note the front and aft air brakes. Source: claudiu_ne, http://en.wikipedia.org.

An US Navy F-14B Tomcat assigned to the “Jolly Rogers” of Fighter Squadron One Zero Three (VF-103) leads a formation
with two Croatian MiG-21 fighter aircraft. U.S. Navy squadrons assigned to Carrier Air Wing One Seven (CVW-17)
aboard the nuclear powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN 73) have sent a detachment to Croatia in
order to participate in the exercise “Joint Wings 2002.” Croatia is now a NATO member and continues to field the
venerable MiG-21 in the air defense role. Source: U.S. Navy.
Although some of these data may be overstated, the range (a low of 17.9, a high of 48, and an accurate
mean estimate at about 29-30 per 100,000 hours) creates concerns over the aircraft’s suitability for
certain non-combat tasks, and certainly civil operations. In other words, its risks and utility are not
balanced. One common aspect of many MiG-21 operators has been the very low number of
serviceable aircraft. Serviceability rates below 50% and even 40% are not uncommon, either today, or
even 15 years ago.
For example, in
1997, the
Slovakian Air Force
had a force of 59
MiG-21s, and of
these, only 18
were operational
due, primarily, to a
shortage of spare
parts and
inadequate
maintenance
support. From an
operational
perspective,
perhaps the
situation involving
the Bulgarian Air
Force (a current
NATO MiG-21
operator) may
summarize the
situation involving
older airframes
like the MiG-21. In 2011, a defense study found that the non-fulfillment of the planned total annual
flight hours was due to spare parts shortages and delays in fulfilling aviation equipment repairs and
refurbishment contracts. Not surprisingly, it was also found that although the number of accidents
was reduced by 7% when compared to the previous year, “the tendency of the past years was
preserved, and approximately 64% of the aviation incidents were due to failures of aviation
equipment.” In 2006, it was reported that the Indian Air Force was only able to achieve a serviceability
rate of 33% (about 55% by other sources) for their upgraded MiG-21 Bison aircraft. Although the rate
may vary, the fact is that at any given time, over half of the aircraft are grounded due to spare parts
shortages, maintenance issues, and insufficient overhauling. This is not an indication that the IAF is not
knowledge on how to increase the serviceability rate, but it does show a tight oversight over the
airworthiness of aircraft, that is, aircraft are not returned to operational status unless there is a high-
level of certainly over their condition and safety. Regardless, it is evidence that the aircraft is note easy

or cheap to operate and maintain, and that as the aircraft continue to age, the situation is not likely to
improve.
Another aspect of MiG-21 safety is survivability. The aircraft has a high lethality rate, that is, the chances
for the pilot surviving an accident are low when compared with other types. For example, Bulgarian Air
Force data (1992) indicates that the lethality rate of MiG-21 accidents was a high 48%, the Indian Air
Force’s is about 45-49% (depending on the data set), while the Czechoslovakian Air Force lethality rate
was a relatively “low” 39% when MiG-21 operations ceased in 2005. Essentially, a MiG-21 pilot has
about a chance in two chance of surviving an accident.
The safety record of the MiG-21 conducting civil aircraft operations in the U.S. is less than desirable.
Since 1992, there has been two major accidents, one of which was fatal, plus another five serious
incidents. During that period an estimated
total of 3,500 hours were flown (average of five
aircraft operational in any given year x 20 years
x 35 hours per year) by civil MiG-21s. This
equates to an accident rate of 57 per 100,000
hours, which is higher than any of the rates
experienced by the military operators
discussed above. MiG-21 operations in the U.S.
are anticipated to increase in both the number
of active aircraft and number of annual flight
hours. One operator plans an active fleet of
eight MiG-21s. Using the accident rate of 57
per 100,000 hours, the probability that in one
year’s time this operator will lose an aircraft in
an accident is 1.09.1
In summary, the MiG-21 does not forgive mistakes by inexperienced pilots or maintainers, and even
those with experience had to stay alert and show superior airmanship and technical knowledge. Top-
notch maintenance and operational procedures are the only way to mitigate many of the safety issues
and risk factors with this unforgiving aircraft. As mentioned in the 1966 DDR Luftstreitkräfte (East
German Air Force) DV-432/4a MiG-21PF Manual, “it must always be remembered by the flying and
technical personnel that a modern fighter, which flies at very high…speed, presupposes deep knowledge
of the aircraft and the engine as well as the necessary understanding of the mode of operation and
maintenance of the systems. Only excellent knowledge of all of the [military] regulations ensures
reliable operation of all systems of the aircraft in the air.” This cannot be ignored as part of any civil
operation, and thus as part of the airworthiness certification process, which requires the ability to think
critically about the hazards of operating such aircraft.
1
In other words, the operator will likely experience an aircraft accident in less than 12 months. Here is the computation. An accident rate of 57 per 100,000
flight hours means that 57 flights end in an accident every 100,000 hours flown. Given eight aircraft flying 20 hours per month, the number of hours per year
is 1,920. (8 X 20 X 12 = 1,920) Therefore, if we have 1,920 flight hours per year with an accident rate of 0.00057 accidents per hour, the probability of having
an accident in a year is 109%. (1,920 x 0.00057 = 1.09 or 109%).
Above, members of the USAF 4477th Tactical Evaluation Squadron standing in
front of an Ex-Indonesian AF MiG-21F-13 in the 1980s.

On this and the following page, four views of the July 12, 2012 overrun of N9307 at Eden Prairie, Minnesota. The pilot was slightly
injured and the aircraft severely damaged. The aircraft was attempting to land on the airport’s 5,000-foot runway when it overrun the
runway and ended its course across a public road. The drag chute failed after deployment. Source: FAA.

A Romanian Air Force MiG-21MF Lancer A during take-off (full afterburner) in July 2010. Source: Alexander St. Alexandrov. Copyright © 2012.
MiG-21 Aircraft in the FAA Registry (January 2013)
Mfr/Mdl Code Number of Aircraft Assigned Manufacturer Name Model Name
05616EZ
OHIO - 1
Total = 1
STATE AIRCRAFT FACTORY F-7 MIG-21
056163Q
ARIZONA - 1
CALIFORNIA - 1
DELAWARE - 3
FLORIDA - 3
ILLINOIS - 1
MINNESOTA - 1
OREGON - 1
TEXAS - 4
Total = 15
MIKOYAN GUREVICH MIG-21
05603QV
IDAHO - 1
Total = 1
MIKOYAN GUREVICH MIG-21F
056147T
FLORIDA - 1
MICHIGAN - 1
Total = 2
MIKOYAN GUREVICH MIG-21MF
05616QY
CALIFORNIA - 1
DELAWARE - 1
ILLINOIS - 1
VERMONT - 1
Total = 4
MIKOYAN GUREVICH MIG-21PF
05630JI
DELAWARE - 1
Total = 1
CAMELOT AVIATION LLC MIG-21PF
05615T6
ALABAMA - 1
CALIFORNIA - 1
WASHINGTON - 1
Total = 3
MIKOYAN GUREVICH MIG-21R
056037S
DELAWARE - 1
NEW JERSEY - 2
OREGON - 3
TEXAS - 2
WASHINGTON - 1
Total = 9
MIKOYAN GUREVICH MIG-21UM
05630IW
DELAWARE - 1
Total = 1
CAMELOT AVIATION LLC MIG-21UM
05602Q5
MONTANA - 1
Total = 1
MIKOYAN GUREVICH MIG-21US
05602PQ
FLORIDA - 1
Total = 1
MIKOYAN GUREVICH MIG-21UT
0560644 Total = 0 MIKOYAN GUREVICH MIG-21VN

Civil MiG-21s in US (2008)
Registration Version & Variant Operational & Remarks
1. N21EV MiG-21UM Yes
2. N21MG F-7 No
3. N21PF MiG-21PF No
4. N21UT MiG-21UM No
5. N22FR MiG-21US Unknown
6. N57GS MiG-21UM Yes
7. N63SG MiG-21 Unknown
8. N121MG MiG-21PF Yes
9. N121TJ MiG-21U No
10. N213DM MiG-21PF Unknown
11. N221GL MiG-21PFM Unknown
12. N221MG MiG-21US Yes
13. N221YA MiG-21F-13 No
14. N315RF MiG-21U No
15. N316DM MiG-21PF Unknown
16. N317DM MiG-21UM Yes
17. N321LS MiG-21 No
18. N321ST MiG-21UM No
19. N711MG MiG-21UM Yes
20. N1011E MiG-21F-13 No
21. N1101E MiG-21F-13 No
22. N1121M MiG-21US No
23. N3751L MiG-21UM No
24. N4318W MiG-21 Unknown
25. N5179Y MiG-21PF Unknown
26. N621DM MiG-21PF Unknown (ex-G-BRAO)
27. N6285D MiG-21F-13 No
28. N6285L MiG-21F-13 No
29. N6285U MiG-21US No
30. N7238T MiG-21UM Unknown
31. N7203S MiG-21UM Yes
32. N7803Z MiG-21R No
33. N9149F MiG-21US Unknown
34. N9242N MiG-21US Yes
35. N1165 MiG-21UM Yes
36. N7708 MiG-21MF No
37. N9307 MiG-21MF Yes
38. N20739 MiG-21UM Unknown
39. N30421 MiG-21R Unknown
40. N80634 MiG-21R No
41. N80639 MiG-21R Unknown

Specifications (Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21PFM)
General Characteristics
• Crew: 1
• Length: 14.5 (with pitot) m (47 ft. 6.86 in)
• Wingspan: 7.154 m (23 ft. 5.66 in)
• Height: 4.125 m (13 ft. 6.41 in)
• Wing area: 23.0 m2 (247.3 ft²)
• Gross weight: 7,800 kg (17,195 lb.)
• Powerplant: 1 × Tumansky R-11F2S-300, 38.74 kN (8,710 lb.) thrust dry, 60.54 kN (13,610 lb.) with
afterburner each
Performance
• Maximum speed: 2,175 km/h (1,385 mph)
• Maximum speed: Mach 2.05
• Range: 1,670 km (1,037 miles)
• Service ceiling: 19,000 m (62,335 ft.)
Armament
• One GP-9 cannon pod with 23 mm GSh-23 cannon, plus
• Two K-13A (R-3S) AAM or
• Two 500 kg (1,102 lb.) of bombs
Specifications (Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21bis)
• Crew: 1
• Wingspan: 7.154 m (23 ft. 5.66 in)
• Height: 4.125 m (13 ft. 6.41 in)
• Wing area: 23.0 m2 (247.3 ft²)
• Empty weight: 5,339 kg (11,770 lb.)
• Powerplant: 1 × Tumansky R-25-300, 40.21 kN (9,040 lb.) thrust dry, 69.62 kN (15,650 lb.) with
afterburner each
Performance
• Range: (internal fuel) 1,210 km (751 miles)
• Rate of climb: 225 m/s (44,280 ft./min)

Above, an Egyptian Air Force MiG-21 aircraft participates in a live-fire demonstration during BRIGHT STAR '82, a combined exercise involving
the armed forces of the US, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Oman. Below, a close-in view of a Soviet MiG-21 Fishbed fighter aircraft with UV-16
rocket pods attached to the wing pylons and a GP-9 23 mm cannon undercarriage. Source: http://www.defenseimagery.mil.

Armament
• One internal 23 mm GSh-23 cannon, plus
• Two K-13A (R-3R) or 4x Molniya R-60 AAM or
• Two 500 kg (1,102 lb.) bombs
Specifications (Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21-93)
• Crew: 1
• Wingspan: 7.154 m (23 ft. 5.66 in)
• Height: 4.125 m (13 ft. 6.41 in)
• Wing area: 23.0 m2 (247.3 ft²)
• Powerplant: 1 × Tumansky R-25-300, 40.21 kN (9,040 lb.) thrust dry, 69.62 kN (15,650 lb.) with
afterburner each
Performance
• Range: (internal fuel) 1,210 km (751 miles)
Source: USAF.

Source: USAF.

Above and below, and using training equipment, Romanian Air Force (NATO member) maintainers explain the inner workings of the R-13 MiG-
21 engine (above) and engine systems (below) to USAF personnel during a joint exercise in 2009. Source: USAF.

R-11 engine diagram and sample R-11 engine data. Source: USAF.

Two views of the R-11 engine. Top, the nozzle petals and seal arrangement. Above, the nozzle ring hydraulic actuator and ring. Source: USAF.

Top, a view of the inlet cowl and cone detail on an R-11-equipped MiG-21F-13 aircraft. Above, the anti-surge door and suck-in door locations on a
USAF MiG-21F-13. Note the low location of the long pitot and probe boom on this aircraft, a real danger to ground crew. Source; USAF.

Above and below, close-up views of a USAF MiG-21F-13 during scheduled maintenance. The first MiG-21, an early F-13 version, was evaluated in the
US in 1968-1969. Source: USAF.

Above, a Romanian Air Force MiG-21bis being overhauled by Aerostar in Romania in 2003. Source: Chris Lofting. Below, a MiG-21F-13
instructional airframe in Romania in 2006. Note the air intake internal structure. Source: Chris Lofting.

Two close-up views of the early MiG-21F-13 cockpit and ejection seat system. Note the forward-hinged canopy, the inner windshield panel, the ejection seat
deflector, and the clear panel behind the cockpit. This cockpit and ejection seat layout differ significantly from the set up provided below, which is that of a
late-model MiG-21. Source: Above, USAF. Below. Unknown.
Top and above, two close-up views of a Romanian Air Force MiG-21 Lancer C, probably the most effective and modern MiG-21 in operations today. Although
out-classed in many respects, the aircraft is now integrated into NATO operations in the air defense role. Compare the later model ejection seat in this aircraft
with the earlier seat in the MiG-21F-13 aircraft shown above. Source: FAA.

Above, a view of the aft cockpit of a Serbian Air Force MiG-21UM Mongol B in 2012. Note the white line painted on the instrument panel,
used as a reference to assist the pilot in recovering from a loss of control. Source: Alexander St. Alexandrov. Copyright © 2012. Below,
the right-hand console of a civil MiG-21. Note the English translation (labels) on most of the switches. Source: FAA

Source: USAF.

Initial MiG-21 Mass Production - Generation One (1957–1961)
Ye-6 (1957)
Three pre-production versions of MiG-21F.
MiG-21F (1959; Izdeliye 72; NATO "Fishbed-B")
Single-seat day fighter aircraft. It was the first production aircraft, with 93 machines being made (20 in
1959, 73 in 1960). The MiG-21F carried 2160 liters of fuel in six internal fuel tanks and was powered by
an R-11F-300 turbojet engine with 5740 kg of thrust. The earliest units were fitted with one NR-30 and
two NR-23 cannon, subsequent aircraft were armed with two 30-mm NR-30 cannons 60 shells each, it
was also capable of carrying two bombs ranging from 50 to 500 kg each. Avionics included PUS-36D
weapons sequencing module, R-800 communications radio, ASP-5NV-U1 computing gun sight, and SRD-
5MN Baza-6 radar rangefinder.
Ye-6/9 (1960)
A production MiG-21F was modified in 1960 to test nuclear strike capability on the MiG-21 airframe.
Ye-6T (1958)
Prototypes based on MiG-21F used for testing the Vympel K-13 (NATO: AA-2 'Atoll') missile system. The
aircraft were later reused for other tests.
Ye-6T/1 ("Ye-66") (1959)
Ye-6T/1 prototype, number 31 Red, was refitted with R-11F2-300 engine to break the world speed
record. "Ye-66" was a "fake" designation used on the documents submitted to the FAI; it was not the
official designation. Konstantin Kokkinaki set a new world speed record on September 16, 1960 in this
aircraft, reaching a top speed of 2,499 km/h (1552 mph) on a 100 km closed course.
Ye-6T/1 ("Ye-66A") (1961)
After setting a new world speed record, Ye-6T/1 "31 Red" was rebuilt again to try to set a new world
altitude record. To this end it had a U-21 rocket booster added to a fairing in the tail, and kept the
upgraded R-11F2-300 turbojet. "Ye-66A" was a "fake" designation used on the documents submitted to
the FAI; it was not the official designation. On April 28, 1961, Georgi Mosolov set the new altitude
record at 34,714 m (113,891 ft.), breaking the previous record set by an American pilot in an F-104
Starfighter by 2899 m (9511 ft.).
Ye-6T/2 (1961)
Second prototype Ye-6T reused to test skid-type landing gear for use on dirt strips.

Above and below, two unusual views of a USAF MiG-21F-13. The first MiG-21 was evaluated in the US in 1968-1969. Source: USAF.

MiG-21P-13 (aka Ye-7) (1958)
Two MiG-21s (Izdeliye 65) were converted to use K-13 missile system as part of a development project
for an interceptor armed with the K-13 missile. Due to the MiG-21P-13 project lagging behind schedule,
it was decided to produce the existing MiG-21F with the capability to use the K-13 missile system,
resulting in the MiG-21F-13. The development continued, however, eventually resulting in the MiG-
21PF.
MiG 21-F13
Short-range day fighter; the MiG-21F-13 was the first MiG-21 model to be produced in large numbers.
Unlike the MiG-21F, the MiG-21F-13 had only one NR-30 cannon on the starboard side, with only 30
rounds; however, it added the capability to use the K-13 missile system, of which two could be carried on
under wing hard points. On early-production MiG-21F-13s the launch rails were of the APU-28 type;
later models had these replaced by APU-13 rails. The launch rails were removable, allowing the MiG-
21F-13 to carry two UB-16-57 unguided rocket launchers, two S-24 rockets on PU-12-40 launch rails or
two FAB-100/250/500 bombs or ZB-360 napalm tanks.
The F-13 had further upgrades: an improved ASP-5ND optical gun sight and upgraded SRD-5ND ranging
radar. The MiG-21F-13 was also built under license in China as the Chengdu J-7 or F-7 for export, as well
as in Czechoslovakia as the Aero S-106, though the S-106 designation was not used for long;
subsequently, the Czech-built units were referred to as "MiG-21F-13" just like the Soviet-built aircraft.
MiG-21FR
Czechoslovak designation for MiG-21F and Aero S.106 (Czech-built MiG-21F) converted to carry
reconnaissance pods.
MiG-21F-13R (1974)
Bulgarian designation for MiG-21F-13 aircraft locally modified to carry an AFA-39 camera.
Ye-6V (1961; NATO "Fishbed-E")
Experimental STOL version of MiG-21F-13 with JATO boosters.
Interceptors - Generation Two (1961–1966)
MiG-21PF (1961; Izdeliye 76; NATO "Fishbed-D")
Production version of the all-weather interceptor. These were powered by the R-11F2-300 turbojet and,
starting with the seventh production batch, fitted with the RP-21 radar (the first six batches used the
older TsD-30T radar (aka RP-9-21). Further, the weapons control system was modified from that of the
F-13 to allow use of the RS-2US (aka K-5MS) beam-riding AAM in addition to the IR-seeking K-13.

MiG 21 PF (1961; Izdeliye 76A)
Version for export to Warsaw Pact countries; only difference from domestic version was the IFF equipment.
MiG-21PFL (1966; Izdeliye 76A)
Version of MiG-21PF tailored to a Vietnamese requirement. The "L" designation may be short for lokator
to reflect the different sensor suite in this version as compared to the standard PF.
MiG-21PFM (Izdeliye 76A)
Not to be confused with the "real" MiG-21PFM this is Izdeliye 94. This was an East German designation
for MiG-21PF aircraft with upgraded RP-21 radars.
MiG-21RFM (Izdeliye 76A)
Romanian designation for the MiG-21PF.
MiG-21FL (1965; Izdeliye 77)
Export (Third world) model of the MiG-21PF. Downgraded from baseline MiG-21PF with older and less
powerful R-11F-300 engine, no provision for carrying RS-2US beam-riding missiles and a simplified,
downgraded version of the RP-21 radar, designated RILL. Wide-chord fin and brake chute fairing at its
base. Built under license in India as the Type 77.
Ye-7SPS (1961)
Test bed to develop flap-blowing system, rebuilt from Ye-6V/2.
MiG-21PFS (Izdeliye 94; NATO "Fishbed-D")
The first nine production batches of the MiG-21PFS were externally identical to the MiG-21PF but with
blown flaps and brake chute fairing at the fin's base.
MiG-21PFS (Izdeliye 94; NATO "Fishbed-F")
From batch 10 to batch 19, the large-chord vertical stabilizer first seen on the MiG-21FL was introduced,
but the aircraft retained the SK ejection seat and one-piece, forward-opening canopy of the MiG-21PF.
MiG-21PFS (Izdeliye 94; NATO "Fishbed-F")
From serial no. 941314 onwards, MiG-21PFS aircraft had the wide-chord tail, a KM-1 ejection seat, and a
two-piece, sideways-opening canopy.

Several details of the MiG-21’s characteristics are presented on this page. Top, the aft fuselage area,
horizontal stabilizer, and wing stall fences are visible. Middle, the intricate set-up of the landing gear,
external fuel tank, and one of the air brakes. Bottom, the Pitot tube, and air data vanes. Photos: FAA.

MiG-21PFM (1964; Izdeliye 94; NATO "Fishbed-F")
The production version of the Ye-7M was a modernized MiG-21PF, with upgraded RP-21 M radar, SRZO-2
Khrom-Nikkel IFF transponder and other changes in avionics. Further, later-production MiG-21PFMs
reintroduced cannon armament, in the form of the capability to carry the GSh-23 cannon and 200 rounds
in an underbelly pod. Following tests in 1966, MiG-21PFM aircraft built after 1968 could carry the Kh-66
air-to-surface missile.
MiG-21PFM (1964; Izdeliye 94A; NATO "Fishbed-F")
Export version with a different IFF system and no capacity to carry S-24 rockets or ZB-62 napalm tanks.
MiG-21PFM (Izdeliye 94N; NATO "Fishbed-F")
Nuclear-capable version of MiG-21PFM.
MiG-21PFMA (Izdeliye 94A)
Polish designation of standard MiG-21PFM.
MiG-21PFMN (Izdeliye 94N)
Polish designation of nuclear-capable MiG-21PFM.
MiG-21RFMM (Izdeliye 94A)
Romanian designation for the MiG-21PFM.
MiG-21SPS (Izdeliye 94A; NATO "Fishbed-F")
To avoid confusion with the local "MiG-21PFM" designation given to the modified MiG-21PF (Izdeliye
76A), the East German air force re-designated the "real" MiG-21PFM of Izdeliye 94A as "MiG-21SPS."
MiG-21SPS-K (Izdeliye 94A; NATO "Fishbed-F")
East German designation for MiG-21PFM (Izdeliye 94A) aircraft wired for using cannon pods.
MiG-21R (1965; Izdeliye 03/94R; NATO "Fishbed-H")
Initially designated Izdeliye 03 to confuse outsiders, the MiG-21R official "type" designation was Izdeliye
94R. The first production unit was rolled out in early 1966 and production continued until 1971. For
Recce missions, the MiG-21R could carry a Type D daylight PHOTINT pod, a Type N nighttime PHOTINT
pod, a Type R general-purpose ELINT pod or a Type T pod housing a TV system, making the MiG-21R one
of the first Soviet Recce aircraft to make use of ELINT equipment. Small changes were made throughout

the production run. Early-production units had the R-11F2S-300 turbojet, which was replaced in later
machines by the R-13-300 powerplant. In the air-to-air role, the MiG-21R could carry two RS-2US or R-3S
air-to-air missiles, and in the strike role it could be loaded with two UB-16-57UM or UB-32 rocket pods,
two S-24 heavy unguided rockets or two bombs of up to 500 kg weight (each).
MiG-21R (Izdeliye 94RA; NATO "Fishbed-H")
Export version of the MiG-21R, delivered with the Type D and Type R pods.
MiG-21RF (Izdeliye 94RA; NATO "Fishbed-H")
Egyptian designation for MiG-21R aircraft which had been locally modified by permanently mounting the
cameras in a fairing under the nose.
MiG-21RF (Izdeliye 96R; NATO "Fishbed-H")
Not to be confused with the Egyptian local designation "MiG-21RF.” This designation was used after
some MiG-21Rs were upgraded with R-13-300 engines as in the MiG-21MF.
MiG-21S (1964; Izdeliye 95; NATO "Fishbed-J")
The production version of the Ye-7S. This was fitted with the RP-22 radar (production version of the
Sapfir-21 radar) working together with an ASP-PF-21 computing gun sight. The airframe was different
from that of the MiG-21PFM by using the same saddle tank as in the MiG-21R. The MiG-21S had an R-
11F2S-300 powerplant and an AP-155 autopilot featuring a 'panic button' auto recovery system. The
MiG-21S could carry the GP-9 cannon pod. It had four under wing hard points, with the two outboard
pods being "wet,” that is, they could carry drop tanks. It could carry all weapons that the MiG-21PFM
could, with the addition of the R-3R (K-13R) missile, the semi-active radar homing variant of the K-13.
MiG-21S was produced from 1965 to 1968 and delivered only to the Soviet air force.
MiG-21N (1965; Izdeliye 95N; NATO "Fishbed-J")
Also known as MiG-21SN, this was a nuclear-capable variation of the MiG-21S.
Modernization - Generation Three (1968–1972)
MiG-21M (1968; Izdeliye 96; NATO "Fishbed-J")
Export variant of the MiG-21S with two major differences: the RP-22 radar of the MiG-21S was
substituted with the older RP-21MA radar, and featured a built-in GSh-23L cannon instead of a cannon
pod. In the air-to-air role it could only carry the R-3S IR-seeking AAM on its four pylons, as the SARH
variant, the R-3R, was not cleared for export. The type was also license-built in India, the first Indian-
built example being delivered in February 1973.

Above, a Bulgarian Air Force (NATO) MiG-21bis SAU Fishbed N in 2012. Source: Alexander St. Alexandrov. Copyright © 2012. Below, an in-flight photograph
of the MiG-21F that was flight tested by the USAF in 1969. Source: USAF.

MiG-21M (Izdeliye 96A, NATO "Fishbed-J")
Export variant for Warsaw Pact countries.
MiG-21MA (Izdeliye 96A, NATO "Fishbed-J")
The Czechoslovak Air Force re-designated its MiG-21Ms that had been re-engined with the Tumansky R-
13-300 engine as "MiG-21MA," keeping the RP-21MA radar. Some of these were later re-equipped with
the RP-22 radar - bringing it to MiG-21MF standard - and were then re-designated "MiG-21MF."
Top, an ex-Bulgarian Air Force MiG-21PF disassembled for shipping. Source: USAF. Above, a stripped down Bulgarian Air Force MiG-21bis Fishbed L during
a recent depot-level overhaul in 2011. Source: Alexander St. Alexandrov. Copyright © 2012.

MiG-21K (1969; proposal)
This was a proposed variant of the MiG-21 for a dedicated ground attack role. It was withdrawn.
MiG-21Sh (1969; Izdeliye 21-32"; project)
This was another ground-attack project that was a "fusion" of the MiG-21 and the MiG-27; it was
referred to alternatively as MiG-21Sh and MiG-27Sh. Cancelled.
MiG-21SM (1969; Izdeliye 15/95M; NATO "Fishbed-J")
Upgrade of the MiG-21S using the R-13-300 engine and with a built-in GSh-23L cannon, as well as a
considerably updated avionics package.
MiG-21MF (1970; Izdeliye 96F; NATO "Fishbed-J")
Export version of the MiG-21SM, with RP-22 radar and R-13-300 turbojet. The choice of weapons loads
was increased with the addition of the R-60 (NATO: AA-8 "Aphid") and later the R-60M IR-seeking AAM.
These were also license-built in India by HAL as the Type 88.
MiG-21MFR (1995)
Bulgarian local designation for MiG-21MF modified to carry Recce pods after the retirement of the MiG-
21F-13R.
MiG-21MF-75
Unofficial designation used in Bulgaria, East Germany, Romania and Czechoslovakia to refer to MiG-
21MF aircraft delivered with cockpit instrumentation identical to that in the MiG-21bis (the "75" refers
to "1975", the year in which these entered production.)
MiG-21MFN
Czech Air Force designation for MiG-21MF upgraded with NATO standard avionics.
MiG-21DF (1969)
A production MiG-21 (S or SM) refitted with R-13F2-300 engine and Kvant radar rangefinder for test
purposes. Though testing revealed an improvement in maneuverability, this variant was not produced.
MiG-21SMF (1970)
A test bed aircraft - a stock MiG-21SM refitted with the uprated R-13F2-300 turbojet. Though a
prototype for what would have been a new model, it never entered production.

MiG-21MT (1971; Izdeliye 96T; NATO "Fishbed-J")
This was a MiG-21MF with increased fuel capacity. Though designed for export, only 15 were built and
none were exported.
MiG-21SMT (1971; Izdeliye 50; NATO "Fishbed-K")
A development of the MiG-21SM with increased fuel capacity. This variant is easily spotted thanks to its
larger spine.
MiG-21ST (Izdeliye 50)
Due to the extreme unpopularity of the MiG-21SMT amongst Soviet pilots, most were rebuilt with the
smaller saddle tank of the MiG-21bis after that type entered production in 1972. Following the
conversion, they were re-designated MiG-21ST and were externally indistinguishable from the MiG-21bis.
MiG-21bis (1972; Izdeliye 75; NATO "Fishbed-L/N"
The ultimate development of the MiG-21, fitted with the Tumansky R-25-300 turbojet engine and a great
number of other advances over previous types. Those MiG-21bis for the Soviet PVO (Air Defense Force)
were equipped with the Lazur GCI system (NATO: "Fishbed-L"), while those for the Soviet Air Force were
fitted with the Polyot ILS system (NATO: "Fishbed-N").
MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75A; NATO "Fishbed-L")
Lazur-equipped version with a slightly different avionics package exported to some Warsaw Pact
countries. In Bulgaria and East Germany these were designated MiG-21bis-Lazur.
MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75B; NATO "Fishbed-N")
Polyot-equipped version with a slightly different avionics package exported to some Warsaw Pact
countries. In Bulgaria and East Germany these were designated MiG-21bis-SAU (SAU referring to
Sistema Avtomaticheskovo Upravleniya = "Automatic Control System"). This variant was manufactured
under license by HAL in India from 1980 to 1987.
MiG-21bis-D
Upgraded in 2003 for the Croatian Air force with some elements of the Lancer standard. Modernized for
NATO interoperability including a Honeywell ILS (VOR/ILS and DME), a GPS receiver, a new IFF system,
and communications equipment from Rockwell Collins.
MiG-21bis/T
Finnish designation for MiG-21bis modified to carry reconnaissance pods.

Trainer Variants (1960–1968 Onward)
Ye-6U (1960)
Trainer prototype based on the Ye-6T.
MiG-21U (1961; Izdeliye 66-400; NATO "Mongol-A")
Two-seat training version of the MiG-21F-13.
MiG-21U-400
East German designation for MiG-21U aircraft of Izdeliye 66-400.
MiG-21UR (1961; project)
This was an unrealized project based on the Ye-6U in which the rear cockpit was transformed into an
extensive camera bay.
MiG-21U (1965; Izdeliye 66-600; NATO "Mongol-B")
Essentially the same as the 66-400, but with the wide-chord vertical stabilizer as on the MiG-21PFM.
MiG-21U-600
East German designation for MiG-21U aircraft of Izdeliye 66-600.
MiG-21US (1966; Izdeliye 68; NATO "Mongol-B")
Two-seat training version; upgrade of MiG-21U 66-400 with blown flaps.
MiG-21US (1966; Izdeliye 68A; NATO Mongol-B")
Export version of MiG-21US with slightly modified avionics.
MiG-21UM (1968; Izdeliye 69; NATO "Mongol-B")
Two-seat training version of the MiG-21MF. Type 69 Indian Air Force designation.
MiG-21UMD
Croatian designation for four MiG-21UMs upgraded for NATO interoperability, similarly to the MiG-
21bis-D.

MiG-21 Upgrade Programs
MiG-21-93
This package provided an upgrade of the avionics suite that includes installation of the Kopyo pulse-
Doppler radar, smaller version of N010 Zhuk airborne radar used by the MiG-29, which enables the
aircraft to fire a greater range of modern weapons such as the beyond-visual-range Vympel R-77 air-to-
air missile. Other upgrade features include installation of a dual-screen HUD, helmet-mounted target
designator, and advanced flight control systems.
MiG-21-2000
Single-seat 21st century version for export buyers by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI).
MiG-21 LanceR
Upgraded version for the Romanian Air Force done by Elbit Systems of Israel and Aerostar SA of
Romania. The LanceR-A version is optimized for ground attack being able to deliver precision guided
munitions of eastern and western origin as well as R-60, R-73 and Python III air to air missiles. The
LanceR-B version is the trainer version and the LanceR-C version is the air superiority version featuring 2
LCD MFDs, helmet mounted sight and the Elta EL/M-2032 Air combat radar.
MiG-21 Bison
Upgraded version for export, the Indian Air Force being the first customer. Equipped with the Phazotron
Kopyo (Spear) airborne radar, which is capable of simultaneously tracking 8 targets and engaging 2 of
them with semi-active radar homing air-to-air missiles, such as the Vympel R-27. The radar also enables
the fighter to deploy active radar homing air-to-air missiles such as the Vympel R-77.
MiG-21-97
MiG-21-93 upgrade. MiG-21-93 is re-engined with the Klimov RD-33 engine, the MiG-29 engine.
MiG-21 Foreign-Built Variants
China (People’s Republic of China)
Chinese-built variants of the MiG-21 are designated Chengdu J-7 and F-7 (for export). Only the initial
version of the J-7 was a copy of a MiG-21 variant, namely the MiG-21F-13. Though an agreement had
been reached between China and the USSR for license production of the MiG-21 in China, political
relations soured between the two countries, causing Soviet assistance to stop. This forced the Chinese
to reverse-engineer parts of the handful of MiG-21F-13s supplied from the USSR, in order to make up for
blueprints and documentation that had not yet been shipped over from the USSR at the time of the
political rift. All subsequent development of the J-7 was indigenous to China and different from Soviet-

made versions. The Guizhou JL-9 trainer, first flown in 2003, is also based on the MiG-21 airframe. See
Chinese J-7 below.
Czechoslovakia
Between 1962 and 1972 the MiG-21F-13 version was manufactured under license by Aero Vodochody, in
Czechoslovakia. Aero Vodochody built a total of 194 planes during this period, under the cover
designation article Z-159. It followed the MiG-15 and MiG-19S built in Vodochody factory from the fifties
to sixties. The sole locally-built version of the MiG-21F-13 differed externally from the Soviet-built
examples by the solid Dural sheet fairing behind the cockpit canopy, as opposed to the transparent one
on the original Soviet MiGs. These machines were built for the Czechoslovak Air Force and also for
export. The R-13-300 engines were imported from the Soviet Union.
India
The production of the MiG-21s in India under license by Hindustan Aeronautics in Nasik started with the
MiG-21FL in 1966 in four phases starting with the assembly of CKD kits, moving on to subassemblies,
parts, and finally advancing to production from scratch. 205 MiG-21FLs, designated Type 77 and
nicknamed Trident, were built in India between 1966 and 1972; the first one built entirely from Indian-
made components was delivered to the IAF on 19 October 1970, with the first Indian-made R-11F2S-300
powerplant leaving the assembly line on 2 January 1969. In 1971 HAL production was switched to an
improved version of the MiG-21M (Izdeliye 96), which was designated Type 88 by HAL; as this variant
was produced exclusively in India, no Izdeliye designation is applicable. The first Type 88 MiG-21M was
delivered to the IAF on 14 February 1973 and the last on 12 November 1981, with a total of 158 built.
The last variant to be produced by HAL was the MiG-21bis. A total of 75 were built in 1977 from CKD
kits, and a further 220 were built from scratch by 1984. Despite a series of crashes during the 1990s,
the Indian Air Force has decided to upgrade about 125 of the MiG-21bis in its inventory to the MiG-21
"Bison" standard. These will serve the Indian Air Force until 2018.
An Egyptian MiG-21 during joint operations with the US in 1982. Source: USAF.

Czech Republic Air Force MiG-21MFN in 2005, just before retirement. Source: Georg Mader. Copyright © 2013.
Photograph of an Indian Air Force MiG-21 Bison (modernized - MiG-21) seen during Aero India 2005 Show, in May 2007. Source: Sheeju
at en.wikipedia.

Current MiG-21 Operators
Note: This list does not include operators of Chinese copies/licensed manufactured versions known as
the Chengdu J-7 and export version, F-7.
Azerbaijan: Azerbaijan Air Force. Around 12 received from Ukraine and to be withdrawn following
purchase of MiG-29.
Angola: Angolan Air Force. First MiG-21s in Angola were 12 MiG-21MF delivered in March 1976 from
the USSR, followed by 8 MiG-21F-13 and two MiG-21US with Soviet pilots. In 1980, 12 more MiG-
21MF and two more MiG-21US were delivered to the Angolan Air Force, and four more MiG-21US and
12 MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75B) in 1983. None remained operational by 2007, but 18 MiG-21bis and 4
MiG-21UM are reportedly still on the Air Force's lists.
Bulgaria: Bulgarian Air Force. From 1963 to 1990 Bulgaria received: 224 MiG-21s. Six remain in service
as of 2012. Bulgaria received 12 MiG-21F-13 in 1963; the surviving nine were converted to MiG-21F-
13R standard as reconnaissance aircraft. The last six were retired in 1988 as life expired. 12 MiG-21PF
were delivered in 1965; four were lost in accidents, the other eight were retired in 1991. 12 MiG-
21PFM were received in 1965, followed by 32 more in 1977–1978 from Soviet surplus stock and two
more in 1986; further, four MiG-21PFS were delivered from Soviet surplus; of the 46 MiG-21PFM and 4
MiG-21PFS, seven were lost in accidents and four were sold to Nigeria; the last active aircraft were
withdrawn in 1992. Six MiG-21Rs were delivered in 1969 and retired in 1995. 15 MiG-21M were
delivered in 1970 and retired in 1990. Twenty MiG-21MFs were delivered in 1974–1975; seven were
converted to MiG-21MFR standard in 1995; all withdrawn by 2000. Thirty MiG-21bis Izdeliye 75B
("Fishbed-N") were delivered in 1983 and six more in 1985; Thirty-six MiG-21bis Izdeliye 75A ("Fishbed-
L") were delivered in 1990 from Soviet AF stocks. 12 MiG-21bis Izdeliye 75B remain in service. A single
MiG-21U Izdeliye 66-400 was delivered in 1966, and a single MiG-21US in 1969, followed by four more
MiG-21US in 1970. 27 MiG-21UM were delivered between 1974 and 1982. A few of these remain
operational after having gun sights and weapons pylons removed and being re-designated MiG-21UM-
2.
Cambodia: Cambodian Air Force. Nineteen second-hand MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75B) and three MiG-
21UMs delivered from the USSR in 1982, as well as three MiG-21UMs from Bulgaria in the same year.
There are plans to modernize these in Israel, but so far only one MiG-21bis and one MiG-21UM have
been rebuilt to MiG-21-2000 standard and returned to Cambodia. MiG-21s (MiG-21bis, MiG-21UM) in
service are assigned to "The Fighter Squadron" based at Phnom Penh.
Croatia: Croatian Air Force. Three MiG-21bis were taken up following defections of Croatian pilots
from the Yugoslav Air Force; two of these were lost in combat. Forty MiG-21bis and MiG-21UM were
bought from (former East) Germany in 1993, of which 16 and 4, respectively, were put into service, the
rest used for parts. Eight MiG-21bis were upgraded to MiG-21bis-D standard and four MiG-21UM to
MiG-21UMD standard in 2003 in Romania; these are currently in service.

Above, a line of Bulgarian Air Force MiG-21 Fishbed aircraft parked on the flight line on Graf Ignatievo Air Base, Bulgaria, Nov. 11, 2008, during exercise
Nickel Javelin, a 20-day long exercise where 230 U.S. Airmen conduct bilateral training with the Bulgarian forces. Note the packed drag chutes behind the
aircraft. Source: USAF. Below: Croatian MiG-21 during low altitude maneuvering 2012. Source: Chris Lofting.

Two Views of a Cuban MiG-21 fighter aircraft inside a Navy hangar. The aircraft was flown to Key West on September 20, 1993 by a defecting
Cuban pilot. Note the afterburner ring in the bottom photograph. Source: http://www.defenseimagery.mil.

Cuba: Cuban Air Force. 40 MiG-21F-13 and two MiG-21Us were transferred to the Fuerza Aérea
Revolucionaria in 1962. At least one squadron of MiG-21PF was delivered in 1964, and either 24 or 36
MiG-21PFM were received in 1966–1967. Twelve MiG-21Rs were delivered in 1968. Sixty MiG-21MFs
were delivered between 1972 and 1974; some of these were sent to Angola. Eighty MiG-21bis
(Izdeliye 75A) were received from 1981. Five MiG-21U (Izdeliye 66-600) were delivered in 1966, and 20
MiG-21UM were delivered starting in 1968. According to Cuban sources, altogether 270 MiG-21s of all
variants were received. 12 MiG-21bis and six MiG-21UMs are still operational.
Egypt: Egyptian Air Force. By 1967, Egypt had received 235 MiG-21 fighters (MiG-21F-13, MiG-21PF,
and MiG-21PFM) and 40 MiG-21U trainers. Almost all were destroyed in the Six Day War - no more
than 10 of the 235 survived that war. 75 MiG-21PFS were supplied in 1970, followed by 12 MiG-21M,
110 MiG-21MF, 24 MiG-21US, and some MiG-21UM. Eighty Chinese J-7 were also received. The MiG-
21 remains in service.
Eritrea: Eritrean Air Force. Old Ethiopian Air Force MIG-21bis aircraft are estimated to operate six.
Ethiopia: Ethiopian Air Force. 48 MiG-21MF and MiG-21UM received 1977–1978; more - reports range
from 50 to 150 - were delivered in 1982-83. Thirty MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75A) delivered between 1986
and 1988. Eighteen are still in service, 18 fighters, and 6 trainers.
India: Indian Air Force. India received its first MiG-21s in 1963, numbering 8 MiG-21F-13s. Two more
F-13s and two MiG-21PFs were received in 1964. The MiG-21FL was designed by Mikoyan to fulfill an
Indian requirement, and this was the first version to be license-built in India by HAL. The first 54 of
these were built and test-flown in the USSR, then dismantled and shipped to India for reassembly; the
first one built completely from scratch in India was handed over to the IAF in October 1970. All told,
205 MiG-21FL were built in India, of which 196 were built entirely in India; the last MiG-21FL was
retired in 2005. In 1971, 65 MiG-21M were delivered to India; license production of an improved
variant unique to India, designated MiG-21MF (Type 88), began in 1973, and lasted until 1981 - a total
of 158 were built. It is important to keep in mind that the HAL MiG-21MF (Type 88) is not the same as
the MiG-21MF (Izdeliye 96) that was made in the USSR for export to other countries. Kits for 75 MiG-
21bis Izdeliye 75A were delivered in 1977, and by 1984, 220 more were built from scratch in India.
Contracts were signed in 1996 to upgrade 125 MiG-21bis (plus an option for 50 more) in a service life
extension program to extend their useful life to 2017; the first two were upgraded by Sokol in Russia,
the remainder by HAL; 94 were completed by January 2006. This upgraded version was known
originally as MiG-21UPG and finally as MiG-21 Bison. A total of 45 MiG-21U of both Izdeliye 66-400 and
66-600 were delivered, including five bought from Ukraine in 1997. Seventy MiG-21UMs were
received, including some received from Eastern Europe in the 1990s.
Laos: Lao People's Liberation Army Air Force. Thirteen MiG-21PFMs and two MiG-21Us were delivered
in 1975, followed by ten MiG-21MF in 1985; none are now airworthy. There are reports of 20 MiG-
21bis Izdeliye 75A having been delivered in 1983, though there is now no trace of these, likely meaning
they are also retired. A second batch of trainers, probably MiG-21UM, was also delivered.

Libya: Libyan Arab Air Force (LAAF). MiG-21 deliveries to Libya started in 1975 of 25 MiG-21UM
trainers, followed by 50 MiG-21MFs; these were supposed to have been used to train and equip a
proposed "Palestinian Air Force" once Israel had been occupied. This did not come to pass, and both
types were used by the LAAF, though 30 of the MiG-21MFs were later sent to Syria in 1982. From
1980, 94 MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75A) were delivered. 33 of these were still in service in 2006. The aircraft
were extensively used during the Libyan uprising of 2011.
Mali: Air Force of the Republic of Mali. Twelve MiG-21bis Izdeliye 75B fighters and two MiG-21UMs
were delivered from the USSR in 1974, and two MiG-21MFs arrived in 2005 from the Czech Republic,
along with another MiG-21UM. Only the three ex-Czech aircraft are still in service.
Mongolia: Mongolian People's Air Force. It received 44 aircraft in 1977–1984. 8-12 MiG-21PFMs and
two trainers - MiG-21UM - have reportedly been carefully been put into storage due to lack of funds
and shortage of spares, though there have been no reports of their reactivation to date.
North Korea: Korean People's Army Air Force (KPAAF). At least 200 MiG-21s, including 30 built in
China, are generally accepted as having been delivered to the KPAAF. By 1966-67, 80 MiG-21F-13 were
delivered, with the first 14 arriving in or before 1963. 65 MiG-21PFM were delivered 1968–1971 and
24 more in 1974. According to the US CIA, by 1977 there were a total of 120 MiG-21s in North Korean
service, but by 1983 this number had dropped to 50; 150 MiG-21PFM and MiG-21MF were reportedly
delivered in 1985. In 1999, 38 MiG-21bis Izdeliye 75A were delivered from Kyrgyzstan. According to
one estimate, 150 MiG-21s are in service. 50 MiG-21 trainers of different variants were delivered, of
which 30 are believed to be in service.
Romania: Romanian Air Force. 24 MiG-21F-13 were delivered in 1962-63; they were withdrawn in
1976 but not officially written off until 1993. Deliveries of the MiG-21PF began in 1965, and a total of
38 were delivered; these were designated MiG-21RFM (Radar Fortaj Modernizat) in Romanian service.
The survivors were grounded in the early 1990s and put into storage by 1999. The first MiG-21PFMs
arrived in 1966. 29 of these were the standard Izdeliye 94A, and 23 nuclear-capable variants (Izdeliye
94N) were delivered as well. Both variants were designated MiG-21RFMM in Romanian service. The
last of these were retired in 2002, replaced by MiG-21 Lancer As. Eleven MiG-21Rs, locally designated
MiG-21C (Cercetare) were delivered in 1968, remaining in service until 1998. Starting in 1969, 60 MiG-
21M were delivered, and a total of 71 MiG-21MFs were delivered starting in 1972. MiG-21Ms formed
the basis for the MiG-21 Lancer “A” upgrade and MiG-21MFs were rebuilt into MiG-21 Lancer Cs. A
total of 73 Lancer A and 26 Lancer C were built, these are currently in service under NATO standards.
In Romanian service, all variants of the two-seat trainer were designated MiG-21DC (Dubla Comanda).
The first for were MiG-21U Izdeliye 66-400 arriving in 1965, followed by three of Izdeliye 66-600. From
1969, fourteen MiG-21US were delivered, and 31 MiG-21UM were delivered between 1972 and 1980,
of which 14 were upgraded to the MiG-21 Lancer B standard.
Serbia: Serbian Air Force. Inherited from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 2006. Possesses 31
MiG-21 aircraft, including MiG-21bis, MiG-21UM, and MiG-21M aircraft modified to carry
reconnaissance pods. Some were still operational in September 2007.

Syria: Syrian Air Force. 40 or 45 MiG-21F-13 were delivered around 1965 followed by 36 MiG-21PFs in
1966; six of the F-13s were lost in 1967 prior to the start of the Six Day War, and during the war itself,
32 of 60 F-13s and PFs were destroyed. These losses were covered by future deliveries from the USSR,
as well as four MiG-21F-13s from Czechoslovakia and ten from Hungary. From 1968, 100 MiG-21PFM
and MiG-21PFS were delivered, as were six MiG-21Rs in the 1970s. Sixty-one MiG-21MFs were
delivered between 1971 and 1973, but massive losses during the Yom Kippur War (180 Syrian fighters
of all types were lost) resulted in the delivery of 75 more MiG-21MFs from the USSR. During the Yom
Kippur War, 12 MiG-21Ms were bought from East Germany. A total of 54 MiG-21s and MiG-23s are
estimated to have been lost by Syria during the 1982 Lebanon War; and subsequently 198 MiG-21bis
were supplied by the USSR through the 1980s. About eight MiG-21U trainers were delivered in the
1960s, and 20 MiG-21UMs around 1973. As of 2007, eight squadrons still operated MiG-21bis aircraft,
about 200 in total, namely 8 Squadron (MiG-21MF) at Deir ez-Zor, 12 Squadron (MiG-21MF) at Tabqa,
679 and 680 Squadrons (all MiG-21MF) at Hama and 825, 826, 945 and 946 Squadrons (all MiG-21bis)
at Al Qusayr. Another source says there are 142 MiG-21 in service.
Uganda: Ugandan Air Force. Up to 18 MiG-21MF fighters and three MiG-21U variants were delivered
in the early 1970s. Seven were destroyed in the Israeli raid on Entebbe in 1976 and the rest were
destroyed or captured by Tanzanian forces in 1979; the wreckage of many of these was still visible in
Entebbe as late as 2003. In 1999, six MiG-21bis Izdeliye 75A and one MiG-21UM arrived from Poland
but were upgraded to MiG-21-2000 by Israel Aerospace Industries prior to delivery. One of these was
lost in an accident, but the rest continue in service in what is called "The Combat Unit."
Vietnam: Vietnam People's Air Force (VPAF). The VPAF received the first of its 20 or 30 MiG-21F-13
fighters in 1965; 30 MiG-21PFLs, a special variant for Vietnam, were delivered in 1966 (some historians
refer to this variant as MiG-21PFV (V = Vietnam), but this is denied by the MiG OKB); either 100 or 110
MiG-21PFM were delivered starting in 1968; sixty MiG-21MF were delivered around 1970; several
batches of MiG-21bis Izdeliye 75B were delivered starting in 1979, and 18 of Izdeliye 75A were received
second hand from Poland in 2005 (the 18 included a few MiG-21UMs). An unknown number of all
variants of the MiG-21 trainers were delivered, but MiG-21UMs were the majority. In 1996, six MiG-
21UMs arrived from the Ukraine. Some reports suggest that as many as 180 MiG-21bis, plus at least
24 MiG-21UMs, are still in service.
Yemen: Yemen Air Force. Following the unification of North and South Yemen, the new air force
received the MiG-21s in service with the former Yemen Arab Republic Air Force and the former
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen Air Force. It is estimated that 21 MiG-21MF were available in
2006, though some reports cite as many as 60 fighters and 12 trainers. Still other reports claim the
presence of MiG-21bis, but these are unsubstantiated. It is not known how many are still airworthy.
Zambia: Zambian Air Force & Air Defense Command. It received 14 MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75A) fighters
and two MiG-21UM trainers in 1976. The two trainers and eight surviving fighters were upgraded in
Israel in 1997-98 and are now in service.

Former MiG-21 Operators
Afghanistan: Afghan Air Force. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Air Force received 40 MiG-21F-
13 (Izdeliye 74) in 1973, and from 1979, 70 MiG-21MF (Izdeliye 96F), 50 MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75A and
75B) and 6 MiG-21UM (Izdeliye 69A) were delivered. Small numbers of aircraft left behind by the
Soviet Air Force after their withdrawal, including MiG-21PFS (Izdeliye 94A) and MiG-21PFM (Izdeliye
94A). Following the overthrow of the communist government, the armies of some warlords operated
MiG-21s. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Air Force was set up by the Taliban, and was known to
have operated at least one MiG-21PFM, 8 MiG-21MF, 5 MiG-21bis, one MiG-21U (Izdeliye 66-400) and
three MiG-21UMs. All are now out of service (derelict and/or destroyed). MiG-21s saw combat during
the civil war in 1994 and 1995.
Algeria: Algerian Air Force. First received MiG-21F-13 starting in 1965, a total of 40 delivered; 31 were
'lent' to Egypt in 1967 for the Six Day War. Of these, six landed at an airbase just captured by the
Israelis in the war - one pilot destroyed his plane, the other five were captured, and four of these were
shipped to the USA for evaluation by the USAF. In 1966–1967 30 MiG-21PF were received, followed by
probably 40 MiG-21PFM. Six MiG-21Rs were reportedly delivered; there is no further information.
Some MiG-21M and MiG-21MF were also received; these were all designated "MiG-21MF" by the air
force. About 60 MiG-21bis of both Izdeliye 75A and 75B were delivered. Some MiG-21s were traded
to Ukraine as part of a package for 36 MiG-29s; similar deals may have been made with Belarus, who
provided Algeria with 36 more MiG-29s aircraft. The last MiG-21s were withdrawn from service by
2003.
Bangladesh: Bangladesh Air Force. Received 12 HAL-built (Indian) MiG-21MF in 1973. All now retired,
instead use Chengdu J-7.
Belarus: Belarus Air Force.
Burkina Faso: Burkina Faso Air Force. Eight MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75A) and two MiG-21UM delivered in
1984; all non-operational by 1993.
China: People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). Three complete MiG-21F-13 and 20 kits were sent
from the USSR to China in 1961; the rest used by the PLAAF were all locally built Chengdu J-7 aircraft.
Though only 23 "actual" aircraft were delivered from the USSR to China, they did see active service in
the PLAAF and/or PLANAF (Naval Aviation).
Congo, Republic of the: Congolese Air Force: Reportedly 14 MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75B) and two MiG-
21UMs were delivered starting in 1988; all out of use by 1997.
Czechoslovakia: Czechoslovakian Air Force. All aircraft passed on to Czech Republic and Slovakia. First
version to operate was the locally built Avia S-106 (= MiG-21F-13); 194 were built, and some were
converted to MiG-21FR standard. 40 MiG-21PF were delivered from 1964, retired by 1990. MiG-
21PFMs, including nine nuclear-capable aircraft, were delivered between 1966 and 1969; all were

retired by 1991. 25 MiG-21R were delivered between 1969 and 1972, retired between 1992 and 1994.
24 MiG-21M were delivered which were later upgraded to MiG-21MA standard. 102 MiG-21MF were
delivered. Three MiG-21U Izdeliye 66-400 and eight of Izdeliye 66-600 were received, followed by 13
MiG-21US and 32 MiG-21UM. An Avia S-106 is credited with the downing of a US Air Force aircraft
violating Czechoslovak airspace in September 1963.
Czech Republic: Czech Air Force. Ten MiG-21MFs were upgraded to the MiG-21MFN standard with
NATO avionics. These were retired in 2005, replaced by the Saab JAS 39 Gripen.
East Germany: East German Air Force (LSK/NVA): 251 MiG-21s of seven versions were handed over to
the Luftwaffe upon reunification; these were rapidly phased-out of service. The LSK/NVA received 75
MiG-21F-13' in 1962-64, 52 MiG-21PF, 83 MiG-21PFM without cannon (locally designated MiG-21SPS)
and 56 with cannon (locally designated MiG-21SPS-K), 89 MiG-21M, 68 MiG-21MF, 14 MiG-21bis
Izdeliye 75A and 32 Izdeliye 75B, 14 MiG-21U Izdeliye 66-400 and 31 Izdeliye 66-600, 17 MiG-21US and
37 MiG-21UM.
Finland: Finnish Air Force. Fighters: MiG-21bis Fishbed-N (26; 1977–1998), MiG-21F-13 Fishbed-C (22;
1963–1986), Trainers: MiG-21UM Mongol-B (2; 1974–1998), MiG-21US Mongol-B (2; 1981–1997), MiG-
21UTI Mongol-A (2; 1965–1997). Six of the MiG-21bis were converted to MiG-21bis/T Recce standard.
All aircraft were operated by HävLLv 31, Finland was the first country outside the Warsaw Pact to buy
MiG-21, after Finland had rejected MiG-19 and Soviet Union offered the brand-new Fishbed-C, Finland
chose Fishbed-C and training of pilots by Soviet air force began, only to stop after start of Cuban Crisis
when Soviet Union ordered its pilots on stand-by, and Finnish Air force decided the training could be
continued in Finland without Soviet trainers.
Germany: Luftwaffe. Aircraft taken over from East German Air Force upon re-unification. All received
Luftwaffe registration numbers, but only those that were in operation received the full Luftwaffe
serials.
Georgia: Georgian Air Force. Two MiG-21UMs were retained by Tbilaviamsheni factory and reportedly
transferred to Georgian Air Force.
Guinea: Air Force of Guinea: 8 MiG-21MF and one MiG-21U delivered in 1986. Five restored to
airworthy condition in Russia and returned to service; one of these crashed into a TV tower in 2007.
Guinea-Bissau: Air Force of Guinea-Bissau: Six MiG-21MFs and one MiG-21UM were delivered from
Soviet surplus in the late 1980s. All are out of service.
Hungary: Hungarian Air Force. Hungary was the first Warsaw Pact country to receive the MiG-21F-13,
receiving 12 in 1961, followed by 68 more; all were retired by 1980. In 1964-65 24 MiG-21PF were
delivered, the last of these being retired in December 1988. Hungary was the only Warsaw Pact nation
not to receive any MiG-21PFM or MiG-21M; the next type received was the MiG-21MF, of which 50
were delivered between 1971 and 1974, and were retired in 1996. 39 MiG-21bis Izdeliye 75A and 24 of
Izdeliye 75B were delivered from 1977, the last of these were retired in 2001. Of trainer variants, 12

MiG-21U Izdeliye 66-400 and six Izdeliye 66-600, as well as 27 MiG-21UM were delivered; the last of
them were withdrawn in 2001.
Indonesia: Indonesian Air Force. Twenty MiG-21F-13s and two MiG-21U Izdeliye 66-400 were received
in 1962. The aircraft were largely grounded in 1969 and removed from service in 1970. At least 13 of
the F-13s and one U were transferred to the USA for test purposes.
Iran: Iranian Air Force had purchased 2 MiG-21PFM and 37 MiG-21F (23 like for Chinese version for J-7)
and some 18 aircraft and 5 MiG-21U (FT-7 for Chinese Version like 4 purchased aircraft).
Iraq: Iraqi Air Force. Iraq received 35 MiG-21F-13 starting in 1963; one of these is the famous "007"
aircraft that defected to Israel and was subsequently transferred to the USA. The first MiG-21PFs were
delivered in 1966; 37 are known for certain to have been received, but some sources suggest 90. 55
MiG-21PFM are known to have been received in 1970, but the number purchased is likely over 100
when taking into account aircraft transferred from Iraq to Egypt and Syria, though it is possible that
these sources have confused or "bundled up" the MiG-21PFs and MiG-21PFMs. Fifteen MiG-21R were
delivered in 1979, and 40 MiG-21MF were received in 1973 with another batch of 40 in 1979. A total
of 61 MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75A) were delivered from 1983; some of these were found in 1990 in
Dresden, Germany for overhaul, and four others at Batajnica, Yugoslavia. The East German Air Force
(and subsequently, the Luftwaffe) had planned to sell surplus trainer variants to Iraq, but this fell
through after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. At least 10 MiG-21Us, 8 MiG-21USs, and 11 MiG-21UMs
were delivered between 1968 and 1985. 35 MiG-21s escaped to Iran during "Desert Storm" in 1991.
Of those remaining in Iraq, none are operational, and most are likely destroyed or scrapped.
Israel: Israeli Defense Force/Air Force (IDF/AF). A number of MiG-21s of various models have been
captured in wars with neighbors, but the best-known example is the "007" aircraft, a MiG-21F-13 of
the Iraqi pilot, who defected to Israel in 1966. This aircraft was examined and then shipped to the USA.
A second MiG-21F-13 was later given the same number; this aircraft is now on display in an Israeli
camouflage scheme with Israeli markings at the IDF/AF museum at Hatzerim AB.
Kyrgyzstan: Air Force of Kyrgyzstan. A considerable number of MiG-21bis and MiG-21UM in storage
near Bishkek. The Kyrgyz Air Force has no interest in operating them and has offered them for sale.
Mozambique: Mozambique Air Force. 48 MiG-21bis were delivered from 1982 from Cuba, including
pilots, for use against guerrillas; by 1990 only 18 were still operational. After the 1990 ceasefire they
were all put into storage and neglected.
Madagascar: Madagascar received eight MiG-21PFMs and one MiG-21U from North Korea in 1978.
There are some unconfirmed reports of MiG-21 deliveries prior to the proven delivery of 12 MiG-21bis
Izdeliye 75B and at least two MiG-21UMs from the USSR. All MiG-21s were placed in storage by 2000.
Namibia: Namibian Air Force. At least two MiG-21bis and one MiG-21UM were delivered to the NAF in
2002 following an overhaul and upgrade in Israel. Namibia also operates twelve Chengdu J-7s since
2006.

Above, a Bulgarian MiG-21bis taxis at Graf Ignatievo Air Base, Bulgaria during a bi-lateral exercise between the U.S. and Bulgarian air forces.
More than 100 members of the Oregon Air National Guard are deployed to the 3rd Air Force Base in Graf Ignatievo to participate in exercise
Sentry Lion. The exercise promotes cooperation and interoperability among NATO partners. Source: U.S. Army. Below, a Bulgarian Air Force
MiG-21UM photographed in 2003. Source: Chris Lofting.

Nigeria: Nigerian Air Force. 25 MiG-21MF and six MiG-21UMs were delivered in 1975. Three were
lost in accidents, and one is preserved as a gate guard at Abuja air base. All were put into storage
in the 1990s due to lack of spares and cash. By 2005, cash was available from increased oil
production, but instead of refurbishing the MiG-21s, it was spent on new Chengdu F-NY fighters
and three FT-NY trainers.
Poland: Polish Air Force. Poland received its first MiG-21F-13 in June 1961. 24 more arrived in 1962-
63, and all were withdrawn in 1971; twelve were sold to Syria in 1973. 84 MiG-21PF were delivered
from 1964; the last ones were retired in December 1989. A total of 132 MiG-21PFM were delivered.
Of these, twelve were the nuclear-capable Izdeliye 94N and were designated MiG-21PFMN by the
Polish Air Force; the rest (Izdeliye 94A) were designated MiG-21PFMA. All were withdrawn by the mid-
1990s; the MiG-21PFMNs were retired in 1989 and stripped of their nuclear capability. Between 1968
and 1972 a total of 36 MiG-21Rs were delivered; the last of these were retired in 2002. 36 MiG-21Ms
were delivered in 1969-70, with all retired by 2002. In total Poland received 120 MiG-21MFs from
1972, with the last survivors retired in 2003. 72 MiG-21bis Izdeliye 75A were delivered to Poland; the
last of these were retired on December 31, 2003. The first trainers arrived in 1965 in the form of six
MiG-21U Izdeliye 66-400; three were lost in accidents, and the other three were retired in 1990. Five
MiG-21U Izdeliye 66-600 were delivered in 1966 and were retired by 1990. Twelve MiG-21US were
delivered in 1969-70, the last being retired on December 31, 2003. Between 1971 and 1981 Poland
received 54 MiG-21UMs; all were likewise retired at the end of 2003.
Slovakia: Slovak Air Force. The assets of the former Czechoslovak Air Force were divided following the
separation of the country into the Czech and Slovak Republics. Of MiG-21 variants, Slovakia received
21 MiG-21F-13s (actually Czechoslovak-built S-106s), three MiG-21PFs, eleven MiG-21PFMs, eight MiG-
21Rs, thirteen MiG-21MA, 36 MiG-21MFs, three MiG-21U Izdeliye 66-600, two MiG-21US and 11 MiG-
21UM. The last few MiG-21MFs and MiG-21UMs still in service were grounded on January 1, 2003.
Somalia: Somalia Aeronautical Corps. The SAC received ten MiG-21MF fighters and four MiG-21UM
trainers in 1974. The total number received is not certain, but most sources suggest that a maximum
of 45 fighters and ten trainers were delivered. All were destroyed or damaged and subsequently
abandoned. Eight MiG-21 wrecks can still be seen at Mogadishu airport.
Sudan: Sudanese Air Force. Eighteen MiG-21PF fighters and two MiG-21U Izdeliye 66-600 trainers
were delivered in 1970, followed by 18 MiG-21M fighters and four MiG-21US trainers in 1971. By 1992
there were only seven fighters and two trainers remaining, with perhaps half being serviceable; none
are in service today. Twelve second-hand MiG-21s were to be delivered in 2007 from the Ukraine,
apparently ordered because the Eastern European mercenaries employed by the Sudanese
government preferred Russian-built aircraft over the Chinese-built F-7s in service. The only air-to-air
action known to have involved Sudanese MiG-21s occurred on September 20, 1972, when several MiG-
21Ms forced a Libyan AF C-130H to land.
Tanzania: Tanzania People's Defense Force Air Wing. 14 MiG-21MFs and two MiG-21UMs were
delivered from the USSR in 1974. A few were lost before 1978, but the survivors took part in the war
against Uganda; one was lost to enemy action and one to friendly fire.

Seven Ugandan MiG-21MFs and one MiG-21U were captured and impressed into service. Four second-
hand MiG-21MFs were bought from Ukraine in 1998, but by 2002 there were no MiG-21s in service.
Turkmenistan: Military of Turkmenistan had 3 MiG-21 aircraft in service.
USA: United States Air Force. In the 1960s around a dozen MiG-21s arrived to the USAF from various
sources. Though from the American point of view the details are a closely held secret, from non-US
sources it is well known that six ex-Algerian MiG-21F-13s landed at an airbase in Egypt and were
captured by Israeli forces, and that four of these were given to the USAF. The famous "007" MiG-21F-
13 of an Iraqi defector to Israel was also handed over to the Americans; further, at least 13 MiG-21F-
13s were sent from Indonesia to the USA by President Suharto in the early 1970s. Most of these were
not flown in the US, but were taken apart and examined in detail. The US Air Force is reported to have
purchased at least 16 MiG-21MF Fishbed Js from Egypt in 1978 as from 1977 to 1988 Constant Peg
Program saw USAF, Navy and Marine fighters flying against Soviet-designed MiG fighters as part of a
training where American pilots could better learn how to defeat or evade the Communist bloc's
contemporary fighters. It is believed that some few years later the USAF acquired from Egypt two
additional Su-20 Fitters and two MiG-21Us. In 1986 a dozen MiG-21s were purchased from China, and
Indonesian MiGs were retired. There was at least one MiG-21F-13, however, that was officially
operated by the US Air Force as photographs prove. This MiG-21F-13 was given the USAF serial
number 68-0965 and was intensively flight-tested in a program codenamed "Have Doughnut" that took
place from January 23 to April 8, 1968.
Ukraine: Ukrainian Air Force. None of the MiG-21s remaining in Ukraine after the breakup of the USSR
were officially taken up by the Ukrainian Air Force, but Ukraine has refurbished aircraft for sale.
North Yemen: Yemen Arab Republic Air Force (North Yemen). In 1968 it received an unknown number
of MiG-21PF fighters via Syria or Egypt; no details of these survive, as after 1978 it switched to Western
aircraft. Following the brief invasion by South Yemen and the subsequent intermittent fighting, the
USSR supplied an additional 45 new MiG-21MF fighters and MiG-21UM trainers; it is interesting to
note that the USSR provided arms and aid to both sides in the conflict, and was simultaneously doing
what it could to unite the two Yemens. Any MiG-21MFs and MiG-21UMs that survived into 1990 were
transferred to the new Yemen Air Force following unification of the two Yemens in 1990.
South Yemen: People's Democratic Republic of Yemen Air Force. In 1971 the USSR delivered MiG-21F-
13s and according to some reports, some others were sent by Bulgaria. Exact numbers are not known,
but it is known that at least one squadron was formed. In the late 1970s further MiG-21 fighters and
trainers arrived, including MiG-21MF. Any MiG-21s that survived into 1990 were transferred to the
new Yemen Air Force following unification of the two Yemens in 1990.
Yugoslavia: SFR Yugoslavia. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia operated up to 200 MiG-21s in
9 variants from 1962 till 1992. During the war in western Yugoslavia, these aircraft were passed on to
the newly established air force of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Top, Serbian Air Force personnel install a centerline fuel tank on a MiG-21 in 2009. Above, a multiple R-60
(NATO reporting name AA-8 'Aphid') missile installation on a Serbian Air Force MiG-21. The R-60 is a
lightweight air-to-air missile designed for use by Soviet fighter aircraft, and very common in MiG-21s. Top,
a Serbian Air Force MiG-21 during take-off. These aircraft continue to provide vital services to that air
force. Source: Serbian Air Force.

Yugoslavia: FR Yugoslavia. The Air Force of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia inherited its MiG-21s
from the former Socialist Yugoslav Air Force. A large number were destroyed during the 1999 NATO
war against Yugoslavia; survivors were passed on to Serbia. These continue in service.
Zimbabwe: Air Force of Zimbabwe received 48 MiG-21F and 2 MiG-21Us.
Chinese J-7 (MiG-21 Derivative)
The Chengdu Jian-7 (Chinese: 歼-7; export versions F-7) is a People's Republic of China license built
version of the Soviet Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21. Though production ceased in 2008, it continues to
serve, mostly as an interceptor, in several air forces, including China's. In the 1950s and early 1960s,
the Soviet Union shared most of its conventional weapons technology with the People's Republic of
China. One of these was the limited cooperation between the two countries in the early stage
development of the famous MiG-21 short-range interceptor-fighter aircraft. Powered by a single
engine and designed on a simple airframe, these fighters were inexpensive, but fast, suiting the
strategy of forming large groups of 'people's fighters' to overcome the technological advantages of
Western aircraft. However, the Sino-Soviet split ended Chinese early participation in the
developmental program of the MiG-21 abruptly, and from July 28 to September 1, 1960, the Soviet
Union withdrew its advisers from China, resulting in the project being forced to stop in China.
However, Nikita Khrushchev suddenly wrote to Mao Zedong in February, 1962 to inform Mao that the
Soviet Union was ready to transfer MiG-21 technology to China and asked the Chinese to send their
representatives to the Soviet Union as soon as possible to discuss the details. The authorization was
personally given by Nikita Khrushchev himself, and on March 30, 1962, the deal was signed. However,
given the political situation and relationship between the two countries, the Chinese were not
optimistic about gaining the technology and thus were prepared for reverse engineering.
Russian sources stated that complete examples of the MiG-21 were sent to China flown by Soviet
pilots, and China did receive MiG-21Fs in kits along with parts and technical documents. Just as the
Chinese had expected, when the Soviets delivered the kits, parts and documents to Shenyang Aircraft
Factory five months after the deal was signed the Chinese discovered that the technical documents
provided by the Soviets were incomplete and some of the parts could not be used. China set about to
reverse engineer the aircraft for local production and in doing so, succeeded in solving 249 major
problems and came up with eight major technical documents that were not delivered.
The mass production of the aircraft was severely hindered by an unexpected problem—the Cultural
Revolution—that resulted in poor initial quality and slow progress, which, in turn, resulted in full scale
production only coming about in the 1980s, by which time the design was showing its age. J-7 only
reached Soviet designed capacity in the mid 1980s. However, the fighter is affordable and widely
exported as the F-7, often with Western systems incorporated like the ones sold to Pakistan. Based on
the expertise gained by this program, China later developed the Shenyang J-8 by utilizing the
incomplete technical information of the Soviet Ye-152 developmental jet.

Specifications (J-7MG)
• Crew: 1
• Length: 14.885 m (Overall) (48 ft. 10 in)
• Wingspan: 8.32 m (27 ft. 3½ in)
• Height: 4.11 m (13 ft. 5½ in)
• Wing area: 24.88 m² (267.8 ft²)
• Aspect ratio: 2.8:1
• Empty weight: 5,292 kg (11,667 lb.)
• Loaded weight: 7,540 kg (16,620 lb.) (two PL-2 or PL-7 air-to-air missiles)
• Maximum takeoff weight: 9,100 kg (20,062 lb.)
• Powerplant: 1 × Liyang Wopen-13F afterburning turbojet
o Dry thrust: 44.1 kN (9,921 lb.)
o Thrust with afterburner: 64.7 kN (14,550 lb.)
Performance
• Maximum speed: Mach 2.0 (2,200 km/h (1,189 knots, 1,375 mph))
• Stall speed: 210 km/h (114 knots, 131 mph)
• Combat radius: 850 km (459 nmi, 528 mi) (air superiority, two AAMs and 3 drop tanks)
• Ferry range: 2,200 km (1,187 nmi, 1,367 mi)
Armament
• Guns: 2× 30 mm Type 30-1 cannon, 60 rounds per gun
• Hard points: 5 in total - 4× under-wing, 1× center-line under-fuselage with a capacity of
2,000 kg maximum (up to 500 kg each)
• Rockets: 55 mm rocket pod (12 rounds), 90 mm rocket pod (7 rounds)
• Missiles: air-to-air missiles: PL-2, PL-5, PL-7, PL-8, PL-9, Magic R550, AIM-9
• Bombs: 50 kg to 500 kg unguided bombs
Foreign J-7 Operators
Bangladesh: Bangladesh Air Force: (As of February 2012), 23× F-7MB/BG in service with another
16× F-7BGI on order.
China: People's Liberation Army Air Force: 290× J-7 plus 40× JJ-7 trainers remained in service (2012).
China: People's Liberation Army Naval Air Force: 30× J-7D/E remained in service (2012).
Egypt: Egyptian Air Force: 74 F-7 in service.

Iran: Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force: 21 F-7 in service.
Myanmar: Myanmar Air Force: 24× F-7M and 6× FT-7 trainers remained in service (2012).
Namibia: Namibian Air Force: Six F-7 and two FT-7 in service, 8 F-7NGs on order.
Nigeria: Nigerian Air Force: 12 F-7 and 2 FT-7.
North Korea: North Korean Air Force: As of February 2012, 180× F-7 remained in service. However,
reports of dire levels of serviceability suggest an airworthiness rate of less than 50%.
Pakistan: Pakistan Air Force: As of February 2012, 143× F-7P/PG (due for replacement by JF-17 from
2015) plus 7× FT-7 remained in service.
Sri Lanka: Sri Lankan Air Force: 9× F-7/GS/BS and 1× FT-7 trainer remained in service (2012).
Sudan: Sudanese Air Force: 20× F-7 in service.
Tanzania: Tanzanian Air Force: 11× F-7 in service.
Yemen: Yemen Air Force: 18× F-7 in service
Zimbabwe: Air Force of Zimbabwe: 7× F-7 in service
Albania: Albanian Air Force: Total 66 plus. 42× F-7A were in service from 1969 through 2004.
Mozambique: Air Force of Mozambique. Aircraft were retired.
Iraq: Iraqi Air Force: Up to 80 F-7s were received. All aircraft were retired.
Albanian Air Force Chengdu F-7A photographed in 2006. Source: Chris Lofting. http://www.airliners.net.

J-7 Variants
Approximately 48 variants of the J-7 exist and are listed below.
J-7 Chinese Variants
J-7
(A.k.a. Type 62) The first reverse-engineered copies of the MiG-21-F-13 "Fishbed-C" by Shenyang
Aircraft Factory in 1966, powered by WP-7 engine (R-11F-300 copy). Only 12 were produced.
J-7I
An improved J-7 variant built by Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corp (CAC) in the 1970s, it differs from the J-
7 in that the fixed intake of the J-7 was replaced by a variable intake, the armament reverted to two 30
mm cannons, a brake parachute container was added to the base of the fin under the rudder, whilst
the WP-7 engine was retained. Production and service with the PLAAF and PLANAF was very limited
due to design flaws, quality control issues, and poor performance. In 1960s, as soon as PLAAF received
PL-2 air-to-air missile, J-7Is started to attempt using PL-2 missiles to intercept USAF reconnaissance
drones. Due to PL-2s' fuse is designed to target larger aircraft, these attempts were unsuccessful to
some degree.
J-7I (modified)
One of the biggest flaws of the original J-7 was in its hydraulic system, which suffered leaks. As many
as 70% of the J-7s in some PLAAF Squadrons were grounded due to this issue. An extensive redesign
was implemented to solve this problem. The resulting J-7I (modified) had much better hydraulic
systems, and although the system still did not reach the Western standard of the same era, the quality
was greatly improved in comparison to the earlier system, and was considered acceptable by J-7 users.
J-7II
Improved J-7I variant built in the 1970s and limited all-weather fighter with two 30 mm guns and a WP-
7B engine. The forward-hinged canopy jettisoned with the ejection seat of the Soviet design proved to
be unsuccessful and was replaced by a rearward hinged canopy jettisoned before the ejection seat.
J-7IIA
Improved J-7II variant in early 1980s with western avionics, such as the British Type 956 HUD, which
became standard for J-7 fighters from then on.
J-7IIM
Conversion package to upgrade domestic Chinese J-7s to F-7M standard.

Two air-to-air views of Pakistani Chengdu F-7PG aircraft during training missions during a multinational exercise Dec. 9, 2009, in Southwest Asia.
Source: http://www.defenseimagery.mil.

J-7IIH
Improved J-7II variant with enhanced ground attack capability. First J-7 model to have a multi-function
display, which is located to the upper right corner of the dashboard. J-7IIH is the first J-7 fighter that is
capable of using PL-8 air-to-air missile.
J-7IIK
Conversion package to upgrade domestic Chinese J-7 to J-7MP/F-7MP/F-7P standard.
J-7III
Reverse-engineered copies of MiG-21MF "Fishbed-J," reportedly obtained from Egypt by Chengdu
Aircraft Industry Corp. (CAC) with JL-7 fire-control radar. Liyang WP-13 turbojet engine, new
HUD/avionics, and improved fuel capacity. The new avionics included Type 481 data link, which enables
the ground-controlled interception centers to feed directions directly to the autopilots of J-7IIIs to fly
"hands off" to the interception, and Type 481 data link was latter included as standard equipment of all
later models. Only 20-30 were produced.
J-7B
The most obvious visual difference between this model and earlier models is that the smaller canopy
and the small window behind it on earlier models were replaced by a larger canopy on this model, so
that the small window no longer existed.
J-7BS
First J-7 to have 4 under-wing pylons.
J-7E
Improved variant of the J-7II developed in 1987 as a replacement for the J-7II/F-7B. A new double-
delta wing, WP-13F turbojet engine, British GEC-Marconi Super Sky ranger radar, increased internal
fuel capacity, and improved performance. It is 45% more maneuverable than the J/F-7M, while the
take-off and landing distance is reduced to 600 meters, in comparison to the 1,000 meter take-off
distance and 900 meter landing distance of earlier versions of the J-7. J-7E is the first of the J-7 family
to incorporate HOTAS, which has since become standard on the later versions. This version is also the
first of J-7 series to be later upgraded with helmet mounted sights (HMS), however, it is reported that
the helmet mounted sight is not compatible with radars, and air-to-air missiles must be independently
controlled by either HMS or radar, but not both.
J-7EB
An unarmed J-7EB variant was used by the People's Liberation Army Air Force August 1 Aerobatic Team.

Pakistan Air Force F-7PG fighters; on the ground, in flight, and landing. Source: Pakistan Air Force.

J-7EH
J-7E derivative used by People's Liberation Army Naval Air Force with capability to carry anti-ship
missiles such as C-802. However, the due to the limitation of its airborne radar, J-7EH cannot
independently engage shipping targets and after the launching of the anti-ship missiles, the targeting
information must be provided by other aircraft.
J-7FS
Technology demonstration aircraft built by CAC, with redesigned under-chin inlet and WP-13IIS engine.
First flew in 1998, only two prototypes were built before being replaced by J-7MF.
J-7G
An improved variant of the J-7E by CAC. It first flew in 2002. Equipped with a new KLJ-6E PD radar,
which is reported to be SY-80 radar with SY is short for Sheen Ying, meaning Celestial Eagle in Chinese.
This radar a Chinese development of the Italian Pointer-2500 ranging radar used for the Q-5M, and the
Italian radar itself was a development of Pointer radar, the Italian copy of Israeli Elta EL/M-2001. In
comparison to the Italian Griffon series radar on Pakistani F-7s, the SY-80 weighs more at 60 kg, and
the range is also shorter, at 30 km. However, the radar does have a feat that the Italian radars do not
have: it is fully compatible with helmet-mounted sights (HMS) so that both the radar and HMS can be
worked together to control PL-8/9 air-to-air missiles. One 30 mm gun was removed, and a more
powerful engine installed.
J-7G2
Improved J-7G with more powerful radar, capable of incorporating detachable conformal tanks.
J-7GB
Unarmed version of the J-7G used to replace the J-7EB for the August 1st Aerobatic team.
J-7M
Until the 2000s (decade), there was at least an F-7M used by Chinese as a radar and avionics test bed.
Differs from other models in that there were no fixed radars and avionics due to the different
equipment being tested.
J-7MG
J-7E armed with GEC-Marconi Super Skyranger radar with planar slotted array and Martin-Baker
ejection seat for potential customers' evaluation. Pakistan and Bangladesh evaluated the aircraft, and
evolved to F-7MG.

J-7MP
After nearly two years use of the F-7M, Pakistani Air Force (PAF) returned the 20 F-7M aircraft to China
in the late 1980s with recommendations for 24 upgrades, including replacing the original GEC-Marconi
Type 226 Skyranger radar with the Italian FIAR Grifo-7 radar, and AIM-9 Sidewinder capability.
The Italian radar weighs 55 kg, had a slot antenna planar array, and had a range greater than 50 km,
while the British radar only weighs 42 kg, with a parabolic antenna, but only had range of 15 km. Both
radars have a mean time between failure rates of 200 hours. The J-7MP is the design specially tailored
to Pakistani requirements.
J-7PG
Alternative to J-7MG, similar to the J-7MG except with Italian FIAR Grifo MG radar, which further
increased the sector of scan to +/- 30 degrees from the +/- 20 degrees of Grifo-Mk-II on F-7P. The
Grifo-MG radar has better ECM, look-down, and shoot-down capabilities than its predecessor Grifo-
Mk-II, while the weight remained the same. The number of targets can be tracked simultaneously is
increased from the original 4 of the Grifo-Mk-II to a total of 8 of the Grifo-MG. Pakistan and Bangladesh
evaluated the aircraft, and evolved to F-7PG.
JJ-7
Dual-seat J-7 trainer and Chinese equivalent of the MiG-21U Mongol-A design. Originally built by
Guizhou Aircraft Design Institute and Guizhou Aircraft Company (now Guizhou Aviation Industry
Group/GAIC) in 1981.
JJ-7I
Chinese equivalent of the Soviet MiG-21US trainer with domestic Type-II ejection seat. Only a very
small number were built before converting to the JJ-7II.
JJ-7II
JJ-7I with Rockwell Collins avionics that became standard for later J-7 models.
JL-9 (FTC-2000)
Also known as FTC-2000 Mountain Eagle (Shan Ying), new two-seat trainer derived from the JJ-7 series.
Built by GAIC in 2000s (decade) as the low-cost solution to JJ-7 trainer replacement.
JZ-7
Reconnaissance version of the J-7, Chinese equivalent of MiG-21R. In addition to the photo
reconnaissance, this aircraft was the first to have the domestically developed ESM reconnaissance pod.

J-7 Drone
Unmanned J-7 remote-controlled drones mostly converted from J-7I fighters.
J-7 Export Variants
F-7IIA
Export version of the J-7IIA, with the pitot re-located to the intake upper lip on the starboard side, a
WP-7BM engine, stronger windscreen, improved zero-zero ejection seat and GEC-Marconi Type 956
HUD/ Weapons Aiming Computer, as well as reinforced landing gear.
F-7IIN
22 modified F-7M sold to Zimbabwe, with the domestic Chinese avionics replacing the western
avionics, originally believed to be fitted with JL-7A radar. There were reports in 2005 that radars on
the fighters had been upgraded.
F-7III
Export version of the J-7III with different missile launching rails that are compatible with French R550
Magic Air-to-air missiles. No sales have been reported.
J-7IIIA
Improved J-7III/F-7-3 with JL-7A radar and WP-13FI turbojet engine, jointly developed by CAC and now
Guizhou Aviation Industry Group/GAIC. Limited production of 20-30. Straight topped spine like that of
MiG-21PF and PFMA.
F-7A
Limited export version of the J-7 with a WP-7B engine, one 30 mm gun, and 2 under-wing pylons. It
was exported to Albania and Tanzania.
F-7B
Export version of the J-7II with re-wired pylons using the French R550 Magic Air-to-air missiles. Sold to
Egypt (a total of 150 F-7Bs and F-7Ms), Iraq, and Sudan from 1982-1983.
F-7BG
16 were delivered to Bangladesh in 2006 including with 4 two-seater FT-7BGs. The capability to carry
reconnaissance pods and operate the equipment inside the pods from the cockpit of earlier F-7MB is
retained.

F-7BGI
Upgraded version for Bangladesh Air Force ordered in 2011. Beyond-visual-range missile capability.
F-7BS
4 export versions of the J-7BS units were sold to Sri Lanka. These aircraft did not a HUD (Heads-Up-
Display.
F-7D
Export version of the J-7IIIA with different missile launching rails that are compatible with the French
R550 Magic Air-to-air missiles. No sales have been reported.
F-7M Airguard
Improved J-7II variant for export with western avionics, with British GEC-Marconi as the prime
contractor. Program initiated in 1978 and took six years to complete, after 10 rounds of negotiation.
Western avionics includes:
• British Type 226 Skyranger radar: Ranging radar that weighs 41 kg with a range of 15 km.
• British Type 956 HUDAWAC. This HUD has a built-in weapon aiming computer, hence the name
Head-Up Display and Weapon Aiming Computer.
• British Type 50-048-02 digitized air data computer.
• British Type 2032 camera gun, which is linked to HUD with capability to interchange rolls of film
while airborne.
• American converter that is over 30% more efficient in comparison to the original Chinese
converter.
• American Type 0101-HRA/2 radar altimeter with range increased to 1.5 km in comparison to
the original 0.6 km of the Chinese radar altimeter it had replaced.
• British AD-3400 secured radio with range in excess of 400 km at 1.2 km altitude.
Other improvement includes domestic newly designed CW-1002 air data sensor developed in
conjunction with the western avionics, and WP-7B/WP-7BM engine. A totally different wing enabled
the take-off and landing distance to be reduced by 20%, while increasing the aerodynamic
performance in dogfights. According to customers' claims, F-7M is nearly 40% more effective than
MiG-21 in terms of overall performance. It can use French R550 Magic and PL-7 Air-to-air missiles. It
was sold to Myanmar, Egypt, and Bangladesh in 1980s. Pakistan contribution: Although Pakistan did
not purchase any F-7M and later returned all 20 F-7Ms to China after evaluation to require China to
provide a better fighter (which eventually resulted in F-7MP/P); Pakistan did provide important
support for F-7M program. In the last quarter of 1982, test flights revealed that the radar was plagued
by the problem of picking up ground clutter. China did not have any western radar assisted air-to-
ground attack experience, and had no idea of conducting the necessary flight tests specifically designed

for the western avionics to solve the problem. Pakistani Air Force provided pilots (including F-16 pilots)
to China to perform these tests and helped in solving this problem. Chinese 630th Institute responsible
for F-7M program lacked the facility and experience to conduct live round weapon tests with advanced
western avionics, and it also lacked the capability to conduct mocked air combat with western aircraft.
Therefore from June, 1984 to September, 1984, two F-7Ms were sent to Pakistan to conduct such
tests.
F-7MB
16 F-7MB units exported to Bangladesh, with the capability to carry reconnaissance pods and operate
the equipment inside the pods from the cockpit.
F-7MF
Italian-proposed export version of the J-7MF armed with FIAR Grifo-M radar. The plan was abandoned
in favor of the FC-1/JF-17, but the aircraft was reportedly used to test the FIAR Grifo-S radar for FC-
1/JF-17. However, it is rumored that of a total 80 F-7PG ordered by Pakistan, the last 30 were switched
to the F-7MF, but this cannot be confirmed.
F-7MG
Export variant of the J-7MG, with the single piece windshield replacing the 3-piece windshield of the J-
7MG. Evolved to F-7BG. Zimbabwe bought at least 12 of these in 2004.
F-7MP
A J-7MP converted from the F-7M. 20 were delivered and are in Pakistani service. It is also known as
the F-7P Skybolt like the F-7P. The Pakistani Air Force does not distinguish the two since the only
difference was how they were produced.
F-7N
18 export F-7MP version to Iran with domestic Chinese avionics replacing the western avionics. The
radar was the SY-80 pulse Doppler radar.
F-7P
Newly built Skybolt for the Pakistani Air Force (PAF). A total of 60 were built. Starting with this model,
F-7s in the Pakistani service began to be upgraded with the Italian FIAR Grifo-Mk-II radar license
assembled by the ISO- 9002 certified Kamra avionics, Electronics and Radar Factory of the Pakistan
Aeronautical Complex (PAC). In comparison to the Grifo-7, the new radar only weighs an extra 1 kg (56
kg total), but the sector of scan was increased to ±20 degrees from the original ±10 degrees of Grifo-7.

