The Naturalist Challenge to Religion Michael Ruse Naturalism “Philosophical Naturalism” – an intention to let one’s philosophical discussions be as science-like and science-based as possible “Methodological Naturalism” – the attempt to understand the world in terms of unbroken law, i.e. no appeal to supernatural interventions. “Metaphysical Naturalism” – it claims that there is nothing beyond this natural world, e.g. no gods. Methodological Naturalism and Metaphysical Naturalism Many methodological naturalists are metaphysical naturalists, while some methodological naturalists are not metaphysical naturalists. Outline The Case for Methodological Naturalism Objections to Methodological Naturalism 1. Inadequacy of Natural Selection a. Origin-of-Life Objections (Plantinga) b. Adaptations Objections (Intelligent Design) 2. Problem of Humans a. Free Will b. Preferences and Character Dispositions c. Consciousness d. Morality 3. Incoherence of Methodological Naturalism Metaphysical Naturalism Methodological Naturalism to Metaphysical Naturalism The Case for Methodological Naturalism Thesis Methodological naturalism is true in the sense that it embodies the proper procedure for acquiring knowledge. Initial Argument After 400 years since the Scientific Revolution, the thesis should have been obvious by now. The world operates lawfully. We, increasingly, are knowing more and more about such laws. Anomalous or difficult to explain events have been resolved, according to unbroken law. Many religious scientists feel absolutely no tension between their religion and wholehearted methodological naturalism, since it works and they feel that they can better reveal and understand God’s creation. Naysayers There are invokers of miracles (actual violations of the laws of nature). At some level, you cannot argue with them. But, from the standpoint of evidence and reason, it is more reasonable to conclude that an alleged miraculous event is likely explicable naturalistically.  Existence and Nature of Organisms: Organisms are adaptively organized, i.e. not just thrown together randomly but are complex, integrated, and functioning (in accordance to their “final causes” – means to ends). For example, hands and eyes have purposes. There’s a need for an intelligent designer. For naturalists, Darwin already solved this problem by proposing natural selection. For Darwin, all organisms are the end product of a long and slow process of change. Some, or the fittest, survive and reproduce and their distinctive features (showing final cause) that are passed on to their offspring. Over time, a change in the direction of adaptive advantage is produced. After Darwin, we reject Aristotelian special life forces, which direct organisms or their parts to ends. But the metaphor of design remains among Darwinists, since natural selection produces design-like entities, e.g. eye. Objections to Methodological Naturalism 1. Inadequacy of Natural Selecti.

1. The Naturalist Challenge to Religion
Michael Ruse
Naturalism
“Philosophical Naturalism” – an intention to let one’s
philosophical discussions be as science-like and science-based
as possible
“Methodological Naturalism” – the attempt to understand the
world in terms of unbroken law, i.e. no appeal to supernatural
interventions.
“Metaphysical Naturalism” – it claims that there is nothing
beyond this natural world, e.g. no gods.
Methodological Naturalism and Metaphysical Naturalism
Many methodological naturalists are metaphysical naturalists,
while some methodological naturalists are not metaphysical
naturalists.
Outline
The Case for Methodological Naturalism
Objections to Methodological Naturalism
1. Inadequacy of Natural Selection
a. Origin-of-Life Objections (Plantinga)
b. Adaptations Objections (Intelligent Design)
2. Problem of Humans
a. Free Will
b. Preferences and Character Dispositions
c. Consciousness

2. d. Morality
3. Incoherence of Methodological Naturalism
Metaphysical Naturalism
Methodological Naturalism to Metaphysical Naturalism
The Case for Methodological Naturalism
Thesis
Methodological naturalism is true in the sense that it embodies
the proper procedure for acquiring knowledge.
Initial Argument
After 400 years since the Scientific Revolution, the thesis
should have been obvious by now. The world operates lawfully.
We, increasingly, are knowing more and more about such laws.
Anomalous or difficult to explain events have been resolved,
according to unbroken law. Many religious scientists feel
absolutely no tension between their religion and wholehearted
methodological naturalism, since it works and they feel that
they can better reveal and understand God’s creation.
Naysayers
There are invokers of miracles (actual violations of the laws of
nature). At some level, you cannot argue with them. But, from
the standpoint of evidence and reason, it is more reasonable to
conclude that an alleged miraculous event is likely explicable
naturalistically.

