The document summarizes opportunities for business development in the Arctic region as sea ice melts. It discusses how three main Arctic shipping routes - the Northern Sea Route, Northwest Passage, and Transpolar Sea Route - could open up substantially by 2030-2050 due to climate change. Shipping bulk materials and supplying Arctic extraction areas will likely be more viable initially than container shipping through the Arctic. Challenges include unpredictable ice, weather, high costs, lack of infrastructure, and remoteness. However, the Arctic region contains an estimated 22% of the world's undiscovered oil and natural gas reserves, presenting opportunities for resource extraction industries.

1. People. Ideas. Success.
Guggenheim Partners
The Melting Arctic: Business Opportunities in Arctic Development
Scott Minerd
Global Chief Investment Officer
January 2014
Guggenheim Investments (“Guggenheim”) represents the following affiliated investment management businesses of Guggenheim Partners, LLC: GS GAMMA Advisors, LLC, Guggenheim Aviation, Guggenheim Funds Distributors, LLC, Guggenheim
Funds Investment Advisors, LLC, Guggenheim Partners Investment Management, LLC, Guggenheim Partners Europe Limited, Guggenheim Partners India Management, Guggenheim Real Estate, LLC, Security Investors, LLC and Transparent
Value Advisors, LLC. This material is intended to inform you of services available through Guggenheim Investments’ affiliate businesses.

2. The Arctic Shipping Opportunity
Climate scientists estimate the Arctic could be ice-free in the late
summer as early as 2030
−
•
The Arctic is warming twice as fast as the rest of the world. The
melting of Arctic sea ice is part of a feedback loop that accelerates
warming and reduces ice extent.
Receding sea ice will open three main trans-Arctic shipping routes:
−
The Northern Sea Route
− The Northwest Passage
− The Transpolar Sea Route
•
9M
Along with the retreat of sea ice, the ice is also becoming thinner and
younger, meaning it is much easier to navigate through.
−
September Average Sea Ice Extent
Title
The Arctic is most appealing for certain kinds of shipping:
−
−
6M
5M
4M
3M
Because of unpredictable and unreliable conditions in the
Arctic, the tight schedule along multiple stops that container
shipping relies on is not possible.
Route
Length (km)
%
accessible, 20002014
%
accessible, 20452059
Northwest Passage
9,324
63%
82%
Northern Sea Route
5,169
86%
100%
Transpolar Sea Route
6,960
64%
100%
Most current traffic is destination shipping within the region, not
transits through the Arctic.
o
−
7M
Shipping through the Arctic will initially be most viable for shipping
bulk raw materials, rather than for container shipping.
o
−
8M
sq. km
•
Mostly in the form of transporting natural resources from the
Arctic, or delivering supplies to extraction areas in the region.
Smaller ships need to be used in Arctic shipping, meaning the cost per
container is usually higher, even if the total voyage costs are less. This
is less of an issue for bulk carriers.
Ships transiting the Arctic can reduce speed and thus fuel costs
instead of saving time, which may be more attractive for bulk carriers.
Source: Humpert and Raspotnik, The Future of Arctic Shipping Along the Transpolar Sea Route.
Please see Disclosures and Legal Notice at end of Document
2

3. Arctic Shipping Routes
Please see Disclosures and Legal Notice at end of Document
3

4. Ice Conditions Could Allow Large Increase In Arctic Shipping Traffic
•
A 2013 study by Smith and Stephenson modeling climate change over the coming decades found that based on ice conditions, it is
likely for Arctic traffic to increase substantially by 2040.
•
The simulation found that by 2040 traffic along the Northern Sea Route will increase substantially and venture further away from the
coast, where the waters are more navigable.
•
Meanwhile, the Northwest Passage will open up to both polar strengthened ships and ordinary ships, in some cases.
•
The Transpolar Sea Route will be used by polar class vessels, instead of the Northern Sea Route, due to the more direct nature of
the route.
Polar class
vessel
Common ships
Northern
Sea Route
Polar class
vessel
Common ships
Transpolar
Sea Route
Northwest
Passage
Source: New Trans-Arctic Shipping Routes Navigable by Midcentury, Smith and Stephenson (2013).
Please see Disclosures and Legal Notice at end of Document
4

