1) The Supreme Court initiated suo moto criminal contempt proceedings against author Arundhati Roy for her comments criticizing a Supreme Court decision in an article and during protests.
2) Roy argued her comments constituted fair criticism protected under law, while the Court held her comments scandalized the Court's authority with malafide intentions.
3) The Court sentenced Roy to one day imprisonment and a Rs. 2,000 fine, citing precedents around permissible criticism of courts and showing magnanimity by keeping the sentence symbolic given Roy is a woman.
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Fair Criticism vs Scandalizing Authority
1. SCHOOL OF LEGAL STUDIES
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
CASE PRESENTATION
Submitted by
Mohith S
4th
Sem LLB (Reg.)
Re:Arundhati Roy.... ... vs --- on 6 March, 2002
(2002) 3 SCC 343
2. Re:Arundhati Roy.... ... vs --- on 6 March, 2002
(2002) 3 SCC 343
In the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India
Contempt Petition (Crl.) 10 of 2001
Bench: G.B. Pattanaik, R.P. Sethi
Brief Facts of the Case
This case concerns a suo-moto criminal contempt petition (that is, a petition initiated by the
Court on its own motion) against the Respondent, Arundhati Roy, a Booker-prize winning
author.
During the course of a writ petition (No. 319 of 1994) by grassroots-movement Narmada
Bachao Andolan, the Court addressed issues of environmental damage and displacement
of marginalized communities due to the development of a reservoir dam on the river
Narmada. Following a Supreme Court order that allowed for the height of the dam to be
increased to RL 85m, the Respondent wrote an article criticizing this decision [The Greater
Common Good in Outlook Magazine].
Subsequently, on 30.12.2000, protests were staged in front of the gates of the Supreme
Court by Narmada Bachao Andolan and the Respondent. This led to contempt proceedings
based on a complaint lodged with the police. During the proceedings, all Respondents
denied the allegations concerning specific slogans and banners and the proceedings were
dropped. However, along with her denial, Roy’s response to the show cause notice criticized
the Court for issuing proceedings in the first place.
She stated in her affidavit that: “On the grounds that judges of the Supreme Court were too
busy, the Chief Justice of India refused to allow a sitting judge to head the judicial enquiry
into the Tehelka scandal, even though it involves matters of national security and corruption
in the highest places. Yet when it comes to an absurd, despicable, entirely unsubstantiated
petition in which all the three respondents happen to be people who have publicly
questioned the policies of the government and severely criticized a recent judgment of the
Supreme Court, the Court displays a disturbing willingness to issue notice. It indicates a
disquieting inclination on the part of the court to silence criticism and muzzle dissent,
to harass and intimidate those who disagree with it. By entertaining a petition based on
an FIR [First Information Report] that even a local police station does not see fit to act upon,
the Supreme Court is doing its own reputation and credibility consider2able harm.”
On the basis of the above averments, suo-moto contempt proceedings were initiated
against the Respondent for imputing motives to the Court. In her reply affidavit to the
contempt notice, the author reiterated her stance and stressed her continuous dissent
against the decision of the Supreme Court. She further noted that she believed this to be a
matter of her right to express her opinions as a citizen as well as a writer. She further alleged
that for the petitioners to attempt to misuse the Contempt of Court Act and the good offices
of the Supreme Court to stifle criticism and stamp out dissent, struck at the very roots of the
notion of democracy.
3. Issues Involved
1. In the aforesaid backdrop, the Supreme Court dealt with the question whether the
offending paras in her affidavit amounted to contempt of court.
2. Whether such comments amounted to fair criticism of judicial acts
Laws Applicable
Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971
Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases.
(1) In the case of a criminal contempt, other than a contempt referred to in Section 14, the
Supreme Court or the High Court may take action on its own motion or on a motion by:
(a) the Advocate-General, or
(b) any other person, with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General, [or]
(c) in relation to the High Court for the Union territory of Delhi, such Law Officer as the
Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf, or any
other person, with the consent in writing of such Law Officer.
Section 5 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971
Fair criticism of judicial act not contempt: A person shall not be guilty of contempt of
court for publishing any fair comment on the merits of any case which has been heard and
finally decided.
Arguments Raised by Respondent
Defence of the Respondent Judicial viewpoint
A preliminary objection was raised by the
contemnor that the Hon’ble Judges who
issued notice of Contempt should not be a
party to the present proceedings and the
case be transferred to some other Bench.