3. Existence and Nature of Organisms: Organisms are adaptively
organized, i.e. not just thrown together randomly but are
complex, integrated, and functioning (in accordance to their
“final causes” – means to ends). For example, hands and eyes
have purposes. There’s a need for an intelligent designer.
For naturalists, Darwin already solved this problem by
proposing natural selection. For Darwin, all organisms are the
end product of a long and slow process of change. Some, or the
fittest, survive and reproduce and their distinctive features
(showing final cause) that are passed on to their offspring. Over
time, a change in the direction of adaptive advantage is
produced. After Darwin, we reject Aristotelian special life
forces, which direct organisms or their parts to ends. But the
metaphor of design remains among Darwinists, since natural
selection produces design-like entities, e.g. eye.
Objections to Methodological Naturalism
1. Inadequacy of Natural Selection
Origin-of-Life Objections
Alvin Plantinga (Religious Philosopher) / Thomas Nagel
(Secular Philosopher): Darwinism does not explain the ultimate
origin of organisms from the non-living, that it never will, and
that this is a severe challenge to naturalism.
Ruse’s Response
They do not appear to have looked at the pertinent science. It is

4. true that the origin-of-life problem has not been cracked and
probably won’t be for some time. But progress has definitely
been made.
In order to carry information, the early life forms probably used
the macromolecule RNA rather than (as most organisms today)
the macromolecule DNA, because RNA has the ability to self-
replicate.
Early life may have been formed on the lips of the deep-sea
vents where the continents are coming up from the depths.
Adaptations Objections
Intelligent Design Theorists (e.g. Michael Behe): Some
biological, adaptive phenomena are so complex that they could
not have been formed by natural selection. All of the parts must
be in place simultaneously for the adaptation to work, and this
natural selection could not produce, e.g. bacterial flagellum and
blood-clotting cascade.
Ruse’s Response
Biologists (e.g. Kenneth Miller) have shown that these examples
do not stand up. One should turn to biology before one should
turn to God for explanations. With the blood-clotting cascade,
for example, there are about thirty, different, sequential,
chemical reactions that have to occur. But that’s not irreducibly
complex. There are lots of existing organisms with simpler
cascades, just parts of the mammalian one. It is just not true
that when you take one step out everything falls apart. Natural
selection could quite well have done the job, move by move.
2. Problem of Humans

5. Free Will
Most naturalists are compatibilism. For compatibilists, free will
and causal determinism can co-exist, because free will is truly
opposed to constraint and has nothing directly to do with being
bound by the laws of nature.
For most naturalists, unless you are bound by the laws of
nature, you are crazy, not free.
The person who shows love and compassion because she was
trained to do so by her parents deserves moral praise.
The hypnotized person is constrained and is not guilty of any
crimes committed in such a state.
The person who tears his clothes off in public for no reason at
all is simply mad and not a moral agent at all.
Preferences and Character Dispositions
Sexual Orientation: generally understood now as in terms of
fetal development
Consciousness
People disagree about the nature of consciousness and its place
in the world. They may not disagree about the science. But what
does it all mean?
Ultimate Reductionists (Dennett, Churchlands): Consciousness
is simply a matter of brain waves and that is it. Explain brain
waves naturally. That’s consciousness.
Do we need more than naturalism to account for consciousness?
It’s not obvious that we need more than naturalism to account
for consciousness. But one does not necessarily need to think
about any supernatural involvement. Evolution just hasn’t given