5. The Northern Sea Route
•
•
Also known as the Northeast Passage, the Northern Sea Route (NSR)
lies mostly along Russia’s northern border, and is approximately 2,600
nautical miles long.
Trade between northwestern North America and Europe could also
benefit:
−
•
Destination
The route would be applicable for trade between Asia north of
Singapore and northern Europe.
−
•
Distances and Days Saved from Kirkenes (Norway) and Murmansk (Russia)
The distance between Vancouver and Rotterdam is 8 days
shorter than through the Panama Canal.
In 2010, just 4 permits were issued for full transits of the NSR.
− This increased to 41 in 2011, 46 in 2012, and 71 in 2013.
The amount of cargo transported has increased at a slower pace: from
824,000 tons in 2011 to 1.26 million in 2012, and 1.36 million in 2013.
−
Via Suez Canal
Through Northern Sea Route
Days
Saved
Distance,
Nm
Speed
Knots
Days
Distance,
Nm
Speed
Knots
Days
Shanghai
China
12,050
14.0
37
6,500
12.9
21
16
Busan,
Korea
12,400
14.0
38
6,050
12.9
19.5
18.5
Yokohama,
Japan
12,730
14.0
39
5,750
12.9
18.5
20.5
Source: Tschudi Shipping Company A/S, cited in Lloy’d’s, “Arctic Opening: Opportunity and Risk in the High North”.
Most of this cargo traveled in an east-to-west direction.
Northern Sea Route Transits
80
71
70
60
46
50
41
40
30
20
10
4
0
2010
2011
2012
2013
Source: Northern Sea Route Information Office, Guggenheim Investments. Data as of 12/31/2013.
Please see Disclosures and Legal Notice at end of Document
5

6. The Northern Sea Route: Studies and Projections
•
A study by DNV calculated the cost of an NSR transit vs. a Suez Canal route. Costs factored in ice projections, speed, fuel consumption, and additional costs
from building and operating ships suitable for the Arctic.
−
The study found that Arctic transit from Tokyo would be economically attractive for part of the year in 2030.
They project 1.4 million TEU of 3.9 million TEU from Tokyo will be transported across the Arctic, which translates to about 480 transit voyages.
− By 2050, these numbers rise to 2.5 out of 5.6 million TEU for 850 voyages. The predicted amount of containers that will be transported through the Arctic
corresponds to about 8% of the total container trade between Asia and Europe in 2030, and about 10% in 2050.
− The study also found shipping from central ports in Asia (Hong Kong) is likely to become marginally profitable only with high bunker prices and a long
summer sailing season in 2050. Traffic across the Arctic from the southern ports in Asia (Singapore) will not be profitable due to a longer sailing route than
via Suez.
−
Other projections on NSR shipping vary widely:
“Freight volume…is expected to triple by 2017.” (Der Spiegel)
“Cargo transport will nearly tenfold…to some 19 million tons in 2020.” (Murmansk Governor Dmitriyenko)
− “The volume to be transported along the NSR will increase…to 50 million tons in 2020. Oil and gas will make up the bulk of this increase.” (Bambulyak and
Frantzen, 2009)
− “Maritime experts say two percent of global shipping could be diverted to the Arctic by 2030, reaching 5 percent by 2050.” (The Arctic Institute)
− South Korea’s Maritime Institute estimates the NSR could account for a quarter of Asia-Europe trade by 2030.
−
−
100
80
Million Tonnes
•
Transit
60
The Northern Sea Route - East
The Northern Sea Route - West
40
From Murmansk to Northern Sea
Route's Starting Point
20
0
2016
2020
2030
Source: The Issues and Prospects of an Expanded Arctic Transportation Network, Alexei Konovalov (2012), Haver Analytics, Guggenheim
Investments. Actual data as of 12/31/2011.
Please see Disclosures and Legal Notice at end of Document
6

