Religious Fundamentalism's Effect on Scientific Reasoning

THE PREDICTIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGIOUS
FUNDAMENTALISM, NEED FOR CLOSURE, AND SCIENTIFIC REASONING
IN COLLEGE STUDENTS
by
Joshua A. Lamb
JACQUELYN ST. GERMAINE, PhD, Faculty Mentor and Chair
JOHN ASTIN, PhD, Committee Member
PAULA FREMONT, PhD, Committee Member
Andrea Miller, PhD, Dean, Harold Abel School of Social and Behavioral Sciences
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Capella University
November 2016

Abstract
For some students, science and religion are in conflict that arises when a student’s
fundamentalist religious beliefs were contrary to the scientific explanations for natural
phenomenon. This study investigated the possibility that there was a predictive
relationship between religious fundamentalism and scientific reasoning, as well as the
degree to which a tendency toward closure might have influenced this relationship.
Using a correlational design, 101 college students were surveyed. The instruments used
to measure the variables included the Religious Fundamentalism Scale (Altemeyer &
Hunsberger, 2004), Need for Cognitive Closure Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011), and the
Classroom Test of Formal Reasoning (Lawson, 2000). Pearson’s Correlation revealed
that religious fundamentalism and scientific reasoning were negatively and significantly
related, while need for closure was not found to be correlated with either religious
fundamentalism or scientific reasoning. Multiple regression analyses revealed that
religious fundamentalism significantly predicted scientific reasoning scores. The analysis
also determined that need for closure did not play a mediating role in this relationship.
Although the results may have inadvertently reflected bias due to the sequencing of the
instruments used, the findings are consistent with the reasoning of Lawson (1995) who
argued that dogmatic beliefs, like those of religious fundamentalists, would inhibit the
development of scientific reasoning. Further research was needed to determine the extent
of the influence of religious fundamentalism on the development of scientific reasoning.

iii
Acknowledgments
I would first like to acknowledge my mentor, Dr. Jacquelyn St. Germaine, and my
committee members Dr. John Astin and Dr. Jean Brown Bryant, for their guidance over
the course of dissertation process. I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my late
father, Jimmy Lamb, who died from colon cancer when I was just beginning graduate
school. Thank you for nurturing my curiosity and constantly challenging me
intellectually. Without your example, I could have never accomplished everything that I
have academically. I would also like to dedicate this to my mother Joan Lamb-Siami and
Dr. Ghodrat Siami. Your constant support and encouragement were invaluable in the
completion of this process. Finally, I would like to dedicate this to my niece and nephew.
You have been a constant source of joy and motivation to continue throughout this
process.

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Table of Contents
Acknowledgements iii
List of Tables vii
List of Figures viii
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1
Background of the Study 1
Statement of the Problem 7
Purpose of the Study 8
Significance of the Study 9
Research Design 9
Research Questions and Hypotheses 10
Assumptions and Limitations 11
Definition of Terms 13
Expected Findings 16
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 18
Theoretical Orientation 19
Development of Scientific Reasoning 19
Piagetian Theory 19
Neo-Piagetian Theory 22
Cultural Influence 24
Avoiding Closure 26
Value of Religious Belief 28
Religious Fundamentalism and Science 30

v
Terror Management Theory 31
Review of Research 34
Development of Scientific Reasoning 34
Terror Management Theory 53
Methodology Review 61
Synthesis of Literature 65
Critique of Literature 70
Methodological Strengths and Limitations 70
Opposing Views 73
Summary 79
CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY 81
Research Design 82
Target Population and Population Selection 83
Procedures 84
Instruments 86
Research Questions and Hypotheses 91
Data Analysis 93
Expected Findings 94
CHAPTER 4 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 96
Introduction 96
Description of the Sample 96
Summary of the Results 99
Details of the Analysis and Results 100

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Descriptive Statistics 100
Research Question 1 101
Research Question 2 107
Conclusion 110
CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 112
Introduction 112
Summary of Results 112
Discussion of Results 113
Discussion of the Conclusion 117
Limitations 119
Recommendations for Future Research 123
Conclusions 126
REFERENCES 128
APPENDIX A. Statement of Original Work 144

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List of Tables
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for Age 97
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Nominal Demographics 98
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables 101
Table 4 Pearson Correlations for Study Variables 107
Table 5 ANOVA for Regression to Predict Scientific Reasoning 108
Table 6 Coefficients of Regression to Predict Scientific Reasoning 108
Table 7 Coefficients of Second Regression to Predict Scientific Reasoning 110

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List of Figures
Figure 1 Distribution of Religious Fundamentalism Scores 101
Figure 2 Distribution of Need for Closure Scores 102
Figure 3 Distribution of Scientific Reasoning Scores 102
Figure 4 Religious Fundamentalism and Need for Closure Scores 104
Figure 5 Need for Closure and Scientific Reasoning Scores 104
Figure 6 Religious Fundamentalism and Scientific Reasoning Scores 105

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Background of the Problem
Scientific reasoning was an essential skill needed to conduct scientific inquiry and
understand complex scientific subjects (Han, 2013). Literacy in science, including the
ability to reason scientifically, is important for the jobs of the future, as the job market of
the future is becoming increasingly more dependent on individuals that were
scientifically competent (Osborne, Simon, & Collins, 2003; Osborne, Simon, & Tyler,
2009). Scientific competence was also essential when it came to dealing with the
challenge of climate change. Sharma (2012) argued that science education was an
essential tool in a societal response to the threat that climate change poses to human
civilization.
Success in the educational environment, especially success in science and math
classes, was an important factor in determining if a student chooses a career in science or
mathematics (Wang, 2013). Research had found that several factors were associated with
performance in the educational environment. Factors related to the educational
environment itself were found to influence academic performance. Specifically, larger
schools (Vorthmann, 2011), smaller class sizes (Schanzenbach, 2014), and quality of the
learning facilities (Mushtaq & Khan, 2012) were associated positively with academic
performance. The location of the school, whether it was in a city, town, suburb, or rural
area, was also associated with academic performance (Vorthmann, 2011). Further, social
class played a role too, as socioeconomic status (Considine & Zappala, 2002; Sirien,
2005) and poverty (Vorthmann, 2011) were associated with academic performance.

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The perspective of the student toward the information being learned may
influence academic performance. Motlagh, Amrai, Yazdani, Abderahim, and Souri
(2011) found that self-efficacy and its sub-factors, self-regulation, self-evaluation, and
self-directing, were correlated with academic performance. Student attitudes, specifically
the value they placed on the learning of specific skills, were also associated with
academic performance (Liddell & Davidson, 2004). A student’s family environment was
found to influence performance. Parental educational attainment was found to be
positively associated with student performance (Rainey & Murova, 2004). Further, stress
coming from the family environment was negatively associated with performance
(Mushtag & Khan, 2004).
Family social influences heavily impacted the type of religious belief and
practices a child adopts (Eaves, Hatemi, Prom-Womley, and Murrelle, 2008). Religious
belief is another factor that is associated with success in the educational environment is
religious belief. Rissler, Duncan, and Caruso (2014) found that religiosity mattered more
than education when it came to predicting students’ understanding of the scientific
concept of evolution. Religious commitment was found to be related to academic
achievement, as children with high religious commitment were found to score higher on
most academic measures, even after controlling for socioeconomic status, race, and
gender (Jeynes, 2003).
Line (2005) found that different types of religious variables have different degrees
of influence on academic performance in college students. Variables measuring private
religiosity, such as personal scripture study and personal prayer, showed a strong
relationship with academic performance. Public religious practice, e.g. church

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attendance, was shown to have a moderate impact on academic performance, while
religious belief variables were found to have a completely negligible impact on academic
performance. McKune and Hoffman (2009) found that the relationship between
religiosity and academic achievement in adolescence was largely due to parent’s social
capital. The results also found that academic achievement was better when adolescents
and parents shared similar levels of religiosity; the lowest achievement was found in
adolescents that had low religiosity while their parents had high religiosity. This research
combined would suggest that while religiosity appears to be positively related to
academic achievement, the effect depended largely on the type of religious practice.
Not all forms of religious practice have an entirely positive impact on education,
especially when it comes to subjects like science (Legre & Visala, 2011). Specifically,
one type of religious practice, religious fundamentalism was often at odds science and
secular education, as it was seen as being in opposition to their beliefs in the legitimacy
of religious scripture and the authority of God (Herriot, 2007; Yarsi & Mancy, 2014).
For example, Christian religious fundamentalists believed in a literal biblical creation,
which places them in sharp opposition to the scientific concept of evolution (Herriot,
2007). The belief in the supremacy of religious text and/or God’s authority could have
led both more fundamentalist Christians and Muslims to not only feel as though science
and religion were in conflict, but to need to reject scientific understanding of the world in
favor of their religious beliefs (Hanley et al., 2014; Yarsi & Mancy, 2014).
Further exacerbating the conflict between science and religion in the mind of
some students was the attempt by young earth creationists to get creationism either taught
side by side with the theory of evolution or in place of evolution in science classrooms in

4
the United States (Scott, 2009). The courts in the United States have consistently ruled
against the teaching of creationism in science classrooms (Numbers, 1982/2006; Scott,
2009). The most famous of these trials was held in Dayton, Tennessee in 1925. A
teacher by the name of John Thomas Scopes was arrested for teaching evolution, which
violated the Butler Act, a law that made it illegal to teach anything that denied the
creation of man as stated in the Bible. Scopes was convicted of teaching evolution, but
the Tennessee Supreme Court eventually overturned the conviction on a technicality
(Scott, 2009). While not a complete victory for the teaching of evolution, the Scopes
Trial did set the stage for future court victories that allowed evolution to be taught in
schools in the United States, while undermining the relevance of creationism to the
science classroom (Numbers, 1982/2006; Scott, 2009).
Consistent defeats in the court system have not stopped creationists from trying to
get their say in science classrooms. For example, when attempts to teach creationism in
science classrooms failed, there was an effort made to repackage creationism into
intelligent design in the hope that it would be more successful (Scott, 2009). This
conflict between creationism and evolution creates unique challenges to science
education, as directly confronting these conflicts can serve to undermine the attempt at
educating the students in scientific matters, such as the concept evolution and the
development of scientific reasoning abilities (Lawson, 1995; Lawson & Worsnop, 1992).
Directly addressing the conflict has served to alienate the religious students (Hanley et
al., 2014), while possibly driving them toward the distrust of higher education in general
(Darnell & Sherkat, 1997).