6. the mental apparatus to solve such problems. In addition,
everything we know about mind-body interactions points to
them being governed by law. The mind seems to follow rules no
less than the brain. We don’t think randomly but conceptualize
the physical world in terms of cause and effect. You alter bits of
the brain and you affect the mind in what become predictable
fashions (e.g. Phineas Gage).
Morality
Many religious people, and some secular people (e.g. Thomas
Nagel), think that moral codes rise above the purely natural.
Even if we grant that morality is in the realm of the non-natural,
it does not necessarily follow that the supernatural realm is
involve. Perhaps there is some sort of non-natural domain that
is entirely secular (e.g. Platonism in mathematics). Moral truths
can be like mathematical truths (in a Platonist sense). Perhaps
emotivists got it right: moral claims are reports on feelings or
expressions of emotions. But even some naturalists consider
emotivism as wrong and immoral, since it seems to trivialize
very deep judgments about certain acts. Make morality non-
natural and obviously you go beyond the bounds of
methodological naturalism. You may not be in the world of the
supernatural, but you are in some limbo beyond this world.
Make morality natural and you run into David Hume’s
prohibition against trying to get morality from statements about
matters of fact. Deny that morality is factually true in some
sense, classify it as all a matter of emotions, and you seem to
flounder on the fact that now morality is subjective, just
relative to individuals and times and places, and that goes
strongly against our sense of morality as objective, more than
just a matter of opinion but binding whether recognized or not.

7. Morality: Sociobiology and Evolution
Some sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists (i.e. ones
who are sympathetic to the Darwinian approach to human social
behavior) think that one can explain moral feelings and
behaviors as the result of natural selection, e.g. nice ones tend
to get more in life than the nasty ones. But some might worry
that that does not justify the truth of certain moral claims.
Morality: Emotivism
Emotivists are probably right in claiming that all we have in
morality is a bunch of emotions that fuel us to be moral, but
they are probably wrong or incomplete in thinking that morality
is nothing more than a bunch emotions. Morality seems to refer
to some objective facts.
Morality and Objectivity
For Darwinians, there are no objective facts beyond us. So, in a
sense, morality or our sense of its objectivity is an illusion. If
we do not think morality was objective, before long it would
break down as we began cheating. If rape isn’t really wrong,
then why stay back when others move forward? So the entirely
natural case is that morality or the objectivity of morality is an
illusion put in place by our biology to make us social animals,
because social animals are selected over non-social animals.
3. Incoherence of Methodological Naturalism

8. Plantinga’s Objection
Methodological naturalism collapses in on itself as an attempt
to find real – reliable, interpersonal, objective – knowledge
about the world, and that the only escape is to reject
metaphysical naturalism in favor of some kind of theistic belief
that guarantees knowledge in the realm considered by
methodological naturalist. It collapses in on itself, because it is
incoherent.
Plantinga’s Argument
P1. If you are a methodological naturalist, then you will take a
Darwinian approach to human nature.
P2. But sometimes selection may and will deceive us for our
own good.
P3. We cannot always trust our beliefs.
P4. We can never know which beliefs to trust or not to trust,
including those of evolution.
P5. So, methodological naturalism is incoherent.
C. Therefore, everything collapses in paradox.
Ruse’s Response
Selection does not deceive us randomly but for good reason
(e.g. the case of morality). The fact that we are deceived does
not mean that we cannot find out about it (e.g. the case of
morality). So, the case is not as dire as what Plantinga suggests.
Total Deception?
Are we living in total deception in some general sense? In some
systematic way selection could be shifting all of our beliefs out
of whack (e.g. someone in a factory with red lighting thinks that
all of the products are red). Since Hume and Kant in the 18th
century, we have been aware that we cannot tell how things

