The SEC Fiduciary Proposal impacts investment managers and broker dealers alike, from both operations and distribution perspectives. Join us for a panel discussion of reactions, considerations and concerns regarding the new the proposal. Hear a summary of key components of the rule proposal as well as a deeper dive into the following issues:
- Critical differences between the DOL rule and the SEC proposal
- Overview of new disclosure requirements
- Practical impacts of the interpretation of the Investment Adviser Standard of Conduct
- What we’re hearing from industry peers and what immediate actions are being taken
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Timothy Welsh - Moderator
Senior Manager, Financial Services Risk Management, EY
Tonia Bottoms
Managing Director & Senior Managing Counsel, Pershing LLC
Susan Grafton
Partner, Dechert LLP
Meet Our Panel
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Agenda
Welcome and Introduction
Overview of Recent SEC Proposals
DOL Rule and SEC Proposal: Similarities and Differences
Regulation Best Interest Overview for Broker Dealers
Overview of New Form CRS Disclosure Requirements
Operational Challenges of Form CRS
Practical Impacts of the Investment Advisor Standard of Conduct Interpretation
Final Thoughts
Q & A
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Overview of Recent SEC Proposals
On April 18th, the Securities and Exchange Commission voted 4-1 to propose a package of
rules and interpretations intended to improve the retail investor experience and to provide
greater clarity regarding investors’ relationships with broker-dealers and investment advisers.
o Voted “Yes” with No Reservations: Clayton (Chair) and Pierce (Rep.)
o Voted “Yes” with Reservations: Piwowar (Rep., has indicated intention to leave SEC in July) and Jackson
(Dem., Term Ends in 2019)
o Voted “No”: Stein (Dem., Term Ended 2017 but can serve for additional 18 months following end of Term).
o It is likely that the Commission that would be called upon to vote on any subsequent adoption will look very
different than the split Commission that voted to propose with reservations expressed.
Per Chairman Clayton, the proposals are intended to supplant DOL’s fiduciary rule and similar
state initiatives.
Comments are due August 7th.
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Overview of Recent SEC Proposals (Cont’d)
The SEC’s proposals:
o Regulation Best Interest, a new standard of conduct for certain broker-dealers
o Interpretative guidance regarding the standard of conduct for investment advisers
o Solicitation of comment on additional substantive requirements for SEC-registered advisers and their
personnel
o New disclosure requirements for financial professionals
o Certain labeling rules
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DOL Rule and SEC Proposal: Similarities and Differences
DOL Rule governed under ERISA
o Focus on brokers that provide investment advice on Retirement Plans and other associated
investment vehicles
SEC governs through Federal Securities laws
o SEC Regulation Best Interest applies to those that provide advice to “Retail Customers”
o Broker dealers and, to a lesser extent, investment advisors
Conflicts of Interest
o DOL had more stringent requirements surrounding conflicts of interest than the SEC’s Reg BI
o Under SEC Reg BI, effectively disclosing a conflict of interest remedies the conflict
(Despite this, the SEC’s “informed consent” approach requires disclosures to be “adequate”, otherwise the
conflict is not cured)
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Regulation Best Interest Overview
Requires broker-dealers and its associated persons to act in the best interest of
their “retail customers” when making recommendations of securities transactions
or investment strategies involving securities
o “Retail customer” would be defined as any person who receives a recommendation about a
securities transaction or investment strategy involving securities from a broker-dealer, and who
uses the recommendation primarily for personal, family or household use
o “Recommendation” would have the same definition as used by FINRA; at least initially
Not placing the broker-dealer or registered representative’s interests (financial or
other) ahead of the customer
Impacts:
Compensation
Product-Specific Activities
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Regulation Best Interest Overview (Cont’d)
Broker Dealers will satisfy the best interest requirement if they satisfy
following three obligations:
o Disclosure Obligation:
Prior or at time of recommendation, reasonably disclose, in writing, material facts about
scope and terms of relationship, including all material B-D conflicts of interest (reference
form CRS)
o Care Obligation:
Exercise reasonable “diligence, care, skill” to (1) Understand potential risks and rewards of
the recommendation and have a reasonable basis to believe that the recommendations
could be in the “best interest of some retail customer; (2) have a reasonable basis to
believe that the recommendation is in the “best interest” of the retail customer to whom
it is being made based on the customer’s investment profile; and (3) have a reasonable
basis to believe that a series of recommended transactions, even when viewed in
isolation, is not excessive and is in the retail customer’s “best interest”
o Conflicts of Interest Obligation:
Broker-dealer required to establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures
designed to identify and (1) disclose or eliminate all material conflicts of interest
associated with the recommendation; and (2) disclose and mitigate, or eliminate all
material conflicts of interest arising from financial incentives associated with the
recommendation
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Overview of New Form CRS Disclosure Requirements
Proposed new Form CRS (Customer or Client Relationship Summary) would be a
standardized four-page disclosure document addressing, among other items:
o Services to be provided;
o Legal standard of conduct applicable to the services;
o Fees and costs the retail investor will pay; and
o Conflicts of interest that may exist in the relationship.
Differences in disclosure requirements for:
o Broker-Dealers;
o IAs;
o Dual Registrants
Restrictions on use of titles
o “adviser” vs. “advisor”
Prominence of disclosure of registration status (e.g., BD or IA) in retail
communications
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Overview of New Form CRS Disclosure Requirements (Cont’d)
In certain circumstances, a relationship summary would need to be provided
to existing retail clients, including when a retail client requests a summary.
The SEC also proposed “labeling” rules under the Exchange Act and Advisers
Act of 1940 that would require broker-dealers and investment advisers to
disclose if they are a registered broker-dealer, registered investment adviser,
or both.
The SEC also proposed to restrict the use of the titles “adviser” and “advisor”
to registered investment advisers or associated persons of registered
investment advisers.
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Operational Challenges of Form CRS
What are some operational challenges to implementing the new CRS
disclosures?
o Includes delivery to High Net Worth and Qualified Investors
o Potential for increased investor confusion, especially with dual-hatted persons
o Costly; should be integrated with existing disclosures (e.g., Form ADV for advisers)
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Practical Impacts of the Investment Advisor Standard of
Conduct Interpretation
What are the practical impacts of the interpretation of Investment Adviser
Standard of Conduct?
Investment Adviser fiduciary duty cannot be disclosed or negotiated away.
o Duty of Care includes:
Providing advice in the best interest of the client;
Seeking best execution where adviser selects broker-dealer; and
Providing ongoing advice and monitoring
o Duty of Loyalty, which includes:
Disclosure of all material facts relating to the relationship, which are sufficient for the
client to decide to consent to any conflicts of interest
New requirements for Investment Advisers, including:
o Licensing and Continuing Education for personnel of SEC-registered Investment Advisers;
o Delivery of Account Statements to clients with investment advisory accounts; and
o Financial responsibility for SEC-registered investment advisers, including fidelity bonds
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Final Thoughts
What are you hearing from your peers?
What are the immediate actions being taken?
Are there State approaches or proposals to consider?
What approaches will firms take to the “identification of conflicts of
interest?”