Emerging options on kashmir 2010 [zartasha niazi]

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; QUAID-I- AZAM U NI VERSITY
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By
Zartasha Niazi
Department of International Relations
Quaid-i-Azam University
Islamabad - Pakistan
2010

FINAL APPROVAL
This is to certify that we have read this dissertation entitled "Emerging Options
on Kashmir" submitted by Mrs.Zartasha Niazi and it is our judgment that this
dissertation is of sufficient standard to warrant its acceptance by Quaid-e-AZam
University, Islamabad, for the (M.phil International Relations).
COMMITTEE:
1. External Examiner
2. Supervisor
3. Chairman

DECLARATION
I hereby declare that this project (Emerging Options on Kashmir) and its
associated work neither as a whole nor as a part have already been developed
by any person. It is further declared that I made this dissertation and its
interface entirely on the basis of my personal experience, made under the
guidance of my project supervisor.
No portion of this work presented in this report has been submitted in support
of any application for any other degree or qualification of this or any other
university or institute of learning.
It is further stated that the project and all its associated documents, and records
are submitted as the partial fulfillment for the M. Phil Degree in International
Relation (IR). I understand and transfer the copyright for this material to the
Department of International Relation, Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad.
Mrs.Zartasha Niazi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Up and above every thing, I am gateful to Almighty ALLAH. THE Most
Gracious, Merciful and Beneficent, in whom I trust and make courage, I have
been able to complete this project successfully, and his Holy Prophet
MUMAMMAD (Peace be upon him) who is forever a true guidance for the
whole humanity.
I feel great honor to express my sincere, thanks to stress effaces the truth
Dr.Lubana Abid Ali, for her invaluable guidance sympathetic attitude,
meticulous training, criticism, concern and motivation, regarding problems that
I faced not only during thesis, but also throughout the study period. She guided
me in critical times and helped me whenever I needed.
My foremost thanks to my husband and friends for providing me all sort of
moral and social support in life. Their prayers have enabled me to reach this
stage. I heartily express my thanks to my brother for his love and care.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Maps
2. Chapter 1
3. Introduction
4. Theoretical Perspective
5. Chapter 2
6. Chapter 3
7. Nature of the dispute
8. Geographical Position
9. Origin of the Dispute
10. Role of United Nation Ii. Indo Pak
War 1965 & Tashkent Conference
12. Ind° Pak War 1971 & Simla Accord (1972)
13. Insurgency in Kashmir 1990
14. The Situation after 2001
15. Militants Attack
16. Uprising in Kashmir
17. 2008 Kashmir Elections
18. Chapter 4
19. Conflict Unending
20. Kashmir as a Source of Tension 13/W Two
Despots
17. Pakistan
18. Pakistan's Official Position in the following
19. Indian Stand
20. Economic Interest in the Region
21. The Stance of Kashmir Political Partiers
22. Where does the International Community Stand
23. In the light of Post-9/11
1
1 - 2
3
4 — 5
5 - 6
7 - 9
10
11
11 - 13
14 - 16
16 - 18
18 - 19
19 - 20
20 - 21
21 - 22
22 - 23
23
23 - 24
25
26
26 - 27
28
29 - 31
31 —32
33
33 - 34
34 - 35
35 - 37

24. Pakistan's Policy in Post 9/11 38 —40
25. Change in India's Approach 40 —41
26. Peace Process between India and Pakistan 41 -45
27. India's Mixed Response 45 — 49
28. New Stakeholders 50
29. In the wake of 26/11(Mumbai Blast) 50— 52
30. Resumption of Composite Dialogue 52
31. Kashmiri's View 52 - 61
32. Chapter 5 62
33. Emerging Options on Kashmir 63
34. CBM and Prospect toward Peace 63 - 65
35. Bus service (Srinagar —Muzafarabad) 65 - 66
36. People to People Contact 66 - 70
37. Pervaiz Musharaf Formula 70
37. Back Channel on Kashmir 70 - 72
38. Emerging Role of civil society 72 - 73
39. Aman ki Asha 73 - 75
40. Kashmir is bridge between India and Pakistan 75 —76
41. Plebiscite 76 — 77
42. Inclusion of Genuine Kashmeri leadership 77 — 79
43. Chapter 6 80
44. Conclusion 81 —84
45. Bibliography 85 - 90

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Supervisor's Approval
I hereby approved that the M.Phil thesis "EMERGING OPTIONS ON KASHMIR" prepared
under my supervision by Ms.Zartasha Niazi of M.Phil (6th
Semester) be accepted in
partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Philosophy of
International Relations.
Supervisor ;Ail 1t...2, A- at

QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
No.DIR/2010- Dated: Sept. 28, 2010
FINAL APPROVAL LETTER
This is to certify that we have read the dissertation by Miss Zartasha Niazi and in our
judgment it is up to the standard of acceptance by Quaid-i-Azam University for the
grant of degree of Master of Philosophy (M.Phil) in International Relations.
A 
1 . Supervisor f t i i v a A
Dr. Lubna Abid Ali
Associate Professor
Department of IR Quaid-
i-Azam University
Islamabad
2. External Examiner
Prof. Dr. Talat A. Wizarat
IBA, I louse No.27-A
Street No. 07
Askari-IV, Rashid Minhas Road
Karachi.
3. Chaioerson
Dr. Lti!ma Abid Ali
Department of IR
Quaid-i-Azam University
Islamabad.
A A-f
.

IN THE NAME OF
ALLAHA
THE BENEFICENT, THE MERCIFUL
WE PRAISE HIM AND SALUTE
HIS HONORABLE MESSENGER

MUHAMMAND (Peace be upon him)
Said
"Verily the man of Knowledge are the
Inheritors
Of the prophet"

DEDICATED
To My Loving Family and Teachers

Introduction
The Kashmir problem since partition has assumed an intricate and of complicated nature
defying a solution over the past many decades. The thorny issue of Kashmir seems to be
one dispute immune from any objective solution due to its extremely complicated nature.
However ,an array of option on the resolution of Kashmir dispute has been put forward
since 1947.These proposed solution include maximum political autonomy, partition along
the line of control, soft border between the two part of Kashmir, regional plebiscite,
referendum/plebiscite. There has not been any dearth of possible proposal but the lack of
political will on the part of countries involved to get the proposals implemented with
earnest.
It seems that India and Pakistan are still at diametrically opposed end. The stand off over
Kashmir has continued for over 57 years. This stand off has borne a heavy share of
responsibility for four wars between India and Pakistan, massive arm build-up and
nuclearization of the region. It has inflicted immeasurable costs on their social, economic
and political system: and has been an enormous impediment to the normalization of
relations between them. Loss of Human lives in Kashmir in many times greater than the
combined casualties of four wars fought between India and Pakistan.
The central questions addresses in this study are: What is the nature .of dispute? What is
the significance of Kashmir for the parties involved? What efforts have been made in the
past to resolve the issue? Why did these efforts fail? The 2"d
part of the paper only
focuses on the situation after 9/11 and also the emerging prospects of the settlement of
the dispute.
The thesis is based on 6 chapters. The main question of thesis is what are the emerging
options for Kashmir in the light of post 9/11?
4

Chapter one is the introduction of the thesis. Chapter two discusses the central question
of the thesis. Third chapter discuss the background on the Kashmir dispute and is based
on the origin and the nature of the dispute and it will also cover the situation after 9/11.
The fourth chapter of thesis will cover the India, pakuistan stand on Kashmir and will
discuss in detail about Pakistan peace process and the causes of failure of that bilateral
talks.
The fifth chapter analyses the available options for the resolution of Kashmir dispute.
And in the last there will be a conclusion of the thesis.
Theoretical Perspective
The theory apply in this dissertation is the constructive school of thought.Constructivism
primarily seeks to demonstrate how many core aspects of international relations are,
contrary to the assumptions of Neo-realism and Nco-liberalism, socially constructed, that
is, they are given their form by ongoing processes of social practice and interaction.
"Public opinion is far too potent a force to be left in the hands of narrow vested interests.
The people of today must find its voice and force the rulers to listen. The people must
write its own placards and fashion its own slogans. The leaders must learn to be led and
not blindly followed."
Their efforts to generate "public opinion" to "force the leaders to listen" suggest that they
are knowingly or unknowingly employing constructivism, which . defines that social
movements (social constructivism) influence the state's international affairs by
mobilizing citizens to press their governments through appeals and measured proposals,
to adopt a policy which they deem fit for their country.
There are two examples in recent history where "social constructivism" has been very
successful - the Vietnam War and the campaign against the superpower nuclear arms
race. During the Vietnam War, protests across the world generated concerns against war
and mobilized public opinion against it. The masses across the globe urged the warring
5

oartiegtostopthewarandweresuccessfulinrealizingtheirgoal.Second,whentheCold
war was at its peak in the late 1960s and the prospect of nuclear war was looming large,
the anti-nuclear groups across the Atlantic, with an objective to bring an end to the
nuclear arm race, called the United States and the Soviet Union to stop the development,
testing and the deployment of nuclear weapon. Their effort contributed to the signing of
the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty in 1972.
Two media groups - Jang from Pakistan and the Times of India from India recently
launched a joint campaign to promote peace between the two countries. It is too early to
predict whether the two media groups will be successful in achieving a similar result by
generating positive public opinion among the masses of the two countries. "Public
opinion", which the media groups want to shape, has always been prone to emotions and
since the memories of 26/11 terrorist attacks still remains fresh among Indians; it puts a
question mark on whether the media would be able to sustain their campaign. Even if
they are successful in shifting public opinion for peace talks, a terrorist attack will
eliminate their all efforts.
A recent opinion poll conducted by the Times of India and Jang suggests that 72. per cent
of Pakistanis and 66 per cent of Indians want peaceful relations between the two
countries. A lower percentage of peace backers in India than that of Pakistan is reflective
of the fact that it is terrorism and the wounds inflicted by terrorist activities that have
adversely impacted Indian sentiments. Pakistan needs to take corrective measures in this
regard, if they really want peace with India.
In an atmosphere of tension, it is the people of the two countries who can influence the
policy decisions of their government.
6