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Constructivist theorists argued that the development of scientific reasoning
requires an environment supportive to its development (Cakir, 2008). Research had
found that the development of reasoning abilities is affected by the degree to which the
environment supports its development (Fiati, 1992; Luria, 1976; Noreanzayan, Smith,
Kim, & Nisbett, 2002; Suizzo, 2000). Learning was conceptualized as taking the form
of a sort of mental blueprint, often referred as a schema or cognitive structure. These
structures become more sophisticated over time as a result experience in their particular
domain of learning. As experience within a particular domain of learning increases,
cognitive structures change gradually, as higher order, more sophisticated structures were
shaped from lower order, less sophisticated structures (Case, 1985). However, the
relationship between religious fundamentalism and scientific reasoning was poorly
understood. Research does show a negative relationship between religious
fundamentalism and scientific literacy (Sherkat, 2011). There was also a negative
relationship between religious fundamentalism and a tendency to engage in analytical
reasoning (Gervais & Norenzayen, 2012; Pennycook, Cheyne, Sell, Koehler, &
Fugelsang, 2012).
Terror management theory argued that worldviews, such as religion, protected
against existential anxiety, such as the anxiety that people experienced when thinking
about death (Vail, Rothschild, Weise, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Greenberg, 2010).
Research supports this view, as individuals that were exposed to a source of existential
anxiety were motivated to reaffirm their own worldview in defense against the threat (e.g.
Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992). Religious beliefs have

6
further been shown to serve a protective function against existential anxiety (Friedman &
Rholes, 2008; Jonas & Fischer, 2006).
Existing beliefs have been found to influence the quality of reasoning (Amsel &
Brock, 1996; Bastardi, Uhlmann, & Ross, 2011; Kuhn, Amsel, & O’Loughlin, 1998).
When religious beliefs run contrary to scientific fact they can affect reasoning ability
(Lawson & Worsnop, 1992). When participants were presented with experiments in
which their religious beliefs were made the subject of the experiment, they rated
experiments more favorable when they were favorable to the religious belief and more
negatively when the experiment was unfavorable to the religious belief, as compared to
participants shown religious neutral experiments (Klaczynski, 2000).
Another factor that was important when it comes to developing scientific
reasoning abilities is the concept of premature closure. Coming to understand complex
scientific subjects and developing reasoning skills requires an individual to avoid
jumping to premature conclusions (Lunzer, 1973). Premature closure occurs when
individuals draw conclusions prior to fully considering all relevant information. Research
had found that avoiding premature closure was essential to the product of quality
reasoning (Wollman, Eylon, & Lawson, 1980). Religious fundamentalism was positively
related to need for closure, which is a measure of an individual’s tendency toward
seeking premature closure (Golec de Zavala & Van Bergh, 2007; Saroglou, 2002). The
relationship between need for closure and scientific reasoning ability had yet to directly
explored in research.

7
Statement of the Problem
This research problem focuses on the development of scientific reasoning under
conditions in which such abilities may be influenced by the beliefs of religious
fundamentalists. Herriot (2007) defined religious fundamentalism as an acceptance of
absolute beliefs in right and wrong and a willingness to believe in and obey a sacred book
and/or deity. This tendency to believe in the supreme legitimacy of their religious text
often resulted in religious fundamentalists believing in creation as set forth by that text
and an unwillingness to accept explanations that contradict this belief, such as the science
of evolutionary biology (Scott, 2009). Lawson and Worsnop (1992) demonstrated that
after instruction in evolution individuals that believed in special creation were less likely
to change their beliefs. Evans (2001) found similar results as belief in evolution was
predicted by natural history knowledge and creationist belief was predicted by religious
interest. Further, research had demonstrated religious fundamentalism was negatively
related to both biological competence (Poling & Evans, 2004) and science literacy
(Sherkat, 2011). When cognitive ability was controlled for, a tendency to engage in
analytical thought was found to predict religious belief. The more willing participants
were to engage in analytical thought the less likely they were to endorse religious beliefs
(Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012).
While the research discussed above supported the existence of a relationship
among religious belief, scientific knowledge and analytical style, research to date had not
explored the predictive relationship between religious fundamentalism and scientific
reasoning directly. The present research first explored this relationship. Next, the
research attempted to determine if a tendency toward premature closure mediates the

8
relationship between religious fundamentalism and scientific reasoning. Need for closure
(Webster & Kruglanski, 1994, 1998) served as the measure of a tendency toward
premature closure and was defined the desire for clarity and certainty in knowledge and
discomfort with ambiguity in that understanding. Religious fundamentalism was found
to be associated with need for closure (Saraglou, 2002), which is the tendency to engage
in premature closure, while the tendency to avoid premature closure, which involves the
resisting of jumping to conclusions prior to the consideration of all relevant information,
had been found to be important in the development of scientific reasoning (Acredolo &
Horobin, 1987; Wollman, Eylon, & Lawson, 1980) and hypothesis generation (Mayseless
& Kruglanski, 1987). This suggested that the tendency toward closure could be a
plausible means by which religious fundamentalism could influence scientific reasoning.
Therefore, this research investigated the predictive relationship between religious
fundamentalism and need for closure, and scientific reasoning, while also determining
whether need for closure was responsible for the relationship between religious
fundamentalism and scientific reasoning.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to address the gap in the research literature by
investigating the predictive relationship between religious fundamentalism, need for
closure, and scientific reasoning. While research to date had explored the relationship
between religious fundamentalism and need for closure, as well as the relationship
between sectarian religion and scientific literacy, research to date had not explored the
relationship between religious fundamentalism and need for closure and scientific
reasoning. The research to date had failed to explore the possibility that need for closure

9
mediated the relationship between religious fundamentalism and scientific reasoning.
This research took a look at these relationships and determines if any predictive
relationship exists between these variables. This research attempted to provide insight
into these subjects of interest that have yet to be addressed in the knowledge base.
Significance of the Study
The development of cognitive abilities was an important issue in the fields of
developmental and cognitive psychology. One of the cognitive abilities that develop
commonly under Western formal educational conditions was scientific reasoning.
However, these abilities do not develop in all individuals, under all conditions (Suizzo,
2000). Understanding how these abilities could have been inhibited, such as in the
presence of religious fundamentalist beliefs, and the factors influencing the development
of scientific reasoning, such as need for closure, was important for a better understanding
of the development of scientific reasoning and cognitive development, in general.
Answering of the questions the research was designed to investigate was of interest to
psychologists and researchers in many different scientific disciplines. The results are of
interest to science educators that may be dealing with resistance to the teaching of
evolution from religious students or parents.
Research Design
This was a quantitative study using a non-experimental, correlational design. The
sampling employed a non-random convenience sample. The study investigated the
predictive relationship between three variables: religious fundamentalism, need for
closure, and scientific reasoning. The present research also investigated the role of need
for closure as serving to mediate the relationship between religious fundamentalism and

10
scientific reasoning. A convenience sample of college students filled out online surveys
consisting of measures of all three variables. The relationship between the variables was
analyzed with descriptive and inferential statistics, including multiple regression with
bootstrapping to look for mediation.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The researcher was interested in the relationship between religious
fundamentalism, need for closure, and scientific reasoning. To accomplish this, this
research answered the following question.
Research Question 1: Is there a relationship between religious fundamentalism,
need for closure, and scientific reasoning in college students?
Hypotheses:
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between religious
fundamentalism, need for closure, and scientific reasoning in college students.
H1: There is a statistically significant relationship between religious
fundamentalism and scientific reasoning in college students.
H2: There is a statistically significant relationship between need for closure and
scientific reasoning in college students.
H3: There is a statistically significant relationship between religious
fundamentalism and need for closure in college students.
The researcher was also interested in the predictive relationship between the three
variables under study: religious fundamentalism, need for closure, and scientific
reasoning, as well as the role of need for closure in mediating the relationship between

11
religious fundamentalism and scientific reasoning. To accomplish this, the research
answered the following question and sub-questions.
Research Question 2: Is there a predictive relationship between religious
fundamentalism and need for closure, and scientific reasoning in college students?
Sub-questions:
Sub-question 1: Which of the variables (religious fundamentalism and Need for
Closure) account for the predictive relationship with scientific reasoning in college
students?
Hypotheses:
H0: Neither of the variables have a predictive relationship with scientific
reasoning in college students.
H1: There is a predictive relationship between religious fundamentalism and
scientific reasoning in college students.
H2: There is a predictive relationship between Need for Closure and scientific
reasoning in college students.
Sub-Question 2: Does need for closure mediate the relationship between religious
fundamentalism and scientific reasoning in college students?
Hypotheses:
H0: Need for closure does not mediate the relationship between religious
H1: Need for closure does mediate the relationship between religious