The newer radar also had improved ECM and look-down and shoot-down capability, and can track 4
targets simultaneously while engage one of four targets tracked.
F-7PG
Export variant of the J-7PG, with the single piece windshield replacing the 3-piece windshield of the J-
7PG. Pakistan ordered a total of 80 in two batches, with 50 and 30 respectively in each. According to
the Pakistan Air Force, the performance at high altitude of the F-7PG has increased more than 83% in
comparison to the F-7P/MP. Just like the earlier Italian FIAR Grifo-Mk-II radar on F-7MP/P, the Italian
FIAR Grifo-MG radar of F-7PG will be assembled under license by the ISO - 9002 certified Kamra
avionics, Electronics and Radar Factory of the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC).
F-7W
First J-7 export model with a HUD. The smaller canopy and the small window behind it were replaced
by a larger canopy so that the small window no longer existed on J-7 models from then on. The first
customer was Jordan, but the aircraft did not enter Jordanian service, instead, ended in Iraq.
FT-7
Export version of the JJ-7. It used the domestic Chinese Type-II ejection seat, replacing the Chinese
copy of the original Soviet design, because the Soviet design was less reliable.
FT-7A
Conversion package offered to Soviet MiG-21U trainer customers such as Egypt to replace the original
Soviet-built ejection seats with Chinese built Type-II ejection seat, and a rear hinged canopy that would
be jettisoned before the ejection seat instead of the forward hinged canopy jettisoned with the
ejection seat.
FT-7B
Export version of JJ-7II, the first J-7 model to have a Martin-Baker ejection seat.
FT-7M
Trainer version of the F-7M. This is the J-7 trainer version on which HUD became standard.
FT-7P
Trainer version of the F-7MP and F-7P. Unlike most Chinese built J-7 trainers which lack radars, the FT-
7P was armed with the same radar on the single seat version and thus fully capable for combat.

FT-7PG
FT-7 trainer variant of the F-7PG for the Pakistani Air Force. The rear seat is 0.5 meter higher than the
front seat, so the periscope is eliminated.
Super-7
It did away with British upgrades to the F-7M in the mid-1980s. After a successful deal with Chinese in
the early 1980s resulting in the F-7M, the United Kingdom offered a further upgrade to improve the
performance of the F-7M by adopting either General Electric F404 or Pratt & Whitney PW 1120
turbofan engines. The radar options would include the Red Fox, a repackaged version of the Blue Fox
radar used on Sea Harrier FRS Mk 1, or the Emerson AN/APG-69. The upgrade was rejected before any
engine tests, because of the cost of the radar, exceeding the cost of the new aircraft ($2 million).
J-7 Exports Overview
Country Variants Quantity Notes
Albania F-7A 12
Egypt F-7A 90 Delivered in the early 1980s
Tanzania F-7A 16 Delivered in the early 1980s
Iraq F-7B 90 Delivered in the mid-1980s
North Korea F-7B 40 Delivered in the early 1980s
Sri Lanka
F-7BS
FT-7
4
2
Delivered in the 1990s
Sudan F-7B 22 Delivered in the 1990s
Bangladesh
F-7M
FT-7
F-7BG
FT-7BG
14
2
12
4
F-7M and FT-7 delivered in 1989;
F-7BG and FT-7BG delivered in 2006
Burma F-7M 24
Iran F-7M 18 Delivered in the mid-1980s
Burma F-7M 24
Namibia
F-7NG
FT-7NG
12 in total Delivered in 2006
Nigeria
F-7NI
FT-7NI
12 in total Delivered in 2006
Zimbabwe
F-7M
FT-7
22
2
Delivered in the late 1980s
Pakistan
F-7P Skybolt
FT-7P Skybolt
80
15
F-7P and FT-7P delivered in 1988~90
Pakistan
F-7PG
FT-7PG
57
9
F-7PG and FT-7PG delivered in 2001~02
Source: http://www.sinodefence.com December 2008.

# Issue(s) Recommended, Action(s), and Coordination with Applicant
Notes,
Action(s) Taken,
and Disposition
MiG-21 Preliminary and General Airworthiness Inspection Issues
1.
Aviation Safety (AVS)
Safety Management
System (SMS) Guidance
Use the AVS SMS guidance as part of the airworthiness certification process, as it supplements the existing
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). FAA Order VS8000.367 (May 14, 2008) and FAA Order VS8000.369
(September 30, 2008) are the basis for, but not limited to (1) identifying hazards and making or modifying
safety risk controls, which are promulgated in the form of regulations, standards, orders, directives, and
policies, and (2) issuing certificates.
Additional Information: AVS SMS is used to assess, verify, and control risks, and safety risk management is
integrated into applicable processes. Appropriate risk controls or other risk management responses are
developed and employed operationally. Safety risk management provides for initial and continuing
identification of hazards and the analysis and assessment of risk. The FAA provides risk controls through
activities such as the promulgation of regulations, standards, orders, directives, advisory circulars (AC), and
policies. The safety risk management process (1) describes the system of interest, (2) identifies the hazards,
(3) analyzes the risk, (4) assesses the risk, and (5) controls the risk. As Chris Kraft (NASA Flight Director) once
put it “the responsibility of managing risk meant that we had to understand failures and not repeat them.”
Kraft, 2001.
2. Aircraft Familiarization
Become familiar with the aircraft before initiating the certification process.
Additional Information: One of the first steps in any aircraft certification is to be familiar with the aircraft in
question. Such knowledge, including technical details, is essential in establishing a baseline as the
certification process moves forward.
3.
Preliminary Assessment
and Assistance from
Another FAA Office
Conduct a preliminary assessment of the aircraft to determine condition and general airworthiness and
determine whether assistance from another office is necessary.
Additional Information: A Manufacturing Inspection District Office (MIDO) inspector may seek Flight
Standards District Offices (FSDO) support as part of this process. Coordination between the offices may be
essential in ensuring adequate technical expertise.
4.
Condition for Safe
Operation
The FAA inspector or authorized representative of the Administrator must evaluate the overall condition of
the aircraft to determine it is in a condition for safe operation.
Additional Information: This refers to the condition of the aircraft relative to wear and deterioration. This
evaluation depends on information such as aircraft age, completeness of maintenance records, and the
overall condition of the aircraft.
5. Denial
The FAA will provide a letter to the applicant stating the reason(s) for denial and, if feasible, identify which
steps may be accomplished to meet the certification requirements if the aircraft does not meet them and the
special airworthiness certificate is denied.
Additional Information: If this should occur, a copy of the denial letter will be attached to FAA Form 8130-6
and forwarded to AFS-750, and made a part of the aircraft’s record.
6. FAA Records Review
Review the existing FAA airworthiness and registration files (EDRS) and search the Program Tracking and
Reporting Subsystem (PTRS) for safety issue(s) and incidents.
7. Aircraft Records
Request and review the applicable military and civil aircraft records, including manual, aircraft, and engine
logbooks. These must be in proper technical English.
Additional Information: There have been many “translated” documents that are in fact not acceptable.
Some of the issues are poor non-technical translation, misuse of conversion units, omitted material, and so
on. For example, as told by an experience MiG operator, when the first Chinese MiGs were introduced in the
US, operators hired “a “graduate student who agreed, for a substantial fee, to translate the manual from
Chinese to English. After the resultant translations proved to be confusing, contradictory, or just outright
nonsensical, [he] admitted that he made frequent trips to a local Chinese restaurant, manual in hand, asking
“What does this mean?” Entrekin, 2012.

Notes,
Action(s) Taken,
and Disposition
8. Aircraft Ownership
Establish and understand the aircraft’s ownership status, which sets the stage for many of the responsibilities
associated with operating the aircraft safely.
Additional Information: There are many cases where former military aircraft are leased from other entities,
and this can cloud the process. For example, if the aircraft is leased, the terms of the lease may be relevant
as part of the certification because the lease terms may restrict what can be done to the aircraft and its
operation for safety reasons.
9. Main Safety Issues
The main goal of this document is to assist the FAA in eliminating preventable accidents and those
accidents and incidents caused by well-known problems that were either not fixed operationally or require
specific mitigation to be contained. In other words, unnecessary risks must be mitigated.
Additional Information: This document addresses the following general safety concerns regarding former
military high-performance aircraft:
• Lack of consideration of inherent and known design failures;
• Several single-point failures;
• Lack of consideration for operational experience, including accident data and trends;
• Operations outside the scope of the airworthiness certificate being sought;
• Insufficient flight test requirements, and unsafe and untested modifications;
• Operations over populated areas (the safety of the non-participating public has not been properly
addressed in many cases);
• Operations from unsuitable airports;
• High-risk passenger carrying activities taking place;
• Ejection seat safety and operation not adequately addressed;
• Weak maintenance practices and engines and ignoring required inspection schedules and
procedures;
• Limited pilot qualifications, proficiency, and currency;
• Weapon-capable aircraft not being demilitarized, resulting in unsafe conditions;
• Extensive use of unqualified Designated Airworthiness Representatives (DAR);
• Accidents and serious incidents not being reported; and inadequate accident investigation data.
10.
Potential Reversion Back
to Phase I
Notify the applicant that certain modifications to the aircraft will invalidate Phase II.
Additional Information: These include: (a) structural modifications, (b) aerodynamic modifications, including
externally mounted equipment except as permitted in the limitations issued, and (c) change of engine make,
model, or power rating (thrust or horsepower). The owner/operator may return the aircraft to Phase I to
flight test specific items as required. However, major modifications such as those listed above may require
new operating limitations. Phase I may have to be expanded as well. In August 2012, the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued safety recommendations concerning a fatal accident of an
experimental high-performance aircraft that had undergone extensive modifications. The NTSB noted “the
accident airplane had undergone many structural and flight control modifications that were undocumented
and for which no flight testing or analysis had been performed to assess their effects on the airplane’s
structural strength, performance, or flight characteristics. The investigation determined that some of these
modifications had undesirable effects. For example, the use of a single, controllable elevator trim tab
(installed on the left elevator) increased the aerodynamic load on the left trim tab (compared to a stock
airplane, which has a controllable tab on each elevator). Also, filler material on the elevator trim tabs (both
the controllable left tab and the fixed right tab) increased the potential for flutter because it increased the
weight of the tabs and moved their center of gravity aft, and modifications to the elevator counterweights
and inertia weight made the airplane more sensitive in pitch control. It is likely that, had engineering
evaluations and diligent flight testing for the modifications been performed, many of the airplane’s
undesirable structural and control characteristics could have been identified and corrected.” As part of the
probable cause, the NTSB stated that “contributing to the accident were the undocumented and untested
major modifications to the airplane and the pilot’s operation of the airplane in the unique air racing
environment without adequate flight testing.” As a result of this investigation, the NTSB issued safety
recommendations, including requiring “aircraft owners to provide an engineering evaluation that includes
flight demonstrations and analysis within the anticipated flight envelope for aircraft with any major
modification, such as to the structure or flight controls.” See Modifications and Phase I Flight Testing below.

Notes,
Action(s) Taken,
and Disposition
11.
Identify Aircraft Version
and Sub-Variants
Identify the series of the aircraft in question. There will be differences among and between the different
series of the aircraft. These differences and their impact on the airworthiness of the aircraft are discussed
throughout this document. Differences in designations are also an issue.
Additional Information: For example, MiG-21 built in Czechoslovakia (about 200 were built) were designed S-
106s. Chinese MiG-21s carry the designation J-7 or F-7. The MiG-21 was produced in three different
factories, Gorky (MiG-21F; MiG-21F-13; MiG-21PF; MiG-21PFL; MiG-21PFS/PFM; MiG-21R; MiG-21S/SN; MiG-
21SM; MiG-21SMT; MiG-21bis; MiG-21MF,) Moscow (MiG-21U; MiG-21PF; MiG-21FL; MiG-21M; MiG-21MT,)
and Tbilisi (MiG-21; MiG-21F; MiG-21U; MiG-21US; MiG-21UM.) There were also MiG-21F-13s built under
license in Czechoslovakia along with MiG-21FL, MiG-21M and MiG-21bis built in India under license. The
Chinese Jian-7 (J-7) and the export versions F-7 may be mistaken as a MiG-21. The Soviet Union provided
China with some of the MiG-21 design and the balance of the design was reverse engineered.
12.
Soviet/Russian
Manufacturer(s)
Although the MiG-21 was designed by the Mikoyan-Gurevich Design Bureau (and built by related production
facilities), and for many years, MiG could be designated as the manufacturer, since the fall of the Soviet
Union, there have been significant changes in Russia with regards to the ownership of the “MiG” aircraft
manufacturer. As such, it impacts the MiG-21 and the operator’s ability to support the aircraft.
Additional Information: The most current designation for the MiG-21 manufacturer would be Russian Aircraft
Corporation MiG (RAC-MiG). Previous names, many used in the 1990s and 2000s, include Moscow Aircraft
Production Organization (MAPO), and Military Industrial Group-MAPO (MiG-MAPO). As a result, depending
on the aircraft, and the circumstances, the “manufacturer” will be MiG, but the designation may change
depending on the reference and timeline. Also, because some MiG-21s were manufactured in
Czechoslovakia, references to its Czech manufacturer may still be found.
13. Chinese Manufacturer(s)
In all cases, all Chinese “MiG-21s,” the J-7 and F-7, are not covered by the Soviet or Russian manufacturer.
In those cases, the manufacturer is Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corp (CAC). A previous designation would be
the Shenyang Aircraft Factory. Another possible designation (from the 1980s) that maybe be used as a
manufacturer representative is CATIC or China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation.
Additional Information: Note: JJ-7s, a dual-seat J-7 trainer and Chinese equivalent of the MiG-21U Mongol-
A, was also built by Guizhou Aircraft Design Institute and Guizhou Aircraft Company (now Guizhou Aviation
Industry Group/GAIC).
14.
Major Structural
Components
Ask the applicant to identify and document the origin, condition, and traceability of major structural
components. This is one of the earlier steps in assessing the level or restoration and hence, airworthiness.
15.
Data Plate, Block Number
and Serial Number
Verify the Soviet military identification plate is installed, and a translation available. Record all information
contained on the identification plate, such manufacturing date, block number, and serial number.
16. FAA Form 8100-1
Use FAA Form 8100-1 to document the airworthiness inspection. Using this form facilitates the listing of
relevant items to be considered, those items’ nomenclature, any reference (that is, NATO manual; FAA Order
8130.2, regulations, etc.) revision, satisfactory or unsatisfactory notes, and comments.
Additional Information: Items to be listed include but are not limited to—
1. FAA Form 8130-6; FAA Form 8050-1;
2. 14 CFR § 21.193; 14 CFR § 45.11(a); 14 CFR § 91.205;
3. FAA Order 8130.2, paragraphs 4002a(7) and (10), 4002b(5), 4002b(6), 4002b(8), 4111c, and 4112a (2);
4. 14 CFR § 91.417(a)(2)(i), airframe records and total time, overhaul; and
5. 14 CFR § 91.411/91.413, altimeter, transponder, altitude reporting, static system test.
17.
FAA/NTSB Accident and
Incident Data System
Review the NTSB accident database and the FAA’s Accident and Incident Data System for the aircraft type
accidents and incidents. Refer to http://ntsb.gov and http://www.asias.faa.gov.
18.
Accident, Incident
Histories, and Risk Factors
Ask the applicant to provide any data concerning all accidents and/or incidents involving the aircraft.
Additional Information: It is important to look at incidents and evaluate risks even when they are not clearly
illustrated by accident data. The Indian Air Force operational experience with high-performance fighters
shows that for every single fatal accident, there are 10 non-fatal accidents preceded by 30 reportable
incidents which were further preceded by 600 unreported, unsafe acts. In other words, considering only
accident data in evaluating safe operations is insufficient since much of the critical safety data mentioned
above, including accidents precursors, is not considered... See Reporting Malfunctions and Defects below.

Notes,
Action(s) Taken,
and Disposition
19. PTRS Entries
If the applicant reports malfunctions and defects, make a PTRS entry accordingly. See Reporting
Malfunctions and Defects below.
20. Airframe and Engine Data
Ask applicants to provide the following:
• Airframe: import country (if applicable), N-Number, manufacture year and serial number, and
airframe time and airframe cycles.
• Engine: type and variant, manufacture date and serial number, and overhaul data, location,
provider, and engine time and cycles.
Additional Information: Properly identifying the relevant and basic characteristics of the airframe and the
engine are necessary to address the safety issues with the aircraft. The following excerpt from an NTSB
report on a former military jet accident illustrates the seriousness of adequate records: “On May 15, 2005, a
British Aircraft Corporation 167 Strike Master MK 83, N399WH, registered to DTK Aviation, Inc., collided with
a fence during an aborted takeoff from Boca Raton Airport, Boca Raton, Florida. The airplane was
substantially damaged and the commercial-rated pilot and passenger sustained minor injuries. The pilot
initially stated he performed a preflight inspection of the aircraft which included a flight control continuity
check. He had the passenger disable the gust lock for the flight controls. He performed a flight control
continuity check before taxiing onto the runway for takeoff; no discrepancies were reported. The takeoff roll
commenced and at the calculated rotation speed (70 knots), he ‘...began to apply pressure to stick and
noticed an unusual amount of load on the controls. I made a quick trim adjustment to ensure that the forces
on the stick were not the results of aerodynamic loads. When the trim changes yielded no change, I initiated
an abort (at approximately Vr at 80 knots) by retarding the throttle, extending the speed brakes, and
applying the wheel brakes.’ He notified the tower of the situation, briefed the passenger, and raised the
flaps. He also opened the canopy after realizing that he was unable to stop on the runway. The airplane
traveled off the end of the runway, rolled through a fence and came to rest upright. The pilot also stated
that the airplane is kept outside on the ramp at the Boca Raton Airport. Examination of the airplane by an
FAA operations inspector before recovery revealed the control column would only move aft between 1/4 and
1/2 inch. No determination was made as to the position of the control lock in the cockpit. Examination of
the airplane following recovery by an FAA airworthiness inspector revealed that the elevator was free to
travel through the full range but was noted to be ‘...very stiff.’ Additionally, the rudder was ‘...extremely
hard to move in either direction.” During movement of the elevator flight control surface, the rudder flight
control surface was noted to move, and with movement of the rudder flight control surface, the elevator
flight control surface was noted to move. A review of a United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority (U.K. CAA)
Mandatory Permit Directive (MPD) No. 2002-001 R1, issued on January 16, 2003, indicates “partial binding or
complete seizure of the elevator/rudder concentric torque tube bearings causing an interconnect between
elevator and rudder control systems. This interconnection has resulted in un-commanded rudder movement
with the application of elevator control inputs and vice versa. Investigation has determined that bearing
seizure was due to inadequate lubrication and water ingress in the elevator torque tube bearings. Aircraft
subject to external storage are particularly prone to this occurrence. A review of the airplane maintenance
records revealed the airplane was last inspection on June 29,2004, in accordance with, ‘...the scope and
detail of the inspection program approved by the FSDO for BAC Strikemaster dated June 29, 2001, and found
it to be in safe operating condition at this time.’ The logbook entry does not indicate airplane total time;
therefore, the time since the inspection was not determined. There was no record that U.K. CAA MPD No.
2002-001 R1 had been complied with.”
21. Functionality Check(s)
Ask the applicant to prepare the aircraft for flight, including all preflight tasks, startup, run-up, and taxi. The
procedures and technical guidance issued for the aircraft must be used. A MiG-21 should not be found to be
in a condition for safe flight unless, at the very least, the basic functionality of the aircraft, engine, systems,
and ground support can be verified.
Additional Information: The reason for this is that in an aircraft like the MiG-21, the airworthiness of the
aircraft cannot be ascertained simply by records review. The applicant should demonstrate that the aircraft
is functional, and adequate pre-flight and post-flight support is provided. There are also engine specific
procedures developed by operational units. For example, under Soviet guidance, the Egyptian Air force ran
the R-11 engine on their MiG-21F-13s because “if the engines were not powered up early every morning, it
[the aircraft] tended to develop technical problems…” Cooper, Arab MiG-21, 2012.
22. Chinese JL-9/JJ-7B Aircraft
If the aircraft in question is a Chinese JL-9/JJ-7B aircraft, the guidance in this document is incomplete and
further coordination with AIR-230 is necessary. This development of the J-7 is far too advanced/different.

Notes,
Action(s) Taken,
and Disposition
23.
Adequate Manuals and
Related Documentation
Ensure the existence of a complete set of the applicable MiG-21 manuals, such as flight manuals, inspections
and maintenance manuals, and engine manuals. These must be in English.
Additional Information: Typically, this may involve over 100 such documents. An operator also needs to
have the applicable technical guidance, equivalent to USAF Technical Orders (T.O.) to address known issues
related to airworthiness, maintenance, and servicing. The owner/operator is responsible for having
complete list of all MiG-21 manuals [technical orders, maintenance manuals, parts catalogues, engine
manuals, inspection schedules, flight manual(s), and checklists] with revisions if available, and ensuring they
are added and properly referenced in any inspection program and operating guidance. Documentation
must be provided in English. This is critical because (1) factory manuals are very ambiguous, and (2) many
poorly translated documents are in circulation. Many earlier translations of Soviet military aircraft are
inadequate and crude. Note: It is incorrect to assume that all MiG-21 manuals are interchangeable.
Although the aircraft are similar in design, from a systems standpoint, and even from a flight characteristics
perspective, there may be differences that have to be properly addressed. Examples include:
• MiG-21bis Operating Instructions, Aircraft, and Systems;
 Book I – Airframe and Systems; Book II – Aircraft Armament;
 Book III – Radio and Radar Equipment; Book IV – Aviation Equipment;
 Book V – Ground Maintenance Equipment and Tools;
• MiG-21bis Technical Description Manuals;
• MiG-21 Technical Description, Part I, Books 1-5; MiG-21 Technical Description, Part II, Books 1-4;
• MiG-21 Technical Description, Part IV, Books 2-5; MiG-21 Maintenance Schedule, Part I- IV;
• MiG-21 Operation & Maintenance Instruction RK333, Books III & IV;
• MiG-21bis Pilot's Flight Operating Instructions;
• MiG-21 Type 69, Pilot Flight Operating Manual;
• MiG-21 UB Pilot’s Flight Operating Instructions, 1975 (USAF Translation);
• MiG-21-F-13, Flight Manual, 1963; MiG-21 (L-17) Flight Manual, Yugoslav Air Force, 1979;
• MiG-21UM (NL-16) Flight Manual, Yugoslav Air Force, 1980;
• MiG-21R, Tactical Manual, Polish Air Force, 1978;
• R-11F-F2K-300 Operations & Maintenance Instructions (several books);
• Самолёт МиГ-21УМ с двигателем Р11Ф2С-300, 1975;
• Type 69 plane - Illustrated Catalog of Details (Illustrated Parts Catalogue) - Book, 1974;
• DDR Luftstreitkräfte (East German Air Force) DV-432/4a MiG-21PF Manual, 1966;
24. Safety Discretion
The field inspector may add any requirements necessary for safety. As provided in statute, under existing
regulations and policies, FAA aviation safety inspectors have discretion to address any safety issue that may
be encountered, whether or not it is included in the job aid.
Additional Information: Of course, in all cases, there should be justification for adding requirements. In this
respect, the job aid provides a certain level of standardization to achieve this, and in addition, AIR-200 is
available to coordinate a review (with AFS-800 and AFS-300) of any proposed limitations an inspector may
consider adding or changing. 49 U.S.C. § 44704 states that before issuing an airworthiness certificate, the
FAA will find that the aircraft is in condition for safe operation. In issuing the airworthiness certificate, the
FAA may include terms required in the interest of safety. This is supported by case law. 14 CFR § 21.193,
Experimental Certificates: General requires information from an applicant, including, “upon inspection of the
aircraft, any pertinent information found necessary by the Administrator to safeguard the general public.”
14 CFR § 91.319 Aircraft Having Experimental Certificates: Operating provides “the Administrator may
prescribe additional limitations that the Administrator considers necessary, including limitations on the
persons that may be carried in the aircraft.” Finally, FAA Order 8130.2, chapter 4, Special Airworthiness
Certification, effective April 16, 2011, also states the FAA may impose any additional limitations deemed
necessary in the interest of safety.
25. MiG-21 NATO Guidance
Verify that the maintenance and operation of the MiG-21 is based on NATO standards to the maximum
possible extent.
Additional Information: This is important because those standards mirror the USAF standards, and therefore,
are acceptable to the FAA as a safety baseline. The MiG-21 is still in service with the NATO countries,
Bulgaria, Croatia (to be retired by the end of 2013,) and Romania. Former NATO operators include Czech
Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. See Romanian MiG-21 Lancer below.

Notes,
Action(s) Taken,
and Disposition
26. MiG-21 USAF Guidance
Ensure the applicant uses all of the relevant USAF technical and operational guidance that was declassified
concerning the use of MiG-21 aircraft by the USAF between 1979 and 1988. This provides an acceptable
baseline for the FAA and complements NATO guidance. See Project Have Doughnut Evaluation below.
27.
Finnish Air Force (FAF)
MiG-21 Guidance
Although in this document NATO or USAF guidance concerning the MiG-21 is considered acceptable,
technical and/or operational guidance used by the Finnish Air Force (FAF) when it operated MiG-21 (single-
seat MiG-21F, MiG-21bis, and UB and UM two-seaters) is also acceptable.
Additional Information: This is because of the high level of expertise inherent with that organization and
operational history with the aircraft in 35 years of operations, ending in March of 1998. For all intended
purposes, it would be equivalent to NATO standards, and thus provides an acceptable baseline for the FAA.
In addition, many of the Finnish AF MiG-21 had Western cockpit instrumentation, in some cases similar to
the Hawk Mk. 51.
28. Luftwaffe Guidance
Because the German Air Force evaluated the MiG-21 after re-unification in 1990, some of MiG-21 technical
and operational guidance may be acceptable and acceptable to the FAA.
Additional Information: About 250 MiG-21s were transferred to the Luftwaffe after reunification but the
type was not accepted as a standard type and they were rapidly phased-out.
29.
Ex-Nigerian Air Force
MiG-21s
Ask whether the aircraft are Ex-Nigerian AF MiG-21s. If so, caution is required in the certification of these
aircraft because of their past history. If certification is considered, additional requirements beyond the scope
of this document may be necessary.
Additional Information: Nigerian acquired 25 MiG-21MF and 6 MiG-21U from the USSR in 1975. However,
these aircraft were, from the start, not properly maintained and supported. Many have not flown in over 20
years and were, for the most part, stored outdoors in tropical conditions (Makurdi Air base). As stated by the
Nigerian Air Force in 2007, “most of our platforms were grounded…and many of our maintenance facilities
became dilapidated.” Many have not been “serviced in decades...” Martin, 2012. Note: As of late 2012, 25
Ex-Nigerian Air Force MiG-21s have been for sale.
30.
Ex-Serbia and
Montenegro Air Force
MiG-21s
Ask whether the aircraft are Ex-Serbia (and Yugoslavia) and Montenegro (since 2006, independent from
Serbia) MiG-21s, locally designated as L-17s. If so, ask for the aircraft’s documentation. Caution is advised.
Many of these aircraft have been in open storage since 1998, expired life-limits, and are in poor condition.
Additional Information: Only a handful (possibly 3) of aircraft was reported operational in September 2007.
31.
Ex-Kyrgyz Air Force
MiG-21s
Ask whether the aircraft are ex-Kyrgyz Air Force MiG-21bis and MiG-21UM. If so, ask for the aircraft’s
documentation. Caution is advised since these aircraft may have been in open storage at Kant Air Base since
1991 and photographic evidence in 2003-2004 showed condition as questionable.
32. Ex-Albanian Air Force F-7
Ask whether the aircraft are ex-Albanian Air Force early Chinese F-7As. If so, ask for the aircraft’s
documentation. Caution is advised since only a handful of these aircraft (about 5), which were retired in
2005, may be in a relatively fair condition and be low-time airframes (400-600 hours or so).
33.
Ex-Slovakian Air Force
MiG-21
Ask whether the aircraft are ex-Slovakian Air Force MiG-21s. If so, ask for the aircraft’s documentation.
Although these aircraft were adequately maintained, the fact that they were retired in December 2002 (and
some offered for sale at scarp value), and storage is questionable (outdoors), caution is advised.
34.
Ex-Mongolian Air Force
MiG-21
Ask whether the aircraft are ex-Mongolian Air Force MiG-21s (MiG-21PFM/Lim. If so, ask for the aircraft’s
documentation. These aircraft are likely not in good condition since they were retired in 1993, although
some reports state the aircraft ere mothballed, but this has not been confirmed.
35.
IAI/Lahav Division
Upgrades
Although not produced en masse, (i.e., 8 aircraft upgrades for Zambia in 2000) upgrades by IAI/Lahav Division
on the MiG-21-2000 project may be considered if properly documented and data available. The reason for
this is that many of the upgrades to the aircraft met Western standards and may be relevant in some cases.
Additional Information: Specifically, the IAI/ Lahav's MiG-21 upgrade is based on the integration of an
advanced Western avionics system and IAI/Elta's Fire Control Radar. It includes a reconfigured "Glass
Cockpit" with new color displays and mission-driven operational modes that increase situational awareness
and reduce pilot workload. The new avionics equipment for the MiG-21 includes a Mission and Display
Processor (MPD), Head Up Display (HUD), Multi-Function Displays (MFDs), HOTAS, navigation sensors, Data
Transfer System (DTS), and radio and communication systems. See http://www.iai.co.il.

Notes,
Action(s) Taken,
and Disposition
36.
Ex-Afghanistan Air Force
MiG-21s
Ask whether the aircraft are ex-Afghanistan Air Force MiG-21s. If so, ask for the aircraft’s documentation.
Caution is advised since these aircraft have been extensively damaged and capability in terms of being
restored is questionable.
37.
Chinese J-7/F-7 Versions
and Variants
Ask whether the aircraft is a Chinese J-7 variant. This is extremely important because much of the Soviet
MiG-21 guidance may not apply to Chinese versions and variants. If this is the case, all of the relevant
documentation must be specific to the Chinese versions and variants and must be in English.
Additional Information: The J-7/F-7 is essentially an updated Chinese-manufactured MiG-21. Many late
model J-7/F-7s use of Western avionics. Chengdu F-7P aircraft are powered by a single Wopen WP-7B
afterburning turbojet producing 59.8 kN (13,460 lb. thrust). This engine is a copy of the Soviet Tumansky R-
11 found in early production MiG-21s. Note: Although as of 2005, the PLAAF was still operating early J-7As,
some have been sold to civilian buyers, including some in the US.
Soviet MiG-21 vs. Chinese J/7F-7
CATEGORY MiG-21 Fishbed (1956) Chengdu F-7(1966)
Unit cost in USD millions 3-10 2-3
Fuel economy in NM/g 1,42 1,21
Fuel tank capacity in liters 2600 2600
Fuel tank capacity in gallon 686 686
Range on internal fuel in NM 853,2 723,6
Powerplant/Engines 1 × Tumansky R-11F-300 1 × Liyang Wopen-13F
Dry thrust in kN 1 x 37 2 x 44
Dry thrust in lb. 1 x 8380 2 x 9500
Afterburner in lb. 1 x 12650 2 x 14500
Max. Speed in Mach 2,05 2,00
Max. Speed in mph 1560 1522
Minimal thrust/weight ratio 0,66 0,65
Normal thrust/weight ratio 0,75 0,77
Maximal thrust/weight ratio 1,03 1,02
Overall length in ft. 51,69 48,54
Wingspan in meters 7,15 8,32
Height in ft. 13,45 13,48
Wing area in sq. ft. 247,48 267,71
Empty weight in kg 4870 5200
Empty weight in lb. 10714 11440
Maximal take-off weight in kg 9400 9100
Maximal take-off weight in lb. 20680 20020
Maximal wing-loading in kg/m2
409 408
Rate of climb in ft./min 35,442 35,442
Source: http://www.kamov.net/versus/mig-21-vs-f-7/.
38.
Ex-Cambodian Air Force
MiG-21
Ask whether the aircraft are Ex-Cambodian AF MiG-21s. If so, caution is required in the certification of these
aircraft because of their past history. If certification is considered, additional requirements beyond the scope
of this document may be necessary. Verify whether the aircraft were upgraded and overhauled in 2000.
Additional Information: Nineteen second-hand MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75B) and three MiG-21UMs delivered
from the USSR in 1982, as well as three MiG-21UMs from Bulgaria in the same year. Although in the later
1990s, there are plans to modernize these in Israel to the MiG-21-2000 standard, it would appear that only
one MiG-21bis and one MiG-21UM have been rebuilt to MiG-21-2000 standard and returned to Cambodia.
This effectively means that in all likelihood any MiG-21s potentially sold in the civil market would be relics
(the non-upgraded aircraft), not operational aircraft.
39.
Ex-Egyptian Air Force
MiG-21/F-7
As whether the aircraft are Ex-Egyptian AF MiG-21s or F-7s. If so, caution is recommended as part of
certification of these aircraft.
Additional Information: This is because the Egyptian AF does not have a traditional history of disposing of
equipment to civil operators, especially equipment that it still has in service. Both MiG-21s (MiG-21UM and
MiG-21MF as of 2006) were and F-7s (2013) are still in operational use. In addition, the records should
disclose the reason for disposal, i.e., accident history, life-limit expiration. This will likely be relevant as part
of the certification process.

Notes,
Action(s) Taken,
and Disposition
40. Ex-Georgian MiG-21s
Ask whether the aircraft are ex-Georgian MiG-21s, likely, MiG-21UMs. If so, ask for the aircraft’s
documentation, in English. Although these aircraft may have been overhauled in 2000 by TAM
(TbilAviaMsheni) Aircraft Plant, caution is advised because there did not entered service with the Georgian
AF and there is no information that they were kept operational since.
41.
Ex-Congo Air Force
MiG-21
Ask whether the aircraft are ex-Congolese Air Force MiG-21s (MiG-21PF, MiG-21US). If so, ask for the
aircraft’s documentation. These aircraft are likely not in good condition since they may not have been
operational since 1997 and stored outdoors.
42.
Ex-Romanian Air Force
MiG-21s
Ask whether the aircraft are ex-Romanian Air Force MiG-21R, MiG-21U, or MiG-21PFM, and whether they
were not upgraded to the Lancer standard. See Romanian MiG-21 Lancer (General) below. If they were not,
ask for the aircraft’s documentation, in English. Caution is advised since these aircraft have been in open
storage at Craiova, Romania, since 1992-2000 and their condition is questionable. The condition of these
aircraft will not be the same as those of aircraft upgraded to the Lancer standard. Note: Although there are
some indications that some of the ex-Romanian AF MiG-21s at Craiova were scrapped after storage, this
cannot be confirmed for all of them, and thus some may have been sold or may be still be available.
43.
Romanian MiG-21 Lancer
(General)
Ask the applicant whether the MiG-21 being certificated is an Ex-Romanian AF MiG-21 Lancer, also known as
a MLU or Mid-Life Upgrade for the MiG-21. Lancer is an upgrade program for MiG-21 Fishbed fighter for the
Romanian Air Force. In addition to being operational with NATO, the aircraft incorporates many
improvements over the stock Soviet type, and its condition will certainly be superior to other MiG-21 types.
It is for all intended purposes, a much more modern aircraft than older Soviet-era MiG-21s, and as such,
more complex in terms of avionics and related systems. Stock MiG-21 guidance that is used for previous and
earlier Soviet MiG-21s may not likely be acceptable for the maintenance of these aircraft.
Additional Information: The Lancer upgrade program(s) was conducted by the Romanian company
AEROSTAR S.A. and ELBIT SYSTEM Ltd. from Israel, and three versions are being built:
- Lancer A - Air to Ground version – single-seaters;
- Lancer B - Air to Ground version – two-seaters;
- Lancer C - Air to Air version – single-seaters;
The MiG-21 Lancer upgrade provides modem combat capabilities and effective service life. Modifications
have been introduced to the cockpit configuration, avionics architecture, and weapons systems, enabling the
MiG-21 Lancer to compete with much costlier fighters and to make the transition to Western standards. The
upgrade program keeps the existing airframe, which was retrofitted with an avionics suite and new weapons
integrated around two MIL STD 1553B multiplex data buses. It includes a complete upgrade of the electrical
system as well. To illustrate the aircraft’s higher level of complexity, the Lancer’s systems include:
• Modular Multi-Role Computer; Elbit 1553B bus; Display and Sight Helmet – DASH; Head Up
Display - Elop 921; Multi-Function Display 5x5 in.; Multifunction Color Display 5x5 in.;
• Hybrid Navigation System - LISA-4000 EB; ILS/VOR/DME; Air data computer - Marconi ADC;
• Hopping frequency VHF/ UHF radio - ACR 435; VHF/ UHF radio - ACR 430;
• Radar Warning Receiver - Elisra SPS-20; Chaff and flare dispensers - TAAS/IMI;
• Range radar Elta EL/M 2001 B (Lancer A/B);
• Multi-Mode Radar - Elta EL/M 2032, with look-down / shoot-down capability (Lancer C);
• Data Transfer System - DTS; Flight data recorder - SAIMS;
• IFF transponder - Plessey (NATO Mk.-10 IFF compatible); Stores Management System; HOTAS;
• Electronic Countermeasure Pod - Elta EL/L-8222R; Laser Designation Pod - Rafael Litening LDP;
• Photo Reconnaissance Pod - Elbit/Aerostar Airborne Reconnaissance Pod – ARP ;
• Smart weapons - Rafael Griffin laser guided bomb (LGB), Lizard LGB and OPHER - IR guided bomb;
• Dumb bombs and cluster bombs - Mk-82, Mk-83, FAB-100, FAB-250, FAB-500, BEM-100, CL-250;
• Air to Air missiles: R-73, R-60, R-3S, R-13R (semi-active), K-13M (infrared), R-13M, Magic II and
Python-3; Unguided rockets : S-5 M/K, carried in UB-16-57; UB-32-57 rocket launchers and; Single
large caliber rockets S-24;
The “MiG-21 Lancer was the world's first widely used operational aircraft which incorporated the HMD
(Helmet Mounted Display System) since 1995 in active service. Also, the MiG-21 Lancer was the first aircraft
in the world to operate weapon pylons which are capable of use both Eastern as well as Western military
equipment, bombs and missiles.” http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread116620/pg1. See Ex-
Romanian MiG-21 Lancer below.

Notes,
Action(s) Taken,
and Disposition
44.
Applicable Publications
Manual
Review the aircraft inspection program (AIP) to verify compliance whether there is a current version of the
applicable publications manuals or equivalent document.
45.
Applicant/Operator
Capabilities
Review the applicant/operator’s capabilities, general condition of working/storage areas, availability of spare
parts, and equipment.
46.
Scope and Qualifications
for Restoration, Repairs,
and Maintenance
Familiarize yourself with the scope of the restoration, repairs, and maintenance conducted by or for the
applicant.
47.
Limiting Duration
of Certificate
Refer to § 21.181 and FAA Order 8130.2, regarding the duration of certificates, which may be limited.
Additional Information: An example would be to permit operations for a period of time to allow the
implementation of a corrective action or changes in limitations. In addition, an ASI may limit the duration if
there is evidence additional operational requirements may be needed at a later date.
48.
Compliance With
§ 91.319(a)(1)
Inform the operator that the aircraft is limited under this regulation. The aircraft cannot be operated for any
purpose other than the purpose for which the certificate was issued.
Additional Information: For example, in the case of an experimental exhibition certificate, the certificate can
be used for air show demonstrations, proficiency flights, and flights to and from locations where the
maintenance can be performed. Such a certificate is NOT IN EFFECT for flights related to providing military
services (that is, air-to-air gunnery, target towing, electronic countermeasures (ECM) simulation, cruise missile
simulation, and air refueling). Also refer to Military/Public Aircraft Operations below.
49. Multiple Certificates
Ensure the applicant submits information describing how the aircraft configuration is changed from one to the
other in those cases involving multiple airworthiness certificates.
Additional Information: This is important because, for example, some research, and development (R&D)
activities may involve equipment that must be removed to revert back to the exhibition configuration (refer to
R&D Airworthiness Certification below). Moreover, the procedures should provide for any additional
requirement(s), such as additional inspections, to address situations such as high-G maneuvering that could
impact the aircraft and/or its operating limitations. Similarly, it should address removing R&D equipment that
could be considered part of a weapon system (refer to Demilitarization below). All applications for an R&D
certificate must adhere to FAA Order 8130.29, Issuance of a Special Airworthiness Certificate for Show
Compliance and/or Research and Development Flight Testing.
50.
Public Aircraft Operations,
State Aircraft Operations,
Military Support Missions,
DOD Contracts
The special airworthiness certificate and attached operating limitations for this aircraft are not in effect during
public aircraft operations (PAO) as defined by Title 49 of the United States Code (49 U.S.C.) §§ 40102 and
40125.
Additional Information: FAA issued airworthiness certificates are not in effect during state aircraft operations,
typically military support missions, or military contracts. Aircraft used in military services are deemed state
aircraft. Also refer to Operations Overseas below. The 1999 accident of MiG-21US N9242N is a good example
of the need to keep civil and military purposes separate: “Privately-owned MiG-21US N9242N broke up in the
mid-air on August 24, 1998, killing the pilot, Doug Schultz, and his passenger. The aircraft was engaged in
radar-tracking exercises with a Canadian warship off the coast of Vancouver, Canada. Working on contract
with the Canadian military forces, the MiG had regularly participated in military training exercises, as well as
performing at airshows.” Fatal MiG Accident, 1999. As an example, the following media release illustrates the
intent of several operators to conduct military support missions: “The transaction includes the advanced
training version of the MiG-21, the MiG-21UM, as well as the front-line interceptor, the MiG-21BIS. This
acquisition adds to the company’s already expansive and highly capable fleet of fighter aircraft. Draken
intends to operate these aircraft in conjunction with the Department of Defense for missile threat simulation,
fleet defense, and adversary support. These MiG-21s, equipped with Jay Bird radar, will present a more
tactically relevant threat than the present older generation aircraft being offered in the Contract Air Services
arena. Similarly, with over 25 operational and highly supportable fighters, Draken will be able to present a
cost effective and large quantity fighter environment for various branches of the armed services and
Department of Defense. Draken International…, “Draken is committed to building the most capable fleet of
aircraft and we have made some tremendous acquisitions to accomplish this goal.”
ttp://drakenintl.com/news-3#more-101.

Notes,
Action(s) Taken,
and Disposition
51.
Re-Conforming to Civil
Certificate
Following a public, state, or military aircraft operation, ensure the aircraft is returned, via an approved
method, to the condition and configuration at the time of airworthiness certification.
Additional Information: This action must be documented in a log or daily flight sheet. Ensure the applicant
submits information describing how the aircraft configuration is changed from PAO, state aircraft, or other
non-civil classification or activity back to a civil certificate. This is important because, for example, some
military support activities may involve equipment or maneuvers that must be removed or mitigated to revert
back to original Exhibition or R&D configuration. The procedures should provide for any additional
requirement(s), such as additional inspections, to address situations such as high-G maneuvering and
sustained Gs that could have an impact on the aircraft and/or its operating limitations. Similarly, it should
address removing equipment that could be considered part of a weapon system. See Demilitarization below.
52.
R&D Airworthiness
Certification
R&D certification requires a specific project. A R&D airworthiness certificate should not be issued based on
the applicant’s intention to possibly conduct unspecified R&D projects in the future.
Additional Information: Ensure the applicant provides detailed information such as— (1) description of each
R&D project providing enough detail to demonstrate it meets the regulatory requirements of § 21.191(a); (2)
length of each project; (3) intended aircraft utilization, including the number of flights and/or flight hours for
each project; (4) aircraft configuration; (5) area of operation for each project; (6) coordination with foreign
CAA, if applicable; and (7)contact information for the person/customer that may be contacted to verify this
activity. Note: All applications for an R&D certificate should include review of FAA Order 8130.29.
53. Temporary Extensions
The certification process using an aircraft-specific job aid (such as this one) allows for the field offices to
consider temporary extensions of existing airworthiness certificates, as appropriate.
Additional Information: This will enable AIR-200 to complete drafting the aircraft-specific job aid and allow
the field inspector(s) and the applicant additional time to complete a full review with the job aid. Field
inspectors are cautioned when issuing a temporary extension to ensure any safety issues they believe need to
be addressed and corrected are mitigated as part of this process. FAA Headquarters (AIR-200, AFS-800, and
AFS-300) will assist with any questions concerning issues affecting the aircraft.
54. Demilitarization
Verify the aircraft has been adequately demilitarized. This aircraft must remain demilitarized for all civil
operations. Refer to the applicable technical guidance. A weapon, a weapon system, and related equipment
can create safety of flight hazards under the jurisdiction of the FAA and must be removed. Demilitarized is not
just the removal of the weapon(s), but also many related systems and components.
Additional Information: Removal of the NR-30 or GSh-23L cannon alone does not suffice. Other systems
include: gun sight, pylons and wiring (in the case of wiring, the firing circuitry must not have any continuity to
it), radar (made INOP), chaff, flares or practice bombs, ECM/Jamming gear, firing control (armament) panel(s),
switches and triggers, and combing computers and systems. Some of the specific MiG-21 weapons system,
depending on the model include:
• RP-22S Saphir “Jay Bird;” SRD-5MN Baza-6 radar rangefinder;
• ASP-5NV-U1 computing gun sight; ASP-PFD-21 gun sight;
•Missile rack and rails: APU-7; APU-13; APU-13M1; APU-28; APU-68 rails; BDZ-60-21R pylons;
• MDB-2-67 multiple ejector rack; BD3-66-21N special weapon rack; GP-9 gun pod;
• UB-16-57 rocket launchers; UB-32 rocket launchers; SPS-141 ECM pod;
• R-3S, R-3R, RS-2, RS-2US, R-13M, R-55, K-13, and R-60 missiles;
• Matra R. 550, AIM-9P (French and US missiles); PL-2, PL-5, and PL-7 (on Chinese J-7/F-7);
• Ch-66, S-21, S-24, and S-5 rockets; FAB-100; FAB-250 bombs; ZB-360 napalm tank.
• OFAB-250-270 He/fragmentation bombs; M-5 bomb; UZR-60 pod (AA-8) training round):
• BVP-60-26 chaff/flare dispenser; Type 941-4C chaff and flare dispenser (Chinese);
With these systems, there are many safety issues that can preclude a finding of “condition for safe operation,”
and “protecting people and property on the ground,” as required by statute and regulations. These safety
issues include accidental firing, compartment fires, inadvertent discharge of flares, toxic chaff, electrical
overloads of the aircraft electric system, danger of inadvertent release, structural damage to the aircraft,
complex flight limitations, and harmful emissions. Note: Some of these weapon systems could be permitted
for a R&D airworthiness certificate, but the related safety issues still have to be addressed, especially if the
aircraft reverts back to an exhibition certificate. TO 00-80G-1, Make Safe Procedures for Public Static Display,
dated November 30, 2002, can be used as a reference as well. Also see SME and 22 CFR § 121.3 below.

Notes,
Action(s) Taken,
and Disposition
55. SME
The following (non-inclusive) is identified as "significant military equipment (SME)" in Category VIII of the U.S.
Munitions List [22 CFR 121] of the International Traffic In Arms Regulations [22 CFR 120-130] and considered
"sensitive."
Additional Information:
SME - Aircraft bearing an original military designation specifically designed, modified, or equipped for military
purposes, including demilitarized aircraft, such as:
• Gunnery & Bombing;
• Rocket or Missile Launching;
• Electronic or Other Surveillance;
• Reconnaissance & Aerial Mapping;
• Airborne Warning and Control;
SME - Cartridge-Actuated Devices (CADs) specifically designed or modified for use with the above aircraft and
engines utilized in emergency escape of personnel.
SME - Inertial Navigation Systems, Inertial Measurement Units (IMUs) and Attitude and Heading Reference
Systems (AHRS) specifically designed, modified, or configured for military use and all specifically designed
components, parts and accessories.
Non-SME - Developmental aircraft, engines, and components specifically designed, modified, or equipped for
military uses or purposes, or developed with DoD funding.
SME - Components and parts:
 RAM-Radar Absorbing Material;
 Fuselage/airframe and empennage (tail assembly);
 Missile ablative shell;
 Impact detectors and circuitry;
 Missile guidance systems;
 Target selection programming data;
 Balanced material orifices;
 Gas generator (when used);
 Pylons for external stores (armament, fuel, etc.);
 Gun barrels;
 Launcher barrels;
 Tubes or pods;
 Receivers;
 Firing mechanisms;
 Gun rotor assemblies;
 Delinking and declutching ammunition feeders;
 Aircraft mounted cannon electric drive assemblies and mounts;
 Internal Aircraft ammunition storage assemblies;
 Ammunition crossover assemblies;
 Magazines and chute assemblies;
 Controllers;
 Intervalometers & Gunner control panels;
 Pilot wing control panels;
 Reflex sight;
 Technical data;
 Associated armament, equipment and subsystems;
See http://download.aopa.org/epilot/2012/120430warbird.pdf.
56. 22 CFR § 121.3
As a references, 22 CFR § 121.3, which in the context of the US Munitions List, distinguishes between aircraft
designed and equipped for military purposes (even including demilitarized aircraft) and aircraft not specially
equipped and not modified for military operations, such as certain cargo, trainer and observation aircraft.

Notes,
Action(s) Taken,
and Disposition
57. 2009 Crash of ZU-BEX
Recommend the accident report concerning the 2009 Lightning T5 ZU-BEX be reviewed in detail. This report,
published by the South African CAA in August 2012, provides valuable insight into the consequences of
operating complex and high-performance former military aircraft in an unsafe manner.
Additional Information: The relevant issues identified in the report include (1) ignoring operational history and
accident data, (2) inadequate maintenance practices, (3) granting extensions on inspections, (4) poor
operational procedures, and (5) inadequate safety oversight. Many of the issues discussed and documented in
the accident investigation report are directly relevant to safety topics discussed in this document. The
South African CAA report can be found at http://www.caa.co.za/.
58. Importation
Review any related documents from U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) for the aircraft. If the aircraft was not imported as an aircraft, or if the aircraft
configuration is not as stated in Form ATF-6, it may not be eligible for an airworthiness certificate. Military
equipment may also jeopardize the aircraft.
Additional Information: There are many cases in which Federal authorities have questioned the origin of
former military aircraft and its installed weapon system. Some have been seized. For example, two T-28s
were seized at the Canadian border by U.S. Customs officials in 1989. Refer to Federal Firearms Regulations
Reference Guide, ATF Publication 5300.4, and Revised September 2005, for additional guidance. If an aircraft
is imported for purposes such as display, parts, or scrap, it is not eligible for an airworthiness certificate.
59. Brokering
Verify the application for airworthiness does not constitute brokering. 14 CFR § 21.191(d) was not intended to
allow for the brokering or marketing of experimental aircraft. Many operators acquire aircraft, seek, and
obtain experimental certification with the intent to sell immediately after certification (i.e., advertisement
before certification).
Additional Information: This includes individuals who manufacture, import, or assemble aircraft, and then
apply for and receive experimental exhibition airworthiness certificates so they can sell the aircraft to buyers.
Section 21.191(d) only provides for the exhibition of an aircraft’s flight capabilities, performance, or unusual
characteristics at air shows, and for motion picture, television, and similar productions. Certificating offices
must verify all applications for exhibition airworthiness certificates are for the purposes specified under §
21.191(d) and are from the registered owners who will exhibit the aircraft for those purposes. Applicants
must also provide the applicable information specified in § 21.193.
60.
Federally Obligated
Airport Access
Inform the operator that operations may be restricted by airports because of safety considerations. The
sponsor of a federally-obligated airport has not only the right and also the obligation to “raise” safety concerns
with regards to operations at the airport. This is accomplished with FAA oversight and concurrence.
Additional Information: As provided by 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a), a federally obligated airport may prohibit or limit
any given type, kind, or class of aeronautical use of the airport if such action is necessary for the safe operation
of the airport or necessary to serve the civil aviation needs of the public. Additionally, per FAA Order 5190.6,
FAA Airport Compliance Manual, the airport should adopt and enforce adequate rules, regulations, or
ordinances as necessary to ensure safety and efficiency of flight operations and to protect the public using the
airport. In fact, the prime requirement for local regulations is to control the use of the airport in a manner
that will eliminate hazards to aircraft and to people on the ground. In all cases concerning airport access or
denial of access, and based on FAA Flight Standards Service safety determination, FAA Airports is the final
arbiter regarding aviation safety and will make the determination (Director’s Determination, Final Agency
Decision) regarding the reasonableness of the actions that restrict, limit, or deny access to the airport (refer to
FAA Docket 16-02/08, FAA v. City of Santa Monica, Final Agency Decision; FAA Order 2009-1, July 8, 2009; and
FAA Docket 16-06-09, Platinum Aviation and Platinum Jet Center BMI v. Bloomington-Normal Airport
Authority).
61.
Environmental Impact
(Noise)
Inform the operator that operations may be restricted by airport noise access restrictions and noise
abatement procedures in accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 47107. As a reference, refer to FAA Order 5190.6. The
operator also needs to ascertain how any noise–related restriction has an impact on safety.
Additional Information: Some airports may have approved noise restrictions. The fact that the aircraft is
experimental does not mean that noise restrictions are not applicable. In fact, the opposite is likely to be true.
If an experimental former military aircraft is not restricted at the airport while a quieter corporate jet is, this
could place the airport in violation of the applicable Federal law concerning unjust discrimination, and the
airport will be required, by the FAA, to take corrective action.

Notes,
Action(s) Taken,
and Disposition
62.
Restrictions on
Operations Overseas
Inform the applicant/operator that operations may be restricted and permission must be granted by a foreign
CAA. The applicable CAA may impose any additional limitations it deems necessary, and may expand upon the
restrictions imposed by the FAA on the aircraft. In line with existing protocols, the FAA will provide the foreign
CAA any information, including safety information, for consideration in evaluating whether to permit the
operation of the aircraft in their country, and if so, under what conditions and/or restrictions. It is also noted
any operator offering to use a U.S. civil aircraft with an experimental certificate to conduct operations such as
air-to-air combat simulations, ECM, target towing for aerial gunnery, and/or dropping simulated ordinances
pursuant to a contract or other agreement with a foreign government or other foreign entity would not be
doing so in accordance with any authority granted by the FAA as the State of Registry or State of the Operator.
Additional Information: On the issue of operations overseas:
• Under international law, the aircraft will either be operated as a civil aircraft or a state
aircraft. The aircraft cannot have a combined status. If the aircraft are to be operated with
civil status, then they must have FAA-issued airworthiness certificates.
• If the applicant/operator is seeking experimental certificates for R&D or Exhibition
purposes for the aircraft, and if the FAA issues (or renews) those certificates for the
aircraft, then the only permissible operation of the aircraft as civil aircraft in a foreign
country, is for an R&D or Exhibition purpose.
• The applicant/operator cannot be allowed to accomplish other purposes during the same
operation, such as performing the contract for a foreign air force. This position is
necessary to avoid telling an operator that any R&D or Exhibition activity could serve as a
cover for a whole host of improper activities using an aircraft with an experimental
certificate for R&D or Exhibition purposes, rendering the R&D or Exhibition limitation on
the certificate meaningless.
• The R&D or Exhibition activity would be a pretext for the real purpose of the operation.
Accordingly, in issuing experimental certificates for an R&D or Exhibition purpose, the FAA
must make it clear that any other activities or purposes for the operation are outside the
scope of permitted operations under the certificate.
• The FAA must also make clear that the operation as a civil aircraft requires the permission
of the foreign civil aviation authority (CAA).
• In requesting that permission, the applicant/operator should advise the foreign aviation
authority that the operation will be for an R&D or Exhibition purpose only and for no other
purpose, including performing a contract for any foreign military organization.
• The applicant/operator must understand that if the foreign CAA asks FAA about the
operation, the FAA will state “that the only permissible purpose of the operation is R&D or
Exhibition, and an operation for any other purpose, even when conducted in conjunction
with an R&D or Exhibition purpose, is outside the scope of the operations allowed under
the certificate.
• If the applicant/operator operates the aircraft as state aircraft, then the national
government of some country will have designated the aircraft as its state aircraft, and the
host country, will have given the aircraft permission to operate through the issuance of a
diplomatic clearance. That diplomatic clearance should include whatever terms and
conditions that CAA deems necessary or appropriate for the operation.
• The aircraft, when operated as state aircraft, does not need an FAA airworthiness
certificate, and the pilots of those aircraft do not need to hold FAA-issued airman
licenses. Safety oversight responsibility for aircraft designated as state aircraft rests with
the country that made the state aircraft designation.

Notes,
Action(s) Taken,
and Disposition
63.
House Report 111-491
(Public Safety)
Recommend that the August 2011 House Report 111-491 STUDY AND REPORT ON FEASIBILITY OF
TRANSFERRING AIRCRAFT FROM A MILITARY DEPARTMENT TO A NON-FEDERAL ENTITY FOR THE PURPOSE OF
RESTORING AND FLYING THE AIRCRAFT be reviewed for background purposes.
Additional Information: The report provides relevant information on the issue of former military aircraft in
civil use. For example, it notes that the “safe operation of military aircraft is a complex engineering and
logistical endeavor, and the challenges of safe operation are only compounded in various ways by the passage
of time. Military squadrons, including military demonstration teams, operate within an environment of
aggressive maintenance and continuous supervision. Maintenance is performed to rigorous standards by
highly trained crews answerable to a clear chain of command and overseen by a cadre of engineering and
supply chain professionals (see, e.g., Commander, Naval Air Forces Instruction, 4790.2A, Naval Aviation
Maintenance Program). Even with such an aggressive program, mishaps within the Military Services do occur.
The expertise, training and resources that would allow for an equivalent environment of safety may well be
impossible in the private sector or prove to be prohibitively expensive for a NFE (non-Federal Entities). In light
of the considerable costs of overhaul and routine maintenance for military and/or historic aircraft in private
hands, the result could be unacceptable compromises in safety-related inspections, maintenance, and repairs.
In addition to maintenance of the aircraft, public safety issues are implicated by standards for pilots of these
types of aircraft. As with maintenance and repair standards, military pilots are subject to rigorous training,
operational and readiness requirements to ensure safest possible flight scenarios. The Naval Air Training
Operating Procedures Standardization General Flight and Operating Instructions, Chief of Naval Operations, or
OPNAV, Instruction, 3710.7U, is a great example of the detailed and complex nature of maintaining and flying
combat aircraft. Because military aircraft, including historic aircraft, present challenges above and beyond
those involved with flying commercial aircraft, the Department strongly questions the possibility of NFE pilots
being adequately trained or experienced in a particular type of aircraft to the extent necessary for safe flight.
The ability of any private organization to maintain and safely fly a vintage Category C aircraft in accordance
with modern standards is questionable at best. Experience shows that these aircraft will become increasingly
more difficult and expensive to maintain as the years pass. The maintenance of these aircraft is compounded
with limited availability of spare parts, repair manuals, technical data, ground support equipment, special test
equipment, tooling, and test benches. There is no assurance that such resources are available to be
transferred with historic aircraft or that the Services would recoup the substantial manpower cost of locating,
collecting, and transferring such items - not to mention their initial cost to the taxpayers. In fact, it is unlikely
that such resources are available, and extensive engineering analysis of a specific aircraft would be needed in
order to determine the availability and suitability of these resources. Specifically with respect to spare parts,
the Military Services have entire organizations dedicated to supply support for active inventory aircraft to
ensure proper configuration control, safety of flight, and proper repair of parts. It is resource-intensive to
maintain this supply support, and it is not continued once an aircraft leaves the active rolls. Given that DoD
cannot guarantee such support, private organizations cannot reasonably be expected to have the resources of
the DoD or equivalent access to a dwindling supply of parts. As age and wear related issues develop, the
Services distribute Time Compliance Technical Orders (TCTO), or similar processes, to provide improved
maintenance procedures, direct replacement of affected parts or limit operational envelopes in an effort to
prevent equipment failure. This type of system program office (SPO) support, if required by legislative
language, would require large expenditures by the Services to provide support to unique, one of a kind aircraft
and necessitate the type of post-transfer involvement that would be fertile grounds for liability claims, as
discussed above. Monitoring such aircraft for airworthiness would require long-term dedication of DoD
resources and coordination with the FAA, DHS, and GSA. The FAA certification of discontinued aircraft
operations may be difficult to obtain since there is no expertise to provide analysis and advice with regards to
the airframe and its airworthiness. There are several examples illustrative of the risks involved with combat
type aircraft in private hands….There are also concerns that the consequences could be exponentially
compounded by a mishap over an inhabited area. Once an aircraft is in the stream of commerce, it would be
extraordinarily difficult to control its ultimate disposition. In addition, while the greatest concern is the
potential for loss of life and injuries, such mishaps would also represent an irreplaceable loss of a historical
artifact. In the Department's experience, requests for flyable combat-coded aircraft are often from
organizations that want to fly at air shows that charge admission or that want two-seat models in order to
allow them to sell backseat rides. These proposed uses underscore the significant public safety considerations
underlying any decision to transfer these types of aircraft.” See
http://download.aopa.org/epilot/2012/120430warbird.pdf.

Notes,
Action(s) Taken,
and Disposition
64. Initial Contact Checklist
The following is a sample of the contents of an initial contact by an FAA field office to an applicant concerning
a proposed certification of a high-performance former military aircraft. It addresses many of the major safety
and risk issues with the aircraft and will assist in (1) preparing an airworthiness applicant, (2) making
corrections and updating any previous application, and (3) documenting the level of airworthiness review.
1. Discuss item missing from the application.
a. Program letter setting the purpose for which the aircraft will be used.
i. Exhibition of aircraft flight capabilities, performance, unusual characteristics at air shows,
motion picture, television and similar productions, and maintenance of exhibition flight
proficiency, including flying to and from such air shows and productions.
ii. Aircraft cannot be certified if the intention is to broker or sell the aircraft.
iii. Aircraft photos.
2. Prepare aircraft and documentation for FAA inspection.
a. Maintenance and modification records.
b. Aircraft history and logbooks (airframe, engine, and components).
c. Have the aircraft maintenance program ready for review and acceptance.
d. Have operations and maintenance and supplements.
e. Have crew qualifications ready for review (pilot, mechanics, A&P, IA).
f. Be prepared to show spare parts records.
g. Be prepared to accomplish preflight, ground checks, run-up, and taxi checks.
h. Be prepared to demonstrate the aircraft has been demilitarized.
i. Have records on status of ejection seats.
j. Be prepared to discuss required ground support equipment and specialized tooling for
maintenance.
k. Be prepared to discuss and document the airframe fatigue life program compliance.
l. Be prepared to discuss engine thrust measurement process.
m. Be prepared to demonstrate oxygen system checks.
n. If “G” suits are used be prepared to demonstrate serviceability.
o. Have records for any fabricated parts and engineering documentation if required.
p. Have records on flight control balancing.
q. Have weight and balance records.
r. Be prepared to discuss external stores.
s. Be prepared to discuss Phase I test flights (recommended 10 hours).
t. Have record of installed avionics.
3. Applicable regulations and ACs.
a. §§ 21.93, 21.181, 21.193, 21.191(d), 23.1441, 43.3, 43.9, 45.11, 45.23(b), 45.25, 45.29, 91.205,
91.307, 91.319(a) (1), 91.407, 91.409(f) (4), 91.411, 91.413, 91.417, 91.1037, 91.1109, and AC 43-9,
AC 91-79.
4. Items to discuss with applicant.
a. Recommendation of establishing a minimum equipment list.
b. Recommend establishing minimum pilot experience and proficiency, including (1) FAA PIC policy,
NAVAIR training, (2) 10 to 15 hours of dual time, and (3) 3 hours per month, and five takeoffs and
landings.
c. Recommend establishing minimum runways length criteria for takeoff and landing.
d. Discuss military use, that is, declaration of public use operations and operating limitations.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
MiG-21 Maintenance Manual(s), Aircraft Inspection Program (AIP),
and Servicing
65.
Changes to Aircraft
Inspection Program (AIP)
Consider whether the FAA-accepted AIP is subject to revisions to address safety concerns, alterations, or
modifications to the aircraft. 14 CFR § 91.415, Changes to Aircraft Inspection Programs, requires that
“whenever the Administrator finds that revisions to an approved aircraft inspection program under
§ 91.409(f)(4) or § 91.1109 are necessary for the continued adequacy of the program, the owner or operator
must, after notification by the Administrator, make any changes in the program found to be necessary by the
Administrator.” As provided by § 91.415, review the submitted maintenance manual(s) and AIP.
Additional Information: Work with the applicant to revise the AIP as needed based on any concerns identified
in attachment 3 to this document. For example, an AIP can be modified to address or verify—
• Consistency with the applicable military T.O.s for airframe, powerplant, and systems to verify
replacement/interval times are addressed.
• All AIP section and subsections include the proper guidance/standards (that is, Technical Orders or
Engineering Orders) for all systems, groups, and tasks.
• No “on condition” inspections for items that have replacement times unless proper technical data to
substantiate the change, that is, aileron boost and oxygen regulator.
• Ejection seat system replacement times are adhered to. No “on condition” inspections for rocket motors
and propellants. Make the distinction between replacement times, that is, “shelf life” vs. “installed
life limit.”
• Any deferred log is related to a listing of minimum equipment for flight (refer to Minimum Equipment
for Flight below, and AFI 21-103);
• Inclusion of document revision page(s).
66. AIP Is Not a Checklist
Ensure the AIP stresses it is not a checklist or just a table of contents. This is important in many cases because
the actual AIP is only a simple checklist and actual tasks/logbook entries say little of what was actually
accomplished and to what standard.
Additional Information: This is one of the major issues with some FAA-approved inspection programs, and
stems from confusion about the different nature of (1) aircraft maintenance manuals, (2) the AIP, and (3)
inspection checklists. Unless a task or item points to technical data (not just a reference to a manual), it is
simply a checklist, not a manual. Ensure the AIP directs the reader to other references such as technical data,
including references to sections and pages within a document (and revision level), that is, “AC 43-13, page
318” or “inspection card 26.2.” Records must be presented to verify times on airframe and engines,
inspections, overhauls, repairs, and in particular, time in service, time remaining and shelf life on life limited
parts. It is the owner’s responsibility to ensure these records are accurate. Refer to Classic Jet Aircraft
Association Safety Operations Manual, Rev. 6/30/08.
67. AIP Limitations
Refrain from assuming compliance with the applicable military standards, procedures, and inspections are
sufficient to achieve an acceptable level of safety for civil operations, as part of the airworthiness certification
and related review of the AIP. This may not be true, depending on the situation and the aircraft.
Additional Information: For example, an AIP based on 1978 requirements does not necessarily address the
additional concerns or issues 35 years later, such as aging, structural and materials deterioration, stress
damage (operations past life limits), extensive uncontrolled storage, new techniques, and industry standards.
68.
AIP Revision Records and
Log of Revisions
As part of the AIP, ensure the applicant/operator retains a master list of all revisions (log of revisions) that can
be reviewed in accordance with other dated material that may be required to be done under a given revision.
Additional Information: The AIP should address revision history for manual updates and flight log history.
Relevant data includes: revision number; date; page or reference numbers; and initials and/or signature.
69. Maintenance Practices
Consider AC 43.13-2, Acceptable Methods, Techniques, and Practices-Aircraft Alterations, and AC 43.13-1,
Acceptable Methods, Techniques, and Practices-Aircraft Inspection and Repair, in addition to any guidance
provided by the manufacturer/military service(s), to verify safe maintenance practices.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
70.
Qualifications for
Inspections
Ensure only FAA-certificated repair stations and FAA-certificated mechanics with appropriate ratings as
authorized by § 43.3 perform inspections on the aircraft. Previous MiG-21 experience is recommended.
71.
Maintenance
Responsibilities
The AIP should address maintenance responsibilities and functions in a clear manner.
Additional Information: The AIP should address the difference between the aircraft owner and operator. The
AIP also needs to address any leasing arrangement where maintenance is spilt or otherwise outside of the
control of the applicant, that is, where maintenance is contracted to another party. The AIP should define the
person responsible for maintenance. The AIP should address qualifications and delegations of authority, that
is, whether the person responsible for maintenance has inspection authority and airworthiness release
authority, or authority to return for service. In terms of inspection control and implementation, the AIP should
define whether it is a delegation of authority, and if so, what authority is being delegated by the owner and
operator. This has been an issue with the NTSB (and the Civil Aeronautics Board before it) since 1957.
72.
Misrepresentations of
MiG-21 Overhaul and
Condition
Caution is advised in accepting claims that the aircraft is “overhauled” or “zero-timed.” It is important to note
that many operators misrepresent the true condition of the aircraft. Some advertise their MiG-21 as low time
airframes, when in reality the opposite is true.
Additional Information: For example, the seller of a MiG-21 advertised his aircraft as having “only 1,500 hours
since new…” Another report in 2000 noted that the MiG (MiG-21US) has logged about 1,800 hours…” This
seriously misrepresents the aircraft’s true condition and airworthiness in many respects. For one, 1,500 hours
is high, not low. Depending on the aircraft version and variant, it either exceeds the 1,200 hour life-limit or is
very close to the 1,600 hour life-limit. An overhaul does not eliminate or “zero-time” the aircraft’s life-limit. In
addition, representing the assembly and restoration as a “complete overhaul” is also inaccurate because that
is a task (technically referred to as a factory refurbishment [Depot Level in the US] is performed by the
manufacturer or a delegated facility, common in the Soviet days. Today, that function is provided only to
some facilities. The cost of an Israeli (IAI) MiG-21 overhaul was $1.5 million in 1999, while an Ukrainian
overhaul could cost slightly less. An overhaul is not a task that an FBO can accomplish in the US without
manufacturer’s support. A MiG-21 overhaul is a significant undertaking which can take up to 3 months, and
includes stripping the aircraft down, removing wings, and remove all components. It also involves
replacement of life-limited components and a structural inspection and repairs, with an emphasis on
corrosion. Despite this, many service providers and operators in the US claim that the aircraft was
“overhauled” when it was not, and even if it were the case, it still does not eliminate the need to address the
aircraft’s life-limit. Another advertisement for a 1967 MiG-21U notes that the aircraft has 1,921 total hours
with an R-11 engine having “595 hours since new” and “144 since major overhaul.” All three items are either
high-time (engine since major overhaul) or actually passed their limit (airframe life-limit). This condition is
actually reflected in the aircraft’s $95,000 price tag. See http://www.aso.com.
73.
Depot Level Maintenance
and Overhaul (450 Hours)
(General)
Verify the AIP includes the proper records and references to the required depot-level overhaul (common
reference in former Soviet aircraft) at 450 hours and other required maintenance conducted before
importation. See Overhaul Calendar Limitations below.
Additional Information: These records must be translated into English. If the operator challenges this
requirement, ask for technical data to corroborate and justify any deviation.
74.
If the aircraft is a MiG-21U, verify the AIP includes the proper records and references to the required depot-
level overhaul (common reference in former Soviet aircraft) at 300 hours or 5 years (rather than 450 as
mentioned above) and other required maintenance conducted before importation.
Additional Information: These records must be translated into English. If the operator challenges this
requirement, ask for technical data to corroborate and justify any deviation.
75.
Extension
If the AIP notes that the aircraft overhaul is at 650 hours, verify that there is data and documentation. See
Overhaul Calendar Limitations below.
Additional Information: For example, in the Hungarian Air Force, by 1993, the overhaul had been raised to 650
hours under 1 0% extension program. It was not arbitrary. Some references (Bulgarian AF) note 800 hours as
the overhaul period for the MiG-21bis, but data is needed to accept this.
76. Aerostar Overhaul
Ask whether the aircraft was overhauled by Aerostar in Romania. This is important because the company
supports the Romanian AF MiG-21 fleet, the largest NATO operator of the MiG-21. It also overhauled and
upgraded Croatian AF MiG-21s. For example in 2003, it upgraded 12 MiG-21s (MiG-21bis and MiG-21UM) for
an $8.2 million. Such an overhaul, if properly documented, enhances the overall safety of the aircraft.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
77.
Bulgarian Air Force Life
Extension and
Ex-Bulgarian Air Force
MiG-21s
Ask whether the aircraft was subjected to the Bulgarian Air Force life extension program (limited) in 2001-
2002. If such a program was conducted on the particular aircraft, verify that it is properly documented in the
original documentation. This is important because the Bulgarian Air Force conducted a limited life extension
program (two months in duration) on some of its MiG-21bis in 2001-2002 in an attempt to keep the aircraft
operational until 2007. Note: Many of the Bulgarian MiG-21bis were delivered new in 1983. This life
extension program was limited in nature and cannot be compared to other factory-sanctioned programs
which may extend the life of the aircraft well beyond its usual life limit from around 1,500 hours to 2,000 or
even 3,000 hours. Note: In early 2000, these aircraft were reported “as rapidly approaching [life expiration]
and so the aircraft will require some upgrade work to be of significant use.” Macedonian MiGs, (February
2000).
78.
Ex-Polish Air Force
MiG-21s
If the aircraft in question is an Ex-Polish Air Force MiG-21, ensure that the AIP is based on the most recent
applicable guidance and records by the Polish Air Force under NATO standards. The records for these aircraft
are likely to be those issued by the Polish Military Property Agency (AMW), which disposes of all military
equipment and armament withdrawn from Polish service. Poland joined NATO in 1999, and the MiG-21 was
operated until December 2003. These aircraft had been stored outdoors since then, and their condition is
unknown, and will need specific consideration. Stock MiG-21 guidance that is used for previous and earlier
Soviet MiG-21s may not likely be acceptable for the maintenance of these aircraft.
Additional Information: Also relevant is that the condition of these aircraft may have been misrepresented. In
advertising its MiG-21s, an US operator noted the “MiG-21bis is the last aircraft produced in the series and are
extremely supportable. Considering the aircraft type is still in service among militaries around the globe, there
is no shortage of spare parts and support. This ensures the ongoing supportability and safety of our low-time
fleet of Mikoyan MiG-21 fighters.” http://drakenintl.com/mig-21-2. However, it is known that Polish Air Force
and Polish Navy MiG-21s were retired, in great part, due to “insufficient funds for overhaul and purchase of
additional spare parts, which had already grounded some aircraft“(Polish MiG-21s Retired, April 2004) and
that in 2002 “the operational life of the majority of the MiG-21 is due to expire by the end of 2003…” (Ciszek,
Posnanian Fishbeds, 2002. A review of the disposal of Polish Air Force MiG-21s noted that “a number of MiG-
21Rs, MiG-21MFs, and MiG-21UMs are stored at the base [Poznan-Krzesiny] and due to be [disposed]…Sadly,
none of the Fishbeds in storage could be restored to flying condition.” Ciszek, Posnanian Fishbeds. More
recently, a January 2013 FAA inspection of several ex-Polish Air Force MiG-21s being imported into the US
noted that “... the aircraft were in bad shape and it appears that the aircraft were not in a flyable status
before they were taken apart. This was evident due to the amount of corrosion found throughout the aircraft
surface….Basically; everything looked very old and junky.” Note: Although 7 ex-Polish AF MiG-21s (MiG-21bis
and MiG-21UM) were delivered to the Ugandan AF in 2004-2005, these were refurbished and upgraded by IAI
The aircraft had been stored at the WZL-3 factory at Deblin, Poland since 1999, but refurbishment in Poland
has not been documented. Another 18 aircraft (likely not overhauled) were delivered to Vietnam in 2004-
2005. These were likely MiG-21bis, MiG-21MF, and MiG-21 UMs.
79.
Ex-Romanian MiG-21
Lancer
If the aircraft in question is an Ex-Romanian AF MiG-21 Lancer, ensure that the AIP is based on the most recent
guidance by the Romanian AF under NATO standards. See Romanian MiG-21 Lancer (General) above.
80.
Sokol
Upgraded Fighter
MiG-21bis
Ask if the aircraft was overhauled or upgraded by Nizhny Novgorod Aircraft Building Plant SOKOL (JSC NAZ
SOKOL, aka ANPK-Sokol), Russia. If this is the case, request and review the related documentation (in
English) concerning the inspection requirements for the aircraft, and the data concerning any upgrades.
This type of data may be needed to establish the proper baseline, including demilitarization.
Additional Information: SOKOL advertises the upgrading of MIG-21bis aircraft, which includes the replacement
of avionics and equipping with modern combat armament and systems. As part of this process, all of the main
aircraft systems are subject to upgrading, including power supply system, fuel system, air-conditioning system,
air cooling system, and powerplant. See http://www.sokolplant.ru/en/spravka.shtml.
81.
Danubian Aircraft
Company Overhaul
Ask whether the aircraft was overhauled by Tököl-based DAC (Danubian Aircraft Company) in Hungary. This is
important because the company supported the Hungarian AF MiG-21 fleet, and was a NATO operator of the
MiG-21. Over the years, this company conducted over 500 MiG-21 overhauls. If the aircraft in question has
had a DAC overhaul before disposal, and if properly documented, it would enhance the overall safety.
Additional Information: Over the years, this company conducted over 500 MiG-21 overhauls. If the aircraft in
question has had a DAC overhaul before disposal, and if properly documented, it would enhance the overall
safety of the aircraft. This is particularly true if the aircraft is one of the last MiG-21UM and MiG-21bis disposed
by the Hungarian AF in the early 2000s, and these still had some operational life remaining.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
82. PAC Overhaul (F-7)
If the aircraft is a Chinese F-7, ask whether the aircraft was overhauled by Pakistan Aeronautical Complex
(PAC). This is important because the company supports the Pakistan Air Force F-7 fleet. Such an overhaul, if
properly documented, enhances the overall safety of the aircraft.
83. LOK MiG-21 Overhaul
Ask if the aircraft was overhauled in the Czech Republic by LOK (Aviation Repair Plant) at Praha-Kbely. This
state-owned company provided MiG-21 services. If this is the case, request and review the related
documentation (in English) and how it compares with the inspection requirements for the aircraft in terms of
hours and calendar times for example. The proper baseline needs to be established.
Additional Information: For example, in 2002, the company overhauled the last Czech Air Force MiG-21MFN,
which was retired in 2004/2005 because they were time-expired. Note: A LOK overhaul is not an equivalent of
a factory refurbishment, life extension, or “zero time.” Note: In 2005, 5 MiG-21MFs and 1 MiG-21UM may
have been overhauled by LOK after being retired by the Czech AF and re-delivered to an unspecified West
African country.
84.
Odesaviaremservice
(Ukraine) MiG-21
Overhaul
Ask if the aircraft was overhauled in the Ukraine by Odesaviaremservice Odessa Aircraft Repair Enterprise
(OARS), in the Ukraine. This company provides MiG-21 services for many of the former Soviet republics and
other customers that still operate the aircraft. If this is the case, request and review the related
documentation (in English) and how it compares with the inspection requirements for the aircraft in terms of
hours and calendar times for example. The proper baseline needs to be established.
Additional Information: For example, in 2011, the company overhauled Yemen AF MiG-21bis aircraft and
several Egyptian AF MiG-21UMs. This company undertakes overhauls, life extensions, on-condition repairs (to
standards), upgrade programs for airframe, engine, and avionics.
85.
Ukrainian Air Force
Aviatsion’nti Remont
Zavod (ARZ)
(Aircraft Repair Works)
Ask if the aircraft was overhauled in the Ukraine by Ukrainian Air Force Aviatsion’nti Remont Zavod (ARZ –
Aircraft Repair Works), Lviv, Ukraine. This state factory provided MiG-21 services to the Ukrainian AF (last
documented in 2005-2006) when the MiG-21UM was still operational in 2005-2006. If this is the case, request
and review the related documentation (in English) and how it compares with the inspection requirements for
the aircraft in terms of hours and calendar times for example. The proper baseline needs to be established.
86.
VRZ Kahn Asparukh
MiG-21 Overhaul
Ask if the aircraft was overhauled by VRZ Kahn Asparukh in Bulgaria. This company provided MiG-21 services
for the Bulgarian Air Force and took over MiG-21 maintenance in 1990. If this is the case, request and review
the related documentation (in English) and how it compares with the inspection requirements for the aircraft
in terms of hours and calendar times for example. The proper baseline needs to be established.
87.
Yugoslav/Croatia
VTRZ Overhaul
Ask if the aircraft was overhauled by VTRZ (Vazduhoplovno Technički Remonti Zavod) at Zmaj, in Velika Gorica,
near Zagreb (now Croatia). R-11, R-13, and R-25 engines were overhauled at the VTRZ Orao facility in Rajlovac,
Sarajevo. This company provided MiG-21 services for the Yugoslav Air Force and other foreign air forces well
into the early 1990s. If this is the case, request and review the related documentation (in English) and how it
compares with the inspection requirements for the aircraft in terms of hours and calendar times for example.
The proper baseline needs to be established.
Additional Information: Many ex-Croatian AF and ex-Serbian, and ex-Republika Srpska MiG-21s have been in
outdoor storage at Velika Gorica since 2004, and photographic evidence shows their condition to be marginal.
See Ex-Serbia and Montenegro Air Force MiG-21s above.
88. Yugoslav YARC Overhaul
Ask if the aircraft was overhauled by Yugoslav Aircraft Repair Center (YARC) Moma Stanojlovic at Belgrade-
Batajnica. This company provided MiG-21 services for the Yugoslav Air Force and other foreign air forces well
into the early 1990s. In fact, in 1998, the Moma facilities overhauled several Iraqi air force MiG-21s that were
not delivered. If this is the case, request and review the related documentation (in English) and how it
compares with the inspection requirements for the aircraft in terms of hours and calendar times for example.
The proper baseline needs to be established.
Additional Information: Many ex-Yugoslav AF MiG-21s have been in outdoor storage and photographic
evidence shows their condition to be marginal. See Ex-Serbia and Montenegro Air Force MiG-21s above.
89.
Bulgarian Overhaul
(Depot Level) by TEREM
Ask if the aircraft (airframe & engine) was overhauled (Main Overhaul or MO, Depot Level) in at TEREM –
GEORGI BENKOVSKI (Aircraft Repair Plant), Plovdiv, Bulgaria, previously known as VRZ Kahn Asparukh. If this is
the case, request and review the related documentation (in English) and how it compares with the inspection
requirements for the aircraft in terms of hours and calendar times for example. This will assist in establishing
the proper baseline. A MiG-21 main overhaul (MO) is a lengthy process, up to 3 months, and cost $1 million.
The last TEREM overhauled took place in 2002.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
90. Chinese J-7/F-7 Parts
It should not be assumed that Chinese J-7 or F-7 parts or components are necessarily interchangeable with
Soviet MiG-21. A Chinese J-7 may look like a Soviet MiG-21F, but is not. It should not be assumed that
because there may have been a certain level of commonality between earlier MiG types (such as the MiG-15)
between Soviet and Chinese variants that those similarities apply to the MiG-21/J-7 relationship.
Additional Information: For the most part, Chinese parts and Soviet parts are not interchangeable. Although
originally the Soviet Union did grant license to the Chinese for MiG-21 production, the transfer of technical
data appears to have been incomplete. In addition, political tensions minimized the needed level of Soviet
support early in the J-7 program. As a result, many technical aspects of the aircraft, including manufacturing
techniques, were changed. The AIP should address this important issue and (1) properly document any such
use, and (2) the necessary technical data in support of such use.
91. Aerostar Overhaul
Ask whether the aircraft was overhauled by Aerostar in Romania. This is important because the company
supports the Romanian AF MiG-21 fleet, the largest NATO operator of the MiG-21. It also overhauled and
upgraded Croatian AF MiG-21s.
Additional Information: For example in 2003, it upgraded 12 MiG-21s (MiG-21bis and MiG-21UM) for an $8.2
million. Such an overhaul, if properly documented, enhances the overall safety of the aircraft.
92.
HAL Spare Parts &
Logistics
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in India manufactures and supplies the entire range of spares required
for first and second-line servicing of certain MiG-21 aircraft at the IAF bases. Canopies, flexible rubber fuel
tanks, main and nose undercarriages, ejection seats, and ground support equipment are examples.
Additional Information: The use of the parts, along with their documentation, will likely be acceptable in some
MiG-21 operations, depending on version and variant. In addition to other suppliers, especially in Eastern
Europe, HAL may provide an alternative that will be acceptable. See http://hal-india.com.
93. TASA Overhaul
Ask if the aircraft was overhauled or upgraded by TASA (Tbilisi Aviation State Association) in Georgia (Georgia
Republic), which was the main manufacturing facility for MiG-21U two-seaters. If so, request and review the
related documentation (in English). This type of data may be needed to establish the proper baseline.
94. Modifications
Verify major changes conform to the applicable guidance (i.e., NATO) and do not create an unsafe condition,
and determine whether new operating limitations may be required within the scope and intent of § 21.93.
Additional Information: In addition, the information contained in appendix A to part 43 can be used as an aid.
Refer to Potential Reversion Back to Phase I above.
95.
Adequate Maintenance
Schedule and Program
(i.e., MiG-21
NATO -6-1 T.O.)
Ensure the AIP follows the applicable requirements, as appropriate (i.e., NATO), concerning inspections. For
example, under USAF standards, the proper reference is the most current version of MiG-21 NATO-6-1,
(Aircraft Scheduled Inspection, and Maintenance Requirements) or equivalent.
Additional Information: This is important when developing an inspection program under § 91.409. The
inspection program must comply with both hourly and calendar inspection schedules. The only modifications
to the military AIP should be related to the removal of military equipment and weapons. Deletions should be
properly documented and justified. A part 43, 100-hour, 12-month inspection program is not adequate.
96. Return to Service
Ensure the AIP clearly defines who can return the aircraft to service and provides minimum criteria for this
authority. Follow the intent and scope of § 43.5, Approval for return to service after maintenance, preventive
maintenance, rebuilding, or alteration; and § 43.7, Persons authorized to approve aircraft, airframes, aircraft
engines, propellers, appliances, or component parts for return to service after maintenance, preventive
maintenance, rebuilding, or alteration.
97. Yugoslav YARC Overhaul
Ask if the aircraft was overhauled by Yugoslav Aircraft Repair Center (YARC) Moma Stanojlovic at Belgrade-
Batajnica. This company provided MiG-21 services for the Yugoslav Air Force and other foreign air forces well
into the early 1990s. Today, it supports the Serbian Air Force. In fact, in 1998, the Moma facilities overhauled
several Iraqi air force MiG-21bis aircraft that were not delivered. If this is the case, request and review the
related documentation (in English) and how it compares with the inspection requirements for the aircraft in
terms of hours and calendar times for example. The proper baseline needs to be established.
Additional Information: Many ex-Yugoslav AF MiG-21s have been in outdoor storage and photographic
evidence shows their condition to be marginal. See Ex-Serbia and Montenegro Air Force MiG-21s above.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
98.
Ex-Croatian Air Force
MiG-21UMD
Ask whether the aircraft is an ex-Croatian AF MiG-21UMD. In 2002-2003, Aerostar (Romania) upgraded
Croatia’s MiG-21s to the MiG-21UMD standard, which gave the aircraft another 10 years of airframe life. If
this is the case, verify that there adequate documentation to validate the aircraft’s origin and, times, and
condition.
99. Ex-Laotian AF MiG-21s
Ask whether the aircraft is an ex-Laotian AF MiG-21s (PFM, MF, bis, and UM). In 2006, these aircraft were in
open storage at the Xieng Khouang Air Base, in a humid and tropical environment. For this reason, caution is
advised specially with regards to documentation and any work performed before and after storage.
100. Metric Conversions
The AIP and related documentation needs to provide for the adequate conversion of all metric units (i.e.,
charts, tables) used in the aircraft, its maintenance, and operations. Below is a sample conversion chart.
For more specific conversions, see http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/Reference/metrics/.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
101.
Reliability-Centered
Maintenance
(RCM)
Provided that adequate technical data is part of any proposal for an alternative, RCM or Reliability Centered
Maintenance, may be considered for certain items covered in the aircraft’s AIP. With RCM the
owner/operator continually analyzes aircraft conformity and airworthiness through surveillance and analysis
and makes adjustments to the equipment’s inspections and maintenance planning based on data. There must
be data.
Additional Information: With the adoption of RCM for certain components, the owner/operator of the
aircraft, can continually adjust any program elements for operational safety and reliability and is evolving the
inspections into a maintenance program by continually monitoring what needs to be inspected or replace at
different times or in different ways or perhaps not at all. RCM is a program that needs to be properly
documented and not a shallow determination that a particular inspection is not needed or an item need not
be replaced. Moving to a RCM-based approach includes 4 objectives: (1) meet the designed safety and
reliability expectations of the equipment, (2) restore safety and reliability to their required levels when
deterioration of this has occurred, (3) obtain information needed for design improvement of items with
reliability that is inadequate, and (4) compare these total costs and operational benefits with the former
inspection program. RCM is based on:
o A failure is an unsatisfactory condition; consequences of a functional failure determine the
priority of maintenance effort;
o Safety – Possible loss of equipment and occupants;
o Hidden-failure – Multiple failures, resulting from undetected failure of a hidden function;
o Scheduled maintenance – Required – Failure could have safety consequences;
o Scheduled maintenance – Required – Failure not evident to the operating crew;
o Safety Consequences – Reduced by the use of redundancy;
o Hidden functions – Made evident by instrumentation or design features;
o Feasibility – Effectiveness of scheduled maintenance depend on inspect ability;
Inherent reliability of equipment is the level of reliability achieved with an effective maintenance program.
This level is established by the design of each item and the manufacturer’s processes that produced it.
Scheduled maintenance can ensure that the inherent reliability of each item is achieved, but no form of
maintenance supported by inspection and engineering data can yield reliability beyond that inherent in the
design. A RCM program includes only what satisfies the criteria for applicability and effectiveness in terms of
Applicability (determined by the characteristics of the item), and Effectiveness (defined by the consequences
the task is designed to prevent).
On-condition is also addressed, but data is used to determine and correct potential failures. Rework and
overhaul, is an item at or before a specified limit, and has to be incorporated. Discard (an item at or before
some specified life limit), and Failure-Finding (failures that occurred but not evident to the operator), are also
part of a RCM program. The RCM includes Simple Items, which is one that is subject to very few failure modes,
and frequently shows a decrease in reliability with increasing operational age or cycles, and Complex Items,
which are those one whose failure may result from many different failure modes, shows little or no decrease
in overall reliability with increasing age unless there is a dominant failure mode. RCM tasks are based on
1) Consequences of each type of failure;
2) Visibility of a functional failure to the operating crew (evidence a failure occurred);
3) Visibility or evidence a failure is imminent;
4) Age-cycle reliability characteristics of each item;
5) Tradeoff between scheduled maintenance criteria and sampling, and life limiting items;
6) Multiple failure – Consequences that would not be caused by any one individual failure; and
7) Default strategy – Provides for conservative initial decisions, revised with operating experience.
8) Finally, RCM programs must be dynamic.
The operating organization must be prepared to collect and respond to real data throughout the operational
life of the equipment. This requires surveillance and analysis of the performance of each item under actual
operating conditions to determine refinements and modifications to the program and to determine needs for
product improvements.
102.
Overhaul Calendar
Limitations
Verify that the AIP makes references to the overhaul limitations, that is, (1) a maximum of two overhauls in
the aircraft’s service life, and (2) overhaul limit at 10 years. The 10 year limit reefers to the need to have an
overhaul performed regardless of hours flown.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
103. Required Inspections
Verify that the AIP includes the required inspections for the MiG-21.
Additional Information: Required inspections include:
• Daily inspection;
• 25-Hour servicing;
• 50-Hour inspection;
• Annual (12 months) inspection;
• Time required inspections and replacements (see below);
• Recommended: Every 10 hours;
104.
Airframe, Engine,
and Component
Replacement Intervals
Verify compliance with required replacement intervals (replacement and overhaul) as outlined in appropriate
and most current military inspection guidance. Ask the applicant/operator for source data validating that
guidance.
Additional Information: If components are not replaced per the military guidance, ask for data to justify
extensions. Applicants should establish and record time-in-service for all life-limited components and verify
compliance with approved life limits. Set time limits for overrun of intervals and track cycles. Evaluate any
overruns of inspection or maintenance intervals. Examples include, but limited to fuel pumps, hydraulic
pumps, pressure tanks, booster, bladder fuel tanks, generators, pyrotechnics, valves, and actuators.
105.
“On Condition”
Inspections
CAUTION: Verify that any “on condition” item is not replacing a required life-limit or replacement
Additional Information: Adhere to the military/manufacturer program and/or provide adequate data to justify
that practice for the applicable part or component if “on condition” inspections are considered. “On
condition” must reference an applicable standard (that is, inspect the NR-21F fuel pump to an acceptable
reference standard, not just “it has been working so far”). Each “on condition” inspection must state
acceptable parameters. “On condition” inspections are not appropriate for all parts and components.
106. Missing Inspection Tasks
Verify the AIP follows the applicable requirements (i.e., NATO) in terms of inspection tasks. It is imperative
that no inspection tasks required by the military standard are removed, unless they are weapon system
related.
Additional Information: If any non-weapons system tasks are removed, there should be adequate justification,
and it cannot be solely cost-related. There have been several cases where an AIP did not conform to the
applicable military standard and tasks were removed without adequate justification, not because they are not
needed, but because the operator cannot or does not want to pay for it.
107.
Cannibalization and
Spare Parts
Verify that the AIP addresses cannibalization. This is likely to be an issue due to the chronic shortage of MiG-
21 spare parts, the number of non-flyable examples in the US, and most affecting those operators with more
than one MiG-21. Unlike what some applicants may state, Soviet spare parts for the MiG-21 are very difficult
to obtain, and this was already an issue for many of the Warsaw pact countries in the 1990s. There is no OEM
support that an be validated.
Additional Information: Cannibalization is a common practice for several former military aircraft operators
and service providers. It is common in MiG-21s. In the case of the MiG-21 as with other Soviet types,
cannibalization can be exacerbated by the fact that the Soviets replaced a significant number of spare parts
with spare sub-assemblies. Operationally, this complicates the replacement of a failed component, but also
encourages further brake down of the component from its sub-assembly often with inadequate
documentation. The extent to which it takes place is not necessarily an issue, but keeping adequate records of
the transfers, uses, and condition is. In 2001, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) published its
findings on cannibalization of aircraft by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). It found cannibalizations
have several adverse impacts. They increase maintenance costs by increasing workloads and create
unnecessary mechanical problems for maintenance personnel. The GAO also found that with the exception of
the Navy, the services do not consistently track the specific reasons for cannibalizations. In addition, a U.S.
Navy study found cannibalizations are sometimes done because mechanics are not trained well enough to
diagnose problems or because testing equipment is either not available or not working. Because some view
cannibalization as a symptom of spare parts shortages, it is not closely analyzed, in that other possible causes
or concerted efforts to measure the full extent of the practice are not made. See Safety Implications of Spare
Parts Shortage below. Also see Parts Fabrication below.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
108.
Drag Chute
(General)
Verify that the drag chute is inspected and maintained as per the applicable guidance and the AIP reflects that
installation. It is a critical safety of flight issue and needs to be inspected and maintained by trained personnel
as per the applicable technical guidance and with adequate logbook entries. This includes re-packing after
use, and those tasks properly documented. Known failures are: fuse pin failure, entangled lines (inadequate
packing and inspection), and release mechanism failure (cable, door).
Additional Information: Repacking and re-installation of the drag chute is not a responsibility to be allocated
to untrained personnel, and is not, as some operators have accepted “a pilot responsibility, normally
accomplished as part of the preflight inspection and not logged in the maintenance records.” There are cases
in US civil use (one in 1994) where the drag chute failed because the drag chute fuse stitching failed after
deployment, causing the chute to separate. In 2012 a drag chute failure resulted in an overrun. There should
be adequate technical data to validate the installation. The drag chute system includes the PT-12UK chute
container mounted in the tail. In some earlier MiG-21s, the drag chute installation had an opening composed
of twin-doors in the fuselage underside. This allowed the streaming of the chute, which pulled the cable from
an under- fuselage channel, with stowage in the ventral fin, to which the end of the cable was attached. See
Approved Drag Chute and Drag Chute Technical Guidance below.
109. Approved Drag Chute
Verify that the drag chute installed in the aircraft is actually an approved type.
Additional Information: Depending on the version of the aircraft, examples include: the PT-5759-58 (16 m2
),
PT-5281-62 (19 m2
). Depending on version and variant, drag chute containers may include the PT-21U, PT-
21UT, and PT-21K (i.e., on late production MiG-21PF and MiG-21PFM) containers. The required technical
guidance must be available and in English. The Chinese J-7 drag chute system differs from the Soviet type. For
example, the parachute container is different. The MiG-21 had a drag chute container with a parabolic rear
end that was split vertically to form both forms, while the Chinese fighter’s container was closed by a one-
piece hemispherical fairing hinged at the top. A recent update from a MiG-21 restoration in the US points to
several of the safety issues surrounding the drag chute in the MiG-21, especially when the applicable technical
guidance is lacking: “One of the things our MiG-21 was decidedly lacking was a drag parachute. Even with the
new extension, lengthening the Lancaster Airport runway to 6,500 feet, stopping the MiG-21 without rapidly
going through brakes and tires is going to take a little extra work…We looked around for parachute sources
and, out of curiosity, checked with the importer that brings in things for the Nanchang CJ-6A. Since the
Chinese make a MiG-21 copy, the J-7, it stood to reason that drag parachutes might be available at a
reasonable price. To everyone’s surprise, he discovered that J-7 parts are even more plentiful than are CJ-6A
parts. Eventually a box with a military looking bag and some funny nylon umbrellas showed up. Fortunately,
the bag came with instructions... in Chinese. Step by step instructions were included for assembling the 14
individual pieces of the MiG-21 drag parachute. The system consists of a container bag into which a hook
mechanism on a plate fills the base end. A 5 meter multi-part braided line then connects to the plate. The
lines are covered with a protective canvas sleeve. One of the reasons that drag parachutes are hard to find in
Eastern Europe is that the braided line makes an excellent tow rope for pulling cars. This line then connects to
the base of the parachute itself. At each connection point, a canvas sleeve with drawstrings protects the
parachute components from chafing on the runway. We were pleased that a completely new parachute set
like the one we’d acquired came with several extra protective sleeves. Last, but not least, a drag chute drogue
chute connects to the top of the parachute to assist in deployment. The inner sleeve of the drogue houses a
spring that leaps out into the world and pulls the main chute behind it. It is interesting to see the ratio of
various spares... the kit came with three drogues; the drogue must take a lot of abuse. We haven’t acquired
one of these machines but we’re told that it’s possible to manually pack the parachute into the housing bag
with a little effort. The parachute is deployed manually by the pilot upon landing with a push of a button in
the cockpit. The housing in the tail opens and pneumatic pressure opens the clamshell in the tail to let the
drogue chute leap out into the world. After slowing to a speed where the parachute is no longer effective, a
second button releases the chute to be picked up by ground crew. A final picture shows the parachute tied
into the bag with a holding pin that keeps it all together until it’s been placed in the aircraft and
“armed.” http://blog.cwam.org.
110.
USAF T.O. 00-25-241
(Chute Logs and Records)
Verify that, on the issue of the drag chute, the AIP provides for the correct documentation and records
keeping.
Additional Information: USAF T.O. 00-25-241, Parachute Logs, and Records, February 1, 1997, Change 2, July
15, 1999, can be used if no other acceptable process is provided. The purpose of this technical order is to
explain how to prepare, replace, and dispose of AF T.O. Form 391, Parachute Log, and AF T.O. Form 392,
Parachute Repack, Inspection and Component Record which are used to log and record parachute information.
The use of these forms is highly recommended.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
111.
Drag Chute and Systems
Technical Guidance
Verify that the technical guidance concerning the installation, maintenance and repacking of the drag chute
and its systems (not just the chute itself). The required technical guidance is available and must be in English.
Additional Information: Relevant technical guidance includes:
• MiG-21 Inspection references (Soviet Air Force); J-7/F-7 Inspection references (China);
• NATO standards (the system is used by several NATO countries, i.e., Romania);
• USAF T.O 391 and 392;
• USAF T.O. 00-25-241 (see below).
• MS 21249A, Military Standard: Handle, Control, Aircraft Drag Chute, September 7, 1987.
112. Civil Drag Chute Guidance
In addition to the military guidance, and for the purpose of being able to ascertain if a poorly documented
drag chute maintenance, inspection, and packing, civil standards may be consulted.
Additional Information: Since 1971, the FAA has certificated several aircraft, such as the Learjet 24, Learjet 25,
Learjet 28, Learjet 31, and Learjet 35/36 with optional drag chutes. The system was also available in some
Learjet Series 50 aircraft and in the Falcon 20 (i.e. FedEx Falcon 20). As a result, there are FAA civil standards
for this type of system, as well as maintenance procedures. In addition, there have been accidents where the
malfunction of the system took place, and in some cases, failure of the drag chute contributed to the accident
as a result of non-compliance with the prescribed maintenance and inspection procedures. Relevant guidance
on civil drag chutes includes:
• Learjet 31 Airplane Flight Manual;
• Learjet FAA Approved Drag Chute AFM Supplement;
• Learjet Process Specification, LES-FT-1244, Drag Chute, Model 24, 25, 28, 29, 35 & 36;
• Learjet Process Specification, LES 1237 Drag Chute Packing, Inspection & Storage ;
• Learjet Process Specification, LES-FT-1219, Rigging, Fitting of M 55 Drag Chute System;
• NTSB Accident Report NYC07LA087, March 26, 2007, Learjet 36A, N527PA. Other accidents
include:
o ERA09LA282 Falcon - chute failed to deploy;
o DFW05LA030 Falcon - no pilot action to deploy chute;
o FTW03FA229 LJ25 - The drag chute was found partially deployed in the tail cone area;
o NYC89FA085 Falcon - chute failed to deploy;
o FTW98LA334 C500 - drag chute separated;
113.
Appendix G to
14 CFR Part 23
Recommend appendix G to part 23 be used as a tool (not a requirement) because it can assist in the review of
the applicant’s proposed AIP and associated procedures and sets a good baseline for any review.
Additional Information: NATO guidance should also contain instructions for the continued airworthiness of
the aircraft. Appendix G to part 23 covers instructions for continued airworthiness.
114.
Prioritize Maintenance
Actions
Recommend the adoption of a risk management system that reprioritizes high-risk maintenance actions in
terms of (a) immediate action, (b) urgent action, and (c) routine action. Also refer to Recordkeeping, Tracking
Discrepancies, and Corrective Action, below.
115. Parts Fabrication
Verify engineering (that is, Designated Engineering Representative) data supports any part fabrication by
maintenance personnel. References to the original manufacturer should be provided. Unfortunately, many
modifications are made without adequate technical and validation data.
Additional Information: AC 43.18, Fabrication of Aircraft Parts by Maintenance Personnel, may be used as
guidance. This is important because the Indian Air Force high MiG-21 accident rate has been traced, in part, to
spare parts manufactured locally needed to keep MiG-21s operational, and many of these parts were not
manufactured to specifications. See Cannibalization and Spare Parts above.
116.
Recordkeeping, Tracking
Discrepancies, and
Corrective Action
Check applicant recordkeeping. The scope and content of §§ 43.9, 43.11, and 91.417 are acceptable.
Recommend the use the USAF Form 781 process (or NAVAIR MAF, or RAF Form 700) to help verify an
acceptable level of continued operational safety (COS) for the aircraft.
Additional Information: Three types of maintenance discrepancies can be found inside USAF Form 781: (1) an
informational, that is, a general remark about a problem that does not require mitigation; (2) a red slash for a
potentially serious problem; and (3) a red “X” highlighting a safety of flight issue that could result in an
unsuccessful flight and/or loss of aircraft—no one should fly the aircraft until the issue is fixed. For more
information on recordkeeping, refer to AC 43-9, Maintenance Records.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
117.
Safety Implications of
Spare Parts Shortage
It is essential to considered spare parts availability part of the AIP and the operation and maintenance of the
aircraft as a whole. Current MiG-21 operators continue to suffer from a severe shortage of spare parts for the
aircraft. This was already a well-documented issue in 1993 for many of the former Soviet Bloc countries soon
after the Collapse of the Soviet Union. In fact, as early as 1992, the Hungarian Air Force predicted
maintenance issue due to the shortage of MiG-21 spares from the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent
States). It is true for all of the NATO MiG-21 operators today, more so for other operators with less than
sufficient funding. The issue is not just funding, but also OEM support. In civil use, this had been a serious
issue ever since the first MiG-21 operated in the US in 1990.
Additional Information: In fact, “Warbird” groups and forums constantly make reference to the lack of spare
parts. This, in turn, leads to serious safety shortcomings, including the likelihood not to replace a time limited
item, and use unapproved parts with undocumented origin. In addition, some parts are fabricated, but there
is no evidence of conformity or basic DER data to the originals specifications. All combined, these present a
serious drawback to ensuring the airworthiness of the aircraft. See Parts Fabrication below. Note: There are
companies in the US that advertise MiG-21 spare parts support. For example, the ISO Group (Defense and
Aerospace Sustainment Partner) notes that it “provides military aviation spare parts, components, and MRO
solutions for the MiG-21 and all variants. ISO Group has experience in the MiG-21 Engine Assemblies,
Rotables, Consumables, Avionics, Hardware, Landing Gear, Electrical Assemblies, Fasteners, and Structural
Assemblies..” http://www.iso-group.com/sustainment/military-aircraft/MIG-21/. A sample spare parts listing
for a recent MiG-21U for sale included:
• 5 Main Tires and 2 Nose Tires ;
• One Engine Driven Fuel Pump NR-21F ;
• 4 Main Brake Sets ; 2 Nose Brake Sets ;
• 2 Main Wheels ; 1 Nose Wheel ;
• 1 Drop Tank ; 2 Ordinance Pylons ;
• 2 Missile Rails ;
• 10 Used but Serviceable Main Tires and a Custom Canopy Cover.
Source: http://www.aso.com/listings/spec/ViewAd.aspx?id=141764.
Another MiG-21 for sale is advertised with the following:
• Manuals including, but not limited to POH, Performance, Technical Description Manuals (TDM’s) for
entire plane and engine;
• Manuals for inspections of airframe components including weapons/fire control;
• All logbooks for engine(s) and airframe from date of manufacturer;
• Current A/F and Engine log’s with US FAA Approved MTX Program;
• All plugs, covers, gust lock and chocks and tow bar;
Engine (R-11F2SK-300) complete with A/B assembly and nozzle control ring (currently in a hangar in
Detroit, MI);
• 14 main tires, 9 nose; 2 retreaded mains…as yet uninstalled and tested for wheel well clearance;
• 1 complete set NOS tires mounted on wheels and ready for installation;
• 4 ea. KT-92b main wheel brakes, and 2 ea. KT-102 nose wheel brakes;
• 4 packed landing drag chutes (one is in the jet) including repacking cylinder, mallet and hydraulic
pressure;
• 1 engine driven hydraulic pump; 1 emergency hydraulic pump (new brushes);
• 1 Starter/Gen. (new brushes); 2 A/B relay control boxes;
• Misc. ejection seat/headrest spares; Crew cockpit O-2 regulator;
• Battery start cart and new batteries (March 2009), charger installed;
• Metric tools;
• APU-7 missile rails;
• 490 l. Belly tank;
• PPK-1 Anti-‘G’ trousers;
• Hydraulic mule hoses with compatible adapters to service hydraulic system w/o starting engine.
Source: http://www.controller.com/listingsdetail/aircraft-for-sale/MIKOYAN-MIG-21-UM/1973-MIKOYAN-
MIG-21-UM/1150503.htm.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
118.
Sample MiG-21 Spare
Parts
The following is a sample list of MiG-21 spare parts. It is provided here as background.
Pos. Part No. Description Aircraft Type
2 MPRF-1A Landing Light Assembly MiG-21
4 WS-1T Chip detector MiG-21
6 DTÄ-1 RPM Transmitter MiG-21
8 AWD 7-44-5 Engine Start Control Box MiG-21
14 5505-1-75 Gaskets KM-1 (Various) MiG-21
19 CK3-9105-222 Gaskets Pyromechanism Canopy MiG-21
21 Testing Device for Canopy Pyro Cylinder MiG-21
23 FG-11 4SN1 Hydraulic Filter MiG-21
24 GA 184U Electromagnetic Hydraulic Valve MiG-21
27 GSR-ST1200WT Starter Generator MiG-21
28 ASP-5ND Gun sight (museum purpose only) MiG-21
29 2323-A Turbo Cooler MiG-21
30 37039770 Engine Casing Part Combustion Chamber MiG-21
31 37169745 Jet Nozzle Metal MiG-21
32 40 22 AT Electro Valve MiG-21
33 520 Cockpit Pressure Regulation Valve MiG-21
35 676400M Emergency Valve MiG-21
36 698 800 Electro Valve MiG-21
37 723900-6AT Non Return Valve MiG-21
38 861400-055 Safety Valve Fuel Accumulator MiG-21
39 8D2.966 0225 Filter Element MiG-21
42 DP1-9M G-Force Transmitter MiG-21
43 DW-15 Altitude Transmitter MiG-21
45 GA-59 Hydraulic Switch-over Valve Main/Emergency MiG-21
46 IKDRDA-830-520-0 Pressure Relay MiG-21
47 KR26-1W2 & KR26-A Oxygen Reducer Valves MiG-21
49 KT 100 Nose Wheel with Brake MiG-21
51 MA250KM Oxygen Manometer MiG-21
52 MDD-TE1-780 Transmitter MiG-21
53 MM-40 s1 Manometer MiG-21
54 MP 100-M Electro Mechanism MiG-21
57 SG 1F Potentiometer MiG-21
60 UA 27 Inertia Switch MiG-21
62 UP 24 Brake Valve MiG-21
63 UP22 Valve MiG-21
Source : http://aero-contact.com/mig-21/.
119.
Qualifications of
Maintenance Personnel
Check for appropriate qualifications, licensing, and type-specific training of personnel engaged in managing,
supervising, and performing aircraft maintenance functions and tasks.
The NTSB has found the use of non-certificated mechanics with this type of aircraft has been a contributing
factor to accidents. Only FAA-certificated repair stations and FAA-certificated mechanics with appropriate
ratings as authorized by § 43.3 perform maintenance on this aircraft. Previous military experience in certain
areas, i.e. engines, safety systems, needs to be considered.
120.
Ground Support,
Servicing, and
Maintenance Personnel
Recurrent Training
Recommend regular refresher training is provided to ground support, servicing, and maintenance personnel
concerning the main safety issues surrounding servicing and flight line maintenance of the aircraft.
Additional Information: Such a process should include a recurrent and regular review of the warnings,
cautions, and notes listed in the appropriate technical manuals. Note: Ejection seat safety is paramount.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
121.
Parts Storage and
Management and
Traceability
Recommend establishing a parts storage program that includes traceability of parts.
Additional Information: This is important in many cases because there is no original equipment manufacturer
(OEM) support.
122.
Maintenance Records and
Use of Tech Data
Conduct a detailed inspection of maintenance records, as required by FAA Order 8130.2. Verify maintenance
records reflect inspections, overhauls, repairs, time-in-service on articles, and engines. Ensure all records are
current and appropriate technical data is referenced. This should not be a cursory review.
Additional Information: Maintenance records are commonly inadequate or incomplete for imported aircraft.
In many cases involving MiG-21 aircraft, adequate records are essential because of the high likelihood that the
aircraft and many of its components may have reached their life-limit. Many have absolutely no records
describing its past military history. If the history of a life-limited component cannot be documented, it must
be assumed to have reached its time/cycle limit.
123.
Airframe Limitations and
Durability (General)
Verify whether the AIP addresses the aircraft’s airframe limit, required overhauls (not the same), how total
time is kept, and the status of any extension. Verify the appropriate data is available to consider an extension
past the life limit for the airframe and wings.
124. 24 Months Periodic Check
Verify that in addition to hourly times, the AIP addresses the required periodic inspections based on calendar
time, i.e., the 24-moth periodic inspection.
125.
Airframe Overhaul at
300-350 Hours
Verify that the AIP provides for the airframe overhaul at 300-350 hours depending on the MiG-21 version.
Additional Information: For example, in East German Air Force service, this inspection was called “pattern
maintenance,” and took place after 300-350 hours of flight. It was accomplished at depot level at VEB
Flugzeugwerft Dresden (FWD). This inspection does not change the airframe life-limit.
126.
1,500 Hour (or 17 Years)
Airframe Limit
(General)
The MiG-21 is an aircraft that was designed with fatigue life limits as part of the process. Some of the
airframes have a fatigue life (also referred to as service life) of 15-17 years or 1,500 hours, whichever came
first. Any claim of airframe time above this mark needs to be verified and documented. The “life” remaining
in an airframe is in fact a deciding point in the MiG-21 aircraft acquisition. Verify that the AIP is specific with
regards to the airframe life-limit depending on the aircraft’s type or (Izdeliye).
Additional Information: Many of the MiG-21s acquired from former Soviet Bloc countries raise the issue of
adequately determine the remaining “utility life” in the airframe. A simple claim that the aircraft has been
“overhauled” or “certified” past the 1,500-hour limit is not sufficient. Additionally, various differences exist
between aircraft; see Type 66, Type 96, and Type 75 MiG-21 Life-Limit and Other Types (Izdeliye) below.
127.
Type (Izdeliye) 66
MiG-21 Life-Limit
(Example)
If the aircraft is a Type-66 MiG-21, verify whether the AIP addresses the aircraft’s airframe limit (also referred
to as service life) at 1,600 hours.
128.
Type (Izdeliye) 96
MiG-21 Life-Limit
(Example)
to as service life) at 1,500 hours.
129.
Type (Izdeliye) 75
MiG-21 Life-Limit
(Example)
to as service life) at 1,200 hours. Some references to the MiG-21bis note that the original service life of the
MiG-21bis model was 2,400 hours or 30 years. If this claim is made, adequate data must be provided.
130.
3,000 Hour Airframe
Extension
If the aircraft has exceeded its life-limit, verify that any “after-market” airframe life-limit extensions, possibly
up to 3,000 hours (as in the IAF MiG-21bis), includes adequate and approved documentation is required.
There are no “homemade” extensions of “de fact” extensions because some “other” MiG-21 types or variants
have had the extension performed.
Additional Information: Although there is not “homemade” SLEP or Service Life Extension Program per se,
there is manufacturer’s guidance. See MiG (Manufacturer) MiG-21 Life-Extension Bulletins and IAF MiG-21
Service Life Extension below. Note: Some references to the MiG-21UM note that the original service life of
the aircraft was 3,000 hours or 30 years. If this claim is made, adequate data must be provided.
131.
MiG (Manufacturer)
MiG-21
Life-Extension Bulletins
If any extension to a life-limit is proposed, verify that the appropriate manufacturer’s Life Extension Bulletins
(LEB) are available and followed.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
132.
Appropriate
Nomenclature
Verify that the AIP provides for the appropriate component nomenclature used in the MiG-21.
Additional Information: This is necessary to avoid confusion, especially when US trained personnel are
involved with unfamiliar terminology, designations, units, and components. It is also critical for handling spare
parts. Examples of MiG-21F component nomenclature include:
• Fuse box 1A-115V;
• Front landing gear strut AYu, 3E-21;
• Turbo cooler KA-F;
• Electric motor F-37VT, 26v, 37 amps;
• Bell crank for stabilizer BU-51MS;
• Motor in vertical stabilizer (drives pump for elevator actuation) D-880T;
• Engine igniter control KNA-114M;
• Afterburner control unit KAF-13D-30ER;
• Afterburner ignition control KNA-114M;
• Emergency hydraulic pump NP-27T Series M;
• Main hydraulic pump NP34-2T;
• Compressed air bottle in wing K83D166;
• Engine fuel control relay DR-3A;
• Fuel indicator RTS-16-4;
• Relay regulator PT-5-56M;
• Fuel metering valve RTS-16A;
• Fuel flow meter RTO-13 (0-4 x 1,000 liters);
• Cabin pressure gage N17855;
• Electric motor for cooler Type 477D;
• EGT indicator TVG-1;
• Oxygen regulator KP-34;
• Oxygen pressure M-2000;
• Electrical control unit KNA-114M;
• 3-Position landing gear switch APN-45;
• Landing gear hydraulic valve GA-142/1;
• Hydraulic valve in nose well GS184U;
• Hydraulic cylinder in left landing gear door 3E-38;
• Hydraulic-electric valve in left landing gear well 5-4000116V;
• Pressure reducing valve for nose gear braking UP-24/1;
• Fuel or oil filter MKPT-9AF;
• Trim actuator MP-100MA Series 2;
• Trimmer ARU-3V;
• Voltage stabilizer in ignition circuit KP-50D;
• Electric motor in nose wheel well TR-115/36;
• Series resistor in ignition system AP 0.3;
• Piping in engine 4/63 72-6100-2200-2;
• Fire extinguisher NU63E97;
• Nitrogen bottle 3E-44;
• Nitrogen bottle 3D-26;
• Drag chute gun trigger 215P #303016;
• Shoulder harness adjust inertial lock 215P #303018;
• Main gear brakes UT23/2M1C;
• Nose wheel pneumatic cylinder 3A1048;
• Metering valve UP-24/1;
• Relay block RP-2 Series 2;
• G-Meter Mo-28A;
• Inertia transmitter 25M1;
• Automatic time control 1MB;
• Speed vs. altitude indicator ARU-3G;
• Voltmeter V-1;