The second chapter of thesis will discuss the central question of thesis "what are the
emerging options on Kashmir".
Previously it was believed that Kashmir is the bone of contention between India and
Pakistan but now its is becoming a peace bridge between Pakistan and India. the world
community is also more proactive in resolving Kashmir issue and the entire state of
Jammu and Kashmir be made a nuclear free zone.
Jammu and Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan has ceased the fortune of
millions of people in south Asia. Kashmir issue after the Kargil crisis of 1999 and .21.K.)2
military escalation between India and Pakistan emerged as a fully ripe nuclear llash point
in the region with great potential to subvert world peace.
It's been six decades the Kashmir issue is still imminent. But now the changing
circumstances and the emerging role of civil society is changing the whole paradigm.
Civil society plays a critical role in nation building and human development. Local
societal issues in Kashmir, unrelated to regional politics, cannot not be subsumed or
ignored until the Kashmir problem is resolved. The civil society in Kashmir faces a
challenge in reorienting its agenda to address a wide spectrum of local issues and thereby
enhance its appeal and relevance to various sections of the society.
It is important to mention that a political dialogue between India and Pakistan on
Kashmir has been impacted by two critical drawbacks, which have been mostly ignored
by the local civil society. The trust deficit that exists between India and Pakistan has been
accentuated by Pakistan's two faced approach towards India — overt expressions of
friendship (composite dialogue, track-II diplomacy, people-to-people contact, cross-LOC
movement of people and goods), and a covert desire to create continuing turmoil in India
(attack on the Parliament, violent attacks in major commercial and technology centers,
markets and luxury hotels, bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul), and Kashmir
(Kargil fiasco, attack on the State Assembly, repeated border infiltration, cross-border
terrorist training camps). So it is inevitable that a delay in building up trust between the
8

two countries is going to delay any closure in regards to the Kashmir problem. Yet the
civil society in Kashmir overlooks this discontinuity in approach between the two
countries and nitpicks on details of implementation of some aspects of the people to
people contact programs deemed inconvenient to a few. Where the civil society should be
seriously contributing ideas to shore up trust between the two countries, and demanding
that neither country engage in overt or covert actions that erode the mutual trust factor, it
is instead mostly focused on lower-tier confidence building measures: (CBMs), which are
necessary but not sufficient to result in expediting the final resolution of the Kashmir
issue.
A fearless but fair civil society is a pillar of strength to a nation. It is part and parcel of
its democratic structure with core beliefs in freedom, justice, human rights, pluralism and
the rule of law. In Kashmir, the civil society is still evolving, but the current extra-
ordinary obsession on politics must give way to a broad set of initiatives that include
politics, but also address other societal issues and public aspirations for a balanced and
wholesome development of the society.
9

Nature of the dispute
Jammu and Kashmir was formerly a Princely State within British India, and its Hindu
Maharaja enjoyed considerable autonomy, exercising autocratic rule over his subjects.
The state was created in the first half of the 19th century by the Hindu Dogra dynasty,
partly through conquest and partly through gift from the Sikhs and the British, between
who's control over north-west India was passing. Jammu and Kashmir yoked together
disparate territories and a variety of ethnic groups.
The origin of the dispute recline in the partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947.A
series of the political measures have been taken by the British, Indian, Pakistani and
Kaslunir's leadership during the partition processes led to the beginning of the crisis. All
efforts meant to the resolution of the conflict (the UN involvement, bilateral Indo Pak
negotiations CBMs and wars between two countries (India Pakistan) also the third party
mediations failed to settle the issue. The purpose of this chapter is to understand the
nature of the dispute, the significance attached to the dispute by the parties involved,
efforts to resolve the conflict and the reason of the war between India and Pakistan, the
chapter also cover the situation after 9/11.
Before we proceed the chapter, it is essential to briefly survey the basic facts and the pre
partition history of Kashmir because the roots of the crisis cannot be adequately
understood without keeping in view of the past history of Kashmir
Geographical Position
Kashmir is the Hamylain territory at the cross roads of India, Pakistan, china, and
Afghanistan. (TA The territory has an area of 86,023 squares miles, divided by line of
control agreed upon in 1972, that leave an area of 32,358 squares miles in the north and
the west of Pakistan and the rest, amounting to 53,665 square mile under the Indian
controll.
Tahir Amin,"Mass resistance in Kashmir :Origion,Evolution,opinion",p.20
11

At the time of partition the state of Jammu and Kashmir comprised of the five regions:
the vale of Kashmir, Jammu, Laddakh, Balochistan, Poonch and Gilgit .when India an
Pakistan agreed to cease fire in the wake of 1947-1948 Kashmir war, Jammu together
with the part of district of Poonch and Mirpur ,the vale of Kashmir and the Laddakh
region came under Indian control and western poonch together with Muzafarabad and
the part of Mirpur ,Gilgit, Balochistan formed Azad Kashmir under Pakistan's
authority2.
The state o ['Jammu and Kashmir consists of the Hindu majority Jammu ,south of the Pir
Panjal range of mountains that separates the valley of Kashmir from the rest of India, the
district of Laddakh with significant Buddhist population, which is the subject of a
separate dispute between India and China the latter in possession of some portions of
Laddkah claimed by the Indian government, the administrative division of Mirpur and
Muzafarabad (now part of Azad Kashmir)the northern areas or territories, consisting of
Balochistan, Hunza and the Gilgit Agency, sparsely settled, with a predominately Muslim
population a portion of this region, North of the peak K-2,which was ceded to china by
Islamabad in an agreement reached on March 2,1963.
Finally there is vale or valley of Kashmir centered on Srinagar3 .The valley contains most
of the state's population and resources, and is the sub region most often equated with
Kashmir in the mind of Indians, Pakistanis and foreigners alike. These different sub
regions have very different ethnic and religious compositions. Muslim constitutes 75% of
the total population of Indian held Jammu and Kashmir. Jammu is about 57 percent
Hindu and 40 percent Muslim Laddakh is 46 percent Muslim and about 50-55 percent
Buddhist, and culturally linked to Tibetan Buddhism.
The valley is overwhelmingly Muslim, but the Hindu minority includes one of the most
important of Indian castes: the Kashmiri Brahmins (to which the Nehru family and many
other senior Indian politicians and bureaucrats belong).
2
Alastair lamb,"Kashmir a disputed Legacy1846-1990",p.5
3
For the text of the agreements, see Dorothy Woodman, Himalayan Frontiers: A political review of British,
Chinese, Indian, and Russian Rivalries(Newyork,Pareger,1969)
12

Muslim Population constitutes almost 100 percent of total population in Azad Kashmir4
.
The following population distribution in Jammu and Kashmir on lines will, help to
understand the complex nature of the dispute.
Total ............................................................7.7 populations
Muslim........................................................75 %
Non Muslim............................................... 25 %
Azad Kashmir and Northern areas
Total.......................................................4 3million
Muslims..................................................100%
Kashmir's in Pakistan
Total ...................................................1 million
Muslims.............................................. 100%
Kashmir's in out side world
Total 0 50million
Muslims............................................. 100
4
Population figure are from the Kashmir study Group, Kashmir: Way Forward (Kashmir: A way forward
Kashmir study group): Larchmont, NY: February, 2000).
13

Origin of the Dispute
The Kashmir conflict is a by product of the partition of subcontinent into Hindu majority
India and Muslim state of Pakistan in 1947. when the sun set on British empire in 1947,
as much as 45 percent of the subcontinent land area was not directly administered by the
British .Almost half of the subcontinent territory was instead covered by a patch work of
562 kingdom and principalities of varying sizes and population that were ruled by the
Indian monarch and enjoyed self determination subject to their rules acceptance to the
ultimate authority known as paramount of British power5. The vast network of princely
states as they were known emerged gradually across the map of the subcontinent during
the ninth century and constituted the pillar of the British practice of the indirect rule.
Kashmir was one of the largest princely states of the British India. It was created in 1846
by a Hindu chief Tun called Ghulab Singh, scion of the warrior clan from a region called
Jammu just south of the Kashmir valley who cobbled together a sprawling polyglot
princely state by partly conquering and partly purchasing a number of adjacent Areas. He
was recognized its Maharaja by the British in 1846 and his male heirs succeeded him
over the next century to the heredity kingship of Jammu and Kashmir as the princely state
was officially known. As decolonization approached in 1947, the princely states had three
options, to join one of the two dominions, India and Pakistan, or to declare independence.
Three princely states (Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir) did not choose their option till
15th August 19476.
The Muslim ruler of jundagadh despite the predominant majority of Hindu population
decided to accede to Pakistan in 1947.With the opposition among the populace to this
move, the Indian army entered the state and conducted a plebiscite with favored its union
with India. Similarly in Hyderabad a Muslim ruler wanted to remain independent but the
majority Hindu population did not approve his plan. On September 13, 1948 the Indian
army entered into Ityderabad and secured its accession to India.
5
ibid
6
ibid
14

The case of the Kashmir was entirely dissimilar to the above mention cases where the
hind Ruler, failing to remain independent, eventually decided to join India against the
desires of the predominant majority of the Muslim population to join Pakistan. India
accepted the accession while rejecting the two earlier ones. The Maharaja of Kashmir
Hari Singh wanted to acquire more time. He preferably wanted to remain independent of
both India and Pakistan, but given the choice between India and Pakistan, he wanted to
throw his lot with I Iindu India rather than with Muslim Pakistan7.
He offered a stand still agreement to both India and Pakistan to maintain communication
and supplies. Pakistan entered into the agreement while India did not. The Maharaja
began to follow a calculated policy. On the one hand, he began a planned genocide of the
Kashmiri Muslim in connivance with the other Hindu Maharajas and on the other; he
undertook several steps to facilitate accession to India.
The Maharaja's contact with the top Indian leadership increased, a speedy construction of
road linking India to Kashmir began to be hastened, the prime Minister of Kashmir
pundit Kak who had singed standstill agreement with Pakistan was replaced by Mehr
Chand who openly sided with India and Sheikh Abdullah whose policy was decidedly
anti-Pakistan, was suddenly released from the jail, while Choudhary Ghulam Abbas and
other Muslim Conference Leaders continued to languish in jail.
All theses events convinced Pakistani leadership of the Maharaja's long term plan to
accede to India. In that communally charged atmosphere, hundreds of Pathan tribesmen
from the Northwest Frontier province of Pakistan entered Kashmir to help their Muslim
coreligionists who were being slaughtered by the Maharaja's forces. The Maharaja's fled
from Srinagar and was apparently persuaded by the Indian authorities to accede to India
on October 22, 1948. However, on hearing the news of tribesmen's entry into Kashmir
India had already dispatched its troops to Kashmir even before the formalities of
accession had been completed.
7 Tahir Amin,''Mass resistance in Kashmir:origins,Evolution,option",p.26
15