9. really are. All of our knowledge comes through our human
faculties. If they distort reality, so be it. The best we can have
is some kind of coherence theory of truth rather than a strict
correspondence theory – the best we can do is to make all of our
judgments hold together coherently – but this really is quite
enough.
Metaphysical Naturalism
Question
Should methodological naturalists be metaphysical naturalists?
[Assumption: The opposite to metaphysical naturalism to be
some of kind of theism – belief in a God who intervenes, and
perhaps more explicitly the God of Christianity. Considering
such assumption, methodological naturalism wipes out much
that is claimed under theism.]
Ruse’s Response: YES
Methodological naturalism certainly wipes out the possibility of
fundamentalist Christianity or the religion of biblical literalists.
It should incline one to metaphysical naturalism, rather than any
moderate forms of theism. If one can explain the world without
God, why should one suppose that there is a God? There is now
no need for a designer to explain organisms, a moral lawgiver to
explain morality, etc. Perhaps methodological naturalism does
not give a full and satisfying explanation of everything (e.g.
sentience), but generally one can get by with it and simply
admit ignorance about the rest. One is not forced into belief in
God.

10. Theistic Response to Ruse
It is not level playing field with the following disjuncts:
methodological naturalism + nothing more = metaphysical
naturalism
Or
methodological naturalism + something more (God) = theism
The former is simpler, so it is much more favorable. But the
disjuncts should be stated in the following way:
methodological naturalism + nothing more = metaphysical
naturalism
or
methodological naturalism + a special sense that God does exist
= theism
The second disjunct in the second set of disjuncts is bringing
something new to the table and simplicity is no longer
definitive. Faith is now part of the equation. Plantinga,
following Calvin, thinks that faith is a gift bestowed by God.
Ruse’s Response: Circularity
If you are in the faith sphere then that is definitive. If you are
not in the faith sphere, then that is because of original sin
[Calvin / Plantinga View]. But that’s begging the question. If
you are in the faith sphere that kind of excuse is compelling but
if you are not in the faith sphere, that kind of excuse is not
compelling. Could it not be that we are mistaken? Plantinga
thinks that we can get out of our troubles by rejecting
metaphysical naturalism and appealing to God. In other words, a
good God would not let us be deceived systematically in the
way that methodological naturalism seems to allow (a-la
Descartes). How can Plantinga be sure that a God exists?
There’s reason for naturalists to be skeptical. The fact that

11. Plantinga believes that his conviction is genuine and self-
confirming is a matter of his psychology and not a philosophical
argument.
A Matter of Choice?
Is it just a matter of choice, i.e. the choice between
metaphysical naturalism and theism, or what is appealing?
Metaphysical Naturalists (not necessarily Ruse): NO
Methodological naturalism is stronger than so far realized.
But, for Ruse, naturalists’ arguments are important, but they are
not definitive.
Naturalists’ Argument 1
E. O. Wilson and others: One can give a naturalistic account of
religion and once one has done that, that is it. Religion is
favored by selection because it fosters a sense of group identity
and with this we get a driving sense of purpose. Religion has
been explained; so, religion has been explained away.
Ruse’s Response
If one thinks that something like the conversion of Saul is a
miracle (outside the course of nature), then one is hardly a
methodological naturalist. So, one is not in this discussion. If
one is a methodological naturalist and wants to take religion as
true, then presumably one is going to say that miracles and such
things are natural but what makes them miraculous is the
meaning behind the events, not the events themselves. And the
point is that if one is such a methodological naturalist, then
religion is putatively a natural phenomenon and one positively
expects therefore that it will have a natural origin. The very fact
that one can give a naturalistic explanation of religion is no

12. more necessarily devastating to the truth claims of the religion.
Naturalists’ Argument 2
Darwin: Methodological naturalism tightens the screw on the
problem of evil to the point where belief in a god, e.g. the
Christian God of love and power, is unreasonable.
Ruse’s Response
This is not a new problem. Christians do have answers. So
perhaps the suffering is a necessary part and parcel of the
creative process.
The Natural
Origin of Religion
Methodological naturalism shows that miracles are really not on
the table.
The methodological naturalists agrees with Hume on this
matter, we get religious ideas because we make mistakes about
inanimate objects being living and it all goes from there.
We had a time and place of mass hysteria and true nuttiness. All
these people from different religious groups couldn’t all be
right. Those poor old disciples had so much invested in Jesus
being the Messiah that on that fateful Easter Sunday they
simply couldn’t face up to the fact that he was dead and buried,
and so made up a collective story about his being risen?