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
133. 4,000-Hour Life-Limit
Any claim that the MiG-21 “has been cleared” to a life-limit of 4,000 hours is not correct, and should not be
accepted as part of any AIP proposal.
Additional Information: A life-limit extension to 4,000 hours was only a 1995 proposal by Sokol Nizhny
Novgorod Aircraft Building Plant SOKOL (JSC NAZ SOKOL), Russia, and was not part of either the MiG-21-93 or
MiG-21-98 upgrades. See Sokol Upgraded Fighter MiG-21bis above.
134.
IAF MiG-21 Service
Life Extension
If any extension of the airframe’s life limit is proposed, ask whether it is based on the extension project by
Indian Air Force concerning the MiG-21bis service life extension program, handled by India’s National
Aerospace Laboratories (NAL) until 2006.
Additional Information: This program included full-scale fatigue testing. It was designed to extend the
airframe life past 2,400 hours, possibly to 4,000 hours. However, fatigue cracks were experienced after only a
further 1,000 hours of simulated flight time. In any event, if such claims are made, adequate data must be
provided.
135.
Aircraft Re-Assembly
Issues
In many cases operators have re-assembled aircraft, “cleaning,” “checking,” and “servicing” components as
part of that process. It cannot be assumed that such work is equivalent to an overhaul or the equivalent of a
Soviet Deport level refurbishment. As a result, all work accomplished for the re-assembly of the aircraft must
be properly tagged or classified as such if it differs from required inspections per the applicable guidance.
Additional Information: This is particularly important because some operators may classify, on their own,
work on components as “on condition” and use that classification to later defer required inspections. That is
not acceptable. Refer to On Condition Inspections above.
136.
Soviet Aircraft
Maintenance Philosophy
The MiG-21, along with its powerplant (i.e., R-11 , R-13) had a very short service life, but in operational military
use (combat ready), this was not an issue since the type was expected to remain with an operational unit for
only a limited number of hours before a major, depot-level overhaul was required. This was common Soviet
philosophy. Operational units were not expected to worry about repairing their aircraft, engines, equipment,
and armament beyond the most elementary maintenance. Instead, they were to operate them through their
relatively short allotted operational lifetime and then exchange them for reserve or newly overhauled aircraft
or/and engine. Operationally, the aircraft is retired and disposed of after reaching their life-limit. As an
example, the Indian Air Force retired “nearly 70 MiG-21s fighters during 2005 as they reach the end of their
design service lives.” MiG-21 Retirements, International Air Power Review, 2004.
Additional Information: The implication for civil use is not, as some have argued, that Soviet life-limits do not
apply, but rather that safe operation must include tight compliance to not only the limitations themselves, but
also the associated level of repair and overhaul, and guidance. There is no technical data (or operational data
from MiG-21 past or current military operators) to suggest that an R-11 engine for example, with its very short
life-limit (150 hours), can be safely operated for 500 before an overhaul. That overhaul, which under Soviet
guidance is a MO or Major overhaul, is not a “homemade” in the “back of the hangar” process with “manuals
that have not be been translated into English,” but a depot-level activity with adequate technical support.
There is no other technical guidance to be used to assume the level of safety the aircraft had in frontline
service and even more to assume a level of safety acceptable in civil use.
137. Aging
Verify the AIP addresses the age of the aircraft.
Additional Information: This means many, if not all, of the age effects have an impact on the aircraft,
including: (1) dynamic component wear out, (2) structural degradation/corrosion, (3) propulsion system aging,
(4) outdated electronics, and (5) expired wiring.
138.
MiG-21 Maintainers
Differences Training
Recommend the applicant/operator provide (in the AIP or SOPs) for differences training between MiG-21
models for all maintainers. Significant differences include engine, instrumentation, drag chute, CG variations,
structural elements, and ejection seat system, and many others.
Additional Information: This is especially true in any situation involving a Soviet MiG-21 and a Chinese F-7 for
example, where the differences can be significant. As author Peter Davies notes, “although externally the
MiG-21bis resembled early versions of the Fishbed (MiG-21F), two decades of development and structural
changes made it a very different aircraft. “ Davis, 2008

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
139.
Use of Cycles
(General)
Recommend the AIP provides for tracking cycles, such as airframe and engine cycles, in addition to time in
service and in combination with inspections. This allows for the buildup of safety margins and reliability.
Additional Information: In military jet aircraft, there is a relationship between parts failures, especially as they
relate to power plants, landing gears, and other systems, and for that reason it is very important to track
airframe and engine cycles between failures and total cycles to enhance safety margins. For example, tracking
all aircraft takeoffs for full-thrust and de-rated thrust takeoffs as part of the inspection and maintenance
program would be a good practice and can assist in building up reliability data. The occurrence of failures can
be meaningfully reduced and cycles can play an important role. When rates are used in the analysis, graphic
charts (or equivalent displays) can show areas in need of corrective action. Conversely, statistical analysis of
inspection findings or other abnormalities related to aircraft/engine check and inspection periods requires
judgmental analysis. Therefore, programs encompassing aircraft/engine check or inspection intervals might
consider numerical indicators, but sampling inspection and discrepancy analysis would be of more benefit. A
data collection system should include a specific flow of information, identity of data sources, and procedures
for transmission of data, including use of forms and computer runs. Responsibilities within the operator’s
organization should be established for each step of data development and processing. Typical sources of
performance information are as follows, however, it is not implied that all of these sources need be included
in the program nor does this listing prohibit the use of other sources of information:
• Pilot reports;
• In-flight engine performance data;
• Mechanical interruptions/delays;
• Engine shutdowns;
• Unscheduled removals;
• Confirmed failures;
• Functional checks;
• Bench checks;
• Shop findings;
• Sampling inspections;
• Inspection discrepancies, and
• Service difficulty reports.
140.
Cycles and Adjustment
Engine Replacement
Intervals
Ask if both engine cycles and hours are tracked. If not, recommend it be done.
141. TS-27 Periscope
Ensure the AIP addresses the required inceptions and functionality of the TS-27 periscope fitted to the MiG-
21U two-seaters.
Additional Information: The rear cockpit was fitted with a retractable periscope to give the instructor a better
view over the nose and the head of his pupil during takeoff and landing. Note: Some single-seat MiG-21 may
have the system installed (i.e., TS-27AMSh) as a visual aid astern.
142. Air Intakes and Ducts
Verify the AIP incorporates the inspection of the air intakes, intake spike, duct, and related system, and
components, as per the applicable technical guidance, and as part of pre-flight. Related structures include (1)
boundary layer bleed, (2) boundary-layer exit doors, (3) spill door, and (4) stone guard.
Additional Information: In Finnish Air Force service, there were several instances where maintenance crews
found lose rivets in intake ducts (some caused FOD damage to the engines), even in relatively new aircraft. In
the MiG-21, the engine breathes through an asymmetric variable supersonic inlet air intake with a 3-position,
3-shock center body. The cone is driven by the air data system and also by power demand and engine rpm.
143. Air Brakes
Verify proper condition, deflection, cylinder condition, and warning signage of the air brakes. The dangers the
air brake poses to ground personnel are lethal and should also be addressed.
Additional Information: In the MiG-21F-13, two lateral air brakes with a total area of 0.76 m2
are mounted
low on the forward fuselage sides at frames 11-13, with a maximum deflection of 25°. A third, ventral
perforated air brake with an area of 0.47 m2
and a deflection of 45° is located at frame 22-25. These
dimensions and deflection change depending on the type and variant, such as in the MiG-21PF. The two-
seaters (i.e., MiG-21U) have a one-piece forward air brake.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
144. Wing Inspections
Verify that the AIP provides not only for the general inspection of the wings, but also of the inspection of the
main spar and aux spars, and the attach points and bolts. The inspection procedures need to reflect the
critical aspects of the wing.
Additional Information: The basic MiG-21 wing is an all-metal cantilever mid-wing monoplane structure with
a TsAGI S-12 series airfoil section and a clipped-wing delta configuration. It sweeps back at about 57° with an
anhedral of -2°. The thickness/chord ratio decreases from 5.0 percent at the root to 4.2 percent at the tip.
Each of the two wing panels is a single structure mainly of D16-T Dural with machined skins that have a
maximum thickness of 2.5 mm. These skins are machined but not integrally stiffened. The wing structure is
based on one main spar (at 33.3 percent chord) and three auxiliary spars (each indexed 90° to the fuselage
centerline), each having V-95 or VM-65 booms and 30KsGSA joints. See Skin Thickness below. The following
narrative of an Indian Air Force MiG-21 provides insight into these critical wing inspections: “On September
24, 2009, [a mechanic] was detailed for night storage servicing on a MiG-21 aircraft. During [the inspection,
the mechanic] observed that the main spar skin attachment bolt at the end towards fuselage was missing.
Under artificial lighting conditions of the night, it was barely possible to notice such a tiny bolt. Had it gone
unnoticed, it could have led to a hazardous situation in air. [The mechanic] good observation averted a
potential hazard.” http://www.indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Jun10.pdf. Note: in 2003, and despite being
recently overhauled, the Croatian Air Force grounded its MiG-21 fleet due to structural concerns involving the
wings. It was only in 2007 when the aircraft returned to service. See Steel Components below.
145. Skin Thickness
Verify that the AIP covers the varying skin thickness of the skin throughout the aircraft and that any repair or
replacement is made to the applicable specifications.
Additional Information: For example, in the wing top surface, there are no less than 10 different wing skin
thicknesses, from 0.035” to 0.21”.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
146.
Inspect and Repair as
Necessary (IRAN)
If an IRAN is utilized (or Soviet equivalent, which is unlikely), verify it is detailed and uses adequate technical
data (that is, include references to acceptable technical data) and adequate sequence for its completion if it is
proposed.
Additional Information: An IRAN must have a basis and acceptable standards. It is not analogous to an “on
condition” inspection. It must have an established level of reliability and life extension. An IRAN is not a
homemade inspection program.
147.
Combining Inspection
Intervals Into One
Set time limits for overrun (flex) of inspection intervals in accordance with the applicable guidance (i.e.,
NATO).
148.
Aircraft Storage and
Returning the Aircraft to
Service After Inactivity
Verify the applicant has a program to address aircraft inactivity (more than 7 days) and specifies specific
maintenance actions for return to service per the applicable inspection schedule(s) (for example, after 31
days).
Additional Information: A daily inspection or “preflight” is not an acceptable equivalent to a detailed
inspection to return the aircraft to flight after 30+ days of inactivity. The aircraft should be housed in a hangar
during maintenance. When the aircraft is parked in the open, it must be protected from the elements, that is,
full blanking kit and periodic anti-deterioration checks are to be carried out as weather dictates.
149.
Specialized Tooling for
Maintenance
Verify adequate tooling, jigs, and instrumentation is used for the required periodic inspections and
maintenance per the maintenance manuals.
Additional Information: Also, a MiG-21 assembly requires specialized equipment such as wing dollies, tail
dollies, and engine dollies.
150.
Technical Guidance Issued
While in Service
Verify the AIP references and addresses the applicable technical guidance issued to the aircraft during military
service to address airworthiness and safety issues, maintenance, modifications, updates to service
instructions, and operations of the aircraft.
Additional Information: For example, if the aircraft in question is a 1967 Ex-polish Air Force MiG-21U two-
seater retired in 1993, the AIP should provided up-to-date information concerning technical data that was in
effect in 2003 when the type was retired. This is necessary to ensure an adequate level of safety.
151. Safety Supplements
Verify the applicant/operator has copies of the applicable safety supplements for the aircraft and they are
incorporated into the AIP or operational guidance as appropriate.
152.
Corrosion Due to Age,
Inadequate Storage, and
Materials Used
Ask whether a corrosion control program is in place. If not, ask for steps taken or how it is addressed in the
AIP. Evaluate adequacy of corrosion control procedures.
Additional Information: Age, condition, and types of materials used in many former military aircraft require
some form of corrosion inspection control. This is paramount in the MiG-21 not only because of its age, but
because of many of the materials used in the aircraft. See for Corrosion Control Guidance below.
153.
Corrosion Control
Guidance
Verify that the AIP incorporates the adequate corrosion control guidance.
Additional Information: This type of guidance includes:
• Refer to FAA Order 8083-30, Chapter 6; FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 43-4A, Corrosion Control for
Aircraft;
• TO 1-1-691, Corrosion Prevention and Control Manual.
154. Pylons (Structural)
If applicable and installed, verify the AIP addresses the inspection of the aircraft’s pylons per the applicable
guidance (i.e., NATO) from a structural standpoint, including checking them for cracks. Pylons have separated
from the aircraft in flight and this constitutes not only a safety issue for the aircraft, but for people and
property on the ground.
155. Travel Pod
Verify that the AIP provides for the inspection of any travel pod being used. Only pods originally modified by
the military service that operated that MiG-21 is permitted, and this is limited to the modified 800-liter
centerline tank, such as those used by the Czech Air Force.
156.
Engine
Maintenance Procedures
Verify the AIP adheres to the maintenance procedures requirements per the applicable engine guidance for
the specific type and variant of the engine, i.e., R-11F-300 vs. R-11F2-300.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
157.
MiG-21 Engine Overview
(R-11)
The following provides a general overview of the MiG-21 engine(s).
“The MiG-21F is powered by one Tumansky (AMNTK Soyuz) R-11-300 (Izdeliye 37) axial-flow afterburning
turbojet rated at 3,880 kg (8,550 lb.) dry and 5,110 kg (11,265 lb.) reheat. The MiG-21 engine is a two-spool
turbojet with a fixed-area air intake, a three-stage supersonic low-pressure (LP) compressor, a three-stage
transonic high-pressure (HP) compressor, a can-annular combustion chamber, single-stage HP and LP turbines,
and an afterburner with a multi-petal axi-symmetrical variable nozzle. No inlet guide vanes or variable stators.
The first compressor stage is overhung ahead of the front bearing, facilitating repair, and has a parabolic
spinner; the second compressor stage has shrouded blades to prevent resonance vibrations. The HP spool has
a speed limiter. The accessory gearbox driven off the HP spool is located ventrally aft of the sixth compressor
stage and has nine drive faces, seven of which are normally occupied by the starter/generator, two hydraulic
pumps, two fuel pumps, the air compressor and the tachometer-generator. The combustion chamber has 12
flame tubes, two of which feature high-energy discharge igniters. The afterburner has three spray rings. The
nozzle is controlled by an electro hydraulic system with three rams driving the actuation ring. When the
engine is cold the axis of the afterburner/nozzle assembly is angled slightly to port with respect to the engine
spools; this angle disappears due to heat expansion when the afterburner becomes hot. The variable
convergent nozzle is located behind the afterburner. The low-pressure shaft is hinged by three bearings (front
main roller bearing, middle auxiliary ball bearing and rear auxiliary roller bearing). The high pressure shaft is
hinged by two main ball bearings in the shaft center and one main roller bearing in the rear shaft section. The
auxiliary gear box is driven by a high-pressure shaft. The front oil pump is driven by a low-pressure shaft. The
starter/generator drives the engine by multiple disc clutches and by ratchet or roller clutch. Starting is
electrical by means of a starter/ generator and is controlled by a single push button. Initial light-up is done
using petrol from an auxiliary tank. Overall engine pressure ratio (EPR) 8.6; mass flow at take-off power 64.5
kg/sec (142.2 lb. /sec). Turbine temperature 1,175.” http://www.kamov.net/general-aviation/mig-21-engine/.
158.
Chinese WP-7 Engine
(General)
If the aircraft is equipped with a Chinese WP-7 engine verify the AIP adheres to the maintenance procedures
requirements per the applicable engine guidance (in English) for the specific type and variant of the engine.
Additional Information: There are many variations of the WP-7. Also, the WP-7 and Soviet engines are not de
facto interchangeable nor are parts. There are manufacturing techniques and QA differences, many
modifications, such as different materials, new combustion chambers liners, new bearings and seals, and
redesigned afterburner and compressor sections, which went from 31 to 24 blades for example. Some of the
modifications were implemented for standardization while others for durability and safety. The only known
instance of such interchangeability (thee extent of which is not documented) may have happened when the
Albanian Air Force received ex-East German Air Force MiG-21 R-11 engines for a possible upgrade to their
Chinese F-7As. The related technical guidance is unknown. See Chinese WP-7B Modifications.
159.
Chinese WP-13 Engine
(General)
If the aircraft is equipped with a Chinese WP-13 engine (fitted to the Chinese copy of the MiG-21MF) verify the
AIP adheres to the maintenance procedures requirements per the applicable engine guidance (in English) for
the specific type and variant of the engine.
Additional Information: There are many variations of the WP-13. Also, the WP-13 and Soviet R-13 -300
engines are not interchangeable nor are parts. These engines were “equivalent”’ but not identical. There are
major differences such as the use of different titanium allows for the compressor disc and casings.
160.
Manufacturer’s and/or
NATO
Engine Modifications
Verify the AIP addresses the incorporation of the manufacturer and military modifications to the engine
installed.
Additional Information: The NTSB and some foreign CAAs have determined a causal factor in some accidents
is the failure of some civil operators of former military aircraft to incorporate the manufacturer’s
recommended modifications to prevent engine failures.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
161.
Engine Replacements and
Modifications
If the applicant considers an engine upgrade, ensure that the AIP addresses this. Only engine upgrades that
have been approved by the manufacturer are permitted.
Additional Information: It should not be assumed that an R-25 engine can be fitted to any MiG-21. Although,
in some cases, the R-13 and the R-25 are interchangeable from an installation standpoint (the R-25 has the
same dimensions and attachment points as the R-13), it can only be done with the OEM oversight and support.
For example, the R-25 is a completely new two-spool turbojet with a compression ratio almost double that of
the original R-11/13, and increased mass flow. The R-25 engine accessories may also be different and the
same applies to the fuel supply system. The afterburner system is also different in that the R-25 has a “soft”
cut-in and full modulation which does not exist with previous engines. No homemade upgrades should be
permitted. The R-13-300 engine had extra airflow in comparison with that of the R-11 series and demanded
the addition of debris guards (small deflector plates) under the auxiliary inlets by the leading edge of the wing
roots.
162.
Engine Type, Version, and
Variant
It is imperative that the AIP be specific to the type, versions, and variant of the engine installed in the aircraft.
There are many variations.
Additional Information: A sample of the engines used in MiG-21 variants are listed in the table below:
Model Engine Thrust – lb. (dry/reheat)
Ye-2 Mikulin AM-9B 5730/7165
Ye-2A/MiG-23
(Izdeliye 63)
Tumansky R-11 8380/ 11240
Ye-50 Tumansky RD-9E + Dushkin S-155 5730/7275 + 8380
Ye-50A/MiG-23U (Izdeliye 64) Tumansky R-11E-300 + Dushkin S-155 8380/11240 + 8380
Ye-4 Tumansky RD-9E 5730/7275
MiG-21 (Izdeliye 65) Tumansky R-11-300 ?/11020
Ye-6 Tumansky R-11F-300 8600/ 12680
MiG-21F (Izdeliye 72) Tumansky R-11F-300 8600/ 12680
MiG-21F-13 (Izdeliye 74) Tumansky R-11F-300 8600/ 12680
Ye-6T (“Ye-66”) Tumansky R-11F2-300 8258/ 13633
Ye-6T (“Ye-66A”)
Tumansky R-11F2-300 + Sevruk S3-
20M5A
8258/13633
Ye-6V Tumansky R-11F2S-300 8710/ 13610
Ye-7 1-2/MiG-21P Tumansky R-11F-300 8600/ 12680
Ye-7 3–4 Tumansky R-11F2-300 8710/ 13490
MiG-21PF (Izdeliye 76, 76A) Tumansky R-11F2-300 8710/ 13490
MiG-21FL (Izdeliye 77) Tumansky R-11F-300 8600/ 12680
Ye-7SPS, MiG-21PFS (Izdeliye 94) Tumansky R-11F2S-300 8710/ 13610
MiG-21PFM (Izdeliye 94, 94A) Tumansky R-11F2S-300 8710/ 13610
Ye-7R Tumansky R-11F2S-300 8710/ 13610
MiG-21R (Izdeliye 03, 94R, 94RA) Tumansky R-11F2S-300 8710/ 13610
MiG-21R (94R late) Tumansky R-13-300 8970/ 14320
Ye-7S Tumansky R-11F2-300 8710/ 13490
MiG-21S/SN (Izdeliye 95/95N) Tumansky R-11F2S-300 8710/ 13610
MiG-21M (Izdeliye 96) Tumansky R-11F2SK-300 8710/ 13610
MiG-21SM (Izdeliye 95M/15) Tumansky R-13-300 8970/ 14310
MiG-21MF (Izdeliye 96F) Tumansky R-13-300 8970/ 14310
MiG-21MT/SMT/ST
(Izdeliye 96T/50/50)
Tumansky R-13F-300 8970/ 14320
MiG-21bis (Izdeliye 75/75A/75B) Tumansky R-25-300 9040/15650 (21825*)
* = limited (3-minute) “extra-power” reheat at altitudes 4,000 meters (13,120 ft.) or less.
See MiG-21 Engine Overview below.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
163.
Failures and Failure
Modes
Verify the AIP discusses the known engine failure and failure modes. This is one of the most significant safety
issues with the MiG-21. Engine fires are common, and their cause needs to be understood. Typical R-11 and
R-13 engine failures include both compressor and turbine (HP) failures. Engine seizures and are nozzle failures
were common. As in many other cases, an engine failure translates in the failure of other critical systems,
such as hydraulic failure. See MiG-21 Accident Case Study Afterburner Failure and The Case of 908 (1983)
below.
Additional Information: This 1972 account of a Romanian AF MiG-21 accident illustrates the issue: “Just after
take-off, while the aircraft was at 3-400 meters and going at 700 km/h in full afterburner two compressor
blades detached and punctured fuselage fuel tank no. 7. The leaking fuel tank exploded seconds later, at 5-
600 meters altitude. The tail and engine detached from the rest of the plane, which glided for another 7 km
before crashing in a field.” http://www.ejection-history.org.uk/Country-By-Country/Romania.htm. Another
example is noteworthy. On October 12, 1965, aircraft 805, an East German Air Force MiG-21PF had an engine
seizure. The pilot ejected and survived. A detailed account of another such incident, by the same pilot, sheds
some light into this common failure: “Wolfgang Bohla subsequently landed the first MiG-21 safely with a
seized engine. In that case, the cause of the seizure was the bearing between high-and low-pressure rotor.
The bearing was sufficiently lubricated. The impact was felt if the throttle lever was moved to under 90%.
Captain Bohla flew almost to the threshold of the runway with 90% power (i.e. insanely fast) and brought the
power down after touch down. Because he brought the aircraft back, the cause was found. Afterwards,
Captain Bohla was honored by the Mikoyan design bureau. The Soviet specialists flew in to examine the
“intact machine” and to determine the cause of the failure. Later, another type of bearing was
installed.” http://home.snafu.de/veith/verluste8.htm. See Polish AF May 7, 1999 MiG-21bis Accident below.
164.
Polish AF May 7, 1999
MiG-21bis Accident
The following 1999 Polish AF account of a MiG-21 accident is provided to illustrate a MiG-21 turbine blade
failure, in this case traced to manufacturing and materiel defects which remained undetected by routine
maintenance inspections.
Additional Information: “Further details are now known about the loss of Polish AF 41 PLM MiG-21bis
Fishbed-N 8861. Just after take-off from Malbork at around 320 knots, the pilot turned off the afterburner,
leaving the throttle at the maximum operation mode. At the same time he heard an ‘unnatural sound’ from
the engine, which he described later as ‘screaming.’ He checked out the engine control panel, and noted no
variations from normal operating indications. Following commands from the Base Flight Supervisor on the
necessity of maintaining allocated flight level, the pilot reduced thrust to some 70% of its dry power. At the
same time, the ‘creaming’ of the engine decreased and became ‘more bass,’ the pilot reported. The aircraft
then made a turn to port with 40° bank and the velocity decreased. Immediately afterwards the [pilot]
reported to the Base Flight Supervisor ‘ in turn on back course, alternating current generator not operating,
drop in pressure in amplifying installation/ ‘ Following the command of the Base Flight Supervisor, the pilot
initiated a 5-10° climb with starboard wing banking of around 20°. The pilot pushed the throttle forward to
increase thrust, which resulted in a dramatic increase in the ‘screaming.’ Noting this, the pilot automatically
pushed back the throttle that brought the aircraft into level flight. After a few seconds, pressure in amplifying
hydraulic installation dropped. During a turn to starboard, the aircraft spontaneously initiated a bank to port
and started to descend. Unable to recover it, the pilot decided to eject. Following a detailed examination of
the crashed airframe and powerplant debris, and after hearing the pilot’s and witnesses’ accounts, the report
of the Polish MOD Commission of Air Accidents Investigation stated that the aircraft failure was related to the
power plant’s malfunction. No traces of foreign object damage were found and damage to the engine’s
turbine first stage blades and the blades of the turbine’s second stage driving apparatus, was noted.
Microscope examination confirmed fatigue cracks on a part of the turbine’s second stage blade. The
Commission determined that there was fatigue-related mechanical damage to the power plant turbine.
However, from the evidence available, the direct cause of the damage to the turbine could not be explicitly
determined. According to the final report, the accident was due to production, construction, technological
and material-related faults caused by the supplier.” Attrition, Air Forces Monthly, No. 176 (November 2002).
165.
Engine
Components Life Limits
Verify the AIP addresses the life limit of engine components. The engine life-limit is not necessarily applicable
to all components and/or accessories. The AIP needs to be clear on this. “On condition” inspections are not
acceptable.
Additional Information: There might be differences between engine types and variants (R-11 vs. R-13-300)
and between Soviet and Chinese engines (R-11 or WP-7).

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
166.
Soviet Engine Inspections
and Time Between
Overhaul (TBO)
(General)
Verify the applicant has established the proper inspection intervals and TBO/replacement interval for the
specific engine type and variant (i.e., R-11, R-13, and R-25) and adhere to those limitations and replacement
intervals for related components. These vary depending on the engine and variant.
Additional Information: While the TBO varies, it is likely to be around 150-200 hours. Verify whether there is
also life-limit (i.e., 1,500 hours) and calendar requirements. Justification and FAA concurrence is required for
an inspection and TBO above those set in the appropriate aircraft/engine inspection guidance. Clear data on
TBO/time remaining on the engine at time of certification is critical, as is documenting those throughout the
aircraft life cycle. Noteworthy is that some R-11 engines have a TBO of just 100 hours. In some cases, if
documented, the TBO of the R-25 could be as high as 500 hours, while 300-400 have been documented in the
MiG-21bis. This can be an issue because many represent a R-11 engine as “only having 120 hours” or “”he
hopes the engine will be good for well over 300 hours and some people have told him that it could actually run
for up to 1,000 hours without any major problem.” Mormillo, 2002. These types of statements are misleading
and not acceptable for purpose of certification.
167.
R-13-300 TBO and
Life-Limit
If the aircraft is equipped with an R-13-300 engine, verify that the AIP provides for the required 500 hours TBO
and 1,500 life-limit. Some references note 300-400 hours. The actual TBO needs to be verified.
Additional Information: Justification and FAA concurrence is required for an inspection and TBO above those
set in the appropriate aircraft/engine inspection guidance. Some operators assumed that an “in-house”
overhaul resets “the clock” on the engine. That is not so. At 1,500 hours, the engine is no longer to be used,
regardless of any refurbishment. Only the manufacturer can validate additional use of the engine and
components.
168.
R-13-300 SARPP-12GM
Data
If installed in the aircraft, recommend that SARPP-12 data be recorded in the AIP at the appropriate time or
inspection cycle.
Additional Information: For example, in the MiG-21MF, operation of the R-13F-300 engine is monitored by the
SARPP-12GM recording equipment. It records 6 analog signals and 6 discrete signals. Analogue signals are
recorded in the course of change of engine speed. Discrete time signal is recorded and the maximum power
on the afterburner. http://www.leteckemotory.cz/motory/r-13/. Also see SARPP-12 Flight Recorder below.
169.
Chinese WP-7/WP-23
Engine Inspections and
Time Between Overhaul
(TBO)
Verify the applicant has established the proper inspection intervals and TBO/replacement interval for the
specific WP-7 and WP-23 engine types and variants and adhere to those limitations and replacement intervals.
Additional Information: While the TBO varies, the TBO of the WP-7 is very low, with some at 100 hours and
other at 200 hours for early models. In the case of the WP-7F, the TBO was 300 hours while the WP-7B had a
lower TBO of 250 hours. Justification and FAA concurrence is required for an inspection and TBO above those
set in the appropriate aircraft/engine inspection guidance. Clear data on TBO/time remaining on the engine at
time of certification is critical, as is documenting those throughout the aircraft life cycle. Also, WP-7 and WP-
13, like their Soviet counterparts, had a calendar time limit, and this must be followed as well.
170.
Chinese WP-7B
Modifications
If the aircraft is equipped with a Chinese WP-7B engine, verify that the current modifications level is
incorporated, which are also one of the reasons why WP-7 components are not interchangeable with Soviet R-
11 or R-13 counterparts. Other reasons include manufacturing techniques and QA. For example, as of 2004,
the WP-7B has had 56 modifications incorporated into its design and manufacturing. Some of the
modifications were implemented for standardization while others for durability and safety.
171.
R-11 Limits
(Bulletin) # 58207512AB
Verify that the AIP and related SOPs reflect the applicable R-11 limitations, including Soviet/Russian (Bulletin)
# 58207512AB.
Additional Information: Recent postings by MiG-21 operators explain the issue: “…below is the updated
explanation on the R-11 ground run RPM limits….This advice is not part of the technical description for the R-
11-300 (37F2 + series). It is in force since March 1973 by the Russian AD # 58207512AB where on the ground
the RPM N1
75-84% and 95 – 98%, so called Transition RPM, must be avoided. This is valid for all R-11 series,
and again, valid only for ground runs. Reason were some dramatically accidents during ground run, caused by
resonance frequencies at those RPMs which caused cracks in the front compressor disk with following
disintegration during the ground run....ending up in a big fire ball...At this time, on all engines a special
inspection with ultra-sonic NDT “Uzedl” was performed....a number of engines were removed. Since we have
raised the index finger now.....please remember that on the Ground the duration for MAX RPM (Mil Power)
and afterburner work is limited to 15 sec only! Please distribute. Bernd.” http://www.classicjets.org/forum.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
172. Engine Check
Verify the AIP includes adequate procedures (i.e., USAF, NATO), including checks and signoffs for returning an
aircraft to airworthiness condition after any work on the engine.
Additional Information: As an example, as part of its investigation of a fatal former military aircraft accident in
2004, the NTSB found after an engine swap-out the week before the fatal accident, the mechanics had warned
the newly installed engine was not operating correctly. The record also shows the A&P mechanic who
oversaw and supervised the engine change did not sign off any maintenance records to return the airplane to
an airworthy status. Before the fatal flight, two engine acceleration tests failed, and multiple aborted takeoffs
took place in the days leading up to the crash.
173.
Engine Thrust and
Temperatures
Verify the AIP includes measuring actual thrust of the engine and tracking engine operating temperatures and
other parameters as per the applicable technical guidance.
Additional Information: The MiG-21 engines (i.e., R-11, R-13, and R-25) use EPR settings, like the civil JT-8 for
example. As an example, take-off EPR ranges from 8.6 on the R-11 to 9.55 on the R-25. These engines
effectively have three indications: Temperature, RPM, and EPR.
174. Engine Starter
Verify that the AIP provides for the adequate maintenance, inspection, replacement (at life-limit), and
calibration of the starter/generator system. This is critical to prevent fires.
Additional Information: For example, operationally, with the MiG-21F-13 and R-11 engine, engine fires on
start-up were not uncommon, especially in tropical conditions if the starter was not properly adjusted. In the
MiG-21F, starting was electrical by means of a starter/generator and is controlled by a single push button.
Initial light-up is accomplished using fuel from an auxiliary tank. In aircraft equipped with the R-13-300 engine,
“the starter system provides ‘triggering’ on the ground and in flight mode and turns on additional burning. The
system is an electric engine. It is constituted by a starter-generator GSR-ST-12000 VT, a fuel system main
combustion chamber, an additional fuel combustion chamber system, an engine electrical system and an
oxygen system engine. When you start the engine on the ground, after the connection to the source of
electrical current starter-generator GSR-ST-12000VT spins through a two-speed drive and an armoire drives
spinning rotor turbo compressors high pressure. Once you reach the idle revs the engine two speed drive
switches starter-generator GSR-ST-12000VT of trigger being mode to generator mode, wherein supplying
direct current to aircraft’s systems. The trigger fuel system ensures the main combustion chamber during
startup regulated supplies fuel to two 'lighters' in the main combustion chamber according to the overall air
pressure (compression) from engine "P2C" with the MKPT-9AF electrohydraulic valve.”
See http://www.leteckemotory.cz/motory/r-13/. See O2
Relight System below.
175. SGO-8 Generator
If the aircraft is so equipped (i.e., the MiG-21PFM has a separate SGO-8 generator supplying 115 V AC), verify
that the AIP provides for its inspection, maintenance, and replacement (the life-limit as prescribed) as per the
applicable technical guidance.
176.
PURT-1F Engine Control
System
Verify that the AIP provides for the adequate maintenance, inspection, and replacement (at life-limit) of the
PURT-1F electro-mechanical engine control system.
Additional Information: Along with the main and afterburner fuel pumps (aka afterburner booster pump), it
ensures smooth operation of the engine through the speed range from ground idle to afterburner settings.
177. O2
Relight System
Verify that the AIP provides for the adequate maintenance, inspection of the gaseous oxygen system that is
part of the system to facilitate relight at high-altitude and low forward speed.
Additional Information: The O2
system delivers oxygen into the engine's main combustion chamber for engine
start during flight. The oxygen system operates with an oxygen pressure of p = 0.9 to 1.05 MPa. Also see
Engine Starter above.
178. Accessory Gearbox
Verify that the AIP provides for the inspection of the gearbox and all of its related components as per the
applicable guidance, including any life-limits.
179. Fuel Dump Pipe
Verify that the AIP provides for the inspection and functionality of the exhaust fuel dump pipe as per the
applicable guidance.
Additional Information: The high number of “back-end” fires in the MiG-21 dictate that all fuel lines in that
area of the aircraft be properly inspected, even when they are open lines, like the fuel dump pipe.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
180.
Afterburner Control Box
and Related Fuel Lines
Verify that the AIP and related inspections (engine) address the afterburner (A/B) control box and related fuel
lines. This is to include replacement well. This needs to be done as per the applicable technical guidance. It
will likely include a ground run to test the system’ functionality and safety. Adequate precautions, such as fire
guard and trained personnel in the cockpit are also an important issue to consider. Unfortunately, in
operational service, afterburner failures have been linked to failure of these components.
Additional Information: The following narrative illustrates the difficult nature of the failure: “After 15 minutes,
one aircraft taxied back. The pilot reported that the after-burner was not getting engaged. It was obvious that
if that aircraft didn’t fly we would not achieve 100% serviceability. From the input of the pilot it appeared that
it was a snag related to the after burner (A/B) electrical control system. Decision was taken to change the A/B
control box and carry out a ground run. The aim was to clear the fault at the earliest and offer it for flying and
achieve 100% serviceability. The suspected component was replaced within 30 minutes. The aircraft was
prepared for a full performance ground run. Testers were connected to the engine to check the satisfactory
engagement of A/B. As a mandatory requirement the A/B fuel gauge was also required to be connected to
measure the A/B fuel pressure. After a short delay, the engine fitters found a fuel gauge with fuel pipe and
connected to the engine A/B fuel manifold. As I was keen to offer the aircraft for flying, I decided to give the
ground run myself and check the A/B parameters. The ground run started with all precautionary measures.
Everything was satisfactory till the max dry run. When I engaged the A/B and was checking its parameters, the
Gang I/C indicated for an “emergency cut off” of the engine. As I was checking the gauges inside the cockpit, I
couldn’t switch off the A/B immediately. When I eventually looked back from the cockpit I could sense the
gravity of the situation. The ground crew was running away from the aircraft shouting “cut off.” I could see a
stream of fuel gushing out from the engine. The engine was running in the A/B regime. So I immediately
switched off the A/B and brought the throttle to idle position. The technician indicated that the fuel leak had
stopped. But, there was a heavy smoke from the engine compartment. I switched off the engine immediately
and came out of the cockpit. The CFT crew was ready to start their operation. The smoke remained for a few
minutes and eventually stopped. As the engine was cut off without proper cooling and running in idle there
was fuel accumulation in the jet pipe which was cleared after cooling off the engine. When I went and
checked the engine compartment I was shocked to see that the A/B fuel pressure pipe (gauge to read the fuel
pressure) had come off from its clamp fitting. The clamp was found on the A/B fuel pressure tapping. Had the
engine not been switched off in time, it could have lead to uncontrolled fuel gushing out from the A/B fuel
pressure tapping. Spreading of fuel in the engine compartment in the hot zone could have lead to fire on the
engine subsequently to a major catastrophe. On investigation, it came to light that the fuel gauge along with
the fuel pipe was unserviceable. It was kept in the engine section for local repairs. The engine fitter detailed
for the ground run was not aware of the fact as the ground run was organized without sufficient preparation
time, the engine fitter couldn’t cross check the serviceability of the gauge with his section I/C. Subsequently
we brought a serviceable gauge from the nearby squadron and accomplished the ground run successfully. This
aircraft was offered in the last detail of the day flying.” http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Jan12.pdf.
See Afterburners, Nozzle, and Related Components above.
181.
Afterburners, Nozzle, and
Related Components
Verify the AIP specifically addresses the inspection of the afterburner system and the augmentor nozzle and
related hydraulic actuators (a total of 3) and gears (including gear pinions). Nozzle failures have been linked to
several accidents. Nozzle gear pinions have a history of failure.
Additional Information: This has been documented in the Indian Air Force, and it was attributed to poor
quality. Other afterburner components include the afterburner nozzle-jack cooling air intake, exhaust nozzle
fairing, 3 hydraulic actuators, and the afterburner cooling intake. Heat insulation should, also be included.
The diffuser is critical. The following Indian Air Force incident illustrates this: “On September 29, 2011, [two
mechanics] were detailed for ‘Afterburner Diffuser’ change of an R-13 aero engine of a MiG-21 aircraft. After
removal, during pre fitment checks of new diffuser, they noticed a crack along the longitudinal axis of the
“structure of second stage nozzle diaphragm assembly at 11 ‘30” position. The location was remote and could
not be traced on an intact engine. On detailed inspection, it was found that the metal was bent at one end of
the crack.” http://www.indianairforce.nic.in. Another account drives the point home: “On April 21, 2010,
during the course of a check, a mechanic noticed abnormal and excessive movement of one of the vanes of
radial flame stabilizer of the after-burner diffuser. Further investigations revealed that the vane center
mounting had cracks.” http://indianairforce.nic.in. See Afterburner Control Box and Related Fuel Lines below.
Note: An afterburner is a device used for increasing the thrust of a jet engine by brining additional fuel in the
uncombined oxygen present in the turbine exhaust gases.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
182.
Fuel Pump Failures and
Failure Modes
Verify that the AIP provides for the inspection, maintenance, and replacement (at the required life-limit) of the
fuel pump (i.e., NR-21F, NR-22F2M2, NR-44, and NR-54F2). These are not necessarily interchangeable, that is
from a MiG-21F to a MiG-21PF, or from an R-11 engine to an R-25 engine. These pumps are known to leak.
Additional Information: The following 1988 Polish Air Force MiG-21 accident narrative illustrates the
consequences of a fuel pump failure: “Pilot Lieutenant Engineer Jaroslav Górecki had 510 hours in airplanes,
about 241 hours in type. It was a night IMC flight. The pilot performed an afterburner take-off from Wroclaw.
After leaving the ground, the height of 15-20 meters, during the climb, there was a short circuit in the fuel
pump and the engine afterburner stopped working. Pilot made no attempt to bailout despite the RP
team.” http://aviacrash.ucoz.ru/load/aviacija_pnr/katastrofy_1971_1980_chast_3/6-1-0-91. Another
accident, this time in May 1970 also illustrates the issue: Pilot: Lieutenant Larkin LP Letchik. Circumstances:
after 22 minutes, 30 seconds after takeoff, the engine stopped. The pilot reported the engine had stopped.
He was instructed to turn on the switch “air ignition” and initiate a climb of 10 degrees. The engine speed
started to increase up to 68% on WFD and 45% of LPR, then fell sharply. This process was repeated twice by
the pilot. The pilot was eventually ordered to eject. The pilot ejected from the aircraft in level flight at an
altitude of 500 meters and a speed 300 km/h. He landed safely, avoiding injury. Reason: The reason for the
engine stopping in flight was the engine limiter which resulted in a low pressure rise in the pump, as evidenced
by the damage countertops valves, piston, and piston sleeve. This was traced to poor design and
manufacturing defects.” http://aviacrash.ucoz.ru.
183. Diffuser Casing
Verify that the AIP provides for the inspection, maintenance, and replacement (life-limit may apply) of the
diffuser casing.
Additional Information: The following is an example: “November 23, 2011, [an engine mechanic] was detailed
to check leakage from the main fuel pump during wet cranking of a MiG-21 Bison aircraft. During checks, he
observed minute dampness from the top of diffuser casing of the engine and the wet cranking was aborted.
Subsequently, detailed checks revealed, that there was a crack in the mounting of diffuser casing at 10 O’clock
position. The diffuser casing was withdrawn. Had this gone unnoticed, it could have led to a fire during start
up. http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/SEP%2012.pdf.
184. Fuel Flow Restrictors
Verify that the AIP covers the proper type and installation of the fuel restrictors.
Additional Information: The following Indian Air Force account sheds detail into this issue: “One day, I was
detailed to give a final ground run (FGR) to one of the MIG 21s. After completing the DI [daily inspection) and
obtaining clearance from all tradesmen, I started the engine. During warm up, I had moved the throttle to
reheat for engagement of afterburner. However, when the afterburner did not engage, I moved the throttle
back below the reheat regime. Suddenly, a loud bang emanating from the engine was heard and I
immediately switched off the engine. This sound was so loud that it attracted the attention of everyone
working in and around ‘Tech Flt’. An investigation was ordered to unearth the cause for this unusual sound.
During the investigations, all the restrictors were removed and checked for proper size and fitment. It was
revealed that the flow restrictors of EM-6 and EM-7 (afterburner carburetor valves) were interchanged. The
maximum flow value restrictor (EM-7) was fitted towards the minimum value side (EM-6) and the minimum
flow value restrictor was fitted towards the maximum value side. Due to this inter change of flow restrictors,
there was a delay in engagement of afterburner to light up which had caused the loud bang. The flow
restrictors ensure that required proportion of fuel is delivered to form a fuel-air mixture in carburetors. The
carburetors supplied fuel-air mixture in atomized form to the after burner igniter. The restrictor design was
such that while seeing it from the bottom it was difficult to distinguish between EM-6 and EM-7 restrictors
especially if an individual had limited knowledge and experience. Both restrictors were identical and installed
in a similar fashion in close proximity to each other. As a supervisor, I had deliberated at length with my
subordinates on the proper procedures of fitment and identification of EM-6 (outward) and EM-7 (inward)
restrictors and the consequences of wrong fitment. Similarly, in the hydraulic decelerator of the main fuel
pump there were two restrictors known as forward flow restrictor and reverse flow restrictor (which were nick
named hydraulic decelerator top (Reverse Flow Restrictor) and bottom (Forward Flow Restrictor). Forward
flow restrictor was provided for a definite rate of RPM reduction with abrupt backward movement of the
throttle lever. If these components were to be interchanged, then the throttle lever would get hydraulically
locked above idle rating. Thus, the engine could not switch off until the fuel shut off valve was closed which in
turn would lead to dry running of all the pumps. The MiG-21 fighter is nearing completion of its total technical
life and design improvement may not be possible due to the aircraft vintage and cost effectiveness.
Unfortunately, construction and design of all MiG-21 series engine remains the same. With little care and
continuity classes at regular intervals, recurrence of such mistakes can be
avoided.” http://www.indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Jun10.pdf.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
185. Rotary Slide Valve
Verify that the AIP and related engine inspection tasks address the engine rotary slide valve in the engine.
Engine malfunctions have been linked to this failure.
Additional Information: The following narrative illustrates such an incident: “There were two incidents I
witnessed while in service with HAL. The first one was an incident of an R-25 engine flame out, during the
engine test run. The defect investigation revealed, that the engine flame out was due to the jamming of rotary
slide valve, which supplies fuel to the engine combustion chamber. This valve is a part of the main fuel pump,
which slides to and from inside the assembly rotating at 4,500 rpm. The clearance between the valve and the
body is between 5 μ to 15 μ. It was concluded that, due to contamination of fuel, some particles got trapped
between the clearances and led to the jamming of the rotary slide valve. Later, modification was carried out
to improve the surface hardness of the rotary slide valve. Several stages for checking the quality of fuel were
also introduced.” http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Dec10.pdf.
186. Aero-Engine Inspection
Verify that the AIP addresses the inspection and maintenance of the aero-engine (starter) and related
components, including the AWD 7-44-5 Engine Start Control Box.
Additional Information: The following illustrates the need for such inspections, including line inspections: “On
July 26, 2011, [a mechanic] was detailed to carry out [a pre-flight inspection] on a MiG-21 aircraft. During the
inspection, he found two loose rivets in the periphery of air-to-air radiator. These rivets were in air intake
passage just before the aero-engine. Subsequent inspection revealed that the rivets were loose from the
base. Had it gone unnoticed, these rivets would have sheared off in subsequent sorties, causing irreparable
damage to the aero-engine.” http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Jan12.pdf. Note: In the MiG-21, The
starter/generator drives the engine by a multiple disc clutch, and by ratchet or roller clutch.
187. Borescope Engine
Recommend the AIP incorporate Borescope inspections of the engine at 25 hours per the applicable inspection
procedures. Recommend a calendar schedule be also used in addition to the hourly inspection. AC 43.13-1
can be used as a reference.
Additional Information: Also see FAA 8083-32 Aviation Maintenance Technician Handbook–Powerplant
Volume 2, U.S. Department of Transportation, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, Flight Standards Service,
2012.
188. Engine Support Structure
Verify that the AIP provides for the inspection of all the engine related support structures in the aircraft. This
is particularly important during engine removal and installation.
Additional Information: The following 1990 accident involving an East German Air Force MiG-21bis illustrates
an afterburner-related engine failure which involved the aircraft’s structure. On that day, aircraft 844, a MiG-
21bis (factory number 75 051 400, use beginning 10/1977), was lost as a result of engine damage. Following
the third time the afterburner was selected, there was a knock in the engine. The pilot deselected the
afterburner. The pilot of the other aircraft could see holes in the fuselage. At an altitude of 1,200 meters, full
engine power no longer possible, and a loss of speed and altitude occurred. The pilot ejected and survived. In
the MiG-21, the engine is connected to the torque tube by a ring. A connection had come loose, and engine
and tube partially separated. As a result, hot gases under pressure escaping. The consequence, in addition to
the very high likelihood of a fire, was that it resulted in the loss of thrust
encountered. http://home.snafu.de/veith/verluste8.htm. See MiG-21 Tail/Engine Separation below.
189. Spool Down Time
Verify the AIP incorporates action(s) following a change in the spool down time of the engine(s) after
shutdown. This is critical as it could be an indicator of an upcoming problem with the engine.
190. Engine Ground Run
Verify the engine goes through a ground run and check for leaks after reassembly. Confirm it achieves the
required revolutions per minute for a given exhaust gas temperature (EGT), outside air temperature, and field
elevation. In addition, it is essential that this process ensure an adequate level of safety during testing.
Additional Information: As an example, on January 7, 1963, an East German Air Force MiG-21F-13 was
involved in a fatal accident in such circumstances. 4 ground personnel were killed. During engine testing on a
contaminated ramp surface (ice), the aircraft jumps over the pads, and shot across the airfield, crashed into a
tanker car, and caught fire.
191. EGT System
Verify that the EGT systems and all of its components are properly inspected, maintained, and replaced as per
the appropriate guidance. Many EGT malfunctions have been documented, and in many cases, due to faulty
thermocouples.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
192.
Use of Different Fuels and
Fuel Quality
Verify the AIP addresses how the use of different fuels may require changes or additions to the engine
inspection and maintenance programs.
Additional Information: The fuels used in the MiG-21’s engines were T-1, TS-1, T-2, and T-7. Some of these
may have a high Hydrogen content. Note: High hydrogen content was used to “clean” out the combustion
and reduce exhaust smoke trail. On the other hand, it increased the level of condensation trails (contrails) at
high-altitude. Suitability of all Western fuel should be checked, and the AIP should include a table describing
the types of Western fuels (i.e., Jet A, JP-4, JP-5, JP-8) that can be used. The AIP should also address fuel
quality. Many MiG-21 accidents were the result of fuel contamination. See Rotary Slide Valve above. It
should not be assumed that Soviet engines “can take anything, “as some have argued.
193.
MiG-21
Tail/Engine Separation
Verify adequate tail/engine separation (at frame 28/28A) by using proper procedures and support equipment
to prevent structural and serious engine damage. An engine change requires removing the whole tail, and this
is a big event which takes a long time to complete. Access to related units and assemblies is very difficult. In
addition, it requires the specialized tail and engine dollies. Proper bolts and nuts are also needed. Unless
properly accomplished, this task could seriously damage not only the engine but the surrounding structure.
No “fork lifts” should be been used for this all-important task. See Engine Support Structure above.
Additional Information: The following narrative illustrates the complexities of such a task and the need to be
knowledgeable on the process: “It was a weekend in the winter season and our squadron had just returned
back from successful detachments. A rum punch was planned on that day. I was attached to R&SS (now Tech
Fit), as the manpower from the squadron use to be attached to R&SS, for second line servicing. The afternoon
task was to complete Rear Fuselage (RF) fitment on a MiG-21 aircraft. The aircraft was to be made available
for functional checks and Full Performance Ground Run, the next working day. I, along with one supervisor,
was detailed to meet the task pertaining to our trade (Elect). I was very excited to complete the task as I knew
that this would be followed by a Rum Punch get together celebrations. I and my supervisor decided to share
the task in hand and after getting necessary clearances, we began our job. In the mean time, the sun light had
gone down inside the hanger. While the supervisor was giving connection to different plugs at R/F joints, I was
fitting the ‘Transmission Pieces’ near R/F joints. The fitment of ‘Transmission Pieces’ requires a good source of
localized lighting, besides continuous focus and attention. But, I had done this job a number of times before,
so I knew there would be no major deterrence in my task. There was one servicing ladder placed near the R/F
joint and it was being used by all tradesmen along with me. One of the ‘Transmission Piece’ was successfully
fitted and I was fitting the next one. I was holding a torch with left hand and tightening this with my right
hand. During the process, the spanner slipped from my hand and slid away in the R/F. I tried a lot to trace it
with the help of torch but did not succeed. I informed my supervisor about the issue, to which he also made
his share of attempts to find the spanner, but failed. We informed the WO in-charge of the afternoon shift
and a combined effort was made by many tradesmen to trace the spanner in the R/F. Many different methods
were applied but all went in vain. In the mean time the Engineering Officer also tried but could not succeed. I
was feeling ashamed and guilty for this situation, knowing well that R/F removal was the only solution to the
problem in hand. After deliberations by various supervisors, it was finally decided to remove the R/F. As we
finished sliding out the R/F, we could locate the spanner, which was a great relief to all. I cannot forget this
incident, as a silly mistake of mine resulted in loss of a lot of man power and man hours. I made it a point to
draw lessons from it and changed my working style, for the better. Sgt.
Kumar” http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Nov11.pdf.
194.
Fire Detection and
Suppression System
If equipped, verify the serviceability of the fire detection and suppression system. The operator should
establish an inspection process (reference the appropriate technical guidance) to ensure the validity of the fire
warning system. Note: there have been cases of in-flight fire warning indications due to fuel leaks in front of
the fire warning transducer. This occurred twice to the same aircraft (N315RF) in 2000 during Phase I flight
testing.
Additional Information: Note: A typical MiG-21 fire suppression system is as follows: “A 2-liter fire
extinguisher bottle is located at frame 20 (in the right wheel well) , with a pyrotechnical valve and a steel
manifold distributing the extinguishing agent in the engine bay, ensuring fire suppression in flight and on the
ground. An IS-2MS (or, on late version, IS-3) fire warning system is provided with flame sensors installed at
fuselage frame 29.” Gordon, MiG-21, 2008.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
195. Compressor Hatch (Door)
The AIP and related SOPs (i.e., flight line support) need to emphasize the all-important engine compressor
“hatch” (door) on the MiG-21.
Additional Information: The following account illustrates the need not only to have trained but safety
conscious personnel: “On 14 January 1975, 849, a MiG-21PFM/SPS (factory number 94 5115) crashed around
noon in the city Cottbus. It was caused by an engine failure due to the loss of the compressor hatch (not
properly secured). The aircraft crashed on approach into house (factory). The pilot and five Polish workers
were killed. In addition, there were 10 injured civilians. The cause of the disaster was human error. Pilots and
mechanics were involved. 849 had been the only spare aircraft that day. The mechanic secured the
compressor hatch (in the wheel well) and probably attached it with only 4 of 36 screws. This was a common
because the inspection of this area is part of the walk around and the pilot would check that area of the
engine called “engine control room.” To save time, the hatch was attached with four screws cross wise. Only
after the pilot had checked the area, would the engine hatch be closed with all of the 36 screws and the
aircraft readied. On that day, the pilot had landed with an unserviceable aircraft and immediately requited
the spare, 848. To avoid delay, the pilot did not complete a comprehensive pre-flight. The ground crew
assisted the pilot in the start-up. However, during this hectic episode, the mechanic did not secure all of the
36 screws. The aircraft took off normally. Even the flight was normal. During flight, the attached screws
loosened, likely due to vibrations. With the retracted left landing gear, the hatch held. However, when the
landing gear was lowered, it got loose and separated. This led to the engine failure. The pilot was ordered to
eject, but because the aircraft was over a populated area, the pilot remained with the aircraft. In the
investigation, the compressor hatch was never found.” http://home.snafu.de/veith/verluste1.htm.
196. Firewalls
Verify that the AIP incorporates the maintenance and inspection of the firewalls, which are critical safety
items, especially in light of the record the aircraft has concerning engine fires.
Additional Information: For example, in the MiG-21F, firewalls made of high-carbon stainless steel are located
in the engine bay at frames 29, 34, 35A, and 36.
197. Flaps Inspections
Verify that the AIP provides for the required inspections and maintenance of the flap system in the aircraft.
The flap system and their complexity, varies depending on the aircraft type and variant.
Additional Information: For example, the early versions of the MiG-21U used area-increasing TsAGI flaps
(modified Fowler flaps) with flap settings of 24° 30’ for take-off and 44° 30” for landing. On the other hand,
single-seat MiG-21 PFS onwards, as well as MiG-21US and UM had blown flaps with a fixed rotation axis. In
that case, flap settings were 25° for take-off and 45° for landing. In the case of the blown flaps, or BLC, the
inspection of addition components (i.e. ducts) is required. See SPS System (Blown Flaps) below. Additional
inspections may be required since this may have developed into an issue previously not well-documented. In-
flight failure has been documented. Case in point, in May 2008, a flap on a Croatian AF MiG-21bis separated in
flight during low altitude maneuvering. That air force’s MiG-21 fleet was temporarily grounded as a result.
Recommend that the outcome of the Croatian AF investigation be considered.
198. Bleed Air (General) Verify the AIP includes procedures for inspecting and ensuring the serviceability of the engine bleed air.
199. Fire Guard
Verify maintenance, servicing, preflight, and post-flight activities include fire guard precautions. This is a
standard USAF/NAVAIR/NATO safety-related procedure and it should be followed. Note: As a reference, the
engine start in a MiG-21 will include a good amount of fuel “leakage” onto the ground from the drain lines.
200. Unsuccessful Engine Start Verify the AIP includes procedures for documenting all unsuccessful starts.
201.
SPS System
(Blown Flaps)
If the MiG-21 version being certificated is equipped with the SPS system (blown flaps – Sduva Pogranichnovo
Sloya) (i.e. MiG-21US), their inspection and maintenance needs to be covered in the AIP as per the appropriate
guidance. Particular attention should be given to the respective air ducts for leaks and the integrity of the
flaps honeycomb structure.
Additional Information: Note: In late model MiG-21s, like the PFM, the engine (R-11F2S-300) was adapted to
the SPS system, which improved takeoff and landing characteristics. The SPS system was introduced into
production with a model designated MiG-21 PFS or MiG-21PF (SPS). Note: The bleed “pipes go straight from
the large connections on each side of the combustion chamber casing to the wing-root spars on each side, and
hence along the front of each flap to terminate in a fishtail pipe very similar to that of Western flap-blowing
systems. The flaps themselves are of slightly greater chord than the original pattern. Instead of running out
and down on tracks at each end they are simply hinged, pulled down by a hydraulic actuator at the flap mid-
span point. The prominent actuator fairing immediately shows the presence of SPS flaps.” Gunston, 1986.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
202.
Servicing, Engine Fire
Servicing Personnel
Unfamiliar with the
Aircraft Create Hazardous
Situations
Ensure the operator warns servicing personnel via training and markings of the fire hazard of overfilling oil,
hydraulic, and fuel tanks.
Additional Information: Lack of experience with the MiG-21 servicing is a safety concern. Require supervision
of servicing operations and fire safety procedures. Improperly securing the oil cap has caused several MiG-21
accidents. The following 1977 Soviet Air Force accident report illustrates this: “Pilot: Captain Shevaldov Yu,
senior pilot, the pilot class 1. On April 13, 1977, the pilot was flying MiG-21R № 383/483 during a training
mission. The incident occurred 29 minutes into the flight to the combat course for photographing objects at
the tactical polygon, and an altitude of 600 meters and a speed of 700 km / h. On slowing down the aircraft,
engine speed started to fall; reducing the intensity of the cabin lighting, the generator failure light came on,
followed by a ‘spontaneous engine shutdown.” After stopping the engine, the pilot reduced speed to the
necessary speed and attempted to start the engine in the air. When the engine did not start and at an altitude
of 450 meters and a speed of 500 km / h, the pilot reported the failure, and was ordered to eject. He did. The
aircraft collided with the ground in 7 kilometers from the landfill, exploded and burned. The reason for the
engine failure ‘was the destruction of the middle bearing ball bearing rotor for lack of cooling due to oil
starvation. The cause oil starvation was leaking oil from the oil tank due to improper installation filler cap.”
http://aviacrash.ucoz.ru.
203. Fire Guard
Verify maintenance, servicing, preflight, and post-flight activities include fire guard precautions. This is a
standard USAF/NAVAIR/NATO safety-related procedure and it should be followed. Note: As a reference, the
engine start in a MiG-21 will include a good amount of fuel “leakage” onto the ground from the drain lines.
204. Unsuccessful Engine Start Verify the AIP includes procedures for documenting all unsuccessful starts.
205. Engine Storage
Review engine storage methods and determine engine condition after storage. Evaluate calendar time since
the last overhaul.
Additional Information: For example, the use of an engine with 50 hours since a 1991 overhaul may not be
adequate and a new overhaul may be required after a specified time in storage. Note: Experimental exhibition
of former military aircraft is that engines that have exceeded storage life limits are susceptible to internal
corrosion, deterioration of seals and coatings, and breakdown of engine preservation lubricants.
206.
Wiring Diagram and
Inspection
Verify the AIP includes up-to-date wiring diagrams consistent with the appropriate guidance (i.e., NATO) and
includes the appropriate inspection procedures. Any reference to the applicable guidance must address
modifications.
Additional Information: In addition to the appropriate guidance, another reference is NA 01-1AA-505, Joint
Service General Wiring Maintenance Manual.
207.
Engine Foreign Object
Damage (FOD)
Verify adoption of a FOD prevention program (internal engine section, external, and air intake).
Additional Information: Use and properly inspect the air intake screen (FOD guards) provided with the aircraft
and designed for the aircraft. See Airframe and Engine Covers below.
208.
Airframe and Engines
Covers
Verify that the AIP provides for and that the operator has the required airframe and engine covers. These are
essentials safety items.
Additional Information: In the MiG-21, these include: engine exhaust cover, engine intake cover, main landing
gear well covers, and auxiliary air inlet covers.
209.
MiG-21 R-11/R-13 and
R-25 Turbine Oil
Verify that the AIP provides for the use of the correct turbine oil for the aircraft. The proper oil must be used
for Soviet turbine engines.
Additional Information: For example, references for the R-11F-300 engine refer t to MK-8 mineral oil and
later VNII NP-50-1-4F synthetic oil. The appropriate Western equivalents are needed, and the AIP should have
a table providing this information. This is a major issue (prone to confusion) in civil use as shown by the
excerpts below from a MiG-21 blog: “I contacted everyone in the oil business yesterday and there is no
substitute available for 1010 (Royco 481) for the MiG-21. The 3SP in not available in the USA and does not
meet flash point requirements for the Russian governing body; and they will not sign a waiver with Shell in
America. You can import it, but it was not advised. I also checked on synthetics, but they are not compatible
with the engine seals. So, 1010 it is… 1010 will work just fine
though.” http://www.classicjets.org/forum/viewtopic.php.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
210.
Engine Condition
Monitoring
(Oil Analysis)
As part of the engine maintenance schedule, recommend an engine Spectrographic Oil Analysis Program
(SOAP) be implemented with intervals of less than 15 hours. If baseline data exists, this can be very useful for
failure prevention. If manufacturer baseline data does not exist, this may still warn of impending failure.
Additional Information: For the latest guidance on SOAPs refer to Joint Oil Analysis Program Manual, Volume
III: Laboratory Analytical Methodology and Equipment Criteria (Aeronautical) (Navy) NAVAIR 17-15-50.3,
(Army) TM 38-301-3, (Air Force) TO 33-1-37-3, and (Coast Guard) CGTO 33-1-37-3, dated July 31, 2012. This
document presents the methodology for evaluating spectrometric analyses of samples from aeronautical
equipment. The methodology enables an evaluator to identify wear metals present in the sample and their
probable sources, judge equipment condition, and make recommendations that influence maintenance and
operational decisions. Following these recommendations can enhance safety and equipment reliability and
contribute to more effective and economic maintenance practices. Note: Operationally, SOAPs have showed
signs of high iron content in R-11 engines.
211.
Lubrication, Hydraulic,
and Servicing Charts
Recommend that independently of other guidance (i.e., daily inspection), the AIP include detailed lubrication,
hydraulic and servicing charts. NAVAIR, USAF, or NATO guidance can be sued.
Additional Information: Below is a sample lubrication and hydraulic fluids chart:
Source: Joint Oil Analysis Program Manual, Volume III: Laboratory Analytical Methodology and Equipment
Criteria (Aeronautical) (Navy) NAVAIR 17-15-50.3, (Army) TM 38-301-3, (Air Force) TO 33-1-37-3, and (Coast
Guard) CGTO 33-1-37-3, dated July 31, 2012.
212.
Systems Functionality and
Leak Checks
Verify procedures are in place to check all major systems in the aircraft for serviceability and functionality.
Verify the leak checks of all systems are properly accounted for in the AIP per the USAF/NATO requirements.
213. De-Icing System
Recommend that the de-icing system and tank (front upper bay) be disabled and the appropriate W&B
corrections made. If the system is retained operational, it must be done in accordance with the applicable
technical guidance, to include the correct fluid. See Visual Meteorological Condition (VMC) and Instrument
Flight Rules (IFR) Operations for operational restrictions.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
Additional Information: The typical de-icing system in the MiG-21 is as follows: “On early versions, the
cockpit windshield is equipped with an ethyl alcohol de-icing system featuring a 4.5-liter tank in the forward
avionics/equipment bay, a spray manifold, and pneumatic valve. The tank is pressurized to 3 kg/cm2.”
Gordon, MiG-21, 2008.
214.
System and Lines
Color Codes
Very that the AIP retains the original color-coding such as fuel lines (yellow), oxygen (blue), hydraulic (grey),
fire extinguisher system (red), and pressurization (black). Specific guidance to these functions should be
discussed in the document to avoid confusion with any Western or civil standards.
215.
Hydraulic Reservoir and
Valves
Verify that the AIP provides for the maintenance and inspection of the hydraulic reservoir and related
components, i.e., valves.
Additional Information: In some versions of the MiG-21, total capacity of both system (primary and booster)
is 36 liters. The hydraulic reservoir is divided by a vertical wall into two unequal sections for primary and
actuator (booster) supply system holding 10.5 liters and 7.2-8 liters respectively. The tank is pressurized to
1.7-2.3 kg/cm2
. The hydraulic reservoir and valve units are located between frames 31-34 and this
compartment is heat-insulated.” Gordon, MiG-21, 2008.
216.
Broken/Blocked Systems
(Fuel, Oil, and Hydraulic)
Lines
Verify the AIP includes procedures for inspecting and replacing fuel, oil, and hydraulic lines according to the
applicable technical requirements, i.e., NATO.
Additional Information: In Indian Air Force service, one of the issues that have cause accidents is related to
the fuel lines. In 2006, IAF’s Director General (Inspection & Safety) Air Marshal P S Ahluwalia noted that ‘’an
ultra-fine hole, or the slide valve on the fuel pipe of the aircraft, was gathering dust, thus constricting the fuel
supply. This led to the flame-out condition resulting in an accident. He said the fault was noticed and rectified
by silver-plating the orifice and providing more holes to ensure an uninterrupted fuel
supply.” http://news.oneindia.in/2006/06/06/iaf-brings-down-accident-rate-including-of-mig21-to-new-low-
1149597267.html. The hydraulic problems with the aircraft have also affected Chinese J-7s variants. In fact,
one of the biggest flaws of early J-7 aircraft (likely to be sold to private entities) was in its hydraulic system,
which suffered leaks. As many as 70% of the J-7s in some PLAAF Squadrons were grounded due to this issue.
The following Indian Air Force incident illustrates a hydraulic leak: “On November 25, 2009, a [mechanic] was
detailed for take off inspector duties on a MiG-21 Bison. During inspection, he traced minute hydraulic oil leak
to the rear air brake. The leak was difficult to detect due to fuel spillage from a drain pipe in the same region.
The intensity of the leak was so minute that it could have gone unnoticed. Subsequent investigation revealed
that the leak was from the thermal valve which could have resulted in a main hydraulic failure in the air.
Despite his limited experience displayed keen sense of observation and averted a potentially hazardous
situation.” http://www.indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/May10.pdf. An oil leak in an Indian Air Force is
described in the following narrative: “ On January 18, 2010, Cpl. Kumar was performing runway controller
duty in the after noon shift. At about 1435 hours a Bison aircraft lined up for routine training flying. He
observed white smoke emanating from the port undercarriage. [Kumar] informed this to the tower on R/T.
The pilot monitored the call, reduced the throttle and cleared off on the ORP and switched off the engine.
Post incident inspection revealed oil leak through the centrifugal breather outlet. Cpl. Kumar displayed a keen
sense of observation and dedication to duty and prevented a potentially hazardous
situation.” http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Aug10.pdf/. MiG-21 engine seizures have been linked to
clogged oil lines. The following narrative illustrates this: “… an incident of engine seizure of a MiG aircraft.
The defect investigation revealed that the lubricating oil transfer pipe from oil pump to the rear support
bearing was clogged with carbon deposits. Hence, no oil was supplied to the rear bearing, which led to
thermal expansion of the engine component due to high temperature. This led to the seizure of the engine.
After this incident, mandatory cleaning of the oil channel inside the tube with brush was introduced during the
overhaul of the engines.” http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Dec10.pdf.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
217.
Hydraulic System
Vulnerabilities
Verify the AIP includes detailed information on the inspection(s) of the MiG-21 hydraulic system and its
“vulnerabilities,” a term commonly used in Soviet aircraft terminology. It needs to be done as per the
applicable technical guidance. It is a system that may have many single-point failures and many aircraft have
been lost to its malfunction.
Additional Information: A US MiG-21 restorer notes some observations on the aircraft’s hydraulic system:
“On jacks, [the aircraft] is about to go through gear retraction and extension cycles. Our external “mule”
allows the hydraulic system to be isolated and checked before we move on to testing the engine. Ground
tests are an important milestone in the restoration and certification process.” However, the same operator
may be deviating from the applicable technical guidance when it notes that “improvisation is sometimes
necessary. A few liters of hydraulic fluid needed to be injected into a hydraulic reservoir through this service
port, so we modified a bug sprayer from the local hardware store to do the job.” http://blog.cwam.org. Note:
There have been cases where of metal shavings were found in the hydraulic cylinder which operates the flaps.
In one such case, it caused the loss of the aircraft. The following account illustrates one of the issues with the
hydraulic system: “On February 19, 2010, Junior Warrant Officer Gopal Airframe/Fitter was detailed to carry
out ‘take off inspector’ duties. During the inspection of a MiG-21 aircraft, he noticed a minute trace of
hydraulic oil near the standard undercarriage bay. The position and size of the leak was such that it could have
easily gone unnoticed. Subsequent investigations revealed that the leak was from the pipeline of the
emergency U/C lowering system. Had this gone undetected it could have resulted in a hydraulic failure in the
air. [His] observation…averted a potentially hazardous situation.” http://indianairforce.nic.in. Another such
incident occurred on January 11, 2011: “Sqn. Ldr. Mishra was supervising full performance ground run of a
MiG-21 aircraft which was on 200-hour servicing and AOG build up. Preliminary checks after aircraft start up
were satisfactory and no leak from any of the panels was observed. During warm up, he noticed some fluid
leak from the ventral fin close to ADF sense antenna. He immediately identified it as hydraulic leak and quickly
indicated to switch-off the engine. After the engine was shut down the power ring of jet pipe caught fire.
Sensing the gravity of situation, he asked the crew to operate the fire extinguisher. The fire was soon
extinguished with minimal damage to the aircraft.” http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Oct11.pdf.
218.
Oil, Fuel, and Hydraulic
Fluids
Verify procedures are in place to identify and use a list of equivalents of materials for replacing oil, fuel, and
hydraulic fluids. Many operators include a cross-reference chart for NATO and U.S. lubricants as part of the
AIP.
Additional Information: For example, some references to the aircraft’s hydraulic system note that “the
system uses AMG-10 oil-type hydraulic fluid.” Gordon, MiG-21, 2008.
219. Electrical System
Verify that the AIP provides for the specific maintenance, inspection, and replacement (when appropriate by
the specific life-limits) of the electrical system and its components as per the applicable technical guidance, in
English.
Additional Information: A typical MiG-21 electric system is as follows: A “28.5 V DC main electrical system
with a 12-kW GSR-ST-1200VT-2I starter/generator as the main power source. Backup DC power is provided by
two 15STs-45A (28 V, 45 A) silver-zinc batteries in the forward avionics/equipment bay, 115 V/400 Hz single-
phase AC power is provided by two converters, PO-1500-VT-2I and PO-750A, two more converters, PT-500Ts
and PT-125Ts, provide 36 V/400 Hz three-phase AC. These supplies serve all avionics and instrumentation,
lighting, and armament controls. The MiG-21PFM has a separate SGO-8 generator supplying 115 V AC. A
ground power receptacle is located ahead of the port wing root.” Gordon, MiG-21, 2008.
220. Battery Compartment
Verify that the AIP includes the inspection of the battery compartment (and its heat resistant housing) behind
the nose-wheel bay for condition, evidence of leaks, high-temperature damage, and other failure indicators.
221. Fuses
Verify that the AIP provides for the inspection, maintenance, and replacement of the fuses in the electrical
system. The AIP needs to address any limitations these may have as well as provide for the source of any
replacements.
Additional Information: As with many Soviet aircraft, including many manufactured in the 1970s (like the MiG-
23), the MiG-21’s electrical system includes fuses.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
222.
Electrical System and
Batteries Compatibility
and Upgrades
Verify that the AIP provides for the functionality of the electrical system and its components as per the
applicable technical guidance and ensure the compatibility of the aircraft’s electrical system with any new
battery installation or other system and component installation or modification needs to be addressed.
Avoiding overload conditions is essential because this is a known problem with the aircraft’s electrical system.
Additional Information: Note: The typical battery (2 of them) installed in the MiG-21 (MiG-21MF) is the 15-
SCS-45 45Ah 24 volt battery. These two batteries can supply the vital systems for a 15-minute period in case
of generator failure, and this capability may be an issue. See Electrical System below
223.
Alternating Current
Converters
Verify that the AIP addresses the inspection and replacement of the alternating current converter (i.e., PO-
750). See Electrical System above.
224.
Pitot/Static, Lighting, and
Avionics and Instruments
Verify compliance with all applicable 14 CFR requirements (that is, § 91.411) concerning the pitot/static
system, exterior lighting (that is, adequate position and anti-collision lighting), transponder, avionics, and
related instruments.
225. RV-UM Radio Altimeter If the RV-UM radio altimeter is fitted, ensure that is it properly addressed in the AIP.
226.
PWD-5, PWD-7, and PVD-
18 Pitot Tube and Air Data
Probes
Verify the AIP addresses the proper inspection and calibration of the PWD-5 or PWD-7 pitot and air data tube
systems (mounted on the pitot tube) as appropriate. There are major differences between aircraft and
systems. This needs to include the require pitot pressure checks and may require specific equipment.
Adequate protection (cover) is also needed.
Additional Information: For example, the PVD-7 differs in having two pairs of vanes, one of which measures
angle of attack, the other sideslip, feeding the data to the air data computer. The PVD-18 (DUAS deviance,
yaw, and pitch deviations) is found in the MiG-21MF. See Angle of Attack (AOA) System below.
227.
Forward Fuselage Vanes
and Sensors
Because some MiG-21s, like the MiG-21MF have vanes (AOA, air data sources) located on the side of the front
fuselage (i.e., the DVA-3A AOA sensor on MiG-21UMs for example, associated with the AP-155 autopilot),
verify that the AIP provides for their inspection and calibration. See PWD-5 and PWD-7 Pitot Tube and Air
Data Probes above and Angle of Attack (AOA) System below.
228. Auxiliary Pressure Tube Verify that the AIP provides for the maintenance and inspection of the auxiliary pressure tube (i.e., TP-156M).
229. S-13 or “D” Camera Pod
If the S-13-100-OS (left wing) or S-13-300-OS (right wing) or “D” camera pod are fitted to the wing of the
aircraft, verify that the AIP provides for its inspection as well as the pylon. See External Stores (General)
below.
230.
Missile Rails/Launchers
(i.e., APU-28 and APU-13
Rails)
Launch rails must be disabled, that is, no live connection or ejectors. Verify that the AIP not only provides for
the inspection of the missile rails (air-to-air missile rails) but also that the rails themselves are permanently
secured.
Additional Information: In 2010, at Air Venture, a missile rail on a MiG-21U came separated during the take-
off roll, and resulted in an aborted take-off. Note: Early-production MiG-21F-13s the launch rails were of the
APU-28 type; later models had these replaced by APU-13 rails. Some MiG-21s also have the APU-7, and they
may not be interchangeable. Other rail types include: APU-13M1, APU-13MT, and APU-68.
231.
Oxygen System Tanks
(General)
Emphasize inspection of the oxygen system (KKO-5 on the MiG-21F) and any modifications as per the
applicable technical guidance. Compliance with § 91.211, Supplemental Oxygen, is required. Moreover, per
FAA Order 8900.1, change 124, chapter 57, Maintenance Requirements for High-Pressure Cylinders Installed in
U.S. Registered Aircraft Certificated in Any Category, each high-pressure cylinder installed in a U.S.-registered
aircraft must be a cylinder manufactured and approved under the requirements of 49 CFR, or under a special
permit issued by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) under 49 CFR part 107.
There is no provision for the FAA to authorize “on condition” for testing, maintenance, or inspection of high-
pressure cylinders under 49 CFR (PHMSA).
Additional Information: This is important because depending on the version of the aircraft, location, type,
and size of the tanks may vary, and it is essential to ensure that the correct configuration is used. Depending
on the version and variant of the aircraft, O2
tanks can be located in the aft dorsal area (additional tanks) and
in the bottom wing area in the landing gear compartment. In the latter case, the possibility of damage due to
FOD or other activities is real. Recommend adherence to § 23.1441, Oxygen Equipment and Supply.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
232.
Oxygen System (O2
Lines)
in MiG-21U (Two-Seaters)
If the aircraft is a two-seater, i.e., MiG-21U, UB, UM, verify that the AIP provides for the specific and regular
inspection and replacement of the O2
lines, especially those than run under the cockpit. The following
accident narrative illustrates this.
Additional Information: On May 9, 1984, aircraft 255, a MiG-21UM (serial number 516995046), crashed near
Eisenhuettenstadt, East Germany. The 2 man crew was killed. In this type (Two-seater), the oxygen supply to
the pilot line runs beneath the seats. This line was damaged by the rear seat and the exiting oxygen ignited by
a parallel heating cable. In addition, a short circuit caused the trim drive to a maximum nose-down attitude.
The two pilots had no chance to recover from the steep dive. Another pilot was flying next to the accident
aircraft and saw a bright flash in the rear cockpit. This created the impression that it was something explodes
in the cabin. As it turned out, this problem only occurred when the “two-seater” and was resolved by
replacing the lines (other installation). See http://home.snafu.de/veith/verluste8.htm. Note: In some MiG-21
versions, such as the MiG-21F-13, the tank containing the gasoline for the starter system was installed close to
an oxygen bottle just aft of the cockpit. Note: Chinese J-7/F-7 aircraft are generally equipped with the
Jianghuai YX-3 oxygen system.
233. Other Pressure Cylinders
Emphasize the proper inspection of any pressure cylinders. Per FAA Order 8900.1 change 124, chapter 57,
each high-pressure cylinder installed in a U.S.-registered aircraft must be a cylinder that is manufactured and
approved under the requirements of 49 CFR, or under a special permit issued by PHMSA under 49 CFR Part
107. There is no provision for the FAA to authorize “on condition” for testing, maintenance or inspection of
high-pressure cylinders under 49 CFR. For example, the fire bottles are time sensitive items, and may have a
limit of 5 years for hydrostatic testing. Non-U.S. bottles may remain installed as long as they are within their
hydrostatic test dates. A problem arises when removing the bottles for hydrostatic testing.
Additional Information: Maintenance programs require these bottles to be hydrostatic tested. Once the
non-U.S. bottles are removed from the aircraft, they are not to be hydrostatic tested, recharged, or reinstalled
in any U.S. registered aircraft. Moreover, those bottles cannot be serviced (on board) after the testing date
has expired.
234. Fuselage Cooling Vents Verify that the AIP and associated procedures cover the fuselage cooling vents, especially engine related ones.
235. Anti-G Suit System
Verify the serviceability of both aircraft systems (that is, anti-G valve) and the anti-G suit, if installed. There
have been instances of anti-G valves being stuck in the open position. If the anti-G valve fails, it can blow
scorching hot air into the cockpit.
Additional Information: Note: A G suit, or the more accurately named anti-G suit, is a flight suit worn
by aviators and astronauts who are subject to high levels of acceleration force (G). It is designed to prevent a
blackout and G-induced loss of consciousness (G-LOC) caused by the blood pooling in the lower part of the
body when under acceleration, thus depriving the brain of blood. Blackout and G-LOC have caused a number
of fatal aircraft accidents.
236. Autopilot
If installed, the AIP needs to address the maintenance and inspection (and functionality) of the autopilot (i.e.,
KAP-2K, RAU-10T).
Additional Information: Earlier versions may be equipped with an earlier “auto-stabilization” system working
only on the pitch-and-roll axes and fitted with a q-feel unit. The inspection of the autopilot actuators need to
be included in the AIP. Note: Some references mention the GA-135T autopilot unit.
237.
Cockpit Instrumentation
Markings
Verify all cockpit markings are legible and use proper English terminology and units acceptable to the FAA.
Some operators do not even translate the cockpit instrumentation to English, and this is a serious safety issue.
Additional Information: The following 2007 posting illustrates this: “We have recently acquired a Czech built
MiG-21 and find ourselves searching for some help. When the Czechoslovakian’s built the MiG-21 they not
only labeled the switches in Czechoslovakian but they moved some of the switches to different locations than
in the Russian or Polish MiG-21s. We are looking for someone who can read aeronautical Czechoslovakian and
translate the switch labels. Using English – Czechoslovakian dictionary doesn’t quite do
it…” http://www.classicjets.org/forum/.The AIP should address inspection of all cockpit instruments with
regular intervals for each subsystem. Care should also be taken to inspect modifications, including
communications, navigation, or other upgrades to the cockpit. The AIP should address cockpit indicators
calibration processes to ensure accurate indications for essential components. Note: All MiG-21
instrumentation is metric.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
238.
Pressurization Vessel and
Environmental Control
Verify the AIP incorporates the inspection of the pressurized sections of the aircraft and its system(s) as per
the appropriate technical guidance. Note pressure cycles and any repairs in the area. Verify the AIP
incorporates related documentation and manuals, in English.
Additional Information: The following is a description of the typical MiG-21 air conditioning and
pressurization systems: “The MiG-21 has a ventilation-type cockpit, which is pressurized to 0.25 kg/cm2
(about
3.6 psi) and air-conditioned. The temperature is maintained at 15+/-5°C. On later versions, the air
conditioning system features a cooling turbine, an overpressure check valve, a shut-off cock, an ARD-57V
automatic pressure regulator, a TRTVK-45M temperature regulator and a connector for a mobile air handling
unit.” Gordon, MiG-21, 2008. As background and to illustrate the complexities of the system, the following is
a description of the cabin pressurization and environmental control systems the MiG-21US: “Cabin air
temperature is regulated by a 3-way switch which is labeled “Hot, Cold, and Automatic.” This switch is directly
linked to the main air distributor. In the automatic mode, air temperature is regulated to a preset value. This
cannot be accomplished by the pilot; it must be preset by ground personnel. Should the temperature become
uncomfortable, the pilot can select either “Cold” or “Hot” resulting in either hot or cold air entering the cabin.
Once the desired temperature has reached, he must switch back to the original position. It should be noted
that, due to limitations of the distributor flap motor, the pilot must expect a lag of 30 seconds before airflow
temperature reverses which requires some pre-planning. In addition, it is advisable that, should a descent be
commenced in certain meteorological condition, the pilot should switch to the hot setting to prevent ice
formation on the outside of the canopy and condensation on the inside of the canopy. In order to pressurize
the cabin, air is bled from the number 6 compressor stage at 350 degrees C which is then channeled to the
distributor where it is separated. Hot air is channeled directly to the cabin via check valve and main airflow
valve whereas air that is used for cooling is bled to two heat exchangers. Once the air is initially cooled,
further cooling is accomplished by an air conditioning turbine which, essentially, is a compressor. The cool air
is then channeled via check valves to main airflow valve. It should be noted that, regardless of the main
airflow valves position, air is always bled from the engine and cooled for the purpose of pressurization. The
main valve, in closed position, merely inhibits pressurized air from reaching the cabin. The amount of pressure
differential is governed by outflow valve in conjunction with the chamber for constant differential pressure
and the aneroid chamber for increasing differential pressure. This system ensures a constant differential
pressure of 220 Torr or 0.31 bars. The safety valve will open if differential pressure rises to 0.34 bars. It
should be noted that cabin pressure remains the same as ambient pressure up to 6000 ft., after which cabin
pressure decreases in direct ratio with altitude maintaining the afore mentioned cabin pressure differential
(0.31 bar; see diagram). Air used for the G-pants is bled directly from the compressor section and channeled
to a paper filter and thence to pressure regulator. The regulator senses G-loads imposed on the pilot and
thereby regulates air flow to the G-pants which is then distributed via coupler. Excess air is bled directly to the
cabin. These are safety valve which opens, should the preset pressure valve from the A/C turbine exceed 0.9
+/- 0.1 bars, and pressure limiter which is activated, should pressure deviate by more than 0.12 bars. The
cabin safety valve is set to 0.34 bars. A ground check valve is incorporated into the system, should ground
tests of the pressurization system become necessary.” http://www.topedge.com.
239.
Cabin Pressure Regulation
System
Verify that as part of the pressurization maintenance and inspections, the AIP addresses the cabin pressure
regulation system, such as the AD-6E in the MiG-21F. It includes the outside venturi. See Pressurization Vessel
and Environmental Control above.
240.
Caution Lights System
(Annunciator Panel)
The AIP should include steps to inspect and maintain the integrity of the caution light systems (annunciator
panel) in the aircraft as per the applicable guidance. The main annunciator panel(s) should be translated and
replaced with one in English.
Additional Information: The USAF evaluation of the aircraft (MiG-21F) noted that the “warning lights were
very poor because they were placed in three different locations on the instrument panel and were very dim.
In the bright sun, the pilot often could not see the warning lights. In addition, the color coding was
inconsistent with USAF practice. As an example, the take-off trim light was red and remained on when in the
take-off trim condition.” Have Doughnut (U) Technical, 1969.
241.
Safety Markings and
Stenciling
(NATO Standard)
Verify appropriate MiG-21 safety markings and stencils required by the technical manuals (i.e., that is, warning
notes, “Remove Before Flight” banners) and to NATO standards have been applied and are in English.
Additional Information: These markings provide appropriate warnings/instruction regarding areas of the
aircraft that could be dangerous. These areas include intakes, exhaust, air brakes, and ejection seats. In the
case of ejections seat systems, and as noted in FAA Order 8130.2, paragraph 4074, “a special airworthiness
certificate will not be issued before meeting this requirement.”