Recently disclosed document of the history of the partition amply reveal the British
complicity with the top Indian leadership to wrest Kashmir from Pakistan. Alastair Lamb,
based on the study of recently declassified documents, has convincingly proved that
Mountbatten, in league with Nehru, was instrumental in pressurizing Red cliff to award
the Muslim-majority distinct of Gardaspur in East Punjab to India which could provide
India the only possible access to Kashmir8.
According, to Alastair lamb, the -Indian claimed that the instrument of accession was
never singed by the Maharaja of Hari Singh. In his point of view • the events strongly
suggest that the Indian troops intervened in Kashmir prior to the singing of the
instruments of accession. In fact he believed the instrument of accession did not exist at
all, because the Maharaja's reluctance to sign it: therefore, the Indian Government never
produced the original document of accession either in official document or at any
international forum9.
From this perspective we can identify the basic Kashmir. Indian and Pakistani positions
on the dispute, the stake of each party in it and the basic issue in the conflict.
Role of United Nations
It is essential to know the asymmetric nature of the India Pakistan conflict in order to
understand the direction of parties towards the resolution efforts. At the time of partition
India had very strong administrative structure than Pakistan. The Indian forces during the
limited war of 1948 had held the bulk of Kashmir and Pakistani forces remained in
possession of relatively unimportant mountainous regions of Kashmir. Originally,
considering nature of accession as temporary India maintained that the future status of
Kashmir would be the subject to an impartial plebiscite under international auspices, later
shifting to the position to the claim that it was an integral part of India.16 The Azad
Kashmir government was formed on the territory which Pakistan held, but this
government remained under the de-facto control of the Pakistani government.
8 ibid
9 M..I.Akbar,"Kashmir:Behind the Vale"p.99
It) Tahir Arnin,"Mass resistance in Kashmir",p.32
16

When the dispute rose in 1947 the Muhammad Ali Jinnah had requested British to
intervene in the conflict in order to help settle difference between the members of the
commonwealth. On the other hand the Indian decision makers perceiving their militarily
superiority and strategically better position in Kashmir were not ready to let any powerful
third party intervene and change the status-quo. India raised the Kashmir question in the
UN under article 35 of the UN charter in the form of complaint against Pakistan. The
Indian spokesman concentrated his attention on the tribal invasion of Kashmir and
accused Pakistan of complicity in it, thus committing aggression against India insofar as
Kashmir had acceded to India on 26 October 1947.The Indian argument was based on the
validity of the Maharaja's accession to India.
The Indian representative also reiterated Jawaharlal Nehru's offer of a plebiscite under
the UN auspices. The Security Council resolutions of April 21, 1948, August 13, 1948
and January 5, 1949 were of cardinal importance. Instead of taking a judicial view of the
complaints and counter complaints of the parties. the Security Council adopted a political
solution and tried to reconcile two extreme positions. It proposed a package deal,
comprising three sections; withdrawal of troops, plebiscite, and interim government in
Kashmir.
But on these proposals Pakistan and India had lots of objectionTM; The UN efforts to
mediate or arbitrate generally ended with conclusion that the only possible solution must
be direct bilateral negotiations. India and Pakistan have, conducted such negotiations in
19531955, 1960, 1962- 1963. It is important the goal of parties have.been changing with
the rising cost of the conflict and the passage of time. During 1962, 1963 when Pakistan
under Ayub regime was able to resolve many smaller disputes with India, particularly,
the Indus water dispute, and the partition was discussed seriously, but the differences
over the vale of Kashmir persisted.
The India-Pakistan conflict was drawn into the vortex of the cold war when Pakistan
entered into the Mutual defense Agreement with the United States .1n1954 and
subsequently joined the CENTO and SEATO (I 955).The primary motive of the Pakistani
'
1
ibid
17

decision makers were certainly fear for their security and Indian intransigence over
Kashmir. The Indian representative at the United Nation, invoking the principle of the
rebus-sic-stantibus. declared, that as the whole context of Kashmir had changed, the offer
of plebiscite no longer remained open for PakistanI2. Since than the alignment patterns of
both the parties have been changing in response to changes in their power position.
India's leaning towards Soviet Union for diplomatic and militarily support on Kashmir
question was a direct consequence of Pakistan's alignment with US. India's shift from
non alignment to bi-alignment in the wake of 1962 Sino-India war led Pakistan to
develop relations with China. Both the parties started acquiring their allies and in the
result the conflict become much larger, involving more issues and greater number of
parties aside.
Indo Pak War 1965 & Tashkent Conference
The cold war which had been simmering between India and Pakistan since 1947
escalated into the full fledge war in September 1965. The full hostilities between Indian
and Pakistani forces ended after three weeks, following a series of UN Security Council
resolutions calling for a ceasefire, but the situation remained tense for the rest of the year.
There were allegations of ceasefire violations and the two sides retained forces in one
another's territory for a period. The USSR undertook mediation, and in January 1966 the
two sides signed a declaration at Tashkent (now in independent Uzbekistan)I3.
However, it was for the first time that the soviet union, which had always favored India
on the Kashmir issue by twice casting veto in her favor at the UN security council, had
not only remained neutral but also had assured the Pakistani decision makers that it
would actively try to settle the Kashmir dispute through a series of such conference.
A limited agreement was achieved through the soviet mediatory efforts whereby both
sides agreed to settle the immediate issues arising out of war and set forth their respective
positions on the unresolved issue of Jammu and Kashmir to be discussed later. The
12
ibid
13 Tahir Amin ,"Tashkent declaration(Institute of strategic studies"1980
18

Indian Prime Minister was died in January 1966.Hysteric reaction against the Tashkent
declaration in both Pakistan and India, the succession of new leadership in India and the
lack of further interest by the Soviet Union led to the disappearance of the Tashkent spirit
between India and Pakistan.
Indo Pak War 1971 & Simla Accord (1972)
The India Pakistan war of 1971 was a turning point in the history of sub-continent.
Unlike the war of 1948 and 1965, which resulted in political and military stalemates India
emerged as a major power after the war of 1971.That was a drastic change in the power
balance of South Asia. An Indian scholar observed that it was the first time since
independence in 1947 that the Indian policy makers were able to get rid of their obsession
with Pakistan.
Perceiving the clear superiority of the enemy, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the then president of
Pakistan also opted for a policy of bilateralism with India. The Simla agreement was
concluded on July 2, 1972 between India and Pakistan on a bilateral basis without the
interference of the third party.
The agreement laid down the principles that should govern their future relations. It also
conceived steps to be taken for further normalization of mutual relations. Most
importantly, it bound the two countries "to settle their differences by peaceful means
through bilateral negotiations". The Kashmir dispute again came to the core-issue when
India and Pakistan signed the controversial Simla Accord in June 1972 in the wake of the
Indo-Pak war on 1971. The accord converted the 1949 UN CeaSefire line into new
boundary undefined (LOC) between Pakistan and India which however did not affect the
status of the disputed territory, since 1972. "In Jammu and Kashmir, the Line of Control
resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides
without prejudice to the recognized position of either side.
The agreement has been the basis of all subsequent bilateral talks between India and
Pakistan, though it has not prevented the relationship between the two countries from
deteriorating to the point of armed conflict, most recently in the Kargil War. The treaty
19

was signed in Simla, India, by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, and
Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India.
Insurgency in Kashmir 1990
The insurgency in the Jammu & Kashmir 1990 has been described variously. Some
scholars illustrated as secessionist movements aimed at the disintegration of India other
have terrorist movement engineered by Pakistan and still other have perceived it as
fundamentalist movement," a part of world wide resurgence of Islam1:4. But the resistance
is basically for the right of the self determination of the Kashmiri people. The wishes of
the people of the Kashmir remained underdetermined since the traumatic events of the
partition of sub-continent in 1947.Mostly observer agree that accession of Kashmir to
India was legally controversial and certainly conditional.
The issue of the self determination of Kashmiri has been one of the oldest unresolved
conflicts still on the UN agenda. the issue remained frozen for long time because Indian
unwillingness to agree to any meaning full proposal leading to the plebiscite proposed by
the United Nations, the tepid support accorded to the issue by the western powers the
exercise of the veto power twice used by the former Soviet Union in favor of India, the
weakness of Pakistan to alter the balance of power equation against India in South Asia
and above all the inability of the Kashmir resistance movement to pose any significant
challenge to the Indian authority. A younger generation of Kashmiri Muslim began to
protest again high handed, political, economic and cultural policies of the Indian state.
Two Muslim movements in South west Asia region had significant demonstration effect
upon the young Kashmeri Muslims. The Islamic revolution in Iran in. 1979and successful
afghan resistance against the soviets (1979-1988) reinforced the incipient Islamic
identity. A wave of self determination, democracy and human rights movement swept the
globe and no state could have stopped the stunning impact of these refreshing
developments. Kashmir was invariably influenced by these developments where the
14 Tahir Amin,"Mass resistance in Kashmir",p.8 1
20