Rejecting the plea of recusal, the Supreme
Court held that cognizance of the criminal
contempt against the respondent has been
taken by the Court, suo motu under Section
15 of the Act. Whereas sub-section (2) of
Section 14 permits a person charged with
the contempt to have charge against him
tried by some judge other than the judge or
judges in whose presence or hearing the
offence is alleged to have been committed
and the court is of opinion that it is
practicable to do so. No such provision is
made under Section 15 of the Act.
4. A further plea was raised by the contemnor
to defer the proceedings to await the
decision of a constitutional Bench in Dr.
Subramaniam Swamy v. Rama Krishnan
Hegde. In the said case a reference was
made to the Supreme Court to reconsider
the dicta laid down by the Supreme court in
Perspective Publications (P) Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra. Truth can be pleaded as a
defence in contempt proceedings
However, the Supreme Court rejected the
submission holding that “[i]nasmuch as the
question of truth being pleaded as defence
in the present case, does not arise.
Contempt proceedings have been initiated
against the respondent on the basis of the
offending and contemptuous part of the reply
affidavit making wild allegations against the
Court and thereby scandalized its authority.
There is no point or fact in those proceedings
which requires to be defended by pleading
the truth.”
Judgment
On the basis of the record, the position of law, findings on various pleas raised and
the conduct of the respondent, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the respondent Ms
Arundhati Roy had committed the criminal contempt of this Court by scandalizing its
authority with malafide intentions.
As the respondent has not shown any repentance or regret or remorse, no lenient view
should be taken in the matter. However, showing the magnanimity of law by keeping in mind
that the respondent is a woman, and hoping that better sense and wisdom shall dawn upon
the respondent in the future to serve the cause of art and literature by her creative skill and
imagination, the Court felt that the ends of justice would be met if she was sentenced to
symbolic imprisonment besides paying a fine of Rs.2000/-.
The respondent was held guilty for the contempt of court punishable under Section
12 of the Contempt of Courts Act and sentenced to simple imprisonment for one day
and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-. In case of default in the payment of fine, the
respondent shall undergo simple imprisonment for three months
Precedents cited
The following precedents were relied upon by the Court while delivering the judgement:
P. N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker [(1988) 3 SCC 167]
The Supreme Court observed that the criticism of the judicial system was made by a person
who himself had been the judge of the High Court and was the Minister at the relevant time.
He had made studies about the system and expressed his opinion which, under the
circumstances, was held to be not defamatory despite the fact that the court found that in
some portion of the speech the language used could have been avoided by the Minister
having the background of being the former judge of the High Court. His speech, under the
circumstances, was held to be not amounting to imminent danger of interference with the
administration of justice nor of bringing the administration into disrepute.
5. E.M. Sankaran Namboodripad v. T.Narayanan Nambiar [1970 (2) SCC 325]
The Court held that while it is intended that there should be freedom of speech and
expression, it is also intended that in the exercise of the right, contempt of court shall not
be committed.
Dr.D.C. Saxena v. Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India [1996 (5) SCC 216]
The Court held that if maintenance of democracy is the foundation of free speech, society
equally is entitled to regulate freedom of speech or expression by democratic action.
Nobody has a right to denigrate others right of person and reputation. Bonafide criticism of
any system or institution including the judiciary cannot be objected to as healthy and
constructive criticism are tools to augment forensic tools for improving its function.
Observations of Jurists
Section 13(a) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 clearly states that no court shall impose
sentence under the Act for a contempt of court unless it is satisfied that the contempt is of
such a nature that it substantially interferes, or tends substantially to interfere with the due
course of justice.
In the present case, no charge was framed to this effect much less any finding recorded
thereon and consequently it has been stated by jurists that as far as the sentence of one
day imprisonment is concerned, it is improper.
Legacy
In this case, the court held, fair criticism of the conduct of a Judge, the institution of the
judiciary and its functioning may not amount to contempt if it is made in good faith and in
public interest. To ascertain the good faith and the public interest, the courts have to see all
the surrounding circumstances including the person responsible for comments, his
knowledge in the field regarding which the comments are made and the intended purpose
sought to be achieved. All citizens cannot be permitted to comment upon the conduct of the
courts in the name of fair criticism which, if not checked, would destroy the institution itself.
Litigant losing in the court would be the first to impute motives to the Judges and the
institution in the name of fair criticism, which cannot be allowed for preserving the public
faith in an important pillar of democratic set-up i.e. judiciary.
References
1. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/505614/
2. https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/re-arundhati-roy/
3. https://www.legallyindia.com/views/entry/a-critical-look-at-re-arundhati-roy