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
242. Pneumatic System
The AIP needs to emphasize the inspection of the pneumatic system and any modifications. Unlike many
Western aircraft, Soviet design philosophy included a significant number of pneumatic systems, and thus,
many critical systems in the aircraft are pneumatic. The brakes area good example.
Additional Information: The typical MiG-21 pneumatic system is as follows: “two subsystems (main and
emergency). The main system actuates the wheel brakes, brake parachute deployment/release, and is
responsible for cockpit pressurization. It also actuates the canopy’s alcohol de-icing system. The emergency
system is responsible for emergency landing gear extension (in the event of a hydraulic failure) and emergency
braking. Basic pressure in both systems is 110-130 kg/cm2
. Nose wheel brake pressure and main wheel brake
pressure is 15 kg/cm2
and 19 kg/cm2
respectively. Emergency braking system pressure is 17.5 kg/cm2
.
Compressed air for the main system is supplied by two-spherical 2-liter air bottles and a cylindrical 4.4-liter
bottle in the starboard main wheel well, plus two 2.23-liter air reservoirs incorporated into the main gear
struts. The emergency system is served by two 1.3-liter spherical bottles in the port main wheel well. The
bottles are changed on the ground from outside sources. The charging connectors are in the starboard main
wheel well at frame 20.” Gordon, MiG-21, 2008. The following illustrates a pneumatic malfunction in the
MiG-21: “On March 15, 2010, Flight Officer Chahal was authorized to fly a 2 Aircraft low–level tactical sortie on
a MiG-21 aircraft. After an uneventful sortie, while carrying out V/As on D/W the pilot noticed that the
pneumatic pressure was reading zero. He announced the same on R/T and carried out a precautionary
landing. After touchdown, he switched off the engine and maintained directions with the help of rudders and
deployed the tail chute. Subsequently he applied emergency brakes to stop the aircraft on R/W. Post flight
inspection revealed a leak from the canopy seal which had led to the pneumatic
failure…..” http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Feb11.pdf.
243. Intake Safety Guard
Recommend that the intake safety guard (frame) is used when the aircraft is parked or displayed. This device
can prevent injury to ground personal and/or airshow attendees.
244. Cockpit FOD
Verify the AIP addresses thorough inspection and cleaning of the cockpit area to preclude inadvertent
ejection, flight control interference, pressurization problems, and other problems.
Additional Information: This is a standard USAF/NAVAIR/NATO practice and should be practiced in the MiG-
21 with much more thoroughly than in any GA aircraft.
245. SARPP-12 Flight Recorder
If installed, verify that the AIP addresses the SARPP-12 automatic flight parameters recorder. Recommend
that it be retained in an operational condition. See R-13-300 SARPP-12GM Data above.
Additional Information: Note: Some Bulgarian AF MiG-21s may have the a new FDR with Control N (solid
state memory), which provides for data downloading, data storage, mission analysis, system parameters, flight
profiles and pilot actions, and airframe and engine condition monitoring. This type of instrument would yield
significant safety benefits in since data can be used for training, performance, and safety management.
246. Flight Test Recorder
If the aircraft is equipped with a flight test recorder (not the same as the SARPP-12 mentioned above),
recommend that it be maintained.
Additional Information: In operational service with the Finnish Air Force, these devices yielded valuable data
on the daily operational service of the aircraft.
247. HUMS
If the aircraft is equipped with HUMS (Health and Usage Monitoring System), recommend that it be
maintained and its data used.
Additional Information: Although technologically outdated by modern standards, HUMS was designed to
provide maintenance crews with data to expedite and enhance (targeting) routine maintenance of the aircraft.
248.
Explosives and
Propellants
Check compliance with applicable Federal, State, and local requirements for all explosives and propellants in
terms of use, storage, and disposal, in addition to verifying service (NATO) requirements are followed.
249. HAZMAT
Where appropriate, recommend the AIP incorporates adequate provisions on HAZMAT handling. Refer to
Gamauf, Handling Hangar Hazmat, August 2012. Some materials used in the aircraft are hazardous. An
example is the engine asbestos lining.
250. Canopy Seals
Test canopy seals for leaks (that is, use ground test connection).
Additional Information: Several pressurization problems in the MiG-21 were traced to seals. Deterioration of
the material itself is also an issue.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
251.
In-Flight Canopy
Separation and Opening
Ensure the AIP addresses the proper maintenance and operating condition of all canopy locks, including the
required power supply (electrical cable and connections), and including the attachment of the Plexiglas panels
with the frame. Problems with locking mechanism have been an issue with the aircraft, including some case s
involving US civil MiG-21 operations. USAF MiG-21 operations include at least two instances of canopy failure.
Additional Information: A USAF pilot had a canopy fail on a MiG-21 because the Plexiglas itself was starting to
come apart from the framing and shattered during flight. He managed to safely land the MiG-21. Canopy
failures are not just related to Plexiglas. The mechanism(s) are also an issue. For example, a March 1985
account by a Cuban MiG-21 pilot illustrates this while recovering from a dive at 480 knots while at 16,000 feet:
“coming out of the dive, I feel this loud bang all over the aircraft. There I was, alone, in an emergency
situation. The canopy of the old MiG-21 had exploded during the depressurization process. The airflow took
away my helmet. The aircraft was in a climb, I lower the nose…Rapidly, I cut the power to reduce the air flow
over the cockpit, and I move my forward behind the windshield. Quickly, I glace at the ejection handles, not to
forget that they were there. I told myself to calm down, look at the engine, it works, and all was not lost. The
bird has life…Stabilizing the aircraft as much as I could, reducing the airspeed to 320 knots, lower would not be
safe in the MiG-21 and I have reducing manoeuvring capabilities. The warning panel is not light, except for the
red depressurization light. Unknown to me, debris form the canopy has punctured a fuel tank behind the
cockpit and damaged the elevator controls. The engine was still working. On my right, another piece of debris,
which looked like scissors appeared ready to cut lose and cut my head clean off. I turned to the airfield. I line
up. Seeing this, ATC though I was smoking, but in reality it was the fuel streaming out. They were ready for
me. I landed, and stopped near the rescue trucks….The next day; they called me in and congratulated me for
returning the aircraft to the airport. However, I was later accused of not having securely closed the canopy,
which I though was absurd because the final closing is done from the outside by the ground crew, which
cannot be done unless the inside lever is properly secured….they also wanted me to pay for the helmet that
flew off into the airstream…” González, 2012. Note: The canopy is a pneumatically operated clamshell hinged
aft for access to the cockpit. The windshield is flat and is made up of 2 layers of for a total thickness of 19 mm.
The side panels are single pane sections and 12 mm thick. The hinged canopy is 10 mm thick. In earlier MiG-21
models, the one-piece canopy hinges forward. Note: Canopy lock issue has been a safety concern not only
with the MiG-21 but other military jet types. This type of failure can be catastrophic. For example, in February
2007, such a failure caused the crash on take-off of an Indian Air Force HTJ-36 jet.
252.
Transparencies Problems
(Plexiglas and Perspex)
Part I
Ensure proper transparencies maintenance for safe operations. Replacement may be necessary within shorter
periods of time when compared to Western aircraft. The AIP should provide for the monitor/inspect canopy
(and side panels where applicable depending on the version or variant of the aircraft) for crazing every 10
hours of flight. This includes the inspection, and replacement of canopy rubber seals and sealing putty.
Separation of the Plexiglas panels from the frame was also documented. See In-Flight Canopy Separation
above. Canopy covers should be used.
Additional Information: Canopy failures, de-laminations, and Plexiglas deterioration are common with Soviet
Bloc transparencies. Procedures should address this in the AIP and as part of post-flight procedures. For
example, operationally, it was not uncommon, depending of the operating environment that cockpit
transparencies began to deteriorate rather quickly, that is, in a matter of months. A Soviet account of MiG-
21F operations noted that “with the passage of time, another serious issue fault emerged – the cockpit
transparency would start to become opaque and hairline cracks appeared due to the ultraviolet radiation…The
process proved to be irreversible despite the efforts made by the maintainers. New transparencies had to be
flown in from the Soviet Union to replace the old ones.” Gordon, MiG-21, 2008. The following account
describes in detail the USAF experience with the MiG-21 canopies: “One of them was the matter of fatigued or
failing canopies. This had first occurred before Gennin arrived, according to Matheny: “Toast had already had
a canopy start to come apart on him in the MiG-21 before he was killed in the MiG-23, but on that occasion
although the canopy had started to raise, he had managed to get the MiG back down again.” The problem
wasn’t that the canopy latches were failing, but rather that the Plexiglas itself was starting to come away from
the framing in which it was mounted. In addition, recalled Bucko, “Some of the canopies were getting spider
web or crazing cracks all on the front canopy wind blast panel. We were worried about the things imploding,
but we each knew it would happen to someone else.” That someone else was Matheny. It became standard
to keep a close watch on the integrity of the canopy, but one day the former auto mechanic was involved in an
incident that nearly killed him: I was at about 18,000 ft, in full afterburner, doing about 500 knots. I was doing
a performance profile as an initial sortie for deployed pilots and was going to do a 180-degree turn in
afterburner to show how much energy the MiG-21 bled in a turn. I was expecting to end up at about 200
knots, and the F-15 was to stay inside my turn circle to see how he could maintain it using mil power while the
MiG bled airspeed like crazy. I racked the jet into the turn, and the entire canopy imploded on me.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
253.
USAF E Transparencies
Problems
(Plexiglas and Perspex)
Part II
It broke my helmet and oxygen mask off, knocked me unconscious, and cut my head up real bad. I regained
consciousness headed straight down at the ground. I started hauling back on the stick, and tried to pull the
throttle back, but there was a piece of Plexiglas jamming it fully open. There’s a lot of land coming up towards
me and I am now supersonic heading straight down. Thinking quickly, he reached over and pulled the
Plexiglas from the throttle, and then managed to pull it to idle. He then pulled back hard on the stick to return
to level flight, and started throwing the bigger pieces of canopy over the side. Massively disorientated, unable
to communicate because his flight helmet and mask were gone, covered in Plexiglas, and unable to see
forward because the MiG-21’s bulletproof forward canopy had shattered, Matheny was in trouble. “I had to
stick my head out to see where I was going, but the real problem was that now the air was rushing over this
unclean surface of the cockpit, a harmonic frequency began to develop. It was like somebody had taken an ice
pick and stabbed it into my shoulder and then started stirring it around. It was tremendously painful.” He
decided to put the Fishbed down on a dry lakebed, and was setting up to land on “Mud Lake” in the northwest
corner of the ranges. “I was concerned that I would pass out again. But then it dawned on me, ‘I can see the
runway from here. Why land on a lakebed?’ So, I flew on a little and landed at Tonopah. As I was on base to
land, Billy Bayer, our GCI, was able to talk the F-15 pilot’s eyes back on me. When he saw the missing canopy
he communicated this to Billy who passed it on to our ops so they had a clue what the problem was. As soon
as the nose wheel touched the runway, the pain in my shoulder stopped.” Bucko was about to take-off in a
MiG-23 just as Matheny landed: He did an amazing job getting the plane on the ground and saved a very
valuable asset. I was taxiing down the center of the runway to go to the far end and make a 180 turn and then
take-off when I see Thug’s jet at the far end. I get there to find Jim lying on the runway with blood all over his
face and people attending. Then I am cleared to make a 180, go up the runway a little, and quickly take-off
because we had a satellite overfly time window that I had to make. It was not very comforting to see him on
the ground and it was definitely in the back of my mind ten minutes later when I was doing 800 knots trying to
show a couple of F-15s that they were not going to catch me. Once again, my mindset – like most successful
fatalistic fighter pilots – is, “It ain’t going to happen to me. I know this machine. I am in charge of it. It will do
what I say. And if I [screw] it up, I will fix it or at least look good as I hit the ground.” Another pilot in a MiG-21
taxied past the broken jet and equally broken Matheny, took one look, turned around and taxied back to
parking. “He decided it was not a good day to fly!” Matheny joked. The implosion was simply the result of
age, it was later determined. “They made superb canopies that were extremely clear, but we later learned
that they replaced them quite often. At the time, we didn’t know that, or if we did, we just blew it off as
unimportant,” Matheny explained. Naturally, Henderson became involved in the research and reverse
engineering process for MiG canopies. A static test program on the canopies followed, and the pilots were
briefed in the interim to conduct daily visual checks for early indications that a failure might be about to occur.
Eventually, Henderson and Nelson located a company in southern California, Swedlow Plastics, which
specialized in transparent plastics for various engineering and domestic uses. A small number of its staff
signed contracts committing them to silence, and were then sent the Perspex canopies from which to make
molds. The reverse-engineered copies were shipped direct to Tonopah.” Davies, Red Eagles, 2008.
254.
Triplex Windshield and
Side Panels
Depending on the MiG-21 version and variant, verify that the AIP provides for the inspection of the bullet-
proof triplex glass screen.
Additional Information: This item is 62 mm thick on the MIG-21F, and the quasi-oval optically flat triplex glass
windscreen (14 mm thick) on later models, i.e., MiG-21PF, MiG-21Fl, and MiG-21MF. The inspection of these
components and related procedures may differ from Plexiglas.
255.
Emergency Canopy
Jettison Mechanism
Verify the AIP includes testing the emergency canopy jettison mechanism, if so equipped. It must be
functional and properly inspected per the applicable technical guidance.
256. Grounding
Verify adequate procedures are in place for grounding the aircraft. Static electricity could cause a fire or
explosion, set off pyrotechnic cartridges, or result in any combination of the above. Refer to USAF T.O. 00-25-
172, Ground Servicing of Aircraft, and Static Grounding/Bonding, dated August 2012, as the baseline for
information on grounding.
Additional Information: In grounding the aircraft, it is essential that all electrical tools are grounded and
industry-approved explosion-proof flashlights or other lighting sources are used. See USAF T.O. 00-25-172
below.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
257. MiG-21 Tires
Verify use of proper (approved) tires (including inner tubes) and adherence to any tire limitation, such as
allowed number of landings, inflation requirements, ply type (i.e., 11 ply), and the use of retreaded tires,
which are not recommended. The appropriate technical guidance (maintenance, inspection, and servicing) are
required and it needs to be in English. As an example, the main tires in the MiG-21MF are KT-92 800x200 mm
wheel/tires at 8.09 kg/cm2
. Not all tires are common items. For example, the KT-92 wheel/tires are not used
in the MiG-21F. The MiG-21 F had 660x200mm wheel/tires at 10.38 kg/cm2
. Chinese parts are not necessarily
acceptable for Soviet MiG-21s. See Chinese J-7/F-7 Wheels, Tires, and Brakes below. The type of tire may
dictate the number of landings. Case in point, some references, including references made by US civil
operators, notes the number of landings per tire at 10. Other sources, notably by the Finnish Air Force, refer
to 40 landings, but only when the landing technique is modified. There should not be “the tires look good”
approach but rather a replacement time. A simple visual inspection as performed in some GA aircraft will not
suffice to detect a serious and potentially catastrophic tire failure.
Additional Information: The levels of energy absorbed during landings due the high landing speed and landing
technique have a significant impact. Also relevant is that US MiG-21 operators are having difficulties locating
tires. The following 2012 exchange illustrates this: “Does anyone know of a source for MiG-21UM main and
nose tires? Also is anyone interested in going together to get some hose kits made…”
http://www.classicjets.org. Wheels must be properly and regularly inspected and balanced. Many former
military high-performance aircraft have a long history of tire failures, one of the leading causes of accidents.
For example, many MiG-21 accidents have occurred due to tire burst. The following is such an incident: “On
December 6, 2010, Flt. Lt. Dash was performing the duties of DATCO. While a MiG-21, T-75 aircraft was on
landing roll, he observed a puff of smoke emanating from the port undercarriage and identified it to be a case
of tire burst. Immediately the crash bell was sounded and the safety services promptly swung into action. The
safety crew after reaching the site confirmed the observed that the port side undercarriage tire had burst. In
addition it was also observed that fuel was dropping close to the undercarriage. Sensing danger,
[extinguishing agent] was applied at the undercarriage, extinguishing smoke.” http://indianairforce.nic.in.
258.
Brake System and Related
Actions
Emphasize a detailed inspection of the brake assemblies, adhere to applicable inspection guidelines and
replacement times (i.e., NATO), and consider more conservative inspections. Chinese parts are not necessarily
acceptable for Soviet MiG-21s. See Chinese J-7/F-7 Wheels, Tires, and Brakes below. The MiG-21 has a well-
known reputation for weak brakes.
Additional Information: One of the brake systems used is the KT-92b. On the MiG-21U two-seaters, other
references include the KT-38 nose wheel (with twin expandable brakes) and the KT-102 (later models, with
disc brakes). Late versions could also be equipped with the KT-90D featuring cerametallic disc brakes. Some
MiG-21F-13 models have KT-27 main wheels. Recommend brake inspection at 20 to 30 landings. Also
recommend that the AIP and related SOPs provide for a clear understanding (and conservative approach) to
braking speeds. The following account illustrates the critically of the MiG-21 brakes and their proper
inspection and repair: On April 7, 1967, 807, a MiG-21PF (serial number 760512) was destroyed. Following a
so-called “pattern maintenance” for an average inspection and repair after 300-350 hours of flight at VEB
Flugzeugwerft Dresden (FWD), and after completion of the repair, there was flight testing. It started with taxi
tests to verify certain systems, including brakes. During the taxi test (rolling test), the aircraft did not stop and
overran the runway, crashing, and bursting into flames. The airport fire department responded, quickly
extinguished the blasé, but the canopy was jammed, smoke was in the cabin, and the pilot was killed. As part
of the investigation, it was determined that much had to be learned about the knowledge of the relationship
between rolling speed and the efficiency of the brakes. The following narrative, from a current US operator
restoring a MiG-21 describes some of the issues with the MiG-21 brake system: “The…MiG-21 wheels and
brakes are massive, as you might expect. The size of the wheel allows a larger brake assembly to be housed
inside, provides more area for heat dissipation from the brakes, and allows for a larger diameter tire to
provide more tread area to absorb high landing wear. The MiG lands at about 200 mph (330 km/h) and a set
of tires may typically last for only ten landings. In earlier and smaller aircraft, drum brakes were used. Disk
brakes were developed when military and commercial aircraft got larger and faster and needed more efficient
breaks to stop on reasonable length runways. This brake stack has four rotor plates that rotate with the wheel
and five stator plates that remain stationary with the wheel hub. The tabs on the rotor plates must be lined
up and slid into the grooves on the inside of the wheel rim shown above. That is what causes them to rotate
with the wheel between the stationary plates. When pressure is applied to the stators, the moving and
stationary plates are squeezed together eventually bringing the wheel to a stop. All of the excess energy from
the speed of the aircraft is turned into heat. Brakes get very hot after a landing and must be allowed to cool
before another landing cycle.” http://blog.cwam.org. Note: There have been cases of weak brakes because
the brake cable from the control stick handle to the control valve broke.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
259.
Chinese J-7/F-7 Wheels,
Tires, and Brakes
If the aircraft is a Chinese J-7/F-7, verify that the AIP provides for the correct documentation in English.
Additional Information: Chinese J-7/F-7 types use different wheel and bakes such as a 500 x 180 mmm nose
wheel tire (102 psi), LS-15 dual action brake, and 600 x 200 mm tires (167 psi) with LS-16 disc brakes. Chinese
tires, brakes and those of the MiG-21 are not interchangeable.
260. Anti-Skid System
Verify that the AIP incorporates the maintenance, and inspection of the anti-skid system (i.e., UA-24 or UA-
24/2M-5 anti-skid braking systems, and UP-53/1M electro-pneumatic valve), as per the appropriate guidance.
Additional Information: The functionality of the system, to the correct specifications is essential in mitigating
the MiG-21’s high-landing speed and propensity for overruns. Note: The UA-24 anti-skid sensor is mounted on
the main wheel’s outer rim. An electro-pneumatic valve powers the anti-skid system, which prevents brake
locking during ground operations.
261. Hoses and Cables
Inspect and replace hoses and cables appropriately, as per the applicable guidance and specifications. Due to
the age of many of the former military high-performance aircraft, and in many cases, poor storage history, it is
essential to ensure thorough inspections of all hoses and cables (multiple systems) and replace them in
accordance with the guidance and requirements (i.e., USAF. NAVAIR, NATO, RAF).
Additional Information: This is an issue because operators revert to fabricating their own. Specifications and
quality are unknown. Case in point, the following advertisement illustrates this: “Specialty Hose has made up
hose kits for the MiG-17 and is now considering doing the same for the MiG-21, if there is enough interest. If
you are interested in such a product you can call…and let him know how many sets you would be interested
in. traerosales@specialtyhose.com.” http://www.classicjets.org/forum.
262. Leading Edge Slats
If applicable to the aircraft in question (i.e., Chinese F-7FG), ensure that the AIP provides for proper slat
condition and functionally (i.e., lubrication, freedom of movement of the rollers, re-alignment). The wing slats
may stick and create asymmetric lift during maneuvering.
263. Anti-Flutter Weights
Verify that the AIP addresses the inspection of the anti-flutter weights on the horizontal stabilizers (external)
and the rudder mass balance weights (internal).
264. Wing Fences
Ensure that the AIP and related tasks (i.e., daily, preflight) check the wing fences on the aircraft.
Additional Information: These are critical for control the airflow near the ailerons.
265.
Tailplane Control
Hydraulic Group
Verify that the AIP incorporates the inspection and maintenance, and replacement (of components) in the
tailplane control hydraulic group located in front and at the base of the vertical stabilizer.
266.
USAF
T.O. 00-25-172
Use TO 00-25-172, Ground Servicing of Aircraft and Static Grounding/Bonding, dated August 2012, as the
baseline for all servicing functions. Also see Grounding above.
Additional Information: This manual describes physical and/or chemical processes that may cause injury or
death to personnel, or damage to equipment, if not properly followed. This safety summary includes general
safety precautions and instructions that must be understood and applied during operation and maintenance
to ensure personnel safety and protection of equipment.
267.
Angle of Attack (AOA)
System
Ensure the AIP covers the adequate inspection and calibration of the AOA system and AOA indexer, as per the
applicable guidance. This should be a required system for flight. It includes the UA-1 AOA indicator.
Additional Information: Early MiG-21 (i.e. MiG-21F) did not have an AOA, while later models (MiG-21-PFM
did). It is a critical piece of equipment for safe operations. It is believed that all of the MiG-21/J-7s in the US
have the AOA system. Also see PWD-5 and PWD-7 Pitot Tube and Air Data Probes above.
268. ARU-3V System
The AIP needs to address the inspection and maintenance (and possibly replacement) of the ARU-3V
automatic system, which controls the stabilizer deflection as a function of speed and altitude.
269.
RP-21MA Temperature
Probe
The AIP needs to address the inspection and maintenance of the RP-21MA temperature probe (or other,
depending on the version and variant of the aircraft).
270. Rivets on Load Areas
Verify the AIP incorporates the inspection of all rivets in critical load areas such as trailing edges where
inspections regularly noted loose rivets.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
271. Antennas
Verify any original antennas are compatible with all installed electronics. In addition, verify the AIP includes
the appropriate inspections of the antennas.
Additional Information: Some new avionics may impose airspeed limitations. Over the years, many different
antennas were installed in this type of aircraft. For the basics on this issue, refer to Higdon, David. Aircraft as
Antenna Farm. Avionics, Vol. 49, No. 9 (September 2012).
272.
Hard Landings and
Over G Situations
Verify hard landing and over-G inspection programs are adopted. The correct technical guidance for the MiG-
21 or J-7 needs to be used.
Additional Information: NATO’s is acceptable since several NATO countries still operate the MiG-21. This is
especially important when acrobatics are performed or when the aircraft is involved in military support
missions outside the scope of its experimental certificate (that is, PAO), and in light of safety concerns with the
wing and flight control surface cracks and delamination.
273. Overspeed Inspection
Verify the AIP incorporates the inspection of the aircraft if an overspeed situation took place. In the MiG-21,
this is likely to occur before gear retraction.
274.
Nondestructive Inspection
(NDI)
Ensure the AIP provides for all the required NDI (Nondestructive Inspection/testing) as per the appropriate
technical guidance, to include USAF and/or NATO guidance, if necessary.
Additional Information: Consideration of modern non-Soviet guidance may be necessary because the NDI
technology for the MiG-21 may not be sufficiently adequate to address certain known (i.e., structural,
corrosion, steel/aluminum combinations) and developing safety issues. See Chapter 5, Nondestructive
Inspection (NDI), and AC 43.13-1 for additional guidance.
275. Exhaust Trail Areas
Verify that the AIP includes the proper inspection of the exhaust trail areas. Engine exhaust deposits are very
corrosive and give particular trouble where gaps, seams, hinges, and fairings are located downstream from the
exhaust pipes or nozzles.
Additional Information: For example, “deposits may be trapped and not reached by normal cleaning methods.
Pay special attention to areas around rivet heads and in skin lap joints and other crevices. Remove and inspect
fairings and access plates in the exhaust areas. Do not overlook exhaust deposit buildup in remote areas, such
as the empennage surfaces. Buildup in these areas will be slower and may not be noticed until corrosive
damage has begun.” http://www.faa.gov/library/manuals/aircraft/amt_handbook/media/faa-8083-
30_ch06.pdf.
276.
Soviet MiG-21
External Fuel Tanks
The AIP needs to provide for the maintenance and inspection of the approved external fuel tanks (PTB-490
and PTB-800) as per the applicable technical guidance.
Additional Information: Also see Fuel System and Description above. Not all external fuel tanks may be
interchangeable. The external fuel tanks are pressurized to 0.81-0.83 kg/cm2
. Note: An in-flight centerline
fuel tank failure may have been the cause of a civil MiG-21 accident.
277.
Chinese J-7/F-7 External
Fuel Tanks
Chinese external fuel tanks may not be used in Soviet MiG-21s.
Additional Information: For example, a Chinese 720-liter centerline fuel tank may not be approved for some
of the Soviet MiG-21s versions or variants. If such practices are contemplated, there should be technical data
to validate the installation.
278.
Fuel Pumps
(i.e., Model 495B Pump)
Verify that the AIP provides for the maintenance, inspection, and replacement (at the appropriate life-limit) of
the fuel pumps.
Additional Information: For example, in some MiG-21s, the Model 495B electric centrifugal pump is uses in
No. 3 and 4 tanks, while the Model 422 pump is used for No. 2 tank. These fuel pumps are driven by fuel-
cooled electric motors. Other references for MiG-21 fuel pumps include the NR-21F engine driven fuel pump.
279. Fuel Filters
Verify that the AIP provides for the inspection and replacement of the fuel filters as per the applicable
technical specifications. Many engine failures were traced to clogged filters, particularly due to excessive
dusty conditions.
280.
Fuel Tank Inspections
T.O. 1-1-3
Recommend that on issues concerning fuel tank inspections, and in addition to the applicable technical
guidance, Inspection and Repair of Aircraft Integral Tanks and Fuel Cells, T.O. 1-1-3, December 22, 2009,
Change 10, February 17, 2013, be also used as a guiding document.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
281.
Fuel System and
Description
(General)
Verify that the AIP provides for the detailed maintenance, inspection, and replacement (of components) of the
fuel system and related structures. The system’s complexity varies depending on the version and variant.
Additional Information: The following illustrates this: “On the MiG-21 F and early-production MiG-21F-13s up
to and including Batch 6, internal fuel was carried in six bladder tanks in the fuselage around the engine inlet
duct and two integral tanks in the wings ahead of the front spar holding a total of 2,160 liters. The bladder
tanks have an inner layer of fuel-resistant rubber 0.5 mm (0.0197 in) thick and an outer layer of rubberized
fabric 1.1-29.5 mm (0.043-1.16 in) thick. They are housed in special metal containers integrated into the
fuselage structure. The No. 3 tank is the service tank. A special valve in this tank ensures stable engine
operation in inverted flight for up to 15 seconds at full military power or five seconds in afterburner mode. On
MiG-21F-13s from c/n N74210701 up to and including c/n N74210814 the internal fuel capacity was increased
to 2,280 liters while retaining the same number of tanks. From MiG-21F-13 c/n N74210815 onwards a second
pair of integral wing tanks was added aft of the main spar, increasing total capacity to 2,470 liters; some
sources state 2,480 liters. The wing tanks are all connected to the No. 2 fuselage tank. The fuel was
distributed as follows:
• No. 1 fuselage tank, 235 liters);
• No. 2 tank, 720 liters;
• No. 3 tank, 265 liters;
• No. 4 tank, 200 liters);
• Nos. 5 and 6 tanks, 240 liters;
• Forward wing tanks, 175 liters;
• Rear wing tanks, 110 liters each.
The MiG-21 PF/MiG-21PFS, MiG-21PFM, and MiG-21FL had a reshaped fuselage spine housing a rigid No. 7
strap-on fuel tank (saddle tank); the bladder tanks inside the fuselage were all new and the forward wing tanks
were slightly enlarged. The distribution of internal fuel was as follows: No. 1 fuselage tank. 60 liters); No. 2
tank, 930 liters; No. 3 tank, 335 liters; No. 4 tank, 175 liters; No. 5 tank, 245 liters; No. 6 tank, 185 liters each;
No. 7 tank, 170 liters; forward wing tanks, 180 liters each; rear wing tanks, 110 liters each. This gave a total
capacity of 2,680 liters. The MiG-21R, MiG-21S/MiG-21M and MiG-21SM/MiG-21MF had the No. 1 bladder
tank deleted but the saddle tank was enlarged to hold 510 liters; the internal fuel capacity totaled 2,800 liters.
The MiG-21 MT and MiG-21 SMT had an even larger saddle tank. Formally this increased the total capacity to
3,250 liters; yet the maximum permitted fuel quantity was restricted to 2,950 liters. The MiG-21bis features a
new saddle tank which is smaller than the one on the MiG-21SMT but larger than the MiG-21 SM’s. The
internal fuel capacity totaled 3,041 liters. On the trainer versions, internal fuel is carried in five bladder tanks
inside the fuselage, a saddle tank and four integral tanks in the wings. This gave a total capacity of 2,350 liters
for the MiG-21 U and 2,450 liters for the MiG-21 US/MiG-21UM. The fuselage tanks are pressurized to 0.21-
0.23 kg/cm2
(3.0-3.28 psi) and the wing tanks to 0.41-0.43 kg/cm2
(5.85-6.14 psi). The fuel pumps are driven
by fuel-cooled electric motors. Model 495B electric centrifugal pumps with 14,000 liters per minute delivery
rate are in the Nos. 3 and 4 tanks, and a Model 422 pump with 8,000 liters per minute delivery rate is in the
No. 2 tank. All versions have a ‘wet’ center line pylon permitting carriage of a 490-liter PTB-490 drop tank; the
tank is of circular cross-section with a pointed nose and cruciform fins. The tank weighs 70 kg (154 lb.) empty
and 470 kg (1,036 lb.) full. Single-seat versions from the MiG-21 R onwards have ‘wet’ outer wing pylons
allowing additional PTB-490 drop tanks to be carried; they can also carry an 800-liter (176 Imp. gal.) oval-
section PTB-800 center line drop tank with no fins. The drop tanks are pressurized to 0.81-0.83 kg/cm’ (11.57-
11.85 psi). The fuel metering system indicates when internal fuel is down to 450 liters (99 Imp gal) and the
fuel in the drop tank(s) down to 100 liters (22 Imp gal).” http://www.kamov.net/general-aviation/mig-21-fuel-
system-and-tank-capacity/. Also see Fuel Tank Inspections and Related Structures above.
282. Saddle Fuel Tanks
If the aircraft is equipped (i.e., MiG-21 SMT, MiG-21bis) with a saddle fuel tank (mounted on the spine), very
that the AIP provides for its maintenance and inspection.
Additional Information: This type of tank has a number connections and components that may have to be
inspected by removal of the tank itself.
283. Fuel Flow Transmitters
Verify that the AIP addresses the inspection, maintenance and replacement of the fuel flow transmitters, i.e.,
ARTS-16A fuel flow transmitters.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
284. Fuel Leaks
The AIP and related SOPs need to address the high potential for fuel leaks. This poses a serious safety
concern, not just for the aircraft in flight for example (in-flight fire and explosion), but also in terms of ground
safety. It is exacerbated by the age and condition of the aircraft. The fuel bladders are a specific concern.
Additional Information: Operationally (i.e., Cuban Air Force service), these were known to leak, and in some
cases, leaks developed rather rapidly in the aircraft’s operational life, in some cases within months following
outdoor storage, especially in moist air. The following account of a ground crewman detecting a fuel leak
illustrates the issue: “On 19 May 11, 2011, the [mechanic] was detailed to carry out night turn around
servicing on a MiG-21 trainer aircraft. While carrying out this inspection, he observed some fuel droplets
leaking out from the rear dive brake of the aircraft. In spite of inadequate lighting at night and leak being not
very prominent, he decided to investigate the cause and reported the matter to the engineering officer.
Further analysis revealed a puncture on the main fuel pipeline in the heat zone of the aircraft. Had the leak
gone unnoticed, it could have led to a serious incident/accident.” http://www.indianairforce.nic.in. Another
incident, this time involving two-seater points out to another source of fuel leaks: “On November 23, 2009…a
MiG-21 trainer was lined up for take-off. [He] observed, fuel leakage from both connectors of the central drop
tank. He immediately transmitted the abnormality on RT. The fuel leakage was also confirmed by other
aircraft. Finally, the aircraft returned to dispersal.” http://www.indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Apr10.pdf.
Another MiG-21 fuel leak incident deserves to be noted: “On May 20, 2010, a [mechanic] realized that the
metallic flange fitted between tank no. 2 neck and saddle tank was of different size and shape. The longer
neck of this metallic flange induced stress on the tank No. 2 neck and ruptured its vulcanized portion which
had twice caused fuel leak on two different tanks. Had this gone unnoticed, the snag would have recurred
causing fuel leak either on ground or in the air.” http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Feb11.pdf.
285.
Bladder Fuel Tanks
Inspections
Verify the AIP includes procedures for inspecting, and when appropriate, the replacement of the bladder fuel
tanks. Soviet bladder fuel tanks had life-limits, usually about 10 years. Deterioration of bladder tank (bag) and
the sealant can pose a safety problem, especially because of the aircraft’s age and storage, as well as the
difficulty of the inspection (and access to the fuel tanks) itself. It does not necessarily take long for the
bladders to deteriorate.
Additional Information: The typical MiG-21 bladder tanks are composed of an inner layer of fuel-resistant
rubber 0.5 mm thick and an outer layer of rubberized fabric 1.1-29.5 mm thick. They are housed in special
metal containers integrated into the fuselage structure. Fuselage tanks are typically pressurized at around
0.21-0.23 kg/cm2
. For comparison, integral wing tanks are pressurized to 0.41-43 kg/cm2
. Tank deterioration
is a big issue. For example in 1962, MiG-21F were deployed by sea to Cuba, and up arrival after about two-
weeks in transit, it was found that the tanks were leaking due to cracks developed in the folds of the empty
tanks. This type of damage required the replacement of the bladder tanks. Bladder-type fuel tank safety is
not necessarily ensured by only “on-condition” inspections and may require more extensive processes,
including replacements. In any event, adequate data must be provided for any justification to inspect rather
than replacing the fuel tanks at the end of their life limit. The issue is to get acceptable tech data (i.e.,
inspection results and findings, USAF inspection guidance) to somehow validate some level of continuing the
use (with a limit) beyond manufacturer’s calendar limit, that is, validate and substantiate an equivalent level of
safety, as required in 8130.2. There is a need to go beyond just “it’s fine because it does not leak” or “the
Soviet life-limit is bogus…” as some in industry have argued. An acceptable process may include the following:
• A reasonable periodic inspection schedule. This inspection would not be a requirement that runs in
perpetuity. For example, the inspection could be done at 5 years initially, deceasing over time and
inspection cycle to ensure safety; 5 years, then each 4, and so on. The idea is to move carefully with the
understanding that there will be a point at which safe operation can no longer be assured;
• Must include the actual removal of the cells for inspection;
• Inspection procedures and the technical basis of the inspection(s) would be to acceptable technical
standards, i.e., USAF Tech Oder on fuel cells with the appropriate references, i.e. type of cells, type of
material, type of storage, type of fittings, etc.;
• Use Inspection and Repair of Aircraft Integral Tanks and Fuel Cells, T.O. 1-1-3, December 22, 2009, Change
10, February 17, 2013 as the main guiding document;
• Provide for adequate/acceptable storage requirements, i.e., “not outdoors for years” or “sitting empty for
long periods of time;”
• Document Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) concepts and data, that is, the inspection program
becomes a living document that can be adapted or adapt to what is found in terms of the inspection(s);
• Report to FAA (FSDO) all defects, leaks, repairs concerning the fuel system/tanks.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
286. Hydraulic Pumps
Verify that the AIP provides for the maintenance, inspection, and replacement (at the appropriate life-limit) of
the hydraulic pumps; the main engine-driven pump (i.e., NP-34M-1T), the boost pump, and the emergency
pump (i.e., NR-27), which provides hydraulic power in the event of engine failure.
Additional Information: In case of a main and booster hydraulic system malfunction, the electrically driven
NP-27T emergency pump provides pressure for 15 minutes to the stabilizer and aileron boosters.
287.
Wings and Tail Bolts
and Bushings
Ask about inspections and magnafluxing of wings, and tail bolts and bushings. Recommend the AIP
incorporate other commonly used and industry-accepted practices involving NDI if not addressed in the
manufacturer or NATO maintenance and inspection procedures.
288.
Ex-Finnish Air Force Wings
and Vertical Stabilizers
(MiG-21F-13)
Verify whether any of the structural components of the aircraft, namely wings and vertical stabilizers are ex-
Finnish Air Force components (MiG-21F-13s). If so, verify that the structures were not tampered with.
Additional Information: This is important because in some cases, disposed Finnish Air Force MiG-21s had
those structures cut or otherwise destroyed for storage purposes and they cannot be repaired to any
airworthy condition.
289.
Horizontal Stab Bearing
Inspection and
Lubrication
Verify that the AIP includes the required inspections and maintenance of the horizontal stab bearings. Failure
to properly lubricate/inspect the bearings or improper reinstallation could result in loss/failure of the bearings
and in-flight loss of control.
290. Steel Components
The AIP must address the inspection and maintenance of all steel components. As with many Soviet aircraft,
the MiG-21 has a significant amount of steel components, including major structural elements, many
embedded within aluminum structures.
Additional Information: For example, in the MiG-21F, the main spar is an I-beam made of steel (30KhGSA
high-strength chrome steel), while crossing ribs are pressed Duralumin sheet, while the skin is generally V95
aluminum alloy varying in thickness from 1.5 to 2.5 mm (other aluminum types used in the aircraft include V65
and ML5-T4). Some of these steel components are located in areas not usually found in Western aircraft. The
issue of aluminum/steel corrosion is critical. Note: Dissimilar Metal Corrosion. Extensive pitting damage may
result from contact between dissimilar metal parts in the presence of a conductor. While surface corrosion
may or may not be taking place, a galvanic action, not unlike electroplating, occurs at the points or areas of
contact where the insulation between the surfaces has broken down or been omitted. This electrochemical
attack can be very serious because in many instances the action is taking place out of sight, and the only way
to detect it prior to structural failure is by disassembly and inspection. The contamination of a metal’s surface
by mechanical means can also induce dissimilar metal corrosion. The improper use of steel cleaning products,
such as steel wool or a steel wire brush on aluminum or magnesium, can force small pieces of steel into the
metal being cleaned, which will then further corrode and ruin the adjoining surface. Carefully monitor the use
of nonwoven abrasive pads, so that pads used on one type of metal are not used again on a different metal
surface. Refer to FAA 8083-30, Chapter 6, and FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 43-4A, Corrosion Control for Aircraft.
291. Honeycomb Structures
Verify the AIP provides for the inspection and replacement of all bonded honeycomb structures per the
applicable guidance (i.e., USAF, NATO).
292.
Flight Control Balancing,
Deflection, and Rigging
Verify flight controls were balanced per the applicable maintenance manual(s) (i.e., USAF, NATO) after
material replacement, repairs, and painting. Verify proper rigging and deflection.
Additional Information: In several former military aircraft, damage to flight controls has been noticed when
inadequate repairs have been performed. If there are no adequate records of the balancing of the flight
controls, the airworthiness certificate should not be issued.
293. Flight Control Rods
Verify that the AIP provides for the proper flight controls rods. For example, in the MiG-21, there are 20 such
rods, of varying types, length, diameters, and thickness.
294. Aileron Inspections
Verify that the AIP provides for the detailed inspection of the ailerons, before and post-flight as well and
possibly expands upon the original guidance. Several MiG-21 accidents have been cause by aileron failures, in
some cases, actual in-flight separations. In some cases, manufacturing defects were found.
295.
Varying Quality
(General)
Recommend that the AIP addresses (in the appropriate sections) the varying qualities that exist between
aircraft, components, and parts. This is a typical result of Soviet aircraft manufacturing techniques because
the MiG-21 was manufactured at many different facilities, and quality control was substandard. This can have
an impact on maintenance, inspection, adherence to standards and spare parts use.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
296. Flight Controls System
Verify that the AIP provides for the inspection and maintenance of all flight control elements and components,
rods as per the applicable guidance. The AIP should have comprehensive guidance to this effect, including the
layout of the system and components. See Boosters System below.
Additional Information: For example, in a MiG-21F, flight control elements include:
• All rods, and rudder foot control bars; aircraft control stick;
• Artificial feel mechanism of aileron system;
• Transmission ratio non-linear change mechanism (both wings);
• Boosters, Type BU-45A; aileron attachment points;
• Automatic transmission ratio controller, Type APU-3V;
• Artificial feel mechanism;
• Booster, Type BU-51MS (BU-210B on MiG-21MF), stabilizer control system;
• Bell crank for stabilizer attachment beam;
• Trimming mechanism, Type MR-100M.
297. Trim Failure (Pitch)
Verify that the AIP provides for the specific inspection of the trim system (pitch) (i.e., Type MR-100M). There
have been several cases on fatal accidents caused by a runway trim.
Additional Information: For example, on September 17, 2001, an Indian Air Force MiG-21 crashed because “a
trim runway had caused excessive pitch-up just after getting airborne. It appears that the pilot overcorrected
in darkness at a height of only 820 feet and a high speed (370 knots). This resulted in almost immediate
impact 2 miles from the runway end.” Attrition, Air Forces Monthly No. 192 (March 2004).
298. Boosters System
Verify that the AIP provides for the inspection, maintenance, and replacement of the flight control boosters,
i.e. BU-45, BU-51, and BU-210B units.
Additional Information: The following description illustrates this important system: “the actuator supply
system caters exclusively for the aileron actuators and the other chamber of the tail plane actuator (the other
chamber is operated by the primary system, not the booster system). Normally, the latter is served by both
systems; in the event one of the systems fails, the actuator remains operational, but delivers only 50% power.”
Gordon, MiG-21, 2008. The following incident illustrates these important items: “On October 27, 2009, Sqn.
Ldr. S. Gupta was authorized to fly a two aircraft BFM mission in a MiG-21 aircraft. During a scissoring
maneuver, the pilot experienced ‘Booster Hydraulic Failure’ with pressure reading zero at a distance of 50 km
from the base. The pilot took prompt actions by lowering undercarriage on emergency and recovering the
aircraft off a flapless approach on priority. Post-flight inspection revealed a heavy leak from the BU-45 Aileron
Booster as the seal of the banzounion valve had worn out. Sqn. Ldr. Gupta displayed a high degree of
professionalism and averted a possible incident.” http://www.indianairforce.nic.in.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
299.
Landing Gear Retraction
Test and Related
Maintenance, and
Description
Verify the AIP provides for the regular landing gear retraction test and related maintenance tasks, including
documentation, per the applicable procedures and required equipment. NATO MiG-21 guidance an also be
used.
Additional Information: The following provides some background on the MiG-21 landing gear system:
“The MiG-21 Landing gear was hydraulically retractable tricycle type, with single wheel on each unit. Nose
unit retracts forward, main units inward into wings and fuselage; in the process the main wheels rotate 87″
around the oleos by means of mechanical links to lie almost vertically beside the inlet duct. On the MiG-
21F/MiG-21F-13, MiG-21PF/PFS and early-production MiG-21PFMs, as well as MiG-21 U trainers up to and
including Tbilisi-built Batch 6, the levered-suspension nose unit attached to fuselage frame 6 has a 500 x 180
mm (19.68 x 7.08 in) KT-38 nose wheel set in a fork and equipped with twin pneumatic expander-tube brakes.
Late-production MiG-21PFMs and subsequent single-seaters, as well as trainers from MiG-21 U c/n 01665107
onwards, have a KT-102 nose wheel of identical size equipped with an eight-piston disc brake. On the MiG-21F
and the first production MiG-21F-13s the main units had 600 x 200 mm (23.62 x 7.87 in) KT-82 wheels; later
MiG-21F-13s and early-production MiG-21PFS had main wheels of the same model but equipped with wider
600 x 220 mm (23.62 x 8.66 in) tires. The wheel track was 2.692 m (8 ft. 9 in) and the wheelbase 4.78 m (15 ft.
8′). Late-production MiG-21PFS and subsequent versions, including the two-seaters, had new 800 x 200 mm
(31.49 x 7.87 in) KT-92 main wheels with 12-piston pneumatic disc brakes; this resulted in the wheel track
being increased to 2.787 m (9 ft. 1 in) and the wheelbase being shortened to 4.71 m (15 ft., 5 in). The latest
versions of the MiG-21 could be fitted with KT-90D main wheels featuring cerametallic disc brakes. Tire
pressure is 7+0.5 kg/cm2
(100+7.14 psi) for the nose wheel and 8+0.5 kg/cm’ (114.28+7.14 psi) for the main
wheels. Brake system pressure is 19.4 kg/cm’ (277 psi). All three units have oleo-pneumatic shock absorbers.
The oleo stroke is 86+2 mm (3.38+0.078 in) for the nose unit and 230+2 mm (9.05+0.078 in) for the main units.
Shock absorber oil capacity is 650 cm3
(39.65 cu in) for the nose unit and 2,200 cm3
(134.2 cu in) for the main
units; nitrogen pressure in the oleos is 3.7+0.1 MPa for the nose unit and 3+0.1 MPa for the main units. The
latter have torque links; the upper portions of the main gear struts double as air bottles of the main pneumatic
system. On the MiG-21 F/MiG-21F-13, the nose unit is castoring; steering on the ground is by differential
braking. Late versions have a hydraulically steerable nose gear unit.” http://www.kamov.net. The following
accident illustrates the consequences of a landing gear failure. In May 1996, a Romanian Air Force MiG-21US
was involved in a landing accident. During a touch and go at night, the left main gear strut collapsed. The
aircraft exited the runway at high-speed and collided with a radio guidance installation. The right wing broke
off. The rest of the aircraft rolled upside down and caught fire. While the pilot in the front seat was rescued
rapidly, the IP, in the back seat, was not so lucky. He was trapped and suffered burns on 30% of the body, but
was finally saved by ARFF personnel. See http://www.ejection-history.org.uk/Country-By-
Country/Romania.htm.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
300. Speed (Air) Brakes
Verify that the AIP addresses the proper inspection, maintenance, condition, deflection, and warning signage
of the speed brake as per the applicable guidance (I.e., USAF, and NATO).
Additional Information: There are two door-type air brakes, located one to each side of the under-fuselage,
below the wing root leading edges, and one door-type air brake just forward of the ventral fin. All of these air
brakes are hinged at their forward edges and activated hydraulically. Insufficient hydraulic power results in
slightly drooped air brakes on parked aircraft. Note: Both forward air brake housings have access panels to
the nozzle adjusting unit (starboard) and throttle connecting rod, both located just aft of the hydraulic
actuators. See Air Brake T-Handle below.
301. Air Brake T-Handle
The AIP should emphasize the correct use (i.e., trained personnel) and safety issues with using this T-handle.
Pulling the handle on the port side causes a short circuit which enables the air brakes to be opened manually
for inspection and access to the panels mentioned in Speed (Air) Brakes above. The accidental operation of
this device can cause injury.
302. Ventral Fin Verify that the AIP contains the necessary inspections and maintenance of the ventral fin under the tail.
303. Static Dischargers
Verify that the AIP provides for the inspection and replacement of the static dischargers. These are commonly
known as static wicks or static discharge wicks.
Additional Information: They are high electrical resistance (6-200 Megohm) devices with a lower corona
voltage than the surrounding aircraft structure. They control the corona discharge into the atmosphere,
isolating noise and preventing it from interfering with aircraft communication equipment. They are used on
aircraft to allow the continuous satisfactory operation of onboard navigation and radio communication
systems during precipitation (p-static) conditions. Precipitation static is an electrical charge on an airplane
caused by flying through rain, snow, ice, or dust particles. When the aircraft charge is great enough, it
discharges into the surrounding air. The discharge path is through pointed aircraft extremities, such as
antennas, wing tips, vertical and horizontal stabilizers, and other protrusions. The discharge creates a broad-
band radio frequency noise from DC to 1000 MHz. This RF noise can affect aircraft communication. During
adverse charging conditions (air friction), static dischargers limit the potential static buildup on the aircraft and
control interference generated by static charge. Static dischargers are not lightning arrestors and do not
reduce or increase the likelihood of an aircraft being struck by lightning. Static dischargers are subject to
damage as a result of lightning strike to the aircraft, and should be inspected after a lightning strike to ensure
proper static discharge operation. Static dischargers will not function if they are not properly bonded to the
aircraft. There must be a conductive path from all parts of the airplane to the dischargers, otherwise they will
be useless. Access panels, doors, cowls, navigation lights, antenna mounting hardware, control surfaces, etc.,
can create static noise if they cannot discharge through the static wick.
304. Yaw Damper Verify any the yaw damper is addressed in the AIP as per the applicable guidance (I.e., USAF, and NATO).
305.
Accurate Weight &
Balance (W&B)
Review original W&B paperwork. Verify adherence to the applicable guidance (supplemented by USAF, and/or
NATO) as well as FAA-H-8083-1, Aircraft Weight and Balance Handbook, if documentation by the applicant
appears to be inadequate.
Additional Information: Several former military aircraft accidents have been linked to center of gravity
miscalculations. Over simplistic procedures have also been issues.
306.
Type of Ejection Seat
System (Soviet)
Identify the type of ejection seat fitted to the aircraft. MiG-21s were equipped with several ejection seats,
such as the KM-1 (aka SK-3), PSMs2, SK-1, and SM-1. There were variants to these.
Additional Information: For example, the KM-1 seat could be a KM-1I, KM-1M, or KM-1V. Regardless, the
type of seat changes many aspects of operations and maintenance. For example, parts and support for an
earlier SK-1 seat will likely be very difficult to obtain, while parts and support for later models of the SM-1,
may not. See Ejection Seat Components Life Limit below. The seat/aircraft combination must be approved by
the airframe manufacturer. Note: Related equipment in a KM-1 installation would include the emergency
oxygen supply (KP-27M) and the survival kit (NAZ-7). While some of the KM-1 seats have zero-zero capability,
the SK seats did not, and have very limited ejection envelopes. Another significant issue between early MiG-
21s and older models is not only the ejection seat (SK vs. KM-1) but the actual ejection sequence.
307. Chinese Ejection Seats
If the aircraft is a Chinese J-7 or F-7, identify the type of seat. Many Chinese J-7s have been equipped with the
Chinese Jali HTY-2 ejection seat (Type 2), and Type III. The newer HTY-4 Zero-Zero seat has also been cleared
for later J-7 models (i.e., J-7 III). Chinese ejection seats are not interchangeable with Soviet MiG-21s.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
308.
KM-1 Ejection Seat
Overview
(Early Model)
Recommend that the ASI become familiar with the basic ejection seat functionality. This is necessary to
properly ascertain how the AIP addresses this important item.
Additional Information: The following
description is provided as background for
an early KM-1 ejection seat fitted to the
MiG-21: “…relative to western seats of that
era, the most interesting features of this
Russian-design are (a) the Seat Man
Separation (SMS) mechanism integrated in
the chute pack, (b) the use of mechanical
altitude-triggered timer exactors, and (c)
the use of a mechanical aircraft
speed/altitude-triggered timer exactors.
On the left knee guard is a black inertia reel
handle. On the other leg guard is a red
handle for ground egress or manual
override situations. In the [front] you can
see the lower harness connections. The
main ejection handles have been sun-faded
from red to an off-white color. The foot
restraints are shown in the closed position
in all photographs, while the arm restraints
are shown retracted in the front and 3/4
right view and in the deployed state in the
other photos. The lower right side of the
seat mounts two mechanical actuators for
various functions of the seat sequencing.
The upper one is a PPK-1P which is armed
by a cable from the first drogue chute
which is attached to the red loop of the
starter key. This is the primary seat
separation initiator. The lower PPK-2P is
actuated by seat motion withdrawing its
starter key (the blue loop). This provides a
failsafe function by having it perform the
seat separation actions after 3.5 seconds if
below 10,000 ft. The cables from both PPK
units can be seen leading back to the aft
end of the seat pan. The back view shows many points of interest. Starting at the top center and moving
clockwise, the top of the black catapult tube is missing some parts. To the right of the shoulder of the catapult
tube is a green box which is the inertia reel/shoulder harness control. Four cables can be seen entering the
top of this unit. They connect to the roller unit’s visible outboard of the springs on the top of the seat. (Those
springs are used to flip up the headrest/drogue container to release the second stabilization chute.) The two
green tubes running vertically along the right edge of the rear are the arm restraint extender (thin, light
green), and retractor (thicker, darker green) units. The arm restraints are extended at seat initiation, and
retracted as part of the seat man separation. Outboard of these at shoulder height is the pyro mechanism for
the canopy release. It also has an interlock to prevent firing the catapult of the seat until the canopy has
separated and withdrawn the interlock. The lower right of the seat contains mechanisms which are used to
release the harness at seat separation on command from the PPK mechanism cables. To the left of the base of
the catapult/rocket tube is a silver cylinder which is an electrical motor to drive the seat pan up and down for
height adjustment. Above it on the outboard left side is a large silver box, which is the KPA-4 Speed/Time
computer. Actuated by a key being pulled by a cable in the first inch of seat travel, it determines the 'mode' of
the seat based on the sensed airspeed. We believe the airspeed is sensed via the black hose running out of
the base of the unit. Next to the KPA-4 is a cylindrical structure with a right-angle turn at the top. This is the
rocket initiator unit. Above it, horizontally mounted behind the catapult is the initiator for seat man
separation. It is fired by a cable from the KPA-4 running up and over the pulley near the top of the seat. The
cable is protected by a clear plastic shield running up from the outboard edge of the initiator.”
http://www.ejectionsite.com/km1seat.htm.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
309.
OEM Ejection Seat
Support
Ask the applicant whether the ejection seat OEM still supports the ejection seat system, and whether it
control part supplies. It is critical to clearly understand if and how the OEM supports both the earlier or
upgraded ejection seats.
310.
Martin-Baker Ejection
Seats
(Mk. 10 and Mk. 16)
There is a possibility that some MiG-21 may incorporate the Martin-Baker Mk. 10 or Mk. 16 ejection seat. This
is because (1) this seat (Mk. 16) was in fact cleared and installed in the IAI MiG-21-200 upgrade, and (2) the
Mk. 10 is installed in some Chinese J-7/F-7s.
Additional Information: Recent Chinese J-7/F-7 aircraft can, and have, been equipped with a Martin Baker
seat, the Mk. 10. The Pakistan Air Force opted to fit their F-7s with the Martin Baker PL10LZ (Mk. 10) ejection
seat. If this is the case, adequate technical data is required. There are no “homemade” ejection seat
installations. With the new the ejection seat, ejection envelope can be significantly increased. The seat can
expand the ejection envelope from a low speed of 55 kt. and high of 550 kt. to a zero speed/zero altitude and
600-kt. capability. The safety margin provided by these new Martin-Baker ejection seats, and the easier and
more reliable support chain for the seats, are other features of the upgrade that rate as very positive. For
more information, refer to Escape System Upgrade Program, T-38 Aircraft at http://www.wpafb.af.mil. As
with the SK and KM-1 ejection seats and as part of the ejection seat system, in the MK. 16, the parachute
(must an approved parachute for that ejection seat system) must be maintained and inspected in accordance
with the USAF procedures and standards. Note: In recent years, the Mk. 10 ejection seat has been involved in
fatal and serious accidents (seat malfunctions). In 2007, the rear seat in a RAF tornado separated inflight (no
ejection) killing the occupant. In 2010, a RAF red Arrows pilot was killed when the seat inadvertently fired on
the ground. In 2012, both seats in an USAF T-6A fired on the ground at Columbus AFB, and in this case, both
pilots survived. These events clearly illustrate the dangers of ejection seats, even modern ones.
311.
Martin Baker
MRO Support
(Chinese F-7 Versions)
If the aircraft is a Chinese version, J-7/F-7, and the Martin Baker Mk. 10 ejection seat is fitted, it is
recommended that manufacturer support be used in the maintenance of the Martin Baker ejection seats in
the aircraft.
Additional Information: Unlike many other older types of ejection seats, Martin Baker, the manufacturer, still
supports its older seats. Through its Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO), Martin-Baker can carry out
maintenance if a customer requested this service. The company now offers a dedicated Maintenance, Repair
and Overhaul (MRO) service, including a facility by one of its subsidiary, Martin-Baker America, in Johnstown,
PA.
312.
Ejection Seat Components
Life Limit
Ensure life-limit requirements concerning the ejection seat are followed. No deviations or extensions should
be permitted. If the seat is not properly maintained, including current pyrotechnics, it must be disabled. It
covers both the SK and KM seats.
Additional Information: There is history of KM-1 ejection seat pyrotechnics malfunctioning. For example, on
June 10, 1992 the pilot of a MiG-21MF was killed following a loss of control when the ejection seat system
failed. After the accident, and following the inspection of other KM-1 ejection seats, the Czech Air Force
determined that some pyros failed. Examples of the pyrotechnic devices on the SK or the KM-1 (not
interchangeable) seat include:
• PK-3M-1 pyrotechnic cartridge (SK), TSM-2500-38 solid rocket motor (SK), PZ-1 rocket motor (KM),
PZ-M rocket motor (KM-1M), and PV-50 pyrotechnic cartridge (KM-1M);
Other SK/KM components (not interchangeable or necessarily time-limited [has to be confirmed] ) include:
• KAP-3 separation device, KAP-4 parachute opener (KM-1M), AD-3U time computer, ORK-11
connector, and PS-1 recovery parachute;
313. Crew Harnesses
Verify the harness used by the crew is the required type for the ejection seat used. Accidents have been fatal
because of harness issues.
314.
Ejection Seat
Modifications
Prohibit ejection seat modifications unless directly made by the manufacturer or permitted under the
applicable and current technical guidance (i.e., NATO). The use of the modified seat must be allowed by the
airframe manufacturer or applicable service guidance.
315.
Ejection Seat System
Maintainers Training
Require adequate ejection seat training for maintenance crews.
Additional Information: On May 9, 2012, an improperly trained mechanic accidentally jettisoned the canopy
of a former military aircraft while performing maintenance and was seriously injured.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
316.
Ejection Seat
System Maintenance
Ensure maintenance and inspection of the ejection seat and other survival equipment is performed in
accordance with the applicable guidance in English (i.e., USAF, NATO) by trained personnel. In the Hungarian
Air Force, this included an annual check of the seat (KM-1) involving seat removal. If the seat is Chinese, the
applicable technical guidance must also be in English.
Additional Information: The operational history of the MiG-21 includes many instances of ejection seat
malfunctions. These failures, coupled with the many types of seats fitted to the aircraft (i.e., see Type of
Ejection Seat System above) makes maintenance of these systems a critical issue. The AIP needs to include
specific inspections and recordkeeping for all pyrotechnic devices, related systems, and other mechanisms.
Ejection seat system replacement times must be adhered to. No “on condition” maintenance may be
permitted for rocket motors and propellants. Make the distinction between replacement times, that is,
“shelf life” vs. “installed life limit.” For example, a 9-year replacement requirement is not analogous to a
2-year installed limit. If such maintenance documentations and requirements are not available, the seat must
be deactivated. A particularly poignant incident occurred in 1972 which more than illustrates the challenge of
ejection seat maintenance. On May 3, 1972, aircraft 617, an East German AF MiG-21M, crashed near Cedynia,
Poland. The ejection seat system telescopic pole partially fired out of the seat by itself. This means that the
seat could not be used. The pilot, Lt. Col. Neumann, attempted an emergency landing, but did not survive.
The pilot was the East German Air Force’s flying inspector in command. Particularly tragic was the fact that he
was the head of a commission of inquiry, which was created to study such accidents (telescope tube) in MiG-
21s. A 1965 Polish Air Force fatal MiG-21 accident also illustrates the need for proper maintenance: “October
13, 1965. Pilot Captain Eugeniusz Bronislaw Mahnitski (800 hours in airplanes) was performing a night flight.
After take-off, he reported that he had a hydraulic failure and that he was returning. He reported that he will
eject. The bailout was too at too low an altitude. He did not separate from the seat, and the pilot hit the
ground. It was found that the AD-3 cable has not been connected to the seat.” http://aviacrash.ucoz.ru/.
317. Radio Altimeter
If the RV-UM radio altimeter is operational (includes the T-shaped dipole antenna), verify that the AIP provides
for its maintenance and inspection as per the applicable technical guidance.
318.
Ground Support
Equipment Maintenance
Verify the AIP provides for the proper maintenance of all required approved ground support equipment for
the aircraft. Related technical guidance must be available as well.
319.
Maintenance Access
Panels
Verify that the AIP includes the inspection and functionality of all maintenance access panels, including
markings. For example on the wing alone, there are 20 such panels.
320. “Experimental” Markings
Verify the word “EXPERIMENTAL” is located immediately next to the canopy railing, on both sides, as required
by § 45.23(b). Subdued markings are not acceptable.
321. N-Number
Verify the marking required by §§ 45.25 and 45.29(b) concerning the registration number (N-number), its
location, and its size are complied with. If non-standard markings are proposed, verify compliance with
Exemption 5019, as amended, under regulatory Docket No. 25731.
322.
Sample Deficiencies in
MiG-21 AIPs
The following listing is provided to illustrate some of the deficiencies found in a MiG-21 AIP.
• No revisions to the inspection document and no dates in the Inspection Program.
• The AIP reads like a check list and not referenced like an inspection program.
• There is no master list of revision levels of manuals and document, and no samples of documents.
• Confusing “RESPONSIBILITIES” between the owner and the operator.
• For return to service, there is no approved data used to accomplish work.
• AIP needs to address overhaul vs. other lesser levels of maintenance, repair, and inspections.
• AIP needs to clarify exactly what training and experience is required to perform work on things like
ejection systems, or other sensitive or dangerous areas (example: who knows how to properly pack
a drogue-chute for your MiG-21).
• Where is the history of modifications and where are those records kept and is it part of the AIP?
• Lack of metric conversion data, and important terms no defined.
• Cannibalization, or removed and missing parts tags and tracking, not found in AIP nor is spare parts
storage discussed.
• No information on the qualification of personnel - example ejection seats, drag chutes, drop tanks.
• There is no data on combining intervals.
• No program outlining short, long term or return for service by maintenance or by the pilot.
• Lacks a section and any technical data or required tools or training.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
323.
USAF MiG-21 Evaluation
(Maintenance Issues)
The following listing is provided to illustrate some of the maintenance issues and defects found by the USAF
during a comprehensive evaluation (February 11, 1968 –March 27, 1968) of a MiG-21F with a total time of 135
hours.
Ground Inspections:
• Cracks in top or right wing, forward flap;
• Asbestos cloth worn through in aft section right side;
• Gasket bad at aft drain bottom of drop tank;
• Hydraulic leak in primary reservoir;
• Fabric covers torn on right side of vertical stabilizer;
• Boot missing from horizontal stabilizer rods inside aft fuselage;
• Both rudder pilot bearings dry and dirty;
• Bonding broken on rudder bell crank at fuselage break;
• First stage compressor blades rusty;
• Corroded battery containers;
• Main hydraulic system pressure gauge INOP;
• Nose wheel axle nut threads stripped;
• Cracks on landing gear lower fairing door;
• Cracked stringers in top of left main landing gear well;
• Fuel leak in aft section right-hand side;
• AMP-Hour meter INOP;
• Hydraulic leak forward of stabilizer actuator;
Flight Discrepancies:
• February 11, 1968 - Cabin pressurization instrumentation failure;
• February 12, 1968 - #1 boost pump INOP;
• February 19, 1968 – Gear would not retract, both main tires worn on the inside;
• February 20, 1968 – Pressure cap found leaking on external connection of booster system, new
seals needed;
• February 24, 1968 – EGT fluctuation, two thermocouples leads with insulation were burned off;
• February 25, 1968 – Hydraulic leak on the underside of the fuselage because of a ruptured booster
system external hydraulic pressure connection;
• February 27, 1968 - Poor brake action on one side;
• February 28, 1968 – Weak brakes because the brake cable from the control stick handle to the
control valve was partially broken;
• March 2, 1968 – Nose wheel shimmy excessive due to wear;
• March 3, 1968 – EGT was first low and then fluctuated during g flight due to faulty thermocouples;
• March 5, 1968 – Both main tires worn beyond limits with a total of 53 landings. Oil SOAP showed
signs of high iron content;
• March 7, 1968 – Brakes still sensitive and tend to lock. The drag chute button cover was found to
be broken. Rivets popped on leading edge of the left wing, and also on the right flap inboard of the
top leading edge.
• March 8, 1968 – Brakes still grab;
• March 11, 1968 – No EGT indication due to probe malfunction;
• March 12, 1968 – Both main tires worn on the inside;
• March 14, 1968 - Canopy disconnected from forward hooks;
• March 15-16 1968 – Pneumatic line on left strut leaking. N1 and N2 rotor Tach generators had to
be calibrated. Hydraulic leak in right aileron booster swivel fittings. Cracks in radar compartment
hood aft end. Multiple rivets popped.
• March 24, 1968 – Nose tire worn beyond limits.