internal colonial model imposed by the Indian state on Kashmir could not withstand the
onslaught of theses transnational developments.
The Situation After 2001
As 9/11 changed the world order across the globe, Kashmir was also not spared the
impact either. Kashmir has gained a disturbingly new relevance since the open
nuclearization of South Asia in May 1998, and the dramatic shift of Pakistan's Afghan
policy post-9/11. The open nuclearization, supposed to bring peace through deterrence,
has in fact heightened the level of risk, not just because of the proximity of the two
opponents, but also because both sides believe in (or at least seriously consider) the
theory of limited conflict under a nuclear umbrella:5
The Hindu nationalist BJP in India, and the military power in Pakistan, failed to agree on
Kashmir at the Agra summit in July 2001.
After 9/11, the immediate turnaround of General Musharaf regarding the Taliban, and
Pakistan joining once again the U.S. coalition as a "frontline state," failed to bring a
dramatic change in Kashmir, for Kashmir is more important to Pakistan than Afghanistan
is. After the December 13, 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, Musharafs speech on
January 12, 2002 defined a new official paradigm. Condemning the jihad as such, and
banning the Lashkar-c-Taiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammad, two key jihadi groups
operating in Kashmir, could not, however, convince India of the genuineness of the new
line, for attacks in Kashmir and elsewhere continued.
Indian "coercive diplomacy" and military mobilization all along the border raised the
stakes for months, before ebbing under international pressure, first in June 2002, and
furthermore after elections were held in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir in
September and October. India, until mid-April 2003, stuck however to its agenda: no
dialogue until infiltrations from Pakistan into Kashmir end. Islamabad denied such
infiltrations, conceding only that some uncontrolled elements may cross the line, and
)5
Paul Bowers,"Kahmir',p.24
21

suggesting that a bilateral or international monitoring force could be established for
checking their movements, a point New Delhi was not ready to accept.
In February 2004, Pakistan further increased pressure on Pakistanis fighting in Indian-
administered Kashmir to adhere to the ceasefire. The nuclear-armed neighbors also
launched several other mutual confidence building measures. Restarting the bus service
between the Indian- and Pakistani- administered Kashmir has helped defuse the tensions
between the countries. Both India and Pakistan have also decided to cooperate on
economic fronts.
On Dec. 5, 2006, Pakistani President Pervaz Musharal gave a proposal, that Pakistan
would give up its claim on Kashmir if India accepted some of his peace proposals,
including a phased withdrawal of troops, self-governance for locals, no changes in the
borders of Kashmir, and a joint supervision mechanism involving India, Pakistan and
Kashmir. IVIusharraf also stated that he was ready to give up the United Nations'
resolutions regarding Kashmir.
Militants Attack
In the week of 10 March 2008, 17 people were wounded when a blast hit the region's
only highway overpass located near the Civil Secretariat, Indian-controlled Kashmir's
seat of government and the region's high court. A gun battle between security forces and
militants fighting against Indian rule left five people dead and two others injured 23
March 2008. The battle began when security forces raided a house on the outskirts of the
capital city of Srinagar. The Indian Army has been carrying out cordon-and-search
operations against militants in Indian-administered Kashmir since. the current armed
violence broke out here in 1989.
While the authorities here say 43,000 persons have been killed in the violence, various
rights groups and non-governmental organizations have put the figure at twice that
number.16
16
ibid
22

According to Govt. of India Home Ministry, 2008 marks the lowest civilian casualties
in 20 years with 89 deaths, compared to highest of 1,413 in 1996. 85 security personnel
died in 2008 compared to 613 in 2001, while 102 militants killed. Human right
situation improved with only 1 custodial death and no custodial disappearance.
Uprising in Kashmir
Massive peaceful demonstrations occurred after plans by the Indian-administered .Jammu
and Kashmir state government to transfer 100 acres (0.40 km) of land to a trust which
runs the Hindu Amarnath shrine in the Muslim-majority Kashmir valley. This land was to
be used to build a shelter to house Hindu pilgrims temporarily during their annual
pilgrimage to the Amarnath temple.
Indian security forces and the Indian army responded quickly to keep order. More than 40
unarmed protesters were killed and at least 300 were detained. The largest protests saw
more than a hall million people waving Pakistani flags and crying for freedom at a single
rally .The United Nations expressed concern on India's response to peaceful protests and
urged to investigate and bring to justice Indian security personnel who had taken part in
the crackdown.
Separatists and workers of a political party were believed to be behind stone pelting
incidents which led to retaliatory lire by the police. Furthermore, following the unrest in
2008, which included more than 500,000 protesters at a rally on 18 August, secessionist
movements gained a boost.
2008 Kashmir Elections
State Elections were held in Indian held Kashmir in seven phases starting 17 November
and finishing on 24 December, 2008. The National Conference party which was
founded by Sheikh Abdullah and regarded as pro India emerged with maximum seats
and will form government in coalition with Indian National Congress.
2008 marked the greatest number of anti India protests since 1980 due to the Amarnath
land transfer controversy with several hundred thousand protesters spilling out onto the
23

streets of Indian-administered Kashmir demanding freedom from India the protests were
suppressed by the Indian army with attacks on protesters leading to the deaths of 40
unarmed civilians. Separatists insist that this was so because people were looking
towards their well being and voting for whatever could get them "bread and clothing',
and the turnout did not necessarily reflect the feelings of the Kashmiri's towards India.
On 30 December Congress and the National Conference agreed to form a coalition
government, with Omar Abdullah as Chief Minister. On 5 January 2009 Omar
Abdullah was sworn in as 1 1 th Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. In March
2009 Omar Abdullah stated that only 800 militants were active in the state and out of
these only 30% were Kashmir's.
24

Continuing Conflict
The second chapter of my thesis would examine the stand of Pakistan, India and Kashmir
on the conflict and also cover the role of international community and United Nations
resolution and also described the public opinion and economic interest in the region. This
chapter will cover the effects of 9 /11 and on going peace process?
This chapter is divided into two different parts. In first part we will describe the stance of
India, Pakistan and Kashmir and the public opinion and the role of international
community and also the resolution of united nation.
The fourth part of the chapter will explain the effects of 9/11 on the Kashmir issue. In
that part we will also touch the ongoing peace process and also the failure of the
dialogue.
First part of the chapter Kashmir Indian and Pakistan stance on the issue and the
approaches of Pakistan and India toward the Kashmir dispute. In this part I will explain
Kashmir's point of view and public opinion of both countries and the economic interest
in the Kashmir region.
Kashmir as a Source of Tension B/VV Two Nuclear states
Kashmir is located in the South Asian region were India and Pakistan both are nuclear
states. Wedged between the two nuclear an armed state of India and Pakistan, Kashmir
has been described on" the most dangerous place on earth". So it is the need of the time
as well as the demand of the region and world powers to solve this problem and bring
back the peace and prosperity of Kashmir. This Kashmir problem is the root of all
tensions between these two states as well as in the region. Due to this, terrorist network is
expanding day by day and most beautiful valley of the world which is earthly paradise is
now has become the "valley of death".
The deliberate stress on peace is justified for a number of reasons. First, if measured in
terms of loss of life, physical and emotional injury and economic hardships. Kashmir's
are suffering for more as a result of internal grievances than they are because of the
26

failure to resolve the wider issue of who controls Jammu & Kashmir: India or Pakistan.
The latter dispute has also caused much problems "divided families. Travel restrictions,
loss of life due to cross border shelling etc. but today, its impact is felt less directly than
that of the internal conflict. If these internal issues can be addressed, a marked
improvement can be seen in the lines of ordinary Kashmir's.
It should also be noted that such internal issues as human rights abuses, regional
autonomy and economic development can be resolved even in the absence of
international resolution should conflict continue between Kashmiri Muslim and the
Indian government.
However, it will be extremely difficult for India and Pakistan to resolve their dispute. Fail
to resolve the internal conflict especially in Indian held Jammu and Kashmir, carries the
'constant danger of escalation into a full-scale war between India and Pakistan. The
Kargil conflict stemmed from the internal conflict. The 2001 attack on the Lok Sabha, the
lower house of the Indian parliament in New Delhi that attack led to a marine troop
deployment along the Indo-Pakistan international border and for some months, the threat
of another lndo-Pakistan war.
The peace process and efforts for reconciliation are not the result of target-oriented
practice between India and Pakistan. Indo-Pakistan history reflects much intense conflict
between the two neighborly states. These conflicts were managed through initiatives and
pacts. The major difference between India and Pakistan is on the issue of Kashmir. That
is the main reason of dispute between them. That's why; it is called the disputed legacy.
Pakistan's stand on Kashmir is based on the principle of pro-nation theory but on the
other hand, India considers the Kashmir as an integral part of the Indian Union. None of
the accords or pacts could however, resolve the Kashmir dispute.
27

Pakistan
From Pakistan perspective Kashmir is the core or central issue and the root cause of the
incessant enmity with India. Pakistan insists that the Kashmir is both a territorial dispute
as well as a humanitarian issue. Its root lies in India's forcible occupation of two-third of
Jammu and Kashmir and in refusal to honor its pledges to implement UN resolution on
self determination for the Kashmiri people. Denying that right, Kashmir's have been
forced to conduct a political and armed struggle for self determination. Refuting Indian
accusation of Pakistan to support cross border militants infiltration in Kashmir.
Pakistan insists that the militancy is indigenous, the outcome of Kashmiri alienation, is
fuelled by India's refusal to accept the Kashmiri rights of self determination and the use
of indiscriminate force to suppress Kashmiri political aspirations. Pakistani traditional
official stand on Kashmir issue is based on two principles. It is the impartial, fair and UN
supervised plebiscite and rejection of LOC as a permanent border between India and
Pakistan. Based on the principle that was given by the UN resolution in 1948, Pakistan
had been insisting the plebiscite in Kashmir must take place as the obligatory step
towards the resolution of the issue.
Furthermore, for Pakistan the resolution of Kashmir conflict is the first priority above
other considerations between two hostilities. Without the solution of Kaslunir, no
improvement on the relationship is practicable for Pakistan. The 1948 UN resolution
offered the three steps to end the dispute between India and Pakistan over the region. The
first step was the ceasefire of the armed conflict between them, which was triggered in
1947 at the time of partition. The second step was to withdraw forces from the line of
ceasefire.
And as the last step, the UN proposed to hold a plebiscite to determine the status of the
region by the people themselves. Both leaders of ex-united states of British Raj accepted
the resolution and promised to conduct it. FIowever, since the withdrawal of both forces
never took place then, the plebiscite to end the war has neither come to the realm of
practice.
28

