Defeating Windows memory forensics

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Defeating Windows memory forensics

  1. 1. Defeating Windowsmemory forensicsFSEC 2012September 19, 2012.Luka MilkovićLuka.Milkovic@infigo.hrINFIGO IS http://www.infigo.hr
  2. 2. Agenda Memory forensics Why? How? Previous memory anti-forensic techniques Windows related Memory acquisition process – flawed by design? Defeating Windows memory forensics Impossible in user-mode… …or not? Possible solutions
  3. 3. Memory forensics – why? Disk forensics prevalent, but memory forensics increasingly popular Used by incident handlers… Malware detection objects hidden by rootkits (processes, threads, etc.) memory-resident malware unpacked/unencrypted images Recently used files „Dead objects” terminated processes, threads, connections… … and the bad guys Password recovery
  4. 4. Memory forensics – how? Two consecutive processes Memory acquisition Memory analysis Acquisition Many tools, focus on free ones Mandiant Memoryze Moonsols Windows Memory Toolkit (Win32dd) ManTech MDD
  5. 5. Memory forensics – how? (2) Analysis Finding OS and other artifacts in image Free and commercial tools Volatility Framework Mandiant Redline/Memoryze EnCase, HBGary Responder and many other All support raw dump, weak support for hib/crash file Volatility has weak support for x64
  6. 6. Memory forensics – how? (3) „The big picture” Analysis tool Acquisition tool Memory dump User mode Install driver Kernel mode Acquisition driver Remote host Send dump over network Memory dump algorithm 1. Reading DevicePhysicalMemory 2. Physical space mapping (MmMapIoSpace()) 3. Raw Virtual2Physical mapping
  7. 7. Previous works - simple Blocking acquisition Killing acquisition process tools always have the same names Blocking driver installation driver installation is necessary on OS >= Win2k3 names not random Metasploit script not available anymore Evasion very simple Rename process Rename driver not that easy if you don’t have the source
  8. 8. Previous works – advanced Blocking analysis Haruyama/Suzuki BH-EU-12: One-byte Modification for Breaking Memory Forensic Analysis minimal modifications to OS artifacts in memory targets key steps of analysis to make it impossible/difficult so-called abort factors tool specific Pros: subtle modifications (harder detection) Cons: cannot hide arbitrary object (could theoretically) breaks entire analysis – can raise suspicion
  9. 9. Previous works – advanced (2) Attacking acquisition & analysis Sparks/Butler BH-JP-05: Shadow Walker – Raising the bar for Rootkit Detection intentional desynchronization of ITLB/DTLB faking reads of and writes to „arbitrary” memory location execute access not faked Pros: awesome idea:) hides (almost) arbitrary objects Cons: not very stable (and no MP/HT support) page fault handler visible (code and IDT hook) performance
  10. 10. Memory acquisition – flawed by design? Where is the weakest link? Analysis tool Acquisition tool Memory dump User modeAttacker kernel access == Install driver Kernel mode Acquisition driver Remote host Send dump over network Memory dump algorithm 1. Reading DevicePhysicalMemory 2. Physical space mapping (MmMapIoSpace()) 3. Raw Virtual2Physical mapping
  11. 11. Defeating Windows memory forensics Introducing Dementia PoC tool for hiding objects in memory dumps currently only processes x86 only Kernel driver NtWriteFile inline hook could hook even lower list of addresses to be hidden virt2phys translation – using DTB of System process clears process allocation (PoolTag „Proc”) „unlinks” the process from the process list in dump clears EPROCESS block
  12. 12. Defeating Windows memory forensics (2)
  13. 13. Defeating Windows memory forensics (3) Limitations Plenty of other artifacts not hidden Handle tables not cleaned Memory allocated by process not cleaned including process code and data Work in progress!
  14. 14. Memoryze case Memoryze is interesting… Not reliant on API calls? What about
  15. 15. Memoryze case (2) Memoryze re-designed the workflow a bit: Analysis tool Write dump Acquisition tool Memory dump User mode Install driver Kernel mode Return read page Acquisition driver Dump memory Memory dump algorithm 1. Reading DevicePhysicalMemory 2. Physical space mapping (MmMapIoSpace())
  16. 16. Memoryze case (3) Yes, attacker can now modify dump from the user mode:) Dementia module Hiding target process, process threads and connections completely from the user mode, no driver used currently even more advanced than the driver mode:) Injects to Memoryze process Hooks DeviceIoControl and sanitizes buffers on the fly Works similarly to Volatility but no virt2phys translation, determine everything from the dump has partial knowledge – only single pages of the dump
  17. 17. Memoryze case (4) DEMO
  18. 18. Possible solutions Memoryze should adopt traditional workflow Current is both slow and insecure Use crash dumps (native!) instead of raw dumps Entirely different OS mechanisms Use hibernation files Plagued by the same problems, but more difficult to tamper with Use hardware acquisition tools? Perform anti-rootkit scanning before acquisition?
  19. 19. Thank you!

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