Notes,
Action(s), and
Disposition
324.
Aircraft
Structural-Life
Management Program
Recommend that as part of the AIP design, the applicant/operator review and consider the Aircraft Structural
Integrity Program or ASIP concepts discussed in the RAND Corporation 2006 report entitled A Survey of
Aircraft Structural-Life Management Programs in the U.S. Navy, the Canadian Forces, and the U.S. Air Force.
This document provides great insight into the manner in which the military services address many of the issues
associated with operating older aircraft from a structural risk management perspective. It is relevant to any
civil MiG-21 operation.
The report summary
notes: “The U.S. Air Force
owns and operates
approximately 6,000
aircraft to meet its force
requirements. The
average age of these
aircraft is approximately
22 years and is expected
to continue to rise. Many
of the older aircraft are
facing aging issues, such as
structural deterioration
due to fatigue, and many
aircraft are expected to
encounter such issues as
the Air Force plans to keep
aging aircraft in service for
many years. Fatigue is a
process in which damage
accumulates in material
subjected to alternating or
cyclic loading. This
damage may culminate in
cracks, which will
eventually lead to
complete fracture after a
sufficient number of load
cycles. Concern is growing
in the Air Force that
structural deterioration in
aging aircraft is increasing the maintenance workload, reducing aircraft readiness, and potentially increasing
safety risks (Pyles, 2003). Since 1958, the Air Force has relied on its Aircraft Structural Integrity Program (ASIP)
to achieve and maintain the structural safety of its aircraft. ASIP provides a framework for establishing and
sustaining structural integrity throughout the aircraft’s life.1 The program’s overarching objective is to prevent
structural failures and to do so cost-effectively and without losing mission capability. ASIP is a key contributor
to the Air Force’s force management processes, and the program’s ongoing viability will be critical as the Air
Force continues to operate an aging force to meet operational needs. In recent years, some issues have been
raised about inadequate implementation of ASIP. The concern is that an aging force, budget pressures,
diminishing program regulation, and challenges in communicating structural condition and structural needs to
decision makers may be leading to omission or incomplete performance of ASIP tasks. A further concern is
that these factors may result in loss of control of ASIP, lack of visibility into the structural conditions of aircraft,
and resource-allocation challenges for ASIP. The effectiveness of ASIP could be degraded, which would
adversely affect operational effectiveness, flight safety, and fleet sustainment costs. This report surveys
aircraft structural-life management programs in the U.S. Navy, the Canadian Forces, and the U.S. Air Force to
offer insights into how the Air Force could strengthen ASIP, particularly in enabling (1) independent and
balanced regulation, (2) clear and timely communications, and (3) adequate and stable resources to achieve
ASIP effectiveness. Table S.1 compares the technical and operational backgrounds for each service, and Table
S.2 summarizes the key characteristics of each program.” See
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG370.html.

Notes,
Action(s) and
Disposition
MiG-21 Operating Limitations and Operational Issues
325.
AIP and Related
Documentation
Require adherence to the AIP and related documentation as part of the operating limitations.
326.
Understanding of the
Operating Limitations
Require the applicant to sign the Acknowledgment of Special Operating Limitations form.
327.
Pilot in Command (PIC)
Requirements
(General)
Ensure the operating limitations address PIC requirements. Direct transition from a modern corporate
jet to a high-performance former military aircraft with minimum training is not a safe practice. Refer to
the appropriate plot training and checking requirements in FAA Order 8900.1, volume 5, chapter 9,
section 2. In addition to holding the required Experimental Authorization, airplane category, the MiG-21
PIC should have:
(1) 10 hours dual training in the MiG-21U in preparation for pilot authorization flight check;
(2) A structured ground school (similar to at least an USAF Short Course);
(3) 1,000 hours in high-performance fighter/fighter-bomber experience, including experience in second
generation aircraft such as the T-38 and F-4 (F-16, F-18, and F-15 can be used for the total);
(4) Proficiency and currency of 3-5 hours per month and 5-6 takeoffs and landings, and
(5) Follow standard USAF proficiency standardization check procedures (see below).
Additional Information: Experience with only straight-wing jets, such as the L-39 or T-33 is not
sufficient. In 2008, and in the words of Air Chief Marshall Tipnis, the “MiG-21 is a high demand aircraft.”
It certainly is a quantum jump for an inexperienced pilot who has just finished his training on sub-sonic
jet trainers like Kiran or Iskra.” http://rupeenews.com/2008/09/world-record-200th-indian-flying-coffin-
mig-29-crashes/. A current US MiG-21 pilot notes that the MiG-21 “requires constant attention and
respect from its pilot. You must always be at 100 per cent performance to dominate it.” Stars and
Stripes MiG Town, 2012. See Currency, Recent Flight Experience, and Conversion Training below.
328.
Currency, Recent
Flight Experience, and
Conversion Training
Recommend currency and recent flight experience of 3 to 5 hours per month and 5-6 takeoffs and
landings. The typical general experience of “at least three takeoffs and three landings within the
preceding 90 days” is not sufficient for the safe operation of the MiG-21. Many MiG-21 operators admit
the difficulty to keep proficient and some note that they limit “activity to around 20 hours per year.”
Stars and Stripes MiG Town, 2012. Recommend proficiency and currency of 3 hours per month and 5-6
takeoffs and landings. Conversion training should be at least 10 hours in type.
Additional Information: Some flexibility could be provided in addressing this issue such as combining
hours and landings (that is, 1 hour and 3 landings) and interjecting (but not replacing all MiG-21 flights
with the specified period) certain high-performance flight profiles in another high-performance military
jet such as the MiG-21U, TA-4J, or T-38. Lack of currency and recent flight experience in the MiG-21
plagued many former Soviet Bloc countries in the 1990s. In 1997, Polish Navy MiG-21 pilots were only
able to reach 65 hours per year in the aircraft, a number considered low, and especially so when
compared to the NATO minimum of 120 hours. In the 1990s, Hungarian Air Force MiG-21 pilots were
only able to get 65-80 hours per year, considered by that air force as “extremely low,” down from 140
per year in the 1980s. In the Romanian Air Force, MiG-21 pilots fly about 100 hours per year, or about
230 sorties per year. This is not to suggest that all civil MiG-21 pilots get 100--120 hours a year, but it
points to the fast that more than the bare minimum provide dun the regulations is necessary for the
MiG-21. The Bulgarian Air Force, another MiG-21 operator which continued to operate the aircraft as a
member of NATO, had similar problems with minimum pilot currency, where the 50 hours per year per
so that its pilots were accumulating was deemed inadequate. On the other hand, in the 1960s, Iraqi Air
Force MiG-21F pilots were able to fly about 20 hours per month, reaching a very high-level of proficiency
and currency in the type. Conversion training is another issue. For example, starting in 1997-1998, the
Indian Air Force, a large MiG-21 operator (still as of 2013), extended the training requirements for its
MiG-21 pilots to 20 hours before solo (70 hours total) and also extended the ground school portion of
the training by six months. These actions were necessary as an attempt to curb down the high accident
rate of the MiG-21 in Indian Air Force service, due in great extent, to the difficulty of transition
inexperienced pilots to the aircraft from straight-wing, low-power trainers like the HAL HIT-16 Kiran. In
the Finnish Air Force, MiG-21 conversion training was comprised by about 12-19 flights totaling about
10-15 hours. In the Bulgarian Air Force, pilot operational conversion and rating in the MiG-21 includes
100-150 hours and takes place over 2 years, while Indian AF MiG-21 pilot conversion to operational
status is about 125 hours in type. See Romanian Air Force MiG-21 Conversion Training below.

Notes,
Action(s) and
Disposition
329.
Romanian Air Force
MiG-21 Conversion
Training
Recommend that in establishing training and conversion requirements, the Romanian Air Force
standards be considered.
Additional Information: In 2002, conversion to the MiG-21 Lancer is divided into two categories. First,
pilots fresh from flight training go though a 60-day theoretical course before logging 21 hours in the air.
Only then is the pilot posted to a unit, but when there, he still ahs much training to accomplish. Second,
the pilots converting from the old MiG-21 (or other types) spend 25 days in the classroom studying the
lancer’s avionics. The practical part of the course consist of seven flights in the lancer-B two-seater
before going solo in the Lancer-A. See Currency, Recent Flight Experience, and Conversion Training
above.
330.
Indian Air Force MiG-21
Conversion Training
As a reference to establish adequate training guidelines, it is recommended that the Indian Air Force
MiG-21 conversion training can be used.
Additional Information: Following extensive ground school (about 10-14 days), the pilots completed:
• A 10-hour course in a simulator;
• Up to 10 flights in a two-seater MiG-21U and
• 10-hours in a single-seat.
331. Annual Checkout
Recommend the some type of PIC annual proficiency be considered, such as an annual checkout on the
aircraft type. This is a critical safety issue because in civil use in the US, MiG-21 pilots have flown less
than 15-20 hours annually. This level of low currency, regardless of other operational flight, such as
corporate or Part 121 flying is very low and safety can be compromised, especially in those cases where
the PIC does not have a former military fighter-type experience.
Additional Information: The MiG-21 is not an aircraft that forgives inexperience and lack of currency.
This issue was and continues to be a safety concern for many MiG-21 military operators. In fact, when
several former Soviet Bloc countries joined NATO in the late 1990s and early 2000s, NATO standard (in
terms of number of hours/sorties flown per year) were implemented to mitigate these risks.
332. Emergencies Procedures
Recommend that training and checkouts procedures incorporate the tasks and function as discussed in
the Emergency Procedures section of the applicable MiG-21 AFM. In the Soviet format, these
emergencies are documented in terms of (a) symptoms, and (b) actions. See Checkout Procedures
above.
Additional Information: For example, the emergency procedures section in the MiG-21UM AFM (Section
VII) includes, but is not limited to the following emergency procedures:
• Engine Fire and Powerplant Failure on Take-Off;
• Powerplant Surge and Engine Flameout;
• Engine in-Flight Starting and Engine Jamming;
• Failure of Air-Intake Cone Control System;
• Drop of Fuel Pressure and Drop of Oil Pressure;
• Failure of Both Hydraulic Systems With Engine Operating;
• Failure of Booster Hydraulic System With Engine Operating;
• Failure of main Hydraulic System With Engine Operating;
• Failure of Aileron Booster;
• Failure of APY Controller and Failure of Autopilot;
• Failure of the Oxygen System and Cabin Depressurization;
• Smoke in the Cockpit, Icing of Aircraft, and Misting of Canopy Glazing;
• Tire or Wheel Damage on Take-Off;
• Failure of the Landing Gear to Extend When Normal Procedure is Used;
• Emergency Extension of Landing Gear and Failure of One Main LG Strut to Extend;
• Failure of Nose Strut to Extend;
• DC Generator Failure and Failure of Inverter;
• Failure of Pitot Failure of Gyro Horizon and Failure of Directional System;
• Off-Airfield Landing;
• Abandoning Aircraft in Flight and Ejection Procedures;
• Emergency Escape From the Aircraft on the Ground;

Notes,
Action(s) and
Disposition
333. Checkout Procedures
Recommend the establishment of a pilot checkout certification process similar to the military operator,
as part of the Experimental Authorization. See Emergency Procedures below.
Additional Information: This training should include a structured ground school process and
documentation covering the operation of the aircraft with an emphasis on emergency procedures.
334.
PIC Currency in Number
of Aircraft
Recommend the operator limit the number of tactical jets the PIC stays current on.
Additional Information: The USAF and USN restrict the number of aircraft types a pilot could hold
currency on to two or three. This should be considered by operators who have several aircraft types in
their inventory.
335. Flight Manuals
Ensure the PIC operates the aircraft as specified in the most current version of the flight manual for the
version of the aircraft being flown, and with the appropriate technical English translation.
Additional Information: It is recommended that the manuals be of a NATO country which is either still
operating the aircraft or has.
336.
MiG-21/J-7
Differences Training
The applicant/operator should provide for and the PIC should have differences training between MiG-21
models. The differences between a MiG-21F and a MiG-21PFM are rather marked. Significant
differences include engine (throttle response), afterburner, weight (19,800 lb. to well-over 22,000 lb.),
ejection seats, blown flaps, and various systems (i.e., fuel, brakes). The differences are especially vital in
any situation involving a Soviet MiG-21 and a Chinese F-7 for example, where the differences can be
significant.
Additional Information: Case in point, the handling and performances differences between a MiG-21
and a Chinese J-7EH and the F-7MG, which has a double delta wing (57° inner wing portion and 42° outer
wing portion), forward sweep trailing edge, and no stall fences, are substantial. Also, some significant
differences exist between single and two-seat versions, both the Soviet MiG-21U and the Chinese JJ-7.
For example, Soviet two-seaters have many switches and functions in the back seat that do not exist in
the single-seat. In addition, the afterburner in the two-seater R-11 engine is a hard light while that in the
single-seat R-13 is a more sequenced event. This difference must be understood as should the
differences in spool-up times between engines. The tendency for the aircraft to “balloon” on landing
would also depend on the version and variant of the aircraft. Also see MiG-21R below.
337. MiG-21R
If the aircraft in question is a MiG-21R (fighter-Reece), SOPs should establish the adequate operational
limitations of the aircraft. Due to its operational capabilities, including external loads, the MiG-21R has
limitations that may not be found in other versions.
Additional Information: For example, the aircraft had a minimum airspeed of 240-270 km/h, and
prolonged flight at Mach 0.85-0.89 was prohibited because the aircraft was prone to vibration and
suffered from a lack of roll stability at these Mach numbers.
338.
Adequate Annual
Program Letter
Verify the applicant’s annual program letter contains sufficient detail and is consistent with applicable
regulations and policies.
Additional Information: Many applicants/operators submit inadequate and vague program letters or
fail to submit them on an annual basis. Also verify the proposed activities (for example, an air show at a
particular airport) are consistent with the applicable operating limitations (for example, avoiding
populated areas) and do not pose a safety hazard, such as the runway being too short. There may be a
need to review the proposed airports to be used.

Notes,
Action(s) and
Disposition
339.
Additional Program Letter
Guidance
Ensure program letters accompanying an application for an experimental airworthiness certificate meet
the requirements of § 21.193. The letter must be detailed enough to permit the FAA to prescribe the
conditions and limitations necessary to ensure safe operation of the aircraft.
Additional Information: The letter must include—
1. The purpose for which the aircraft is to be used (such as R&D, crew training, or exhibition).
2. The purpose of the experiment. The letter must describe the purpose of the experiment and the
aircraft configuration or modifications, and outline the program objectives.
3. The estimated number of flights or total flight hours required for the experiment and over what
period of time (for example, days, or months).
4. The areas over which the experiment will be conducted. A written description or annotated map is
acceptable. Specifically describe the area. Describing the operating area as “the 48 states,” is not
acceptable. The FAA may establish boundaries of the flight test area, including takeoff, departure,
and landing approach routing to minimize hazards to persons, property, and other air traffic.
However, it is the responsibility of the operator to ensure safe flight of the aircraft.
5. Unless converted from a type certificated aircraft, three-view drawings or three-view dimensioned
photographs of the aircraft.
6. Any pertinent information found necessary by the FAA to safeguard the general public. The letter
must also include any exemptions that may apply to the aircraft, such as non-standard markings or
using an experimental aircraft for hire.
7. If using the aircraft for multiple purposes or roles, (1) documentation of all operations for each
purpose, (2) a description of any configuration changes that will occur between each purpose to
include adding or removing external stores and enabling or disabling systems, and (3) a separate
section for each purpose. For example, an aircraft could have an experimental airworthiness
certificate for the purposes of R&D and exhibition. The same aircraft may also conduct military,
State, or public aircraft operations (PAO). In this example, the program letter must describe all
three roles with the same level of detail. While the airworthiness certificate is not in effect, nor can
the FAA prescribe limitations for PAO, the FAA cannot determine the appropriate certification
without knowing the aircraft’s use.
R&D
• Describe program purpose for which the aircraft is to be used (14 CFR 21.193(d) (1)), i.e., R&D
providing chase for Major Airplane Manufacturer for certification testing of their next business jet.
Aircraft Certification Office X is the project office. The assigned project number is ACOXzzz;
• Provide the following information as it pertains to your Program Letter (a) estimated flight hours
required for program, i.e. 75 hours, (b) estimated number of flights required for program, number
of flights, i.e. 50, (d) estimated duration for programs (14 CFR § 21.193(d)(2)), i.e. 150 days;
• Describe the areas over which the flights are to be conducted, and address of base operation (14
CFR 21.193(d) (3)), i.e., the flights will take place within 150 nm of airport KAAA, excluding the
airspace over City-X. The maximum altitude is FL 240. The base of operations is Major Airplane
Manufacturer Hangar, 12345 Tower Drive, City, etc.;
• Describe the aircraft configuration (attach three-view drawings or three-view dimensioned
photographs of the aircraft (14 CFR 21.193(d) (4) and include a description of how the configuration
is different from the other purposes listed). See attached.
Exhibition
• Describe program purpose for which the aircraft is to be used (14 CFR 21.193(d)(1)) such as
exhibition at the following events over the next 8 months, i.e., AirVenture, August 1, 2013;
• Provide the following information as it pertains to your Program Letter (a) list estimated flight
hours required for program, i.e., 13 hours exhibition, including the flights to and from the events.
10 hours for crew training; (b) list estimated number of flights required for program, and (c) list
estimated duration for programs (14 CFR § 21.193(d)(2)), i.e. 8 months;
• Describe the areas over which the flights are to be conducted, and address of base operation
(14 CFR 21.193(d)(3)), i.e. crew training flights will take place within 125 nautical miles of Any
Town, USA airport with a maximum altitude of 10,000 feet. The base of operations is the address
listed above;
• Describe the aircraft configuration (attach three-view drawings or three-view dimensioned
photographs of the aircraft (14 CFR 21.193(d) (4) and include a description of how the
configuration is different from the other purposes listed). See attached;

Notes,
Action(s) and
Disposition
• Date, Name and Title (Print or Type), and Signature.
340.
Flight Manual Warnings,
Cautions, and Notes
Consider requiring review (before flight) of all flight manual warnings, cautions, and notes. Such a review
will greatly enhance safety, especially in those cases where the PIC does not maintain a high level of
proficiency in the aircraft.
Additional Information: The following definitions apply to warnings, cautions, and notes found
throughout this instruction. Warning: Explanatory information about an operating procedure practice,
or condition that may result in injury or death if not carefully observed or followed.
Caution: Explanatory information about an operating procedure, practice, or condition, which may result
in damage to equipment if not carefully observed or followed. Note: Explanatory information about an
operating procedure, practice, or condition, which must be emphasized.
341. Operating Limitations
The PIC must operate the aircraft as specified in section discussing Operating Limitations, in addition to
the FAA-approved operating limitations.
342. Safety Supplements
Verify the applicant/operator has incorporated the applicable safety supplements into operational
guidance as appropriate.
Additional Information: The most current version of the AFM/NATO/NATOPS/Pilot Notes usually
provides a listing of affected safety supplements and this can be used as a reference.
343.
Foreign Aircraft
Particularities and
Restrictions
Verify whether the aircraft includes aircraft-specific restrictions. If those restrictions exist, the operator
must understand those restrictions before flight, especially any post-restoration flight.
344.
Maintenance and Line
Support
Verify the aircraft is operated with qualified crew chief/plane captains, especially during preflight and
post-flight inspections as well as assisting the PIC during startup and shutdown procedures.
Additional Information: Recommned that ground personnel training addresses the following areas and
issues:
• Flight controls check;
• FOD;
• Marshalling signals;
• Servicing and handling amrkings;
• Exterior drains and vents;
• Normal refeuling and defueling;
• Access doors and panels;
• Covers and guards;
• Cockpit area safety checks;
• Danger areas;
• Blast effects;
• Pushing;
• Towing;
• Electrical connections;
• Pneumatic connections;
• Hydraulic connections;
• Landing gear and tire servicing;
See Assisted Flight Control Checks below.
345. Restrict Acrobatics Restrict acrobatics per the appropriate flight manual and require a minimum of 10,000 feet AGL.
346. Engine Operating Limits Adhere to all engine limitations in the applicable flight manuals.
347.
Mach Meter and
Airspeed Calibration
Require the installation and calibration of a Mach meter or verify the PIC makes the proper Mach
determination before flight.
Additional Information: Unless the airspeed indicator is properly calibrated, transonic range operations
may have to be restricted.
348. Accelerometer If provided, ensure the aircraft’s accelerometer is functional. This instrument is critical to remain within

Notes,
Action(s) and
Disposition
the required G limitation of the aircraft.

Notes,
Action(s) and
Disposition
349. BD-66-21N Rack The installation of the BD3-66-21N special weapon (nuclear weapon) rack is prohibited.
350.
PIC Training
Require adequate ejection seat training for the PIC and crew, if applicable, for the type of seat installed.
There should not be a “general” ejection” seat training program. It needs to be specific to the seat
installed, i.e., SK or KM. The PIC must also be able to ensure any additional occupant is fully trained on
ejection procedures and alternate methods of escape. Evidence shows the safety record of attempted
ejections in civilian former military aircraft is very poor, typically indicating inadequate training leading to
ejections outside of the envelope. The ejection envelope is a set of defined physical parameters within
which an ejection may be successfully executed.
Additional Information: Critical in ejection seat training is the seat itself. One of the most common
MiG-21 ejection seats is the KM-1 seat. It can be found in MiG-21PFM, M, and MF. The MiG-21F, F-13,
PF, and some MiG-21PFMs have the older (and less effective) SK ejection seat. The SK cannot be used on
the ground, on takeoff up to (about) 170 m (550 ft.) and on landing below 200 m (600 ft.) depending
upon speed and pitch angle. See SK Ejection Seat below. The MiG-21bis uses a slightly improved KM-1M
which has a different leg restrain mechanism. The KM-1 ejection seat is propelled from the aircraft by an
ejection gun which is assisted by a rocket motor (commonly referred to as “pyros”). The ejection seat
system includes an automatic ejection sequencing system. In the two-seat MiG-21U, the front canopy
separates before the rear canopy followed by the pilot in the aft cockpit and the pilot in the front cockpit
last. This occurs when the ejection is initiated by either pilot through the ejection handles. The following
provides additional details on the seat sequencing and mechanisms: “In Type 68 (MiG-21US) both
canopies will be jettisoned if one of the emergency canopy jettison handles is pulled. In Type 69 (MiG-
21UM) the rear canopy can be jettisoned separately. However, both canopies jettison if initiated by the
pilot in the front cockpit. If necessary, ejection can be accomplished at ground level between 75 knots
and 280 knots. If faster than 280 knots, an altitude of 100 ft. or higher should be observed.”
http://www.topedge.com/panels/aircraft/sites/kraft/km1.htm.
351.
Ground Safety
Verify the safety of ejection seats on the ground. Verify ejection seats cannot be accidentally fired,
including prohibiting untrained personnel from sitting on the seats.
Additional Information: As an example, on January 25, 1963, aircraft 654, a MiG-21F-13 (serial number
N74212011, use beginning 28/07/1962), was involved in an ejection seat (SK) related accident. Because
of the failure to observe the safety regulations, one of the pyros was accidentally armed and fires the
seat with the pilot in it. Because the SK seat was not a Zero-Zero seat, the pilot was killed. As NAVAIR
states, “the public shall be denied access to the interior of all aircraft employing ejection seats or other
installed pyrotechnic devices that could cause injury.” In addition, operators should provide security
during the exhibition of the aircraft to prevent inadvertent activation of the ejection system from inside
or outside the aircraft by spectators or onlookers. The PIC on a recent former military jet operation
noted: “Recently we had a case where a guest in the back jettisoned the rear canopy on the ground at
the parking position while trying to lock the canopy with the lever on the R/H side… The canopy went
straight up for 6 m (20 ft.) and fell back on the ground, right in front of the left wing leading edge next to
the rear cockpit (fortunately not straight back on the cockpit to punish the guy).” A fatal 2011 accident
involving the Red Arrows is also a reminder: “November 9, 2011. Flight Lieutenant Sean Cunningham
was killed yesterday when his ejection seat fired while his aircraft was at a standstill. Despite the
accidental firing of the seat, the pilot should have been able to parachute down to safety but it appears
that the parachute never deployed. Sean Cunningham died of his wounds a short time after the incident.
This type of accident is extremely rare but, although modern ejection seats are very effective, they are
very complex and potentially dangerous pieces of equipment.” http://www.worldwarbirdnews.com.
Note: Any ejection seat training must include survival and post-bailout procedures, based either on U.S.
Navy, USAF, or NATO training, as appropriate for the equipment being used. Note: As a result of
accidents, DOD policy prohibits the public from sitting on armed ejection seats.
352.
Safety Pins
Require the PIC to carry the aircraft’s escape system safety pins on all flights and high-speed taxi tests.
Additional Information: As a recommendation stemming from a fatal accident, the U.K. CAA may
require “operators of civil registered aircraft fitted with live ejection seats to carry the aircraft’s escape
systems safety pins (a) on all flights and high-speed taxi tests (b) in a position where they are likely to be
found and identified without assistance from the aircraft’s flight or ground crews.”
353.
Pyrotechnics and Pylon
Ejectors
Except for those that are part of the ejection seat system, the installation, and use of any pyrotechnics,
including those installed as part of pylons and ejector units in external stores are prohibited. Prohibit
explosive pylon charges (ejectors). The related pylon/ejector assemblies cannot be functional.

Notes,
Action(s) and
Disposition
354.
Parachutes
(Live Ejection Seat)
As part of the ejection seat system, the parachute (must be an approved parachute for that ejection seat
system) must be maintained and inspected in accordance with the manufacturer’s (or applicable NATO)
procedures and standards. The parachute must be rated for the particular ejection seat being used.
355.
Parachute
(De-Activated Ejection
Seat)
Comply with § 91.307, Parachutes and Parachuting.
Additional Information: This regulation includes parachute requirements (1) that the parachute be of
an approved type and packed by a certificated and appropriately rated parachute rigger, and (2) if of a
military type, that the parachute be identified by an NAF, AAF, or AN drawing number, an AAF order
number, or any other military designation or specification number.
356.
Parachute Data
(Crew Parachutes)
Concerning parachutes, track parachute log books along with serial number, dates of manufacture and
service life limits. The parachute must be packed, maintained, or altered by a person who holds an
appropriate and current parachute rigger certificate.
Additional Information: The certificate is issued under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14
CFR) part 65, subpart F. Note: Some operators deactivate the ejections seat but continue to carry the
parachute. Such practices need to be properly documented and adequate training and procedures
instituted.
357.
External Stores
(General)
Prohibit the installation of external stores or equipment that was not approved by the military service,
i.e., NATO. Under FAA Order 8130.2, only aircraft certificated for the purpose of R&D may be eligible to
operate with functional jettisonable fuel tanks or stores, but the safety of people and property on the
ground still has to be addressed.
Additional Information: As the NTSB stated in 2012 following the fatal accident of a high-performance
experimental aircraft, “the fine line between observing risk and being impacted by the consequences
when something goes wrong was crossed.” In many cases, the pilots may understand the risks they
assumed, but the spectators’ presumed safety has not been assessed and addressed.
358.
Externally Mounted
Devices
Unless properly documented (i.e., DER data) or originally cleared for the aircraft, prohibit the installation
of any external device to the aircraft, including cameras, and the S-13 pod. The GP-9 gun pod is also
covered, even if installed for esthetic reasons. There are many safety-related issues with “homemade”
installations. It would also be applicable to travel pods. See Travel Pod above.
Additional Information: As an example, when the Bulgarian Air Force attempted to modify and adapt
an ELINT pod from the MiG-21R to the MiG-21MF, flight test showed that “directional stability was
considerably affected, especially during the landing phase.” Mladenov, April 2001. The following 2005
exchange concerning such as installation in a MiG-21 illustrates the issue: “Anyone have any ideas on
mounting a small video camera somewhere on the MiG-21 to get external shots? The Soviet method is a
monstrosity mounted in an under wing pylon….I realize that this is not going to be a 400 MPH duct tape
job. It has to be safe and legal. Maybe facing aft in the IFF ant area atop the vertical stabilizer? In the
structure, not on it? …I have taken many videos with a wide angle 8 mm digital from the back seat of
your old "U" N315. I would like to get a different perspective, ideally from outside the cockpit either
looking forward or aft. Bottom of the aircraft would make a unique video. I have been thinking about
remoting a very small camera in the IFF area atop the vertical stabilizer. In the compartment, with a
lipstick type camera jutting out slightly and looking forward. These cameras are available and they would
transmit to a recorder in the backseat There is a small panel up there that could be modified to permit
this. The radio frequency and the aerodynamics would be looked at very carefully. A wide angle view
from that perspective would be worth the hassle….” http://www.classicjets.org/forum.
359.
Pylon Ejectors and
Explosive Release Units
Prohibit explosive pylon charges (ejectors). The related pylon/ejector assemblies, including the pylon
ejector mechanism cannot be functional.
Additional Information: For example, in 1967, an East German ground crewman was killed when the
pyros on an external fuel tank fired.
360. External Tank Limitations
The operating limitations (as well as SOPs) should incorporate the specific drop tank limitations related
to (1) takeoff and landing performance, (2) G limits, (3) airspeed, and (4) fuel in the tanks.
Additional Information: The crash of a civil MiG-21 in 1999 is believed to have been caused by the pilot
exceeding the airspeed limitation of the external fuel tank, which failed in-flight, leading to the loss of
the aircraft due to a loss of control.

Notes,
Action(s) and
Disposition
361.
MiG-21
External Fuel Tanks
Verify the type, condition, installation, and removal of external fuel tanks meet the applicable
requirements, i.e., NATO. Only external tanks cleared for use by the applicable military service (i.e.,
NATO, Indian AF) may be used on the aircraft.
Additional Information: These include the PTB-490 and PTB-800 tanks. MiG-21 fuel tanks vary, but two
typical tanks include the 490 liter drop tanks and the 800 liter centerline tank. External fuel tank
installation is not a simple task nor should they be “homemade” proven by a simple flight test. Drop tank
clearance relies on elaborate engineering and flight test processes that can be compared to a simple
flight to show that they hold in Phase I. There are serious issues with air loads, fittings, G limitations,
flutter, limitations on the amount that can be used, take-off, and landing performance, W&B issues, and
fuel sloshing, and so on. The AIP needs to address their inspection and maintenance. There should not
be any means of jettisoning these tanks while on the ground or in flight. The safety issues with these
systems is not covered by § 91.15 Dropping objects. There is a distinction between removable and
jettisonable tank. A MiG-21 operator in the US explains that “we have removable drop tanks on
our…MiG-21… We sometimes fly to airshows with the tanks on, remove the tanks for the show, and
then put them back on for the flight home. Removable vs. droppable.” http://eaaforums.org. Finally,
there should not be any modifications to the drop tanks except when to prevent jettisoning. Note: The
drop tanks would typically have data plates.
362. Dropping Ordnance
Prohibit the dropping or release of ordnance, including training ordnance. Although Part 91 and FAA
Order 8130.2 provide some references to dropping objects (i.e., 91.15 and “droppable” in R&D
certificates in 8130.2), the fact is that neither contemplated (1) ordnance release, and (2) considered the
many dangers of such activities. Part 91 and the Order were designed to address civil purposes, not
combat testing, and training.
Additional Information: From a practical standpoint, under 91.319 and related guidance, including SMS,
the issue is one of (1) identifying the risks, and (2) mitigating them within the valid civil purposes. In
some cases, some risks cannot be mitigated, and that needs to be recognized. It is inadequate to
consider issuing a civil airworthiness certificate to permit ordinance and other loads to be releasable (as
a matter of fact, that is “drop whatever you want as you wish…”) solely based on (1) a review of 91.15
and 8130.2 guidance, (2) and the claim that the “aircraft used to do that in the military…” argument.
There is much more to such activities. To illustrate the dangers of such activities, the following listing
provides some, but not all, of the issues/dangers/risks that have to be addresses or mitigated (not
necessarily in a priority order):
1. Liability;
2. 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a) concerning restricting airport access (federally-obligated airport) on the
grounds of safety;
3. Adherence to a significant applicable guidance and safety requirements;
4. Storage safety;
5. Handling and installation safety (procedures);
6. Handling and installation (personal training, i.e., Aviation Ordnanceman rating); For example,
personnel directly involved in ordnance handling must be qualified and/or certified according
to the Navy's current qualification/certification programs;
7. Ramp safety;
8. Safety of any signal cartridge and fuzing safety;
9. Safety or any propellants, and HAZMAT considerations;
10. Mechanical v. pyrotechnical release;
11. Only service (i.e., cleared ordnance, configurations, and parameters);
12. Weapon (system) specific separation testing and associated limitations to address air loads,
fittings, G limitations, flutter, limitations on the amount that can be used, take-off, and
landing performance, W&B issues.
13. Impact on aircraft’s structure;
14. Impact on aircrafts’ electrical system;
15. Safety of people and property on the ground;
16. Flight route safety and ATC coordination;
17. Safe altitudes, and range safety;
18. Emergency and inadvertent release;
In summary, the FAA is not in a position to assume responsibility for handling the issues above and
incorporate them in the civil airworthiness certification process.

Notes,
Action(s) and
Disposition
363. (ESRH) Disable the Emergency Stores Release Handle (ESRH), if applicable.
364. Master Armament Switch
Disable and disconnect the master armament switch from any system. Weapon-related buttons
(bomb/rocket button, trigger) on the control stick grip and panels must also be disabled and
disconnected from all systems.
365.
High-Speed Restrictions
and Max ‘q’
Supersonic flight is prohibited. Recommend limiting transonic operations to 0.9 Mach. This provides a
good safety margin [such as avoiding q (dynamic pressure) limitations], and could be addressed in the
operating limitations, the AFM, and related SOPs.
Additional Information: This is particularly important at low level. For example, at MiG-21 pilot noted
that “at low level, the speed of the MiG-21F-13 was limited to Mach .98. We would experience severe
buffet if attempting to fly any faster…” Cooper, Arab MiGs, 2011. Aerodynamically, in the MiG-21, q or
dynamic pressure is restricted to a maximum indicated airspeed of 595 knots below 16,000 feet. At this
point, excessive buffeting and structural problems are encountered. Also, even skilled pilots find the
aircraft difficult to maneuver at speeds above 510- knots.
366. Phase I Flight Testing
Recommend, at a minimum, all flight tests and flight test protocol(s) follow the intent and scope (and not
necessarily duration) of acceptable USAF/U.S. Navy/NATO functionality test procedures. The aircraft
needs detailed Phase I flight testing for a minimum of 10 hours.
Additional Information: Returning a high-performance aircraft to flight status after restoration cannot
be accomplished by a few hours of “flying around.” It is not analogous to the 2 FCFs performed after a
main overhaul when the aircraft was operational. Safe operations also require a demonstrated level of
reliability. Note: In 1986, when the first MiGs were considered for an airworthiness certificate, the FAA
required not only 15 hours in Phase I but also that the testing be done at the Mojave Airport for safety
reasons. Entrekin, 2012.
367.
Post-Maintenance Check
Flights
Recommend post-maintenance flight checks be incorporated in the maintenance and operation of the
aircraft and TO 1-1-300, Maintenance Operational Checks and Flight Checks, dated June 15, 2012, be
used as a reference.
368. Controlled Bailout Area
If operational procedures require the establishment of a controlled bailout area, ensure it (1) does not
endanger people or property on the ground in any way, (2) follows established USAF/NAVAIR/NATO
procedures, and (3) addresses the possibility of erratic flight paths after ejections. Refer to Flight Over
Populated Areas above.
369. G Limitations
Ensure that there are conservative G limits. Recommend limiting to +3 Gs and half of its original negative
G limit. Not all MiG-21s have the same G limits. Many of these aircraft have structural problems
dictating this prudent approach. There is no justification to take the aircraft anywhere near its original
limitations.
Additional Information: The fact that the aircraft could be G loaded does not mean such performance
should be attempted or is inherently safe. This is especially true given the aircraft’s age and historical
use. Maximum G limits should be established below design specifications based on the age and
condition of the airframe. Particular attention to the condition of the wings is required because in-flight
breakups with the original wings have occurred recently.
370.
Visual Meteorological
Condition (VMC) and
Instrument Flight Rules
(IFR) Operations
Day VMC operations only. IFR operations are prohibited. Many MiG-21 accidents were caused by spatial
disorientation. Note: Stability, instrumentation, and lighting are inadequate for IMC operations.
Additional Information: The MiG-21 was not an easy aircraft to operate at night or in low visibility.
Known icing needs to be prohibited. One of the main issues is the unnatural representations by several of
the cockpit instruments, notably the AI. See Early Attitude Indicators (AI) and Cockpit Familiarization
below. Unless a high-level of proficiency and currency in the aircraft in instrument conditions and at
night, it is unsafe to permit such operations. In fact, at the height of the Vietnam War in December of
1972, of the 185 qualified MiG-21 pilots, only 34 were night qualified following training in the Soviet
Union. A 1975 MiG-21MF report noted that “the [Soviets] seem strictly to avoid flying on instruments
although the MiG-21 has a full blind-flying panel with attitude and heading instruments driven by a
remote central gyro platform. This was non-toppling in roll but locked and reset slowly at the top of a
loop, producing briefly misleading or inadequate information. Loss of control and disorientation at this
stage, sometimes resulting in the loss of the aircraft, were not unknown.” ttp://www.flightglobal.com.

Notes,
Action(s) and
Disposition
371.
Flight Over Populated
Areas
Prohibit all flights over populated areas, including takeoffs and landings. The consequences of a MiG-21
accident in a populated area would be devastating. Strict operating areas must be established for the
MiG-21. While the experimental category may allow a reduced level of safety for the aircraft when
compared to a standard category aircraft, an equivalent level of safety for the public must be
maintained. In all instances, there must be adequate and detailed egress and ingress routes in and out
of all airports that are used to avoid flights over and near populated areas.
Additional Information: Recommend the general avoidance of populated areas be accomplished by
keeping the aircraft a certain distance away from those areas (that is, 2 nautical miles), not just “clear
underneath” and not to direct energy at those areas such as keeping the populated areas behind the
forward 180° quadrant in relation to the aircraft’s flight path. This requires rigorous flight planning. To
address this, any airport used must be evaluated as part of the program letter. As the NTSB stated in
2012 following the fatal accident of a high-performance experimental aircraft, “the fine line between
observing risk and being impacted by the consequences when something goes wrong was crossed.”
Specifically tailor geographic proficiency areas, not just in terms of distance, but also taking into account
specific populated areas. It is necessary to review egress and ingress routes in detail. Rigorous flight
planning is needed from the PIC. Simply flying a route that is not “directly” over populated areas but
that near such areas may not provide an adequate level of safety. Ejecting from an aircraft that is not
directly over a populated area is not enough to prevent the aircraft from impacting people and property
on the ground a short distance away. Case in point, in many military aircraft like the MiG-21, the loss of
hydraulic power (not uncommon) can lead to a severe if not a total loss of control. Therefore, the pilot
becomes unable to further direct the aircraft and the aircraft “will choose its own impact point.” If the
loss of control occurs at a certain altitude, it is actuality possible (if not highly likely) that the probability
of the aircraft impacting an area away from the intended rather than directly underneath the flight path
is actually greater. Thus, it is important to remember that the applicant that the PIC is responsible for
complying with the operating limitation restricting flights over populated areas. The PIC must be aware
of the areas above which the flight is taking place and coordinate with ATC accordingly. Regardless, the
very nature of this type of aircraft dictates that the operator must be the one to find a way to avoid the
populated areas, and if in some cases, their overfly cannot be avoided, then it is incumbent upon the
operator, as per the limitations, to find an alternate airport from which operate of transit in and out of.
The dangers of operating such an aircraft over populated areas are best illustrated by the June 8, 1998
accident where a MiG-21 MF and a MiG-21UM of the Czech Air Force crashed into apartment buildings in
the town of České Budějovice due to bad weather by arriving from an air show.
See http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/ for photography of this accident. Another MiG-21 accident,
this time in Indian in 2002 was more catastrophic: “On May 3, 2002, an Indian Air Force (IAF) MiG-21bis
crashed into a bank in Jalandhar, Punjab, India, killing eight and injuring 17 people on the ground. The
pilot, who ejected from the aircraft, survived. A number of by passers were also injured as they
attempted to rescue people trapped in the buildings. The aircraft, piloted by Flt Lt SK Nayak, had taken
off from Adampur Air Force airbase about 10:00 am, five minutes prior to the crash. The pilot reported
that he "he heard some unusual noise followed by an explosion in the engine,” and ejected. The aircraft
crashed in a heavily-populated residential and commercial section of the city. The crash started a large
fire in the bank and the adjoining lumber store. Pieces of the aircraft also landed on nearby homes. The
first firefighting units to respond could not find water sources with which to fight the blaze, which was
not attacked until Indian Army trucks with foam arrived on scene. It took 40 fire units five hours to
contain the fire. At least one news source reported that a copilot had also ejected, however the MiG-
21bis is a single seat aircraft. Following the crash, the IAF suspended all MiG-21 flight training
operations.” http://en.wikipedia.org.
372.
Carrying of Passengers,
§ 91.319(a)(2)
Prohibit the carrying of passengers (and property) at all times. The MiG-21 is a Group 6 aircraft because
it cannot comply with 91.117 in normal cruise configuration. Flight training is permitted only in
accordance with an FAA-issued letter of deviation authority (LODA). No “rides.”
373. Stall and Spins
Prohibit intentional stall and spins. The MiG-21 is susceptible to accelerated stalls at lower speeds. Sink
rates are very high.
374.
TO 00-80G-1 and
Display Safety
Recommend using TO 00-80G-1, Make Safe Procedures for Public Static Display, dated November 30,
2002, in preparing for display of the aircraft. This document addresses public safety around aircraft in
the air show/display environment. It covers hydraulics, egress systems, fuel, arresting hooks, electrical,
emergency power, pneumatic, air or ground launched missiles, weapons release (including inert rounds),
access panels, antennas, and other equipment that can create a hazard peculiar to certain aircraft.

Notes,
Action(s) and
Disposition
375.
Occupant (Other than PIC)
Training and Limitations
Implement adequate training requirements and testing procedures if a person is carried on the back seat
[refer to Carrying of Passengers, § 91.319(a) (2) above to allow the performance of that crew’s position
responsibilities per the applicable Crew Duties section of the Flight Manual. This training should not be a
simple checkout, but rather a structured training program (for example, ground school on aircraft
systems, emergency and abnormal procedures, “off-limits” equipment and switches, and actual cockpit
training). The back seat qualification should also include (1) ground egress training (FAA-approved
ejection seat training), (2) ejection seat and survival equipment training, (3) abnormal/emergency
procedures, and (4) normal procedures.
Additional Information: In addition to any aircraft-specific (that is, systems and related documentation)
training, it is recommended that the Naval Aviation Survival Training Program (Non-aircrew NASTP
Training) or/and the United States Air Force Aerospace Physiology Program (AFI 1 I-403, Aerospace
Physiological Training Program) be used in developing these programs. In addition, passenger
physiological and high-altitude training should be implemented for all operations above 18,000 ft. This
issue can be addressed as part of the operating limitations by requiring the rear seat training and
incorporating the adequate reference (name) of the operator’s training program.
376.
Aft Cockpit Override and
Control Panel
Regardless of flight functions and other training (as discussed above), require that any person seating in
the aft cockpit of the aircraft receives an adequate check-out on this particular panel.
Additional Information: This is important because the two-seater MiG-21s are equipped with an
override and control panel in the rear cockpit and the pilot in that seat can override they front seater’s
actions and provide system failure inputs. The safety consequences of not being properly trained on this
panel are obvious. See Use of Aft Cockpit Controls, Features, and Switches (MiG-21U) below.
377. Maximum Altitude
Prohibit operations above FL 410. Above, FL 290 appropriate RVSM approval is required. Operations
above FL 410 are too risky to be mitigated under civil use and without specific training, equipment (i.e.,
approved Soviet high-altitude suit and equipment, such as the VKK-6M pressure suit, GSh-6, GSh-4MS or
ZSh-3 full-face pressure helmets (not necessarily interchangeable), and the KM-32M oxygen mask,
maintained as per the proper requirements and technical data), inspections, and strict operational
procedures. The aircraft’s pressurization system, its age, condition, and maintenance are safety
concerns.
Additional Information: When discussing operations above 50,000 feet, a MiG-21 pilot noted that
“flying a MiG-21F-13 at such altitudes was exceptionally dangerous and required plenty of skill,
particularly as the engine was prone to stall and the aircraft became unstable. Several cases are known
where a catastrophic disintegration of the airframe occurred.” Cooper, Arab MiGs, 2011. Note: At
heights above 50,000 feet, even with 100% oxygen, a person will quickly become hypoxic, because the
ambient pressure is so low that the lungs will not absorb the oxygen. It is at this altitude that a
pressurized flight suit must be worn. Any altitude above 50,000 ft. is labeled as “space equivalent zone.”
Also see High-Altitude Training below.
378. High-Altitude Training
Recommend the PIC complete an FAA-approved physiological training course (for example, altitude
chamber). Refer to FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) Physiology and Survival Training
website for additional information. USAF Aerospace Physiological Training Program, AFI 11-403,
November 30, 2012 can also be used.
Additional Information: Refer to FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) Physiology and Survival
Training website for additional information. USAF Aerospace Physiological Training Program, AFI 11-403,
November 30, 2012 can also be used.
379. Pressure Suit Training
If pressure suits are used, require pressure suit training as per the applicable USAF guidance. This
includes original and refresher pressure suit training and refresher training.
Additional Information: Original training is a one-time requirement provided upon initial assembly and
fitting of the pressure suit assembly. Refresher pressure suit training is required every 5 years for those
who have undergone original pressure suit training. The reference is Aerospace Physiological Training
Program, AFI 11-403, November 30, 2012.

Notes,
Action(s) and
Disposition
380.
Minimum Equipment
for Flight
Ask the applicant to specify minimum equipment for flight per applicable guidance, and develop such a
list consistent with the applicable requirements (i.e., USAF, NAVAIR, NATO) and § 91.213.
Additional Information: These documents list the minimum essential systems and subsystems that
must work on an aircraft for a specified mission or flight.
381.
Post-flight and Last
Chance Check Procedures
Recommend the establishments of post-flight and last chance inspection per the applicable guidance
(i.e., USAF, NAVAIR, and NATO).
Additional Information: Last chance checks may include coordination with the airport and ATC for
activity in the movement areas.
382. JATO/RATO Rockets
Prohibit the use of JATO or RATO (SPRD-99) rockets in all applications, including R&D.
Additional Information: This would include any internal booster system like the N 12-51 or U-21 rocket
booster added to a fairing in the tail. The very high hazard and risk factors involved with these rockets
have no place in civil applications.
383. Jet Exhaust Dangers Establish adequate jet blast safety procedures per the appropriate guidance (i.e., USAF, NATO).
384. Pylon Ejectors Prohibit explosive pylon charges (ejectors). The related pylon/ejector assemblies cannot be functional.
385.
Changes in Approved
External Aircraft
Configuration
Any change in external loading for the MiG-21 (e.g., a change in a pylon, rack, or external store) from
configurations previously approved by the manufacturer, NATO or some operators (Soviet Air Force,
Indian Air Force) should be justified via analyses, test, and data.
386.
Servicing and
Flight Servicing Certificate
Ensure the applicant verifies ground personnel are trained for operations with an emphasis on the
potential for fires during servicing. Prohibit non-trained personnel from servicing the aircraft.
Recommend a Flight Servicing Certificate or similar document be used by the ground personnel to attest
to the aircraft’s condition (that is, critical components such as tires) before each flight to include the
status of all servicing (that is, liquid levels, fuel levels, hydraulic fluid, and oxygen).
Additional Information: Specific servicing areas may include: oxygen tanks and filler, fuel fillers, engine
oil tank, brake control units, batteries, external power receptacles, rain removal system, single-point
refueling (needs to be disabled), emergency air bottle and filler, and hydraulic reservoir.
387.
Ground Support
Equipment
Verify all required ground equipment is available and in a serviceable condition.
388. Aerial Target Towing
Prohibit all aerial towing. Notwithstanding the standard language in the FAA Order 8130.2 limitations
concerning towing, the aircraft is not to be used for towing targets because such operations pose a
danger to property and people on the ground and endanger the aircraft.
389.
Asymmetric Wing
Mounted Stores
Prohibit asymmetric wing mounted equipment regardless of the applicable manuals.
390.
Formation Take-Offs and
Landings
Prohibit formation takeoffs and landings. There is no civil use, including display, to justify the risks
involved, especially lateral control and power response deficiencies with the MiG-21.
Additional Information: As noted by the USAF during its evaluation of the MiG-21F, “engine response
was poor, the engine accelerated slowly even at high-power setting. The poor engine response
precluded precise formation flying.” Have Doughnut (U) Technical, 1969.
391. Personal Flight Equipment
Safe operations require the use of the adequate personal flight equipment and attire compatible with
the aircraft and ejection seat system.
Additional Information: Compatibility of the MiG-21 and its systems is not guaranteed with all Western
(US, NATO) equipment. Some NATO MiG-21 operators adopted British helmets, but retained the Soviet
KM-34 oxygen mask and related tubing. Other attire includes a helmet, oxygen mask, fire retardant
(Nomex) flight suit, gloves (that is, Nomex or leather), adequate foot gear (that is, boots), and clothing
that does not interfere with cockpit systems and flight controls. Operating with a live ejection seat
requires a harness, and thus only approved harnesses compatible with the ejection seat can be used.

Notes,
Action(s) and
Disposition
392. Minimum Runway Length
The minimum runway length for MiG-21 operations is 8,000 feet. One of the safety issues with the MiG-
21 in the civil use in the US has been runway overruns, not surprising because the aircraft has a history of
overruns. A conservative and adequate runway length is essential beyond the specifics in the
performance books for the aircraft. In addition, ensure the PIC verifies, using the appropriate aircraft
performance charts (Performance Supplement), sufficient runway length is available considering field
elevation and atmospheric conditions. To add a margin of safety, use the following:
For Takeoff
1. No person may initiate an airplane takeoff unless it is possible to stop the airplane safely on the
runway, as shown by the accelerate-stop distance data, and to clear all obstacles by at least 50 ft.
vertically (as shown by the takeoff path data) or 200 ft. horizontally within the airport boundaries
and 300 ft. horizontally beyond the boundaries, without banking before reaching a height of 50 ft.
(as shown by the takeoff path data) and after that without banking more than 15 degrees.
2. In applying this section, corrections must be made for any runway gradient. To allow for wind
effect, takeoff data based on still air may be corrected by taking into account not more than 50
percent of any reported headwind component and not less than 150 percent of any reported
tailwind component.
For Landing
3. No person may initiate an airplane takeoff unless the airplane weight on arrival, allowing for
normal consumption of fuel and oil in flight (in accordance with the landing distance in the AFM for
the elevation of the destination airport and the wind conditions expected there at the time of
landing), would allow a full stop landing at the intended destination airport within 60 percent of the
effective length of each runway described below from a point 50 ft. above the intersection of the
obstruction clearance plane and the runway. For the purpose of determining the allowable landing
weight at the destination airport, the following is assumed:
o The airplane is landed on the most favorable runway and in the most favorable direction, in
still air.
o The airplane is landed on the most suitable runway considering the probable wind velocity
and direction and the ground handling characteristics of that airplane, and considering other
conditions such as landing aids and terrain.
o No credit is applied for use of thrust reverse or drag chute.
Additional Information: MiG-21 operators worldwide use the minimum runway concept as a means to
reduce the likelihood of an overrun, either on landing or as a result of an aborted take-off. For example,
the shortest of the 4 Egyptian AF air bases where MiG-21s and F-7 fighters are based is 8,300 feet. The
following NTSB narrative concerning the 2012 MiG-21 overrun at Eden Prairie
(see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2vf389pwxsg) explains the implication of a drag chute fa8lure:
“On June 12, 2012, at 0958, a Mikoyan Gurevich MiG-21MF, was substantially damaged when it ran off
the runway while attempting to land on Runway 10R at Flying Cloud Airport (FCM), Minneapolis,
Minnesota. The pilot was flying to Flying Cloud Airport so the MiG-21 could be part of an exhibition that
was being held there that weekend. He said the en route portion of the flight was uneventful. Prior to
landing, he made several low passes over the runway to burn off fuel. As the pilot turned onto final
approach, he established an approach speed of 165 knots and landed approximately 300 feet down the
5,000-foot-long runway. Approximately 3-4 seconds after touching down, the pilot deployed the drag
chute. As the chute deployed, it snapped off the back of the airplane. The pilot then used the anti-skid
braking system to slow the airplane, but it did not decelerate as he expected. When he realized that he
was going to go off the runway, the pilot maneuvered the airplane onto the grassy area adjacent to the
runway to avoid crossing a state highway. The airplane struck a berm and a chain link fence before
coming to a stop upright. According to one inspector, the airplane landed on runway 10R. When it was
approximately halfway down the runway, the drag chute deployed. Before the chute fully opened, it
departed the airplane and landed on the runway. The airplane continued down the runway at a high
rate of speed before it veered left near the east end of the runway…before it came to a rest near the
edge of Highway 212. The pilot said he tested the drag chute approximately three weeks before the
accident in preparation for this particular flight and there were no malfunctions of the system. He also
said that he had successfully deployed the drag chute about 6 or 7 times prior to this accident. The pilot
held an airline transport pilot rating for airplane single-engine land and sea, and multi-engine. He is also
type-rated in an A-320, B-737, and DC-6. The pilot’s last FAA First Class medical was issued on March 26,
2012. At that time, he reported a total of 21,000 total flight hours.” http://www.ntsb.gov.

Notes,
Action(s) and
Disposition
393. Runway Considerations
Consider accelerate/stop distances, balanced field length, and critical field length in determining
acceptable runway use per CJAA guidance.
Additional Information: To enhance operations, it is recommended takeoff procedures similar to the
USAF minimum acceleration check speed (using a ground reference during the takeoff run to check for a
pre-calculated speed) is adopted.
394.
Runway Safety Areas
(RSA)
Recommend restricting use to airports with appropriate runway safety areas (RSA) and Runway
Protection Zones (RPZ) to add a margin of safety. A runway safety area (RSA) is defined as the surface
surrounding the runway prepared or suitable for reducing the risk of damage to airplanes in the event of
undershoot, overshoot, or excursion from the runway.
Additional Information: The RSA is an integral part of the runway environment. RSA dimensions are
established in AC 150/5300-13, Airport Design and are based on the Airport Reference Code (ARC). The
RSA is intended to provide a measure of safety in the event of an aircraft’s excursion from the runway by
significantly reducing the extent of personal injury and aircraft damage during overruns, undershoots
and veer-offs. Refer to FAA AC 150/5300-13, Airport Design. FAA Order 5200.8 Runway Safety Area
Program provides additional insight into the value of RSAs. In addition, where possible, recommend
USAF Potential Loss of Aircraft Zone (PLAZ) standards be used as well.
395.
Engineered Materials
Arresting Systems (EMAS)
Recommend that, in conjunction with RSA consideration, runways with EMAS should also be considered.
This is important because When it is not practicable to obtain a safety area that meets current standards,
consideration should be given to enhancing the safety of the area beyond the runway end with the
installation of EMAS.
Additional Information: AC 150/5220-22, Engineered Materials Arresting Systems (EMAS) for Aircraft
Overruns, pertaining to the installation and use of EMAS, provides details on design to be considered in
determining feasibility of this alternative. EMAS uses crushable concrete placed at the end of a runway
to stop an aircraft that overruns the runway. The tires of the aircraft sink into the lightweight concrete
and the aircraft is decelerated as it rolls through the material.
396. Suitable Airport
Ensure all airports to be used are properly vetted in terms of suitability (that is, runway length, RSAs,
emergency equipment). Requiring prior coordination with the airport management and fire rescue
would not be unreasonable in some cases.
Additional Information: If this is contemplated, coordination with the Appropriate FAA Airports District
Office (ADO) and FAA’s Airports Compliance Division, ACO-100, is required to ensure compliance with the
applicable 49 U.S.C. airport access requirements as outlined in FAA Order 5190.6 FAA Airport Compliance
Program. This order sets forth policies, procedures, interpretation, and the administration of the various
federal requirements associated with FAA airport funding, which includes requirements for safe
operations and terms and conditions for airport access at federally obligated airports.
397.
Barrier
MA-1, MA-1A, and
BAK-15
Recommend the use of a barrier (MA-1A) system be considered where available. These were and are
available, if not required, for MiG-21 operations not only in the Soviet and Warsaw Pact air forces, but
currently at NATO and Indian Air Force bases as well.
Additional Information: If a barrier system is used, ensure procedures be developed for this. Refer to
AC 150/5220-9, Aircraft Arresting Systems on Civil Airports, dated December 20, 2006. The military
installs and maintains aircraft arresting systems when certain military operations are authorized at civil
airports. Aircraft arresting systems serve primarily to save lives by preventing aircraft from overrunning
runways in cases where the pilot is unable to stop the aircraft during landing or aborted takeoff
operations. They also serve to save aircraft and prevent major damage. Aircraft arresting systems must
be installed according to the latest official criteria of the military aircraft operational need. In most
cases, the criteria can be found in AFI 32-1043, Managing, Operating, and Maintaining Aircraft Arresting
Systems.
398. Wet Runway
Recommend the applicant/operator restraint from operating the aircraft on any runway that has
standing water. The aircraft’s propensity to overruns, poor barking, and high-landing speed justify this
restriction.
399. Class B Airspace Prohibit operations in and under Class B airspace unless prior ATC permission is obtained before flight.

Notes,
Action(s) and
Disposition
400. Drag Chute
Required that the drag chute be maintained, inspected, and re-packed per the applicable technical
guidance (i.e., Soviet, USAF, and NATO), and by trained personnel. It must also be the correct type and
approved drag chute for the aircraft in question. For MiG-21 operations, the drag chute is mandatory in
IAF service.
Additional Information: See Drag Chute (General), Approved Drag Chute, Drag Chute and Systems
Technical Guidance, USAF T.O. 00-25-241 (Chute Logs and Records), and Civil Drag Chute Guidance
above. Note: A drag chute is a small parachute (usually stowed in the tail of the aircraft) used specifically
to slow the aircraft down during landing.
401.
Hot and Pressure
Refueling
Prohibit hot and pressure refueling. There are too many dangers with these types of operations.
Additional Information: The following narrative of an incident involving the refueling of a MiG-21 is a
good example: “In the early nineties, I was posted to a MiG 21 squadron in one of our forward western
base. The weather was clear. Due to the impending Aircrew Examination Board (AEB) visit the quantum
of flying had increased, both by day and night. The squadron was operating from the blast pens
dispersed all over the airfield. The daily servicing section (DSS) had been set up in blast pens X and Z.
The DSS was on a two-shift routine with nearly 60% man-power dedicated for the night shift. On this
eventful night, flying was scheduled from pen X and Y. One Sergeant (Sgt.) and one Leading Aircraftsman
(LAC) were in-charge of servicing operations from Pen X. The aircraft in this pen flew two missions that
night, amounting to two separate details. After the last flying detail got over, the LAC was asked to
refuel the aircraft as part of Last Flight Servicing (LFS). The aircraft refueler was hence summoned to Pen
X to refuel this aircraft. A novice refueler operator accompanied the aircraft refueler. He did not have
sufficient experience in night operations especially in dispersed locations. Though he was well trained in
taking all precautions for prevention of fuel contamination, he was not comfortable in executing them
during the reduced visual orientation required of night operations. The LAC responsible to refuel the
aircraft assumed that the refueller operator was comfortable in the current situation and so he promptly
climbed on top of the aircraft to be refueled. After opening the refueling hatch, he asked for the
refueling nozzle. The refueller operator dutifully unwound the nozzle and passed it to the LAC. They
then commenced refueling the aircraft. The LAC sitting astride the saddle tank on top of the aircraft
noticed, despite the low light conditions in the pen, that the delivery pressure was very low. Apparently
the refueller operator had not opened the out-pressure valve to the correct setting, perhaps he had not
watched the delivery pressure meticulously, when initially opening the valve. Anticipating an extended
time for refueling a single aircraft and subsequent unnecessary delay in the LFS, the LAC asked the
refueling operator to increase the delivery pressure. The novice refueller operator was not careful of
gradually increasing the pressure to the required value on the gauge. He simply ‘increased’ the delivery
pressure. The area of the refueling nozzle was fixed so the increased pressure translated into a rapid
increase in the force per unit area of the refueling nozzle diameter. The LAC sitting astride the aircraft
saddle tank did not anticipate such an increase in the refueling nozzle’s normal reaction to the increased
fuel flow. The refueling nozzle rapidly rocketed back, out of the filling point and hit the LAC’s chest.
With nothing to hold on to, the LAC was thrown off the top of the aircraft he was refueling, along with
the refueling nozzle with a great force. With the strong impact on his chest, he landed unconscious on
the hard concrete floor of the pen in a pool of jet fuel now gushing out of the refueller nozzle. The
shocked novice refueller operator fumbled to shut off the fuel supply first before going to the aid of the
LAC. Luckily, the Sqn DSS was in the same pen. A technician available at the DSS desk rushed to the spot
and promptly gave first aid to the victim. The LAC was rushed to the Station Medical Centre in the CO’s
car. The Duty Medical Officer gave him immediate medical attention and prevented possible fatal
consequences of the accident. The LAC had suffered major injuries. In addition to the broken ribs due to
the impact of the refueling nozzle, he also had external injuries due to the dangerous fall. He was
admitted to the Military Hospital for three months and then was forced to go on forty-five days of
recuperative sick leave. He recovered from the accident but only after sustaining injuries, which were
likely to affect him later in his service career, all attributable to service. An insignificant action of opening
a fuel outlet valve a little too fast caused a valuable life to be at stake. The Squadron missed the output
of the LAC for a hundred and thirty-five days! A lot of highly inflammable jet fuel caused a definite fire
hazard before going down the drain. Had the refueller operator followed the correct SOP of checking the
gauge pressure when adjusting the delivery pressure, all the consequences would have been prevented.
It is for all of us to remember that SOPs are not merely for efficient tasking but also to ensure the
personal safety of the technicians. SOPs help in avoiding situations which might lead someone into a
tight spot, whether in the air or on ground and thus foster aerospace safety. In fact, actually and
contrary to what many people believe, SOPs are ‘saviors’ of personnel who set forth to enhance the
operational edge.” http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Jan11.pdf.

Notes,
Action(s) and
Disposition
402. ARFF Coordination
Coordinate with Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) personnel at any airport of landing. A safety
briefing should be provided and include: an ejection seat system overview; making the ejection seat
safe, including location and use of safety pins; canopy jettison; fuel system, fuel tanks; intake dangers,
engine shut-off throttle; fuel; batteries; flooding the engines; fire access panels and hot exhaust ports;
and crew extraction-harness, oxygen, communications, and forcible entry.
Additional Information: ARFF personnel should be provided with the relevant sections of the aircraft
AFM and other appropriate references like Fire Fighting and Aircraft Crash Rescue, Vol. 3, Air University,
Maxwell AFB, 1958. An additional reference is the NATOPS U.S. NAVY Aircraft Firefighting and Rescue
Manual, NAVAIR 00-80R-14, dated October 15, 2003. The FAA maintains a series of ACs that provide
guidance for Crash Fire Rescue personnel. Refer to AC 5210-17, Programs for Training of Aircraft Rescue
and Firefighting. Note: On November 1, 2012, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendation A-12-64
through -67. The NTSB recommends the FAA require the identification of the presence and type of
safety devices (such as ejection seats) that contain explosive components on the aircraft. It further
stated that that information should be readily available to first responders and accident investigators by
displaying it on the FAA’s online aircraft registry and that the FAA should issue and distribute a publicly
available safety bulletin to all 14 CFR part 139-certificated airports and to representative organizations of
off-airport first responders, such as the International Association of Fire Chiefs and the National Fire
Protection Association, to (1) inform first responders of the risks posed by the potential presence of all
safety devices that contain explosive components (including ejection seats) on an aircraft during accident
investigation and recovery, and (2) offer instructions about how to quickly obtain information from the
FAA’s online aircraft registry regarding the presence of these safety devices that contain explosive
components on an aircraft.
403. Coordination With Airport
The applicant must provide objective evidence that the airport manager of the airport where the aircraft
is based has been notified regarding both the presence of explosive devices in these systems and the
planned operation of an experimental aircraft from that airport.
404. ATC Coordination
Coordinate with ATC before any operation that may interfere with normal flow of traffic to ensure the
requirement to avoid flight over populated areas is complied with.
Additional Information: ATC does not have the authority to waive any of the operating limitations or
operating rules. It is the PIC responsibility to integrate the operating limitations of the aircraft and ATC.
In this respect, it is possible that IFR operations (not IMC) may have to be curtailed to comply with the
operating limitations.
405.
Military/Public
Aircraft Operations
Require the operator to obtain a declaration of PAO from the contracting entity or risk civil penalty for
operating the aircraft outside the limits of the FAA experimental certificate. Some operators may enter
into contracts with the DOD to provide military missions such as air combat maneuvering, target towing,
and ECM. Such operations constitute PAO, not civil operations under FAA jurisdiction.
Additional Information: Verify the operator understands the differences between PAOs and operations
under a civil certificate. For example, the purpose of an airworthiness certificate in the exhibition
category is limited to activities listed in § 21.191(d). Note: The following notice, which was issued by
AFS-1 in March 2012, needs to be communicated to the applicant: “Any pilot operating a U.S. civil
aircraft with an experimental certificate while conducting operations such as air-to-air combat
simulations, electronic counter measures, target towing for aerial gunnery, and/or dropping simulated
ordinances is operating contrary to the limits of the experimental certificate. Any operator offering to
use a U.S. civil aircraft with an experimental certificate to conduct operations such as air-to-air combat
simulations, electronic counter measures, target towing for aerial gunnery, and/or dropping simulated
ordinances pursuant to a contract or other agreement with a foreign government or other foreign entity
would not be doing so in accordance with any authority granted by the FAA as the State of Registry or
State of the Operator. These activities are not included in the list of experimental certificate approved
operations and may be subject to enforcement action by FAA. For those experimental aircraft operating
overseas within the limitations of their certificate, FAA Order 8130.2, section 7, paragraph 4071(b) states
that if an experimental airworthiness certificate is issued to an aircraft located in or outside of the United
States for time-limited operations in another country, the experimental airworthiness certificate must be
accompanied by appropriate operating limitations that have been coordinated with the responsible CAA
before issuance.” For additional information on public aircraft status, refer to 76 FR 16349, Notice of
Policy Regarding Civil Aircraft Operators Providing Contract Support to Government Entities (Public
Aircraft Operations), March 23, 2011.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
MiG-21 Risk Management, SOPs, Training, and Best Practices
406.
Use of Operational Risk
Management (ORM)
(Part I)
In addition to using existing FAA SMS (Safety Management Systems) guidance recommended that an ORM-
like approach be implemented by the MiG-21 owner/operator. This process has been successfully used by
the US Navy in managing risk and reducing mishaps. A similar process is used by the USAF. The use of ORM
principles in OPNAVINST 3500.39C will go a long way in enhancing the safe operation of tactical aircraft like
the MiG-21 aircraft. The US Navy’s ORM employs a five-step process: (1) Identify hazards, (2) Assess
hazards, (3) Make risk decisions, (4) Implement controls, and (5) Supervise. ORM is a systematic, decision
making process used to identify and manage hazards. ORM is a tool used to make informed decisions by
providing the best baseline of knowledge and experience available. Its purpose is to increase safety by
anticipating hazards and reducing the potential for loss. For additional information and guidance, see
Wirginis, Ted. ORM Corner: Understand the process. Approach (May-June 2008).

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
Use of Operational Risk
Management (ORM)
(Part II)
Additional Information: The ORM process is utilized on three levels based upon time and assets available.
These include: (1) Time-critical: A quick mental review of the five-step process when time does not allow
for any more (that is, in-flight mission/situation changes), (2) Deliberate: Experience and brain storming
are used to identify hazards and is best done in groups (that is, aircraft moves, fly on/off), (3) In-depth:
More substantial tools are used to thoroughly study the hazards and their associated risk in complex
operations. The ORM process includes the following principles: Accept no unnecessary risk, anticipate and
manage risk by planning and make risk decisions at the right level. Refer to OPNAVINST 3500.39C, ORM,
July 2, 2010. Source: OPNAVINST 3500.39C. Note: The following Air Force press release is a ORM-based
analysis of a 2011 jet trainer accident: “CULTURE OF RISK TOLERANCE’ CITED IN CRASH PROBE – 9/1/2011 –
RANDOLPH AIR FORCE BASE, Texas –Investigators found that the Feb. 11 crash landing at Ellington Field,
Texas, resulted from a series of mistakes by a fatigued pilot during landing, and they admonished the pilot’s
squadron for creating a ‘culture of risk tolerance.’ The pilot, from the 14th
Flying Training Wing at
Columbus Air Force Base, Miss., became disoriented and misjudged the landing runway, lost altitude too
quickly and allowed his airspeed to fall below a safe level, according to the Air Education and Training
Command accident investigation report. This resulted in catastrophic damage to the [aircraft’s] landing
gear and right wing. The mishap occurred during the fourth sortie of the day as a night solo continuations-
training mission into Ellington Field, near Houston, on a squadron cross-country sortie. The pilot safely
departed the aircraft when it came to rest on the ground, and he sustained only minor injuries. In addition
to the culture of risk tolerance, the report cited inadequate operational risk management of the cross-
country weekend plan. ‘Inappropriate supervisory policy, combined with inadequate ORM, led to the
mishap pilot flying a high-risk mission profile,’ the report said. The board further found that the pilot’s
fatigue, resulting from the aggressive flight plan approved by his squadron, substantially contributed to the
mishap. ‘Outside of these cross-country weekends, it was rare for an (instructor pilot) to fly four sorties in
one day. There was a mindset that a day consisting of four continuation training sorties was generally less
risky than a day consisting of three student pilot instructional sorties,’ the report said. ‘The sortie was (the
mishap pilot’s) fourth sortie of the day and was flown entirely at night... This mishap was caused by the
authorization and execution of a mission having an unnecessarily high level of risk relative to the real
benefits.’ Damage to the [aircraft] – landing gear, engines, right wing, and tail section – was assessed at
$2.1 million. The impact also caused minor damage to the runway, but no damage to private property, the
report said. According to Col. Creig A. Rice, AETC director of safety, risk mitigations were put in place to
address the issues outlined in the accident investigation report.” See
http://www.torch.aetc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123277394.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
407.
System Safety
MIL-STD-882B
Recommend the use of MIL-STD-882B, System Safety Program Requirements, in the operation of the
aircraft.
Additional Information: This guidance is also useful in the maintenance and operation of high-
performance former military aircraft. It covers program management, risk identification, audits, and other
safety-related practices. MIL-STD-882B discusses the system safety requirements to perform throughout
the life cycle for any system, new development, upgrade, modification, resolution of deficiencies, or
technology development. When properly applied, these requirements should ensure the identification and
understanding of all known hazards and their associated risks; and mishap risk eliminated or reduced to
acceptable levels. The objective of system safety is to achieve acceptable mishap risk through a systematic
approach of hazard analysis, risk assessment, and risk management. This document delineates the
minimum mandatory requirements for an acceptable system safety program for any DOD system. See
http://www.faa.gov/library/manuals/aviation/risk_management/ss_handbook/media/app_h_1200.PDF.
408. Safety Culture
Recommend the establishment of safety culture policy and associated processes for the operator. Although
this will vary depending on the size and type of operator, the basic concepts can still be applied even to the
smallest type of MiG-21 operation.
Additional Information: The applicability of safety culture is not just limited to the pilot and the cockpit. It
involves other aspects of the operation, from maintenance, expenses, and record keeping. Recognizing the
risks involved with the operation of the aircraft and acting upon them, is, by far, one of the most critical
aspects of any adequate safety culture. For example, not acting upon a series of incidents will likely pave
the way towards a major accident, and this is especially true in high-performance aircraft like the MiG-21.
Safety culture is descriptive of organizations where each person involved in the organization’s operations
recognizes and acts on his or her individual responsibility for safety, and actively supports the organization’s
processes for managing safety. The outcome is that the organization’s ability to manage safety continues to
improve because decision makers at all levels work to use their knowledge of safety risk to learn and adapt,
thus improving the system’s ability to support safety outcomes.
409.
Cockpit Resource
Management (CRM) and
Single-Pilot Resource
Management (SRM)
Recommended the applicant and operator adopt a CRM-type program for aircraft operations. It goes
without saying that the safe operation of a high-performance fighter like the MiG-21 requires many skills
that CRM/SRM-like process can contribute greatly to overall safety. While CRM focuses on pilots operating
in crew environments, many of the concepts apply to single-pilot operations. Many CRM principles have
been successfully applied to single-pilot aircraft, and led to the development of SRM. SRM is defined as the
art and science of managing all the resources (both on board the aircraft and from outside sources)
available to a single pilot (prior and during flight) to ensure the successful outcome of the flight. SRM
includes the concepts of Risk Management (RM), Task Management, Automation Management (AM),
Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) Awareness, and Situational Awareness (SA).
Additional Information: SRM training helps the pilot maintain situational awareness by managing the
automation and associated aircraft control and navigation tasks. This enables the pilot to accurately assess
and manage risk and make accurate and timely decisions. Integrated CRM/SRM incorporates the use of
specifically defined behavioral skills into aviation operations. Standardized training strategies are to be
used in such areas as academics, simulators, and flight training. Practicing CRM/SRM principles will serve to
prevent mishaps that result from poor crew coordination. At first glance, crew resource management for
the single pilot might seem paradoxical but it is not. While multi-pilot operations have traditionally been
the focus of CRM training, many elements are applicable to the single pilot operation. The Aircraft Owners
and Pilots Association’s (AOPA) Flight Training described single-pilot CRM as “found in the realm of
aeronautical decision making, which is simply a systematic approach that pilots use to consistently find the
best course(s) of action in response to a given set of circumstances.” Wilkerson, Dave. September 2008.
From a U.S. Navy standpoint, OPNAVINST 1542.7C, Crew Resource Management Program, dated October
12, 2001, can be used as guidance. Also refer to CRM For the Single Pilot. Vector (May/June 2008). FAA
guidance includes: Summers, Michele M., Ayers, Frank Ayers, Connolly, Thomas Connolly, and Robertson,
Charles. Managing Risk through Scenario Based Training, Single Pilot Resource Management, and Learner
Centered Grading, 2007, and Chapter 17, Airplane Flying Handbook FAA-H-8083-3A. Note: Consider the use
of AFI 11-290/AETC Sup 1, Cockpit/Crew Resource Management Training Program.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
410.
Indian Air Force (IAF)
LOSA Program
Recommend that MiG-21 operator consider the use of LOSA or Line Operations Safety Audits as part of its
operation. It is being promoted by the Indian Air Force, one of the largest MiG-21 operators in the World.
LOSA “is one method for monitoring normal flight operations for safety purposes. This program facilitates
hazard identification through the analysis of actual in-flight performances.
Additional Information: Line Operations Safety Audits (LOSA) is one method for monitoring normal flight
operations for safety purposes. It facilitates hazard identification through the analysis of actual in-flight
performances. It facilitates understanding the situation that may have precipitated the exceedence of flight
parameters by the crew. It is a tool for understanding of human errors in flight operations. It is used to
identify the threats to aviation safety that lead to human errors, to minimize the risks that such threats may
generate and to implement measures to manage these errors within the operational context. LOSA enables
operators to assess their resistance to operational risks and errors by front-line personnel. Using a data-
driven approach, they can prioritize these risks and identify actions to reduce the risk of accidents. LOSA
facilitates understanding both successful performance and failures. Hazards originating from operational
errors can be identified and effective countermeasures developed. Data from LOSA also provide a picture
of system operations that can guide strategies in regard to safety management, training, and operations.
Data collected through LOSA can provide a rich source of information for the proactive identification of
systemic safety hazards. LOSA identifies examples of superior performance that can be reinforced and used
as models for training. (Traditionally, the aviation industry has collected information on failed performance
and revised training programs accordingly.) For example, based on LOSA data, CRM/SRM training can be
modified to reflect best practices for coping with particular types of unsafe conditions and for managing
typical errors related to these conditions. ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) endorses LOSA as
a way to monitor normal flight operations. ICAO has published a manual, Line Operations Safety Audit
(LOSA) (Doc 9803), to provide guidance to operators regarding LOSA programs. During normal flights,
crews routinely face situations created outside the cockpit that they must manage. Such situations increase
the operational complexity of their task and pose some level of safety risk. These threats may be relatively
minor (such as frequency congestion), through to major (such as an engine fi re warning). Some threats can
be anticipated (such as a high workload situation during approach) and the crew may brief in advance, for
example, “In the event of a go-around...” Other threats may be unexpected. Since they occur without
warning, no advanced briefing is feasible. Errors are a normal part of all human behavior. Flight crew
errors tend to reduce the margin of safety and increase the probability of accidents. Errors may be minor
(setting the wrong altitude, but correcting it quickly) or major (not completing an essential checklist item).
LOSA employs five categories of crew errors. These include: (a) communication error, (b) proficiency error,
(c), operational decision error, and (d) procedural error. Since threats and errors are an integral part of
daily flight operations, systematic understanding of them is required for safely dealing with them. LOSA
offers an informed perspective on threats and errors from which suitable coping strategies can be
developed. Specifically, quantifiable LOSA data are useful in answering such questions as: What type of
threats do flight crews most frequently encounter? When and where do they occur, and what types are the
most difficult to manage? What are the most frequently committed crew errors, and which ones are the
most difficult to manage? The most effective countermeasures go beyond trying to simply prevent errors.
We must identify unsafe conditions early enough to permit flight crews to take corrective action before
adverse consequences result from the error. In other words, we must “trap” the error. The most effective
countermeasures seek to improve the everyday work situation in which flight crews face the inevitable
threats to safe performance measures which give crews a “second chance” to recover from their errors.
Such systemic countermeasures include changes in aircraft design, crew training, standard operating
procedures, management decisions, etc. We have to evaluate the data obtained through commitment
exists to act upon the lessons of LOSA, to identify those hazards posing the greatest risks to the
organization and then take the necessary actions to address them. LOSA can only reach its full potential if
the organizational willingness and must have an assurance that the data output will not be used against
them. Data-driven programs like LOSA require data quality management procedures and consistency
checks. The database must be validated for consistency and accuracy before a statistical analysis can
proceed. As the data are collected and analyzed, patterns emerge. Certain errors occur frequently, certain
airfields or activities are problematic, certain SOPs are ignored or modified, and certain maneuvers pose
particular difficulties. These patterns become targets for enhancement. An action plan can be developed
and implemented. Through subsequent LOSA audits, the effectiveness of the changes can be measured.
After a LOSA is completed; a feedback is provided to the operators. Pilots are interested not only in the
results but also management’s plan for improvement.
See http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/JAN%202013.pdf.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
411.
USAF Proactive Safety
(ProSEF)
Recommend that applicant and operator consider implementing a ProSEF-like approach to flight operations
and accident prevention. This proactive accident reduction program has many benefits that can be sued by
a civil operator, especially an operator of a high-performance former military aircraft like the MiG-21. This
process fits with existing SMS guidance and other risk management tool discussed in this document.
Additional Information: The following description by the USAF Air Force Safety center explains ProSEF:
“Use correlating data streams for hazard identification and risk mitigation to prevent mishaps and more
safely accomplish the mission. Foster a culture of mishap prevention throughout the Air Force by
inculcating the value of evidence-based proactive safety throughout the Major Commands, by providing
operators and maintainers with guidance and encouragement for implementing Military Flight Operations
Quality Assurance, Aviation Safety Action Program, and Line Operations Safety Audit, and by performing
meta-analysis and trending for all participating Air Force aircraft types. Traditionally, safety investigation
boards (SIBs) have revealed those small events that link together to create disproportionate and disastrous
effects. Proactive safety (ProSEF) is taking corrective action based on leading safety indicators that fall
outside of traditional historical metrics of incident and accident reporting. We are transforming Air Force
safety by studying leading indicators of mishaps, while continuing to investigate trailing indicators as
revealed through SIBs. After all, mishap precursors are often detectable prior to mishaps, but often only
through concerted (proactive) effort. Historically, we have practiced "active safety," which can be
described as managing known hazards. Proactive safety entails searching for and measuring precursors
that are hidden or not obvious to all. Proactive safety is an attempt to systematically and scientifically
understand the gap between desired and actual flight performance. Traditionally, we have only understood
that gap after the findings, causes and recommendations of a SIB are released. But, why wait for a mishap
to occur in order to investigate mishap precursors? To understand the gap between desired and actual
flight performance, there must be a continuous exchange of real operational information between aircrew
who are embedded in an organizational culture, safety professionals who can detect unsafe trends, and
leaders who can implement hazard management and measure the success of their efforts. Proactive safety
brings together technology and human ingenuity to analyze and take action on previously undetected or
insufficiently assessed hazards. Over the past 50 years, the aviation industry has developed three key
programs for detecting such mishap precursors prior to accidents or serious incidents, and though we are
not the airline industry, the initiatives that have proven very successful for civilian aviators can be modified
and used in military settings as well. Over a decade ago, the Air Force started analyzing the routine
recordings of aircraft data to detect mishap precursors, a program known as Military Flight Operations
Quality Assurance (MFOQA). We have 10 Mission Design Series (MDS) currently participating in MFOQA,
with more on the way. Three years ago, the Air Force started a program for voluntarily reporting threats
and errors to flight operations, an initiative we call Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP). We have
received hundreds of reports about threats and errors that never would have been exposed otherwise. This
past year we started training experienced pilots to fly as jump seat observers to detect systemic safety
problems in our operations, a program we call Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA). Proactive safety
programs reach their peak potential for mishap prevention when used together. Each program has
particular strengths. MFOQA is excellent at scientifically measuring what is happening. ASAP provides
unique insights into why specific hazards exist. LOSA provides a broad-view of cultural and systemic issues
that impact flight safety. We currently have several MDS communities using all three programs, which
results in a nuanced and in-depth ability to prevent mishaps. There are two widespread misconceptions
about proactive safety. First, though some people think these programs are for heavy drivers only, our F-16
and T-6 MFOQA programs and the F-15 and F-16 ASAP reports provide excellent safety insights. Second,
some aircrew members worry that these programs will be used against them. All three programs are non
punitive approaches to mishap prevention. The air Force believes very strongly in protecting the identity of
participating aircrew and in protecting aircrew from punitive action, except for cases of suspected willful
disregard of regulations and procedures. On this website you will find detailed descriptions of MFOQA,
ASAP and LOSA. Each program has provided us with outstanding mishap prevention information. In fact,
some of you reading this page may be alive today because of those programs. But we need your input into
all three programs and your help to continue growing the programs and saving lives. Welcome to the
cutting edge of mishap prevention. Welcome to proactive aviation safety!”
http://www.afsec.af.mil/proactiveaviationsafety/prosef.asp