Pakistan's Official Position is the following
The state of Jammu and Kashmir since the end of British rule over undivided India has
been a disputed territory; the state's accession to India in October 1947 was provisional.
This understanding is formally acknowledged in the UN Security Council resolutions of
13thl
August 1948, 5th January 1949 and all other resolutions, to which both Pakistan and
India agreed and neither party could unilaterally discard it.
Talks between India and Pakistan over the future status of the state should be focused
upon securing right of self determination for the kashmiri people via conducting of free.
fair and internationally supervised plebiscite as agreed in the aforementioned UN
Security Council resolutions. The plebiscite should offer the people of Kashmir, the
choice of permanent accession of the entire to Pakistan or India.
Talks between India and Pakistan in regard to the future status of the state should be held
in conformity both with the Simla agreement of July 1972 and the aforementioned UN
Security Council resolutions. An international mediatory role in these talks should not be
ruled out17
. Pakistan has fundamental reason For clinging to its claim. It was founded as
the homeland for the Indian Muslims, and feels incomplete without its 'neighboring
Muslim majority state.
Moreover what Pakistani has accused is the violation of human rights in the Indian-
controlled Kashmir. Indian government enforces Kashmir specified laws then arrests and
tortures those activists seeking for the independence or conducting anti-Indian
propaganda under these laws. There are many unknown graves found in the region,
which are considered to be for people who were killed by the Indian forces. According to
Sardar Amjad Yousal Khan, there are several laws enacted by the government of India
that are violating the international laws. For example, the National Security Act contains
provision to empower the authorities not to disclose the reasons of detention to the
detainee.
17
1947-1997. The Kashmir Dispute at filly: Chartine. Paths to peace, Reports, The Kashmir study group
(US: 1997), p.6.
29

These laws facilitate human rights violations with complete protection against
prosecution. Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) is another example, which
triggered citizens' aggression against the Indian government. Amnesty immediately
warned that the ordinance would undermine the human rights because it gives wide-
ranging powers to the police regarding detention. The local newspapers and media are
still subject to intimidation.19
After 1995, the Indian policy towards Kashmir comes to be
known as "catch and kill" against suspects.
In spite of the constitution of Indian-controlled Kashmir, which has been promulgated by
its assembly in 1957, declares that the state of Jammu and Kashmir is integral part of the
Indian Union and its article 370 enshrines the autonomous status of Indian-controlled
Kashmir, the autonomy and its basic principles have been violated and ignored by the
Indian central government. Initially, the Article 370 of Indian Constitution states that
Indian central government can decide matters related to defense, foreign affairs, currency
and communications and on other subject under the Indian Union's jurisdiction.
However, between 1954 and 1965, the autonomy in the legislative, judicial and fiscal
spheres of Indian-controlled Kashmir has been destroyed by a series of integrative and
centralizing measures enacted from New Delhi.2°
However, recently Pakistan also has shown its flexibility towards the issue. It is because
the stakes to resolve the issue becomes more significant for the political leaders. Newly
established civilian government, lead by Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, declared
that Pakistan no longer insists that a resolution of Kashmir issue is a pre-requisite for the
progress on other issues, and also modified its earlier stance that solution must be found
by implementing the UN resolution.21
The four-point proposal made by Pakistani
President Pervaiz Musharraf in December 2006, calls for ceasefire and military
18 Sardar Amjad Yousaf Khan is the executive director of Kashmir Institute of International Relations.
Descriptions above are from his essay, "Human Rights in conflict region of Jammu and Kashmir", p.3.
19 Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War, LB. Tauris 2003, pp237-
238.
20 Sumantra Bose, "Contested LANDS", HarperCollins Publishers India 2007, p170.
21 Pervaiz lqbal Cheema, "Demilitalization: First Step towards setting a stage for settlement", p.13.
30

disengagement, joint control, self-governance and autonomy, and free movement across
the LOC, while retaining the same borders in Kashmir.
For Pakistanis, the solution of Kashmir conflict and future sustainability of peace
dialogue seems to depend on Indian attitude. Because Indian attitude remains rigid with
less effort towards the resolution, she seems to avoid making progress in the peace
settlement as India had rejected several proposals given by Pakistani leaders and
historical UN representatives.22
Indian Stand
Indian position is diametrically different from that of Pakistan. Indian insists that Jammu
and Kashmir (J&K) is an integral part of the Indian union. If there is dispute it only
involves one-third of Kashmir territory occupied by Pakistan. Militancy in Kashmir is
abetted by the Pakistani government and militant organization based in Pakistan. There
is, however, a shift in Indian policy from placing all blame for unrest in J&K on Pakistani
intervention to an emphasis on internal reconciliation. While India is concerned about
Kasluniri alienation. It believes that it could be addressed through internal and
democratic mean such as election and other participatory mechanisms. The Indian
government's official position regarding Jammu and Kashmir contains three basic
postulates:
I. The state of Jammu and Kashmir is and has been an integral part of Indian union
since its accession to India on 26th
October, 1947.Nothing agreed by India in the
UN Security Council resolutions of 13th
August 1948 and 5th
January 1949 or in
any subsequent instruments, alters this status or in any way modifies Indian
sovereignty over the state.
2. The only component of Kashmir issue legally admissible in talks between India
and Pakistan over the future of state pertains to the need for Pakistan to vacate
terrorist illegally occupied. The future status of the state is otherwise an
22
'bid, p.1, pp.6-7, p.13.
31

exclusively domestic matter to be resolved, as Indians typically put it, within the
four comers of the Indian constitutions.
3. Talks between India and Pakistan in regard to the future status of the state should
be held within a strictly bilateral framework and in conformity with the Simla
agreement of July 197223.
Since the mid 1950, India has consistently rejected offers of mediation, whether by UN,
the US or any other third party, arguing that the solution must arise locally without the
meddling of foreign power-no matter how well intentioned. Solving the issue through
bilateral negotiations has not been working for the last thirty years.
India-Pakistan conflicting positions on Kashmir
ISSUE INDIA PAKISTAN
Jammu and Kashmir is a disputed territory
No Yes
Azad Kashmir is constitutional territory of Pakistan
No No
Elections are substitute for a plebiscite
Yes . No
Third-party mediation is needed
No Yes
The UN resolutions are binding for both
No Yes
23
Ibid,P.23
32

Economic Interest in the Region
Territorial dispute over Kashmir contains not only ideological or religious issue of either
side but also economic interest. Kashmir is a beautiful place where has been attracted
people from outside. While tourism does not compose much extent of economic interests
for its neighbors, the main economic as well as geo-strategically reason due to which
neither India nor Pakistan accept to demise the land is related to water resource. Indian-
controlled Kashmir covers four main rivers, Jehlum, Indus, Chenab and Ncelam in its
land and by that vital resource Kashmir has strategic significance for both states to
compete each other.
Competition over water resource between India and Pakistan has antagonistic past. As
one of the long-running conflict over this vital resource, the Baglihar dam of the Chenab
River has been a center issue of them. India has started to construct the dam in 1992 and
it comes to the final stage of construction now. Pakistan has been protesting to the dam
construction, claiming that the design, height, and storage capacity of the dam violate the
1960 Indus River Treaty whereas India denies it. While India alleges that Pakistan
opposes to the dam because it is to bring economic advance to Kashmir, Pakistan
criticizes that India intends to slow Pakistan's hydrological strangulation.
Thus both of them don't intend to come closer to resolve the issue. This situation
indicates that when fundamental national interests are at stake in the relationship between
these historical antagonists, bilateralism comes up against a dead end.
The Stance of Kashmiri Political Parties
Ever since 1947 the views of the Kashmiri have been obscured by the dispute between
India and Pakistan. The majority of Kashmiri want to practice their right of self
determination to decide their future. The Kashmiri self determination struggle is founded
on the various UN Security Council resolutions. The All parties Hurriyat Conference now
led by Gillani faction have said at many occasions that; we want to become a part of
33

Pakistan. The API-IC was founded in1993 to unite various parties of Jammu and Kashmir
demanding the right of self determination.
For Kashmir's bilateralism has failed because of the tripartite nature of the conflict.
APIIC and other pro freedom parties are of the firm opinion that Kashmir's are the final
arbiters of their destiny as such any bilateral agreement between India and Pakistanis not
a final word for the people of Jammu and Kashmir. For determining the constitutional
future of the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, the people of Kashmir must be
considered an irrefutable party to the dispute. After the 1965 India-Pakistan war, the
Tashkent declaration of 19666 did not mentioned the rights of the inhabitants of Jammu
and Kashmir.
The Simla agreement was also rejected by the Kashmiri on both sides of the LOC in 1972
because the agreement excluded the views of the Kashmir's. Kashmir's internal politics
have also made the Kashmir dispute far harder to settle.
API-IC headed by Syed Ali Gillani is of the view that belbre initiation of any dialogue
India government must recognize Kashmir as disputed territory and the dialogue must be
held between the three parties, while Abbas Ansari and some other pro movement's
leaders have started dialogue with the Indian government without any significant results.
With the decade old conflict in Kashmir, most Kashmiri are eager for a peaceful
settlement. There are now not two but three parties involved in the Kashmir issue, India
Pakistan and Kashmir's. As Kashmiri are not allowed to meet each other at any level, the
common ground of understanding is lacking in the Kashmiri point, of view due to the
restriction imposed by the government of India.
Where does the International Community Stand?
'Ile United States, British and France have traditionally been committed supporter of the
plebiscite/referendum is as the only way a solution could be implemented. They
sponsored all the resolution of Security Council calling for plebiscite. But in the post cold
war period and particularly after 9/11, the foreign powers are only interested to facilitate
the process backed off by India and Pakistan. Today the international community does
34