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H2: Need for closure partially mediates the relationship between religious
fundamentalism and scientific reasoning.
Assumptions and Limitations
Assumptions
One assumption would be the accuracy with which the measures of the study
variables reflect the concepts the study was seeking to measure. The assumptions for this
study included the assumption that people responded honestly to all questions, that adults
should be capable of developing scientific reasoning abilities, and the assumption that
scores on measures of religious fundamentalism, need for closure, and scientific
reasoning scores would be well distributed.
Limitations
One limitation of this study was the non-experimental design. This research was
correlational therefore one could only answer questions about the relationship between
variables. The study could not answer questions of causation. The reasoning underlying
the basis for the research argues that religious fundamentalism would inhibit the
development of scientific reasoning because of the nature of fundamentalist beliefs. It
also assumes that a greater tendency toward premature closure in fundamentalists was
responsible for this. However, this study could not explicitly answer whether or not
religious fundamentalism and need for closure effect the development of scientific
reasoning skills. The study could only look for the predictive relationships between
religious fundamentalism and need for closure and scientific reasoning, and the mediation
of the relationship between religious fundamentalisms and scientific reasoning that
should have existed if the rationale was correct.

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Another limitation was the number of variables in the study. There were only
three variables in the study. With so few variables, the ability of the study to potentially
identify and control for the influence of mitigating variables was somewhat limited.
There may be other variables not under study that could be factors in producing the
relationships observed in this study. Similarly, the study cannot fully account for all
variables that may be responsible for variance in scientific reasoning scores. Other
variables could influence scientific reasoning to more or less a degree to that of religious
fundamentalism and need for closure.
Definition of Terms
Religious Fundamentalism
Religious fundamentalism reflects an intrinsic religiosity, which serves the
function of providing meaning and personal value. Intrinsically religious individuals
hold more orthodox religious beliefs (Batson, 1976). Peter Herriot (2007) argues that
three of the most common features of religious fundamentalism were: reactivity, dualism,
and authority. Reactivity reflects a general hostility toward the secular modern world.
Having a general hostility toward the modern world means that they see the modern
world as inconsistent with and moving away from the fundamental principles contained
within their worldview and in need of correction. Dualism meant seeing the world in
black and white terms. In the dualist point of view, there were only right and wrong
answers, as they often construct the world as a battle between good and evil. Those with
such beliefs and values were good, and modern secular society was bad. Finally,
authority represents their willingness to believe in and obey a sacred book and/or
authority figure(s) (Herriot, 2007). In the case of Christian fundamentalism, this likely

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means taking the Bible as the literal truth, and a creation of the ultimate authority: God
(Emerson & Hartman, 2006; Herriot, 2007).
These traits were consistent with definitions of religious fundamentalism that see
it as a form of religious authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996). Altemeyer and Hunsberger
(1992) define religious fundamentalism as:
The belief that there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains the
fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity;
that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by the forces of evil which must
be vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed today according to the
fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past; and that those who believe and
follow these fundamental teachings have a special relationship with the deity. (p.
118)
This definition is the same as the one used by the measure of religious fundamentalism
being used in this research (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004).
Need for Closure
Premature closure occurs when an individual draws a conclusion or conclusions
prior to the consideration of sufficient information to draw that conclusion (Lunzer,
1973). This variable was measured by the revised short form Need for Cognitive Closure
scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). Need for Closure (NFC) reflects a motivational
tendency by which an individual had a desire for a clear answer and an aversion to
ambiguity. NFC was conceptualized as emerging from five sub-facets: preference for
order, preference for predictability, discomfort with ambiguity, close-mindedness, and
decisiveness. People that were high in preference for order prefer structure and

15
consistency, while disliking disorder and chaos. When preference for predictability was
high, there was a desire for knowledge that was reliable and unchallenged. A high
capacity for discomfort with ambiguity reflects a dislike of situations and stimuli that
were not easily characterized. A high desire for close-mindedness reflects an
unwillingness to have one’s knowledge challenged or brought into question. Finally,
individuals high in decisiveness desire to make decisions quickly (Roets & Van Hiel,
2011).
Individuals that were high in NFC may display a degree of cognitive impatience.
It may be common for them to leap to conclusions based on insufficient or inconclusive
evidence. They may also display very rigid thought and reluctance to consider views
inconsistent with their own. This was in contrast to individuals that were low in NFC.
They tend to be very comfortable with ambiguity and uncertainty. They were more likely
to resist seeking quick judgment and quick to look for alternative explanations
(Kruglanski & Webster, 1996).
Scientific Reasoning
In this study, there were three variables under study: scientific reasoning,
religious fundamentalism, and need for closure. Reasoning was broadly defined as a
process by which conclusions were drawn. Reasoning was often described in terms of
being either inductive or deductive. These conclusions help to support problem-solving
and decision-making. The conclusions also help in the creation of goals and the
successful accomplishment of those goals (Leighton, 2004). A conclusion that was
inductively drawn may be strongly supported by a set of premises, but does not necessary
follow from the premises. The conclusion may plausible based on the premises, but was

16
not the only possible conclusion that can be drawn from the premises. Inductive
reasoning was consistent with the reasoning of pre-adolescents (Case, 1985).
When a conclusion was drawn deductively, it necessarily follows from a set of
premises. The conclusion was the only possible one given the premises (Leighton, 2004).
This was consistent with the reasoning of adolescents and adults. The capacity for
drawing deductive conclusions allowed reasoning to become more complex and more
efficient. Lawson (1995) saw reasoning within the domain of science as involving many
steps and consisting of the intermixing of inductive and deductive capabilities in a
process he referred to as abduction.
The process of abduction involves making connections between the present
situation and knowledge stored in memory and the use of that knowledge to develop
hypotheses relevant to the current situation. Abduction also involves making predictions
about the expected results of experiments and the confirmation of those results through
the process of collecting data and the comparison of that data to the predictions made.
Finally, the conclusions drawn from the data allow for the rejection or acceptance of the
hypotheses, as well as the development of new hypotheses to be tested at some point in
the future (Lawson, 1995).
Expected Findings
Research to date had yet to explore how religious fundamentalism and scientific
reasoning relate to each other. There was research showing a negative relationship
between religious fundamentalism and scientific literacy (Sherkat, 2011), as well as
research showing that those that were more likely to use analytical reasoning were more
likely to endorse supernatural beliefs (Pennycook et al., 2012). Therefore, it was

17
expected that religious fundamentalism and scientific reasoning would be significantly
correlated. Religious fundamentalism was also expected to be significantly related to
need for closure, which would be consistent with prior research (Saroglou, 2002). While
the relationship between need for closure and scientific reasoning had not been directly
studied, avoiding premature closure had been found to be important to successful
scientific reasoning (Acredolo & Horobin, 1987). Therefore, need for closure was
expected to be significantly related to scientific reasoning.
The reasoning behind the expected correlations also served as rationalization for
predictive relationships. Religious fundamentalism and need for closure were both
expected to be predictive of scientific reasoning scores. The relationships between
religious fundamentalism and need for closure, and the importance of avoiding premature
closure was to scientific reasoning, suggested that need for closure would be a plausible
mediator of the relationship between religious fundamentalism and scientific reasoning.
Therefore, it was expected that need for closure would fully mediate the relationship
between religious fundamentalism and scientific reasoning.

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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
This research investigated the predictive relationship among religious
fundamentalism, need for closure, and scientific reasoning, while also determining the
role of a tendency toward premature closure played in the relationship between religious
fundamentalism and scientific reasoning. This literature review discussed theory and
research relevant to that topic. The theory and research reviewed demonstrated what was
already known about the topic and need for specific research on this topic.
The research discussed in this literature review was surveyed using multiple
approaches. Available databases in the Capella University library and online were
searched for relevant keywords. Several keywords were used including “scientific
reasoning”, “formal reasoning”, “critical thinking”, “neo-Piagetian”, “constructivism”,
“working memory”, “religious fundamentalism”, “religion”, “authoritarianism”, “Need
for Closure”, “closure”, “terror management theory”, “mortality salience”, among others.
The keywords were used both by themselves and in combination with other keywords.
While most databases available in the Capella library were searched, the ones that were
most valuable in finding the documents needed were PsycINFO, ScienceDirect, and
ProQuest Psychology Journals. Google Scholar online was also extremely useful in
finding relevant documents. Another means of finding relevant research was to search
Amazon.com with the keywords for academic books on the subject matters relevant to
the research topic. Finally, reference mining was employed to find articles that were
relevant to the research topic. This would include finding cited articles and books
referenced in other academic texts and then either obtaining them using Journal or Book
Locator database or using an Interlibrary Loan to obtain the documents.