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
412.
OPNAV Instruction
1500.75B
Recommend that applicant and operator review and consider the safety management benefits included in
the US Navy OPNAV INSTRUCTION 1500.75B Policy and Procedures for Conducting High-Risk Training,
March 4, 2010. The policies and procedures discussed in this document have many benefits that can be
sued by a civil operator, especially an operator of a high-performance former military aircraft like the MiG-
21. As with the USAF ProSEF above, this process fits with existing SMS/ORM guidance and other risk
management tool discussed in this document.
Although “heavy” with Navy terms and acronyms, the following excerpts from OPNAV 1500.75B explains
the purpose and value of this guidance: “This instruction establishes policy and procedures to abate or
minimize mishaps during high-risk training. Due to recent changes to the Navy’s training organization, this
instruction has been extensively revised and should be read in its entirety. Naval operations often require
aggressive training programs to prepare personnel to perform mission essential high risk tasks in a variety
of environments. All leaders must recognize that risk cannot be mitigated merely through written
procedures. Therefore, planning and execution of high-risk training shall incorporate the program elements
and principles of ORM per reference (a). The expectation is to maximize the benefits of ORM where
essential skills are practiced, perfected, and tested. While the goal is zero mishaps in training, this policy
does not establish a requirement to eliminate all exposure to risk where valid training objectives are
established. Perform risk assessments of training per reference (a). OPNAV 1500/54 Deliberate Risk
Assessment shall be used to perform a basic risk assessment. Designate high-risk training courses under
their cognizance and maintain a list of these courses by title and course identification number (CIN).
Develop and implement safety oversight criteria that meet at least the minimum requirements of this
instruction, and any further requirements, as the training environment may dictate to ensure subordinate
activities comply. Include a self-assessment program, which quantitatively and qualitatively evaluates the
effectiveness of the established oversight program. Establish additional qualification requirements for
military, civilian, or contracted TSOs and assistant training safety officers (ATSOs) at subordinate training
activities as applicable. Incorporate ORM and safety awareness training into instructor training. Training
shall include all three levels of ORM per reference (a), safety policy and directives per references (e) and (f)
as applicable, precautions in technical manuals and publications, and lessons learned from training related
mishaps and injuries or best practices provided by COMNAVSAFECEN and other appropriate data sources.
Ensure high-risk training safety reviews are conducted, as defined in enclosure (1), on a recurring basis at
least triennially by COs and OICs of training activities. Convene safety reviews subsequent to a training
mishap, near miss/hit, major curriculum changes, and major course revisions. Active senior leadership
involvement is imperative to the success of these reviews and consideration of leadership’s planned
rotations or transfers is highly encouraged, as many mishaps occur relatively close to turnover periods. Put
in place and adhere to curricula safety requirements. Conduct training following only approved course
curricula and high-risk evolutions only where necessary to meet graduation requirements of the course.
Ensure all training includes specific and related ORM training per reference (a). Establish an instructor
certification process for all high-risk instructors as directed by the training agent. Establish an evaluation
program that assesses high risk instructors in classroom and laboratory or field settings on a recurrent basis,
in percentages commensurate with the amount of time spent instructing in those environments. Conduct
quarterly procedural walk-through(s) and fully exercise and validate emergency action plans (EAPs)
annually. Include all emergency response agencies, where practicable. Include “training time out” (TTO)
procedures in all high-risk course curricula. Include “drop on request” (DOR) procedures in all voluntary
high-risk curricula. Ensure students are thoroughly briefed on TTO and DOR policies prior to
commencement of training. Designate a qualified safety officer as the high risk TSO for safety oversight on
all courses assessed as high risk. For activities without a safety officer billet, a trained and qualified
collateral duty safety officer or independent TSO may be designated in writing to perform those duties. The
designated TSO will be directly responsible to the CO or OIC for the safe conduct of high-risk training.
Where safety officer and TSO duties and responsibilities need to be separately established for
organizational structure, ensure amplifying procedures and policies define their duties, roles, and
responsibilities relative to mishap reporting and investigation of mishap events. Report and record all
training related mishaps and injuries per reference (d). Establish a mishap analysis program to examine
near miss/hit and mishap data as well as student critique feedback on unsafe conditions and practices
identified in high-risk courses. Mishap analysis should be closely aligned with the training staff to enable
“lessons learned” or “best practices” to be expeditiously incorporated into the conduct of high-risk
training.” See http://doni.daps.dla.mil/Directives/01000%20Military%20Personnel%20Support/01-
500%20Military%20Training%20and%20Education%20Services/1500.75B.pdf.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
413.
Risk Matrix and Risk
Assessment Tool
Recommend using a risk matrix in mitigating risk in routine and daily aircraft operations. A risk matrix can
be used for almost any operation by assigning likelihood and severity. In the case presented, the pilot
assigned a likelihood of occasional and the severity as catastrophic.
Additional Information: As one can see, this falls in the high risk area. The following is a risk assessment
tool presented in figure 17-5 of the Airplane Flying Handbook, FAA-H-8083-3A.
Source: FAA
414. AFM Addendums
Consider additions or restrictions to the AFM. Operational restrictions should be also addressed in the
AFM.
415.
Training Guidance
(General)
Recommend the applicable USAF/NAVAIR/NATO/RAF training manuals and materials be used as an integral
part of the operation of the aircraft.
416. USAF Phase Training
Recommend consideration of SOPs and training incorporate the current USAF Phases of Training.
Additional Information: USAF Phases of Training include—
• Initial Qualification Training (IQT). This training is necessary to qualify aircrew for duties in the
aircraft.
• Mission Qualification Training (MQT). This training is necessary to qualify aircrew for specific
unit mission or local area requirements.
• Continuation Training (CT). This training is necessary for qualified aircrew to maintain their
assigned level of proficiency and/or increase flight qualifications. It provides minimum ground
and flight training event requirements.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
417.
In-Flight Canopy
Separation, Failure, and
Opening
Revise the pilot checklist and back seat occupant (MiG-21UB) briefing to emphasize (that is, “warning—
caution”) the proper closing of the canopy. See Canopy Opening in Flight (Case Study) below.
Additional Information: The following incident illustrates how not adhering to the proper procedures
(with training) can be dangerous: “…summer afternoon. Bison aircraft were being inducted into a squadron
and after a stint of eight months at HAL, the squadron was ready to ferry out the initial lot of aircraft back
to their parent base. The entire manpower was aware that this was the beginning of the end of the long
and drawn out TD. I, for myself, was planned for a sortie in the morning followed by ferry of a Trainer
aircraft back to base. The sortie went through as planned, albeit after a delay, due to the first wave of ferry
out aircraft. I realized that the squadron EO was to be my passenger in the Trainer for the ferry. I checked
up on the readiness of the Trainer aircraft and was told that it was ready for ferry out. Thirty minutes to go
for departure and I sent my small overnight kit to be put in the aircraft nose bay. The EO had still not
turned up for briefing and I was getting worked up for the same. I had to decide whether to delay the ferry
or go ahead and I did the right thing of delaying the ferry even at the cost of getting stranded midway in the
ferry, at the TRS base. I first helped the EO to adjust his flying clothing and wear it and then commenced
my briefing for the ferry. I covered all the relevant safety aspects which is ‘must know’ to sit in the cockpit.
A quick check for clearances for delayed departure and we were ready to walk to the aircraft. The summer
sun was shining bright and with high relative humidity the comfort index was non-existent on the tarmac. I
took the EO to the aircraft and personally showed him all the relevant switches in the cockpit. I told him to
strap up while I did my round of externals of the aircraft. By the time I had completed, the EO was strapped
up and I had a good look at all his connections. The poor guy was sweating profusely. I should have
personally got the canopy closed and checked for locking but that may have meant an additional 10-12
minutes of intense baking for the young man in the rear cockpit till start up. And anyone who has flown in a
MiG-21 knows that the air conditioning becomes active only after reaching a certain altitude in the air,
meaning that the EO would be in uncomfortable temperatures for more than 30-35 minutes. So I
benevolently decided to keep the canopy open in the rear cockpit till start, after confirming from the EO
that he was familiar with the canopy closing procedure. Obviously, the EO knows how to close the canopy.
A quick start, after start checks and we were ready to taxi. Only one small problem, the differential
pressure was indicating very close to zero instead of normal 0.02 kg/cm2
. This trainer had a known issue of
low differential pressure build up on ground which was an indication problem than actual one. I quickly
reconfirmed from the rear cockpit if the canopy was closed and sealed, which was replied to in affirmative.
I thought of getting it rechecked from the Armament tradesman, but decided to believe in the EO’s
affirmative and taxied out. All my attention was now focused on the differential pressure during taxi and
Vital Actions. I asked the EO to recheck whether his sealing was on which he replied confidently in
affirmative. I recollected one Trainer Captain discussing the same problem some days back and [it was]
mentioned that the problem was of the indication due to calibration and was to be sorted out after ferry
back to base. I also recollected the Trainer Captain saying that the problem did not exist in air after take-
off. All these inputs had to be simultaneously processed and a decision taken whether to continue or to
return back to dispersal. Pros for continuing on were many. The probability of returning back to dispersal
with a serviceable aircraft weighs very heavily on any fighter pilot’s mind. And that too when the squadron
is ferrying back to base and there is a requirement of the trainer back at base for syllabus progression. The
factor of “get homeitis” can never be discarded altogether from the decision making process. So I
reconfirmed from the rear cockpit that his sealing was on as that doubt lingered on in my mind, as I lined up
for take-off after a vehement confirmation from the rear seat. As I opened up RPM for warm up, the
differential pressure rose a wee bit above zero or was it my imagination? I reduced the RPM and increased
it again and YES, there was a very slight movement of the differential gauge needle. I DECIDED TO
CONTINUE WITHOUT VERIFYING MY DOUBT, thinking that everything will turn out alright as it always does.
We got airborne and the differential pressure gauge started to register but in negative. It was clear that
there was definitely some problem in the canopy sealing. All required precautions were taken and a
priority landing was executed. The Airframe tradesman was informed of the snag on switch off and I
reflected back on the stupid mistake I had made under some perceived pressures. The Airframe tradesman
came in after sometime to inform that there was no problem of differential pressure and the indications
were normal. He was immediately followed by the young EO, who was looking sheepish and embarrassed.
He informed me that he had not sealed the rear canopy as it involved movement of two levers in the MiG-
21 trainer, as against one single movement of hand in the fighter to lock the canopy and seal it. Thus ended
my day with me being let off very lightly by my fate for leaving things to chance in aviation but enriched by
the lessons learnt. Wing Cdr. Lohokare” http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Oct11.pdf.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
418.
Canopy Opening in
Flight (Case Study)
The following account is provided to illustrate the potentially fatal consequences of a canopy opening in
flight, either as a cause of human error (pilot not latching the canopy) or mechanical failure (locking
mechanism failure). See In-Flight Canopy Separation, Failure, and Opening above.
Additional Information: “ON 10-01-2009 AT APPROXIMATELY 10 AM LOCAL TIME, THE SAME MIG-21
N315RF TAXIED OUT TO RUNWAY 26R AT BROWN FIELD (SDM) TO TAKE OFF FOR A LOCAL FLIGHT. BY
WITNESS ACCOUNTS, THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS OCCURRED:
MIG-21 N315RF TOOK THE RUNWAY 26R FOR TAKEOFF @10:10AM LOCAL TIME. THE MIG-21 APPLIED
TAKEOFF POWER AND BEGAN ACCELERATING WESTBOUND ON RUNWAY 26R. AT OR ABOUT ROTATION
(APPROXIMATELY 3000' FEET DOWN THE RUNWAY) THE MIG-21 LIFTED AND WAS OBSERVED THAT THE
AIRCRAFT "DIPPED" TO THE LEFT AND THEN "CORRECTED" TO THE RIGHT. AT THIS POINT, IT WAS ALSO
OBSERVED THAT THE CANOPY WAS NOT CLOSED AND "THE PILOT APPEARED TO BE TRYING TO CLOSE IT.”
NEXT THE MIG-21 BEGAN A DESCENT AFTER REACHING ABOUT 75-100' ABOVE THE RUNWAY AND AT THE
END OF RUNWAY 26R WAS IN A SLIGHT LEFT DESCENDING TURN, CROSSING THE WEST END OF TAXIWAY
ALPHA....TOWARDS THE DIRT SOUTHWEST OF THE RUNWAY. IT WAS THEN WITNESSED THAT THE MIG-21
TOUCHED THE MAIN LANDING GEAR TIRES IN THE DIRT AND STAYED DOWN FOR APPROXIMATELY 100'
FEET BEFORE AGAIN BECOMING AIRBORNE. THE MIG-21 CLIMBED INTO THE RIGHT TRAFFIC PATTERN AND
MADE THREE CIRCUITS BEFORE LANDING AGAIN ON RUNWAY 26R. THERE WAS NO COMMUNICATION
WITH THE MIG-21 FROM TOWER PERSONNEL, AND ON ONE CIRCUIT THE MIG WAS LINING UP WITH THE
905 FREEWAY THAT PARALLELS RUNWAY 26L TO THE SOUTH. AFTER THE MIG-21 LANDED, HE ROLLED OUT
AND PARKED THE AIRCRAFT. HE WAS MET BY SENIOR OPERATIONS MANAGER CHRIS COOPER. COOPER
IDENTIFIED THE PILOT AS REG [THE PILOT] WHOM HE HAD MET ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS AT THE
AIRPORT. COOPER SAID [THE PILOT] HAD BLOOD ON HIS CHIN AND THAT THE BACK SEAT PASSENGER,
MIKE MCKENNA WAS GETTING OUT OF THE REAR SEAT SAYING THAT HE HAD VIDEO OF THE FLIGHT.
COOPER DESCRIBED THE EVENTS OF THE FLIGHT TO [THE PILOT] AND SAID THAT [THE PILOT] DENIED MANY
ASPECTS OF WHAT WAS DESCRIBED TO HIM BY COOPER. (COOPER WITNESSED THE ENTIRE EVENT FROM
MID-FIELD) COOPER TOOK [THE PILOT] TO THE SITE WHERE HE TOUCHED DOWN IN THE DIRT. COOPER
TOLD ME THAT WHEN [THE PILOT] SAW THE DEBRIS AND THE LANDING GEAR TRACKS IN THE DIRT HE SAID,
"IN MY 50+ YEARS OF FLYING, I'VE NEVER COME THIS CLOSE.” COOPER SAID HE GAVE [THE PILOT] A RIDE
BACK TO HIS PLANE. DURING THE RIDE BACK [THE PILOT] MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS: “ON OR
ABOUT ROTATION THE CANOPY CAME OPEN AND THE BLAST BLEW HIS HELMET, MIC AND GLASSES OFF HIS
HEAD. THIS CAUSED HIM TO LOSE COMMUNICATION AND IMPAIRED HIS VISION GREATLY. HE HAD
TROUBLE RE-LATCHING THE CANOPY WHILE TRYING TO FLY AND CONTROL THE STICK AND THROTTLE. HE
SAID HE DID NOT THINK HE DESCENDED LOW ENOUGH TO STRIKE THE DIRT WITH HIS MAINS. DURING THE
PATTERN CIRCUITS, HE SOMEHOW TRANSFERRED THE FLYING TO THE BACK SEATER WHO EVENTUALLY HAD
DIFFICULTY RELINQUISHING CONTROL BACK TO [THE PILOT].” REFERENCE THE CANOPY; [THE PILOT] SAID
THAT WHEN HE LINED UP ON THE RUNWAY THERE WAS NO CANOPY LITE ILLUMINATED. HE SAID AS HE
ROTATED AND WAS ALREADY CLIMBING, THE CANOPY POPPED OPEN. [THE PILOT] SAID HE IMMEDIATELY
GRABBED THE CANOPY AND FOUGHT TO SECURE IT. SIMULTANEOUS WITH THAT, HE LOST HIS HELMET,
MIC AND GLASSES, WHICH MADE IT DIFFICULT TO SEE. [THE PILOT] SAID HE SLIGHTLY DECREASED HIS
THROTTLE ON THE CLIMB OUT IN HOPES TO REDUCE THE AIRFLOW AND ALLOW HIM TO SECURE THE
CANOPY. HE SAID THIS MAY HAVE ALLOWED THE AIRCRAFT TO SETTLE SLIGHTLY. [THE PILOT] SAID AS HE
FOUGHT TO SECURE THE CANOPY IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT HE WOULD NEED TO CLIMB UP TO PATTERN
ALTITUDE AND AT LEAST FLY THE PLANE AROUND TO THEN LAND IT AGAIN. HE SAID HE DID SO AND THAT
SEEING WAS DIFFICULT AT BEST BECAUSE ALL OF HIS HEAD GEAR HAD BLOWN ALL OVER THE COCKPIT.
[THE PILOT] ALSO STATED THAT THE REAR SEATER HAD A VERY FIRM GRIP ON THE REAR CONTROL STICK
AND IT MADE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO FLY THE PLANE. [THE PILOT] EVENTUALLY GOT COMPOSED
ENOUGH TO GET FULL CONTROL AND LAND THE MIG-21 SAFELY. AFTER THE FLIGHT [THE PILOT] SAID HE
DID A THOROUGH INSPECTION OF THE AIRCRAFT AND THE CANOPY SYSTEM. HE APPLIED MORE
LUBRICANT TO THE LATCH ASSEMBLY AND IT GROUND CHECK GOOD. SAN-FSDO IS WORKING CLOSELY
WITH [THE PILOT] ON HIS MAINTENANCE PROGRAM TO ENSURE THAT [THE PILOT] STAYS IN COMPLIANCE
WITH HIS AAIP. [THE PILOT] HAS SINCE STATED HE PLANS TO MOVE THE MIG OPERATION TO MOJAVE
DESERT. CASE WILL BE CLOSED WITH A WARNING LETTER TO [THE PILOT].” PTRS entry.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
419. Fuel Mismanagement
Require special emphasis on fuel starvation and fuel management. This is an important item, especially for
a “short-legged” aircraft like the MiG-21. The complexities and variations of the fuel system must also be
included in SOPs and training. See Fuel System and Description above. See SFC below.
420. Specific Range
Verify actual aircraft-specific range (nautical air miles traveled per pound of fuel used).
Additional Information: As with Fuel Management above, this is an important item, especially for a “short-
legged” aircraft like the MiG-21, and when some aircraft are involved in extensive cross-country operations
for airshow purposes. See SFC below.
421.
Flight Time Block and
Cross-Country
Operations
Because of the aircraft’s notorious short range, recommend that in addition to Bingo and minimum
landing fuel (see above), operators consider SOPs that rely on using a very conservative flight time block
(i.e., maximum of 45 minutes) to ensure an additional level of safety to mitigate against any low-fuel
situation, especially in cross-country operations.
422. SFC
Recommend that SOPs and training address the Specific Fuel Consumption t (SFC) rates for the specific
engine type and variant installed.
Additional Information: For example, in the R-11-300 engine, SFC at take-off is (with full afterburner) is
1.96 kg/kgp hour, while cruise is 0.94 kg/kgp hour. Also see TSFC below.
423. TSFC
Recommend that consideration be given to engine’s Thrust Specific Fuel Consumption (TSFC). This can
assist in understanding the fuel consumption and performance of the engine.
424.
Bingo and Minimum
Landing Fuel
Recommend establishing SOPs addressing minimum landing fuel for IFR operations as provided in § 91.151,
Fuel Requirements for Flight in VFR Conditions, in addition to § 91.167, to add a level of safety.
Additional Information: In addition, a “Bingo” fuel status (a pre-briefed amount of fuel for an aircraft that
would allow a safe return to the base of intended landing) should be used in all flights. Note: Bingo fuel
and minimum landing fuel are not necessarily the same, in that a call for Bingo fuel and a return to base still
require managing the minimum landing fuel. See Flight Time Block and Cross-Country Operations below.
425.
Minimum Landing and
Landing Pattern Fuel
Recommend SOPs address minimum landing fuel. SOPs should also address the minimum amount (i.e., 800
lb.) of fuel for a circuit, landing, and possible going around.
Additional Information: The MiG-21 has a 450-liters fuel remaining warning light.
426.
Flapless Landing
(Hydraulic Failure)
Recommend that SOPs and training cover the possibility (not an actual simulation) of a flapless landing.
Additional Information: The following account of such an actual incident provides insight into this
emergency: “I was a young flying officer full of spirit and aspiration just posted to a squadron. After lot of
studies, ground training and spending hours in the cockpit (the ac being on ground), we started flying the
MiG-21. It was my third solo sortie wherein I was supposed to fly a handling profile in sector. The sortie
was uneventful till rejoin on downwind, when after lowering u/c, my main hydraulic failure warning came
on. I declared the emergency, then took a moment to ascertain the situation and went over the actions. I
reported dead side again, completed my actions and landed off a flapless approach in the next circuit
which is considered quite tricky on the MiG-21. I was debriefed the following day, in fact I was praised, and
my actions at such limited experience were appreciated. I was quite happy with myself and continued
flying with a newly gained confidence. I even got a commendation through the flight safety channel for my
emergency handling. But about six months down the line when I gained sufficient experience on the MiG-
21, I realized that my actions had not been very correct, in fact they were wrong. When I realized that I had
an emergency on downwind, all I had to do was continue in the circuit and land. But I elected to go around
and carry out one more circuit which could have led to an aircraft fire as I already had a hydraulic leak. All is
well that ends well. But the point to ponder is that why was this point not brought out to give a lesson to
other youngsters in the squadron. In the interest of flight safety, I write this and implore those young pilots
flying this aircraft to apply system knowledge to the emergency encountered so that they do not land up
complicating the emergencies encountered. Flt. Lt.
Mahale.” http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Jun12.pdf.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
427.
Asymmetric Flap
Condition
Recommend that SOPs and training address the possibility of an asymmetric flap situation. This has
happened in MiG-21s. The issue is not only related to extension and retraction malfunctions, but also an
actual in-flight separation.
Additional Information: In May 2008, a flap on a Croatian AF MiG-21bis separated in flight during low
altitude maneuvering. The pilot was able to maintain control despite the asymmetric configuration and
land the aircraft. However, the issue was very serious and it resulted in the temporarily grounding of MiG-
21s in the Croatian AF.
428.
Speed Limitations
Due to Avionics and
Other Equipment
Verify the speed limit of the aircraft is adjusted to address installed avionics, which may have speed
limitations. This can be an issue due to the fact that many modern avionics are fitted to the aircraft along
with their antennae.
429. Command Ejection
If the aircraft is a MiG-21U (two-seater), ensure SOPs address the command ejection issue, that is, who
ejects first, per the appropriate guidance (i.e., USAF, NAVAIR, NATO), before the flight if the back seat or
rear seat is occupied.
Additional Information: Relevant to the command ejection issue, not all ejection systems in the MiG-21
are similar even between variants. For example, in the MiG-21UM, the canopy system was modified,
allowing both canopies to be jettisoned from the front cockpit. However, the instructor could jettison his
canopy independently with the forward canopy already gone.
430. SK Ejection Seat
SOPs and special training should be provided concerning the unusual characteristics of the SK ejection seat
fitted to early MiG-21s. This type of seat arrangement carries dangers not usually found in any other
system, old or new.
Additional Information: In the early MiG-21s, the canopy was hinged at the front, and connected with the
ejection seat by gimbaled mountings to leave the aircraft with the seat, so providing the pilot with some
protection from the slip-stream blast. This is very unfamiliar set-up when compared not only to later
models, but to Western ejection seat systems. In addition, the interlock between the SK ejection seat and
the canopy release proved unreliable, primarily due to its complicated structure and mechanism. Similar if
not greater deficiencies (cruder manufacturing tolerances) exist with the Chinese version of the earlier SK
seats fitted to Chinese F-7As. The diagram below illustrates this unusual set-up. See Ejection Seat System
PIC Training above.
Source: USAF.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
431.
Weight and Height
Limits for the
Ejection Seats
If the ejection seat is active, procedures should ensure that for every flight, the weight and height of any
occupant meets the seat requirements.
Additional Information: This is a common limitation in all Soviet ejection seats, including the SK and KM-1
seats fitted to the MiG-21. It is also found in many of the Western ejection seat systems.
432.
Brake and Steering
System
Recommend an adequate and thorough check-out (and SOPs) on the aircraft’s brake and steering system
has been given to the PIC and anyone taking control of the aircraft on the ground.
Additional Information: The following account of a Soviet MiG-21 overrun in 1984 illustrates not only a
brake failure, but inappropriate procedures: “Due to the lack of spare parts, the emergency switch of the air
system equipment was rearranged several times from one aircraft to another. On the next flight…after
landing gear retraction, the “tap” into the neutral position was not set, and did not engage the wheel lock
system. As a result, the air from the main switch of the air system bled. [this description needs to be
verified against the technical for accurate translation] In addition, the reverse on the air valve of the brake
parachute was faulty [this description needs to be verified against the technical for accurate translation].
Upon landing, the pilot squeezed the trigger brakes – no brakes, pressed the brake parachute – parachute
came out, pulled the emergency brake valve – from the experiences of thought, and it did not work – total
failure! …already rolling on the ground and the pilot waited for the runway end. The plane did not
disappoint. It ran the whole runway, rolled to the ground, broke through the fence airport, and gave way to
the trench front rack, stopped. The pilot did not get a scratch. Immediately it became a question of who is
to blame, and how to report back to the top. The pilot could be blamed... but “they’ (maintenance) had a
“finger in the fluff.” A compromise was quickly found…signs of impacts by the
enemy….” http://www.airforce.ru/history/localwars/afganistan/part9.htm.
433.
Limit the Use of the
Afterburner
Recommend the use of the afterburner be limited to those phases of flight where it is actually necessary,
such as takeoff. This is because there a long history of afterburner failures in the MiG-21, including
instances where it resulted in engine failure and engine fires. This concern varies depending on the aircraft.
For example, in early R-11 equipped aircraft, engaging full afterburner at altitudes below 5,000 meters, and
increase speeds to beyond 510 knots, the fuel pumps may not be able to keep up with the engine’s
requirements.
Additional Information: For example, in the MiG-21bis, the R-25-300 engine has a three-minute
emergency (air combat) afterburner rating that can be used at low level. However, it is not recommended
that this setting be used. The following narrative illustrates an afterburner failure: “On November 23, 2010,
during the period of his duty a two aircraft formation of MiG-21 aircraft lined up for take-off. On the take-
off roll, the runway controller saw the reheat of the ac suddenly going off…He immediately transmitted this
abnormality…No 1 who in turn aborted his takeoff.” http://indianairforce.nic.in.
434. Roll Limitation
Recommend that SOPs and training limit rates of roll to below than 90°/sec. This was a standard Soviet Air
Force limitation instituted to minimize LOC incidents. Any acrobatic maneuvers should account for this.
435. High AOA
Ensure SOPs emphasize the risk of high AOA operations and AOA usage not only during landing or in the
landing configuration, but also on go-arounds, and maneuvering. The limitation discusses this.
Additional Information: Note: More than 20% of all the Bulgarian Air Force MiG-21 losses were attributed
to stalling and subsequent departure from controlled flight during basic fighter maneuvering and air combat
exercises. In the Hungarian Air Force, pilots “[regarded] it [AOA system and limiter] as the most important
instrument during aerial combat maneuvering.” Buza, MiG-21MF, 1993. As an example, the MiG-21F’s
operational AOA limit was 10-11°. Other sources note 20° for the MiG-21MF, while the MiG-21bis mention
15°. Regardless, action on this item must be specific to the aircraft and system fitted. See High AOA, Loss
of Control (LOC), and Abrupt Maneuvering below. In the MiG-21U, Soviet flight test data indicates that the
aircraft has a tendency to increase the AOA after landing gear retraction during a take-off at full military
power, a tendency neutralized by forward stick motion. This was not encountered during afterburner take-
offs.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
436.
MiG-21 Wake
Turbulence and Jet Blast
It is essential that if any flights are conducted in the vicinity of another aircraft, the wake turbulence and jet
blast of the MiG-21 and its impact on other aircraft be clearly understood. This is an item specifically
mentioned in the AFM for the aircraft. Recommend separation limitations for flight near another aircraft,
especially in terms of horizontal and vertical separation.
Additional Information: In fact, in 2006, a Piper PA-42 Cheyenne was destroyed and the pilot and four
passengers killed with it entered the wake turbulence of a MiG-21 during an aerial photography session.
The following excerpt from the NTSB accident report illustrates this: The MiG pilot flew the airplane at
9,000 feet mean sea level in a 30-degree right-hand turn at 200 knots (about 90 percent power set) with
approach flaps selected (approximately 25 degrees). He continued to circle in that configuration to allow
the Cheyenne to rendezvous with the MiG. The MiG pilot reported that he observed the Cheyenne meet up
at his 5 o'clock position about 300-400 feet behind him and about the same altitude. The MiG pilot looked
forward and when he looked back to the Cheyenne, he could not see it…The MiG pilot waited to hear back
from the Cheyenne pilot, but when he did not receive any additional information, he asked the Cheyenne
pilot to repeat because he did not understand the last transmission. The Cheyenne pilot did not respond
and the MiG pilot never received additional information. The MiG pilot continued flying in that manner and
tried to reach the Cheyenne pilot over the radio. After a couple of minutes he observed a column of smoke
rising from the desert terrain and became concerned about the Cheyenne. The MiG pilot called the
Prescott air traffic controller and asked if they were receiving because he could not see the Cheyenne; could
not reach him over the radio, and could now see a column of smoke in the area in which they were flying...
The NTSB found that probable cause of the accident was “the failure of the pilot following a jet aircraft to
maintain adequate separation from the high velocity jet core exhaust. The separation of the T-tail …due to
contact with the high velocity jet core exhaust was a factor.”
437.
High AOA, Loss of
Control (LOC),
and Abrupt
Maneuvering
Ensure SOPs and training not only emphasizes the risk of high AOA operations and considers asking that
procedures/training be adopted accordingly, but also limits the possibility of a LOC event due to abrupt
maneuvering. It is well documented that the MiG-21 is not a forgiving aircraft in some flight regimes and
flight envelop areas. The MiG-21 is prone to LOC events.
Additional Information: Many MiG-21s have been lost due to LOC, especially in simulated ACM and abrupt
maneuvering. An Israeli Air Force evaluation noted that “the fighter could not maneuver as well as the
Mirage in some regimes and had high stick forces. The nose and low wing tended to drop in high-speed
turns. This could result in a snap into a spin that, at low altitude, could prove fatal.” Norton, 2004. Below
is a graph showing the variation of the aircraft (MiG-21bis) lift coefficient (Cy) with the Mach number. Also
see Stability and Controllability below.
438.
Stability and
Controllability
Recommend that SOPs and training cover in detail the Information on Aircrafts Stability and Controllability
section in the AFM. Also see High AOA, Loss of Control (LOC), and Abrupt Maneuvering above.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
439. Engine Fires
Recommend that SOPs and training focus on the likelihood of an in-flight engine fire, a common occurrence
in the MiG-21. False indications are also common. It is critical that the PIC be properly trained and SOPs in
place on how to handle an engine fire in the aircraft.
Additional Information: The following analysis of an Indian Air Force MiG-21 incident provides a needed
insight into such failures: “…It wasn’t long before all pairs hit Bingo and peeled off for base. I however was
still loaded with bags of fuel (a miracle in a MiG-21) and so decided to carry out a few hard turns before I
rejoined. RPM 100%, trim her for 750 IAS, approaching about 820 IAS, roll into the turn while engaging
reheat, kick, and generate. That is when it happened. The master blinker came ’ON’ like an alarm clock in
the middle of the night. An instinctive glance at the T-10 panel indicated that the “Fire Warning” light was
on. Even as my mind cursed my luck and the prospect of being grilled by a COI sent icy fingers up my spine,
my left hand switched off the reheat and throttled her back to 85% as I rolled out of the turn. And lo and
behold! Voila! Another miracle! Even as my eyes scanned the JPT gauge for any indications of fire, the
master blinker went off, fire warning light went off, and the JPT remained steadily normal. A scan in the
rear view revealed no smoke or fire. Darn it! Why couldn’t these emergencies behave as per the
celebrated ever evolving (evolving even as I write) emergency flip card of the MiG-21. As I turned towards
base and announced my emergency to the SU and then ATC, I wasn’t sure if I really had an engine fire or it
was just a spurious warning. Should I operate the fire extinguisher or not? To be or not to be? There were
absolutely no indications of fire now. What if I were to operate the fire extinguisher and it turned out to be
a spurious warning? The engine would be withdrawn for servicing and the Flight Commander would chew
me. I decided against using the fire extinguisher since it appeared to be a spurious warning anyway. By
now I had announced my intention of a priority landing off a descending circuit, partial flap approach and
switching off after touchdown. The SFS piped up in the mean time, “What’s up man?” I told him the whole
story, my actions, and intentions. No comments from him except, “Don’t switch off on touchdown. Clear
off the runway on to the apron and switch off…” Nice steady approach with partial flaps, 340 IAS on
threshold, chute below 280 IAS and grinding halt abeam one marker to go. Opened RPM to BLC to cock the
nose and jettison chute off the runway when the master blinker came ‘ON’ again, this time with both fire
warning light ON an JPT shooting up like mad. HP off, pumps off, battery off and I jumped out to run
upwind totally out of wind. They later found that all the flame tubes had melted and there was a large hole
in the combustion chamber. I guess I had been really close to final recall there. But hey! No story is
complete without the customary and all important mistakes made and lessons learnt. Given the
circumstances and my relative inexperience, I thought it was a spurious fire warning. Therefore I did not
operate the fire extinguisher in the air. The SFS fell for it too despite his experience. Spurious fire warnings
are rather rare in the MiG-21bis. The SFS negated my decision to switch off after touchdown and asked me
to switch off after clearing off on the apron. In hindsight, I should have operated the fire extinguisher
before switching off the battery and carrying out a quick exit, when the fire indications came on the second
time, on the ground. Lessons learnt:
• Emergencies don’t necessarily turn up the way they are given in the emergency flip card.
They are like little evil goblins which hide in nooks and crannies much like melting flame
tubes in weak engine designs. They de-rated the [MiG-21] bis aero engine after this
incident to cater for the flame tubes which had a certain tendency to melt.
• Know your aircraft systems like the back of your hand. Aircraft do not give you leeway for
inexperience, nor do they show respect for rank and bags of experience.
• As captain of the aircraft, even a young and junior pilot can negate a senior who is in an
advisory capacity. It is the captain who having signed for the aircraft is responsible for its
safety and that of its crew. If you are convinced about the correctness of your decisions
then never devolve this responsibility to anyone else. I should have switched off on
touchdown despite the SFS’s suggestion to the contrary. Wing Cdr.
Dhar.” http://indianairforce.nic.in.
440.
Project Have Doughnut
Evaluation
Recommend that the USAF Project Have Doughnut evaluation (December 1968, declassified in 1998) of the
MiG-21 be considered as part of training. See MiG-21 USAF Guidance above.
Additional Information: Many aspects of the aircraft are included and it provides a valuable source of
information. Have Doughnut (U) Technical report is or particular interest.
441. Brake Application
Recommend SOPs and training focus on the proper application of braking action during landing, especially
in unusual circumstances.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
442. Spool Down Time
Ensure SOPs incorporate the PIC recording the spool down time of the engine after shutdown. This is
critical, as it could indicate an upcoming problem with the engine.
443. V-N Diagram
Recommend that the SOPs, training, and documentation incorporate a detailed understanding of the MiG-
21 V-G/V-N diagrams.
Additional Information: A chart of velocity versus load factor (or V-n diagram) is another way of showing
limits of aircraft performance. It shows how much load factor can be safely achieved at different airspeeds.
The V-G Diagram is a relatively unfamiliar diagram to most non-military pilots. However, its full
understanding and practical implication is absolutely critical to upset recovery for example. The operating
flight strength limitations of an airplane are presented in the form of a V-N or V-G diagram. This chart
usually is included in the aircraft flight handbook in the section dealing with operating limitations. Each
airplane type has its own particular V-N diagram with specific V’s and N’s. The flight operating strength of
an airplane is presented on a graph whose horizontal scale is airspeed (V) and vertical scale is load factor
(n). The presentation of the airplane strength is contingent on four factors being known:
(I) Aircraft gross weight;
(2) Configuration of the aircraft (clean, external stores, flaps and landing gear position, etc.);
(3) Symmetry of loading (since a rolling pullout at high speed can reduce the structural limits to
approximately two-thirds of the symmetrical load limits); and
(4) Applicable altitude. A change in any one of these four factors can cause important changes in
operating limits.
Below is an example of a V-N diagram for a MiG-21F:
Source: USAF. For additional information, see NAVPERS 00-8-T-80, Aerodynamics for Naval Aviators,
January 1965.
444. Directional Gyro (DG)
If the aircraft is equipped with an early Soviet or Chinese DG, recommend that SOPs and training mitigate
the instrument’s limitations, such as its compass card and airplane index. For example, “with the compass
card adjusted so that north was at 12 O’clock and the flight path was east, the airplane index would point
90 at 3 O’clock.” Entrekin, 2012.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
445. E-M Diagram
Recommend that the SOPs, training, and documentation incorporate a detailed understanding of the MiG-
21 E-M (Energy Maneuverability) in addition to the V-G/V-N diagrams.
Additional Information: An aircraft’s Energy and Maneuverability (E-M) diagram is an excellent way to
graphically see the relationship between two dynamics – operational maneuverability and energy
management. This may assist in remaining “inside” the envelope and avoid high-risks maneuvering. Such a
graph, used by the USAF is provided below:
An E-M diagram combines three essential parameters on one chart: (1) aircraft structural limitations, (2)
turn performance data (turn rate data and turn radius curves), and (3) specific power data in the form of
Ps curves. The E-M diagram provides a few crucial data points can be derived. These include:
• Corner Velocity: This point at the intersection of the aircraft G limit and lift limit equates to
the corner airspeed. Corner airspeed has been previously defined as the lowest airspeed at
which the maximum g is available. The turn rate at this point is the best instantaneous turn
rate. The tradeoff for maneuvering the aircraft at this point is the energy loss. All
maneuvering beyond is energy depleting. Additionally, the E-M diagram shows the effect each
maneuver will have on the aircraft’s turn radius.
• Maximum Sustained Rate: This point is the maximum sustained turn rate. As a result, it is
possible to identify a particular (i.e., 19 degree per second) sustained turn rate without losing
energy. This becomes significant when operating on the deck where altitude cannot be traded
for airspeed.
For additional information, see at http://navyflightmanuals.tpub.com/P-821/P-8210204.htm.
446.
External Tank
Limitations and
Handling
The SOPs and training should address the external fuel tank limitations. These are not limited to takeoff
and landing performance, G limits, airspeed, or fuel remaining, but, depending on the version of the MiG-
21, other significant limitations as well.
Additional Information: For example, in many versions and variants, the carriage of a belly drop tank
disables the speed brake (or brakes in case of the F-13 then had no air brakes when carrying a drop tank).
447.
External Tanks Impact
on Handling and
Performance
The SOPs and training should address the impact that external fuel tanks and their use have on aircraft
handling, which is seriously affected, and performance. This can be aircraft type and variant specific.
Additional Information: The issue is not limited to a “heavy” aircraft or “more runway length is needed”
when operating with full tanks. For example, in the MiG-21SMT, there was “instability” (controllability)
when flying with full tanks, especially at high density altitudes. This will vary depending on the version.
448. Runaway Trim
Ensure SOPs and training address the possibility of a runaway trim.
Additional Information: Emphasize this concern in the airworthiness review and note the need for
adequate corrective action as per the Flight Manual and Checklist.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
449. Configuration Checks
Recommend SOPs and training focus on configuration checks.
Additional Information: In 1999, a Romanian MiG-21 Lancer B two-seater was involved in a totally
preventable accident. During a training flight, the aircraft was unable to gain sufficient speed and altitude
after takeoff. It was found that the flaps were set for landing instead of take-off, and both the student and
the instructor failed to notice it. The aircraft crashed some 2 miles from the runway at Bacau military
airfield. Another configuration issue with the MiG-21 is attempting take-off with the air brakes extended.
This is common. The following incident is one of many such instances: “On September 17, 2010, Sgt.
Kumar was performing the duties of l/C Ops from ATC tower. On takeoff roll of a MiG-21 (Bison) aircraft he
noticed that the air brakes of the aircraft are in extended position. He promptly informed the DATCO which
was immediately transmitted to the pilot of the aircraft. The pilot acknowledged the same and retracted
the air and continued with the take off.” http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Mar11.pdf.
450. Fuel Leaks
Recommend that SOPs (not just for maintenance, but servicing and flight crew as well) address and with
extreme caution, the high potential for fuel leaks in the MiG-21.
Additional Information: This poses a serious safety concern, not just for the aircraft in flight but also in
terms of ground safety. Over time, there is a tendency by operators to treat fuel leaks as a “common”
occurrence, and in due time, this has created serious, and sometimes, fatal situations.
451. Oxygen Check
Recommend SOPs and training require the pilot to perform the “PRICE” check on the oxygen equipment
(Pressure, Regulator, Indicator, Connections, and Emergency) before flight.
Additional Information: The acronym PRICE is a checklist memory-jogger that helps pilots and
crewmembers inspect oxygen equipment. Mix and match components with caution. When interchanging
oxygen systems components, ensure compatibility of the components storage containers, regulators, and
masks. This is a particularly important issue because the age of the aircraft may require the use of modern
equipment, at least for some components.
452. Runaway Trim
Ensure SOPs and training address the possibility of a runaway trim.
Additional Information: Emphasize this concern in the airworthiness review and note the need for
adequate corrective action as per the Flight Manual and Checklist.
453.
End of Runway (EOR)
Check
Recommend SOPs and training emphasize the importance of an EOR (or Last Chance) check. This was a
common Soviet practice, even when the aircraft was not armed.
454.
Early Attitude Indicators
(AI)
If the aircraft is equipped with an early Soviet or Chinese AI, recommend that SOPs and training mitigate
the instrument’s limitations. For example, these early AIs were black and white (not blue/brown) and were
non-toppling. In a loop, it locked near the top and then took some time to reset. This as because the gyro
was non-toppling on all axis. This issue can surprise an unfamiliar pilot.
Additional Information: In its evaluation of the MiG-21, the USAF noted that the “attitude gyro in the
aircraft was extremely poor and precessed excessively. The artificial horizon/airplane presentation was
opposite to our presentation; consequently, the pilot tended to make the wrong correction in roll to bring
the aircraft back to wings level flight.” Have Doughnut (U) Technical, 1969. The following account by a US
civil pilot illustrates some of the cockpit and instrumentation issues with the aircraft: “The instrument panel
is typical for Soviet fighters… The attitude-director indicator (ADI) is also distinctively “Soviet” in being
earth-stabilized rather than aircraft stabilized….it features a drum which rotates in the vertical plane to
indicate pitch attitude, with a separate symbol which rotates through 360° of arc to denote angle of bank.
The pilot has to integrate these two cues mentally to get a full attitude representation. I had found this
instrument disconcerting when I encountered it…” Lambeth, 1994. An experience MiG operator
commented on another type of Soviet and Chinese AI: “The face of the instrument was blue on the bottom
and brown on the top. Think about that for a second and try to visualize in your mind’s eye the gyro in your
aircraft. This is, of course, the exact opposite of the orientation of a standard Western attitude indicator
and, to say the least, quite confusing during actual instrument meteorological conditions. That the USA day
VFR only limitation during Constant Peg now begins to make sense! At least bank angle did correspond to
the direction of turn. The idiosyncrasies of this primary instrument fostered an old Marine Corps adage of
improvise, adapt, and overcome. To that end, I simply ignored the gyro and referred to turn and needle
and vertical speed indicator and flew partial panel in IMC…” Entrekin, 2012. See Visual Meteorological
Condition (VMC) and Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) Operations VMC Day above.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
455.
Engine Surges and
the SPP System
Ensure that SOPs and training properly provide for correctly identifying and handing an engine surge in the
MiG-21.
Additional Information: The following account illustrates this: “On September 6, 2009, Sqn. Ldr. Dham was
authorized to fly a Bison [MiG-21] aircraft as a CAP in 4 + 3 vs. 3 missions. The aircraft was in 3 D/T
configuration and also modified with SPP system (Anti Surge System). During initial engagement at an
altitude of 3.5 KM on pressing missile firing button he experienced loss of thrust. On checking engine
parameters, he noticed RPM winding down to flight idle and then again building up to 100% after a delay of
6 seconds with throttle lever stationary at full dry power. He also noticed ignition light illuminated on the
failure warning panel. The sequence of RPM dropping and then rising again repeated. The pilot correctly
identified this as a malfunction of Anti Surge System and promptly switched off the Anti Surge CB. He called
off the mission and recovered the aircraft safely on priority. Sqn. Ldr. Dham, despite his limited experience
on type, displayed a keen sense of observation and a high degree of professionalism in preventing a
possible incident/accident.” http://www.indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Feb10.pdf.
456.
Acceleration Check, and
Takeoff Computations
Recommend computation of a 2,000 ft. acceleration check speed anytime the computed takeoff roll
exceeds 2,500 ft.
Additional Information: Practically, this involves an acceleration check speed, which is using a ground
reference during the takeoff run to check for a pre-calculated speed. When the computed takeoff roll is
2,500 ft. or less, use the actual takeoff distance versus the computed takeoff distance to evaluate aircraft
performance. Compute a refusal speed for all takeoffs. This is a standard USAF practice.
457. Take-Off Technique
Recommend that SOPs and training address the proper take-off technique, including proper rotation
attitude and the use of the afterburner.
Additional Information: In 2010, a MiG-21 take-off was marginal, possibly due to improper technique.
Footage of the incident shows that immediately after getting airborne, the aircraft became unstable shown
by a pronounced wing (unintentional) rocking. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wHEqXNjoD-Q.
458.
Minimum Flying Speed
and §91.117
Recommend that SOPs and training properly balance a safe minimum operating speed within the scope of
the applicable regulations [91.117 (d)] and aircraft operating procedures (AFM).
Additional Information: For example, in the MiG-21, as airspeed decreases below 270 knots, both stability
and control effectiveness start to deteriorate rapidly and could create a less-than desirable situation. The
aircraft's poor lateral stability at low speeds can make maintaining aircraft control challenging during
takeoff, landing or maneuvering and the pilot instructions encourage transitioning through certain airspeed
ranges quickly. The pilot instructions also describe airspeed ranges that have instability characteristics that
requires forward stick during speed reduction. Maintaining lower airspeeds with the resultant instability
needs to be properly considered in conjunction with any regulatory maximum airspeed, such as the 250-
knot limit below 10,000 feet. In other words, balancing the safety of the aircraft’s operation with that of
other traffic, and ATC, must be considered. It could, in some cases, require alternate mitigating measures
such as not operating within certain types of airspace. On this issue, coordination between the operator
and the air traffic organization must take place. References to consider include § 91.117 Aircraft Speed and
FAA Order JO 7110.65U Section 7- Speed Adjustment.
459.
Suspected Flight
Control Failure
Recommend establishing SOPs for troubleshooting suspected in-flight control failures, that is, specific
checklist procedures, altitude, and clear location. This is very important due to the MiG-21s’ history of
flight control problems.
460.
Rejected/Aborted
Take-Off
Recommend SOPs and training address the abort decision. Many MiG-21 accidents occurred because of
poor planning and execution concerning an aborted take-off.
Additional Information: In fact, at AirVenture 2010, such a serious incident took place, where the pilot
aborted the take-off at rotation. For footage of the incident see http://www.youtube.com. Two witnesses
noted that “he barely made it off the runway and above the tree line on the second attempt. We were
right on the flight line further down, and I thought for sure he was done, “and “looks like an afterburner
flameout, or something. The all MiG-21s (F-13, MiG-21bis, and the UM you saw) need afterburner for take-
off. So pretty much take your pick: Scrub the take-off or stall out eventually and slam into residential
houses!” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ykAIWQtdb0M. This emphasizes the need for a runway
length of at least 8,000 feet. See Minimum Runway Length above.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
461.
Fuel Consumption and
CG Shifting
Recommend emphasizing, though SOPs and training, that the PIC knows the automatic fuel sequencing on
the MiG-21 (with or without external fuel tanks) and familiarity to address any of the aircraft’s sensitivity to
CG changes due to fuel consumption.
Additional Information: For example, and depending on the version or variants, only two thirds of internal
fuel can be used before the CG, which moves progressively aft with fuel burn-off, passes beyond the rear
limit, rendering the MiG-21 virtually uncontrollable at low speeds. In the MiG-21MF, which carries 2,600
liters total internal fuel (about 570 gal), “800 liters (about 176 gal) are unusable. Fuel burn-off moves the
e.g. aft until, at 800 liters, it passes out of limits and the aircraft may then diverge uncontrollably nose-up at
low speed, making it impossible to land safely.” http://www.flightglobal.com/.
462.
Pilot Induced Oscillation
(PIO)
Emphasize susceptibility to PIO on landing and takeoff. This phenomenon must be clearly understood by
the PIC. Proper rotation and landing/flare technique is critical. Many MiG-21 crashed because of PIO.
Additional Information: An Indian Air Force narrative noted that “on March 1, 2011, [an airman] was
detailed to perform [support] duties and video recording of take-off/landing. During the tour of his duty, a
MiG-21 aircraft met with an accident during the landing, wherein the aircraft was observed to have entered
PIO. The airman continued to record all the events occurring at the time of the accident. This footage
proved to be of immense value during the investigation, and a valuable debrief aid for future
reference.” http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Oct11.pdf.
463.
Flare vs. No-Flare
Landings
Considerations
Recommend that the operator consider, as per the appropriate guidance for the aircraft version and variant
in question, the benefits or lack thereof (i.e., pros and cons) of landings without a flare and landings with a
flare. This may be an issue because some literature concerning Soviet flight techniques (many of which
would survive and be incorporated into flight manuals) indicate that Soviet techniques may have
emphasized the aircraft hit the runway without a flare. This was implemented in order to reduce LOC
events before touchdown and to better manage the aircraft high-airspeed requirements (see MiG-21
Landing Characteristics and Overruns above).
Additional Information: However, in operational service, some operators, such as the Finnish Air Force,
researched and developed landing techniques that incorporated a normal flare. As a result, and as one of
the benefits, wheel tire life went up dramatically and in some case searched 200 landings per tire rather
than below 40 or even lower. However, operators need to be cautioned to properly ascertain the benefits
of such techniques, that is, ensure that they are not trading “saving tires” at the expense of a higher
overrun probability or risking low-speed LOC at touchdown. Note: During flight testing, the Soviets tried
landing techniques with 16-18° AOA and pilots found “that the stabilator authority was insufficient during
these high-AOA landings,” and that “the unusually high nose-up attitude and high-position of the cockpit
above the ground complicated the landing approach, demanding special skill, and concentration on the part
of the pilot.” The flight test report also noted that “the fighter’s longitudinal stability was insufficient
[degraded] at certain CG positions (for example, 37.5% MAC).” Gordon, MiG-21, 2008.
464.
Throttle Movements
and
Spool-Up Time
Recommend the establishments of training and SOPs to address the slow spool-up time of the R-11, R-13,
and R-25 engines. Many MiG-21 accidents, especially those equipped with R-11, due to the slow spool-up
time. The same is true of the Chinese WP-7. This was an issue not only in the pattern environment, such as
being slow and low on final or in a go-around, but also during maneuvering.
Additional Information: A MiG-21 pilot recalls during practice of zooming maneuvers that “…the R-11
engine responded very slowly to input from the throttle and he pulled up before his engine was in full
afterburner…the forward movement dropped to less than 200 km/h: the plane ended ‘standing’ on its tail
with the nose pointing high into the sky before flipping out of control…” Cooper, Arab MiGs, 2011. Note:
R-11 throttle response was slow from idle to military thrust. This is a dangerous characteristic for pilots
with experience in only modern jet engines (both civil and military) with a higher spool times. This is also an
issue in differences training. A Finnish Air Force pilot noted that “the engine spool-up time is longer than
your patience. So as I said, don’t practice these things at circuit heights. On occasion pulling the throttle
back and then trying to get back to higher settings has made me feel like the engine has failed. So, don’t do
that at low altitude, because it may increase your heart rate significantly!” Laukkanen, 2004. A description
of the MiG-21 flown by the USAF noted that “the axial flow engine in the MiG-21 is slow to spool up,
requiring about 15 seconds to accelerate from idle to MIL (Military Power) (10 seconds from 85% power to
MIL power) or full throttle without afterburner. Afterburner light-off requires another three to five seconds
after reaching MIL.” Peck, 2012, and Have Doughnut (U) Technical, 1969.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
465.
MiG-21 Landing
Characteristics and
Overruns
Ensure that SOPs and training focus on the landing characteristics of the aircraft. This has been, by far, one
of the most critical safety issues with the aircraft, not just in operational military service, but in civil use as
well. Sink rates at near stall have been characterized as “spectacular.” In Soviet MiG-21 flight training
forced pilots to be very conservative in handling procedures such as forbidding full-flap landings and
required a very cautious approach to low speeds. The Soviets forbade full-flap landings because the MiG-21
“balloons” as the flaps move out and then decelerates and sinks rapidly. Another account notes that “the
reason for forbidding full-flap landings in nearly all versions was that on first depressing the flaps fully the
aircraft balloons severely, gaining perhaps 200 feet, whereupon the immediate reaction is to stuff the nose
down. This comes just as speed bleeds off fast and the aircraft begins to sink uncontrollably. A lot of MiG-
21s were lost in full-flaps landings…” Gunston, 1986. Forward visibility is restricted during the landing in
several Russian fighter types, and the MiG-21 is no exception.
Additional Information: A MiG-21 MF report noted that “at the low-speed end of the flight envelope, the
MiG-21MF begins to judder at about 180 mph, 290 km/hr., and aileron effectiveness declines at 150 m.p.h.,
240 km/hr. Normal touch-down speed is 170 mph, 270 km/hr. [Soviet] circuit technique is to fly a very wide,
square pattern at circuit height with a very long, straight final
approach.” http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1975/1975%20-%201967.html. In fact, the high
landing speed of the aircraft was an issue even for pilots with previous fast jet experience like the Hunter.
In any case, airspeed management in final is essential. A USAF F-16 pilot who flew a MiG-21 with Bulgarian
Air force in 2010 described that this was “brought home to me during landing while in the backseat of a 1st
Squadron jet at Graf Ignatievo, Bulgaria. The pilot maintained 310 mph in the final turn to land, which is
approximately 124 mph faster than the F-16. I was wondering if we were going to perform a touch-and-go
as the distance remaining boards raced by at an alarming rate. Luckily, the front-seater decided to pull the
drag chute before any impolite questions had to be asked. It was very different experience than flying an
American fourth generation fighter.” Tyleloss, 2010. The following account by a ne w Indian Air Force MiG-
21 pilot illustrates the aircraft’s characteristics further: “After my Stage 3 training on Kiran MK-II aircraft, I
was posted to my first Fighter Squadron at a premier Fighter base in the West, for syllabus [training] on
MiG-21 T-96 aircraft. The morale was high and so were the spirits. The station housed two fighter
squadrons operating the same type of aircraft. So, the atmosphere with 22 flying officers wasn’t very
different from that in Training Command. Every morning ushered in unlimited visibility and high
serviceability; one could hear reheat after reheat, and it filled us with thrill. Soon, my ground training was
over and I commenced flying on what was called the real fighters. She was sleek and fast and could take
anyone for a ride. The time on downwind got over in a flick and there was no time to get our parameters
and carry out vital actions, leave alone the situational awareness on the circuit traffic. A few days later, the
first guy in the course cleared his solo check and was launched in a fighter for his first solo. With most of us
due for our solo checks in a few days, we proceeded along with the ACP pilot to see the first solo landing of
our course. He was our very own – Call Sign 919. After about 20 minutes, we heard Call Sign 919 on R/T for
the rejoin. He reported dead side and turned downwind. In the first overshoot, he was correctly on glide
path, after which he turned for downwind. In this time, Prowler formation that had gone for a BFM sortie
to the sector, too had rejoined. Prowler 2, a trainee, joined circuit behind 919, and the leader maintained
overhead to regulate gravy. 919 reported downwind, followed by Prowler 2. I picked him up visually on
finals – but wait a second! These were two aircraft in close proximity!! 919 while carrying out his
downwind vital actions had delayed his base leg turn and Prowler 2 had turned at the correct base leg
turning point. As a result when Prowler 2 rolled out on finals he was dangerously close to 919. The ATC in a
panic gave a call to Prowler 2 to go around and 919 to continue. However 919 also initiated go around in a
panic. The ACP pilot intervened and told Prowler 2 to go around on dead side. On seeing 919 in such close
proximity while going around, Prowler 2 put on a vicious bank with undercarriage and flaps down and
yanked back towards dead side. The ACP pilot in a horror yelled on R/T to offload, but the aircraft with
nose up and at very low speeds continued towards dead side and started a wild wing to wing rocking which
is a symptom of approach of stall. But much to everybody’s relief, it thereafter gradually lowered nose, and
spaced out to the correct dead side. Both aircraft were recovered safely subsequently. Lessons Learnt: The
MiG-21 requires careful handling at low speeds…”http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Jun12.pdf.
466.
360-Degree Overhead
Pattern Technique
Recommend the operator consider implementing SOPs to refrain from 360-degree overhead patterns at
uncontrolled airports. See AIM, Section 5-4-27 for additional information.
467. Crosswinds
Recommend the operator consider implementing SOPs that refer to conservative crosswind limitations
(possibly more conservative than those in the AFM) and adhere to the appropriate crosswind landing
techniques.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
468. Power on Final
Recommend that SOPs and training focus on the correct power settings on final.
Additional Information: The following account involving a two-seater MiG-21U illustrates this: “…we
encountered bad weather and therefore decided to abort the mission. The decision was taken to return to
base as we also got a message that base weather was deteriorating. On reaching overhead and checking
our fuel status we realized that we had to burn up fuel to get to the landing fuel figure. This marked the
beginning of the chain of events that were to ensue. The trainer captain gave a call that instead of burning
up fuel he would like to carry out circuit flying for benefit of the U/T. I followed his plan and decided to
carry out circuits myself. By this time we could see a rain patch close to the airfield however decided to
stick to our plan. We both fed into the circuit pattern. All was well till I initiated overshoot [go-around] on
my first circuit where I encountered rain on cross wind leg. In the second circuit the rain patch had come
closer and was now between runway and downwind displacement. Therefore it became difficult to keep
the trainer aircraft that was ahead of me in visual contact. There are very few amongst us who actually
build up spacing only on takeoff heading. After the second circuit while going round my attention got
diverted in visually picking up the trainer so as to build up the correct spacing. In hindsight I think I was
actually reluctant to rapidly accelerate during overshoot for fear of catching up and getting too close to the
trainer aircraft ahead of me. These perhaps led me to either not open full power or inadvertently maintain
the throttle back below the maximum dry power. I did not realize this and as a result my speed started
washing off. The situation hit me when I retracted my undercarriage and the aircraft instead of going up
and away from the ground actually started going down. There I was just about 80-100 meters above
ground with my undercarriage retracted and the flight path of the aircraft taking me towards the runway
and I could see the runway numerals getting bigger and bigger. A lot of thoughts crossed my mind in those
few seconds (which felt like a lifetime at that time).... this could not be happening to me!! ....what would
happen if I landed the ac with undercarriage in up position.... or should I eject ... (and of all things under the
hazy sun!) will I still be able to go for the QFIC. Luckily, may be because of my preoccupation with my
future or my years of training, I did not pull back on the stick, opened max thrust and the ac slowly
accelerated and started responding to my control input and I went around from a height of 10-15 m after
giving heart attacks to the runway controller and the people in ATC including the SFS. After landing it took a
while for me to come out of the ac and walk back as my now wobbly legs were still shaking due to shock.
After reaching the flight complex, I reported the entire episode to the flight commander and CO. They both
told me to relax for the day and the next day I was made to cover the episode during morning emergency
session and every one of us in the squadron analyzed the events that led to the situation. The trainer
captain in his exuberance to take out some benefit from the sortie decided to continue with circuits even
with approaching bad weather, I as a leader, did not exercise control and submitted to No. 2’s decision as
he was the Flt Cdr. The SFS did not intervene despite having the entire picture as he thought the flight
commander must have taken the correct decision. On my part, I was also at fault of not carrying out the
correct go round checks which clearly specify that the max dry light had to be checked after opening full
power on initiating go round. We however missed out on the essential (heartfelt) participation by the
runway controller, bird watchers, DATCO and the [weather officer], who would have probably assumed by
then that such occurrences were quite normal once in a while ! This brings out the importance of sticking
to the SOPs, the need for us to exercise control and not give in to the gradient of the formation. However,
the best thing that happened that day was I lost my swagger and the false sense of being invincible. Wing
Cdr. Gupta.” http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Nov10.pdf.
469. FAA AC 91-79
Recommend the use of AC 91-79, Runway Overrun Prevention. According to AC 91-79, safe landings begin
long before touchdown.
Additional Information: Adhering to SOPs and best practices for stabilized approaches will always be the
first line of defense in preventing a runway overrun, common in MiG-21 operations, military or civil.
Recommend review of George, Fred. How Much Ruwnay is Enough? Business & Commercial Aviation
(October 2012) for insight into best practices to avoid ovevruns.
470. FAA AC 61-107
Recommend the use of AC 61-107, Operations of Aircraft at Altitudes Above 25,000 ft. MSL and/or Mach
Numbers (MMO) Greater Than 0.75.
Additional Information: This AC can be used to assist pilots who are transitioning from aircraft with less
performance capability to complex, high-performance aircraft like a MiG-21. It also provides knowledge
about the special physiological and aerodynamic considerations involved in these kinds of operations.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
471. Multiple Failures
Recommend that SOPs and training focus on possible multiple failure. These are common with the MiG-21
and can quickly overwhelm the crew.
Additional Information: The following Indian Air Force MiG-21 incident illustrates such a situation:
“On November 16, 2009, Wing Cdr. Thomas and Sqn. Ldr. Sharma were authorized to fly a sortie in a MiG-
21U aircraft. After take-off, on selecting undercarriage lever up, the landing gear failed to retract with
associated indication on T-6 panel going off. Immediately, the undercarriage lever was selected down but
still no indications of the undercarriage position were available in the cockpit. Subsequently, trim, main and
booster hydraulic warning lights were also seen going off in the cockpit with angle of attack lights behaving
erratically. An undercarriage check was carried out subsequently, in which the landing gear was reported
down. Flaps and airbrakes were found non-operational. A precision approach was executed. On landing,
the chute did not deploy and antiskid did not function as well. Despite all abnormalities the aircraft was
safely decelerated.” http://www.indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Jun10.pdf.
472.
Drag Chute Failures
(SOPs)
Ensure the PIC trains and assumes drag chute failure for all flights when applicable, that is, in the MiG-21
that are so equipped (installation provided in the design). This is because of the very high number of drag
chute failures, including a recent MiG-21 overrun in Eden Prairie, Minnesota in 2012. Recommend the
establishments of training and SOPs to focus on this.
Additional Information: Effectively, the aircraft should not be operated with total dependence on the drag
chute system to stop on available runway. The brake parachute is not to be relied upon to enable planned
landing at a field shorter than that which would be required without this parachute. Note: The operation
of the drag chute requires proper procedures, starting on the ground. The following MiG-21 incident
illustrates the commonalty of the problem: “On 25 Nov 09, Flt. Lt. Parthasarthy was detailed for aerodrome
controller duties in the morning shift. During his shift, a MiG-21 was on take-off roll when the controller
observed that the tail chute of the departing aircraft had deployed. The controller promptly transmitted
the emergency on [radio] which enabled the pilot to abandon take off safely in
time.” http://www.indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/May10.pdf.
473. Tire Bursts
Recommend that SOPs and training address the high-likelihood of tire burst with the MiG-21, including
actions to reduce that likelihood.
Additional Information: The following incident narrative illustrates an all-too common event: “On Jan 21,
2011, Flt. Lt. Parthasarthi noticed smoke coming from the starboard undercarriage of a MiG-21 aircraft
which had just landed. Further observation revealed tire pieces hitting the starboard wing. He asked the
pilot to switch off the aircraft on runway and immediately activated the safety services. Prompt intimation
helped the pilot in taking tire burst actions in time. He also diverted three fighter aircraft which were in air
as the runway was blocked. Timely activation of safety services and diversion of aircraft in air helped in
providing quick assistance to the emergency aircraft and safe recovery of aircraft in air at the diversionary
airfield.” http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Sep11.pdf. See Landing Gear Retraction Test and Related
Maintenance, and System Description below.
474. Outdoors
Recommend establishing SOPs to address the aircraft’s sensitivities to weather, including hydraulic seal
failures and leakages, freezing moisture, transparencies, air intake, and exhaust protection if necessary.
Additional Information: The MiG-21 electrical system is highly susceptible to moisture, and there have
been cases where moisture has caused short circuits leading to electrical malfunction, including total power
loss. As an example, during the Vietnam War, many North Vietnamese MiG-21s were not airworthy
following even limited exposure to tropical and moisture conditions.
475.
Assisted Flight Control
Checks
Recommend that SOPs and training include the need to have a qualified crew chief assist the pilot with all
of the flight controls checks. This is to be accomplished after engine start and before taxiing.
476.
Lateral Control and
Dynamic Lateral-
Directional Stability
SOPs and training should note that lateral damping and lateral-directional stability may be poor. The USAF
evaluation (of the MiG-21F) noted that for all conditions tested, the damping following abrupt lateral
control pulses was “deadbeat,” and dynamic lateral-directional s damping was fair to poor. It also noted
that in turbulent conditions the aircraft was not acceptable platform for instrument flying, in part because
of weak lateral-directional damping. Also see High AOA, Loss of Control (LOC), and Abrupt Maneuvering
and Stability and Controllability above.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
477.
Reporting Malfunctions
and Defects
Ask the applicant/operator to report (to the FSDO or MIDO) incidents, malfunctions, and equipment defects
found in maintenance, preflight, flight, and post-flight inspection. This would yield significant safety
benefits to both operators and the FAA. See Accident, Incident Histories, and Risk Factors above.
Additional Information: A 2011 study for the U.S. Navy points to the effectiveness of such practices. It
stated: “The data analysis carried out was a comprehensive attempt to examine the strength of the link
between safety climate and mishap probability. Our findings would seem to support the premise that
safety climate and safety performance are, at best, weakly related. Mishaps are rare events, and they
describe only part of the spectrum of risks pertaining to a work system. We suggest that measuring
workers’ self-reported safety attitudes and behavior is an alternative way to assess the discriminate validity
of safety climate.” O’Connor, October 2011. In other words, reporting safety issues, such as malfunctions,
goes a long way in preventing an accident. As an element of reducing accidents, notably MiG-21 accidents,
the Indian Air Force uses the “Air Force System on Error Management” (AFSEM) process. This process
provides a platform to all operational personnel to report any type of unsafe act/event, errors, and
violations which may undermine safety of the IAF. It facilitates reporting of the faults and utilizes them as a
vital source of information for predictive capability and subsequent formulation of accident preventive
program. Aviation history has shown that for every single fatal Cat-1 accident [Class A Mishap] which has
occurred in aviation field, there were 10 non-fatal accidents preceded by 30 reportable incidents which
were further preceded by 600 unreported, unsafe acts. The IAF today faces the challenge of addressing the
unreported and unsafe acts/ errors related with flying operations at the field units. The errors, violations
and unsafe acts, if left neglected, have proved to be a potent source of incidents and
accidents.” http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Dec11.pdf.
478. Cockpit Familiarization
Recommend detailed and comprehensive SOPs/training (not unlike the military-style training known as
“blindfold cockpit check with boldface items” conducted in a cockpit or cockpit simulator) be instituted to
ensure adequate cockpit familiarization for the PIC. The MiG-21 cockpit layout does not conform to normal
standards familiar in civil or Western military types.
479.
Autopilot
Recommend that if the aircraft has an original functional autopilot (i.e., KAP-1, KAP-2K, AP-155, AP-17, or
Chinese KJ-11 two-channel autopilot), that it be thoroughly understood.
Additional Information: For example, and depending on the system, it may have functions that may be
unfamiliar, such as “dumping stabilizers,” which can be used for landing, or the “horizontal flight” function,
in case of disorientation. Others, like the earlier KAP-1 only had roll control, essentially a wings leveler.
Earlier versions may be equipped with an earlier “auto-stabilization” system working only on the pitch-and-
roll axes and fitted with a q-feel unit. A reference to the KAP-2 autopilot notes that it is a single-channel
system stabilizing the aircraft on the roll axis only. The KAP-2 limited the aircraft’s bank angle to +/- 35°. It
had two operating modes. One addressed roll damping, the other stabilization. In the former mode, it
damped the aircrafts’ toll oscillations, monitoring the roll rate. In stabilization mode, it kept the wings level
and brought the aircraft into wings-level flight from any attitude. Gordon, MiG-21, 22008. On the other
hand, the AP-155 operates in all axes.
480. ARU-3V System
Recommend that SOPs and training address the correct use of the ARU system, which controls the stabilizer
deflection as a function of speed and altitude. The correct utilization of the auto stab system is a critical
safety of flight issue. This will vary depending on the aircraft’s version and variant.
Additional Information: A Finnish Air Force pilot noted that “once on base leg, slow down…and check
again that the gear is down and locked and pressures are OK. Check also that the stabilizer light is
illuminated to advice you that the ARU is in the correct gearing to give you full stabilator movement for
landing.” Laukkanen, 2004. In the MiG-21MF, “the controls are very heavy, though fully powered, and the
stick tailplane loading is automatically adjusted in accordance with speed and altitude. The MiG-21 has
auto stabilization in pitch and roll but not in yaw.” http://www.flightglobal.com. In the MiG-21F was
originally “equipped with a choice of two gear ratios manually selected by the pilot. A complex panel
instrument displayed Mach and altitude, and indicated when to change from one tailplane regime to the
other.” Gunston, 1986.
481. High-G Training
Recommend the PIC and any occupants received training, including techniques to mitigate the potential
effects of high-G exposure if operations above 3 Gs are contemplated. This is consistent with a 2012 NTSB
recommendation (A-12-11) for high-performance aircraft.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
482.
Transfer of Aircraft
Control
(MiG-21U)
Accidents have occurred with two pilots on board when both pilots thought the other was in control. It is
recommended that before the flight, the PIC discuss with any other pilot (i.e., back seater in the MiG-21UB)
the circumstances under which the PIC would (1) intercede and (2) take control of the aircraft.
Additional Information: The transfer of control, could include the following exchange: PIC: “You have the
flight controls” – Other pilot: “I have the flight controls” – PIC: “You have the flight controls.” During the
discussion, it is also recommended to establish whether the PIC wishes the other pilot to conduct any flight
crew ancillary tasks. If so, these should be clearly specified to avoid confusion between the PIC and the
other pilot. This is particularly important when events are moving quickly and the aircraft is in critical flight
segments such as take-off or final approach to landing.
483.
Use of Aft Cockpit
Controls, Features, and
Switches
(MiG-21U)
SOPs and training should provide for procedures to ensure that all controls, features, and switches in the aft
cockpit are not inadvertently operated or in any way interfere with the PIC in the front seat.
Additional Information: The MiG-21U is equipped with switches and functions in the back seat allowing an
instructor to disable some instruments in the front cockpit to simulate failures. This is the large control
panel in front of the pilot, over the main instrument panel in the back cockpit. In addition, certain functions
operated from the back seat will disable the similar function in the front seat, and this can create serious
hazards unless properly understood and communicated. One such example is the trim control switch. An
Egyptian Air Force pilot explained “how to manually engage a gear tang on the throttle control system if it
slipped out of synchronization while transitioning from the afterburner setting back to the military power
setting. It cannot be engaged from the front cockpit, so if it slips it must be reengaged from the era cockpit,
to avoid an in-flight engine emergency situation. “Gunston, 1986. Also see Aft Cockpit Override and Control
Panel above.
484.
Medical Fitness for
Ejection Seats
Recommend the applicant/operator consider aircrew medical fitness as part of flight qualifications and
preparation. In addition to meeting any ejection seat limitations (that is, weight and height) and seat-
specific training, relevant U.S. military medical fitness standards could be used to ensure survival after
ejection is maximized and injuries minimized.
Additional Information: Ejection records show that when survivable, many ejections inflict serious injuries.
Examples of aeromedical guidance include AFI 48-123, Medical Examinations, and Standards, dated May 22,
2001, and Army Regulation 40-501, Standards of Medical Fitness, dated June 14, 1989. Also refer to
Defense and Civil Institute of Environmental Medicine, Department of National Defense, Canada. Ejection
Systems and the Human Factors: A Guide for Flight Surgeons and Aeromedical Trainers, May 1988.
485.
Rejected Takeoff
(RTO)
Recommend SOPs and training address the abort decision. Many MiG-21 accidents have been caused by
inappropriate procedures during an abort.
Additional Information: A rejected takeoff (RTO) or aborted takeoff is the situation in which it is decided
to abort the takeoff of the aircraft. There can be many reasons for deciding to perform a rejected takeoff,
but they are usually due to suspected or actual technical failures, like an engine failure, poor acceleration,
configuration issues, and inadvertent drag chute deployment.
486.
Engine Out (Flame-Out)
Landing
Recommend that SOPs and training address whether or not an engine-out landing should be attempted and
how the guidance in the AFM should be followed. The survivability of such an attempt needs to be
considered.
Additional Information: The MiG-21 was designed to do flame-out landings. The following account is of an
USAF pilot who had such an experience: “the Soviet philosophy was that you punched out if you lost your
engine. We did it because we had experience in single-engine fighters and we trained for it by putting out
our speed brakes to simulate the drag of the stalled engine, and flying certain parameters. I was now flying
these parameters for real, one of which was to maintain at least 250 knots so that the engine would
windmill and keep the hydraulics working. This was crucial: the hydraulics drove the MiG’s flight control
surfaces. Without the hydraulics the surfaces would freeze and cause Scott to lose control. The problem
was that you couldn’t touch down at 250 knots in that airplane. The drag chute was made for a maximum
of 190 knots and the brakes weren’t strong enough to stop you. As advertised, I popped the chute and it
disintegrated or ripped itself out of the housing. That left the rabbit catcher, the netting that would catch
the airplane and stop it. Scott became the first pilot to test the MiG-21 with the barrier at the end of the
runway, thankfully with positive results.” Davies, 2008.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
487. 49 CFR Part 830
Ask the applicant/operator to adopt open and transparent SOPs that promote the use and requirements of
49 CFR Part 830, Notification And Reporting Of Aircraft Accidents or Incidents and Preservation of Aircraft
Wreckage, Mail, Cargo, and Records, because there have been many instances where accidents and
incidents are not reported, hindering safety.
Additional Information: Occurrences, which are events other than an accident or incident (that requires
investigation by the Flight Standards Service for its potential impact on safety), should also be reported.
Occurrences include the following when no injury, damage, or § 830.5 reporting requirements are involved:
(1) aborted takeoffs not involving a runway excursion, (2) air turn-backs where the aircraft returns to the
departure airport and lands without incident, and (3) air diversions where the aircraft diverts to a different
destination for reasons other than weather conditions. Reference should be made of FAA Order 8020.11,
Aircraft Accident and Incident Notification, Investigation, and Reporting.
488.
BASH
(Bird Strike
Management)
Recommend that to the extent practicable, operations of the aircraft consider the basics of mitigating the
hazards of bird strikes.
Additional Information: While all military aircraft are very vulnerable to bird strikes, and the risks are
highly dependent on varying issues such as geography and time of year, the operational history of the MiG-
21 includes a very high number of bird strikes accidents where the aircraft was actually destroyed (primarily
due to engine failure) and in many cases, crew killed. This appears to indicate rather high vulnerability due
to the air intake position. USAF guidance, such as Bird/Wildlife Aircraft Strike Hazard (BASH) Management
Techniques, AFP 91-212, February 1, 2004, can be used.
489.
NATO
Aviation Safety
Guidance
Recommend the relevant sections of Aviation Safety AFSP-1(A), NATO, March 2007, be incorporated into
the appropriate operational aspects of the operations to enhance overall safety.
Additional Information: This document, which incorporates many safety issues concerning the safe
operation of combat aircraft, sets out aviation safety principles, policies, and procedures—in particular
those aimed at accident prevention. This document is a basic reference for everybody involved in aviation
safety, both in occurrence prevention (starting from the development, testing, and introduction of material
and procedures) and in its aftermath (the determination of the causes of an occurrence and the
implementation of measures to prevent its recurrence). It is also recommended this process include
internal safety audits. Safety audits help identify hazards and measure compliance with safety rules and
standards. They assist in determining the adequate condition of work areas, adherence to safe work
practices, and overall compliance with safety-based and risk-reduction procedures.
490.
USAF
AFI 91-202
Recommend the incorporation of USAF AFI 91-202, The Mishap Prevention Program, August 5, 2011, as part
of the operation of the aircraft.
491.
USAF
AFI 11-218
Recommend the incorporation of USAF AFI 11-218, Aircraft Operations, and Movement on the Ground,
October 28, 2011, Change 1, November 1, 2012, as part of the operation of the aircraft.
492. Aircrew Records
Recommend the applicant/operator establish and maintain processes to address aircrew qualifications and
records. This could include pilot certification, competency, ground and flight training (records, instructors,
conversion training, command training, and proficiency), medical, duty time, and flight time records.
493.
Type Clubs or
Organizations
Recommend the applicant/operator join a MiG-21 type club or organization. This facilitates safety
information collection and dissemination.
494. TSA Publication A-001
Recommend that operator become familiar with the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Security
Guidelines for General Aviation Airports, Information Publication A-001, May 2004.
Additional Information: This guidance document was developed by TSA, in cooperation with the General
Aviation (GA) community. It is intended to provide GA airport owners, operators, and users with guidelines
and recommendations that address aviation security concepts, technology, and enhancements. The
recommendations contained in this document have been developed in close coordination with a Working
Group comprised of individuals representing the entire spectrum of the GA industry. This material should
be considered a living document which will be updated and modified as new security enhancements are
developed and as input from the industry is received. To facilitate this, TSA has established a mailbox to
collect feedback from interested parties. Persons wishing to provide input should send Email
to General.Aviation@dhs.gov and insert “GA Airport Security” in the subject line.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
495.
IAF Defect
Investigation/Failure
Analysis
Recommend that the Indian Air Force Defect Investigation/Failure Analysis for the MiG-21 be consulted,
and to the extent practicable, be considered as part of the operation and maintenance of the aircraft.
Additional Information: This study/program by the IAF tracks and analyses premature withdrawals of
equipment and components from frontline units and reviews and investigates the causes for
defects/failures. As a byproduct, repetitive cases are then taken up for in-depth study and modifications
are incorporated in the units to minimize the recurrence of such defects/failures in future. Such data will
be very valuable in ensure a higher level of safety in any MiG-21 civil operation. The Indian Air Force is the
largest MiG-21 operator in the World and the most experienced (having started MiG-21 operations in
1962). As a reference, in 2007, there were still over 270 MiG-21s in service. The versions and variants were
the MiG-21bis, MiG-21Fl, MiG-21 Bison, the MiG-21M/MF, and MiG-21U two-seaters. There is an extensive
amount of data on the safety of MiG-21 aircraft in Indian Air Force service. The following excerpt by an
Indian Air Force official not only describes the upgrades the MiG-21 has had in Indian, but also remains of
the limitations of the aircraft itself: “The starting point was of course the MiG-21bis fleet itself, which was
the last variant of the large MiG-21 family of aircraft produced under license in India. The proposal for 125
MiG Bis aircraft with an option to upgrade 50 more aircraft at a total cost of approximately $630 million was
cleared in January 1996. The upgrade was to include major modifications by MiG-MAPO which would
incorporate Western Avionics as well as indigenously developed components. The aircraft which was given
the nomenclature of MiG-21bis UPG came to be known as the ‘Bison’ in the Indian Air Force (IAF). The
‘Bison’ was indeed an ambitious upgrade program but there were some major issues with regard to time
and cost overruns which marred the upgrade scenario. The last i.e. 125th
Bison work was completed only in
2007, almost five years behind schedule. This has had serious repercussions on the residual life of the
upgraded aircraft, some of which will not even see 10 years of useful operational life post the upgrade, as
the entire fleet is scheduled to be retired between 2014 and 2017. The second shortcoming is that while
the avionics and weapon systems were impressive in their upgraded avatar, the old airframes and aero
engines continued to pose flight safety problems. A number of upgraded MiG-21 Bisons have already been
lost in CAT-I accidents because of these issues. The overall serviceability state of the fleet has also been a
matter of concern.” http://www.spsaviation.net/story_issue.asp?Article=1078.
496.
National Warbird
Operator Conference
(NWOC)
Recommend the MiG-21 applicant/operator participate at the National Warbird Operator Conference.
Additional Information: Founded in 1993, “the annual NWOC event brings together warbird owners,
operators, and museum directors to address particular events facing warbird owners and to discuss
common goals related to the ever-changing economics, operations, and regulations pertaining to flying ex-
military aircraft. NWOC focuses on the exchange of ideas and information concerning the safe operation
and restoration of warbird aircraft. This unique educational conference offers programs to enhance pilot
skill and knowledge, expand aircraft maintenance technician and restorer knowledge, develop awareness of
medical and insurance facts, and address aircraft-specific topics to ensure continued flight for these unique
historic aircraft.” http://www.warbirdconference.com/.
497. Insurance
It is recommended that the applicant/operator acquire the adequate type of insurance coverage. This is,
and continues to be, an issue for many operators. However, the important role of insurance as part of an
overall safety culture should not be underestimated.
Additional Information: For example, EAA’s Warbirds of America’s insurance program “emphasizes
SAFETY, utilizing various training syllabuses and safety forums,” and includes “discounts available for
participation in approved ground and flight safety programs.” The adequate type of insurance coverage will
greatly contribute to the safe operation of the aircraft because it involves an additional level of safety
oversight that complements both the operator’s and the FAA’s.
498.
Military MiG-21
Operators
Guidance
Recommend that the applicant/operator review and consider the MiG-21 safety guidance that is available
from various military operators.
Additional Information: A good example is the Indian Air Force, the largest MiG-21 operator toady. Many
of the IAF’s experiences are recorded in this document, but additional guidance is still available.
Attachment 4 below provides additional guidance.
499.
Emergency Planning and
Preparedness
Recommend the applicant/operator institute emergency plans and post-accident management SOPs that
ensure the consequences of major incidents and accidents to aircraft are dealt with promptly and
effectively.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
500.
MiG-21 Accident Case
Study
(Part I)
The following is provided to illustrate several of the safety issues with the MiG-21 in an operational setting.
Additional Information: “It was the 29th
of September 1969 and I was Archer One. ‘There has been an
accident’, they sang out in unison. A trainee pilot from Eighth Pursuit had crashed on takeoff. The aircraft
was a write-off and the pilot was seriously injured. I felt sad. Getting youngsters to convert into high
performance aircraft was never easy. Babi (Wing Commander PKD) had just taken over the Eighth and I felt
sorry for him. A few minutes later there was a call from the Command HQ. Wing commander MS was on
the line. There has been an accident, he repeated the news. I said, yes, I have heard about it. Are any
details known? No, he said. We only know that it was a crash on takeoff. We are putting you in as the
president of the court of inquiry. Just get there quickly and start the proceedings. I will get the list of your
team members shortly. That was that. I went home and packed my bags. Half an hour later an IL-14 came
to pick me up. A mournful journey began. I first had to sequester all the technical documents pertaining to
the aircraft that had crashed as well as all the training documents related to the pilot. This posed no
problem. The unit’s flight safety officer had already gathered all the documents in anticipation of my
arrival; he now handed these documents over to me. I met the AOC of the Base and his flying and his
technical staff. At the unit level I met the flight commander, Squadron Leader RK and the officiating CO
Squadron Leader Rod. I could not meet, the commanding officer, as he was out of station. I gathered all
the documents and retired to my room in the mess. I had a lot to study. Karthigeyan, the pilot who had
crashed, was in the hospital. He was alive but critically ill. He had multiple internal injuries and was
extensively burnt. He was however conscious, and strangely, not in great pain. It seems that his outer skin
was so thoroughly burnt that his mechanism for sensing pain was not working any more. I wondered
whether I should make an attempt to gather a report from him at first-hand. I spoke to the Senior Medical
Officer about it and he vetoed the idea. The poor lad was under heavy sedation and was fighting for his life.
No pressure could be allowed on him. Answering questions would be too much of a strain. Dropping the
idea of recording a statement from Karthigeyan, I started examining the documents I had brought down.
The very first document I opened was the Form 700 of the aircraft. It told me that the pre-flight servicing
on the aircraft was done as scheduled. Fuel, oil, air, and oxygen had been replenished and topped up. The
electric accumulators had been checked for adequate voltage. All flight and engine instruments were
tested for proper functioning. The airborne interceptor radar and the radio communication sets were
checked for serviceability. The aircrafts’ documents had been checked and it was confirmed that all line
replaceable parts were left with adequate hours for next inspection. It was also certified that no reported
defect investigations were left undone. I leafed back on the document to see what sort of defects had been
reported on the aircraft in the recent past and what were the corrective actions taken. What I found
caused me to stop short. Just a couple of days earlier, it had been reported that the afterburner had failed
to light up on demand on one occasion! This was a very serious defect report. Horror of horrors! This was
not the first occurrence of after-burner malfunction. As I went back on the maintenance log there was yet
another report of after-burner not lighting up. And what was the follow-up action on these occasions? On
both occasions the aircraft was tested extensively and repeatedly on the ground, but the failure could not
be reproduced. The fuel system was then flushed cleaned and put back. The after-burner ignition system
was also ‘serviced’: A very clear case of ‘found nothing fixed everything’ maintenance. There was a knock
on the door. Two young pilots walked in. They were the first persons to reach Karthigeyan after the crash.
They were standing on the tarmac when the accident took place. As soon as they saw the accident,
instinctively they had jumped on to a motorcycle, had driven through the airfield area, had gone through
the boundary fence broken at one place, had gone through the drain beyond the fence and had found
Karthigeyan on the ground in an extensively burnt but fully conscious condition. These two boys were
obviously very important witnesses. I decided to talk to them for some time. What were their first
impressions when they had met Karthigeyan? The most unexpected impression these two had was that
Karthigeyan was not in pain. He was extensively burnt, but was fully conscious. He was talking normally.
And what was he saying to them? Apparently he was fixated on two point; ‘why did I crash?’ and ‘the after
burner light was on’. Obviously, he had thought that the after-burner must be working because the after-
burner light was on! Next morning I went down to the technical headquarters of the station and sat down
with the Chief Technical Officer. Wing Commander SSS was the CTO. A very sincere and hard working
officer who was seriously disturbed at the discovery of questionable maintenance practices related to the
aircraft destroyed in the accident. We sat down and went minutely through the procedures and practices
followed by the second line maintenance organization of the station. Sometime in the forenoon
Karthigeyan breathed his last. The end came rapidly without any warning. One moment he was lying
peacefully and in a second he felt wretched and was gone.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
501.
Study
(Part II)
The information was sent to the Command HQ. I could not continue as the President of the C of I. A court
of inquiry on a fatal accident needed to be presided over by an officer at least in the rank of a Group
Captain. I was told to carry on as the senior flying member of the C of I. Next morning Group Captain RS
came and took over the conduct of the C of I. I provided him with a brief of all the information that I had
gathered. After I finished my briefing we sat together for a long time and decided on our plan of action. It
was decided that we would investigate the background of the pilot, the history of the aircraft and the
happenings on the immediate environment individually. Thereafter, we would examine the accident itself
and try to come to a conclusion about the cause of the accident and our recommendations about
preventive measures. Once we came out of the debriefing, the technical member and I began our
individual quests. The tech member had his tasks cut out. The engine had to be salvaged and brought back
to the base from the site of the crash. He then would have to devise a method to find a way to determine
why the after burner had failed. (There seemed to be overwhelming evidence to indicate that the after
burner had indeed failed to light up on takeoff.) He also had to examine all technical practices in vogue on
the station and examine the technical supervisory chain minutely. This was a daunting task and it needed
technical officers specially trained to carry out such forensic examination. I had to investigate Karthigeyan
as a person; his training, his motivation, his attitude to flying, his abilities as recorded, and his emotional
status prior to the accident, all had to be examined. I also had to investigate the flying environment at the
time of the accident. The functioning of the Air Traffic Control, the meteorological conditions, the briefing
received before the flight, and of course the dynamic of the accident itself, all had to be examined in detail.
There was one thing however that was bothering me since the previous day. According to the two young
pilots who had reached Karthigeyan first after the accident, Karthi was confused about the cause of his
accident. He had seen the ‘Afterburner ON’ light glowing and had concluded that the afterburner was
indeed on. That was the root of his confusion. My unease also started from that point. In the MiG-21,
there are two main indications available to a pilot on the takeoff run to assess whether the afterburner was
lit-up properly. The first cue would be the lack of acceleration as the brakes are released. If the pilot fails
to perceive the lack of acceleration, he would see a large difference in the rotational speed of the low and
high speed turbines. If the afterburner lights up as it should, the two turbines would be turning at almost
similar speeds. Both these were mandatory checks to be carried out by the pilot to continue on his takeoff
run. Karthi had clearly failed to perceive the situation of afterburner failure on the takeoff run and was
confused. This situation could be brought about only by three conditions. Was his ground training about
the aircraft and its systems inadequate? Was he temporarily distracted by some other thoughts or
concerns? Was he careless by nature and paid inadequate attention to his drills, checks, and techniques of
flying? What was it? This haze caused me distress. I had to find out the truth. I called for his blue book
and immersed myself into it. As I waded through Karthi’s blue book many questions arose in my mind. It
seemed that Karthi was not a meticulous maintainer of this very important diary. It contained very little
introspection. Descriptions of his actions in the cockpit were often perfunctory. For many sorties, there
was no analysis at all. I leafed back from his MiG training days to his Mystère operational days. I found that
he had actually stopped maintaining the blue book for a long time. I wondered why this was so. Reading
even this patchy record, I discovered a pattern. On many occasions, there was a mention of untidy or
delayed joining up after take off with the rest of the formation. These comments were there in both his
Mystère and MiG-21 periods. Did this constitute a hint of a cause factor for the accident? I asked for his
blue book for the earlier period of his life in a Vampire and a Toofani squadron. I also requested the
Command HQ to procure his training records of his Cadet Days from the Training Command. While I was
investigating the pilot’s past my technical member worked hard to retrieve the engine from the crash site
debris and bring it back to the base. The engine was surprisingly intact and it yielded clear proof that the
pilot had engaged the throttle in the afterburner regime and the exhaust was fully open to accommodate
the afterburning flow volume of the exhaust gas but the afterburner light-up had not taken place. There
was however no direct indication of the cause of this failure. The technical team dismantled the engine and
extracted the afterburner torch that ignites the fuel being pumped in to create and sustain the afterburner
flame. It was a tough task and it took time. It was possible for us to inspect the opened torch only on the
fifth day of the investigation. Even with the pieces opened, it was difficult to find any clear-cut cause for
the failure of afterburner light-up. We however did find that the carbon contact panel in the torch wall was
some-what eroded. We argued long over this observation and decided that while we could not definitely
link the failure of afterburner to the state of the carbon contact, we also could not rule out the possibility of
the igniting spark being ‘intermittent’ because of it. Karthigeyan’s training records arrived on the fourth
day of the investigation and it was comprehensive. His total flying training records from his first sortie in an
HT2 through the Harvard stage to his last sortie in FTW were neatly bundled.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
502.
Study
(Part III)
His ground training records were also included. I spent many hours going through this bundle and found
what I had expected to find. Karthi had joined the Air Force when it was in the throes of a rapid expansion.
The days of massive pruning at the initial flying training days at the Academy were long gone. Any cadet
who could somehow muddle through the flying syllabus was allowed to pass out of the Academy. During
the Harvard stage Karthigeyan had some problems with the formation flying stage of flying and needed
additional instruction. The problem was repeated in the Vampire stage. After being commissioned and
passing through the FTW, Karthi transited through a Vampire Squadron and reached a Toofani Squadron.
By then, the Chinese war had thrown the Air Force into utter confusion. The Training Command was
churning out ‘pilots’ at a furious rate. Serviceability state of the operational units was poor. As the units
filled up with the pilots produced by the training command, it became difficult to provide enough flying for
the young ones to keep them in touch with any kind of flying. Taking them through their operational
syllabus quickly became a distant dream for most of the units. A few bright youngsters were selected to
undergo operational training with the RAF on Hunter aircraft. Some more were sent off to the USA for an
operational training course on the F-86. Karthi was not selected for either. He hung on in a Toofani
squadron. In the time frame of 1963/68, the Toofani was the most neglected part of the Air Force’s fighter
inventory. Most of its senior pilots were drained off to fill the Mystère units just as the Hunter and Mystère
units shed their top lot to fill the growing MiG-21 fleet. Slowly, the Toofani units closed down one by one.
By then the Mystère fleet had also lost its’ elite status. Most of the pilots from the Toofani squadrons
landed up in the newly reorganized Mystère units. Karthi was one of those. Karthi’s conversion into the
Mystère fleet was slow and patchy. There were too many pilots in the queue, the serviceability of the
Mystère fleet was not good, the tenures of supervisors were short due to too much of mobility, and reasons
for his patchy training were many. He however managed to complete his operational training syllabus and
was declared fully operational by day. Through passage of time he was promoted to the rank of a Flight
Lieutenant. One factor that perhaps played a part in Karthi’s training on the Toofani and the Mystère was
something over which Karthi had no control. Neither of these two types had a two seat ‘type trainer’
version. For a period of over five years, Karthi (and all other pilots on these types) never had the
opportunity of his cockpit work being scrutinized by a supervisor. Of course his supervisors did fly with him
in formation and did watch his aerial performance from outside his aircraft. But here too, in the formative
part of his training he did not have the opportunity to fly regularly with the same leader who could judge
and then guide him over a period of time. His flying was not perceived as being below ‘acceptable’ levels.
He remained unremarked and unmarked. His latent problem, that of being somewhat tentative about his
judgment of aerial distances and closing speeds, remained unspotted and uncorrected. The problem
however troubled him every time he changed his type of aircraft and found himself in an unfamiliar cockpit.
Babi was at that time the star test pilot of the Air Force. For any and every major testing activity, be it for a
new acquisition or for unraveling a knotty problem in a development program, Babi seemed to be the first
name that came in front of the Plans Branch. Unfortunately, from the perspective of the Personnel Branch,
it was time for Babi to command a fighter squadron. He was therefore appointed as the CO of number
Eight Squadron. In the first half of 1969, there were many unfinished testing chores awaiting Babi’s
attention. Within the first six months of his taking over the squadron, the Air HQ found it fit to call him out
for temporary assignments in Bangalore / Delhi / Paris / London / Moscow over and over again. His total
absence from the unit exceeded 90 days out of the first 180. It also seemed to me that he was also kind of
short-changed in the supporting staff given to him. Only one of the two flight commanders given to him,
RK, was fully operational on type. The other, Rod, was operational under training. He was thus unable to
shoulder responsibility of operating as a supervisor for flying training of the young pilots of the unit. In the
absence of Babi from the unit due to his other air force tasks, Rod was also required to spend time on the
units’ administration. He was thus not available in the flight office. RK had to bear the total burden of
training a big bunch of young pilots single handed. He was clearly overloaded. While I was piecing together
the operational environment of the unit, the Technical Member investigated the technical ambience
existent at that moment. The Air Force at that point of time was practicing a ‘Semi Centralized’ mode of
technical administration. In this mode, the responsibility of second line servicing was taken away from the
unit commander and was reposed on the CTO (Chief Technical Officer) of the base. The CTO decided on the
distribution of manpower between first and second line servicing. At least one out of the four engineer
officers (from mechanical, armament, and electrical, electronic, or signal specialization) was nominated for
first line servicing while the rest were merged into the pool of the station’s engineer resources. The
engineer in the first line reported to the commanding officer and worked alongside the flight commanders
while the other engineers were controlled directly by the CTO. In this arrangement a little fuzziness crept
into the chain of command.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
503.
Study
(Part IV)
Legally, the commanding officer continued to be initiating officer for the annual confidential report while
the commanding officer seldom had a chance to see his engineers at work. This base at that moment of
time housed two types of aircraft. The two AN-12 squadrons of the Air Force were located there. The MiG-
21 Type 77 Type Training Squadron (TTS) was also located there. One after another, all the fighter
squadrons earmarked for conversion into MiG 21 Type 77 were moved here temporarily and were moved
out after they completed their basic conversion under the benign support of TTS. From the station point of
view, the AN-12 fleet was clearly the more demanding technical task. These aircraft were carrying out
operational tasks, not the least of which was the air maintenance of Ladakh. Any shortfall in this task
affected a huge number of people in the front line. On the other hand, both the fighter units were on a
training role. TTS was the type training squadron for the MiG-21 fleet for the whole air force. The other
squadron located here was invariably a squadron under conversion to MiG-21. Operational pressure on
these units was less pronounced. It was therefore understandable that the CTO would allocate his
resources for the AN-12 fleet with greater concern. The engineer appointed by him to the MiG-21 R&SS
was trained on the type but his experience on the type was not great. The two experienced engineers were
located at the first line of the two units. From a technical point of view, we had to discover why despite
two previous failures of after burner engagement, the aircraft was put back on the flight line without the
cause of the failures being clearly established. The repair work was clearly symptomatic and not specific.
The CTO and all engineers involved in servicing the aircraft were questioned about it. Every one agreed that
at some stage, someone should have spotted that the reported problem on the aircraft was not fully
addressed by the rectification actions taken. Unfortunately the safety net was weak. The aircraft slipped
through with inadequate attention. Of course, with hind sight, we knew that the carbon contacts in the
after burner torch was perhaps the source of the problem, but that item was not to be opened up at the
first or second line. It should have been removed and sent back to the factory for investigation. Once
again, no one realized the gravity of the situation. The sad part was that this was clearly a collective failure
rather than an individual’s carelessness or oversight. Having looked at the pilot’s background and the
technical history of the aircraft, we now tried to reconstruct the dynamics of the accident itself. The
exercise planned was a two aircraft tactical formation sortie. It was led by Squadron Leader RK who was
the flight commander. The pair briefed for the sortie, started up, and taxied out normally. The airfield was
busy. There was a queue of formations waiting for taking off. This pair had planned to do a stream take off
where the two aircraft roll with a short time gap one behind the other to take off individually and then join
up to practice tactical formation flying. RK rolled first. Karthi’s followed after a short pause. RK got
airborne normally and climbed away. Karthi’s aircraft did not accelerate normally. A plume of black smoke
came out of his jet pipe. Karthi’s luck had apparently deserted him totally that morning. Perhaps he was
too tense, afraid of losing sight of his leader on that misty morning or perhaps he had something else
occupying his mind. He did not realize that his acceleration was slower than normal. He also did not go
through the drill of checking his engine RPM (rotational speed per minute of his high and low speed
turbine) or the temperature of his exhaust jet. Had he done so, he would have known that his after burner
had not lit up. Or perhaps he saw all this and was confused because of some fatal inadequacy of his ground
training? He did not react to the situation. If he had reacted directly, he would have brought the throttle
back to the High Pressure Fuel Shut Off position and he would have deployed his breaking tail parachute to
slow the aircraft down. It would have been easy thereafter to apply brakes and stop the aircraft. He did
none of these. But, had his luck been with him that morning, he might have escaped death even after all
these serious lapses. Unfortunately, as I have just said, his luck had deserted him that morning. Another
pair of MiG 21 was waiting for takeoff at the beginning of the runway. That pair was being led by a senior
supervisor from a neighboring squadron. The leader of this pair was watching Karthi’s take off. He realized
that Karthi’s had had an afterburner failure as soon as he saw the slow acceleration and the plume of black
smoke. He could have called out to Karthi and could have asked him to abandon take off. He did not do so
for complex set of reasons. Primarily, it was not his call to interfere into flying of another squadron. There
was a properly designated supervisor sitting at the flying control to direct young pilots seen to be erring in
any way. It was his call to tell Karthi to abandon take off. This vital radio call could be jammed if someone
else tried to transmit on the same frequency at the same time. The supervisor leading the next pair waited
for the supervisor at the flying control to call out. That call never came. A window of opportunity was thus
lost. The supervisor on duty at the air traffic control was a very sincere and capable officer. There was no
reason for him to fail to come to Karthi’s rescue. But once again, Karthi’s luck played a foul. The air traffic
controllers operated from a large hall with excellent all round view. A number of air traffic controllers were
on duty.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
504.
Study
(Part V)
One controlled the local circuit traffic. Another functioned as the approach controller. A third vetted the
flight plans submitted by crew leaving for outstation trips. A fourth coordinated these flights with the air
defense set up. A supervisory pilot was on duty keeping an eye on the performance of trainee pilots on the
circuit. As luck would have it, just as Karthi was about to roll, one crew came in with a flight plan for
clearance. For some reason there was an altercation and the attention of the supervisor pilot on duty was
diverted to the source of this distraction for a few seconds. He missed the take-off run of Karthigeyan. The
officer on duty for circuit traffic saw the trail of smoke and called out to the supervisor pilot. The
supervisor, while looking away from the runway to the altercation taking place elsewhere in the room had
dropped his microphone on the table. Unfortunately, now when he picked up the microphone to ask Karthi
to abandon take off, he picked up the microphone for the approach frequency instead of the circuit control
frequency. Both the microphone was lying on the table side by side. The call to Karthi to abandon takeoff
was broadcast on the approach frequency; Karthi was on the circuit frequency and did not hear the call.
Karthi rolled on and mechanically tried to lift the aircraft’s nose for the take off. The MiG-21 has very large
control surfaces. Even though Karthi had not reached flying speed, the nose of The aircraft rose above the
runway presenting a higher angle of attack to the airflow. This increased angle produced additional drag.
In the absence of full power from the engine, the acceleration was hindered further. The end of the runway
came up. Desperately Karthi pulled back on the stick. The aircraft staggered into the air, only to fall back to
the ground beyond the airfield fence and across a small drain. As he fell towards the ground, a tree in his
path punctured the saddle tank behind the cockpit causing a spray of fuel on the hot engine section and the
aircraft caught fire. As the aircraft contacted ground, the deceleration caused the burning fuel to engulf the
cockpit. Karthi was drenched with this burning fuel and was extensively burnt. On contact with the ground
the ejection seat fired lifting the burning mass of Karthi’s body and it fell on a steep slope of the drain.
Karthi suffered some internal injuries, but he was alive. Because of the extensive burning, all his nerve ends
were singed. He felt no pain. As we went through the reconstruction of the dynamics of the accident, a
strange kind of sadness enveloped us. In one way it was easy to find the cause of the accident and to
apportion blame. But at the same time we had to recognize the multitude of options that was provided by
providence that so many amongst us could have used to save the aircraft and the pilot and did not. How
were we to classify this accident? Was it pilot error? Sure. Karthi failed as a pilot on many counts, but
could we consider it the primary cause? Was not there a technical failure? Yes indeed! The After burner
had failed to light up when selected and there was a good chance that the afterburner failed because of an
improper carbon contact of a torch igniter. Was this, seemingly a case of a material failure, then the
primary cause? We were not in a position to say so confidently. What about the two warning shots that
the engine had provided? Why were those two reports not followed up with conclusive rectification? If the
engine was withdrawn and sent for strip examination after the second incident in the air in the face of our
inability to reproduce the failure on the ground, this accident would not have taken place. Was poor
technical management then the culprit? In the technical organization, who should we pin the blame on?
On the R&SS officer who had very little experience on MiG 21 and this kind of twin spool after burning jet
engines? Or should we catch the Engineer in charge of the first line who accepted a ‘found nothing / fixed
everything’ kind of maintenance clearance and allowed the aircraft to come on the flight line? Surely there
was an undesirable level of technical mismanagement; but could it be considered as the primary cause?
The answer was obviously no. Step by little step we examined all the possible cause factors to determine
the real cause. What about the deficiencies of his immediate training? Very recently Karthi had undergone
a period of ground training at the MiG 21 MCF specifically designed to impart all necessary technical
knowledge about the MiG 21 that a pilot needs to know. And yet, it was evident from Karthi’s actions and
words that he was unsure about the information provided by the ‘Afterburner Light’. He evidently thought
that the glowing of the light meant that the afterburner was on and functioning. In actual fact the light only
indicated that the throttle had been moved through the ‘After Burner Gate’. The light did not reflect that a
light up of the afterburner had taken place. This deficiency of his knowledge certainly contributed to the
accident, but could we consider it to be the primary cause? We had to admit that it was not. Karthi’s
earlier weaknesses in training that came to our notice were examined and considered. The only relevant
one noticed was his apparent [lack] of judgment of aerial distances when he was new in a cockpit. We
could not consider this to be a significant contributory cause. At most, this weakness could have enhanced
his level of anxiety, to some extent, on that fateful morning.