7. The Northern Sea Route: Time and Cost Savings
•
One study found that shipping along the NSR is currently less costly
than through the Suez Canal for selected routes. Specifically, the study
examined a scenario of shipping LNG from Hammerfest, Norway to
Tobata, Japan. (See table to the right)
−
−
−
−
−
•
Shipping LNG from Melkoya, Norway to Yokohama, Japan saves 21.4
days, for total roundtrip cost savings of:
−
−
−
−
−
•
Distance: 6,500 nm vs. 12,180 nm
Speed: 12.03 knots vs. 13 knots
Time: 22.5 days vs. 40 days
Fees: $5/ton icebreaker assistance fee vs. $5/ton Suez fee
Fuel cost: $300,000 saved
Environmental savings: 1560 tons of CO2
Timecharter/day: $150,000 * 21.4 * 2 = $6,420,000
Bunkers burn off 0.1% LNG/day * 21.4 * 2 = $2,200,000
Suez round voyage cost = $150,000
NSR tariff = ($632,000)
Savings = $8,138,000
616
$1,032,000
$2,170,000
Suez Canal Fee
-
$413,000
$339,000
-
$2,295
$2,086
Crew Cost/day
$5,479
$5,479
Maintenance Cost/day
$7,326
$6,600
24
32
Operational Cost
$357,000
$451,000
Depreciation Cost
−
423
Insurance/day
In 2010, the bulk carrier Nordic Barents carried 41,000 tons of iron ore from
Kirkenes, Norway to Lianyungang, China, saving 17.5 days relative to the
Suez route.
HammerfestSuez-Tobata
Total Fuel Cost
•
HammerfestNSR-Tobata
$1,580,000
$1,927,000
Total Cost
$3,307,000
$4,960,000
Navigation Hours
Ice Breaker and Ice Pilot Fee
Total Voyage Days
Source: Study of Feasibility of the Northern Sea Route from Recent Voyages, Otsuka, Izumiyama, and Furuichi
(2013), Guggenheim Investments.
Shipping iron ore from Kirkenes to Shanghai saves 18 days, for total one
way savings of:
−
Timecharter/day: $15,000 * 18 = $270,000
Bunkers fuel 33 * 700 * 18 = $416,000
− Suez cost = $250,000
− NSR tariff = ($375,000)
− Savings = $560,000
−
Source: Tschudi Shipping Company, Guggenheim Investments.
Please see Disclosures and Legal Notice at end of Document
7

8. The Northwest Passage
•
Potentially applicable for trade between Asia north of Shanghai and the northeast of North America
−
Distance saving between northwest North America and Europe was also demonstrated by the recent transit of the Danish-American, Nordic Orion, carrying
coal from Vancouver to Finland, which saved 5 days relative to the Panama Canal and $80,000 in fuel.
•
Several potential routes, the more northerly routes, are more direct but more prone to ice blockage.
•
Ice conditions will not improve as quickly as in the NSR.
−
−
The route is currently ice free for about two months a year.
This is especially problematic because of the many narrow straits on the route, where ice tends to collect.
o
−
Narrow straits also limit the size of ships, in addition to shallow areas along the Northwest Passage (NWP).
There is also less infrastructure in the region, and currently less of a political push to develop the route.
•
The Northwest Passage will face pressure not only from the significantly widened Panama Canal, but also from rail transport across North American for Asian
trade to the U.S. east coast.
•
The simulation study by Smith and Stephenson found that by the 2040-2059 period the NWP will be the most efficient route for transits to or from eastern North
America for polar strengthened vessels, and will be an efficient option for ordinary ships most of the time.
Please see Disclosures and Legal Notice at end of Document
8

9. The Transpolar Sea Route
•
The Transpolar Sea Route (TSR) is a direct route through the middle of the Arctic Ocean.
•
The TSR as a viable shipping route is a long-term prospect, as the route is currently covered by ice, even in the summer.
– However, icebreakers have already transited the route, and even with ice still present the route may become available for use.
•
Over the long-term, as demonstrated by the Smith and Stephenson study, the TSR could replace NSR as the most efficient route for
polar class vessels, and even some ordinary ships with the assistance of an icebreaker.
•
Advantages:
− Most direct route (up to 41% distance savings between Tokyo and northern Europe)
− Few draft and beam restrictions, can accommodate all but the very largest Ultra Large Crude Carriers
− No country can claim it
Port of
Origin
Port of
Destination
Distance in Nautical Miles
Days at sea at 17 knots
Via Suez
Canal
Via TSR
Via Suez
Canal
Distance
savings in %
Via TSR
Tokyo
Rotterdam
11,192
6,600
27.4
16.1
-41%
Shanghai
Rotterdam
10,525
7,200
25.8
17.6
-32%
Hong Kong
Rotterdam
9,748
8,000
23.9
19.6
-18%
Singapore
Rotterdam
8,288
9,300
20.3
22.7
+12%
Source: The Future of Arctic Shipping Along the Transpolar Sea Route, Humpert and Raspotnik (2012).
Please see Disclosures and Legal Notice at end of Document
9