19
This introduction was followed by a discussion of the theoretical orientation
serving as the basis for this research. The discussion of theoretical orientation was
followed by a reviewed of literature relevant to the research topic. This discussion
included a review of research supporting the theoretical orientation, the research
variables, and methodology. The discussed research was then be synthesized in a
discussion of the larger themes and patterns, while discussing the strengths and
limitations of the content of the research findings. The research reviewed was then
critiqued based on quality of methodological approaches and opposing viewpoints,
including the strengths and limitations of both. Finally, literature review concluded with
a summary of the conclusions that can be drawn from the research reviewed.
Theoretical Orientation
Development of Scientific Reasoning
The theoretical tradition that had the most influence on understanding the
development of scientific reasoning was that of the constructivist tradition.
Constructivism sees knowledge as arising as a result of the internationalization of
experience; whereby the individual plays an active role in constructing his or her own
knowledge. Cakir (2008) explained that this knowledge was a product of intellectual
processes shaping the experience into a form that provides meaning to the experiencer.
That was, that knowledge was not simply the storage of experiences as they happen, but
was a human invention brought to life in the interplay between prior stored experiences
and present stimulation influencing the construct of new knowledge.
Piagetian theory. No one has influenced the constructivist tradition and the field
of developmental psychology more than Jean Piaget. What Piaget’s theory of cognitive

20
development accomplished was to change the way in which children’s cognitive abilities
have since been conceptualized and understood. A child’s cognitive abilities were no
longer seen as static and separate from adult abilities, but were seen as undergoing
constant change as they developed gradually into the form in which they take in adults
(Beilin, 1992). At the heart of Piaget’s theory of cognitive development was the
constructivist mental construction of knowledge. The construction was also referred to as
a schema (Cakir, 2008).
Piaget’s concept of the schema was strongly influenced by the work of James
Mark Baldwin (Case, 1985). Baldwin reasoned that changes in the environment caused
an activation of stored movements that resulted in the individuals orientating in the
direction of the stimulus. The individual sought to maximize the intensity of the stimulus
by centering it in their field of perception. The movements that succeeded in centering
the stimulus became habitual over time. Successful movements were stored as a
“blueprint” for orientating to a specific stimulus, which Baldwin called a “schemata”.
For Piaget, these schemata or schema were not directly developed from the
environment, but were constructed logically. Higher order schemas, logical structures,
were assembling from lower order schema. Intellectual development was a process of
cognitive adaption whereby more complex cognitive abilities were built out of earlier
simpler forms (Piaget, 1977). One must develop the logical structure necessary for the
performance of a task in order to be successful in performing it. If children have not
developed the structures necessary for performing a task then their learning in the task
domain will be hindered, as they can only benefit from learning within their own domain
of understanding (Case, 1985).

21
This process of construction and reconstruction resulting in the development of
more complex forms proceeded through four stages, each stage only becomes possible
during a certain age range and each stage leading to the development of new logical
structures, each qualitatively superior to the previous stages. In accordance with the
Piagetian view of development, the development of certain abilities only becomes
possible during particular age ranges. Each stage develops newer more sophisticated
logical structures out of the less sophisticated structures of the previous stage (Simatwa,
2010). Piaget conceptualized children as moving through four stages: sensorimotor,
preoperational thought, concrete operations, and formal operations. The sensorimotor
stage starts at birth and proceeds until around two years of age. The actions of an infant
were at first exclusively reflexive, but as the stage proceeds their ability to more
efficiently use their senses and motor function to explore and interact with the world
increases.
The preoperational stage begins at the age of two and ends around the age of
seven. In this stage, children were not yet capable of logical thought and relied on
symbolic thought for the development of language and problem solving skills. The next
stage, concrete operations starts around the age of seven and proceeds until around the
age of eleven. Concrete reasoning involves reasoning about concrete objects, such as
objects in their environment or those stored in memory. They were not yet capable of
thinking in abstraction. This ability arises around the age of 11 when the stage of formal
operations begins. This stage continues into early adulthood. It was during this stage that
scientific reasoning becomes possible, as the ability to think in abstraction was applied to
scientific subjects (Simatwa, 2010).

22
For conceptual change to occur, conflicts between existing structures and present
situation must exist (Mayo, 2010). Knowledge was a process of active construction. The
learner does not passively store information, but actively constructs understanding
relevant to self (Cakir, 2008). The knowledge construction involves three processes.
First, the process of assimilation occurs when new information was incorporated into
existing schema. Second, accommodation occurs when an existing schema was altered to
bring it into line with knowledge obtained through the experience of some novel
stimulus. The final process was disequilibrium. Piaget (1977) theorized that humans
were motivated to keep the mind in a state of equilibrium. When a novel experience
demonstrates an existing schema was inadequate, the system was sent into a state of
disequilibrium. The individual was then motivated to employ cognitive resources toward
the changing the existing schema and thereby return the system to a state of equilibrium.
Neo-Piagetian theory. Most of the Piaget’s theory was preserved by neo-
Piagetian theorists, including stage-based transitions and age ranges in which certain
abilities arise. Neo-Piagetian theorists also argue that more sophisticated structures were
constructed from less sophisticated structures of the previous stages (Case, 1987).
Piaget’s description of cognitive change resulting in the construction of new schema
(structural change) and that new structure serving the function of providing the individual
with a means to deal with some cognitive conflict (functional change) had become an
essential element in modern constructivist and neo-Piagetian theories (Beilin, 1992).
Finally, neo-Piagetian theorists also support the idea that the constructed of knowledge
occur through the processes of accommodation, assimilation, and disequilibrium.

23
Disequilibrium had become an essential mechanism in explaining how cognitive change
occurs (Beilin, 1992).
In order to provide a better theoretical framework, neo-Piagetian theorists, such as
Robbie Case, Juan Pascual-Leone, and Kurt Fischer, have made an effort to advance
Piagetian theory (Case, 1985; Case & Okamoto, 1996; Fischer & Bullock, 1984; Fischer
& Silvern, 1985; Lamborn & Fischer, 1988; Pascual-Leone, 1969; Pascual-Leone &
Baillargeon, 1994; Pascual-Leone & Johnson, 2011). These theorists have advanced the
theory in several ways. First, they have theorized that there were differences in the
pattern of development in all individuals. The rate and pattern of development depends
on the types of experiences each individual had within that domain of learning. For
example, some children might have had more experience with logic and therefore were
better at logically reasoning, while others might have had more experience with
linguistics and were therefore more advanced in linguistics than other children (Case,
1987). This was a result of differences in experiences in the social domain or exposure to
more or learning experience in a particular domain.
When changes occur in structures, those changes were mostly limited to one
particular domain. Processing ability also influences these changes. The maturation of
brain structures was believed place limits on what types of changes can occur and when
(Andrews & Halford, 2011). Processing resources were believed to be limited and affect
the quality of reasoning that can be performed at certain ages. Working memory was that
limited resource in neo-Piagetian theory (e.g. Case, 1985; Pascual-Leone, 1969; Pascual
Leone & Johnson, 2011). Pascual-Leone (1970; 2000) argues cognitive resources focus
attention on concepts in the environment or in the mind. These resources then hold the

24
relevant concepts in working memory until they can be used or altered. Pascual-Leone
and Baillargeon (1994) theorize that the ability of working memory to hold more
information increases every two years, thereby allowing the child to engage in tasks that
were increasingly more resource intensive with age. As working memory increases, the
quality of reasoning that the individual was capable of increases as a result of the
increasing availability of cognitive resources. Children become more able to handle tasks
that require the investment of more significant amounts of mental effort.
Adolescence begins around the age of eleven and marks the beginning of
Piagetian formal operational stage. At this age, adolescents become capable of
developing deductive reasoning, as well as developing reasoning abilities that involve
thinking in abstraction. Reasoning during this period was considered to be hypothetical-
deductive reasoning (Lawson, 1995). This was because adolescent reasoning involves
imagining of abstract, hypothetical possibilities that may not be present in the
environment or a product of previous experience. The reasoning of the prior stage was
considered to be concrete, because it involved reasoning about things that the individual
had in memory or was perceiving in the environment. This limitation of pre-adolescent
minds to consider abstract possibilities was theorized to be a result of the maturation
process of the brain. As the brain matures into adolescence and early adulthood, the
individual becomes better able to think in abstraction and consider multiple hypothetical
possibilities (Lawson, 1993).
Cultural Influence. While Piaget believed that scientific reasoning was a product
the development of domain-general logical structures, the neo-Piagetian view was that
scientific reasoning was a product of domain-specific development of reasoning

25
strategies that allow for the drawing of accurate scientific conclusions. Case and
Okamoto (1996) argue that the absence of formal educational setting in many African
countries had served to inhibit the development of formal reasoning in those individuals.
Lev Vygotsky argued that the learning environment failed to provide sufficient
scaffolding in education of adolescents. That was, the educational environment did not
provide the type of support, such as in the form of lessons, activities, and/or instruction,
necessary to support the adolescent in the developing of their scientific reasoning abilities
(Tudge, 2010). According to the Piagetian perspective, the individual must experience
conflict in respect to an existing schema (disequilibrium) in order to be motivated to
change the existing schema into a form that was better suited to handling tasks requiring
scientific reasoning. The absence of sufficient scaffolding in the environment promoting
disequilibrium allows the existing schema to be maintained unchanged; in this case, a
reasoning capacity short of the quality necessary to reason about scientific matters.
Neo-Piagetian theorist Kurt Fischer argued that the development of certain
cognitive abilities was dependent on specific environmental conditions (Fischer &
Silvern, 1985). Individuals were characterized as being within a specific developmental
range that was determined by optimal and functional levels. When environments were
highly supportive to the development of specific knowledge and abilities children will
show optimal performance, but when children were in a low support environmental
condition the knowledge or abilities would fail to reach optimal level of performance.
This means that functional levels of specific knowledge and abilities will vary both
within and across cultures (Fischer & Bullock, 1984). The developmental range of
specific knowledge and ability will also vary across cultures, as different cultures would