not seem prepare to take seriously the UN resolution on Kashmir. The international
community has favored a bilateral route of talk between India and Pakistan.
After 9/11 no country is prepare to believe that the freedom fighters are independent and
not under the control of Pakistan. .1-he 1972 Simla agreement, the 1999 Lahore
declaration and the 2004 Islamabad and the resumption of the composite dialogue
become the new touch stone of international opinion.
In the light of Post-9/11
After 9/11, new international game rules were set by the United States. The newly coined
9/11 terminology helped New Delhi to cohort Pakistan with Taliban, a hub of terrorism,
and project India as a victim of terrorism. Besides, the situation also offered India and
Pakistan a watershed opportunity to transform their diplomatic relations with the USA.
New Delhi immediately extended all-out support to Washington's War on Terror,
presenting its war-related facilities for use against the Taliban regime:
Meanwhile. Islamabad became a frontline state for the USA. Pakistan feared that India
might snatch the opportunity to forge an anti-Pakistan alliance with the US. It quickly
disappointed New Delhi and created a sense of both in the corridors of the Indian
establishment and the public.
During this period, a number of events occurred that favored New Delhi; for instance, the
UN Resolution 1373 (2001) adopted by the Security Council at its meeting on September
28, 2001, clearly ignored the distinction between the freedom movement and terrorism.
whereas the US dubbed all resistance movements for the right to self-determination as
terrorist campaigns. Besides a few exceptions. the entire world comthunity accepted this
flaw in interpretation.
Kashmir was among the first casualties of these new game rules. Soon after, the
traditional sympathy towards oppressed people disappeared and the world media and big
countries started to call freedom fighters terrorists. India cashed in on this trend and
35

portrayed itself as a victim of terrorism, not a brutal oppressor confronting the freedom
struggle of the Kashmir's.
Just three months after the September 11 events, the Indian parliament was attacked. The
episode invited condemnation from all over the world and sympathy towards India, while
Pakistan was pressurized to rein in militants active inside INK. Indian Prime Minister
Atal Behari Vajpayee, according to renowned writer Arundhati Roy, seized the
opportunity to compare this attack with the 9/11 attacks. India snapped diplomatic
relations and all communication links with Pakistan and manned its border with Pakistan
with half a million soldiers, challenging Pakistan to change its Kashmir policy or face
dire consequences24
.
Responding in the same coin, Pakistan also mobilized it forces. The standoff created a
war-like situation in the region and alarmed the US, which was heavily dependent on
Pakistan for its crucial logistic support in the US war in Afghanistan. It was untenable for
the US to allow Pakistan to shift its focus from the Afghan border to the eastern one.
Another thing went in the favor of India the India Us Nuclear deal.
The immediate aftermath of 9/11 was one of uncertainty for Pakistan as it was deeply
involved in Afghanistan and felt threatened for its own survival. -Initially. India was
hoping to draw the world attention towards the Pakistani involvement in 'cross-border
terrorism' as 'right wing agenda of national security, nationalism, anti-Pakistan/Muslim
sentiments acquired a new legitimacy'. The Indian Defense Minister even accused
Pakistan's indirect involvement in 9/11 and in veiled terms called for the US military
action against it. But as Pakistan took a U-turn and joined the 'War on Terror' against
Taliban, Indian expectation for the Western support for its own military camriaign against
Pakistan proved futile.
Pakistan also failed in its attempts to seek Western support for Kashmir in lieu of its
joining the War on Terror. In the ensuing confusion, the Kashmiri resistance militants
Ersahad Mahmood,"Pak-India Peace" An apprise, volume 4,no2
36

also increased their activities to keep the international focus on Kashmir converged. The
alleged militant attack outside the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly in early
October 2001 raised tensions and the Indian government threatened to attack and destroy
'terrorist camps' inside Azad Kashmir in Pakistan. As the US was trying to cool down the
tempers, alleged terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament in New Delhi in December
2001.
The Pakistani or Kashmiri involvement was never proven, but the attack provoked the
Indian government and it 'launched its biggest ever peacetime mobilization of forces on
Pakistan's border called Operation Parakram'25
. Pakistan responded with its own troop
mobilization and, in May 2002, war seemed like a distinct possibility. 'Faced with the
nightmare scenario of an India-Pakistan shooting war turning into a nuclear conflagration
with devastating consequences for the region and the American anti-terror campaign
against Al-Qaeda Washington exerted intense diplomatic pressure on New Delhi and
I s l a m a b a d , a s k i n g t h e m t o p u l l b a c k f r o m t h e p r e c i p i c e ' .
In June 2002, after months of brinkmanship, both the countries agreed to pull their troops
back. While India realized that there was not much world support for its own 'war on
terror' and 'hot pursuit', Pakistan had to come to terms with the changed worldview and
abandon its support for the Kashmiri militants as well as linkage politics linking solution
to the Kashmir problem with its progress in relations with India. Pakistan's then Foreign
Minister, Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri described the shift as 'confrontational mode of the
subcontinent being rolled back in the face of ground realities of today's turbulent world".
This could perhaps be described as what Zartman (2006) calls the 'ripe moment which in
this case was created by the active influence of outside powers, particularly the US. This
'ripe moment' advanced the constituency of peace and strengthened it at the cost of those
ho sought a perpetual confrontation for either their personal or ultra-nationalistic goals26
.
25
ibid
26 William Zartman," the Timing of Peace Initiatives: hurting stalemates and rip moment'Voll no I
37

Pakistan's Policy in Post 9/11
The events of 9/11, the attack on the Indian parliament, and the following war-like
situation between India and Pakistan not only greatly impacted the Kashmiri resistance
movement but also compelled Islamabad to change its track on Kashmir. Moreover, the
unfriendly international environment and Pakistan's deep involvement in Afghanistan
forced Islamabad to rethink its relations with India and its Kashmir Policy. The decision
of General Pervez Musharraf to join the US-led War on Terror was also a factor in
changing Islamabad's strategic position on Kashmir, particularly in terms of its
ideological foundation.
The economic condition of the country, unrest in the tribal areas, and allegedly externally
sponsored violence in some parts of Balochistan, and the growing engagement along the
Afghan border also played an instrumental role in bringing about a paradigm shift in
Islamabad's thinking towards India. It is also said that Pakistan's trusted friends, like
China and Saudi Arabia, advised it to seek an unconventional way out for a lasting deal
with India over the Kashmir issue and bilateral relations; besides, constant persuasion
from the United States also continued.
Pakistan's capacity to protract the low cost conflict in Kashmir is beyond any doubt.
Although the likely spillover effects of this on Pakistan's polity are obvious, they will be,
to a great degree, manageable. On the other hand, despite its conventional military
superiority and strong diplomatic backing from the world. India cOuld not subdue the
resolve of Pakistan to support Kashmir's right to self-determination and its demand for
sovereign equality with India. Pakistan's ties with the United States, and its role as an
ally of the West, are considered advantageous for seeking a settlement of the Kashmir
issue.
38

We cannot deny the post-9/1 1 reality that our "friends," the Americans, now have deeper
than ever stakes in India-Pakistan rapprochement as a factor of stability for regional and
global peace27.
The 'covert' US engagement with Islamabad, Delhi and Kashmir's is no longer a secret.
Washington has expressed its desire at a number of times to help settle the Kashmir issue
within the existing territorial parameters but with minor realignment. It views India as a
potential rival to China, not only in the region but also in global affairs28. The US is
striving to build India as a strategic counterweight to China, along with Japan and
Australia.
Termed as naïve by critics, Pakistan's calculations of the ground realities are optimistic,
being based on the belief that India will never be able to bring normalcy into Kashmir
because Kashmiri's are highly skeptical towards it, and that India will need Pakistan's
support and will ultimately makes tangible transformations in its current stance over
Kashmir. The majority of Kashmiri's do not trust the Indian government and, ever since
the eruption of the resistance, their aspiration for the right of self-determination has
multiplied manifold and now cuts across even the hardcore pro-India circles in the
Kashmir Valley.
India's carrot and stick tactics and the brutalities of its forces have alienated the local
population and invoked armed resistance, which may not die down easily. It is this
assessment of the situation that emboldened Islamabad to make tangible concessions on
Kashmir and bring India to the table for talks. Some also believe that the personal
ambition of the President Musharraf his wish to be regarded in history as a statesman
who settled one of the world's most complicated disputes is a driving factor that has
brought essential changes in Islamabad's policies.
Besides various other factors that caused India and Pakistan to change their policies on
the Kashmir issue, back channel diplomacy led by the US played a major role in
27
OpCit
28
http://www.ips.org.pldinternational-relation/pakistan-and-its-neighbours/1013-pak-india-peacc-process-
an-appraisal-.html
39

alleviating the crisis and creating a viable atmosphere for initiatives towards a
comprehensive normalization process.
Change in India's Approach
For a long time, India's approach for dealing with Pakistan had revolved mainly around
zero tolerance in any concerns related to India's security or political ideology. However,
its inability to 'punish' Pakistan and to break its back economically (by creating a war-
like environment in the region) had a sobering impact on the Indian mindset and led New
Delhi to conclude that its conventional policies vis-à-vis Pakistan and Kashmir were
getting nowhere. In the past, New Delhi had publicly pronounced several times that it
would take punitive action and destroy what it alleged were militant training camps
inside Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) by air strikes. However, its hostile attitude did
not yield the desired results and Islamabad did not succumb to its pressure.
At the same time, economic tycoons and multinational companies were pressuring the
Indian government to normalize relations with Islamabad as hostile relations between the
two neighbors and the constant fear of war had a negative impact on business activity and
international investment. New Delhi needed peace in the region and internal stability to
continue its current annual growth rate of 8-10 percent and obtain further foreign
investment. As one researcher on the peace process put it:
Improved relations would lead to improved trade: there was money to be made, and this
had become a strategic objective for both Islamabad and New Delhi.
India realized that its successful economic journey would cease if it did not settle-disputes
with Pakistan. It had to think about the immense potential in bilateral trade and in trade
with landlocked Afghanistan and Central Asia via Pakistan. Besides:, India aspires for a
permanent seat in the UN Security Council for which it had to ensure friendly relations
with neighbors and settle the Kashmir issue in the context of which India is regarded
among those countries that did not comply with the UNSC resolutions. Moreover, the
Kashmir resistance poses a huge financial burden on the Indian 'treasury. It is also
acknowledged that the Indian security forces do not have the capacity to fix the problem;
40

