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Narrow­Bicliques: Cryptanalysis of Full IDEA
Dmitry Khovratovich , Gatan Leurent , and Christian Rechberger
CS5425
Rifad MMM(138229c)
Mumtaz MAM (138218R)
Information Security and Cryptography
Dr. Chandana Gamage
1.0 Introduction
This work is based on [1].
The biclique attack framework was recently introduced as a way to add more rounds to a                             
meet­in­the­middle attack while potentially keeping the same time complexity. Apply and extend                     
the recently introduced biclique framework to IDEA and for the first time describe an approach to                             
noticeably speed­up key­recovery for the full 8.5 round IDEA.
1.1 Meet in the Middle Attacks
The Meet­in­the­Middle attack attempts to find a value using both of the range (ciphertext) and                           
domain (plaintext) of the composition of several functions (or block ciphers) such that the                         
forward mapping through the first functions is the same as the backward mapping (inverse                         
image) through the last functions, quite literally meeting in the middle of the composed function.
●  ∀   ∈  :
and save each   together with corresponding   in a set A
●  ∀   ∈  :
and compare each new   with the set A
When a match is found, keep kf1,kb1 as candidate key­pair in a table T. Test pairs in T on a new                                       
pair of (P,C) to confirm validity. If the key­pair does not work on this new pair, do MITM again on a                                       
new pair of (P,C).
2.0 IDEA
The International Data Encryption Standard" (IDEA) is one of the longest standing and most                         
analyzed ciphers known. It was designed by Lai and Massey in 1991. In cryptography, the                           
International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) is a block cipher designed by James Massey of                         
ETH Zurich and Xuejia Lai and was first described in 1991. As a block cipher, it is also                                 
symmetric. The algorithm was intended as a replacement for the Data Encryption Standard                       
(DES). IDEA is a minor revision of an earlier cipher, Proposed Encryption Standard (PES); IDEA                           
was originally called Improved PES (IPES).
IDEA operates on 64­bit blocks using a 128­bit key. IDEA derives much of its security by                             
interleaving operations from different groups — modular addition and multiplication, and bitwise                     
eXclusive OR (XOR).
Note that a "break" is any attack which requires less than 2­128 operations; the 6­round attack                             
requires 2­64 known plaintexts and 2­126.8 operations.
3.0 Biclique Attack
A biclique is a set of internal states, which are constructed in the first or in the last rounds of a                                       
cipher and mapped to each other by specifically chosen keys [1]. Attacks using biclique was                           
originally designed for cryptanalysis of hash functions, however, later it was applied to the block                           
ciphers. The idea behind this attack is to break the block cipher key sets into set of keys, where                                   
each key in the group is tested using meet­in­the­middle technique.
Let’s consider the permutation based key schedule as in IDEA with 3 set of key bits; Kb, Kf, Kg.                                   
In a key group the value Kg is fixed (and hence enumerates the groups), and Kb and Kf take all                                     
possible values.
g = mapping describing a cipher round
A biclique for the group Kg
 => {Si} {Cj} sets of states
When plaintexts (S) and corresponding ciphertexts are given, function g maps the states S into                           
C as following.
To test the keys within a group, a variable v is calculated in both directions as depicted by the                                   
following equations. In this case the mapping function is called as chunks (g1 and g2).
If the cost of computing V is Cg1 and Cg2, the biclique construction cost if Cbiclique, and the cost of                                     
rechecking key candidates on other state bits of plaintext/ciphertext pairs is Crecheck, then the                         
computation complexity of testing single group is:
Cbiclique + 2|Kf|
Cg1 + 2|Kb|
Cg2 + Crecheck
The following figure depicts key testing with biclique of three plaintexts and three internal states.
A narrow biclique technique limits the length of a biclique to the number of rounds needed for the                                 
full diffusion.
This technique occupies minimal number of footprint for the computation.
4.0 Key Recovery for the Full IDEA
Authors have used a short search program to to find optimal values for Kf
and Kb
. Based on the                                   
search, the following key partitioning is chosen.
Kg
 (guess): bits K0...40, 42...47, 50...124
Kf
 (forward): bits K125...127
Kb (backward): bits K41, 48, 49
The full IDEA is partitioned into a biclique, chunks, and the matching parts according to the                             
following table and figure.
The following relation, which is called as Biryukov­Demirci relation serves as internal variable for                         
the matching in round 4­6.
5.0 Bibliography
[1] Dmitry Khovratovich, Gaëtan Leurent, and Christian Rechberger. 2012. Narrow­Bicliques:                 
cryptanalysis of full IDEA. In Proceedings of the 31st Annual international conference on Theory                         
and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques (EUROCRYPT'12), David Pointcheval and               
Thomas Johansson (Eds.). Springer­Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, 392­410.