10. Challenges for Arctic Shipping
•
−
−
•
−
−
−
Costs
−
Ice breaker fees
o Average cost for escort through NSR around $200,000.
o However, not all ships require icebreaker escorts.
−
More open water = unpredictable ice flows
Even as ice diminishes, first-year ice disappears
first, allowing much harder/more difficult multi-year ice to
drift into lanes, potentially gathering in chokepoints
Weather
−
•
•
Ice
Slower speeds due to conditions
Icebreakers or ice class cargo vessels burn more fuel
Insurance
Equipping ship for ice
Permits
o Russia currently requires permits for ships using any
part of the NSR. In the past, this process has been time
consuming.
o New agency, Northern Sea Route Administration,
opened in March to develop infrastructure and increase
NSR traffic, which should help speed up permit
applications.
−
Storms – polar lows (small storms that are difficult to detect
and predict)
Cold
Fog (visibility)
Sea spray causing icing
−
−
−
Difficulty of forecasting future climate. No one knows how
global climate change will develop.
−
August ice extent was up over 20% last year, demonstrating
unpredictability even in the near-term
•
Shortened shipping season
•
Remoteness – rescue and emergency
•
Unreliable shipment times
•
Lack of infrastructure and infrastructure financing
−
−
−
−
−
Refueling stations
Transshipment ports
Ship-to-shore communication
Marine surveys/ice charts
Lack of mariners with Arctic experience
−
•
Many of these costs are offset by the fact that costs are
saved elsewhere.
o Ice breaker fee, but no canal transit fee
o Higher insurance, but no piracy insurance
o Outfitting ship for ice, but no anti-piracy equipment
Smaller ships = higher cost per container/ton of freight
−
−
Many ships used elsewhere would require two icebreakers
Draft and beam restrictions due to narrow and shallow
straits
Please see Disclosures and Legal Notice at end of Document
10

11. 22% of the World’s Undiscovered Oil and Natural Gas
•
•
The Arctic currently accounts for about 11% of global oil production and
26% of natural gas production.
Undiscovered Oil
Arctic –
Eurasia
4%
In 2008, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) estimated that the
Arctic contained some 412.2 billion barrels of undiscovered oil and oil
equivalent, 84% of which is estimated be offshore.
•
Over two-thirds of this was estimated to be natural gas – approximately
1,669 trillion cubic feet, representing 30% of global undiscovered natural
gas (approximately equivalent to Russia’s entire current proven reserves of
natural gas).
•
Some 90 billion barrels were estimated to be oil – 13% of the estimated
global total of undiscovered oil, (approximately three times the current
total proven reserves of oil of the United States).
Arctic –
N. America
9%
Rest of World
87%
Source: Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal, USGS (2008), Guggenheim Investments.
Estimated Undiscovered Arctic Oil and Gas Resources
Undiscovered Natural Gas
billion barrels of oil equivalent
250
NGL
200
Gas
Arctic Eurasia
22%
Oil
150
100
Rest of
World 70%
50
Arctic – N.
America
8%
0
Russia
US
Norway
Greenland
Canada
Source: Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal, USGS (2008), Ernst & Young, Guggenheim Investments.
Source: Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal, USGS (2008), Guggenheim Investments.
Please see Disclosures and Legal Notice at end of Document
11

12. 22% of the World’s Undiscovered Oil and Natural Gas
Please see Disclosures and Legal Notice at end of Document
12