26
employ different functional socialization of knowledge and ability in various content
domains (Lamborn & Fischer, 1988).
The development of scientific reasoning would therefore depend on a supportive
environment to nurture its development. The failure to elicit change in structures
resulting in the development of scientific reasoning abilities had also been theorized to
occur in response to ideologies that were hostile to science. Lawson (1995) argues that
dogmatic belief system would “retard the development” development of scientific
reasoning abilities. Lawson argued that such worldviews create environments in which
ideas were not critically analyzed and low effort thought was often enforced by the
worldview itself; these dogmatic environments can prevent the type of schematic change
from occurring that was necessary to fully develop scientific reasoning abilities.
Avoiding closure. An important factor in conceptual change was avoiding
closure. Lunzer (1973) argued that when developing the reasoning skills necessary to
reason scientifically it was important to avoid jumping to premature conclusions either
from inconclusive data or failing to fully consider the information at hand. Solving
scientific problems requires an individual to identify variables that may be casual and to
test those variables before making determination as to which variable(s) were the correct
casual factor(s) (Wollman, Eylon, & Lawson, 1980). People have to be willing to accept
ambiguity and uncertainty, for the time being, in order to develop approximate reasoning
strategies to deal with scientific problems and ultimately draw conclusions about those
problems.
Despite this need for avoiding premature closure, people have a fundamental need
to reduce uncertainty about the nature of self, the thoughts they should have, the manner

27
in which they should behave, and how other people will perceive and choose to treat
them (Hogg, 2000, 2007). This need for certainty provides people with the sense of
clarity about self and the world they live in. This greater sense of certainty makes the
world seem more predictable and actions more efficacious (Hogg, Adelman, & Blagg,
2010). When threats to self arise, it was necessary to deal with them to protect self from
anxiety and maintain self-esteem (Greenberg et al., 1986). This need to immediately deal
with threats to self can result in an individual fixating on one solution without fully
considering the evidence at hand or the evidence that may be needed to draw good
conclusions. This premature closure would thereby inhibit conceptual change by drawing
conclusions before sufficient considering of all relevant factors had occurred (Lunzer,
1973).
Individual differences arise in our willingness to allow threats to linger and our
need to quickly seek resolution to presented threats. Individuals differ in their tendency
toward engaging in premature closure or the avoidance of closure. These differences in
motivation reflect a need for cognitive closure (NFC) (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994,
1998). This need was a motivational tendency that favors certainty in knowledge.
Individuals high in NFC were relatively close-minded as they prefer order and
predictability, as well experience discomfort when presented with ambiguity (Roets, Van
Hiel, & Cornelis, 2006). Individuals that have a weak tendency for NFC were more
tolerant toward states of confusion and ambiguity, and were less likely to quickly jump to
conclusions under such states. NFC comes in two forms: “need for specific closure” and
“need for non-specific closure” (Webster & Kruglanski, 1998). Need for specific closure
reflected a preference for specific answers over others. For example, religious

28
fundamentalists often believe in special creation and reject scientific concepts like
evolution (Scott, 2009). When presented with evidence in favor of evolution a religious
fundamentalist with high NFC might reject that evidence outright in favor of special
creation. This was an example of need for specific closure, as the preference for the
belief in special creation led to closure in response to evidence supporting evolution. In
contrast, if an individual, however, had a tendency to jump to such conclusions about
most, if not all, subject matters, it would be considered a need for non-specific closure.
Such an individual would seek to maintain definitive knowledge regardless of the subject
matter.
Value of Religious Belief
The nature of religious fundamentalism and the value these beliefs provide to
believers help serve to better illuminate why scientific reasoning ability may be inhibited
by religious fundamentalist worldviews. Sigmund Freud saw religion in an extremely
negative light. To Freud, religion was a psychologically immature state of mind and was
generally maladaptive. This “infantile” state of mind was theorized to produce serious
negative costs, such as the inability to perceive reality, failure to develop full human
potential, and a failure to be free as an individual (Freud, 1927/1964). The value of
religion arose as a means of avoiding engagement in the struggle between life (Eros) and
death (Thanatos) (Freud, 1930/1961). Religion was seen as a delusion or childish fantasy
that provided believers with the illusion of safety from many of the trials of life,
especially protection from the fear of the forces of nature and death. The religious belief
systems serve as a replacement for the safety provided by parents. In this, religion serves
as a defense against anxiety, while God serves as wish fulfillment that seeks to disregard

29
reality in order to protect self against personal insecurities and life’s many tribulations
(Freud, 1927/1964).
While more positive and goal-centric, Alfred Adler saw the value of religion
similar to Freud. Adler (1956) argued that each individual had his or her own perceived
inferiorities. This sense of inferiority caused one to feel as though they were lacking in
power. Religion provides a means by which an individual could have altered his or her
perceived inferiority; this occurred through the belief in God. God, in religion, was often
conceptualized as being perfect and omnipotent. By striving to be like God, humans
were striving for perfection. By striving for perfection, humans construct a means by
which to eliminate their perceived inferiorities. Therefore, to Adler, religious belief had
value to people because it provides a blueprint for overcoming a sense of inferiority by
striving for perfection (Adler, 1956).
While Freud and Alder saw the motivation for adopting religion as somewhat
one-dimensional, other theorists have recognized that religion often serves different
functions for different individuals. William James produced one of the earliest treatises
on the psychology of religion in his classic work The Varieties of Religious Experience
(1902/2002). He drew a distinction between institutional religion and personal religion.
For James, there were two types of religious experience and personality: “healthy-
minded” (p. 132) and “sick soul” (p.137). Individuals that were ‘healthy-minded” in their
religious expression have a strong desire to expend energy toward moral pursuits that
aspired to make the world a better place. In contrast, individuals with a “sick soul” have
a passive desire for comfort and reassurance, as well as a desire to seek protection from a

30
divided, incomplete inner self. For James, religion had a beneficial influence on the
pursuit of a fruitful, fulfilling human life.
Gordon Allport also focused on individual differences in religious orientations in
his work, The Individual and His Religion: A Psychological Interpretation (1950).
According to Allport (1950), there were two distinct religious orientations: intrinsic and
extrinsic. An intrinsic religious orientation was related to the striving for meaning and
value. These individuals were seen as having a mature expression of religion. Extrinsic
religiosity, in contrast, was more self-interested, as the individuals use it to protect self,
gain social standing, and find solace. An extrinsic religious orientation was seen as being
immature. Individuals that were intrinsically religious attended church services as an end
in itself, while extrinsic religiosity might do so to satisfy social needs, or because
attending services help reduce stress. Batson and Ventis (1982) argue that the measures
of extrinsic religiosity measure a sort of utilitarian religiosity, where the individual uses it
for his or her own needs, often being religious for the sake of tradition, ritual, and/or
personal gain. However, they saw intrinsic religiosity as often measuring a tendency
toward dogmatic religiosity with uncritical respect for authority.
Religious Fundamentalism and Science
Among religious fundamentalists, especially those from Jewish, Muslim, or
Christian traditions, the authority of their religious texts was central to their worldview
(Herriot, 2007). The belief in one true God was also a central tenet of Judaism, Islam,
and Christianity (Almond, Sivan, & Appleby, 1995). The scientific concepts like
evolution can serve as an explicit threat to the fundamentalist worldview (Emerson &
Hartman, 2006; Tracy, Hart, & Martens, 2011).

31
Among Christian fundamentalists, a literal interpretation of the Bible was central
to their worldview. The book of Genesis suggests that the God created everything in six
days, roughly 6000 years ago. The theory of evolution and the supporting research
contradicts this, placing the age of the universe closer to 13.7 billion years (Numbers,
1992/2006; Hawking & Mlodinow, 2010). This was not the only reason that many
fundamentalists have a problem with evolution, as they also dislike the implication that
humans arose from lower life forms. Under Jewish, Christian, and Muslim orthodox
views, man was above that of animals and second only to God in importance (Numbers,
1982/2006). Anti-evolutionists also tend to feel that evolution diminishes the humanity
by removing purpose and meaning from human existence that would be implied by the
existence of a creator (Scott, 2009). One of ways some religious fundamentalists have
continued to fight modernity was through either trying to get evolution removed from
biology classrooms or trying to sneak creationism/intelligent design in the school
curriculum (Scott, 2009; Numbers, 1982/2006).
Terror Management Theory
Terror management theory (Greenberg et al., 1986; Pyszczynski et al., 1999) was
one of the first theories to attempt to explain why people show allegiance to certain
worldviews and not others (Rosenbatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989;
Koltko-Rivera, 2004). Terror management theory (TMT) was largely built on the work
of Ernest Becker (1962, 1973, 1975). Becker (1962) argued that humans have a
fundamental need for self-esteem. Our capacity for symbolic, temporal, and self-
reflective thought, while useful for understanding the world, had the negative
consequence of potentially causing us to consider the possibility that the world was

32
uncontrollable and uncertain, as well as allowing for the recognition that death was an
inescapable consequence of our existence. Becker (1973, 1975) suggested that this could
lead to humans potentially being paralyzed by terror at any point in their lives. Culturally
derived worldviews help subdue this potential by making the world orderly, predictable,
and meaningful. In other words, culture provides the individual with the ability to ignore
and/or deny his or her own vulnerabilities and mortality.
Becker (1973, 1975) argued that human infants start out completely dependent on
their parents for security and protection. As they become children, they come to learn
that as long as they were good boys or girls, the security provided by their parents will
continue. This security helps contribute to a positive self-image (self-esteem). However,
as children become older and learn that parents were both mortal and incapable of
providing for all of their security and protection, they begin to look to culture to provide
that security and protection. Their security needs were transferred from parents to
religious and secular concepts, symbols, and cultural authorities (Greenberg et al., 1986).
Religious beliefs serve to provide knowledge, or at least the illusion of knowledge, about
the nature of reality. These beliefs protect against the anxiety that can arise from one’s
awareness of personal ignorance and/or vulnerability. Religion was especially good at
protecting against anxiety by providing a hope of immortality, thereby allowing the
individual to escape the terror that may result from awareness of an impending end to the
existence of self (Vail et al., 2010). Vail and colleagues (2010) argued that religion was
especially suited to provide anxiety protection because the nature of religious beliefs
makes them inherently hard to disconfirm.