Notes,
Action(s),
and
Disposition
505.
Study
(Part VI)
That this weakness was not rooted out over the previous 7 years while he moved from a subsonic to
transonic to a supersonic type of aircraft had to be noted with sadness all the same. We then considered all
the environmental causes. The two cases of lost chances to prevent the accident caused us emotional
distress. It was so evident that a call from either the officer on duty at the flying control or the supervisor
waiting his turn for a takeoff could have saved Karthi’s life. But, distressful as both the incidents were,
could we consider them as primary cause for the accident? We had to agree that these were not the
primary cause for the accident. They were merely opportunities lost to save a life. In the case of the officer
on duty losing his concentration for a short while due to unexpected cross talk by a visiting crew we
examined the situation with greater care. Was the situation as captured by the accident indicative of a lack
of discipline at the flying control? We examined the normal functioning of the ATC over a period of time
and felt that it would be unfair to impute a general lack of discipline of the ATC because of a momentary
situation by an external element. We were less than satisfied when we examined the impact of the
performance of the higher Headquarters on this accident. The newly appointed commanding officer of the
unit, Babi, was clearly prevented from performing his required tasks as a squadron commander by the Air
HQ. Everyone knew that Babi was a valuable asset for the Plans Branch because of his ability as a test pilot
and his vast experience in assessing aircraft and weapon systems for procurement. The Personnel Branch
however functioned under its own set of rules. Under that set of rules, Babi was now required to command
a fighter squadron. The command of an operational unit was a necessary step for one’s progress in the
hierarchy of the air force. Windows of opportunity for such appointments were not easy to find. Babi was
now due for his command slot. A slot was available. He was therefore appointed as a squadron
commander. The Plans branch however had unfinished business on its plate for which Babi’s services were
needed. Babi was therefore pulled out of his chair as a squadron commander time and again and was
required to go to many corners of the world in performance of his specialist duties as ordained. This
conflict of requirement should have been sorted out between the PSOs at the Air Head Quarters, but it was
not done. Babi was thus prevented from functioning with his full potential as a commanding officer
because of his repeated absence from the unit. He was absent from the unit for 90 days out of his first 180
days in office as a CO. Having known Babi over a long period of time, both Groupi RS and I felt that perhaps
if Babi was permitted to function normally as a squadron commander, this situation of an aircraft with
doubtful maintenance being offered for flying might have been averted. However, regrettable as the
situation was the absence of the squadron commander from the unit could not be considered as a primary
cause for the accident. We struggled hard and debated for long hours to define the primary cause of the
accident. There were many latent contributing factors that we had identified, but none of these factors
could be considered as the primary factor by itself. We could of course just call it pilot error and leave it at
that; Karthi was not there anymore to protest if we did so. We were however not ready to pin this accident
solely on his errors. After long cogitation we defined the primary cause of the accident as: An accumulation
of multiple organizational failures spread over a long period of time and attributed to many individuals that
permitted a weak pilot, a doubtful aircraft and an unresponsive environment to come together in space and
time to cause this accident to take place. Conducting this court of inquiry was one of the most sobering
events of my service life. It taught me how far reaching the effects of our minor or instantaneous actions
could be. There was nothing that we could do to undo the accident. I however found it even more difficult
to formulate concrete plans for preventive actions. The causes were diffused and so difficult to define as an
individuals’ failure, I found it difficult to list preventive actions that I could honestly advocate. I carried this
dissatisfaction with me as I grew through the service and decided to increase awareness about the
complexity of making aviation a safe occupation through my speech and action. When I became the
Director of Flight Safety at the Air HQ, I made an educational film based on this incident. I mourn for
Karthigeyan even today.” http://indianairforce.nic.in/fsmagazines/Dec11.pdf.

506.
The Case of Soviet
MiG-21’908’
(1983)
The following 1983 a translated transcript of the aircrew communications involving a Soviet MiG-21
accident. It is provided here as background information because it illustrates an all-too common multiple
in-flight failures (fuel leaks, fire warning, hydraulic pressure failures, engine fire, and failure) and their
handling by the pilot.
Additional Information: “The day began aimlessly…
- 908 Fire light on, “Fire!”
- 905 Check the engine parameters. I can’t see smoke behind you.
- 908 Feels normal.
- 907 The fire is not confirmed.
- 103 Who reported the fire?
- 908, The light went out.
- 908, I have a drop in the pressure in the main hydraulic system.
Comment: This set of failures is alarming. A fire alarm system sometimes fails due to failure of sensors, but
now more and hydraulic failure.
- 905 Check the pressure in the booster (hydraulic booster).
- 908 Normal.
- 905 Pressure in the main?
- 908 Zero.
Comment: Turning to the east, slowly gaining altitude.
- 905 103, pass on to “Ellipse” (Bagram) to provide an emergency landing for 908.
- “Ellipse” 103, 908 coming in with emergency.
- “Ellipse” understood.
- 908 [Pressure] also fell in the booster!
- (905) How is control?
- (908) Under control.
Comment: Power-steering stabilizer irreversible scheme, with full pressure drop in both the hydraulic lever
in the longitudinal plane for jams. On a roll, however, it can be managed with great effort….you can control
the pitch and change speed. Steady speed during its climb, braking lowers the nose. So you can make it to
the airfield – eject near the airfield in a protected area.
- 905 908 Feels balanced at that speed.
- 908 Balanced.
- 905 907, get closer to the left.
Comment: 907 goes left. I went closer. On the fuselage of 908, below the reddish stains on the silver tail I
can see obviously kerosene – damaged tanks or pipelines? Kerosene is flowing, but will there be enough to
return to base? Getting over the mountains is an issue.
- 905 901, give the “Ellipse” – a couple of [Choppers] in the air.
- “Ellipse,” 901, pick-up a pair of SAR helicopters.
- “Ellipse” understood.
- 905 908 How are you managing?
- 908 Low oil warning light on.
- 905 Oil pressure?
- 908 3.5.
- 908 Will it go down?
- 905 Going down [oil pressure]
Comment: Suddenly, fire appears in the back of Igor’s plane. It grows almost without smoke in a silence
long, 20-meters long, fiery trail. A reality that is hard to believe.
- 905 Igor, Fire, Eject!
- 907 908 Ejected, aircraft on fire.

Attachment 4 – Additional Resources and References
Additional Resources
• MiG-21 accident data/reports, especially Indian Air Force reports and data.
• Indian Air Force Flight Safety guidance and magazine (Aerospace Safety).
• Aviation Management. Air Force Instruction 11-401, 10 December 2010.
• Aviation Safety Management. TP 13739E, Transport Canada, 2001.
• Australia’s CAAP 30-3(0), Approved Maintenance Organization (AMO) — Limited Category
Aircraft, Civil Aviation Advisory Publication, December 2001. This publication addresses the
restoration and maintenance of ex-military aircraft and is an excellent guide for developing
adequate aircraft maintenance and inspection programs.
• CAP 632, Operation of Permit to Fly Ex-Military Aircraft on the UK Register. This is a
comprehensive source of information and guidance on topics like technical requirements,
specialist equipment and systems, pilot/crew qualification, operational requirements, records
and oversight procedure, and safety management.
• Chamberlain, H. Dean. FAA News, Armed and Dangerous, November/December 2003.
• CJAA Safety Operations Manual, June 30, 2008.
• COMNAVAIRFORINST 4790.2A, Chapter 16, Intermediate Level (I-Level) Maintenance Data
System (MDS) Functions, Responsibilities, and Source Document Procedures, CH-2 10, November
2009.
• Defense and Civil Institute of Environmental Medicine, Department of National Defense,
Canada. Ejection Systems and the Human Factors: A Guide for Flight Surgeons and Aeromedical
Trainers, May 1988.
• Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Department of Defense, JCS Pub. September 1,
1974.
• Drury, Colin G. and Watson, Jean (FAA). Human Factors Good Practices in Borescope Inspection,
2001.
• FAA AC 5220-9, Aircraft Arresting Systems.
• FAA AC 150/5300-13, Airport Design.
• FAA AC 150/5220-22, Engineered Materials Arresting Systems (EMAS) for Aircraft Overruns.
• Federal Firearms Regulations Reference Guide, ATF Publication 5300.4, Revised September
2005.
• Flying the MiG-21F-13 by Jyrki, Laukkanen, 2004 (see References and Bibliography below).
• Morris, Greg. EAA Warbirds of America. Warbirds (magazine), Warbird Airmanship,
March 2009.
• NATO AFSP-1(A), Aviation Safety, March 2007.
• NATOPS OPNAVINST 3710.7U, General Flight and Operating Instructions, November 23, 2009.
• NAVAIR 00-80R-14, U.S. Navy Aircraft Firefighting and Rescue Manual, October 15, 2003.
• NAVAIR 00-80T-109, Aircraft Refueling NATOPS Manual, June 15, 2002.
• Naval Aviation Maintenance Program Standard Operating Procedures (NAMPSOPs), chapter 10.
• Naval Safety Center: A “One-Stop Safety Shop” for Sailors and Marines. The Hook, Winter 2008.
• NAVPERS 00-8-T-80, Aerodynamics for Naval Aviators, January 1965.

• New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority. AC 43-21, Escape and Egress Systems, December 25, 1997.
• Safety Regulation Group, Civil Aviation Authority (UK). CAA Document No. 743,
Civil Air Displays: A Guide for Pilots, Transport Canada, 2003. Maintenance and Manufacturing
Staff Instructions, MSI 52, Issuance of Special Certificate of Airworthiness – Limited, 03/31/2006.
• Stall/Spin Problems of Military Aircraft. AGARD-CP-199, NATO, November 1975.
• U.S. Department of Defense. Manual 4160.28 (volume 3), Defense Demilitarization: Procedural
Guidance, June 7, 2011.
• USAF AFP 127-1 and NAVAIR 00-80T-116-2, Technical Manual Safety Investigation, Volume II
Investigative Techniques, July 31, 1987.
• USAF TO 1-1-300, Maintenance Operational Checks and Flight Checks, June 15, 2012.
• USAF TO 1-1-691, Corrosion Prevention, and Control Manual.
• USAF TO 1-1A-1, Engineering Handbook Series for Aircraft Repair, General Manual for Structural
Repair, November 15, 2006.
References and Bibliography
Organizations
Air Force Safety Center.
Aviation Safety Network (Flight Safety Foundation).
Flight Safety Foundation.
Center for Air Power Studies (India).
Indian Air Force (IAF).
Israeli Air Force.
National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC).
National Museum of the US Air Force.
Naval Education and Training Command (https://www.netc.navy.mil).
Naval Safety Center.
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
Romanian Air Force.
Serbian Air Force.
Published
1991 Write-Offs Review. Air Forces Monthly, No. 53 (August 1992).
1995 – World Military Aircraft Incident. Flight International, (April 24-30, 1996).
1996 – World Military Aircraft Incident. Flight International, (June 4-10, 1997).
1997 – World Military Aircraft Incident. Flight International, (September 23-29, 1998).
1998 – World Military Aircraft Incident. Flight International, (1999).
2010 Nall Report, AOPA Air Safety Institute. Frederick, Maryland, 2010.
49 U.S.C.
Accident Reports. Air Forces Monthly, No. 236 (November 2007).
Accident Reports. Air Forces Monthly, No. 223 (October 2006).

Accident Reports. Air Forces Monthly, No. 133 (April 1999).
AC 43.18 Fabrication of Aircraft Parts by Maintenance Personnel.
Advisory Circular AC 120-17A Maintenance Control by Reliability Methods. FAA, March 27, 1978.
Aeronautical Information Manual, FAA, February 9, 2012.
Aeronautical Material Shelf Life Program. Mech (Winter 1974).
Africa Aerospace & Defense, Briefs (Zambia). Air Forces Monthly, No. 152 (November 2000).
Air Combat Revealed! The World’s Top Fighting Aircraft. Key Publishing, Lincolnshire, England, 2004.
Air Forces of Europe Survey Update. Air Forces Monthly, No. 184 (July 2003).
Air Intel. Combat Aircraft, Vol. 7, No. 8 (September 2008).
Air Intel. Combat Aircraft, Vol. 5, No. 5 (March 2004).
Air Intel. Combat Aircraft, Vol. 4, No. 4 (August 2002).
Air Intel. Combat Aircraft, Vol. 4, No. 2 (April 2002).
Air Intelligence. Aircraft Illustrated, Vol. 33, No. 10 (October 2000).
Airshow Review: AirVenture 2012. Jets (November/December 2012).
Airworthiness Review: Civilian MiG-29 Operations. FAA, AIR-230, September 9, 2011.
Albanian Flypast. Air Forces Monthly, No. 179 (February 2003).
Aloni, Shlomo. Arab-Israeli Air Wars 1947-1982. Osprey Publishing, Oxford, England, 2001.
Aloni, Shlomo. Mirage III vs. MiG-21. Osprey Publishing, Oxford, England, 2010.
Aloni, Shlomo. Thirty Years After The October 1973 War. Air Forces Monthly, No. 189 (December 2003).
Aloni, Shlomo. Suez Combat. Air Forces Monthly, No. 139 (October 1999).
Andrade, John M. Latin-American Military Aviation. Midland Counties Publications, Leicester, England,
1982.
Angelo, Joseph A. The Dictionary of Space Technology. Facts of Life, Inc., New York, 1999.
Angelucci, E. and Matricardi, P. Les Avions 5 – L’Ère des Engins à Réaction. Elsevier, Bruxelles, 1979.
AOPA Airports 2011-2012. AOPA, Frederick Maryland, 2011.
Arab Air Power. Air Forces Monthly, No. 141 (December 1999).
Arab Air Power Survey – Part One. Air Forces Monthly, No. 141 (December 1999).
Arab Air Power Survey – Part Two. Air Forces Monthly, No. 1421 (January 2000).
Ashley, Mark. Accidents Will Happen. Air Display, No. 45 (June-July 1995).
Ashley, Mark. F-5 v. MiG. Aircraft Illustrated, Vol. 30, No. 1 (January 1997).
Ashley, Mark. North Weald: Now of Never? Aircraft Illustrated, Vol. 31, No. 7 (July 1998).
Ashley, Mark. Russian Upgrade Wars. Air International, Vol. 64, No. 5 (May 2003).
Ashley J. Tellis, Ashley J. Dogfight! India’s Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft Decision. Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 2011.
Avioane Reactive: În Culorile Fortelor Aeriene Ale României. Editure Modelism, Bucarest, Romania, 1997.
Attrition. Air Forces Monthly, No. 297 (December 2012).
Attrition. Air Forces Monthly, No. 288 (April 2012).
Attrition. Air Forces Monthly, No. 287 (February 2012).
Attrition. Air Forces Monthly, No. 284 (November 2011).

Attrition. Air Forces Monthly, No. 283 (October 2011).
Attrition. Air Forces Monthly, No. 280 (July 2011).
Attrition. Air Forces Monthly, No. 273 (January 2011).
Attrition. Air Forces Monthly, No. 269 (September 2010).
Attrition. Air Forces Monthly, No. 269 (August 2010).
Attrition. Air Forces Monthly, No. 264 (March 2010).
Attrition. Air Forces Monthly, No. 255 (June 2009).
Attrition. Air Forces Monthly, No. 230 (May 2007).

BAe Systems Navigator Killed in Tornado Tragedy. Air Forces Monthly, No. 236 (November 2007).
Badri Maharaj, Sanjay. Indian Air Force. Air Forces Monthly, No. 137 (August 1999).
Bailey, A. and Murray, S. G. Explosives, Propellants & Pyrotechnics. Brassey’s, London, 1989.
Bangladesh Air Force Exercise. Air Forces Monthly, No. 256 (July 2009).
Bangladesh Inducts F-7BGs. Air Forces Monthly, No. 219 (June 2006).

Belyakov, R. A. and Marmain, J. MiG 1939-1989. Editions Larivière, Paris, 1991.
Bennett, James (Ed). Flying the World’s Greatest Aircraft. Fall River Press, New York, 2009.
Bhargava, Kapil. Indian Air Force Test Center. Air Forces Monthly, No. 129 (December 1998).
Billig, Detlef and Meyer, Manfred. Flugzeuge der DDR, Vol. I. Motor Buch VerlagFriedland, Germany,
2001.
Billig, Detlef and Meyer, Manfred. Flugzeuge der DDR, Vol. II. Motor Buch VerlagFriedland, Germany,
2002.
Billig, Detlef and Meyer, Manfred. Flugzeuge der DDR, Vol. III. Motor Buch VerlagFriedland, Germany,
2003.
Billig, Detlef and Meyer, Manfred. Flugzeuge der DDR, Vol. IV. Motor Buch VerlagFriedland, Germany,
2004.
Bird, John. Czech Air Force Today. Air Forces Monthly, No. 108 (March 1997).
Bodemer, Alfred. Les Turbomachines Aéronautiques Mondiales. Éditions Larivière, Paris, 1989.
Boisselon, Christian. Fishbeds et Floggers : Visite au Régiment Stromfeld de la Magyar Légierö. Air Fan,
No. 143 (Octobre 1990).
Boisselon, Christian, and Moulin, Jacques. Magyar Légierö. Air Fan, No. 141 (Août 1990).
Boniface, Roger. MiGs over North Vietnam. Hikoki Publications, Manchester, England, 2008.
Bratukhin, A. G. Russian Aircraft. Mashinostroenie, Moscow, 1995.
Braybrook, R., Skrynnikov, S., Yakutin, L. Russian Warriors. Osprey Publishing, London, 1993.
Brooke, Micool. Cambodian Air Force on Hold. Air Forces Monthly, No. 127 (October 1998).
Brookes, Andrew. Crescent Wings. Air International, Vol. 70, No. 3 (March 2006).
Brno: Turany Air Show. Air Forces Monthly, No. 113 (August 1997).
Bueschel, Richard M. Communist Chinese Air Power. Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1968.
Bulgarian Air Force. Air Forces Monthly, No. 146 (May 2000).
Bulgarian Air Force MiG-21bis Life Extension. Air Forces Monthly, No. 295 (October 2012).
Burma (Airscene). Air International, Vol. 38, No. 5 (May 1990).
Butowski, Piotr and Miller Jay. OKB MiG. Aerofax, Inc., Leicester, England, 1991.
Butowski, Piotr. Red Star Fighters. Combat Aircraft, Vol. 10, No. 1 (February-March 2009).
Buza, Zoltán. Mikoyan MiG-21MF Fishbed (Lock on No. 21). Verlinden Productions, Lier, Belgium, 1993.
Calvert, Denis. The New Super MiG. Combat Aircraft, Vol. 5, No. 5 (March 2004).
CAP 632 – Operation of ’Permit-to-fly’ Ex-Military Aircraft on the UK Register. UK CAA, 2009.
CAR/CAM 1.73-1(a), Experimental Airworthiness Certificates: Type of Operations, CAR/CAM 1.74,
Experimental Certificates, Requirements for Issuance, and CAR/CAM 1.75-1, Experimental
Certificates: Duration.
CJAA Annual Convention 2011 Safety Review. (March 19, 2011).
Cambodian Fishbeds Returned. Air Forces Monthly, No. 144 (March 2000).
Camp, Phil. Indian MiGs. Air Forces Monthly, No. 252 (March 2009).
Capronitól a Gripenig. Szaktudás Kiadó Zrt., Budapest, 2008.
Casualties. Aircraft Illustrated, Vol. 31, No. 9 (September 1998).
Casualties. Aircraft Illustrated, Vol. 30, No. 2 (February 1997).
Chance Meeting. Aircraft Illustrated, Vol. 31, No. 10 (October 1998).
Chant, Chris. The World’s Air Forces. Chartwell Books, Inc., New York, 1979.
Chengdu Advances to F-7MF. Air Forces Monthly, No. 154 (January 2001).
Chendgu J-7/F-7: The Supersonic Sports Plane. World Air Power Journal, Vol. 7 (Autumn/Winter 1991).

CIS Military Aircraft Plants, Part 2. Air Forces Monthly, No. 156 (March 2001).
Ciszek, Jacek. Posnanian Fishbeds. Air Forces Monthly, No. 167 (February 2002).
China to begin production of JL-9. Air Forces Monthly, No. 209 (August 2005).
China Today: Aviation Industry. The China Aviation Industry Press, Beijing, 1989.
China Still Operating Early J-7 Variants. Air Forces Monthly, No. 205 (April 2005).
Collins, Jake. Chinese Fighter Evolution. Air Forces Monthly, No. 163 (October 2001).
Conditional Donation of an F-4D Aircraft. Audit Report, DOD Office of the Inspector General, Report No.
97-222, September 30, 1997.
Cooper, Tom, and Nicolle, David. Arab MiGs: Supersonic Fighters: 1958-1967. Harpla Publishing,
Houston, Texas, 2011.
Cooper, Tom, and Nicolle, David. Arab MiGs: The June 1967 War. Harpla Publishing, Houston, Texas,
2012.
Cooper, Tom, and Weinert, Peter. African MiGs: Sukhois in Service in Sub-Saharan Africa. Harpla
Publishing, Houston, Texas, 2010.
Cooper Tom, and Bishop, Farzad. Iran-Iraq War in the Air. Schiffer Publishing, Atgen, Pennsylvania, 2000.
Croatia Receives First Upgraded MiG-21. Air Forces Monthly, No. 184 (July 2003).
Croatia to Receive MiG-21s. Air Forces Monthly, No. 178 (January 2003).
Croatia to Upgrade MiG-21s. Air Forces Monthly, No. 133 (April 1999).
Croatian AF MiG-21bis Back in Service After Four Years. Air Forces Monthly, No. 238 (January 2008).
Croatian MiG-21UMD Operational. Air Forces Monthly, No. 190 (January 2004).
Croatian MiG-21 Update Progress. Air Forces Monthly, No. 188 (November 2003).
Croft, John. RVSM Non-Compliance Alarming FAA. Flight International, Vol. 181, No. 5325 (7-13 February
2012).
Crosby, Chester G. (Dr.) Readings in Aircraft Maintenance Management, MAS 609-2. Embry=Riddle
Aeronautical University, Daytona Beach, February 1991.
Crusius, Timothy and Channell, Carolyn E. The Aims of Argument. McGraw-Hill, New York, 2003.
Czech MiG-21s Delivered to ‘West Africa.’ Air Forces Monthly, No. 213 (December 2005).
Davies, Steve. Red Eagles – America’s Secret MiGs. Osprey publishing Limited, Oxford, England, 2008.
Dazzling Fishbed. Air Forces Monthly, No. 119 (February 1998).
De Ridder, Jan. Times are Changing in Bulgaria. Air Forces Monthly, No. 287 (February 2012).
Degraef, Stefan, and Borremans, Edwin. Survival of the Hungarian Fishbeds. Air Combat, Vol. 25, No. 5
(September/October 1997).
Demaliaj, Petrit. PETRIT DEMALIAJ: Albanian Lt. Colonel Engineer Memoirs and the American Dream.
Times Square Press, New York, 2011.
Disposals. Air Forces Monthly, No. 101 (August 1996).
Donald, David and Lake, Jon. The Encyclopedia of Word Military Aircraft. Barnes & Noble Books, New
York, 2000.
Donaldson, T. S. and Poggio, E.C. Depot Inspection and Repair Capability: Unique or Redundant? USAF,
Rand Corporation, November 1974.
Draken International, Inc. MiG-21 Inspection Program (2012).
Dwiggins, Don. The Complete Book of Cockpits. TAB books, Inc. Blue Ridge Summit, Pennsylvania, 1982.
Eden, Paul and Moeng, Soph. Modern Military Aircraft Anatomy. Metro Books, Aerospace Publishing Ltd.,
London, 2002.
Egozi, Arie. Born-Again Fighter. Flight International (2-8 August 1995).

Egyptian Air Force MiG-21US and F-7 Detachment at Hurghada. Air Forces Monthly, No. 287 (February 2012).
Egyptian MiG-21s Still Operational. Air Forces Monthly, No. 214 (January 2006).
Egyptian MiG-21UM Overhauled at Odessa. Air Forces Monthly, No. 273 (January 2011).
Egyptian Mongol at Aswan. Air Forces Monthly, No. 155 (February 2001).
Elbit Wins Ethiopian MiG-21 Deal. Air Forces Monthly, No. 126 (September 1998).
Entrekin, Paul T. Mr. MiG: The Real Story of the First MiGs in America. Xlibris Corporation, US, 2012.
Equipment Update: Bangladesh Defense Force Air Wing. Aircraft Illustrated, Vol. 33, No. 10 (October
2000).
Equipment Update: Elbit Defense Systems. Aircraft Illustrated, Vol. 30, No. 1 (January 1997).
Equipment Update: MiG-21bis (Update). Aircraft Illustrated, Vol. 30, No. 1 (January 1999).
Equipment Update: Royal Cambodian Air Force. Aircraft Illustrated, Vol. 29, No. 12 (December 1996).
Equipment Update: Russia’s VPK MAPO. Aircraft Illustrated, Vol. 30, No. 9 (September 1997).
Equipment Update: VPK MAPO (Indian Air Force). Aircraft Illustrated, Vol. 30, No. 1 (January 1997).
European Air Forces Survey (Part Two). Air Forces Monthly, No. 174 (September 2002).
European Air Forces Survey (Part Three). Air Forces Monthly, No. 175 (October 2002).
European Air Forces Survey (Part Four). Air Forces Monthly, No. 213 (December 2005).
F-7MG Moves On. Air Forces Monthly, No. 154 (January 2001).
F-16 Functional/Operational Check Flight. 419th
Fighter Wing Instruction 21-109, 15 August 2009.
FAA-H-8083-1 Aircraft Weight and Balance Handbook.
Farewell to Finnish Fishbeds. Air Forces Monthly, No. 123 (June 1998).
Farnborough Airscene. Air International, Vol. 35, No. 4 (October 1988).
Fatal MiG Accident. Flypast, No. 220 (November 1999).
Fernandez, José, and Luczak, Wojciech. Adieu à Brzeg. Air Fan, No. 154 (Septembre 1991).
Fernandez, José, and Luczak, Wojciech. Le 2PLM “Cracovie.” Air Fan, No. 140 (Juillet 1990).
Final MiG-21 Flights. Air International, Vol. 69, No. 2 (August 2005).
Finati, Mauro, and Rollino, Paolo. Wings Over the Balkans. Air International, Vol. 56, No. 3 (March 1999).
First Photos From LAVEX 07. Air Forces Monthly, No. 237 (December 2007).
Fishbed C/E Aerial Tactics (Manual on the Techniques of Piloting and Military Use of the MiG-21F-13).
Foreign Technology Division, Air Forces Systems Command, USAF, November 5, 1965.
Fishbeds for Sale? Air Forces Monthly, No. 147 (June 2000).
Fishbed Retirement. Combat Aircraft, Vol. 7, No. 2 (September 2005).
Flying the Fishbed. Flight International (September 25, 1975).
Francillon, René. The Wings of Misriya. Air International, Vol. 60, No. 1 (January 2001).
French test Pilot Fishbed. Air Forces Monthly, No. 161 (August 2001).
Frka, Daniel, and Jereb Vojislav. MiG Sur la Croatie. Jets, No. 17 (Mai 1997).
Fulber, Marcus. Caucasus Warriors: Military Aviation in Georgia. Air Forces Monthly, No. 203 (February
2005).
Functional Check Flights, Transport Canada, February 2011.
Lambeth, Benjamin. Flying the Flogger. Flight International (February 23 – March 1, 1994).
Fornier, Michel. Les MiG-21 Hongrois. Air Fan, No. 143 (Octobre 1990).
Frka, Daniel and Jereb, Volislav. MiG Sur La Croatie. Jets, No. 17 (Mai 1997).
Fuel Facts: Safe Handling of JP Fuels. Approach (November 1962).
Fulton MiG-21 Inspection Program. Aviation Classics, 2012.
George, Fred. How Much Ruwnay is Enough? Business & Commercial Aviation (October 2012).

Gething, Michael J. Fishbeds With a Future: Upgarding the MiG-21. Air International, Vol. 56, No. 2
(February 1999).
Golan, John. China’s Hidden Power: The First Half-Century of PLAAF Fighter Aviation. Combat Aircraft,
Vol. 7, No. 8 (September 2008).
Gordon, Yefim, and Dexter, Keith. Mikoyan MiG-21. Midland Publishing, Leicester, England, 2008.
Gordon, Yefim, and Komissarov, Dmitry. Soviet Tactical Aviation. Hikoki Publications, Manchester,
England, 2011.
Gordon, Yefim, and Komissarov, Dmitry. Soviet Air Defense Aviation 1945-1991. Hikoki Publications,
Manchester, England, 2012.
González, Alejandro Roque. Nacido Patria o Muerte. Alejandro Roque (Self-Published), 2012.
Grattoni, Federico, and Toselli, Claudio. Young Croatian Wings. Air Forces Monthly, No. 101 (August
1996).
Green, William and Swanborough, Gordon. Flying Colors. Salamander Books, Ltd., London, 1981.
Grifo 7 Radards at Kamra. Air Forces Monthly, No. 161 (August 2001).
Guhl, Jean-Michel. Peenemünde: JFG 9 Heinrich Ray. Air Action No. 13 (Janvier 1990).
Gunston, Bill. Aircraft of the Soviet Union: The Encyclopedia of Soviet Aircraft Since 1917. London,
Osprey, 1983.
Gunston, Bill, and Gordon, Yefim. MiG Aircraft Since 1937. Putnam Aeronautical Books, London, 1998.
Gunston, Bill. Mikoyan MiG-21. Osprey Publishing, London, 1986.
HAL Plans. Air Forces Monthly, No. 145 (April 2000).
HAL Sitara in Dramatic Accident at Aero India. Air Forces Monthly, No. 229 (April 2007).
HAL Upgrading MiGs. Air Forces Monthly, No. 144 (March 2000).
Harriers in Romania… Air Forces Monthly, No. 189 (December 2003).
Hart, Tom. Syrian Skies. Air Forces Monthly, No. 295 (October 2012).
Hewson, Robert. Asean Air Power. Air Forces Monthly, No. 144 (March 2000).
High Attrition Rate for Upgraded Romanian MiG-21s. Air Forces Monthly, No. 273 (January 2011).
Holdanowicz, Grzegorz. Polish Navy Aviation. Air Forces Monthly, No. 125 (August 1998).
Hooftman, Hugo. Russian Aircraft. Aero Publishers, Inc., Fallbrook, California, 1965.
Honour, Walt. Lt. Cdr. Spin/Departure Training: A Must! Approach (April 1976).
Hungarian MiG-21 Loss. Air Forces Monthly, No. 100 (July 1996).
Hungarian MiG Retires. Air Forces Monthly, No. 151 (October 2000).
Hungarian MiG Upgrades. Air Forces Monthly, No. 63 (June 1993).
IAI Lahav MiG Upgrades. Air Forces Monthly, No. 126 (September 1998).
IAF MiG-21bis Upgrade Nearing the End. Air Forces Monthly, No. 205 (April 2005).
India Downs Pakistani Atlantic. Air Forces Monthly, No. 139 (October 1999).
India-Pakistan Tension Rises. Air Forces Monthly, No. 136 (July 1999).
India to Retire MiGs. Combat Aircraft, Vol. 6, No. 2 (September 2004).
Indian Air Force at 75. Air International, Vol. 70, No. 5 (November 2007).
Indian Air Force Losses Increase. Air Forces Monthly, No. 103 (October 1996).
Indian Air Force Upgraded MiG-21-93 on Display. Air Forces Monthly, No. 166 (January 2002).
Indian Air Power. World Air Power Journal, Vol. 12 (Spring 1993).
Indian Losses. Air Forces Monthly, No. 125 (August 1998).
Indian MiG-21bis Service Life Extension. Air Forces Monthly, No. 223, (October 2006).
Indian MiG-21 Update. Air Forces Monthly, No. 137 (August 1999).

Indian MiG-21 Upgrade Plans. Air Forces Monthly, No. 131 (February 1999).
Indian MiG-21 Upgrade Flies. Air Forces Monthly, No. 129 (December 1998).
Indian MiG-21 Upgrade to Fly Later This Year. Air Forces Monthly, No. 126 (September 1998).
Indian Trainers. Aircraft Illustrated, Vol. 33, No. 10 (October 2000).
India’s Fabulous Fishbeds. World Air Power Journal, Vol. 9 (Summer 1992).
India’s Lowest Ever Accident Rate. Air Forces Monthly, No. 123 (June 1998).
Israel Aircraft Industries Golden Anniversary. Air Forces Monthly, No. 190 (January 2004).
Israeli Air Strike on Syria. Air Forces Monthly, No. 236 (November 2007).
Israeli/Romanian Upgrades on View. Air Forces Monthly, No. 128 (November 1998).
Jackson, Paul. Death of an Air Force. Air Forces Monthly, No. 63 (June 1993).
Jan de Ridder, Dirk. Young at 95! Air Forces Monthly, No. 251 (February 2008).
Jenkins, Cliff. SMS and the need for Innovation. Premium on Safety, No. 9 (2012).
Kajava, Tom (Cadet 96). MiG-21 F-13 –HÄVITTÄJÄHANKINNAN VAIKUTUS SUOMEN ILMAVOIMIEN
HÄVITTÄJÄLENTOKOULUTUKSEEN VUOSINA 1962–1977. Finnish Air Force, 2012.
Kappas, Joanna. Review of Risk and Reliability Methods for Aircraft Gas Turbine Engines. DSTO-TR-1305,
DSTO Aeronautical and Maritime Research Laboratory, Victoria, Australia, May 2002.
Karivalo, Perttu. Oulunsalo Shooting Camp. Air Forces Monthly, No. 96 (March 1996).
Karivalo, Perttu and Tolvanen, Lassi. Finished MiGs. Aircraft Illustrated, Vol. 31, No. 7 (July 1998).
Kim, Yool, Sheehy, Stephen, and Lenhardt, Darryl. A Survey of Aircraft Structural-Life management
Programs in the US Navy, the Canadian Forces, and the US Air Force. Project Air Force, RAND
Corporation, Santa Monica, 2006.
Kopenhagen, Wilfried. Flugzeuge und Hubschrauber de NVA: von 1971 bus zur Gegenwart. Militärverlag
der Deutschen Demokratischen republic, Berlin, 1989.
Knott, Chris, and Spearman, Tim. Bangladesh Air Force. Air Forces Monthly, No. 132 (March 1999).
Kopenhagen, Wilfried. Die Luftstreitkräfte der NVA. Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart, 2002.
Kořán, František, Martinek, Josef, Rogl, Stanislav, and Soukop, Petr. MiG-21 MF in Detail. Wings & Wheels
Publications, RAK, Czech Republic, 2004.
Kowalski, Jan. Fishbeds at Poznań. Air Forces Monthly, No. 176 (November 2002).
Kraft, Chris. Flight: My Life in Mission Control. Dutton, Penguin Group, New York, 2001.
Kromhout, Gert. Fishbeds Over Holland. Air Forces Monthly, No. 141 (November 1999).
Kyrgyzstan MiG-21s in Storage at Kant. Air Forces Monthly, No. 202 (January 2005).
L’Étoile a Filé: Dans La Force Aérienne Hongroise. Le Fanatique de L’Aviation, No. 262 (Septembre 1991).
L’Ex-Est à L’Ouest: Les Avions Soviétiques en Allemagne. Le Fanatique de L’Aviation, No. 262 (Septembre
1991).
L-39s in Cambodia. Air Forces Monthly, No. 108 (March 1997). (Includes MiG-21 Data)
Lake, Jon. Red Stars over America. Air International, Vol. 70, No. 4 (April 2007).
Lamarque, Dirk, and Davis, Greg L. Congo Deployment. Air Forces Monthly, No. 115 (October 1997).
Laotian MiG-21s in Storage. Air Forces Monthly, No. 227 (February 2007).
Lancers Visit the Netherlands. Air Forces Monthly, No. 152 (November 2000).
Last Bulgarian Fishbed Overhauled. Air Forces Monthly, No. 175 (October 2002).
Last MiG-21 Lancer for Romanian Air Force. Air Forces Monthly, No. 184 (July 2003).
Last Fishbed Flown at Poznan-Krzesiny. Air Forces Monthly, No. 191 (February 2004).
Last FT-7 for PLAAF. Air Forces Monthly, No. 178 (January 2003).
Last LOK Overhauled Fishbed. Air Forces Monthly, No. 169 (April 2002).

Laukkanen, Jyrki, and Francillon, René. L’Aviation Militaire Finlandaise (1st
Part). Air Fan, No. 218 (Janvier
1997).
Laukkanen, Jyrki. MiG-21 in Finnish Air Force. Apali, Kustantaja @ Publisher, Tampere, Finland, 2004.
Learmont, David. Reducing the Risk (Military Safety). Flight International (24-30 September 2002).
Learmont, David. The Enemy Within (Military Safety). Flight International (24-30 September 1996).
Lednicer, David. Airfoils. Analytical Methods, Inc.
Lister, Pete. Maintenance Control: Keystone of Squadron Ops. Naval Aviation News, (March/April 1986).
Lorenc, Miroslav, and Rogl, Stanislav. Zrušená Křídla. Votobia, Olomuc, Czech Republic, 2000.
Losses. Combat Aircraft, Vol. 13, No. 7 (July 2012).
Lutz, Freundt. Sowjetische Fliegerkräfte Deutschland 1945-1994 (Band 2). Edition Freundt Eigenverlag,
Diepholz, Germany, 1998.
Lutz, Freundt. Sowjetische Fliegerkräfte Deutschland 1945-1994 (Band 4). Edition Freundt Eigenverlag,
Diepholz, Germany, 2000.
Kyushin, Émile. 50e
Anniversaire de L’Indépendence de L’Ouganda: Meeting Aérien à Entebbe. Le
Fanatique de L’Aviation, No. 521 (Avril 2013).
Macedonian MiGs. Air Forces Monthly, No. 143 (February 2000).
Maintenance and the Aircraft Accident Rate. Approach (May 1962).
Malloy, Alfred M. Corrosion Control in Naval Aircraft. Naval Aviation News (May 1975).
Martin, Guy. Nigerian Regeneration. Air International, Vol. 83, No. 5 (November 2012).
Matricardi, Paolo. The Great Book of Combat Aircraft. Vmb Publishers, Vercelli, Italia, 2006.
Menaul, S. W. B. and Gunston, Bill. Soviet War Planes. The Illustrated War Library. Salamander Books
Limited, London, 1976.
Michel, Martin, and Riester, Erich. Norwegian Extravaganza: Exercise NATO Air Meet 2005. Air Forces
Monthly, No. 213 (December 2005).
MiG-21. 4+ Publication, Praha, Czechoslovakia, 1991.
MiG-21bis-ness. Aircraft Illsutarted, Vol. 31, No. 11 (November 1998).
MiG-21 – Makettsstúdió No. 6. Péta Lapkladó, Budapest, Hungary, 1991.
MiG-21-2000 Flies. Air Forces Monthly, No. 123 (June 1998).
MiG-21 Fishbed. Air International, Vol. 70, No. 5 (November 2007).
MiG-21 in New Libyan Colours. Air Forces Monthly, No. 291 (June 2012).
MiG-21 Retirements. International Air Power Review, Vol. 14 (2004).
MiG-21 Super Profile. Haynes Publishing Group, Somerset, England, 1984.
MiG-21PF. Aviones de Combate. Editorial Planeta DeAgostini, Barcelona, Spain, 2011.
Mikoyan Fishbed-N in Soviet Service. Air International, Vol. 17, No. 6 (December 1979).
Military Air Safety. Flight International, (6-12 April, 1994).
Military Accidents. Air International, Vol. 76, No. 2 (February 2009).
Military Accidents. Air International, Vol. 74, No. 3 (March 2008).
Military Accidents. Air International, Vol. 71, No. 5 (November 2007).
Military Accidents. Air International, Vol. 71, No. 5 (November 2006).
Military Accidents. Air International, Vol. 70, No. 6 (June 2006).
Military Accidents. Air International, Vol. 70, No. 2 (February 2006).
Military Casualties 1988. Flight International (May 13, 1989).
Military Casualties 1989. Flight International (May 16-22, 1990).
Military Flight Safety 1983 Reviewed. Flight International (Marchy 24, 1984).

Military Flight Safety 1985 Reviewed. Flight International (May 24, 1986).
Military Flight Safety 1991 Reviewed. Flight International (May 13-19, 1992).
Military Flight Safety Review. Flight International (May 13-19, 1992).
Military Flight Safety Review. Flight International (January 3, 1981).
Military Hardware for Zimbabwe. Air Forces Monthly, No. 132 (March 1999).
Miyashita, T. Rebuilt Aircraft Tires Are as Good as or Better Than New Tires. Mech (Winter 1974).
Mladenov, Alexander. Bulgarian Air Force. Air Forces Monthly, No. 146 (May 2000).
Mladenov, Alexander. Bulgarian Air Force: In the Midst of a Difficult Transition. Air Forces Monthly, No.
201 (December 2004).
Mladenov, Alexander. Bulgaria’s Last Fishbeds. Combat Aircraft, Vol. 10, No. 3 (June-July 2009).
Mladenov, Alexander. Fishbed in Bulgarian Service. Air International, Vol. 60, No. 4 (April 2001).
Mladenov, Alexander. Looking for Fulcrums and Frogfoots. Air Forces Monthly, No. 104 (November
1996).
Mohan Jagan, P. V. S., and Chopra, Samir. The India-Pakistan Air War of 1965. Manohar, New Delhi,
India, 2005.
More African MiG-21s? Air Forces Monthly, No. 141 (December 1999).
More F-7MGs for Pakistan. Air Forces Monthly, No. 132 (March 1999).
Morgan, Sebastian. Cold War Foes: Phantom vs. Fishbed. Jets, (July 2012).
Mormillo, Frank B. $50 a Minute. Air Enthusiast, No. 100 (July/August 2002).
Mormillo, Frank B. Precious Metal. Aircraft Illustrated, Vol. 32 No. 5 (May 1999).
Müeller, Holger, and Büttner, Stefan. LanceRs on Alert. Air Forces Monthly, No. 236 (November 2007).
Müeller, Holger, and Golz, Alexander. Black Sea Exotics. Air Forces Monthly, No. 243 (June 2008).
Müeller, Holger. Back in Business. Air Forces Monthly, No. 272 (December 2010).
Müeller, Holger. MiG-21. Motorbuch Verlag, Stuttgart, Germany, 2012.
Müeller, Holger. MiG-21s Over Europe Part II). Air Forces Monthly, No. 250 (January 2009).
Müeller, Holger. MiG-21s Over Europe (Part I). Air Forces Monthly, No. 249 (December 2008).
Müeller, Holger. Nigerian Air Force. Air Forces Monthly, No. 268 (July 2010).
Myanmar F-7M. Air Forces Monthly, No. 237 (December 2007).
Myanmar: Fishbed Deliveries. World Air Power Journal, Vol. 8 (Spring 1992).
Naik, Ajay. 7 Pilots and 19 MiG-21 Crashes in Last Five Years. Security, (August 2010).
Nedialkov, Dimitar. Bulgarian Aviation During the Cold War. BOEHHO ИЗДАТЕЈСТВО, Bulgaria, 2011.
New Chinese LIFT. Air Forces Monthly, No. 154 (January 2001).
News Briefs (Polish Air Force MiG-21s). Air Forces Monthly, No. 141 (November 1999).
Nicolle, David and Cooper, Tom. Arab MiG-19 and MiG-21 Units in Combat. Osprey Publishing, Oxford,
England, 2004.
No. 30 Squadron Indian Air Force Disbands. Air Forces Monthly, No. 179 (February 2003).
Nigeria Finally to Upgrade Its Grounded MiG-21s. Air Forces Monthly, No. 189 (September 2004).
Nigeria Inducts FT-7NI Into Service. Air Forces Monthly, No. 268 (July 2010).
Nigerian Air Force Mass Disposal Under Way. Air Forces Monthly, No. 285 (December 2011).
Nijhuis, Hans. Final Touchdown: The Last Days of East German Air Power. Concord Publications Company,
Hong Kong, 1992.
No W-3H Helicopter and More on Recce MiG-21. Air Forces Monthly, No. 172 (July 2002).

Nordeen, Lon, and Quigley, John. Self Defense, Part One. Air Forces Monthly, No. 224 (November 2006).
Norton, Bill. On the Edge: A History of the Israel Air Force and Its Aircraft since 1947. Midland Publishing,
Leicester, England, 2004.
North Korea Gets More MiGs. Air Forces Monthly, No. 139 (October 1999).
Noush, Kian. Afghanistan’s Two Air Forces. Air Forces Monthly, No. 165 (December 2001).
Novak, Karel. Czech Air Force Today. Air Forces Monthly, No. 194 (May 2004).
O’Connor. Patrick D. T. Practical Reliability Engineering. John Wiley & Sons, LTD. West Sussex, England,
2006.
PAC Kamra. Air Forces Monthly, No. 280 (July 2011).
Paloque, Gérard. MiG-21 Fishbed (1955-2010). Histoires & Collections, Paris, 2009.
Pakistan AF F-7PGs in UAE Exercise. Air Forces Monthly, No. 263 (February 2010).
Pakistan AF F-7PG Ready for Delivery. Air Forces Monthly, No. 163 (October 2001).
Pakistan Considers F-7MG. Air Forces Monthly, No. 141 (December 1999).
Parrish, Robert L. Maintenance Records, and Compliance. Business & Commercial Aviation, March 1989.
Pavlović, Predrag, and Pavlović, Nenad. Fighter Performance in Practice: Phantom vs. MiG-21. (Unknown).
Peck, Gaillard R. America’s Secret MiG Squadron: The Red Eagles of Project CONSTANT PEG. Osprey
Publishing, Oxford, England, 2012.
Petersen, Mark. Lessons Learned: Warbirds, the Overhead Approach, and Nontowered Airports. Warbirds,
(March 2009).
Pilbeam, Kieron, Knott, Chris, and Watson, Simon. The Guns of Oulunsalo. Aircraft Illustrated, Vol. 30, No. 9
(September 1997).
PLAAF (The): August 1st
Aerobatic Team. Air Forces Monthly, No. 123 (June 1998).
Poland Retires Fishbed. Combat Aircraft, Vol. 5, No. 5 (March 2004).
Polderman, Robin. Albania Air Force. Air Forces Monthly, No. 193 (April 2004).
Polderman, Robin. Romanian Air Force in Transition. Air Forces Monthly, No. 174 (September 2002).
Polish Air Force Fishbeds Relocate. Air Forces Monthly, No. 175 (October 2002).
Polish Fishbeds Act as Exocets. Air Forces Monthly, No. 179 (February 2003).
Polish MiGs for Vietnam. Combat Aircraft, Vol. 7, No. 2 (September 2005).
Polish MiG-21s Retired. Air Forces Monthly, No. 193 (April 2004).
Postcards From Kyrgyzstan. Air Forces Monthly, No. 189 (December 2003).
Prlenda, Antonio. Croatia Hosts. Air Forces Monthly, No. 237 (December 2007).
Prlenda, Antonio. Top Guns Over Pula. Air Forces Monthly, No. 180 (March 2003).
Radic, Aleksander. Serbia & Montenegro Air Force. Air Forces Monthly, No. 204 (March 2005).
Radic, Aleksander. Serbian Fishbeds. Air Forces Monthly, No. 220 (July 2006).
Radic, Aleksander. The Split. Air Forces Monthly, No. 227 (February 2007).
Rare Sighting of Active Serbian MiG-21. Air Forces Monthly, No. 236 (November 2007).
Re-Engined MiG-27 Offered. Aircraft Illustrated, Vol. 41, No. 5 (May 2008).
Reals, Willaim J. Medical Investigation of Aviation Accidents. College of American Pathologists, Chicago,
Illinois, 1968.
Recent Casualties. Combat Aircraft, Vol. 9, No. 1 (February-March 2008).
Richardson, Doug. The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Modern Warplanes. Crescent Books, New York, 1982.
Ripley, Tim. Saddam’s Air Power. Air Forces Monthly, No. 176 (November 2002).
Robinson, Anthony. Soviet Air Power. Brompton Books Corp., Greenwich, Connecticut, 1983.
Romanian Fighter Acquisition Plans. Air Forces Monthly, No. 247 (October 2008).

Romanian Lancers Deploy to UK. Air International, Vol. 69, No. 2 (August 2005).
Romanian Lancer Upgrade Suspended. Air Forces Monthly, No. 174 (September 2002).
Romanian Lancers Visit Colmar. Air Forces Monthly, No. 199 (October 2004).
Rupprecht, Andreas, and Cooper, Tom. Modern Chinese Warplanes. Harpla Publishing, Houston, Texas,
2012.
Rush, Steve. Slovak republic Air Force. Air Forces Monthly, No. 204 (March 2005).
RV I PVO VsiCG – Serbia and Montenegro Air Force. International Air Power Review, Vol. 15 (2005).
Sadik, Ahmad, and Cooper Tom. Iraqi Fighters. Harpla Publishing, Houston, Texas, 2008.
Salinger, Igor. Beautiful Batajnica. Air Forces Monthly, No. 296 (November 2012).
Santana, Sérgio. Protecting the Sky of the Motherland. Air Forces Monthly, No. 288 (March 2012).
Segota, Zejko, and Sabljic, Ivan. Air Forces Monthly, No. 222 (September 2006).
Sentinels of the Sky: Glimpses of the Indian Air Force. Ritana Books, New Delhi, India, 1999.
Serbia and Montenegro Air Force Sales. Air Forces Monthly, No. 195 (June 2004).
Serbia Repairing Iraqi Aircraft. Air Forces Monthly, No. 129 (December 1998).
Serbian Air Force Today. Serbian Ministry of Defense, Belgrade, 2009.
Sgarlato, Nico. Soviet Aircraft of Today. Squadron Signal Publications, Carrollton, Texas, 1978.
Sharifi, Shahram. Teheran Army Day Parade Practice. Air Forces Monthly, No. 255 (June 2009).
Sharpe, Michael, and Chant, Chris. Fighting Aircraft of the World. Amber Books, London, 2004.
Show Gallery. Air Forces Monthly, No. 141 (December 1999).
Siladic, Mato F. and Rasuo, Bosko. On-Condition Maintenance for Non-Modular Jet Engines (RD-33) – An
Experience. University of Belgrade, Aeronautical Department, Serbia, 2008.
Singh, Jasjit. Defense from the Skies: Indian Air Force through 75 Years. Center for Air Power Studies,
New Delhi, Indian, 2007.
Sixma, Herman J., and Van Geffen, Theo. Brothers in Arms. Aircraft Illustrated, Vol. 36, No. 1 (January
2003).
Sixma, Herman J., and Van Geffen, Theo W. La Finlande et Ses MiG. Air Fan, No. 137 (Avril 1990).
Slovakia’s Hopes. Air Forces Monthly, No. 114 (September 1997).
Slovenian Air War. World Air Power Journal, Vol. 8 (Spring 1992).
Spearman, M. Leroy. Some Fighter Aircraft Trends. NASA Technical memorandum 86352, January 1985.
Spick, Mike. Honing the Breed. Air Enthusiast, No. 47 (September/November 1992).
Spick, Mike. Odd Couple. Air Forces Monthly, No. 193 (April 2004).
Spick, Mike. Pilot’s Brief: Farnborough ’96. Air Forces Monthly, No. 104 (November 1996).
Spick, Mike. The Great Book of Modern Warplanes. Salamander Books Limited, London, 2000.
Sokol MiGs. Air Forces Monthly, No, 142 (January 2000).
Soukop, Petr. Czech Tigers in Detail. RAK, Prague, Czech Republic, 2000.
Sowjetishe Fliegrkräfte Deutschland 1945-1994 (Band 2). Edition Freundt Eigenverlag, Diepholz,
Germany, 1998.
Sri Lanka Nears MiG-29 Deal, Six More F-7s Delivered. Air Forces Monthly, No. 242 (May 2008).
Stall/Spin Problems of Military Aircraft. AD-A029 071, ADVISORY GROUP FOR AEROSPACE RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT, JUNE 1976.
Stafrace, Charles. Arab Air Forces. Squadron Signal Publications, Carrolton, Texas, 1994.
Stapfer, Hans-Heiri. MiG-21: Cold War Warrior. Arms and Armour, London, 1992.
Stapfer, Hans-Heiri. Warsaw Pact Air Forces. Squadron Signal Publications, Carrolton, Texas, 1991.

Stapfer, Hans-Heiri. MiG-21 Fishbed Walk Around, Part 1. Squadron Signal Publications, Carrolton, Texas,
2004.
Stapfer, Hans-Heiri. MiG-21 Fishbed Walk Around, Part 2. Squadron Signal Publications, Carrolton, Texas,
2005.
Stars and Stripes MiG Town. Classic Aircraft, Vol. 45, No. 7 (July 2012).
Stitt, L. K. A Beautiful Day? Mech (Winter 1974).
Sturgeon, W. R. Canadian Forces Aircrew Ejection, Descent and Landing Injuries, 1 January 1975- 31
December 1987. Defense and Civil institute of Environmental Medicine, Downsview, Ontario,
Canada, December 1988.
Sutiagin, Yuri, and Seidov, Igor. MiG Menace Over Korea: The Story of Soviet Fighter Ace Nikolai Sutiagin.
Pen & Sword, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, England, 2009.
Sweetman, Bill. Soviet Military Aircraft. Presidio Press, Novato, California, 1981.
Szabo, Stanislav, Gyűrösi, and Stolár, Michal J. Slovak Air Force in Pictures (1993-2008). Magnet Press,
Slovakia, 2008.
Szczpanik, Ryszaed and Leski, Andrzej. Evolution of Aircraft Maintenance/Support Concepts with
Particular Reference to Aircraft Availability – Polish Air Force Perspective. Air Force Institute of
Technology, Warsaw, Poland, 2011.
Szekeres, Gábor. Farewell My Fishbed. Air Forces Monthly, No. 152 (November 2000).
Szekeres, Gábor. Hungarian Withdrawals. Air Forces Monthly, No. 111 (June 1997).
Tanhan, George K., and Agmon, Marcy. The Indian Air Force: Trends and Prospects. RAND, Santa Monica,
California, 1995.
Taurino, Giovanni. Co-Operative Key. Combat Aircraft, Vol. 7, No. 3 (November 2005).
Tehran Flaunts Its Military Might. Air Forces Monthly, No. 243 (June 2008).
Tezpur Says Farewell to MiG-21. Air Forces Monthly, No. 237 (December 2007).
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as Amended. Revised September 1, 1948, Washington, DC.
Third MiG-21 lancer Version. Air Forces Monthly, No. 106 (January 1997).
Tokunaga, Katsuhiko, and Berger, Heinz. Silver Wings: Serving and Protecting Croatia. Harpla Publishing,
Houston, Texas, 2009.
Toperczer, István. Air War Over North Vietnam: The Vietnamese People’s Air Force 1949-1977. Squadron
Signal Publications, Carrolton, Texas, 1998.
Toperczer, István. MiG-21 Units of the Vietnam War. Osprey Publishing, Oxford, England, 2001.
Trainees of the Volga. Flight International (June 2, 1966).
Tuttle, Jim. Eject! The Complete History of US Aircraft Escape Systems. MBI Publishing Company, St. Paul,
Minnesota, 2002.
Tyleloss, Eric. The Flying Kalashnikov. Air Forces Monthly, No. 268 (July 2010).
Two Ukraine MiG-21UMs Still Flying. Air Forces Monthly, No. 204 (March 2005).
Ugandan MiG-21 Controversy. Air Forces Monthly, No. 141 (December 1999).
Ugandan MiG-21 Delivered. Air Forces Monthly, No. 203 (February 2005).
Ugandan MiG-21s. Air Forces Monthly, No. 141 (November 1999).
Un Pilote de MiG-21 Fait Defection…Raids Aviation, No. 2 (Juillet/Août 2012).
Upgraded Indian MiG-21 Bisons Suffering Poor Serviceability. Air Forces Monthly, No. 224 (November
2006).
USAF Test Pilot School Flying Qualities, Volume II. USAF-TPS-CUR-86-03, Edwards AFB, California, 1986.
Van Woezik, René. Perfect Plovdiv. Air Forces Monthly, No. 284 (November 2011).

Van Woezik, René. Sri Lanka’s Skybolts. Air Forces Monthly, No. 284 (November 2011).
Velovich, Alexander. India and Mikoyan Struggle over MiG-21. Flight International (7-13 June 1995).
Vietnam Acquires More Su-27s, and Polish MiG-21s. Air Forces Monthly, No. 132 (March 1999).
Vlad, Danut. Aerostar Turns 50. Air International, Vol. 64, No. 5 (May 2003).
Vlad, Danut. Romania’s Floggers. Air Forces Monthly, No. 195 (June 2004).
VPAAF MiG-21s Still Going Strong. Air Forces Monthly, No. 204 (March 2005).
Walg, Jim. Postcard From Ulaanbaatar. Air Forces Monthly, No. 96 (March 1996).
Warnes, Alan. A hero’s Home. Air Forces Monthly, No. 234 (September 2007).
Warnes, Alan. A Tough Transition. Air Forces Monthly, No. 226 (January 2007).
Warned, Alan. Albanian Treasures. Air Forces Monthly, No. 227 (February 2007).
Warnes, Alan. Co-Operative Key 2003. Air Forces Monthly, No. 188 (November 2003).
Warnes, Alan. Craiova Storage. Air Forces Monthly, No. 203 (February 2005).
Warnes, Alan. Faisal’s Finest. Air Forces Monthly, No. 200 (November 2004).
Warnes, Alan. Fighter Forces in Europe. Air Forces Monthly, No. 193 (April 2004).
Warnes, Alan. In From the Cold (LAVEX 2007). Air Forces Monthly, No. 236 (November 2007).
Warnes, Alan. Libya Opens Up. Air Forces Monthly, No. 227 (January 2007).
Warnes, Alan. Romania’s Ghost Towns. Air Forces Monthly, No. 224 (November 2006).
Warnes, Alan, and Watson, Simon. India’s MiG Complex. Air Forces Monthly, No. 239 (February 2008).
Warnes, Alan. Mianwali: The Cradle of Fighter Pilots. Air Forces Monthly, No. 197 (August 2004).
Warnes, Alan. Masroor. Air Forces Monthly, No. 204 (March 2005).
Warnes, Alan. More Than Just a MiG Force… Air Forces Monthly, No. 298 (January 2013).
Warnes, Alan. PAC Kamra. Air Forces Monthly, No. 232 (July 2007).
Warnes, Alan. Pakistan’s New Fighters. Air Forces Monthly, No. 187 (October 2003).
Warnes, Alan. Pakistan Air Force Chief. Air Forces Monthly, No. 172 (July 2002).
Warnes, Alan. Romanian Air Force. Air Forces Monthly, No. 200 (November 2004).
Warnes, Alan. New Tricks for Old Dogs. Air Forces Monthly, No. 212 (November 2005).
Warnes, Alan. Sri Lanka’s Unique Air Force. Air Forces Monthly, No. 100 (July 1996).
Warnes, Alan. Sri Lankan Air Force at War. Air Forces Monthly, No. 76 (July 1994).
Warnes, Alan. Taming the Tigers. Air Forces Monthly, No. 255 (June 2009).
Wei, Bai. China’s Mountain Eagle takes Wing. Air Forces Monthly, No. 282 (September 2011).
Westerhuis, Rogier. Bangladesh Air Power: The Bangladesh Air Force in 2012. Combat Aircraft, Vol. 13,
No. 9 (September 2012).
Western CISAF. Air Forces Monthly, No. 63 (June 1993).
Willemsen, Fred. Romanian Priorities. Air Forces Monthly, No. 131 (February 1999).
Willis, David. From Russia With Love. Air International, Vol. 76, No. 2 (February 2009).
Willisch, Jürgen. Mikojan-Gurewitsch MiG-21 F-13 (U). Bmvd-Verlag, Buchholz, Germany, 2004.
Willisch, Jürgen. Mikojan-Gurewitsch MiG-21PF, SPS, SPS-K. Bmvd-Verlag, Buchholz, Germany, 2002.
Wilson, Séan. Bulgarian Bite. Air International, Vol. 76, No. 4 (April 2009).
Wirginis, Ted. ORM Corner: Understand the process. Approach (May-June 2008).
World Accidents, Incidents and Losses 2001. Flight International (24-30 September 2002).
WORLD AIR FORCES 2011/2012. Flight International, 2012.
Write-Offs. Air Forces Monthly, No. 129 (December 1998).
Write-Offs. Air Forces Monthly, No. 127 (October 1998).
Write-Offs. Air Forces Monthly, No. 126 (September 1998).

Write-Offs. Air Forces Monthly, No. 125 (August 1998).
Write-Offs. Air Forces Monthly, No. 122 (May 1998).
Write-Offs. Air Forces Monthly, No. 119 (February 1998).
Write-Offs. Air Forces Monthly, No. 118 (January 1998).
Write-Offs. Air Forces Monthly, No. 110 (May 1997).
Write-Offs. Air Forces Monthly, No. 108 (March 1997).
Write-Offs. Air Forces Monthly, No. 107 (February 1997).
Write-Offs. Air Forces Monthly, No. 106 (January 1997).
Write-Offs. Air Forces Monthly, No. 104 (November 1996).
Write-Offs. Air Forces Monthly, No. 103 (October 1996).
Write-Offs. Air Forces Monthly, No. 100 (July 1996).
Write-Offs. Air Forces Monthly, No. 76 (July 1994).
Yemen MiG-21bis Overhauls in Ukraine. Air Forces Monthly, No. 273 (January 2011).
Zimbabwe AF Open Day. Air Forces Monthly, No. 213 (December 2005).
ZTZ Storage Area at Velika Gorica. Air Forces Monthly, No. 199 (October 2004).
Audio Visual (Films)
41 Eskadra Lotnictwa Taktycznego – Malbork MiG-21 (2010).
94th
ACG Surveys an Ex-Bulgarian MiG-21 “White 38” (2010).
Aeromiting Batajnica 1998 (2011).
Akrobatsko Letenje na NL-16 (MiG-21) Yugoslav Air Force (1979).
Albania & Macedonia 2007. Aviation Video DVD (2007).
Aviation Day 1967 – Moscow Domodedovo Airport (1967).
Bangladesh Air Force F-7 – Flight (2010).
Bird Aircraft Strike Hazards. USAF (Training Film 38595).
Chengdu J-7. PLAAF (1979).
Doru Davidovici, in Memoriam (2008).
Emisija Dozvolite – Obuka Pilota MiG-21 (Aerodrom Slatina) (2011).
Evaluation of MiG-21 by USAF (1969).
Farewell to MIG-21, НТВ Channel Production, Russia (2010).
FCM MiG-21 Crash (2012).
Free Libya AirForce.avi (2011).
Hungarian Air Force MiG-21 Finálé! Pápa, 2000.08.31 (2008).
Indian Air Force IAF MiG-21 Special – NDTV Documentary (2008).
Iraqi MiG-21 Tested in Israel (1966).
Jalandhar MiG-21 Crash May 3, 2002 (2010).
MiG-23 9PLM Rosnowo Zegrze Pomorskie (2012).

MiG-21 Aborted Takeoff at EAA Airventure 2010 (2010).
MiG-21 Checkride Flight (2011).
MiG-21 Crash Site – Flying Cloud Airport – July 12, 2012.
MiG-21 Drewitz DDR GDR NVA, TAFS-87, JBG-37 (2011).
MiG-21 Fishbed Tribute 1. (2011).
MiG-21 FLIGHT (2006).
MiG-21 Flight Prep And... (Reno, Nevada), (2009).
MiG-21 Flyby (2010).
MiG-21 Graf Ignatievo Airbase, Bulgaria (2010).
MiG-21 Holzdorf DDR GDR NVA JG-1 (1990).
MiG-21 HRZ (1/2) – Pobjednički Bedem 1997/Winning Rampart 1997 (2007).
MiG-21 Instructional Film (Yugoslav Air Force), Part I, and Part II (1980).
MiG-21 Jet Crash Flying Cloud Airport, 7-12-12 (2012).
MiG-21 JRV (125 Fighting Squadron, Yugoslav Air Force (1991).
MiG-21 Lancer Periscope (Romanian Air Force), (2006).
MiG-21 – NVA DDR. Auf dem Wächter der Eroberungen des Sozialismus (2011).
MiG-21 Pod Nohama Nebe (excerpts) (2008).
MiG-21MF Czech Air Force (2006).
MiG-21 MF Legendary Dogfighter. UranusVideoTV.tk (2008).
MiG-21UM, N711MG (Serial No. 05695175), Ground Run, DeKalb, Illinois (2011).
MiG-21 Fighter Jet Taxing at Minneapolis/St. Paul International Airport (2012).
Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21 Fishbed. Discovery Civilization (2012).
Myanmar Air Force F-7 Fighter Jets (2012).
PAF Female Pilots Complete Operational Conversion on F-7P Fighter Aircraft (2008).
Pakistan Air Force F-7PG (2006).
Polish MiG’s-21 – Gdynia Babie Doły – EPOK (1995-1998).
Prima Femeie Pilot Pe Supersonic Din Forţele Aeriene Române – MiG 21 LanceR (2009
Red Star (In the Cockpit). Arts Magic DVD, 2007.
Romanian Air Force MIG-21 Lancer Part 1 (2010).
Romanian Air Force MIG-21 Lancer Part 2 (2010).
Sandesh News – MiG 21 Aircraft Crashes in Kutch (2012).
Soft ground Arrestor System for Airports, FAA, 1996.
Soviet MiG-21 Aerobatic Team (2008).
Uphill Task: Induction of F-16 and F-7P in PAF – Part 1 & 2 (2009).
When Pilots Eject. Discovery Channel (2003).
Will Ward – MiG-21 – Sunset Afterburner Flybys – Willow Run Airport (2011).
Wings of the Red Star: Phantom’s Foe! MiG-21 Fishbed! Discovery Channel (1994).
Xcorps Action Sports TV #29. MIG-21 DIRECTORS CUT HQ (2008).
Web Links
http://173.254.58.56/~islamtri/2010/11/10/18ussia-mig-21-crashes-on-training-mission.html
http://aces.safarikovi.org/victories/ethiopia-1977-1978.html

http://adehttp://173.254.58.56/~islamtri/2010/11/10/yemeni-mig-21-crashes-on-training-
mission.htmlvarul.ro/locale/cluj-napoca/vezi-actiune-avionul-s-au-prabusit-cei-doi-piloti-clujeni-foto-
1_50ae2b1d7c42d5a6639a4aef/index.html
http://aircraftwrecks.com
http://apstraining.com/2009/10/13/the-v-g-diagram-or-v-n-diagram/
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2003-07-07/india/27205076_1_mig-21s-mig-variants-design-
limitations
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-08-02/india/29841905_1_mig-27-mig-21-routine-sortie
http://aviacrash.ucoz.ru/load/aviacija_pnr/katastrofy_1961_1970_chast_3/6-1-0-67
http://aviation-safety.net
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002_Jalandhar_MiG-21_crash
http://blog.cwam.org
http://careerairforce.nic.in/pgcat.asp?lang=1
http://caterpillarclub.com
http://classicjets.org
http://dawn.com/2011/08/15/paf-f-7-fighter-aircraft-crashes-near-bhakkar/
http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English/about/History/60s/1966/160801.htm
http://drakenintl.com/news-3#more-101
http://dms.ntsb.gov/aviation/AccidentReports/m2epwr45akffca451bcyb5551/Y03162013120000.pdf
http://eaaforums.org/showthread.php?2644-Need-quick-answer-Drop-tanks-on-a-warbird/page2
http://dawn.com/2011/08/15/paf-f-7-fighter-aircraft-crashes-near-bhakkar/
http://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Luettelo_Suomen_ilmavoimien_lento-onnettomuuksista
http://forums.airbase.ru/2007/12/t58914,2–avarii-katastrofy-chast-2.html
http://forum.keypublishing.com
http://forums.liveleak.com/showthread.php?t=83960
http://fpage.sweb.cz/havarie.htm
http://home.snafu.de/veith/verluste9.htm
http://home.spas.faa.gov
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/mig-crash-exposes-iaf-training-flaw/1/150353.html
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/mig-21-crashes-in-barmer-pilot-safe/1/153993.html
http://lotniczapolska.pl/MiG-21-%E2%80%93-naddzwiekowy-olowek-,231
http://militarytechnics.com/news/news-and-upcoming-events/event-3/
http://news.in.msn.com/national/mig-21-crashes-in-gujarat-pilot-safe
http://news.oneindia.in/2006/06/06/iaf-brings-down-accident-rate-including-of-mig21-to-new-low-
1149597267.html
http://news.oneindia.in/2011/10/07/raj-indian-air-force-to-boot-out-mig-21-another-crash.html
http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/12/11/pakistans-air-force-is-falling-apart-more-than-a-dozen-crashes-in-
18-months-and-the-u-s-is-unlikely-to-help/
http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~rajwar/pictures/planes/iaf_planes.html
http://registry.faa.gov/aircraftinquiry/AcftRef_Results.aspx?Mfrtxt=&Modeltxt=MIG-21&PageNo=1
http://rupeenews.com/2008/09/world-record-200th
-indian-flying-coffin-mig-29-crashes/
http://sabre-pilots.org/classics.htm.
http://safetycenter.navy.mil/
http://science.howstuffworks.com/19ussian-guryevich-mig-21.htm

http://warbirddepot.com/aircraft_jets_mig21-ward.asp
http://wn.com/MiG-21_La_Leyenda_Contin%C3%BAaavi
http://yumodelclub.tripod.com/20ussian20_air_force/mig21/mig21var.htm
http://www.123rf.com/photo_7559056_military-base-ceske-budejovice-czechoslovakia-28-8-1992-mig-
21mf-shortly-before-his-last-run-few-min.html
http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread116620/pg1
http://www.aero-news.net
http://www.aeropress-bg.com/
http://www.aircrashed.com
http://www.airforce-bg.com/en/aircraft/fighters/mig-21bis/
http://www.airforce.ru/history/localwars/afganistan/part9.htm
http://www.airliners.net
http://www.airshowstuff.com/blog/?p=108
http://www.airspacemag.com/history-of-flight/AS-Interview-Georgy-Mosolov.html
http://www.airspacemag.com/snapshot/42927702.html
http://www.airventuremuseum.org/collection/aircraft/3Mikoyan-
Gurevich%20MiG%2021%20Fishbed%20Specifications.asp
http://www.airwarriors.com
http://www.airwar.ru/enc/fighter/mig21-93.html
http://www.altair.com.pl/news/view?news_id=3618
http://www.altair.com.pl/news/view?news_id=4803
http://www.aopa.org/aircraft/articles/2012/120809reconciliation-of-former-combatants-inspires-heals.html
http://www.aso.com/listings/spec/ViewAd.aspx?id=141764
http://www.avcom.co.za/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=28934
http://www.aviation-history.com
http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/awx_02_13_2013_p0-548507.xml
http://www.aviationweek.com/Blogs.aspx?plckBlogId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-
01329aef79a7&plckPostId=Blog%3a27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3a1253fb8a-3b45-
4f68-b273-fff9b8f2f73d
http://www.barksdale.af.mil/news/story_print.asp?id=123334048
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/Aircraft/Current/602-MiG-Suresh.html
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/Aircraft/Current/608-MiG-Prodyut.html
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/Aircraft/MiG-21.html
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/Units/Squadrons/4-Squadron.html
http://www.caa.co.uk/application.aspx?catid=60&pagetype=65&appid=1&mode=detailnosummary&fullregm
ark=BRAO
http://www.casa.gov.au/scripts/nc.dll?WCMS:HOMEPAGE::pc=PC_90001
http://www.controller.com
http://www.controller.com/listingsdetail/aircraft-for-sale/MIKOYAN-MIG-21-UM/1967-MIKOYAN-MIG-21-
UM/1163877.htm
http://www.defence.pk/forums/bangladesh-defence/73779-baf-training-aircraft-crashes-karnaphuli.html
http://www.defence.pk/forums/r20ussian-defence/222630-j-7-crashed-today-shantou-city.html
http://www.defenseworld.net/news/8165/MiG_Fighter_Aircraft_Complete_50_years_in_India

http://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/84947/KAJAVA_TJ.pdf?sequence=1http://www.ejection-
history.org.uk
http://www.egfighters.freehosting.net/migb.html
http://www.ejection-history.org.uk/Aircraft_by_Type/PAKISTAN/2121ussian21_f7p.htm
http://www.ejection-history.org.uk/project/Biographies/Joint-Crash-Details/2005-10-26_Indian_MiG-
21/2005-10-26_MiG-21.htm
http://www.ejectionsite.com
http://www.etaiwannews.com/etn/news_content.php?id=1273451&lang=eng_news
http://www.f-117a.com/Bond.html
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/row/mig-21.htm
http://www.fighterworld.com.au/the-aviation-collection/aircraft-displays/21ussian-gurevich-mig-21
http://www.flightglobal.com
http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1975/1975%20-%201968.html
http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/2003/2003%20-%202074.html?search=mig-21
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/aged-air-force-inventory-highlights-malis-weakness-381004/
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/21212121ussian21-mig-21-pilots-escape-mid-air-collision-
347790/
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/romania-halts-mig-21-training-flights-after-fatal-crash-349220/
http://www.freefalcon.com/Manuals/Flight_Companion.pdf
http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1911/19110550.htm
http://www.globalair.com/aircraft_for_sale/Warbird_Aircraft/Mikoyan-
Gurevich/Mig__21_for_sale_60389.html
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/rakshak.htm
http://www.iaf.org.il/3642-7231-EN/IAF.aspx
http://www.iai.co.il/35439-en/BusinessAreas.aspx?PageNum=1&SearchText=mig-21&Group=0&Unit=0
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/-mig-crashes-due-to-less-experience-/857614
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/mig-crash-exposes-iaf-training-flaw/1/150353.html
http://www.jber.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123314594
http://www.kamov.net/21ussian-aircraft/mig-21/
http://www.leteckemotory.cz/motory/r-13/
http://www.mig-21.de/english/inservice.htm
http://www.military-heat.com/19/21ussian-military-aircraft-sale-general-public/
http://www.milavia.net/aircraft/mig-21/videos/VrgpIN4aiMM.html
http://www.museumofflight.org/aircraft/mikoyan-gurevich-mig-21-pf-fishbed-d
http://www.museumofflight.org/aircraft/mikoyan-gurevich-mig-21-pfm-fishbed-f
http://www.museumofflight.org/event/my-enemy-my-friend-story-reconciliation-vietnam-war-brig-gen-dan-
cherry
http://www.museumofflight.org/WWII?gclid=CKTp5ujKvbYCFcud4AodMX4A3A
http://www.nasicaa.org/mig21.pdf
http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil
http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=16889
http://www.ondutchwings.nl
http://www.paf.gov.pk/ac_gallery.html
http://www.pakdef.info/pids/paf/schowdhury1.html

http://www.puolustusvoimat.fi/wcm/b119bf8047616847bea6bef9f59cc682/1960-1990.pdf?MOD=AJPERES
http://www.redeagleav.com/warbirds.html
http://www.roaf.ro/en/cersenin_en.php
http://www.scramble.nl
http://www.sicuropublishing.com
http://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/fighter/j7.asp
http://www.sokolplant.ru/en/spravka.shtml
http://www.spsaviation.net/story_issue.asp?Article=1078
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htatrit/20111209.aspx
https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairfo/articles/20100427.aspx
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htatrit/articles/20121227.aspx
http://www.thanhniennews.com/2010/Pages/20100708143401.aspx
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/industry-and-economy/logistics/iafs-mig21-bison-aircraft-crashes-in-
gujarat-no-casualties/article4129952.ece
http://www.thestatesman.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=382360&catid=35
http://www.topedge.com/panels/aircraft/sites/kraft/warbirds.htm#e4
http://www.turvallisuustutkinta.fi/Oikeapalsta/Haku/1210772808116
http://www.valka.cz/clanek_10582.html
http://www.warbirdalley.com
http://www.warbirdcolors.com
http://www.warbirddepot.com/aircraft_jets_mig21-rosenberg.asp
http://www.warbirdinformationexchange.org
http://www.warbirdregistry.org/jetregistry/mig21-7505.html
http://www.warbirdsofindia.com/Crashes/crpage.php?cur=0&qacid=61&qafdb=IAF&datesall=ON
http://www.worldwarbirdnews.com/?s=mig-21

Attachment 5 – Partial Listing of MiG-21/J-7 Accidents and Relevant Incidents
# Date Version Operator Severity Probable Cause & Remarks
1. February 13, 2013 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal Engine Failure After Take-Off
2. December 4, 2012 J-7 PLAAF Nonfatal Mechanical Failure (Hit Residential Area, 4 Injured)
3. November 24, 2012 MiG-21 Bison Indian AF Nonfatal Unknown
4. November 20, 2012 MiG-21MF Egyptian AF Fatal (1) Maneuvering
5. October 15, 2012 MiG-21UB Yemen AF Fatal (1) Mechanical Failure
6. September 12, 2012 MiG-21 Syrian AF Fatal (1) LOC on Landing
7. July 12, 2012 MiG-21MF N9307 Nonfatal Overrun on Landing – Drag Chute Failure
8. June 19, 2012 MiG-21UM Croatian AF Nonfatal In-Flight Canopy Separation (Rear Canopy) (AND)
9. May 29, 2012 F-7PG Pakistan AF Nonfatal Fire During Maintenance (Ground)
10. May 2, 2012 F-7NI Nigerian AF Nonfatal Unknown (Suspected Low Altitude Maneuvering)
11. April 1, 2012 MiG-UM N1185 Nonfatal Overrun (AND)
12. February 8, 2012 F-7PG Pakistan AF Fatal (1) Crashed After Take-Off (Mechanical)
13. January 25, 2012 FT-7P Pakistan AF Nonfatal Crashed After Take-Off
14. December 2, 2011 MiG-21 Bison Indian AF Nonfatal Mechanical Failure After Take-Off
15. October 7, 2011 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal Landing Accident
16. September 6, 2011 MiG-21 Bison Indian AF Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
17. August 15, 2011 FT-7 Pakistan Air Force Fatal (1) Mechanical (Female Pilot Ejected Safely, Ground Fatality)
18. August 7, 2011 MiG-21M Indian AF Fatal (1) Crashed Near the Airfield (Pilot Did not Survive Ejection)
19. August 7, 2011 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal Unknown
20. August 1, 2011 MiG-21bis Indian AF Fatal (1) In-Flight Fire – Failed Ejection
21. May 11, 2011 FT-7NI Nigerian AF Nonfatal Unknown
22. March 22, 2011 F-7NI Nigerian AF Fatal (1) Unknown (Crashed After Take-Off)
23. March 17, 2011 MiG-21UM Free Libyan AF Unknown Mechanical Failure
24. March 1, 2011 MiG-21 Indian Air Force Nonfatal PIO
25. February 4, 2011 MiG-21 Bison Indian AF Nonfatal Crashed Immediately After Take-Off (Mechanical Failure)
26. November 10, 2010 MiG-21 Yemen AF Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
27. November 1, 2010 MiG-21UM Romanian AF Fatal (2) LOC During Landing
28. September 23, 2010 MiG-21bis Croatian AF Nonfatal Mid-Air (1st
Aircraft)
29. September 23, 2010 MiG-21bis Croatian AF Nonfatal Mid-Air (2nd
Aircraft)
30. August 17, 2010 MiG-21 North Korean AF Fatal (1) Crash Landing in China
31. August 7, 2010 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal LOC During ACM
32. August 6, 2010 MiG-21UM N711MG Nonfatal Aborted Take-Off (Missile Rail Separated) (AirVenture) (AND)
33. July 7, 2010 MiG-21 Vietnamese AF Nonfatal Unknown
34. June 15, 2010 MiG-21M Indian AF Nonfatal Unknown
35. May 29, 2010 MiG-21bis Vietnam AF Nonfatal Engine Failure
36. February 19, 2010 MiG-21FL Indian AF Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
37. January 22, 2010 F-7M Myanmar AF Fatal (1) Landing Overrun
38. November 12, 2009 MiG-21UM Vietnam AF Fatal (2) In-Flight Fire
39. October 2, 2009 MiG-21 Yemen AF Fatal (1) Mechanical Failure
40. October 1, 2009 MiG-21 N315RF Nonfatal LOC During Take-Off Due to Canopy Opening At Rotation (AND)
41. September 20, 2009 MiG-21 N315RF Nonfatal Low Altitude – High-Speed Flight Over Populated Areas (AND)
42. September 10, 2009 MiG-21MF Indian AF Fatal (1) Engine Failure
43. August 5, 2009 F-7 Pakistan AF Fatal (1) Mechanical Failure
44. June 18, 2009 MiG-21FL Indian AF Nonfatal Engine Failure After Take-Off
45. June 6, 2009 MiG-21MF Egyptian AF Unknown Unknown
46. May 29, 2009 FT-7P Pakistan AF Fatal (1) Unknown – Crew Ejected, 1 Fatality and 6 Injured on the Ground
47. May 27, 2009 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal Crashed After Take-Off
48. April 4, 2009 MiG-21 North Korean AF Unknown Engine Failure
49. December 24, 2008 MiG-21 Uganda AF Fatal (1) Crashed During Flight Test (Pilot Did Not Recover From Dive)
50. November 12, 2008 MiG-21U Indian AF Nonfatal Engine Failure
51. October 29, 2008 MiG-21 North Korean AF Unknown Mid-Air (1
st
Aircraft)
52. October 29, 2008 MiG-21 North Korean AF Unknown Mid-Air (2nd
Aircraft)
53. October 9, 2008 F-7 Pakistan AF Nonfatal Night Crash – Unknown
54. July 6, 2008 FT-7M IRIAF (Iran) Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
55. June 21, 2008 FT-7 Pakistan AF Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
56. May 26, 2008 MiG-21bis Croatian AF Nonfatal In-Flight Flap Separation
57. May 23, 2008 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal Fire After High-Speed Landing – Gear Failure
58. May 11, 2008 MiG-21U Vietnamese AF Nonfatal Unknown – Crashed into Residence
59. April 17, 2008 FT-7 Pakistan AF Nonfatal Crashed After Take-Off
60. April 8, 2008 F-7 Bangladesh AF Fatal (1) Unknown (Failed Ejection)
61. February 21, 2008 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal Unknown