13. Arctic Oil and Natural Gas: Long-Term Production Prospects
•
While the Arctic accounts for a large share of undiscovered oil, its share of
total resources is smaller.
−
Arctic Oil Production in Relation to Global Supply
Additionally, the cost of producing a barrel of oil from the Arctic ranges
from $35 to $100 per barrel. While this makes Arctic production
currently viable, much cheaper conventional sources exist.
•
The Arctic’s 11% share of global oil production is likely to remain fairly
steady over the coming decades.
•
A study by the Norwegian government found that while the Arctic will
become an increasingly large share of non-OPEC conventional production
and Arctic oil output will double by 2050, Arctic oil will actually decrease to
8% of world oil production by 2050.
−
•
However, if oil prices rise more than expected, the Arctic’s share could
increase to 16% of world production.
The same study found that the Arctic’s share of natural gas production will
decrease more substantially, from 26% currently, to 10% by 2050.
Source: The role of the Arctic in future global petroleum supply, Lindholt and Glomsrod (2011)
Long Term Oil Supply Cost Curve
Arctic Gas Production in Relation to Global Supply
EOR
Coal to
Liquids
Source: International Energy Agency, Guggenheim Investments
Source: The role of the Arctic in future global petroleum supply, Lindholt and Glomsrod (2011)
Please see Disclosures and Legal Notice at end of Document
13

14. Mining
•
The Arctic is believed to hold some of the world’s largest reserves of coal (Alaska alone is believed to have 17% of the world’s coal
reserves), gold, silver, tin, nickel, copper, platinum, cobalt, iron ore, lead, zinc, and rare earth elements (REEs).
•
Most mineral development to date exists in Russia, with Alaska and Canada being relatively unexplored and underdeveloped.
•
Russia’s Norilsk mine produces 22% and 40% of total global supply of nickel and palladium. Copper and platinum are also mined in significant quantities in
Norilsk.
•
Alaska is home to the world’s most productive zinc mine, Red Dog.
•
Rare earth elements are also deemed to be one of the most attractive areas for investment in the Arctic, particularly in Alaska, given its colossal mountain
ranges. There are believed to be significant deposits of REEs in Alaska and in Canada’s Yukon.
Arctic Share of Global Mineral Extraction
45%
40%
40%
35%
30%
26%
25%
25%
22%
20%
20%
15%
15%
11%
10%
9%
Cobalt
Zinc
Tungsten
10%
5%
0%
Palladium
Gem
stones
Rare Earth
Elements
Nickel
Diamonds
Platinum
Source: The Coming Arctic Boom, Scott Borgerson (2013), IISS, Schroders, Guggenheim Investments.
Please see Disclosures and Legal Notice at end of Document
14

15. Infrastructure
•
Developments in any industry (energy, minerals, shipping) will require
substantial investment in infrastructure.
−
•
According to Lloyd’s, investment in the Arctic could reach $100 billion
over the next 10 years, largely in infrastructure.
Transportation needs are significant in every region of the Arctic.
−
Existing infrastructure will become more expensive to maintain as
temperatures increase and the permafrost layer becomes unstable.
− Shorter winters are limiting the use of ice roads.
− This will create a need for new infrastructure in many areas, including:
o
o
o
o
Roads
Bridges
Airports
Railways
•
Pipelines and tankers are needed to make development of energy
resources viable.
•
Though estimates of increased shipping differ, in any scenario more
infrastructure will be needed in a variety of areas:
−
Ports
o Under optimistic scenarios, by 2030 cargo volume along the NSR
could equal the volume currently handled by ports such as New
York/New Jersey or Vancouver.
o Existing ports are far too small to handle the projected increase in
traffic.
o Transshipment hubs could become especially important.
−
There are only approximately 50 icebreakers worldwide, far below
what will be needed. Furthermore, Russia alone accounts for 25
icebreakers, while the U.S. has just two.
Ice class vessels will become increasingly needed as Arctic shipping
becomes more viable and more attractive.
Ocean charting and surveying, marine navigation aids
Marine communications, traffic monitoring and control
Search and rescue capabilities
−
−
−
−
Please see Disclosures and Legal Notice at end of Document
15

16. Other Opportunities
Renewable Energy
•
•
•
Norway has invested heavily in renewable energy, which now constitutes nearly 60% of its total domestic energy consumption.
Iceland derives over 80% of its energy supply from renewable sources, mostly geothermal.
There are a number of opportunities to replicate this successful model elsewhere in the Arctic, particularly in Alaska, with its wind and hydroelectric resource
potential.
Water
•
•
•
Most of the world’s fresh water is locked up at the poles, with Canada serving as a reservoir for 20% of the world’s fresh water.
Russia’s major rivers flow into the Arctic Ocean and Alaska is also a vast storehouse of fresh water.
Long-term supplies of pure mountain water can be shipped to any deepwater port on the planet.
Fishing
•
•
The Arctic already accounts for 10% of the global fishing catch.
As Arctic ice recedes and access becomes easier, the region will play an increasingly important role in the global fishing industry.
Other
•
•
•
•
The Arctic is an attractive tourist destination due to its unique environment, diverse cultures, and opportunities for hunting, boating, and sports tourism.
In 2004, 1.2 million passengers traveled to Arctic destinations on cruise ships. Just three years later, the number more than doubled.
8% of the world’s wood reserves lay within the Arctic.
Trans-Arctic telecom cables, satellite ground stations, and data centers also offer opportunities
Please see Disclosures and Legal Notice at end of Document
16