13. The Problem of Evil
Methodological naturalism having explained away all of the
compulsive reasons for theism, the way is now clear for the
problem to have full and definitive effect. For example, look at
the lives of children who senselessly suffered under the hands
of cruel people. Going on to metaphysical naturalism is not just
an inference justified by reason; it is an inference that is
morally obligatory.
Morality
What is Morality?
“Morality”
(Inadequately) Defined
Morality, as an object of moral theorizing, at the very least
refers to codes of conduct or systems of rules in a society that
are accepted by a group of people, an individual, or all rational
persons (or ideal observers). Such codes or rules are supposed
to govern human behaviors toward other people and sentient
beings. It is typically treated in philosophy as having a
descriptive element and a prescriptive element. Its descriptive
element refers to what in actuality a group of people or an
individual accepts as codes of conduct. Its prescriptive element
refers to the demand for such codes or rules to direct actions. It
is commonly distinguished from religious laws, positive laws,

14. and etiquettes.
Moral Assumptions that Guide Moral Thinking
Some philosophers, such as Russ Shafer Landau, identify
plausible moral assumptions that reasonably constrain moral
thinking:
Neither the law nor tradition is immune from moral criticism.
Everyone is morally fallible.
Friendship is valuable.
We are not obligated to do the impossible.
Children bear less moral responsibility than adults.
Justice is a very important moral good.
Deliberately hurting other people requires justification.
Equals ought to be treated equally.
Self-interest is not the only ethical consideration.
Agony is bad.
Might does not make right.
Free and informed requests prevent rights violations.
Features of Moral Rules
OVERRIDING
UNIVERSALIZABLE
UNCONDITIONAL
Morality
OBJECTIVE VS. RELATIVE

15. “Objective” Defined
A claim p is objective just in case
the truth or falsity of p does not depend on what any claimant of
p thinks about the truth or falsity of p
the truth or falsity of p depends on what in actuality obtains in
reality.
“Relative” Defined
A claim q is relative just in case the truth or falsity of q
depends on what the claimant of q thinks about the truth or
falsity of q.
Moral Claim as Objective?
A moral claim p is objective just in case
its truth or falsity is independent of the valuation of an
individual moral agent or a group of moral agents
its truth or falsity is dependent on how it corresponds to a
morally relevant fact or a set of morally relevant facts (or how
it coheres with other morally relevant claims).
Moral Claim as Relative?
A moral claim q is relative just in case its truth or falsity is
dependent on the valuation of an individual moral agent or a
group of moral agents.
Why Even Bother?

16. We constantly and inevitably make moral judgments pertaining
to behaviors, actions, or ways of thinking of other people. We
need to know the statuses of such judgments.
For some people, it is easier to make sense of our moral
judgments if they are objective. But it is not clear that they are
objective. As a matter of fact, there are reasons for thinking that
they are relative.
There are constraints on moral thinking that appear to be
intuitively reasonable or plausible. Why do they even appear to
be that way?
“Euthyphro”
PLATO
Plato, Socrates, Euthyphro
Plato: author of Euthyphro; inspired by his teacher (Socrates the
ideal philosopher)
Socrates: the chief figure in Plato’s dialogues (including
Euthyphro); historical Socrates ≠ Plato’s Socrates
Euthyphro: supposedly well-known expert on religious matters
Why Dialogue?
Despite the fact that, according to Julia Annas, Plato is
intensely concerned with arguments and bold (but subtle and
elusive) ideas, Plato, as the author, detaches himself from his