rather, they invite anger by frequently committing severe human rights violations that
aggravate the already complex situation.
After the withdrawal of Indian forces from the Pakistani borders, Pakistan made a chain
of unilateral concessions pronounced by President General Musharraf himself. It began
with a unilateral ceasefire on LOC announced by Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali
in November 2003. In the following month, speaking to Reuters, General Musharraf said
he had "left aside" the 55-year-old demand for a UN mandated plebiscite on Kashmir and
wished to meet India "halfway" in a bid for peace in the subcontinent29.
These multiple pulls created a sense of obligation among the Indian ruling elite to at least
take some measures to show that they were serious about settling the problems.
Eventually, the Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee went to Kupwara in the
south of the Kashmir Valley and offered a hand of friendship to Pakistan in April 20043°.
This was regarded a departure from the conventional Indian thinking on Kashmir and
Pakistan, and paved the way for further initiatives on Kashmir. It also created a palatable
environment for Vajpayee to visit Islamabad to attend the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit.
Peace Process between India and Pakistan
The dialogue process between Islamabad and New Delhi is slowly 'progressing despite
several ups and downs. It is often said that the continuation of the process is in itself a
success because, in the past, the two countries have been unable to remain engaged in a
sustainable dialogue. However, the substance of the process and prospects of its success
need to be analyzed.
Until February 1994, India and Pakistan were engaged in sporadic dialogues that always
ended with zero progress. This is why both countries formally su*nded dialogue in
1994. Islamabad's approach was to settle the Kashmir issue first, after which the other
lbid
http://mondediplo.com/2004/06/03pakistan
41

problems would get settled almost automatically, whereas India was interested in dilating
first on other issues, such as trade and travel. Eventually, to bridge the gap between the
two positions, both governments agreed to address all political and territorial issues
simultaneously, including Jammu and Kashmir.
Consequently, the foreign secretaries of the two countries met in Islamabad and resumed
the stalled dialogue process in June 1997.They institutionalized the process by identifying
eight areas to deliberate upon and established working groups to make progress on each
issue separately but simultaneously.
This entire process was called off when the Kargil confrontation occurred. As discussed
earlier, post-9/11 events also contributed in the stalemate between the two countries.
Later, in 2004, India and Pakistan launched a renewed peace process aimed at resolving
all their longstanding disputes. However, the Kashmir dispute still dominates over other
issues. Even after voicing his new approaches, President Musharraf said that if progress
on Kashmir could not make headway, the entire process would be back to square one.
Recently, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz has underscored the settlement of Kashmir as a
precondition for further progress on other related disputes as well as for offering trade
and business opportunities to India.
Since January 2004, both neighbors have been engaged on two different levels. The first
is the official level, at which concerned officials from both sides meet periodically and
report their progress to foreign secretaries, who meet to review the outcome and discuss
the Kashmir, peace and security issues, before, finally, the foreign ministers meet to take
stock of developments and set the rules for further dialogue.
The second level of engagement is back-channel diplomacy. Pakistan's National Security
Secretary, Tariq Aziz, who is known to be a close aide of President Mushatraf, and
India's S. K. Lamba, former High Commissioner to Pakistan, are engaged in a serious
dialogue. However, it has been said that only five people in Pakistan are truly in the loop
on the actual state of bilateral negotiations. Therefore, no one can really assess the
behind-the-curtains activities or predict the contours of solutions.
42

So far, at the official level, both countries have completed four rounds of a composite
dialogue. This process received a dent when the Mumbai train blasts on July 11, 2006
caused a postponement in the foreign secretary-level talks. India blamed elements from
Pakistan for their involvement in the blasts but no evidence was provided by the Indian
government to Pakistan. This decision was in violation of the joint statement, issued on
April 18, 2005, by the leaders of Pakistan and India, which states that, "Terrorist acts
would not be allowed to derail the peace process.-
Eventually, sanity prevailed and the stalled process was resumed in November 2006.31
Likewise, in February, the Lahore-bound Samjhauta Express became a target of bomb
blasts that killed 68 passengers, most of whom were Pakistani. Islamabad reacted with
caution and did not allow the peace process to derail, despite the immense loss of its
citizens' lives. The question does arise how New Delhi would have reacted had Indian
citizens been the victims.
The fourth round of composite dialogue was held in Islamabad on March 13-14, 2007,
with a focus on the Jammu and Kashmir dispute and peace and security. In the context of
peace and security, the two sides discussed a wide range of issues relating to their
conventional and nuclear military capabilities and reviewed the entire process. The
Pakistani team sought India's response to President Musharraf's "ideas" on the resolution
of the Kashmir issue and emphasized the need for forward movement on Jammu and
Kashmir, saying it was time to move from confidence-building measures to dispute
resolution.
Among related issues, Pakistan pushed for early finalization of the agreements on speedy
return of inadvertent line crossers; quarterly flag meetings of the sector commanders at
the LOC; and liberalization of the visa regime. Pakistan also proposed some new cross-
LOC confidence building measures, including allowing sports activities and launch of
helicopter and postal services between Srinagar and Muzafarabad32.
Opcit
32 http://www.ipcs.org/article/indo-pak/index-4.html
43

In addition, Pakistan tabled a new proposal on anti-ballistic missiles. Siachen, Sir Creek
and economic cooperation were among the other issues discussed.
Following are the significant consensus points of the fourth round of foreign secretary-
level talks:
 After years of reluctance, Pakistan agreed to the Indian proposal of launching a
bus service between Kargil and Skardu in the Northern Areas. The two sides will
next discuss logistics and modalities;
 It was agreed that a tnick service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad would be
launched in a few months;
 It was agreed that the Joint Committee of Retired Judges, set up to look into the
prisoners issue, would begin its work soon and suggest ways to ensure the
humane treatment of Indian prisoners in Pakistani jails and Pakistani prisoners in
Indian jails;
 The two countries agreed to conclude an agreement on "No Development of New
Posts and Defense Works" along the LOC and proposed drafts for new border
control guidelines along the International Border;
 The two sides agreed to work on finalizing a liberalized visa regime, including a
proposal for group tourism33.
Although the meeting could not settle the problem of demilitarizing Siachen, it was able
to narrow down differences on some elements. The political leadership of both countries
a p p e a r s o p t i m i s t i c a b o u t r e s o l vi n g t h i s i s s u e i n t h e d a ys a h e a d .
Likewise, the formation of a Joint Counter-Terrorism Mechanism is also a significant
development. India has long blamed Pakistan for any terrorist activities occurring on its
territory. The Mechanism offers an opportunity for thorough investigation of incidents
prior to the pronouncements of conclusions.
However; it was reported in sections of the Pakistani and Indian press that Islamabad
seeks to keep the armed resistance in J&K out of the ambit of the Joint Anti-Terrorism
33 Priyashree Andley," Third Composite dialogue :An overview of Ind° Pak relatioris"p.5
44

Mechanism. At a joint press conference with the Indian Foreign Secretary Slaivshankar
Menon, his Pakistani counterpart, Riaz Mohammad Khan, said that Jammu and Kashmir
was "disputed" and should not be "mixed" with the initiatives that are between India and
Pakistan only.
The visible achievement of the four rounds of foreign sectaries' level dialogue is the
initiation of a Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service and, of late, the opening of entry points
along the LOC for civilian crossing. Although the 42-month dialogue process has not
yielded the desired results, both the governments seem to be closer] to agreements on a
number of issues. Besides, the two countries have also exchanged some proposals
through the back channel on the settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.
However, very few people of the two governments are fully aware of what is going on
behind the scene. Concerned citizens and the general public on both sides know virtually
nothing. This makes the back channel process vulnerable: nobody knows how
stakeholders and the public will react when the solution is finally made public.
India's Mixed Response
Initially, the Indian leadership was quick to turn down President Musharrac s proposals
on Kashmir, making it clear that sharing the sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir with
Pakistan was out of the question. However, due to the host of factors outlined above, it
eventfully realized that it had to reciprocate and take the proposals into serious
consideration.
The Indian Prime Minister made some reconciliatory remarks that encouraged pro-
settlement forces in Kashmir and Pakistan. India resumed the negotiation process with
APHC's Mirwaiz faction and also held meeting with Sajjad Ghani Lone, Chairman of the
People's Conference and to the leader of Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF),
Yasin Malik. The Indian Prime Minster held three Kashmir-related roundtables with the
pro-India leadership of IRK and formed five working groups to seek recommendations
on various issues.
45

The pro-independence leadership was also invited but it did not participate, demanding
that a separate meeting be held with it instead of a joint sitting with pro-India politicians.
Notably, President Musharraf personally encouraged the pro-independence APHC
leadership to join talks with India and Pakistan separately, as this would be a step in the
direction of trilateral talks.
There is a feeling in a large section of the Indian establishment andl public opinion that
Pakistan has narrowed down its position and come closer to that of India's, despite its use
of different jargon and nuances. It is interesting to note that, in the last two years, Indian
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has spoken on his vision of how to settle the Kashmir
issue several times. On March 24, 2006, in Amritsar, he argued for a step-by-step
approach and commencement of dialogue with the people "in their areas of control" to
improve the quality of governance.
Regarding the future status of the LOC, he said that it might eventually become a mere
line on a map, and that people might be able to visit and trade freely.34
He made a
departure from his government's earlier stated position by acknowledging that the "the
two parts of Jammu and Kashmir can, with the active encouragement of the governments
of India and Pakistan, work out cooperative consultative mechanisms so as to maximize
the gains of cooperation." He also offered a treaty of friendship between India and
Pakistan.
Subsequently, at the Second Round Table Conference held in Srinagar in May 2006, the
Indian Prime Minister indicated that he might take some institutional arrangements to
bring people from both sides of the LOC closer to each other. While meeting with a
APHC Conference delegation in New Delhi, he said India might create an environment in
which a person could live in Srinagar or Muzaffarabad without any legal restriction. He
reiterated that India was willing to move beyond its stated position, and expressed his
openness to any ideas that might contribute to the ongoing thought process. Finally,
speaking to a meeting of Indian businessmen in New Delhi, Prime Minister Manmohan
34 ibid p.7
46

