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Counterfeit Electronic Components Overview and observations from recent counterfeit detection experiences Henry Livingston, BAE Systems
What is a Counterfeit Electronic Component? … An Aerospace and Defense Equipment Manufacturer’s View ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],Marking indicates an Op Amp from ADI… …  but contains die for a Voltage Reference from PMI Evidence of prior marking for a part with inferior performance … …  accompanied by  bogus test report Device lead condition shows parts were used  Part number indicates a CLCC package, but this package is a CDP…
What  is not  a Counterfeit Part? (BAE Systems view) ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Electronic Component Counterfeiting Is On The Rise ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
GIDEP Alerts / Problem Advisories Reporting  Counterfeit Electronic Components (as of July 2007) Many other counterfeit cases have been discovered by users, but were not reported via GIDEP.  Data shown does not reveal instances where a GIDEP notice alerted another user who subsequently found counterfeits as a result of the notice.  Component manufacturers are aware of counterfeit cases involving their products, but generally do not report those cases via GIDEP or industry “watch dog” organizations.  We have been informed that one Government organization has reportedly discouraged such GIDEP notifications for fear of undermining a government investigation, but have had other Government agencies applaud GIDEP notifications Data courtesy of GIDEP
Semiconductor Manufacturer Survey  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
“ EU, U.S. vow crackdown on computer counterfeits” BRUSSELS (Reuters) - Feb 22, 2008 ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Observations From Recent Counterfeit Detection Experiences ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Counterfeit Case Summaries
Supply Chain Analysis Parts exchange hands several times before reaching the end user. Eight (8) out of our eighteen (18) cases trace back to sources in China…  … Perhaps more. Same unique part type obtained through several suppliers. Seventeen (17) unique part types. Broad variety of device functions.  Ten (10) manufacturers represented. Twenty (20) USA based suppliers Eleven (11) China based suppliers Full details available to GIDEP Participants.  Others may apply for membership at the  GIDEP Help Desk (951-898-3207) Origin unknown for all cases All involve Independent Distributors Similar bogus test reports Similar bogus test reports One (1) UK based supplier
Observations from Counterfeit Detection Efforts (summary) ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Observations from Counterfeit Detection Efforts ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Observations from Counterfeit Detection Efforts ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Observations from Counterfeit Detection Efforts ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Observations from Counterfeit Detection Efforts ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Observations from Counterfeit Detection Efforts ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Observations from Counterfeit Detection Efforts ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Observations from Counterfeit Detection Efforts ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Authentic perhaps, but where have they been? … ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Summary ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]

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15 livingson-updated-cqsdi-baesystems-counterfeit-components

  • 1. Counterfeit Electronic Components Overview and observations from recent counterfeit detection experiences Henry Livingston, BAE Systems
  • 2.
  • 3.
  • 4.
  • 5. GIDEP Alerts / Problem Advisories Reporting Counterfeit Electronic Components (as of July 2007) Many other counterfeit cases have been discovered by users, but were not reported via GIDEP. Data shown does not reveal instances where a GIDEP notice alerted another user who subsequently found counterfeits as a result of the notice. Component manufacturers are aware of counterfeit cases involving their products, but generally do not report those cases via GIDEP or industry “watch dog” organizations. We have been informed that one Government organization has reportedly discouraged such GIDEP notifications for fear of undermining a government investigation, but have had other Government agencies applaud GIDEP notifications Data courtesy of GIDEP
  • 6.
  • 7.
  • 8.
  • 10. Supply Chain Analysis Parts exchange hands several times before reaching the end user. Eight (8) out of our eighteen (18) cases trace back to sources in China… … Perhaps more. Same unique part type obtained through several suppliers. Seventeen (17) unique part types. Broad variety of device functions. Ten (10) manufacturers represented. Twenty (20) USA based suppliers Eleven (11) China based suppliers Full details available to GIDEP Participants. Others may apply for membership at the GIDEP Help Desk (951-898-3207) Origin unknown for all cases All involve Independent Distributors Similar bogus test reports Similar bogus test reports One (1) UK based supplier
  • 11.
  • 12.
  • 13.
  • 14.
  • 15.
  • 16.
  • 17.
  • 18.
  • 19.
  • 20.