33
According to TMT, cultural worldviews provide people with a sense of value or
self-esteem (Greenberg et al., 1986; Rosenblatt, et al. 1989). The worldview provided the
individual protection against anxiety. This buffer against anxiety consists of two
components: a) belief in a cultural worldview and the values and standards inherent in
that belief, and b) the belief one was living up to those standards (Rosenblatt, et al. 1989).
One can only maintain a high sense of value if the worldview provides protection from
threats. Worldviews arise from commonly held beliefs and practices within culture, and
were rarely subjected to critical analysis prior to a threat to the belief arising. This causes
worldviews to be prone to error. A belief that was incorrect or inadequate in dealing with
the context will result in anxiety, and will therefore require bolstering to preserve self-
esteem.
Worldview defense. A threat to an individual’s worldview increases anxiety and
thereby decreases self-esteem. Defense of one’s worldview against such threats are often
necessary to maintain self-esteem (Greenberg et al., 1986). For example, an individual
might reaffirm allegiance to a political or religious group by denigrating members of the
outgroup (e.g. Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992). The exact
nature of the defense, if any, depended on the nature of the nature the threat; not all
threats to worldviews were equal. Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon (1999)
differentiate between proximal and distal defenses to threats. The difference between the
two concerns the ability of the threat to be dealt with conscious defense alone. Proximal
defenses can deal with threats with relative the same level of abstraction as the threat; it
typically only requires a quick conscious defense of the worldview to overcome.
Questioning the fairness of a test you failed or dismissing the thought of dental pain that

34
was not occurring in the moment, requiring only a modest conscious defense and
therefore typically does not increase worldview defense.
Distal defenses concern threats that cannot be dealt with by the same level of
abstraction or conscious defense alone (Pyszczynski et al., 1999). While it may be
possible to push the threat awareness out of consciousness, the threat still remains
significant enough that it lingers on in the unconscious mind. These threats were things
like awareness of mortality or attacking highly valued religious beliefs, such as God or
belief in special creation (Vail et al., 2010). To protect their self-esteem, defense against
such threats often requires a more direct affirmation of value, thus such threats increase
worldview defense.
Review of Research
Development of Scientific Reasoning
Cognitive conflict. Constructivist theorists argued that an individual’s capacity to
develop an intellectual ability like that of scientific reasoning depends on direct learning
experiences in which scientific ability was fostered. Specifically, Piagetian and neo-
Piagetian theorists argued that learning that elicits conflict with existing concepts and
abilities motivates the learner to alter existing concepts and abilities to fit the needs of the
situation (Cakir, 2008). These new concepts and strategies that were successful resolving
the conflict were preserved.
The role of cognitive conflict in shaping the development of scientific knowledge
and reasoning had become popular focus in research. Chen and Klahr (1999) studied the
ability of children to control variables. Children were told that they were to evaluate
specific experimental trial and determine the trial’s usefulness in determining how far a

35
ball would roll down a ramp. Children seven to ten years old were shown comparisons of
trials in which it was impossible to determine the casual variable influencing the outcome
due to extraneous variables and trials in which such a variable was controlled for. The
children were asked to determine whether the comparison of trials was a “good test” or
“bad test” of determining the casual factor the distance a ball would roll down the ramp.
In the training condition, the researchers provided feedback to the child after each trial,
including explaining why each test was either a good test or bad test. This feedback,
which acted to generate a conflict in the children’s mind between their own determination
quality of test and the researcher’s explanation of the proper response, resulted in
children in the training group improving their abilities to correctly determine the
informativeness of experiments and to draw inferences from them. Older children
showed the ability to transfer these new abilities to novel contexts even after a delay of
seven months.
Baser (2006) studied the role of cognitive conflict in fostering the development
of understanding of heat and temperature. Eighty-two second grade pre-service teachers
were randomly assigned to experimental and control groups. The control group got a
traditional physics course focusing on the concepts of heat and temperature. The
experimental group got physics instruction that focused on creating cognitive conflict.
This consisted of the professor pointing out an anomalous situation that conflicted with
the student’s prior conception. Whenever possible students were instructed to design an
experiment that demonstrated this anomalous situation. When experimentation was not
possible, students discussed the situation with his or her peers and then the instructor lead
a discussion in which student ideas were discussed and proper explanations were pointed

36
out and explained. Pre and post instruction tests were used to determine each
individual’s understanding of the concepts of heat and temperature. While there was no
difference between the two groups prior to instruction, after instruction the experimental
group showed better understanding of the concepts of heat and temperature; suggesting
that cognitive conflict did in fact foster the development of the understanding of the
concepts of heat and temperature.
Another study used a similar means to produce cognitive conflict, which the
researchers called holistic mental model confrontation. Gadgil, Nokes-Malach, and Chi
(2012) instructed students in the experimental condition to compare and contrast his or
her own flawed model of the human circulatory system with an expert’s model of the
system. The student was then prompted to explain the expert model. Students that were
not in the experimental group just had to explain the expert model without first being
instructed to compare and contrast their model with the expert’s. The research found that
students that had the holistic confrontation were more likely to acquire the correct model
of the circulatory system and showed a deeper understanding of the parts that the system
was made up of than the students that only had to explain the expert’s model. The
researchers argued the conflict helped target the flawed model at the proper level of
understanding, thus motivating the student to change his or her existing model to more
accurately reflect the expert’s model.
Avoiding premature closure. Avoiding closure was essential for successful
scientific reasoning. Wollman and colleagues (1980) sought to test the hypothesis of
Lunzer (1973) that the ability to accept a lack of closure (ALC) emerges in children
between 9 and 11 years of age. The study gave inference tasks emphasizing memory,

37
ALC, and hypothetico-deductive reasoning to children between the ages of 5 and 12
years of age. The results did not support the hypothesis of Lunzer (1973). While the use
of ALC increased with age, there was use of ALC among children as young as 6 years of
age. The tasks that placed more demands on working memory resources and the tasks
that required hypothetical-deductive reasoning were shown to be the most difficult.
Performance on tasks requiring hypothetico-deductive reasoning was a good predictor of
the spontaneous use of ALC. The results support the idea that ALC was essential to
performance on scientific reasoning tasks. The results were also consistent with Neo-
Piagetian theorists (e.g. Pascual Leone, 1969, 1970; Case, 1985) that argued that the
development of working memory was one of the primary factors driving the developing
of increasingly more advanced reasoning abilities with age.
Acredolo and Horobin (1987) sought to understand the developmental differences
in relational reasoning and in the avoidance of premature closure in children. The study
participants were 14 first graders, 17 third graders, 17 fifth graders, and 16 sixth graders
(ages ranging from 5 years and 10 months to 12 years and 2 months). They were given
20 relational reasoning problems, which required them to determine the possible sizes of
one item as compared to two other items by visually comparing the sizes. Some of the
problems had a single solution, while others had multi-solutions. The results found that
prior to the sixth grade, children did not consider the possibility of there being more than
one solution to the multiple solution problems. That was, children in fifth grade and
younger engaged in premature closure by assuming that there was only one solution to
the problem. Once they had come to that first solution they stopped looking for others
resulting in poorer performance on these reasoning tasks. First, third, and fifth graders

38
received corrective feedback on multiple solution problems on which they failed. The
corrective feedback did succeed in increasing the performance of children in these
grades, but the performance level never rose to the level demonstrated by sixth graders in
their spontaneous avoiding of premature closure on one solution. The results suggest that
the capacity to avoid premature closure, and thereby produce successful performance on
relational tasks, increases with age.
Cultural influences. Research found that cognitive abilities, particularly in the
case of scientific reasoning, were influenced by the degree to which the environment
supports their development. Luria (1976) studied syllogisms in farmers in central Asia.
Syllogisms employ the use of deductive reasoning to arise at a conclusion from two or
more propositions. For example, a syllogism from Luria’s research would be something
like “Cotton grows where it was hot and humid. England was cold and damp. Can cotton
grow there or not?” Luria studied both farmers that were not literate (and that had no
formal schooling) and those that were literate (and had some form of schooling). The
non-literate farmers would not even consider the problem; typically, they responded that
since they had no direct experience with one of the propositions they could not draw a
conclusion. They appeared to treat the propositions as completely dependent on an
individual’s personal experiences and independent of pieces of information and not as
pieces of the problem as a whole. Literate farmers, on the other hand, that had no
problem drawing the correct conclusion from the given propositions.
Fiati (1991) a group of individuals that lived in mud huts that had grass roofs in
the Volta region of central Africa. The villagers utilized subsistence farming to provide
for their livelihood. The passage of information among the village was largely oral. All