Singh repeated his hope for a treaty of peace and friendship with Pakistan and
emphasized the need for linkage among South Asian states for economic development.
This was the second time he had spoken of such a treaty in the period of about a month.
Just one month earlier, he had initiated his idea of a treaty of peace and friendship at a
public rally in Amritsar. Echoing the same line a few days earlier, the Indian External
Affairs Minster Paranab Mukarjee had said that India had to be prepared for some give
and take in the border talks with China and Pakistan and should be prepared to shun rigid
claims of national sovereignty if the talks were to be meaningful35.
These pronouncements indicate that the Indian leadership is willing to have a phased-out
formula for the resolution of the Kashmir issues. Nevertheless, it is neither relinquishing
Indian sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir, nor ready to trade off territory. At the end
of the day, the people of Jammu and Kashmir may have de facto reunification of the
state, which will give them psychological satisfaction. Apart from Monmohan Singh's
reconciliatory remarks, a number of other key political stakeholders, such as Mufti
Muhammad Sayyed's People's Democratic Party (PDP), National Conference, and
APHC's Mirwaiz faction all support the Islamabad approach on Kashmir with slightly
varied interpretations.
In this context, the Indian government has adopted a policy of engaging both Kashmir's
and Pakistan in the dialogue process, separately but simultaneously. It suggests that New
Delhi has attached huge expectations to an internal agreement with the people of
Kashmir, giving relatively less importance to the external factor. However, it recognizes
the significance of people-to-people contacts across the LOC and, therefore, agreed to
initiate the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service and allowed Kashmiri. leaders to travel on
it to Muzaffarabad in July 2005. It has also given relatively better political space to the
Mirvvaiz faction of APHC and frequently facilitated its travel outside the country36.
35
http://www.ips.org.pk/international-relation/pakistan-and-its-neighbours/1 013-pak-india-peace-process-
an-appraisakhtml
ibid
47

On the other hand, a number of Indian officials and commentators are restlessly
following the beaten track of bitterness, continuing to hurl accusations at Pakistan with
no regard for the emerging environment. Officials in India's top echelons quite frequently
use isolated events to accuse Pakistan of terrorism without offering any substantial
evidence. At times, Islamabad's sincerity is questioned37. For instance, according to
Satish Chandra, former Deputy National Security Advisor to the Indian government:
Is the military in Pakistan sincere in wanting good relations with India? Pakistan's
engagement in the current dialogue process is due to compulsion of external pressures
and military exigencies which have tied up substantial Pakistani forces on the West.
In April 2005, when Musharaf visited New Delhi, both the governments made
announcements that the peace process was irreversible and no incident would be
permitted to derail it. But immediately after the Mumbai bomb blasts, New Delhi called
off the dialogue process and stalled the foreign secretary-level talks for almost three
months. Indeed, New Delhi left no stone unturned to prove that Pakistan was a haven for
terrorists and was involved in promoting terrorist networks inside India, particularly in
the occupied Jammu and Kashmir.
Pakistan's involvement in terrorism is well-known. It is not limited to Jammu and
Kashmir, but extends to several parts of India, including the northeast. One of my major
concerns was that in many parts of India, including New Delhi, we are a hair's breadth
away from a major terrorist attack38.
In view of such contradictions, it may be assumed that either opinion within the Indian
establishment is divided on the future course of action, or New Delhi has a well-defined.
official double-edged policy of conducting talks with Islamabad and, at the same time,
continuing its blame game to keep the latter under pressure. It is possible that New Delhi
wishes to maintain tactical ambiguity to keep both pro- and anti-peace process forces
37
ibid38
http://www.rcdiff.corn/news/munibai-blasts.htm
48

confused with mixed signals. Such an approach also allows the Indian government to
drag its feet on the peace process whenever it desires.
It appears that India does not care if its stance sends negative signals to the people of
Pakistan, or if it reinforces the argument before them that Delhi is not responding to
Musharraf's flexibility, even in diluted form. On the other hand, Musharraf has
consistently applauded Vaj payee and Marunohan Singh, calling them statesmen, but the
Indian leadership has never reciprocated the gesture. Musharraf has earned a lot of
appreciation across the world for his efforts to solve the Kashmir problem but this too has
made little impression on the Indian establishment.
Some leading Indian opinion makers believe that Pakistan had no option but to comply
with Indian demands. This view has been echoed by former Indian Prime Minister lnder
Kumar Gujral in the following words:
What options does he (Musharaf) have? His country faces innumerable problems. He also
finds India growing taller and taller. His friends, the Americans, have told him not to rock
the boat39.
Thus, the process of reconciliation and the blame game are continuing simultaneously,
indicating that the Indian establishment has yet to enter true reconciliation mode.
Naturally, several questions arise about this complex Indian attitude. The answer
primarily lies in the changed ground realities; for instance, back and forth movement
across LOC has admittedly gone down, while militants are no longer a major threat to the
security forces. Moreover, with the tacit approval of Islamabad, the fencing of the LOC
has been completed without any real hassle. The unfaltering commitment on the part of
Pakistan to respect the ceasefire along the LOC is a further encouraging factor.
Inside Kashinir, the APHC stands divided into two factions and one of them, headed by
Mirwaiz Omer Farooq, is in touch with Indian interloCutors, seeking a compromised
settlement of the issue within the Indian Union.
39
ibid
49

New Stakeholders
Recently, Kashmiri domestic politics took a dramatic turn when the President of the pro-
India National Conference, Omar Abdullah, made a striking demand. He said that no
solution for Kashmir was possible without the involvement of Hizbul Mujahideen (HM)
in the dialogue process. He urged India and Pakistan to hold talks With the United Jihad
Council and HM's chief, Syed Salauddin. Besides Omer Abdullah, the PDP chief
Mehbooba Mufti has also consistently advised New Delhi to bring HM on board. JKLF
leader Yasin Malik, known as the pioneer of militancy, also sets dialogue with HM as a
precondition to a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute.
Moreover, a number of intra-Kashmir dialogue conferences organized by the Centre for
Dialogue and Reconciliation, Delhi, have persistently been arguing for a seat for militants
in the ongoing process".
HM has welcomed the suggestion for the first time in its 17-year armed resistance. Its
inclusion in the dialogue has become a bipartisan demand of the Kashmiri stakeholders,
cutting across the political divide. However, several questions arise regarding HM's
future course of action. It is a fact that HM has played an instrumental role in
highlighting the Kashmir issue by rendering huge sacrifices. It commands immense
respect and credibility among the masses. Its chief, Syed Salauddin, is a household name
in Kashmir and is regarded as one of the most trusted leaders of the state41
.
In the wake of 26/11(Mumbai Blast)
The India Pakistan peace process has been started in 2004 due to a number of internal and
external compulsions for India and its view that post-9/11 Pakistan was under tremendous
pressure internally and externally so it was the best time for the final settlement of all issues
on its terms. On 26 November, 2008, the biggest blow to the peace process between India
40 http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070408/j&k.htm
41
ibid
50

and Pakistan came in the shape of a series of terror attacks in Mumbai the targeted two
luxury hotels and other landmarks across the city and led to the deaths of 172 people and
India related this with 9/11 attack. India completely blamed Pakistan for this terrorist
activity.
The event became a major halt between ongoing peace process. Indian longstanding
obsession with pretending itself as the victim of terrorism emanating from Pakistan has
remained enduring even if its credibility has worn over the years. 26/11 has become the
biggest excuse for India to avoid any serious diplomatic interaction with Pakistan to
resolve long festering issues including Kashmir. At time it seems that bilateralism hasn't
worked too well in solving the Indo- Pak problems. Nothing illustrates this point better
than blaming of Islamabad by New Delhi and the Indian media within hours of the
Mumbai terrorist attacks.
It seems that the India and Pakistan peace process is suffering from the classical spoiler
problem. Pranab Mukerjee once described Pakistan as a "nursery of global terrorism".
Since the War on Terrorism started, Pakistan has played a very significant role in it. It is
credited for the capturing of a number of Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders42. However, at
the same time, Pakistan is alleged to be part of the problem as the West continues to
blame that some elements in Pakistan support the Taliban in Afghanistan. Despite
playing a major role in the on-going war against terror, allegedly Pakistan remains a safe-
heaven for the Jehadis and Al-Qaeda.
This attack was unique in a number of ways. Unlike the 1993 and 2006 terror attacks in
Mumbai, the attackers opted for a new target strategy that relied on surprise and creating
confusion which would not have been possible without detailed preparation and internal
support. While the attack was tragic and resulted in the loss of innocent lives, it also
revealed strong deficiencies in India's internal security setup. It was clear that there was a
great intelligence failure lack of coordination between various forces that are corrupt and
poorly trained and equipped and delays in there sponge of NSG commandos'''.
http://article.wn.corniview/2010/02/24/India-and-Pakistan-hold-first-Kashmir-peace-ta1ks-since-Mumb/ 43
ibid
51

If one goes by the logic of three Ws: What, When and Why, one can deduce that the
attacks were carried out to derail the already faltering peace process between India and
Pakistan and to create an atmosphere of revenge hysteria in India that would result in a
war between the two countries. Though the later never happened,. the relationship of
muted hostility between the two countries exists.
Resumption of Composite Dialogue
India suspended the composite dialogue process, which was launched in 2004, in the
wake of last year's Mumbai terror attacks. New Delhi blamed the attacks on Pakistan-
based elements, including the Lashker-e-Taiba, and linked the resumption of dialogue to
Islamabad taking steps to bring the perpetrators of the terrorist assault to justice44
.
Now it is a time the world community also plays a role in strengthening "strategic
stability" in South Asia. According to the foreign office spoke person Abdul Basit
Pakistan wanted "irreversible and result-oriented dialogue" as this was necessary for
lasting peace in the region. Time has come to give this right to the Kashmiris so that the
region could move forward and to ensure peace and prosperity.
Kashmiri's View
During my research I got a chance to work with Kashmir institute of international
relation. There I got some very fruitful insights and the very first time I come across the
distinguish leaders of across the border and also the point of view of different scholars
diplomats and intellectual and civil society members. They explained their opinion and
Some of the Kashmiri in a view the conflict has internal and external dimensions, conflict
within the state, within India and between India and Pakistan. The failure in resolutions
between any areas would result in failure in at all levels. The motivations for the external
dimensions of the conflict had morphed from essentially political pre-1947, to ideological
over the later half of the twentieth century and in recent times back to politically
motivated post 9/11. Internally the conflict was shifting from a political movement
44 http://wwvv.indianexpress.cominews/pak-seeks-resumption-of-composite-dialogue/584883/
52

Emerging options on kashmir 2010 [zartasha niazi]

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