62. February 15, 2008 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal Crashed After Take-Off – Suspected Mechanical Failure
63. December 17, 2007 FT-7 Myanmar AF Fatal (2) Unknown
64. December 15, 2007 FT-7 Pakistan AF Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
65. November 23, 2007 MiG-21 Vietnamese AF Nonfatal Unknown
66. October 30, 2007 MiG-21 Lancer B Romanian AF Unknown Nose Cone Failure (Possible FOD) – Collision With Unknown Object
67. October 18, 2007 MiG-21MF Mali AF Unknown Crash Landing
68. September 22, 2007 MiG-21 Syrian AF Unknown Unknown
69. September 22, 2006 MiG-21MF Romanian AF Fatal (1) Crashed in First Post-Restoration Flight
70. September 5, 2007 FT-7 Pakistan AF Fatal (1) Unknown
71. September 4, 2007 MiG-21 Syrian AF Unknown Unknown
72. August 16, 2007 J-7 PLAAF Unknown Unknown (Hit Residential Area Wounding 2 Children)
73. May 22, 2007 MiG-21U Indian AF Fatal (2) Unknown
74. May 22, 2007 MiG-21bis Indian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
75. April 16, 2007 MiG-21U Guinean AF Nonfatal In-Flight Fire (Hit Residential Area and TV Station)
76. March 28, 2007 JJ-7 PLAAF Nonfatal Unknown
77. March 13, 2007 FT-7PG Pakistan AF Nonfatal In-Flight Canopy Separation – Emergency Landing – LOC on Approach
78. March 3, 2007 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Unknown (Failed Ejection – Parachute Failed to Deploy)
79. March 1, 2007 MiG-21FL Indian AF Fatal (1) Bird Strike
80. February 15, 2007 F-7P Pakistan AF Nonfatal Bird Strike
81. February 7, 2007 F-7P Pakistan AF Nonfatal Engine Failure on Landing
82. November 22, 2006 MiG-21 Lancer Romanian AF Fatal (1) Mechanical Failure
83. October 18, 2006 MiG-21U N21UT Fatal (5) Formation Flying - PA-42 Destroyed by MiG’s Jet Blast & Turbulence
84. August 31, 2006 F-7P Pakistan AF Fatal (1) Mechanical Failure
85. June 12, 2006 F-7E PLAAF Fatal (1) Unknown (Hit Industrial Area Killing One Civilian)
86. May 17, 2006 MiG-21UM N1185 Nonfatal Tire Failure After Landing (AND)
87. May 11, 2006 MiG-21U Vietnamese AF Nonfatal In-Flight Fire
88. April 12, 2006 MiG-21 Vietnamese AF Nonfatal Engine Fire
89. April 6, 2006 FT-7 PLAAF Fatal (9) Unknown (Hit Residential area Killing 9)
90. April 5, 2006 F-7 Pakistan AF Fatal (1) Mechanical Failure
91. April 4, 2006 JJ-7 PLAN Fatal (2) Mid-Air Explosion
92. April 5, 2006 F-7P Pakistan AF Fatal (1) Unknown
93. March 21, 2006 MiG-21U Indian AF Fatal (2) Crashed Shortly After Take-Off
94. February 21, 2006 JF-7P Pakistan AF Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
95. January 17, 2006 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal Engine Failure (Surge) (Possibly Weapons Related)
96. December 13, 2005 MiG-21FL Indian AF Nonfatal Engine Failure
97. October 26, 2005 MiG-21U Indian AF Fatal (1) Crashed During Test Evaluation – Engine - (One Killed After Ejection)
98. August 28, 2005 MiG-21 Yemen AF Fatal (1) Unknown
99. August 5, 2005 F-7P Pakistan AF Nonfatal Emergency Landing – Tire Burst on Take-Off
100. June 7, 2005 F-7MB Bangladesh AF Fatal LOC – Mechanical Failure(Hit Residential Area – Ground Fatalities)
101. May 13, 2005 J-7 PLAAF Unknown Unknown
102. April 28, 2005 MiG-21 Yemen AF Fatal (1) Unknown
103. March 15, 2005 F-7H PLAAF Fatal (1) Unknown (Hit Into Residential Area)
104. March 8, 2005 MiG-21 Lancer C Romanian AF Nonfatal LOC During ACM – Spin
105. March 8, 2005 MiG-21bis Indian AF Unknown Unknown
106. January 16, 2005 MiG-21 Yemen AF Fatal (1) LOC on Take-Off - Runway Excursion
107. January 4, 2005 MiG-21bis Indian AF Fatal (4) Crashed Shortly After Take-Off (4 Killed on the Ground)
108. December 5, 2004 MiG-21UM N1185 Nonfatal Runway Excursion Brake/Anti-Skid System (AND)
109. November 9, 2004 J-7B PLAAF Nonfatal Mid-Air (1
st
Aircarft)
110. November 9, 2004 J-7B PLAAF Nonfatal Mid-Air (2nd
Aircarft)
111. November 1, 2004 MiG-21bis Indian AF Nonfatal Engine Failure
112. August 26, 2004 MiG-21 Lancer C Romanian AF Nonfatal Mid-Air (1
st
Aircraft) (Crashed Into Residences)
113. August 26, 2004 MiG-21 Lancer C Romanian AF Nonfatal Mid-Air (2
nd
Aircraft) (Crashed Into Residences)
114. August 18, 2004 F-7M Myanmar AF Nonfatal Mechanical failure (Aircraft Hit Ground Residences)
115. July 1, 2004 F-7 PLAAF Fatal (1) Unknown – 1 Civilian Killed on the Ground
116. June 30, 2004 J-7B PLAAF Nonfatal Mechanical Failure (Killed Person on the Ground)
117. April 22, 2004 MiG-21 Guinean AF Fatal (1) Engine Failure (Pilot Did not Survive Ejection)
118. April 8, 2004 F-7P Pakistan AF Fatal Unknown
119. March 2004 J-7 PLAAF Fatal (1) Mechanical Failure – LOC at on Approach
120. February 21, 2004 MiG-21MF Indian AF Nonfatal Fuel Starvation (Fuel System Failure – 20 Minutes After Take-Off)
121. December 10, 2003 F-7P Pakistan AF Nonfatal Engine Failure
122. November 28, 2003 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
123. October 24, 2003 MiG-21bis Indian AF Nonfatal Mid-Air With UAV (AND)
124. September 25, 2003 MiG-21 Lancer B Romanian AF Fatal (1) Pilot Disorientation at Night
125. August 13, 2003 F-7P Pakistan AF Nonfatal Unknown
126. July 15, 2003 MiG-21 Ugandan AF Fatal (1) LOC During Low-Level Acrobatics
127. July 14, 2003 MiG-21U Indian AF Fatal (2) Engine Failure on Go-Around
128. June 4, 2003 MiG-21bis Indian AF Unknown Unknown
129. May 26, 2003 MiG-21bis Bulgarian AF Unknown Unknown
130. May 20, 2003 MiG-21 Egyptian AF Nonfatal Engine Failure

131. May 16, 2003 MiG 21 Bulgarian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
132. April 26, 2003 MiG-21bis Indian AF Nonfatal Bird Strike
133. April 20, 2003 MiG-21U Indian AF Fatal (2) Unknown
134. April 7, 2003 MiG-21bis UPG Indian AF Nonfatal Crashed After Take-Off Into Residential Area (Ground Injuries)
135. April 1, 2003 MiG-21bis Bulgarian AF Nonfatal Hit Cables at Low Level (AND)
136. February 25, 2003 FT-7B Bangladesh AF Nonfatal Landing Gear Failure on Take-Off
137. December 26, 2002 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Mechanical Failure (Fatality on the Ground - Residence)
138. December 10, 2002 F-7PG Pakistan AF Nonfatal Mid-Air (1
st
Aircraft)
139. December 10, 2002 F-7PG Pakistan AF Nonfatal Mid-Air (2
nd
Aircraft)
140. November 14, 2002 MiG-21U Indian AF Fatal (2) Low-Altitude and Weather – Hit the Ground
141. October 23, 2002 MiG-21 Lancer A Romanian AF Nonfatal Bird Strike on Take-Off
142. October 21, 2002 MiG-21bis Indian AF Unknown Night Flying
143. October 11, 2002 MiG-21U Indian AF Nonfatal Mechanical Failure (Hit Residences)
144. October 1, 2002 F-7M Myanmar AF Fatal (1) Unknown
145. September 9, 2002 MiG-21U Indian AF Nonfatal Unknown
146. September 9, 2002 MiG-21bis UPG Indian AF Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
147. September 9, 2002 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal Engine Failure
148. July 22, 2002 F-7P Pakistan AF Fatal (1) Mechanical Failure (Failed Ejection)
149. July 19, 2002 F-7P Pakistan AF Fatal (1) Engine Failure
150. July 15, 2002 MiG-21U Indian AF Nonfatal Engine Fire After Take-Off
151. July 11, 2002 J-7 PLAAF Nonfatal Landing Gear Failed to Extend – Crash Landing
152. June 27, 2002 MiG-21bis Indian AF Unknown Unknown
153. May 9, 2002 MiG-21U Ethiopian AF Fatal (2) Unknown
154. May 9, 2002 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Crashed During Take-Off
155. May 3, 2002 MiG-21bis Indian AF Fatal (7) Engine Failure (Hit Residential Area, Killing 8, Injuring 17)
156. April 27, 2002 MiG-21 Afghanistan AF Fatal (1) LOC – Failed Ejection
157. April 26, 2002 MiG-21M Indian AF Nonfatal Engine Failure
158. April 20, 2002 MiG-21U Indian AF Fatal (2) Unknown
159. April 5, 2002 MiG-21bis Indian AF Nonfatal Unknown
160. April 4, 2002 MiG-21bis Indian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
161. March 26, 2002 F-7P Pakistan AF Nonfatal Engine Failure After Take-Off
162. March 26, 2002 MiG-21 Lancer A Romanian AF Nonfatal Engine Failure (Fuel Contamination)
163. March 15, 2002 MiG-21 Indian AF Unknown Unknown
164. February 26, 2002 F-7P Pakistan AF Unknown Unknown
165. February 21, 2002 MiG-21 Lancer Romanian AF Fatal (1) Engine Failure
166. February 6, 2002 F-7P Pakistan AF Nonfatal Unknown
167. 2002 MiG-21bis Croatian AF Nonfatal Engine Fire on Start-Up
168. December 27, 2001 MiG-21FL Indian AF Unknown Unknown
169. December 13, 2001 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Engine Failure and In-Flight Fire – Crashed on Final
170. October 1, 2001 F-7M Myanmar AF Fatal (1) Unknown
171. September 27, 2001 F-7P Pakistan AF Fatal (1) Unknown – Failed Ejection (Chute)
172. September 26, 2001 MiG-21M Indian AF Fatal (1) Unknown (One Killed on the Ground)
173. September 22, 2001 MiG-21bis Polish AF Nonfatal Engine Failure – Fire – In-Flight Explosion (Fuel Leak)
174. September 17, 2001 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Crashed After Take-Off (Runway Trim)
175. September 11, 2001 MiG-21 Indian AF Unknown Unknown
176. August 28, 2001 MiG-21FL Indian AF Fatal (1) Bird Strike – Pilot Did Not Survive Ejection
177. July 13, 2001 MiG-21 Lancer C Romanian AF Nonfatal Engine Failure (Test Flight)
178. July 4, 2001 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) In-Flight Fire
179. July 1, 2001 MiG-21 Lancer Romanian AF Nonfatal Unknown
180. July 2001 J-7B PLAAF Unknown Unknown
181. June 8, 2001 MiG-21M Indian AF Nonfatal Crashed After Take-Off
182. June 2, 2001 JJ-7 PLAAF Fatal (2) Bird Strike
183. May 6, 2001 MiG-21bis Indian AF Fatal (1) Flew Into the Ground
184. April 12, 2001 J-7M PLAAF Fatal (1) Crashed on Take-Off
185. April 10, 2001 MiG-21bis Indian AF Unknown Unknown
186. April 1, 2001 J-7B PLAAF Fatal (1) Bird Strike
187. March 31, 2001 J-7E PLAAF Unknown Engine Failure (Turbine Blade Failure and Separation)
188. March 27, 2001 MiG-21 Indian AF Unknown Unknown
189. February 23, 2001 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) In-Flight Fire (Crashed Into Residential Area – Ground Injuries)
190. February 10, 2001 MiG-21bis Indian AF Fatal (1) Stall
191. January 25, 2001 F-7P Pakistan AF Nonfatal Unknown
192. January 22, 2001 F-7 Zimbabwe AF Nonfatal (Blocked Runway – Fuel Starvation)
193. January 22, 2001 F-7 Zimbabwe AF Nonfatal Pilot Disorientation at Night
194. January 7, 2001 FT-7B Bangladesh AF Fatal (1) Crashed After Take-Off (One Successful Ejection)
195. January 2001 F-7IIN D. R. of Congo Nonfatal Lightning Strike
196. December 30, 2000 F-7IIN Zimbabwe AF Unknown Unknown
197. December 18, 2000 MiG-21bis Indian AF Fatal (1) In-Flight Explosion
198. December 11, 2000 MiG-21 North Korean AF Unknown Mid-Air (1st
Aircraft)
199. December 11, 2000 MiG-21 North Korean AF Unknown Mid-Air (2nd
Aircraft)

200. December 7, 2000 F-7IIN Zimbabwe AF Unknown Unknown
201. December 1, 2000 MiG-21 Indian AF Unknown Mechanical Failure
202. November 12, 2000 MiG-21MFN Czech AF Fatal (1) CFIT (1
st
Aircraft)
203. November 12, 2000 MiG-21MFN Czech AF Fatal (1) CFIT (2
nd
Aircraft)
204. November 6, 2000 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal Unknown
205. October 27, 2000 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Unknown – Killed Person on the Ground
206. October 19, 2000 F-7 Myanmar AF Fatal (1) Unknown
207. October 16, 2000 MiG-21U Indian AF Fatal (1) Mid-Air (1
st
Aircraft)
208. October 16, 2000 MiG-21FL Indian AF Non-fatal Mid-Air (2
nd
Aircraft)
209. October 13, 2000 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (2) Crashed Into 18 Houses (Two Children Killed)
210. October 10, 2000 MiG-21MF Czech AF Fatal (1) CFIT (1
st
Aircraft)
211. October 10, 2000 MiG-21MF Czech AF Fatal (1) CFIT (2
nd
Aircraft)
212. September 6, 2000 MiG-21UB Kazakhstan AF Nonfatal LOC at on Landing
213. August 14, 2000 MiG-21 Polish AF Unknown Unknown
214. August 5, 2000 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) LOC After Take-Off
215. July 23, 2000 FT-7BS Sri Lankan AF Nonfatal LOC on Touchdown
216. July 20, 2000 F-7P Pakistan AF Nonfatal Mechanical Failure – Emergency Landing (AND)
217. July 14, 2000 MiG-21bis Polish AF Fatal (1) Stall at Low Altitude While Maneuvering – Late Ejection
218. July 14, 2000 MiG-21UM Indian AF Fatal (2) Engine Failure
219. June 2000 MiG-21US N315RF Nonfatal Fire Warning (Transducer) – Fuel Leak (AND) (2nd
Event)
220. June 11, 2000 MiG-21R Polish AF Nonfatal Hit Ground Obstacle During Flyby
221. June 9, 2000 MiG-21US N315RF Nonfatal Fire Warning (Transducer) – Fuel Leak (AND) (1st
Event)
222. May 23, 2000 MiG-21 Indian AF Unknown Unknown
226. April 20, 2000 MiG-21bis Ethiopian AF Fatal (1) Crashed Into Residential Area
227. April 13, 2000 MiG-21 Indian AF Unknown Unknown
228. April 7, 2000 F-7P Pakistan AF Fatal (1) Unknown
229. March 28, 2000 J-7E PLAAF Fatal (1) LOC – Mechanical Failure
230. February 1, 2000 MiG-21UB Uzbekistan AF Fatal (2) Mid-Air
231. January 4, 2000 MiG-21bis Indian AF Unknown Unknown
232. December 15, 1999 MiG-21FL Indian AF Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
233. December 11, 1999 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
234. November 16, 1999 MiG-21U Yemen AF Fatal (2) Unknown
235. October 29, 1999 MiG-21bis Polish Navy Nonfatal Unknown
236. October 27, 1999 MiG-21bis Indian AF Nonfatal Mid-Air (1
st
Aircraft)
237. October 27, 1999 MiG-21bis Indian AF Unknown Mid-Air (2nd
Aircraft)
239. September 13, 1999 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal In-Flight Fire
240. August 25, 1999 MiG-21US N9242N Fatal (2) LOC in Flight (Possible Failure of External Fuel Tank)
241. August 18, 1999 MiG-21bis Indian AF Nonfatal Erroneous Ejection
242. August 18, 1999 MiG-21bis Indian AF Nonfatal LOC on Wake Turbulence During Take-Off
243. August 17, 1999 MiG-21 Lancer B Romanian AF Nonfatal Failed to Get Airborne (Flap Settings)
244. July 15, 1999 MiG-21bis Ugandan AF Fatal (1) Unknown
245. June 23, 1999 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Unknown – Crashed Into Residential Area
246. June 19, 1999 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Bird Strike
247. June 17, 1999 MiG-21MF Czech AF Fatal (1) Mid-Air (1
st
Aircraft)
248. June 17, 1999 MiG-21UM Czech AF Fatal (2) Mid-Air (2nd
Aircraft) (Low Altitude Ejection)
249. June 17, 1999 MiG-21bis Indian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
250. June 2, 1999 MiG-21UM Bulgarian AF Fatal (2) Crashed After Take-Off (Mechanical Failure)
251. May 31, 1999 F-7M Zimbabwe AF Unknown Unknown
252. May 13, 1999 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal Unknown
253. May 7, 1999 MiG-21bis Polish AF Nonfatal Engine Failure (Turbine Fatigue Cracks)
254. April 20, 1999 MIG-21 Ethiopian AF Fatal (9) Hit Pylon – Crashed Into Residential Area Killing 8 on the Ground
256. April 7, 1999 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal Bird Strike
257. March 26, 1999 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
258. March 23, 1999 F-7M Zimbabwe AF Unknown Unknown
260. March 16, 1999 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal Unknown
261. March 15, 1999 MiG-21U Indian AF Nonfatal Unknown
262. February 18, 1999 F-7M Zimbabwe AF Unknown Unknown
263. February 15, 1999 F-7M Zimbabwe AF Unknown Unknown
264. February 9, 1999 F-7P Pakistan AF Fatal (1) Unknown
265. December 13, 1998 F-7M Zimbabwe AF Unknown Unknown
266. November 18, 1998 J-7 PLAAF Nonfatal Engine Failure (Cracked Engine Compressor)
267. October 27, 1998 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
268. October 26, 1998 FT-7M Bangladesh AF Fatal (1) Unknown

269. October 22, 1998 JJ-7 PLAAF Nonfatal Landing Gear Failure During Touch and Go (Ejections)
270. October 7, 1998 MiG-21bis Indian AF Fatal (1) Possible Mechanical Failure
271. October 1998 J-7L PLAAF Fatal (1) Possible CFIT
272. September 15, 1998 J-7EB PLAAF Fatal (1) Low Altitude Acrobatics
273. September 7, 1998 F-7P Pakistan AF Unknown Unknown
275. August 18, 1998 MiG-21 Yemen AF Unknown Unknown
276. August 14, 1998 MiG-21bis Indian AF Nonfatal Engine Fire After Take-Off (Injured on the Ground)
277. July 30, 1998 F-7P Pakistan AF Fatal (6) Engine Failure (Seized) (Crashed into Street, Killed 6, Injured 25)
278. July 27, 1998 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal Mechanical Failure (Possible Engine Failure)
279. July 16, 1998 MiG-21MFR Bulgarian AF Nonfatal Stall
280. July 9, 1998 MiG-21MF Bulgarian AF Unknown Unknown
281. June 24, 1998 MiG-21bis Indian AF Nonfatal Unknown
282. July 23, 1998 MiG-21MF Vietnamese AF Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
283. July 9, 1998 MiG-21MF Bulgarian AF Nonfatal LOC - Stall on Final
284. June 8, 1998 MiG-21MF Czech AF Nonfatal Mid-Air (1st
Aircraft) (Crashed into Apartment Building)
285. June 8, 1998 MiG-21UM Czech AF Nonfatal Mid-Air (2
nd
Aircraft)
286. June 4, 1998 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
287. May 21, 1998 MiG-21 Serbian AF Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
288. May 12, 1998 MiG-21M Indian AF Fatal (4) Engine Failure – Crashed Into Crowded Mall
289. April 27, 1998 J-7D PLAAF Nonfatal Mid-Air (1
st
Aircraft)
290. April 27, 1998 J-7D PLAAF Fatal (1) Mid-Air (2nd
Aircraft)
291. April 18, 1998 F-7P Pakistan AF Nonfatal Engine Failure
292. March 21, 1998 MiG-21bis Indian AF Unknown Unknown
293. March 14, 1998 MiG-21bis Hungarian AF Unknown Unknown
294. January 21, 1998 MiG-21M Indian AF Nonfatal Engine Failure
295. December 10, 1997 MiG-21UM Romanian AF Nonfatal Engine Failure(Fuel System)
296. October 21, 1997 MiG-21UM Polish Navy Nonfatal Overrun on Take-Off
297. October 3, 1997 F-7P Pakistan AF Nonfatal Bird Strike
298. September 17, 1997 MiG-21bis Indian AF Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
299. September 7, 1997 F-7P Pakistan AF Unknown Unknown
300. September 7, 1997 MiG-21FL Indian AF Unknown Unknown
301. September 2, 1997 MiG-21FL Indian AF Unknown Unknown
302. August 23, 1997 jJ-7 PLAAF Nonfatal Bird Strike
303. June 25, 1997 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Mid-Air (1st
Aircraft)
304. June 25, 1997 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Mid-Air (2
nd
Aircraft)
305. June 10, 1997 MiG-21PFM Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
306. June 9, 1997 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal Bird Strike
307. June 1997 J-7EB PLAAF Unknown Mid-Air (1st
Aircraft)
308. June 1997 J-7EB PLAAF Unknown Mid-Air (2
nd
Aircraft)
309. June 1997 J-7EB PLAAF Unknown Mid-Air (3rd
Aircraft)
310. May 25, 1997 F-7M IRIAF Unknown Unknown
311. May 22, 1997 MiG-21 Romanian AF Nonfatal Unknown
312. February 24, 1997 F-7P Pakistan AF Nonfatal Unknown
313. January 29, 1997 MiG-21bis Indian AF Unknown Unknown
314. January 28, 1997 MiG-21MF Bulgarian AF Nonfatal Bird Strike (Engine Failure)
315. January 23, 1997 MiG-21MF Czech AF Nonfatal LOC on Landing – Runway Excursion
316. January 1997 J-7 PLAAF Unknown Unknown
317. December 27, 1996 MiG-21UM Vietnamese AF Fatal (1) Mechanical Failure - Crashed After Take-Off
318. December 17, 1996 MiG-21 North Korean AF Unknown Unknown
319. December 12, 1996 MiG-21 North Korean AF Unknown Unknown
320. November 14, 1996 MiG-21bis Yugoslav Republic AF Nonfatal Mid-Air (1
st
Aircraft)
321. November 14, 1996 MiG-21bis Yugoslav Republic AF Nonfatal Mid-Air (2
nd
Aircraft)
322. November 13, 1996 MiG-21bis Yugoslav Republic AF Nonfatal Bird Strike
323. September 18, 1996 MiG-21bis Hungarian AF Unknown Unknown
324. October 22, 1996 FT-7 Pakistan AF Nonfatal Unknown
325. October 22, 1996 MiG-21 North Korean AF Unknown Unknown
326. October 17, 1996 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
327. October 11, 1996 MiG-21 Polish AF Nonfatal Engine Failure on Take-Off - Aborted Take-Off - Overrun
328. October 9, 1996 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal Engine Fire on Approach
329. September 18, 1996 MiG-21bis Hungarian AF Unknown Afterburner Failure/Hydraulic Failure
330. September 15, 1996 F-7P Pakistan AF Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
331. September 3, 1996 MiG-21MF Polish AF Nonfatal Unknown
332. September 2, 1996 MiG-21MF Czech AF Nonfatal Flew Into Trees (Severe Injuries)
333. August 14, 1996 MiG-21 Croatian AF Fatal (1) LOC During Break for Landing
334. July 29, 1996 MiG-21bis Polish Navy Nonfatal Engine Failure and Fire
335. July 18, 1996 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal Engine Failure
336. June 28, 1996 MiG-21bis Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
337. May 8, 1996 F-7 Bangladesh AF Fatal Unknown

338. May 8, 1996 MiG-21US Romanian AF Nonfatal Landing Gear Failure on Landing – Runway Excursion
339. April 24, 1996 MiG-21bis Hungarian AF Nonfatal Hard Landing – Fogged Windshield
340. April 4, 1996 MiG-21FL Indian AF Fatal (1) Engine Failure – Failed Ejection (Capsule Separation Failure)
341. April 1996 MiG-21UM Romanian AF Nonfatal Crashed on Final Approach
342. March 28, 1996 MiG-21 Indian AF Unknown Fuel Tank Mechanical failure (Not External Tanks)
343. March 23, 1996 F-7P Pakistan AF Unknown Mid-Air
344. March 13, 1996 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal Engine Failure on Take-Off
345. March 6, 1996 MiG-21 Mali AF Fatal (1) Unknown
346. February 11, 1996 MiG-21 Indian AF Unknown Unknown
347. February 6, 1996 FT-7 Pakistan AF Nonfatal Unknown
348. August 29, 1995 MiG-21UM Romanian AF Nonfatal Engine Failure
349. August 14, 1995 MiG-21bis Croatian AF Unknown Unknown
350. July 27, 1995 MiG-21UM Romanian AF Fatal (2) Unknown
351. July 15, 1995 F-7P Pakistan AF Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
352. June 9, 1995 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal Unknown
353. April 21, 1995 MiG-21bis Croatian AF Fatal (1) Mechanical Failure
354. April 16, 1995 MiG-21bis Croatian AF Fatal (1) Hit Trees During Low Level Flight
355. March 25, 1995 F-7P Pakistan AF Fatal (1) Mechanical Failure
356. March 22, 1995 MiG-21bis Finish AF Nonfatal Engine Fire
357. March 21, 1995 F-7P Pakistan AF Fatal (1) Unknown
358. March 21, 1995 F-7P Pakistan AF Fatal (1) Mechanical Failure
360. February 27, 1995 F-7M Zimbabwe AF Fatal (1) Engine Failure
361. February 14, 1995 MiG-21 Vietnamese AF Unknown Unknown
362. February 4, 1995 MiG-21 Vietnamese AF Unknown Unknown
363. January 6, 1995 MiG-21bis Indian AF Nonfatal Bird Strike
364. 1995 MiG-21bis Finnish AF Nonfatal Collided With Aerial Tow Target (AND)
365. December 28, 1994 MiG-21bis Bulgarian AF Fatal (1) Auto-Pilot Related Engine Problems
366. December 12, 1994 MiG-21bis Indian AF Nonfatal LOC on Landing (Rolled Over)
367. November 14, 1994 F-7M Zimbabwe AF Unknown Unknown
368. October 27, 1994 MiG-21bis Indian AF Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
369. October 18, 1994 MiG-21M Indian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
370. October 14, 1994 MiG-21MF Romanian AF Fatal (1) Pilot Error
371. September 29, 1994 MiG-21MF Romanian AF Nonfatal Unknown
372. September 23, 1994 MiG-21U Vietnamese AF Fatal (2) Aborted Take-Off
373. September 17, 1994 MiG-21U Indian AF Fatal (2) Hit Ground Vehicle During Emergency Landing
374. September 4, 1994 F-7 Bangladesh AF Unknown Unknown
375. August 31, 1994 F-7P Pakistan AF Fatal (1) In-Flight Canopy Failure – Failed Landing
376. August 25, 1994 MiG-21FL Indian AF Nonfatal Burst Tires on landing – Runway Excursion - Overturned
377. August 11, 1994 MiG-21bis Indian AF Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
378. June 29, 1994 MiG-21MF Romanian AF Nonfatal Bird Strike
379. June 26, 1994 MiG-21bis Angolan AF Fatal (1) Unknown
380. June 1, 1994 MiG-21UM Hungarian AF Fatal (1) Unknown (One Pilot Did Not Eject)
381. June 1, 1994 MiG-21bis Yugoslav Republic AF Fatal (1) Mid-Air (1st
Aircraft)
382. June 1, 1994 MiG-21bis Yugoslav Republic AF Nonfatal Mid-Air (2
nd
Aircraft)
383. May 17, 1994 MiG-21MF Romanian AF Fatal (1) Flew Into the Ground During low Altitude Maneuvering
384. May 2, 1994 MiG-21F South Yemen AF Fatal (1) Unknown
385. March 29, 1994 MiG-21bis Indian AF Nonfatal In-Flight Canopy Failure
386. March 15, 1994 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) CFIT
387. March 10, 1994 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Crashed on Landing on the Runway
388. March 5, 1994 MiG-21PF N121MG Nonfatal Drag Chute Failure (AND)
389. March 1, 1994 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal Caught Fire on the Ground Due to Fuel leak
390. February 25, 1994 MiG-21bis Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
391. February 21, 1994 MiG-21FL Indian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
392. February 14, 1994 MiG-21 Indian AF Unknown Crashed on the Runway During Landing
394. September 15, 1993 MiG-21MF Czech AF Nonfatal Mid-Air (1
st
AircarfT) (AND)
395. September 15, 1993 MiG-21MF Czech AF Nonfatal Mid-Air (2
nd
AircarfT) (AND)
396. August 25, 1993 MiG-21 Indian AF Unknown Unknown
397. August 8, 1993 MiG-21 Yemen AF Fatal (1) Mid-Air (1
st
Aircraft)
398. August 8, 1993 MiG-21 Yemen AF Fatal (1) Mid-Air (2
nd
Aircraft)
399. July 28, 1993 MiG-21MF Czech AF Nonfatal Landing Gear Failure (Failed to Extend) (AND)
400. June 15, 1993 MiG-21 Yugoslav AF Unknown Unknown
401. June 26, 1993 MiG-21 Indian AF Unknown Unknown
402. May 19, 1993m MiG-21 Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Engine Failure
403. April 27, 1993 MiG-21 Indian AF Unknown Tire Burst on Landing
404. April 15, 1993 MiG-21U Indian AF Fatal (2) Engine Failure After Take-Off (Late Ejection)
405. April 13, 1993 MiG-21UM Romanian AF Fatal (2) Mid-Air (1
st
Aircraft)
406. April 13, 1993 MiG-21 Romanian AF Nonfatal Mid-Air (2
nd
Aircraft)

407. March 13, 1993 MiG-21UM Romanian AF Fatal (2) Mid-Air (1
st
Aircraft)
408. March 13, 1993 MiG-21 Romanian AF Fatal (2) Mid-Air (2
nd
Aircraft)
409. December 15, 1992 MiG-21bis Indian AF Fatal (1) G-LOC
410. December 3, 1992 MiG-21 Indian AF Unknown Unknown
411. November 20, 1992 MiG-21 PFM Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
412. November 20, 1992 MiG-21PFM Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
413. November 11, 1992 MiG-21bis Finnish AF Fatal (1) Spatial Disorientation
414. November 4, 1992 MiG-21 Romanian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
415. September 25, 1992 MiG-21bis Indian AF Fatal (1) LOC During Maneuvering (High Density Altitude)
416. September 15, 1992 MiG-21bis Indian AF Fatal (1) G LOC – Spin
417. August 28, 1992 MiG-21MF Czechoslovakian AF Fatal (1) Low Level Demonstration
418. August 5, 1992 MiG-21bis Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
419. June 10, 1992 MiG-21MF Czechoslovakian AF Fatal (1) LOC (High AOA) Failed Ejection – Pyros Malfunction
420. June 4, 1992 MiG-21 Indian AF Unknown Unknown
421. May 13, 1992 MiG-21bis Indian AF Fatal (1) LOC During ACM – Failed Ejection
423. April 22, 1992 F-7P Pakistan AF Fatal (2) Engine Failure (Killed Two on the Ground)
424. April 8, 1992 MiG-21UM Romanian AF Fatal (2) Unknown
425. February 27, 1992 MiG-21 Romanian AF Fatal (1) Unknown (Night Flight)
426. February 4, 1992 MiG-21MF Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Landing Accident
427. January 28, 1992 MiG-21UM Bulgarian AF Fatal (1) Spatial Disorientation
428. November 5, 1991 MiG-21bis Finnish AF Nonfatal Landing Gear Failure on Landing
429. October 31, 1991 MiG-21PFM Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Landing Accident (AND)
430. October 1, 1991 MiG-21MF Czechoslovakia AF Nonfatal Engine Failure
431. September 12, 1991 MiG-21MF Hungarian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
432. August 25, 1991 MiG-21 Yugoslav AF Fatal (1) Unknown
433. August 22, 1991 MiG-21bis Hungarian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
434. August 7, 1991 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
435. July 19, 1991 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Crashed After Take-Off
436. July 9, 1991 MiG-21UM Romanian AF Fatal (2) Unknown
437. July 1991 MiG-21 Russian Air Force Nonfatal Engine Failure on Approach
438. June 27, 1991 MiG-21bis Russian Air Force Nonfatal Spin
439. June 12, 1991 MiG-21 Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Landing Accident (AND)
440. June 1991 MiG-21R Romanian AF Nonfatal Unknown
441. April 22, 1991 MiG-21MA Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Mid-Air (1st
Aircraft)
442. April 22, 1991 MiG-21MA Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Mid-Air (2
nd
Aircraft)
443. March 19, 1991 MiG-21U Hungarian AF Nonfatal Emergency Landing – Oil Pressure System (AND)
444. March 1, 1991 MiG-21 MF Polish Air Force Unknown Mid-Air
445. March 1, 1991 MiG-21bis Indian AF Fatal (1) Crashed into Hill on Approach
446. 1991 MiG-21PF Laos AF Unknown Unknown
447. 1991 MiG-21SPS Polish AF Unknown Unknown
448. 1991 MiG-21 Romanian AF Unknown Unknown
449. December 28, 1990 MiG-21 Indian AF Unknown Unknown
450. November 21, 1990 MiG-21 Angolan AF Unknown Unknown
451. November 16, 1990 MiG-21bis Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
452. November 14, 1990 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Spatial Disorientation
453. September 11, 1990 MiG-21R Soviet Air Force Fatal (1) Loss of Airspeed on Final
454. July 31, 1990 MiG-21MF Romanian AF Fatal (1) CFIT
455. June 29, 1990 MiG-21bis Hungarian AF Nonfatal In-Flight Fire – Hydraulic Leak
456. June 10, 1990 MiG-21 Afghanistan AF Nonfatal Engine Failure
457. March 8, 1990 MIG-21 SPS DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Engine Fire
458. February 19, 1990 MiG-21bis DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Engine Failure (Afterburner Failure)
459. February 16, 1990 MiG-21MF Czech AF Unknown Unknown
460. 1990 MiG-21bis Bulgarian AF Unknown Unknown
461. December 14, 1989 MiG-21bis Angolan AF Nonfatal Crash Landing (Lost/Fuel)
462. November 23, 1989 MiG-21MF Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Engine Failure (Surge)
463. November 10, 1989 MiG-21 Indian AF Unknown Unknown
464. October 13, 1989 MiG-21PF Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
465. October 11, 1989 MiG-21UM Congo AF Unknown Unknown
466. October 5, 1989 MiG-21PFM Bulgarian AF Fatal (1) PIO – Flight Control failure on Approach
467. September 13, 1989 MiG-21PFM/SPS DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Gear-Up Landing
468. September 8, 1989 MiG-21MF Romanian AF Nonfatal Unknown
469. August 4, 1989 MiG-21MF Angolan AF Unknown Unknown
470. July 20, 1989 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal Fuel Starvation (Pilot Lost)
471. July 20, 1989 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Engine Fire
472. June 19, 1989 MiG-21 Zimbabwe AF Fatal (1) Failed to Get Airborne on Take-Off – Overrun - Fire
473. June 14, 1989 MiG-21 Mozambique AF Fatal (1) Attempted to Land in Strom
474. May 10, 1989 MiG-21bis Indian AF Unknown Engine Flame-Out
475. May 3, 1989 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Unknown

476. April 20, 1989 MiG-21UM Romanian AF Fatal (2) LOC at Low Altitude
477. April 19, 1989 MiG-21 Cuban AF Fatal (4) Unknown – Killed 3 on the Ground
478. April 18, 1989 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal In-Flight Fire
479. April 13, 1989 MiG-21bis Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
480. April 11, 1989 MiG-21U Czechoslovakian AF Fatal (2) Stall at Low Altitude (High AOA)
481. May 24, 1989 MiG-21PF Slovakia AF Unknown Unknown
482. May 10, 1989 MiG-21bis Indian AF Unknown Engine Failure
483. March 15, 1989 MiG-21 Angolan AF Fatal (1) Crashed on Landing
484. March 14, 1989 MiG-21bis Hungarian AF Nonfatal Mid-Air in IMC (1
st
Aircraft)
485. March 14, 1989 MiG-21bis Hungarian AF Nonfatal Mid-Air in IMC (2
nd
Aircraft)
486. February 23, 1989 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Fatal (1) Possible Pilot incapacitation (O2) During Test Flight
487. December 13, 1988 MiG-21 Angolan AF Fatal (11) Engine Failure - Crashed Into Structure – Killed 11
488. December 2, 1988 MiG-21 Indian AF Unknown Mid-Air (1
st
Aircarft)
489. December 2, 1988 MiG-21 Indian AF Unknown Mid-Air (2
nd
Aircarft)
490. November 22, 1988 MiG-21SMT Soviet Air Force Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
491. November 8, 1988 MiG-21bis Indian AF Fatal (1) Crashed During Flyby
492. November 2, 1988 MiG-21PFM Czechoslovakian AF Fatal (1) Possible Flight Controls Failure
493. October 14, 1988 MiG-21U Czechoslovakian AF Fatal (2) Unknown
495. August 18, 1988 MiG-21bis Hungarian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
497. August 4, 1988 MiG-21bis Angolan AF Unknown Unknown
498. July 9, 1988 MiG-21bis Angolan AF Unknown Unknown
499. July 5, 1988 MiG-21MF Angolan AF Unknown Unknown
500. June 21, 1988 MiG-21bis Soviet Air Force Fatal (1) Stall on Landing
501. June 17, 1988 MiG-21bis Polish Air Force Fatal Crashed During Final Approach at Night (LOC)
503. June 10, 1988 MiG-21bis Hungarian AF Nonfatal Unknown
504. June 3, 1988 MiG-21 Nigerian AF Fatal (13) Mechanical – Crashed Into residential Area – Killed 12 on the Ground
505. May 27, 1988 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown (AND)
506. May 25, 1988 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
507. May 21, 1988 MiG-21bis Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown
508. May 6, 1988 MiG-21UM Hungarian AF Nonfatal Unknown
509. May 6, 1988 MiG-21PFM DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Mechanical Failure
510. May 4, 1988 MiG-21MF Czechoslovakian AF Fatal (1) Mid-Air (1
st
Aircraft)
511. May 4, 1988 MiG-21MF Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Mid-Air (2
nd
Aircraft)
512. April 21, 1988 MiG-21F DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Mid-Air (1
st
Aircraft)
513. April 21, 1988 MiG-21F DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Mid-Air (2nd
Aircraft)
514. April 21, 1988 MiG-21PFM Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal LOC (High AOA)
515. April 15, 1988 MiG-21 Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Fuel Starvation on Final
516. April 7, 1988 MiG-21bis Angolan AF Unknown Unknown
517. March 16, 1988 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
518. March 14, 1988 MiG-21bis Angolan AF Unknown Unknown
519. March 4, 1988 MiG-21MF Polish Air Force Fatal (1) Engine Failure
520. January 11, 1988 MiG-21 Indian AF Unknown Unknown
521. December 27, 1987 MiG-21bis Angolan AF Unknown Unknown (1st
Aircraft)
522. December 27, 1987 MiG-21bis Angolan AF Unknown Unknown (2
nd
Aircraft)
523. December 26, 1987 MiG-21bis Angolan AF Unknown Unknown
524. December 12, 1987 MiG-21MF Angolan AF Unknown Unknown
525. November 25, 1987 MiG-21MF Angolan AF Unknown Unknown
526. September 3, 1987 MiG-21bis Indian AF Unknown Crashed During Low-Level Flight
527. September 2, 1987 MiG-21bis Angolan AF Unknown Unknown
528. August 19, 1987 MiG-21bis Angolan AF Unknown Unknown
529. July 30, 1987 MiG-21UM Angolan AF Unknown Unknown
530. June 27, 1987 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Fatal (1) Flew Into the Ground
531. July 21, 1987 MiG-21 Indian AF Unknown Unknown
532. June 22, 1987 MiG-21bis Angolan AF Unknown Unknown
533. June 8, 1987 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
534. June 8, 1987 MiG-21 Sudan AF Nonfatal Crash Landing
535. June 3, 1987 MiG-21R Polish Air Force Fatal (1) LOC at Low Altitude (Distraction)
536. March 15, 1987 MiG-21bis Angolan AF Unknown Unknown
537. February 20, 1987 MiG-21bis DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Engine Failure
538. February 1987 MiG-21bis Finnish AF Nonfatal Runway Excursion (AND)
539. January 31, 1987 MiG-21bis Angolan AF Unknown Unknown
542. December 13, 1986 MiG-21bis Angolan AF Unknown Unknown
543. November 21, 1986 MiG-21bis DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Total Power Loss (Electrical)
544. September 30, 1986 MiG-21bis Finnish AF Nonfatal Engine Failure

545. September 22, 1986 MiG-21MF Angolan AF Unknown Unknown
546. September 17, 1986 MiG-21SMT Soviet Air Force Nonfatal Ground Collision With Landing Aircraft (Runway Incursion)
547. September 17, 1986 MiG-21SMT Soviet Air Force Nonfatal Collision With Aircraft on the Runway (Runway Incursion)
548. August 29, 1986 MIG-21 PFM DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Engine Failure
549. August 27, 1986 MiG-21UM Bulgarian AF Unknown Unknown
550. August 27, 1986 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
552. July 17, 1986 MiG-21UM Hungarian AF Fatal (2) Crashed After Take-Off (Possible Engine Failure)
553. July 2, 1986 MiG-21PFM Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
554. June 17, 1986 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Unknown (One Killed on the Ground, 10 Injured)
555. June 14, 1986 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (13) Mechanical Failure (Hit Residential Area, Killing 13)
556. March 25, 1986 MiG-21PF Hungarian AF Nonfatal Engine Failure
557. February 23, 1986 MiG-21F-13 Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
558. January 10, 1986 MiG-21R Soviet Air Force Fatal (1) Spatial Disorientation
559. January 9, 1986 MiG-21PFM Soviet Air Force Fatal (1) Unknown (Disappeared – Debris Found in 2006)
560. 1986 MiG-21UM Cuban AF Unknown Unknown
561. December 19, 1985 MiG-21MF Czechoslovakian AF Fatal (1) Crashed on Instrument Approach (Short of the Runway)
562. December 16, 1985 MiG-21 Yemen Fatal (1) Mechanical Failure
564. August 6, 1985 MiG-21UM Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
565. July 31, 1985 MiG-21bis Angolan AF Fatal (1) Landing Accident
566. July 25, 1985 MiG-21MF Hungarian AF Nonfatal Unknown
567. June 28, 1985 MiG-21PF Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Engine Failure After Take-Off (Surge)
568. June 22, 1985 MiG-21MF Bulgarian AF Nonfatal Engine Exploded on the Runway (Compressor Blade)
569. June 1, 1985 MiG-21M Indian AF Unknown Unknown
571. May 21, 1985 MiG-21PF Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
572. May 11, 1985 MiG-21UM Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
573. May 10, 1985 MiG-21MF Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Fire After Emergency Landing
575. April 11, 1985 MiG-21F-13 Bulgarian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
576. April 9, 1985 MiG-21M Indian AF Fatal (11) Crash After Take-Off (Hit Residential Area, 11 killed)
577. April 1, 1985 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown LOC
578. March 15, 1985 MiG-21M DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Hydraulic Failure (Line) (Aircraft Crashed Into University Dorm)
579. March 8, 1985 MiG-21UM Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown (1st
Aircraft)
580. March 8, 1985 MiG-21UM Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown (2
nd
Aircraft)
581. February 15, 1985 MiG-21UM Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown
582. November 28, 1984 MiG-21M Romanian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
583. October 22, 1984 MiG-21MF Bulgarian AF Nonfatal Loss of Power
584. October 16, 1984 MiG-21UM Hungarian AF Fatal (1) Bird Strike
585. September 22, 1984 MiG-21M DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Unknown
586. August 24, 1984 MiG-21bis Finnish AF Nonfatal Oil Loss (Cap Opened in Flight)
587. August 16, 1984 MiG-21bis Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown
588. August 9, 1984 MiG-21bis Angolan AF Nonfatal Fuel Starvation
589. June 17, 1984 MiG-21M Bulgarian AF Nonfatal Unknown
590. June 5, 1984 MiG-21MF Hungarian AF Nonfatal Mid-Air (1st
Aircraft)
591. June 5, 1984 MiG-21MF Hungarian AF Fatal (1) Mid-Air (2
nd
Aircraft)
592. May 16, 1984 MiG-21bis Hungarian AF Nonfatal Unknown (AND)
593. May 9, 1984 MiG-21UM DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (2) Oxygen-Fueled Fire in the Cockpit
594. April 25, 1984 MiG-21 SPS-K DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Landing Gear Failure (Failure to Extend)
595. April 12, 1984 MiG-21bis Hungarian AF Nonfatal Unknown
596. April 11, 1984 MiG-21PFM Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Engine Failure
597. March 21, 1984 MiG-21bis Soviet Air Force Nonfatal Overrun (Brake Failure AND Drag Chute Failure)
598. March 1, 1984 MiG-21 MF Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
599. February 23, 1984 MiG-21bis Hungarian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
600. February 18, 1984 MiG-21PF Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
601. January 27, 1984 MiG-21MF Bulgarian AF Unknown Unknown
602. January 20, 1984 MiG-21bis Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown
603. December 30, 1983 MIG-21 SPS DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
604. December 21, 1983 MiG-21PFM Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
605. December 9, 1983 MiG-21UM Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown
606. December 2, 1983 MiG-21MF Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
607. November 29, 1983 MiG-21 MF Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
608. November 10, 1983 MiG-21bis Angolan AF Fatal (1) Acrobatic Practice
609. November 2, 1983 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
610. October 2, 1983 MiG-21UM Angolan AF Fatal (2) Crashed During ACM
611. September 1, 1983 MiG-21PFM Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
612. July 12, 1983 MiG-21US Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
613. July 7, 1983 MiG-21bis Hungarian AF Unknown Unknown

615. July 1, 1983 MiG-21bis Soviet Air Force Nonfatal Tire Burst on Landing (AND)
616. June 2, 1983 MiG-21UM Bulgarian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
617. May 28, 1983 MiG-21PFM Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Engine Failure
618. May 21, 1983 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Fatal (1) High-Speed Landing – Runway Excursion – Fatal Ground Ejection
619. May 13, 1983 MiG-21 Nigerian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
620. May 12, 1983 MiG-21PFM(SPS) Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
621. May 6, 1983 MiG-21MF Bulgarian AF Fatal (1) LOC on Landing (Disorientation)
622. April 23, 1983 MiG-21 Angolan AF Unknown Unknown
623. April 20, 1983 MiG-21bis Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown
624. March 9, 1983 MiG-21bis DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Engine Fire
625. January 28, 1983 MiG-21UM Hungarian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
626. January 21, 1983 MiG-21US Czechoslovakian AF Fatal (2) Flew Into a Hill
627. 1983 MiG-21 SPS DDR Luftstreitkräfte Unknown Mid-Air (1
st
Aircraft)
628. 1983 MiG-21 SPS DDR Luftstreitkräfte Unknown Mid-Air (2
nd
Aircraft)
629. 1983 MiG-21 USAF 4477th Nonfatal In-Flight Canopy Failure (AND)
630. December 12, 1982 MiG-21UM Angolan AF Fatal (2) Crashed During ACM
631. December 1982 MiG-21 Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
632. November 17, 1982 MiG-21M Polish Air Force Unknown Engine Failure
633. November 8, 1982 MiG-21 Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Engine failure (Compressor)
634. October 29, 1982 MiG-21U Indian AF Fatal (1) Bird Strike on Take-Off (One Ejection)
635. October 8, 1982 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Crashed During Low-Level Flyby
637. October 2, 1982 MiG-21 Indian AF Unknown Unknown
638. September 22, 1982 MiG-21M Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
640. June 11, 1982 MiG-21F-13 Finnish AF Fatal (1) Spatial Disorientation
641. June 1, 1982 MiG-21 Indian AF Nonfatal Engine Fire
642. May 31, 1982 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Stuck Throttle
643. May 17, 1982 MiG-21 MF Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
644. May 3, 1982 MiG-21 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal In-Flight Engine Fire (Landed)
645. April 27, 1982 MiG-21 SPS-K DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Engine Failure on Take-Off
646. March 29, 1982 F-7A Albanian AF Fatal (1) Bird Strike
647. March 3, 1982 MiG-21MF Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
648. February 9, 1982 MiG-21U Hungarian AF Fatal (1) LOC (Wake Turbulence)
649. January 27, 1982 MiG-21bis Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown
650. January 17, 1982 MiG-21M Polish AF Unknown Unknown
651. 1982 MiG-21MF Bangladesh AF Unknown Unknown
652. 1982 MiG-21 USAF 4477th Nonfatal In-Flight Canopy Failure (AND)
653. October 25, 1981 MiG-21MF Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown (1
st
Aircraft)
654. October 25, 1981 MiG-21MFs Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown (2
nd
Aircraft)
655. October 13, 1981 MiG-21bis Hungarian AF Unknown Unknown
656. September 22, 1981 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Mid-Air (1st
Aircraft)
657. September 22, 1981 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Mid-Air (2
nd
Aircraft)
658. September 1, 1981 MiG-21PFM/SPS DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Spatial Disorientation at Night
659. August 27, 1981 MiG-21bis Hungarian AF Unknown Unknown
660. August 12, 1981 MiG-21MFs Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown
661. August 11, 1981 MiG-21PFM Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
662. July 23, 1981 F-7 Pakistan Air Force Unknown Unknown
663. July 9, 1981 MiG-21 Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
665. June 19, 1981 MiG-21MF Nigerian AF Unknown Unknown
666. June 9, 1981 MiG-21bis Hungarian AF Unknown Unknown
667. June 5, 1981 MiG-21 UM Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
668. June 5, 1981 MiG-21UM Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
669. May 22, 1981 MiG-21PFM Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
670. May 6, 1981 MiG-21bis Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown
671. April 21, 1981 MiG-21MF Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Flight Controls Failure
672. April 7, 1981 MiG-21PF Hungarian AF Nonfatal Unknown (AND)
673. April 2, 1991 MiG-21MA Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Flight Controls Failure
674. January 26, 1981 MiG-21bis Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
675. January 8, 1981 MiG-21 SPS DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Canopy Opened in Flight
676. January 6, 1981 MiG-21bis Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
677. 1981 MiG-21MF Cuban AF Unknown Unknown
678. 1981 MiG-21F USAF 4477
th
Nonfatal Engine Failure (Emergency Landing) (AND)
679. December 12, 1980 MiG-21PFM Polish Air Force Fatal (1) LOC – Spatial Disorientation
680. December 7, 1980 MiG-21U DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) LOC – Maneuvered Into the Ground
681. November 1980 MiG-21bis Hungarian AF Nonfatal Unknown (AND)
682. October 24, 1980 MiG-21PFM Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown

683. October 1, 1980 MiG-21 UM Polish Air Force Fatal (1) Fire in the Cockpit – Inadvertent Ejection
684. October 1, 1980 MiG-21UM Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
685. September 17, 1980 MiG-21M Bulgarian AF Unknown Unknown
686. September 1980 MiG-21 Afghanistan AF Fatal (1) CFIT (1
st
Aircraft)
nd
Aircraft)
rd
Aircraft)
689. July 22, 1980 MiG-21MF Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Pilot Disorientation in Clouds
690. July 12, 1980 MiG-21U DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Accessories Drive Shaft Failure
691. July 1, 1980 MiG-21PFM Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown
692. May 8, 1980 MiG-21 SPS DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Unknown
693. April 10, 1980 MiG-21PF Hungarian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
694. April 9, 1980 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Weather Related
695. February 25, 1980 MiG-21 PFM Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
696. February 15, 1980 MiG-21PFM Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown
697. February 1, 1980 MiG-21FL Indian AF Fatal (1) LOC During ACM
698. January 9, 1980 MiG-21PFM Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown
699. October 8, 1979 MiG-21 Romanian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
700. October 1979 MiG-21R Soviet Air Force Nonfatal Unknown
701. September 10, 1979 MiG-21U Yugoslav AF Fatal (2) Unknown
702. September 10, 1979 MiG-21U Yugoslav AF Fatal (2) Unknown
703. August 3, 1979 MiG-21bis DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Mid-Air
704. August 3, 1979 MiG-21UM Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Engine Failure (Compressor)
705. August 2, 1979 MiG-21F-13 Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
706. June 20, 1979 MiG-21M Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
707. June 8, 1979 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Mid-Air (1st
Aircarft)
708. June 8, 1979 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Mid-Air (2
nd
Aircarft)
709. May 29, 1979 MiG-21F Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown
710. April 9, 1979 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Pilot Incapacitation
711. March 26, 1979 MiG-21FL Indian AF Nonfatal Engine Fire
712. March 22, 1979 MiG-21F-13 Polish Air Force Fatal (1) Stall (High AOA)
713. March 11, 1979 MiG-21PF Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
714. January 17, 1979 MiG-21MF Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Unknown
715. 1979 MiG-21UM Cuban AF Unknown Unknown
716. December 28, 1978 MiG-21F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Barrier Engagement
717. December 28, 1978 MiG-21M DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Fuel Starvation (Debris Hit Kindergarten)
718. December 1978 MiG-21PFM Soviet Air Force Fatal (1) Possible Inadvertent Ejection
719. September 4, 1978 MiG-21UM Czechoslovakian AF Fatal (2) Unknown (Pilot Error)
720. August 22, 1978 MiG-21M DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Landing Gear Failure (failed to Extend – Ejection)
721. August 14, 1978 MiG-21F-13 Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
722. August 5, 1978 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Unknown (Pilot Error)
723. July 30, 1978 MiG-21M Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
724. July 28, 1978 MiG-21 Indian AF Fatal (1) Mid-Air with Hunter
725. June 27, 1978 MiG-21MF Hungarian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
726. June 21, 1978 MiG-21bis Yugoslav AF Fatal (1) Unknown
727. June 14, 1978 MiG-21M Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
728. June 14, 1978 MiG-21U Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
729. May 26, 1978 MiG-21 F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Unknown
730. April 27, 1978 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Unknown (Pilot Error)
731. March 23, 1978 MiG-21 SPS-K DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Spatial Disorientation (Fatal High-Speed Ejection)
732. March 1, 1978 MiG-21UB Nigerian AF Fatal (16) Collision With F-27 Airliner at the Airport
733. January 19, 1978 MiG-21 SPS-K DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Unknown
734. January 17, 1978 MiG-21 SPS-K DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal LOC During ACM
735. January 16, 1978 MiG-21M Polish Air Force Fatal (1) Crashed During Circling Approach
736. January 16, 1978 MiG-21U Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
737. December 13, 1977 MiG-21bis Hungarian AF Nonfatal Unknown
738. November 21, 1977 MiG-21S Soviet Air Force Fatal (1) Tow Low on IFR Approach
739. November 19, 1977 MiG-21F Finnish AF Nonfatal Landing Gear Failure to Extend (Pilot Ejected)
740. November 15, 1977 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Fatal (1) Cracked Canopy (Supersonic Impact)
741. November 14, 1977 MiG-21 MF Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
742. October 15, 1977 MiG-21MF Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Mechanical Failure
743. October 12, 1977 MiG-21 F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Unknown
744. September 30, 1977 MiG-21 Romanian AF Unknown Unknown
745. October 3, 1977 MiG-21F-13 Polish AF Nonfatal Unknown
746. September 26, 1977 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Pilot Ejected Having Misdiagnosed an Engine Failure
747. September 20, 1977 MiG-21 MF Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
748. September 20, 1977 MiG-21 US Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
749. September 8, 1977 MiG-21 Romanian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
750. August 17, 1977 MiG-21MF DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Engine Failure – Bird Strike
751. July 28, 1977 MiG-21 SPS-K DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Hit the Ground

752. July 24, 1977 MiG-21PFM Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown
753. July 13, 1977 MiG-21MF Hungarian AF Nonfatal Unknown (AND)
754. July 9, 1977 MiG-21M Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown
755. June 21, 1977 MiG-21M Bulgarian AF Unknown Unknown
756. June 21, 1977 MiG-21M Bulgarian AF Unknown Unknown
757. June 15, 1977 MiG-21MF Polish Air Force Fatal (1) Fuel Starvation – Failed Ejection
758. May 24, 1977 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Mechanical Failure
759. March 1977 MiG-21R Romanian AF Unknown Unknown
760. April 13, 1977 MiG-21R Soviet AF Nonfatal Engine Failure (Oil System Failure)
761. February 10, 1977 MiG-21PFM Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown
762. January 18, 1977 MiG-21MF Hungarian AF Unknown Unknown
763. January 13, 1977 MiG-21SPS DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Collapsed From Jacks (AND)
764. October 23, 1976 MiG-21F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Aircraft Jumped the Chocks During Engine Run (AND)
765. October 2, 1976 MiG-21PFM DDR Luftstreitkräfte Unknown Mechanical Failure
766. October 1, 1976 MiG-21MF Nigerian AF Unknown Unknown
767. September 25, 1976 MiG-21MF Hungarian AF Unknown Unknown
768. September 6, 1976 MiG-21MF DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Mid-Air with Mi-4
769. September 1, 1976 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Landing Gear Failed to Extend (AND)
770. August 9, 1976 MiG-21U DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal FOD on Start-Up (Total Loss)
771. August 3, 1976 MiG-21bis Hungarian AF Nonfatal Unknown
772. July 28, 1976 MiG-21 Indian AF Unknown Unknown
773. July 13, 1976 MiG-21 Romanian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
774. July 7, 1976 MiG-21US Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
775. July 1, 1976 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Engine Failure
776. June 1, 1976 MiG-21F Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown
777. May 20, 1976 MiG-21 Romanian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
778. May 18, 1976 MiG-21PFM Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown
779. May 11, 1976 MiG-21U DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Hard Landing
780. April 1976 MiG-21MF Angolan AF Nonfatal Hydraulic Failure
781. March 20, 1976 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Mechanical Failure (Canopy)
782. March 3, 1976 MiG-21F-13 Finnish AF Unknown Unknown
783. January 29, 1976 MiG-21 SPS DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Unknown
784. January 25, 1976 MiG-21 Ugandan AF Fatal (1) Low Altitude Maneuvering
785. January 23, 1976 MIG-21 SPS DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Unknown
786. January 9, 1976 MiG-21MF Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
787. December 31, 1975 MiG-21 MF Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
788. December 31, 1975 MiG-21 MF Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
789. December 31, 1975 MiG-21M Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
790. December 18, 1975 MiG-21MF Hungarian AF Unknown Unknown
791. November 19, 1975 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Engine Failure (Bearings and Loss of Oil)
792. September 8, 1975 MiG-21F Finnish AF Nonfatal Engine Failure (HP Turbine Failure)
793. August 18, 1975 MiG-21R Czechoslovakian AF Fatal (1) Hit Terrain
794. August 12, 1975 MiG-21 MF Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
795. August 12, 1975 MiG-21 MF Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
796. August 1, 1975 MiG-21U DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Fuel Pump Failure
797. July 8, 1975 MiG-21R Soviet AF Fatal (1) LOC – Bird Strike
798. June 12, 1975 MiG-21UM Romanian AF Fatal (2) Unknown
799. June 1975 MiG-21R Soviet Air Force Fatal (1) LOC – Flew Into the Ground
800. May 15, 1975 MiG-21F-13 Hungarian AF Fatal (1) LOC During ACM – Failed Ejection
801. April 11, 1975 MiG-21FL Indian AF Fatal (1) Mid-Air (1
st
Aircraft)
802. April 11, 1975 MiG-21FL Indian AF Nonfatal Mid-Air (2
nd
Aircraft)
803. April 1, 1975 MiG-21FL Indian AF Fatal (1) Bird Strike
804. February 25, 1975 MiG-21U Indian AF Nonfatal In-Flight Fire
805. January 14, 1975 MiG-21PFM/SPS DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (12) Engine Failure (Compressor Hatch) – Fatalities in Residential Building
806. January 11, 1975 MiG-21 F-13 Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
807. 1975 MiG-21PF Bulgarian AF Unknown Unknown
808. November 14, 1974 MiG-21 SPS-K DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Possible LOC – Hit Residential Area, Wounding Civilians
809. November 12, 1974 MiG-21PF Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
810. September 29, 1974 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Engine Failure
811. September 23, 1974 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
812. August 26, 1974 MiG-21M Bulgarian AF Unknown Unknown
813. August 7, 1974 MiG-21R Soviet Air Force Fatal (1) LOC – Stall (High AOA)
814. July 1974 MiG-21 Romanian AF Unknown Unknown
815. June 20, 1974 MiG-21U DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Nose Wheel Failed to Extend (Ejection)
816. June 1, 1974 MiG-21FL Indian AF Unknown Engine Failure
817. June 1974 MiG-21R Soviet Air Force Unknown Unknown
818. April 11, 1974 MiG-21PFM DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Explosion During Ground Run (Mechanic Killed)
819. March 25, 1974 MIG-21 PFM DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Engine – Fuel Pump Failure
820. March 21, 1974 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Engine Failure

821. November 8, 1973 MiG-21R Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
822. September 29, 1973 MiG-21UM Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
823. September 7, 1973 MiG-21 Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown
824. August 30, 1973 MiG-21MF DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Stall During Maneuvering
825. August 24, 1973 MiG-21 F-13 Polish Air Force Unknown Engine Failure
826. August 15, 1973 MiG-21SPS-K DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Hard Landing and Subsequent Fire
827. August 1, 1973 MiG-21 SPS-K DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Unknown
828. August 1, 1973 MiG-21FL Indian AF Unknown Bird Strike
829. July 9, 1973 MiG-21U DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Throttle Jammed, Engine Remained in Afterburner
830. June 26, 1973 MiG-21 SPS DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) LOC – Dive
831. June 26, 1973 MiG-21M DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Landing Accident
832. June 23, 1973 MiG-21MF DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Mid-Air (1
st
Aircraft)
833. June 23, 1973 MiG-21MF DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Mid-Air (2
nd
Aircraft)
834. June 1, 1973 MiG-21UM Indian AF Unknown Engine Failure
835. May 31, 1973 MiG-21F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Overrun – Landing Gear Failure (AND)
836. May 30, 1973 MiG-21FL Indian AF Fatal (1) LOC During ACM (Mushed into the Ground)
837. May 14, 1973 MiG-21 SPS-K DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Engine Failure (Turbine Blades)
838. May 10, 1973 MIG-21 SPS DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Engine Failure
839. March 26, 1973 MiG-21MA Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
840. March 16, 1973 MiG-21FL Indian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
841. February 15, 1973 MiG-21 Egyptian AF Fatal (1) Flew Into the Water at Low Level
842. February 10, 1973 MiG-21 SPS-K DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Landing Gear Failure (Failed to Extend)
843. January 26, 1973 MiG-21 PF DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Engine Failure on Start-Up – Engine Fire (Aircraft Destroyed)
844. January 16, 1973 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
845. December 1, 1972 MiG-21FL Indian AF Unknown Bird Strike
846. December 1, 1972 MiG-21FL Indian AF Unknown Crashed After Take-Off
847. November 25, 1972 MiG-21FL Indian AF Fatal (1) Engine Failure
848. October 3, 1972 MiG-21F-13 Hungarian AF Unknown Unknown
849. September 4, 1972 MiG-21 Romanian AF Nonfatal Engine Failure During Take-Off (Compressor Failure)
850. September 19, 1972 MiG-21PF Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
851. August 29, 1972 MiG-21U DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Engine Failure (Fuel Pump Failure)
852. August 16, 1972 MiG-21MF Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
853. July 21, 1972 MiG-21R Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
854. June 15, 1972 MiG-21PFM DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Mid-Air With Su-7
855. June 6, 1972 MiG-21 SPS-K DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal PIO on Landing – Gear Collapsed – Fire
856. June 1972 MiG-21 Romanian AF Nonfatal Unknown (Night Flight)
857. May 26, 1972 MiG-21US Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
858. May 3, 1972 MiG-21M DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal(1) In-Flight Partial Ejection (Telescope Tube Partially Deployed)
859. April 6, 1972 MiG-21U Hungarian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
860. April 4, 1972 MiG-21FL Indian AF Fatal (1) Bird Strike
861. March 20, 1972 MiG-21 PF DDR Luftstreitkräfte Unknown Overrun
862. February 15, 1972 MiG-21PFM Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
863. January 6, 1972 MiG-21PFM Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
864. November 3, 1971 MiG-21M Bulgarian AF Unknown Unknown
865. October 1971 MiG-21PFM Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
866. September 21, 1971 MiG-21R Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
867. September 9, 1971 MiG-21F-13 Hungarian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
869. August 31, 1971 MiG-21 PFM Polish Air Force Unknown Mid-Air
870. August 31, 1971 MiG-21 PFM Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
871. August 25, 1971 MiG-21U DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Engine Failure
872. August 2, 1971 MiG-21 SPS DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal PIO on Landing – Hard Landing – Gear Collapse
873. July 27, 1971 MiG-21 MF Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
874. July 8, 1971 MiG-21 Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown
875. July 2, 1971 MiG-21F Finnish AF Nonfatal Hit Trees at Low Level
876. May 18, 1971 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
877. May 11, 1971 MiG-21M Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
878. May 11, 1971 MiG-21F-13 Polish Air Force Unknown Mid-Air
879. May 6, 1971 MiG-21 Polish Air Force Fatal (1) LOC Over Airfield – Hit MiG-15UTI on the Ground
880. April 27, 1971 MiG-21PFM DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Hit the Ground
881. April 23, 1971 MiG-21PF Hungarian AF Nonfatal Flight Controls Failure
882. April 15, 1971 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
883. February 16, 1971 MiG-21PFM Polish Air Force Fatal (1) LOC – Spatial Disorientation
884. November 9, 1970 MiG-21PF Polish Air Force Fatal (1) Mid-Air
885. October 28, 1970 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
886. September 26, 1970 MiG-21F-13 Hungarian AF Unknown Unknown
887. September 18, 1970 MiG-21 PFM Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
888. September 11, 1970 MiG-21UM DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Spatial Disorientation
889. September 3, 1970 MiG-21M Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown

890. September 1970 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
891. August 12, 1970 MiG-21MA Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
892. August 11, 1970 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
893. May 14, 1970 MiG-21U DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (2) Crash Landing
894. May 8, 1970 MiG-21SN Polish Air Force Nonfatal Engine Failure
895. May 6, 1970 MiG-21F Finnish AF Fatal (1) Unknown
896. April 2, 1970 MiG-21PF Polish Air Force Fatal (1) LOC – Pilot Disorientation
897. March 18, 1970 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
898. March 16, 1970 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
899. March 4, 1970 MiG-21F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal LOC on Landing - Overturned
900. February 25, 1970 MiG-21FL Indian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
901. February 5, 1970 MiG-21PF DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Brake Failure During Landing (Hit Airfield Structure) (AND)
902. January 10, 1970 MiG-21U DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Hard Landing – Gear Failure – Runway Excursion
903. January 6 , 1970 MiG-21PFM Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Mid-Air (1
st
Aircarft)
904. January 6, 1970 MiG-21PFM Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Mid-Air (2
nd
Aircarft)
905. November 6, 1969 MiG-21F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Overrun – Landing Gear Failure
906. September 29, 1969 MiG-21 Indian Air Force Fatal (1) Afterburner Failure During Take-Off
907. September 25, 1969 MiG-21F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Mechanical Failure –Undershoot - (Emergency Landing)
908. September 25, 1969 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Mechanical Failure-Crash Landed 400 Meters Short of the Runway
909. August 13, 1969 MiG-21PFM Polish Air Force Fatal (1) Flew Into the Ground After Take-Off
910. August 12, 1969 MiG-21 Polish Air Force Fatal (1) Flew Into the Ground
911. July 17, 1969 MiG-21F-13 Hungarian AF Unknown Unknown
912. July 10, 1969 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Mechanical Failure
913. July 1, 1969 MiG-21FL Indian AF Fatal (1) Aborted Take-Off – Overrun
914. July 3, 1969 MiG-21F-13 Hungarian AF Unknown Unknown
915. June 5, 1969 MiG-21F-13 Hungarian AF Unknown Unknown
916. May 27, 1969 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Mechanical Failure
917. May 16, 1969 MiG-21 SPS DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Hit the Ground
918. May 10, 1969 MiG-21U DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Flight Controls Failure
919. May 10, 1969 MiG-21F-13 Hungarian AF Nonfatal Unknown
920. April 29, 1969 MIG-21 PFM DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
921. April 18, 1969 MiG-21F DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Premature Gear Retraction (AND)
922. April 16, 1969 MiG-21U DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Lightning Strike (One Pilot Did Not Survive the Ejection)
923. April 10, 1969 MiG-21PFM Bulgarian AF Unknown Unknown
924. March 8, 1969 MiG-21U Hungarian AF Unknown Unknown
925. February 24, 1969 MiG-21 F-13 Polish Air Force Fatal (1) In-Flight Explosion – Failed Ejection
926. January 29, 1969 MiG-21 SPS-K DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Engine Failure on Take-Off
927. January 24, 1969 MiG-21PFM Polish Air Force Fatal (1) Flew Into the Ground
928. December 16, 1968 MiG-21 SPS-K DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal LOC on Approach (Aircraft Flew on for 20 Miles)
929. December 12, 1968 MiG-21U DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (2) Mechanical Failure
930. November 25, 1968 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Mechanical Failure
931. November 25, 1968 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
932. October 17, 1968 MiG-21PF Hungarian AF Nonfatal Unknown (Night Flight)
933. September 2, 1968 MiG-21PF DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Overrun – Brake Failure
934. August 20, 1968 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Mechanical Failure
935. August 17, 1968 MiG-21F-13 Hungarian AF Nonfatal Unknown
936. August 10, 1968 MiG-21 F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Unknown
937. August 9, 1968 MiG-21PF Bulgarian AF Fatal (1) LOC on Turn to Final
938. August 8, 1968 MiG-21F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) LOC on landing - Overturned
939. August 4, 1968 MIG-21 PFM DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
940. July 20, 1968 MiG-21 SPS-K DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
941. July 5, 1968 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Mechanical Failure
942. June 18, 1968 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
943. June 1, 1968 MiG-21PFM Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
944. May 23, 1968 MiG-21 PFM Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
945. May 23, 1968 MiG-21PFM Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
946. May 18, 1968 MiG-21 SPS DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Unknown
947. May 16, 1968 MiG-21F-13 Hungarian AF Unknown Unknown
948. May 3, 1968 MiG-21PFM/SPS DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Ground Collision with AN-2
949. May 3, 1968 MiG-21PFM/SPS DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Engine Failure (Fuel Contamination) - Parachute Failed to Open
950. April 22, 1968 MiG-21PF Hungarian AF Unknown Unknown
951. March 29, 1968 MiG-21FL Indian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
952. March 25, 1968 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Mid-Air (1
st
Aircraft)
953. March 25, 1968 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Mid-Air (2
nd
Aircraft)
954. March 12, 1968 MiG-21F-13 Hungarian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
955. January 30, 1968 MiG-21PF Hungarian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
956. January 29, 1968 MiG-21FL Indian AF Unknown Pilot Disorientation
957. January 23, 1968 MiG-21 PFM Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown

960. January 22, 1968 MiG-21F-13 Polish Air Force Fatal (1) Autopilot Failure – Spatial Disorientation
961. January 22, 1968 MiG-21PF Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
962. 1968 MiG-21F Indonesian AF Unknown Unknown
963. December 21, 1967 MiG-21F-13 Hungarian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
964. December 7, 1967 MIG-21 SPS DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Unknown
965. October 12, 1967 MiG-21 F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Engine Failure
966. October 10, 1967 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
967. October 5, 1967 MiG-21F-13 Hungarian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
968. September 28, 1967 MiG-21PF Polish Air Force Fatal (1) Too Low on Instrument Approach
969. September 27, 1967 MiG-21 F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Unknown
970. September 21, 1967 MiG-21 SPS DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Spatial Disorientation
971. September 7, 1967 MiG-21F-13 Hungarian AF Unknown Unknown
972. August 31, 1967 MiG-21F-13 Hungarian AF Nonfatal Engine Fire After Landing
973. August 18, 1967 MiG-21F-13 Hungarian AF Unknown Unknown
974. August 16, 1967 MiG-21 F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Unknown
975. August 11, 1967 MIG-21 PFM DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
976. August 7, 1967 MIG-21 SPS DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Bird Strike
977. July 27, 1967 MiG-21F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Ground Accident – Inadvertent Firing of the Pyros on Fuel Tank
978. July 20, 1967 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Engine Failure
979. July 14, 1967 MiG-21F-13 Hungarian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
980. June 19, 1967 MiG-21PFM Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
981. June 19, 1967 MiG-21PF Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Engine Failure
982. June 7, 1967 MiG-21F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Overrun – Aborted Take-Off
983. June 1967 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Mechanical Failure
984. May 13, 1967 MiG-21U DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) LOC Near the Ground
985. May 11, 1967 MiG-21F-13 Hungarian AF Fatal (1) Hydraulic Failure
986. April 17, 1967 MiG-21F-13 Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
987. April 17, 1967 MiG-21PF Polish Air Force Fatal (1) CFIT
988. April 7, 1967 MiG-21PF DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Brake Failure on Landing - Overrun
989. April 4, 1967 MiG-21 PFM Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
990. March 8, 1967 MiG-21 F-13 Polish Air Force Fatal (1) Failed to Set Proper Climb Gradient – Hit Trees
991. March 1967 MiG-21US Soviet Air Force Nonfatal Engine Fire on Take-Off – Abort - Overrun
992. January 28, 1967 MiG-21PF Polish Air Force Fatal LOC on Landing – Did Not Survive Ejection
993. November 30, 1966 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Mechanical Failure
994. November 9, 1966 MiG-21U Indian AF Nonfatal LOC on Landing
995. October 22, 1966 MiG-21 F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
996. October 14, 1966 MIG-21 PFM DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Engine Failure
998. September 5, 1966 MiG-21PF DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Exploded on Start-Up
999. June 30, 1966 MiG-21F-13 Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
1000. June 30, 1966 MiG-21PF Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
1001. June 23, 1966 MiG-21F-13 Hungarian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
1002. June 28, 1966 MiG-21PF Bulgarian AF Fatal (1) Stall
1003. June 1, 1966 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
1004. June 3, 1966 MiG-21PF Polish Air Force Fatal (1) Spatial Disorientation
1006. May 5, 1966 MIG-21 PFM DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
1007. May 5, 1966 MIG-21 PFM DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Fuel Starvation
1009. February 23, 1966 MiG-21 F-13 Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
1010. February 23, 1966 MiG-21PF Soviet Air Force Fatal (1) Afterburner Failure After Take-Off
1011. December 4, 1965 MiG-21PF Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Mechanical Failure
1012. October 13, 1965 MiG-21F-13 Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
1013. October 13, 1965 MiG-21 F-13 Polish Air Force Fatal (1) Hydraulic Failure – Ejection Seat Malfunctioned
1014. October 12, 1965 MiG-21 PFM DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Engine Failure (Engine Seized)
1015. August 30, 1965 MiG-21PF Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Mechanical Failure
1016. August 23, 1965 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
1017. August 13, 1965 MiG-21 F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
1018. July 27, 1965 MiG-21 F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Engine Failure
1019. June 30, 1965 MIG-21 PFM DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Engine Failure (Engine Seized) (Ejection Seat Malfunction)
1020. June 25, 1965 MIG-21 PFM DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
1021. June 23, 1965 MiG-21F-13 Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
1022. June 23, 1965 MiG-21 F-13 Polish Air Force Fatal (1) Engine Failure
1023. May 25, 1965 MiG-21 PFM DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Engine Failure (Engine Seized)
1024. April 18, 1965 MiG-21 F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Unknown Unknown
1025. February 26, 1965 MiG-21 F-13 Czechoslovakian AF Nonfatal Undershoot (Landed Short)
1026. February 3, 1965 MiG-21 F-13 Romanian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
1027. January 16, 1965 MiG-21F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Engine Failure – Crash Landing

1028. January 15, 1965 MiG-21F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Overrun on Landing – Barrier (AND)
1029. December 13, 1964 MiG-21 F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Flight Controls Failure (Aileron Failure)
1030. December 1964 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
1031. October 1, 1964 MiG-21 F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Mechanical Failure
1032. September 29, 1964 MiG-21 F-13 Romanian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
1033. September 26, 1964 MiG-21F Czechoslovakian AF Unknown Unknown
1034. September 19, 1964 MiG-21F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Aborted Take-Off Due to Power Loss (AND)
1035. August 4, 1964 MiG-21F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Canopy Opened During Take-Off
1036. July 14, 1964 MiG-21F-13 Hungarian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
1037. July 10, 1964 MiG-21F-13 Hungarian AF Nonfatal Engine Failure
1038. May 20, 1964 MiG-21F Finnish AF Nonfatal Engine Failure
1039. February 5, 1964 MiG-21F-13 Hungarian AF Nonfatal Unknown
1040. February 12, 1964 MiG-21F-13 Hungarian AF Fatal (1) CFIT in Snow Storm
1041. 1964 MiG-21F Soviet Air Force Unknown Unknown (1
st
Aircraft)
1042. 1964 MiG-21F Soviet Air Force Unknown Engine Failure (2
nd
Aircraft)
rd
Aircraft)
th
Aircraft)
th
Aircraft)
th
Aircraft)
th
Aircraft)
th
Aircraft)
th
Aircraft)
th
Aircraft)
th
Aircraft)
1052. 1964 MiG-21F Soviet Air Force Unknown Engine Failure (12th
Aircraft)
th
ircraft)
th
Aircraft)
1055. 1964 MiG-21F Soviet Air Force Unknown Unknown (15th
Aircraft)
1056. 1964 MiG-21U Soviet Air Force Unknown Engine Failure (16th
Aircraft)
th
Aircraft)
1058. 1964 MiG-21F Soviet Air Force Unknown Engine Failure (18th
Aircraft)
th
Aircraft)
1060. 1964 MiG-21F-13 Syrian AF Unknown Engine Failure
1061. December 21, 1963 MiG-21F Indian AF Nonfatal Mid-Air (1
st
Aircraft)
1062. December 21, 1963 MiG-21F Indian AF Nonfatal Mid-Air (2
nd
Aircraft)
1063. November 29, 1963 MiG-21 F-13 Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
1064. November 20, 1963 MiG-21F-13 Polish Air Force Fatal (1) CFIT
1065. November 20, 1963 MiG-21F-13 Polish Air Force Unknown Unknown
1066. September 30, 1963 MiG-21 F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Unknown Engine Failure (Engine Seized)
1067. September 13, 1963 MiG-21 F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Nonfatal Engine Failure
1068. August 12, 1963 MiG-21F-13 Hungarian AF Fatal (1) Engine Failure – Failed Ejection
1069. May 16, 1963 MiG-21F-13 Hungarian AF Nonfatal Engine Failure Engine Problems
1070. March 25, 1963 MiG-21F-13 DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (1) Inadvertent Ground Ejection on the Ramp
1071. January 7, 1963 MiG-21F DDR Luftstreitkräfte Fatal (4) Aircraft Runaway During Engine Run, 4 Ground Crew Killed
1072. May 28, 1958 Ye-6 Soviet Air Force Fatal (1) Engine Failure – Hydraulic Failure Surge – Emergency Landing
1073. 1961 MiG-21F Soviet Air Force Unknown Unknown (1st
Aircraft)
nd
Aircraft)
rd
Aircraft)
th
Aircraft)
th
Aircraft)
th
Aircraft)
th
Aircraft)
1080. 1965 MiG-21F Indian Air Force Unknown Unknown
1081. 1967 MiG-21F-13 Hungarian AF Nonfatal Engine Fire on Take-Off – Abort
1082. 1970 MiG-21 Yugoslav AF Fatal (1) Unknown
1083. 1971 MiG-21 Yugoslav AF Fatal (1) Unknown (Did Not Survive Ejection)
1084. 1972 MiG-21 Yugoslav AF Fatal (1) Collision With Parachute (Did Not Survive Ejection)
1085. 1974 F-7 Albanian AF Unknown Mechanical Failure
1086. 1975 MiG-21PF Bulgarian AF Unknown Unknown
1087. 1976 MiG-21 Nigerian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
1088. 1978 MiG-21bis Yugoslav AF Fatal (1) Unknown
1090. 1980 MiG-21bis Yugoslav AF Fatal (1) Unknown (Pilot Did Not Survive Ejection)
1091. 1982 MiG-21US Bulgarian AF Unknown Hard Landing
1092. 1982 MiG-21bis Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown
1093. 1984 MiG-21bis Ethiopian AF Fatal (1) Unknown (Training Flight)
1094. 1985 MiG-21US Bulgarian AF Unknown Unknown
1095. 1985 MiG-21 Nigerian AF Fatal (1) Unknown (1st
Aircraft)
1096. 1985 MiG-21 Nigerian AF Fatal (1) Unknown (2nd
Aircraft)

1097. 1985 J-7II PLAAF Nonfatal Unknown (1st
Aircraft)
1098. 1985 J-7II PLAAF Nonfatal Unknown (2
nd
Aircraft)
1099. 1985 J-7II PLAAF Nonfatal Unknown (3rd
Aircraft)
1100. 1985 J-7II PLAAF Nonfatal Unknown (4
th
Aircraft)
1101. 1985 J-7II PLAAF Nonfatal Unknown (5th
Aircraft)
1103. 1987 MiG-21bis Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Engine Failure
1104. 1987 MiG-21bis Yugoslav AF Nonfatal Unknown
1105. 1988 MiG-21MF Bulgarian AF Unknown Unknown
1106. 1988 MiG-21 Nigerian AF Fatal (1) Unknown (1
st
Aircraft)
nd
Aircraft)
st
Aircraft)
nd
Aircraft)
1110. 1990 MiG-21bis Bulgarian AF Nonfatal High Speed Maneuvering (Excessive AOA)
1111. 1996 MiG-21bis Polish Navy Fatal (1) Unknown (1
st
Aircraft)
1112. 1996 MiG-21bis Polish Navy Fatal (1) Unknown (2
nd
Aircraft)
1113. 1996 MiG-21bis Ethiopian AF Fatal (1) Runway Excursion
1114. 1996 MiG-21 Indian AF Unknown Nozzle Failure (Gear Pinion)
1115. 1997 MiG-21bis Ethiopian AF Fatal (1) Unknown
1116. 1998 MiG-21bis Ethiopian AF Fatal (1) Hit trees During Low Level Training Flight
1117. 2001 MiG-21U Ethiopian AF Fatal (2) Unknown

Attachment 6 – Glossary and Abbreviations
8100-1 Conformity Inspection Record
° Degrees
# Pounds
AAIB Aviation Accident Investigation Board (UK)
A&P Airframe & Powerplant (Mechanic)
AAM Air-to-Air Missile
A/B Afterburner
ABO Aviator’s Breathing Oxygen
AC Advisory Circular
ACMI Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation
AD Airworthiness Directive
ADM Aeronautical Decision Making
AEP FAA Office of Aviation Policy Planning and Environment
AFM Airplane Flight Manual
AFS Flight Standards
AGC FAA’s Office of the Chief Counsel
AIM Air Intercept Missile
AIP Aircraft Inspection Program
AIR-200 FAA – Production & Airworthiness Division
AIR-230 FAA – Airworthiness Branch
AloS Acceptable Level of Safety
ALQ ECM Pod(s)
AloS Acceptable Level of Safety
AOA Angle of Attack
AOPA Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
AND Aircraft Not Destroyed
AP Air Publication
APU Auxiliary Power Unit
ARFF Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting
ASI Aviation Safety Inspector
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
AVS FAA Aviation Safety (Line of Business Designator)
CAA Civil Aviation Authority
CAR Civil Air Regulations
CAS Close Air Support
CFIT Control Flight into Terrain
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CG (c.g.) Center of Gravity
CJAA Classic Jet Aircraft Association
Class ‘A’ Mishap Accident Classification Used by USAF and U.S. Navy

CoA Certificate of Airworthiness
COS Continued Operational Safety
CP Center of Pressure
DAR Designated Airworthiness Representative
DER Designated Engineering Representative
DDR Deutsche Demokratische Republik (East Germany)
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOD Department of Defense
EAA Experimental Aircraft Association
ECM Electronic Counter Measures
EEJ Experimental Exhibition Jets
EO Engineering Order
EOR End of Runway
EPR Engine Pressure Ratio
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FBO Fixed Base Operator
FCF Functional Flight Check
FL Flight Level
FOD Foreign Object Damage
Form 700 Aircraft Record (RAF)
Form 781 Aircraft Flight Data Record
FMEA Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
FSIMS Flight Standards Information Management System
FSDO Flights Standards District Office
Ft Feet
GA General Aviation
GAF German Air Force
Gsh-23/30 MiG Aircraft 23/30 mm Cannon
HAL Hindustan Aeronautics Limited
Hg Mercury
HUD Heads Up Display
IAI Israel Aircraft Industries
IAF Indian Air Force
IAS Indicated Airspeed
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IFF Identification Friend or Foe
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions
INOP Inoperative
IRAN Inspect and Repair as Necessary
IRST Infrared Search and Tracking
JATO Jet Assisted Take-Off (aka RATO – Rocket Assisted Take-Off)
JP-4/JP-5 Military Designations for Jet Fuels
KM-1 Soviet Ejection Seat
Kts Knots

LABS Low Altitude Bombing System
Lb./lbs./lb. Pounds
LOA Letter of Authorization
LOC Loss of Control
LOSA Line Operations Safety Audits
LOX Liquid Oxygen
Luftwaffe German Air Force
Mach Speed of Sound
Martin Baker Manufacturer of Ejection Seats Fitted to the Hunter
MEL Minimum Equipment List
MIDO Manufacturing Inspection District Office
mm Millimeters
MTBF Mean Time Between Failure
NASIC National Air and Space Intelligence Center
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDI Non-Destructive Inspection
NDT Non-Destructive Testing
NFE Non-Federal Entities
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
O2 Oxygen
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
OKB Mikoyan-Gurevich Design Bureau
ORM Operational Risk Management
Pa Pascal
PAO Public Aircraft Operations
PIC Pilot in Command
PIO Pilot Induced Oscillations
PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force
PPH Pound per Hour
Psi Pounds per Square Inch
q Dynamic Pressure
R&D Research and Development
RAC Russian Aircraft Corporation
RAT Ram Air Turbine
RCR Runway Condition Reading
RHAW Radar Homing and Warning
RM Risk Management
RN Royal Navy
RPZ Runway Protection Zone
RSA Runway Safety Area
RSC Runway Surface Condition
RTO Rejected Take-Off
RuAF Russian Air Force
MA-1A USAF Arresting Barrier

MAF Maintenance Action Form (U.S. Navy)
Major Service RAF Equivalent of U.S. Depot Level Inspection
MRO Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul
NAS National Airspace System
SAS Stability Augmentation System
SFA Special Flight Authorization
SIC Second in Command
SME Significant Military Equipment
SMS Safety Management Systems
SOAP Spectrometric Oil Analysis Program
SRM Single Pilot Resource Management
TAM TbilAviaMsheni Aircraft Plant
TBO Time Between Overhauls
TCTO Time Compliance Technical Orders
TO Take-Off
T.O. Technical Order
TSA Transportation Safety Administration
UHF Ultra High Frequency
UK United Kingdom
USAF United States Air Force
USN United States Navy
VFR Visual Flight Rules
W&B Weight and Balance
ZU-BEX South African Civil Registration for a Lightning T5 (Accident aircraft)

Page Intentionally Left Blank

171705017 appendix-14-mi g-21-airworthiness-certification

More Related Content

What's hot

Similar to 171705017 appendix-14-mi g-21-airworthiness-certification

Recently uploaded

171705017 appendix-14-mi g-21-airworthiness-certification