17. Economic Fundamentals Are Mostly Favorable
Gross Debt to GDP, 2012
Projected Real GDP Growth, 2013-2018 Average
120%
3.5%
100%
3.0%
2.5%
80%
2.0%
60%
1.5%
40%
1.0%
20%
0.5%
0%
0.0%
Canada
Denmark
Finland
Iceland
Russia
Sweden
US
Source: IMF, Guggenheim Investments.
Canada
Denmark
Finland
Iceland
Russia
Sweden
US
Source: IMF, Guggenheim Investments.
GDP per Capita, 2012
Ease of Doing Business Rank, 2012
$80,000
120
$70,000
100
$60,000
80
$50,000
$40,000
60
$30,000
40
$20,000
20
$10,000
$0
0
Canada
Denmark
Source: IMF, Guggenheim Investments.
Finland
Iceland
Russia
Sweden
Alaska
Canada
Denmark
Finland
Iceland
Russia
Sweden
US
Source: IMF, Guggenheim Investments.
Please see Disclosures and Legal Notice at end of Document
17

18. The Arctic Is a Large, Fast Growing Region
Share of Global GDP, 2012
Real GDP Growth by Region (2002=100)
12%
11.5%
250
Arctic
10%
225
World
8%
200
7.0%
Others
175
4%
Canada
Developed
Markets
150
6%
US
3.3%
2.5%
125
2%
Russia
100
0%
Arctic
Brazil
India
China
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
Source: IMF, Guggenheim Investments.
Please see Disclosures and Legal Notice at end of Document
18

19. Important Notices and Disclosures
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Funds Investment Advisors, LLC, Guggenheim Partners Investment Management, LLC, Guggenheim Partners Europe
Limited, Guggenheim Partners India Management, Guggenheim Real Estate, LLC, Security Investors, LLC and
Transparent Value Advisors, LLC.
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Any hypothetical performance results shown: (i) do not represent the results of actual investments but were achieved
by retroactively applying a strategy designed with the benefit of hindsight; and (ii) do not reflect material economic and
market factors that might have had an impact on Guggenheim Investments’ decision-making when using the strategy
to manage actual client accounts.
Simulated results are shown for some methodologies because these are new strategies and, thus, have no
performance history. There is no guarantee that an actual client portfolio will have the same return and risk profile as
the simulated models. Model portfolios do not represent actual trading. Where model results are portrayed,
Guggenheim Investments clients may have had investment results that were materially different from those portrayed
herein. Some of the securities or strategies reflected in the model portfolio do not relate or relate only partially to the
services currently offered by Guggenheim Investments.
The information presented herein is not intended to be target, projected or estimated returns. Rather, these numbers
are based upon historical results derived from calculations using the risk distribution assumptions stated. This
information is presented solely to assist you in creating a portfolio structure and forming investment guidelines and
sector allocations.
The comparisons herein of the performance of the market indicators, benchmarks or indices may not be meaningful
since the constitution and risks associated with each market indicator, benchmark or index may be significantly
different. Accordingly, no representation or warranty is made to the sufficiency, relevance, importance,
appropriateness, completeness, or comprehensiveness of the market data, information or summaries contained herein
for any specific purpose.
The information contained herein is given as of the date hereof and this does not purport to give information as of any
other date. Neither the delivery of this document nor any sales made hereunder shall, under any circumstances, create
an implication that there has been no change in the matters discussed herein since the date hereof.
© 2014 Guggenheim Partners, LLC. All Rights Reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored, or
transmitted by any means without the express written consent of Guggenheim Partners, LLC. The information
contained herein is confidential and may not be reproduced in whole or in part.
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