39
activity in the village ceased at dark and everyone gathered around the fire for
storytelling. No modern technology or books were present in the village, and children
did not attend any form of formal schooling. Western ten-base system of measurement
were also absent from their culture, as all trade involved direct barter and not any form of
currency.
These villagers were tested on measures of dimensional and spatial reasoning and
compared with children from schools in a nearby city and town. The influence of
schooling was clear as those with schooling performed significant better on the test of
dimensional and spatial reasoning (Fiati, 1991). Scores on reasoning tasks found to be
strongly related to both the presence and quality of schooling. Children without
schooling rarely solved problems that involved more than one variable, even during
adolescence. There were no differences in age related abilities, as there were no
significant differences in the groups of children on measures of working memory and
counting time.
The influence of schooling was not the only factor that can differ based on culture
that can influence the application of reasoning abilities. Culture can show preferences to
certain types of reasoning. Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, and Nisbett (2002) argued that
there were cultural differences in preferences for intuitive versus formal reasoning. They
argued European Americans would be more likely to set aside intuition in favor of formal
reasoning as compared to those from East Asia. Formal reasoning was based on rules,
focuses on logical inferences and represents concepts as being necessary and sufficient,
and discards sensory experience when in conflict with logic. Intuitive reasoning was
more based in experience, resisting separate reasoning from context, relies on sensory

40
experience, and favors intuition when in conflict with logic. The research exposed
groups of European American, Asian American, and East Asian undergraduate students
to conditions in which a conflict between formal and intuitive strategies was presented.
In a series of studies, European and Asian Americans students were found to be more
willing to favor of reasoning that was formal in nature, while setting intuition aside, as
compared to East Asian students. The opposite pattern was found in East Asia, as
students relied more on intuitive reasoning strategies as compared to Americans students.
This study demonstrates that cultural influences, such preferences for intuitive or
analytical reasoning, can influence the quality of reasoning strategies that arise in a
specific culture.
Soong, Lee, and John (2012) wanted to study cultural differences in justificatory
reasoning. Justificatory reasoning was the capacity to defend the rationale behind one’s
opinions, beliefs, and actions. Three types of justificatory reasoning were studied:
absolutism, relativism, and evaluativism. Absolutism involves defense by pointing to
values of authorities or common held norms. Relativism involves defense on the ground
that there were no right or wrong answer and that differing opinions should receive equal
consideration. Evaluativism involves defense based on evidence and sound reasoning.
Australian (a western/individualistic culture) and Malaysian (an eastern/collectivistic
culture) students had the links to online surveys sent directly to their school email
accounts. The surveys employed three scenarios were an individual defended a belief in
astrology, as well as three scenarios where an individual defended a perspective on
adultery. Each scenario employed one of the three approaches to justificatory reasoning.
Students were asked to respond to the scenarios. The responses of the students were

41
scored based on whether they agreed with, disagreed with, or were uncertain about the
defense of the belief in the scenario. Students from Australia preferred evaluativism
when defending belief in astrology, while students from Malaysia preferred relativism
when defending belief in astrology. In contrast, both of the cultures preferred absolutism
when in came to the moral issue of adultery. The results of the study suggest that cultural
differences can influence the way one defends their beliefs and actions.
Richland, Chan, Morrison, and Au (2010) studied analogical reasoning in children
in different cultures. Pre-school children from the United States and Hong Kong were
studied to understand the similarities and differences in logical reasoning errors. The
results showed that on analogy tasks children from both the U.S. and Hong Kong
demonstrated similar performance, but children from Hong Kong outperformed U.S.
students on tasks that were more relationally complex. Children from both cultures had
problems ignoring perceptual or semantic distractors during reasoning tasks. The results
suggest that culture differences can influence the development of better representations of
knowledge, which allows more efficient processing of relationally complex problems.
The results also suggested that inhibitory control in pre-school children was not
influenced by cultural differences.
The development of concepts like evolution can also be influenced by cultural
factors. Evans (2001) wanted to understand how belief in origin species emerged. Evans
utilized a mixed-design possessing aspects of both quantitative and qualitative research.
The researcher recruited Christian fundamentalist children and parents from two
Christian schools and one home school-group. Non-fundamentalist children and parents,
which had been matched for age with the fundamentalist group, were also recruited from

42
the same town, as well as adjacent towns and cities. All the children and parents
complete the same tasks and interviews. The only difference between children in parents
was that children responded from their own perspective, while parents responded from
the child’s perspective on certain tasks.
The results showed that children’s beliefs in the origins of species changed with
time. Younger non-fundamentalist children between the ages of 5 to 7-years-old had
mixed beliefs about the origin of species, including creationist beliefs. In contrast,
fundamentalist children of the same age strongly endorsed creationist views. Middle age
children between the ages of 8 to 10-years-old mostly endorsed creationist ideas. By
adolescence, the beliefs about the origins of life took on the shape of the beliefs of the
community they were from. Children from fundamentalist communities were more likely
to adopt creationism, while children from communities that endorsed evolution were
more likely to adopt beliefs in evolution. The frequency of natural explanations for the
origin of species were some uncommon in the fundamentalist community, as compared to
the non-fundamentalist community, that it led Evans to conclude that natural explanations
for the origin of species had been “almost completely suppressed in the fundamentalist
community” (p. 231). Another finding of the research was that children’s knowledge of
natural history predicted the adoption of evolutionist beliefs, while religious interest
predicted the adoption of creationist beliefs. Evans (2001) interpreted this to meaning
that children adopted the beliefs of their communities. Children start out with their own
beliefs about the origin of species and then the community, in which they grown up,
either supports or discourages those beliefs.

43
Prior belief and reasoning. The development of scientific reasoning and the
quality of reasoning within a scientific context can be influenced by an individual’s
existing beliefs. Kuhn, Amsel, and O’Loughlin (1988) studied the evaluation of
covariation evidence in children and adults. Their primary interest was determining how
they reconciled existing beliefs about specific casual variables with covariation evidence.
Participants were asked about which foods they believed beliefs would make a difference
in determining if a person caught a cold or not. From the questioning, four variables
were selected with two being factors that influence catching cold and two that do not.
The researchers then created evidence that confirmed one casual existing theory and one
non-casual theory. They also presented evidence that disconfirmed one existing casual
theory and one non-casual theory. The participants were then presented with the
evidence and asked questions about what the evidence showed on all four variables.
The researchers found three major patterns in the responding. First, they found
that as participants aged, the quality of evaluation of covariation increased, which was
consistent with constructivist theories of the development of scientific reasoning.
Second, subjects used several strategies that helped them keep prior theory and evidence
in alignment when they were actually discrepant. These strategies included ignoring
evidence, distorting evidence, and selectively attending to evidence that was consistent
with existing theory. Finally, they found that individuals adjusted existing theory to fit
evidence. While this was the expected response to disconfirming evidence, they found
that individuals were often unaware that they had altered their existing theory. They
found that some participants reporting having given a theory that was consistent with the

44
evidence originally, when in reality their initial theory was actually inconsistent with the
evidence (Kuhn, Amsel, & O’Loughlin, 1988).
Amsel and Brock (1996) studied whether or not children (from second grade to
seventh grade) and adults (college students and non-college attending adults) evaluated
evidence in a fashion that was independent of prior beliefs. The researchers chose similar
design to Kuhn, et al. (1988), but one that was less cognitively demanding. Participants
were selected based on whether or not they held prior beliefs about the relationship
between the health of plants and the exposure of plants to sunlight. Participants were
presented with four data sets, which either showed a perfect positive correlation, or no
correlation that either confirmed or disconfirmed their existing beliefs. The results
revealed that college students were the most “ideal reasoners”, as they were better at
evaluating covariation evidence than children and non-college attending adults. The
research also found that all groups of children made judgments about covariation
evidence that was consistent with their prior beliefs. Non-college attending adults were
in between making less prior theory consistent evaluations of covariation evidence than
children, but making more prior theory consistent evaluations than college students.
Bastardi, Uhlmann, and Ross (2011) sought to determine if desires would
override beliefs based in fact while participants evaluated scientific evidence, as well as
determine if participants would change their initial beliefs after being exposed to
ambiguous evidence. Thirty-six participants were selected based on prescreening
questioning. Only subjects that had reported that they believed that home care for
children was better than day care and that they planned to have children in the future
were selected. The participants were equally broken up into two groups. The “conflicted

45
group” planned to use day care in the future, despite a belief that home care was better.
The “unconflicted group” had reported that they would only be using home care, in the
future, for their children. The participants were presented with evidence from two
fictional studies one that was deemed to be in favor of day care, which was referred to as
the “Thompson study”, and one that favored home care, which was referred to as the
“Cummings study”. The other half of were told the opposite that the Thompson study
favored home care and the Cummings study favored day care. The participants were then
asked to rate the studies based on the quality of the research design and instructed to list
what they believed to be the strengths and weakness of each design. Next, the
participants indicated how convincing each study was. Finally, the participants were
asked which type of childcare was best for the development of their children.
The unconflicted group rated the Cummings study more negatively, as compared
to the Thompson study, when it supported day care than when it supported home care,
while the conflicted group rated the Cummings study more positively, as compared to the
Thompson study when it favored day care rather than home care. The results also
showed that the ambiguous evidence led the conflicted group to change their belief in
home care being better, while the unconflicted group maintained their belief that home
care was superior. Researchers interpreted the results to indicate that both groups
interpreted the results consistent with their initial beliefs. The conflicted group wanted to
believe that their choice to use day care was a good one so the evidence led them to
change their belief in its quality. The unconflicted group wanted to maintain their choice
in the superiority of home care, so the same evidence led them to maintain that strong
belief (Bastardi, Uhlmann, & Ross, 2011).