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Narrow bicliques cryptanalysisoffullidea

  • 2. 1.0 Introduction This work is based on [1]. The biclique attack framework was recently introduced as a way to add more rounds to a                              meet­in­the­middle attack while potentially keeping the same time complexity. Apply and extend                      the recently introduced biclique framework to IDEA and for the first time describe an approach to                              noticeably speed­up key­recovery for the full 8.5 round IDEA. 1.1 Meet in the Middle Attacks The Meet­in­the­Middle attack attempts to find a value using both of the range (ciphertext) and                            domain (plaintext) of the composition of several functions (or block ciphers) such that the                          forward mapping through the first functions is the same as the backward mapping (inverse                          image) through the last functions, quite literally meeting in the middle of the composed function. ●  ∀   ∈  : and save each   together with corresponding   in a set A ●  ∀   ∈  : and compare each new   with the set A When a match is found, keep kf1,kb1 as candidate key­pair in a table T. Test pairs in T on a new                                        pair of (P,C) to confirm validity. If the key­pair does not work on this new pair, do MITM again on a                                        new pair of (P,C).
  • 3. 2.0 IDEA The International Data Encryption Standard" (IDEA) is one of the longest standing and most                          analyzed ciphers known. It was designed by Lai and Massey in 1991. In cryptography, the                            International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) is a block cipher designed by James Massey of                          ETH Zurich and Xuejia Lai and was first described in 1991. As a block cipher, it is also                                  symmetric. The algorithm was intended as a replacement for the Data Encryption Standard                        (DES). IDEA is a minor revision of an earlier cipher, Proposed Encryption Standard (PES); IDEA                            was originally called Improved PES (IPES). IDEA operates on 64­bit blocks using a 128­bit key. IDEA derives much of its security by                              interleaving operations from different groups — modular addition and multiplication, and bitwise                      eXclusive OR (XOR). Note that a "break" is any attack which requires less than 2­128 operations; the 6­round attack                              requires 2­64 known plaintexts and 2­126.8 operations.
  • 4. 3.0 Biclique Attack A biclique is a set of internal states, which are constructed in the first or in the last rounds of a                                        cipher and mapped to each other by specifically chosen keys [1]. Attacks using biclique was                            originally designed for cryptanalysis of hash functions, however, later it was applied to the block                            ciphers. The idea behind this attack is to break the block cipher key sets into set of keys, where                                    each key in the group is tested using meet­in­the­middle technique. Let’s consider the permutation based key schedule as in IDEA with 3 set of key bits; Kb, Kf, Kg.                                    In a key group the value Kg is fixed (and hence enumerates the groups), and Kb and Kf take all                                      possible values. g = mapping describing a cipher round A biclique for the group Kg  => {Si} {Cj} sets of states When plaintexts (S) and corresponding ciphertexts are given, function g maps the states S into                            C as following. To test the keys within a group, a variable v is calculated in both directions as depicted by the                                    following equations. In this case the mapping function is called as chunks (g1 and g2). If the cost of computing V is Cg1 and Cg2, the biclique construction cost if Cbiclique, and the cost of                                      rechecking key candidates on other state bits of plaintext/ciphertext pairs is Crecheck, then the                          computation complexity of testing single group is: Cbiclique + 2|Kf| Cg1 + 2|Kb| Cg2 + Crecheck The following figure depicts key testing with biclique of three plaintexts and three internal states.
  • 5. A narrow biclique technique limits the length of a biclique to the number of rounds needed for the                                  full diffusion. This technique occupies minimal number of footprint for the computation.
  • 6. 4.0 Key Recovery for the Full IDEA Authors have used a short search program to to find optimal values for Kf and Kb . Based on the                                    search, the following key partitioning is chosen. Kg  (guess): bits K0...40, 42...47, 50...124 Kf  (forward): bits K125...127 Kb (backward): bits K41, 48, 49 The full IDEA is partitioned into a biclique, chunks, and the matching parts according to the                              following table and figure.
  • 7. The following relation, which is called as Biryukov­Demirci relation serves as internal variable for                          the matching in round 4­6.
  • 8. 5.0 Bibliography [1] Dmitry Khovratovich, Gaëtan Leurent, and Christian Rechberger. 2012. Narrow­Bicliques:                  cryptanalysis of full IDEA. In Proceedings of the 31st Annual international conference on Theory                          and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques (EUROCRYPT'12), David Pointcheval and                Thomas Johansson (Eds.). Springer­Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, 392­410.