46
Some religious beliefs run contrary to scientific fact and can inhibit the
development of scientific knowledge and abilities. Lawson and Worsnop (1992)
hypothesized that strong religious belief and a belief in special creation (a God being
responsible for the creation of the universe and all life in it) as hindering the acquisition
of scientific concepts. Students were first pretested to determine beliefs in respect to
evolution or specific creation, knowledge about natural selection and evolution, reflective
reasoning ability, and strength of commitment to religious practice. They then received
instruction in the subjects of evolution and natural selection. After instruction in
evolution and natural selection, students were given a post-test on those same things.
Reasoning ability was associated with prior scientific beliefs and increases in declarative
knowledge after instruction, but not changes in beliefs about evolution. Strength of
commitment to religion was negatively associated with prior beliefs in evolution and
changing of belief after instruction. The researchers’ initial hypothesis that strong
religious commitment and belief in special creation would hinder the acquisition of
scientific concepts like evolution was supported by the data.
Klaczynski (2000) studied the tendency of theory-motivated reasoning biases to
arise when reasoning skills were used to evaluate evidence that was either consistent or
inconsistent with individual’s belief systems. Sixty-six early adolescents and seventy-
three middle adolescents initially filled out questionnaires that determined their initial
theories about matters of social class and religion. Each individual was then presented
with nine experimental evaluation problems that were constructed so that the social class
or religion of the participant was the subject of the experiment. The individual’s social
class or religion was compared to others in other social classes or other religions on

47
things like intellectual matters and moral behaviors. Each experiment evaluation was set
up so that it was class or religion favorable, class or religion unfavorable, or class or
religion neutral. The participants then indicated how strong they felt the conclusions
were and how valid or well the research was conducted. Finally, the participants wrote
the justifications for their conclusions. In both the social class and religion conditions,
reasoning biases were found in their justifications. However, only in the religious
condition was their evidence of in-group bias. The ratings of religion favorable
experimental evaluations were significantly higher than religion neutral experimental
evaluations, which in turn were significantly higher than religion unfavorable. The
justifications were most complex for religion unfavorable experimental evaluations.
There was also a significant difference between groups in terms of scientific reasoning
ability, as middle adolescents were better reasoners than early adolescents. When this
more analytical reasoning was used, it was used to evaluate and reject theory-incongruent
evidence, while more intuitive “judgmental heuristics” were used to evaluate and accept
theory-congruent evidence.
Religious resistance to science. The studies above showed that the motivation to
preserve religious belief was strong and drives a desire to resist subjects that were seen as
at odds with religious belief. Darnell and Sherkat (1997) argued that there was a great
deal of resistance toward higher education among Protestant fundamentalists. They
believed that fundamentalist beliefs and conservative Protestantism drove this resistance
to higher education would have a negative effect on educational attainment. The study
data was obtained from the Youth Parent Socialization Panel Study (YPSPS), collected
by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. The longitudinal study

48
consisted of interviews with high schoolers from 1965 to 1982. The interviews of the
participants were separated into three groups: Conservative Protestants (CP), Biblical
Inerrantists (BI), and general population (GP). BIs were people that believed in a literal
interpretation of the Bible. The results revealed that CP and BI had significantly lower
educational aspirations then the general population. CP and BI were, also, found to have
significantly lower educational attainment in 1973 and 1982. There was no statistical
difference in the grade point averages any of the respondents. When the control for
social background was taken into account most of the relationships remained significant
(with the exception of educational aspirations of BI which lost its statistical significance).
The researchers concluded that the results demonstrate that fundamentalist orientations
have a direct, negative impact on post-secondary educational attainment in high school
students.
The resistance to education was most pronounced with respect to science. Yasri
and Mancy (2014) investigated the range of perspectives that students hold in respect to
religion and science, and how those positions may explain students’ approaches to
learning science. To accomplish this, the researchers employed a phenomenographic
design and the data was obtained through interviews with the participants. The
participants were nine students from Christian high schools. The researchers found five
different positions on how religion and science related in the students interviewed. Three
of the positions, contrast, commentary, and coalescence, each held by one student,
represented distinct ways in which the students attempt to reconcile religious and science
as compatible. Another position, compartmental, also held by one individual, held an
undecided perspective about the relationship between the subjects. The student was

49
aware of the differences in explanation, but could not decide whether one was superior or
whether they were both compatible. Finally, the incompatible position argued that
science and religion were at odds and that religion should trump science. This position
was held by four of the nine students. These students could not reconcile evolutionary
explanations of the origin of species with their religious beliefs. These students did not
simply reject evolutionary explanations, but actively engaged in arguing against the
evolutionary perspective. For these students, the Bible was the only document of
relevance and only positions supporting the biblical account could be taken as legitimate.
Employing a grounded theory design, Hanley, Bennett, and Ratcliffe (2014)
sought to study how religious background of students would effect their willingness to
embrace scientific explanations about the emergence of life and the universe.
Researchers used questionnaires and focus groups to obtain data from more than 200
students. The researchers found that students could be divided into four categories based
on where they sit on four dimensions: whether their knowledge base was belief-based or
fact-based; their tolerance of uncertainty; their open-mindedness; and whether they
believe science and religion were in conflict or harmony. The four categories resemble
those found in Yasri and Mancy (2014). The first category “confused” reflects
individuals that were could not come to a conclusion as to how to reconcile their religious
beliefs with science. These individuals tended to have knowledge that was both belief
and fact based, while being intolerant of uncertainty and relatively close-minded.
“Reconciled” individuals had found a way to reconcile their religious belief and scientific
fact. They were more open-minded and tolerance of uncertainty than confused
individuals, but not by much. “Explorers” enjoyed the challenge of making religious

50
views and scientific fact fit together. They were the most open-minded and tolerant of
uncertainty, while not seeing religion and science as being antagonistic. Finally,
“resistors” were the most close-minded and intolerant of uncertainty. They also held a
knowledge base that was heavily belief-based and saw religion and science as
antagonistic. They had determined that religion held the answers and that science had to
be rejected. The researchers reasoned that:
Resistors probably find school culture as a whole alienating, and not simply
aspects of science. Their preference for belief-based systems and their view of
the relations between science and religion as antagonistic, combined with the
desire for clear positions that are not open to doubt, suggest they would resist and
perhaps resent attempts to draw them into discussion of crossover topics such as
origins. (Hanley, Bennett, & Ratcliffe, 2014, p. 1223)
Many of the Muslim students often got defensive to the point of resentful of any
approach that forced them to discuss science and religion together. Researchers
concluded that such individuals might feel as though imposing the discussion of the
origin of life on them was an attempt at assimilation, thereby demanding that they give up
their culture and belief system in favor of scientific orthodoxy. Such a discussion in a
learning context could actually serve to further alienate them and drive them farther from
accepting of science.
Scientific literacy and reasoning. In people with fundamentalist beliefs, this
resistance to science and scientific concepts like evolution was accompanied by
decreased scientific literacy. Sherkat (2011) wanted to understand how religious
fundamentalism influenced scientific literacy. He obtained the data from the 2006

51
General Social Survey obtained by the National Opinion Research Center at the
University of Chicago. The survey included information about religious orientations,
religious beliefs, income, race, and gender, among others. The data showed that
individuals that have self-identified as having a fundamentalist religious orientation had
significantly lower scores on a test of scientific literacy than any other religious
orientation or non-religious group identification. Religious fundamentalists with a belief
in the Bible as literal truth scored significantly lower on scientific literacy scores than
those that thought the Bible was merely inspired by God and those that thought it was a
book of fables after controlling for education and all other demographic variables.
Controlling for the demographics variables did decrease the magnitude of the difference
between sectarian Protestants and all other groups, but it did not eliminate the
significance. Sherkat (2011) concluded that the research demonstrated that the “religious
factors have persistent negative effects on scientific literacy” (p. 1146).
Religious beliefs, in general, have been found to be associated with a decreased
tendency toward analytical reasoning. Gervais and Norenzayan (2012) sought to
understand the cognitive processes that promote religious disbelief. In the first study,
they presented participants with three measures of religious belief and had them undergo
a task designed to test their analytical thinking skill. The results of this study showed that
analytical ability was negatively associated with all three measures of religious belief. In
studies 2 through 5, the researchers used various primes to trigger analytical thinking in
participants. For example, participants in the experimental group were given pictures
found to stimulate analytical thinking, such as a picture of Auguste Rodin’s “The
Thinker” sculpture. Individuals in the control group were given pictures of other

Religious Fundamentalism's Effect on Scientific Reasoning

Religious Fundamentalism's Effect on Scientific Reasoning

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