17. own works through his use of the dialogue format. Why?
Why Dialogue?
It appears that, according to Julia Annas, Plato does not intend
to entertain us through his dialogues. Rather, he wants his
readers to be engaged with the serious issues that he raises and
to be involved in doing philosophy.
It appears that, according to Julia Annas, Plato, by not directly
presenting his own position, prevents himself from telling his
readers what to think. He wants his readers to do the work of
understanding the issues for themselves and to not accept what
he thinks about an issue based on his authority.
Meletus on Socrates
Corrupter of the Youth
Inventor of New Gods (a poet as a maker of the gods)
Euthyphro on His Father
Suing his father for his father accidentally and indirectly
murdered one of his laborers who, while intoxicated, killed a
domestic servant
Initially Impressive Euthyphro
SOCRATES: “I suppose that the man whom your father
murdered was one of your relatives—clearly he was; for if he
had been a stranger you would never have thought of
prosecuting him.”

18. EUTHYPHRO: “I am amused, Socrates, at your making a
distinction between one who is a relation and one who is not a
relation; for surely the pollution is the same in either case, if
you knowingly associate with the murderer when you ought to
clear yourself and him by proceeding against him. The real
question is whether the murdered man has been justly slain. If
justly, then your duty is to let the matter alone; but if unjustly,
then even if the murderer lives under the same roof with you
and eats at the same table, proceed against him…”
Socrates’ Worry:
Euthyphro’s Confidence
SOCRATES: “Good heavens, Euthyphro! and is your knowledge
of religion and of things pious and impious so very exact, that,
supposing the circumstances to be as you state them, you are
not afraid lest you too may be doing an impious thing in
bringing an action against your father?”
EUTHYPHRO: “The best of Euthyphro, and that which
distinguishes him, Socrates, from other men, is his exact
knowledge of all such matters. What should I be good for
without it?”
Piety? Impiety?
SOCRATES: “… And therefore, I adjure you to tell me the
nature of piety and impiety, which you said that you knew so
well, and of murder, and of other offences against the gods.
What are they? Is not piety in every action always the same?
and impiety, again—is it not always the opposite of piety, and
also the same with itself, having, as impiety, one notion which
includes whatever is impious?”
Piety = Reverence (Substitute: Morally Right)
According to Paul Woodruff, it is a virtue that is

19. traditionally associated with the keeping of oaths,
treatments of the weak, family relationships, and respect
towards the gods.
Impiety = Irreverence (Substitute: Morally Wrong)
Problem with Piety / Impiety: Euthyphro vs. His Relatives
EUTHYPHRO: “…And my father and family are angry with me
for taking the part of the murderer and prosecuting my father.
They say that he did not kill him, and that if he did, the dead
man was but a murderer, and I ought not to take any notice, for
that a son is impious who prosecutes a father. Which shows,
Socrates, how little they know what the gods think about piety
and impiety.”
Note: Most Athenians were probably shocked with Euthyphro’s
irreverent act of suing his own father. But Euthyphro, on the
other hand, was confident that there is something reverent about
his act. How can his act be both reverent and irreverent?
Euthyphro’s First Response
EUTHYPHRO: “Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to say,
prosecuting any one who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of
any similar crime—whether he be your father or mother, or
whoever he may be—that makes no difference; and not to
prosecute them is impiety. And please to consider, Socrates,
what a notable proof I will give you of the truth of my words, a
proof which I have already given to others:—of the principle, I
mean, that the impious, whoever he may be, ought not to go
unpunished. For do not men regard Zeus as the best and most
righteous of the gods?—and yet they admit that he bound his
father (Cronos) because he wickedly devoured his sons, and that

20. he too had punished his own father (Uranus) for a similar
reason, in a nameless manner. And yet when I proceed against
my father, they are angry with me. So inconsistent are they in
their way of talking when the gods are concerned, and when I
am concerned.”
Plato’s Response
SOCRATES: “…Tell me, for the love of Zeus, whether you
really believe that they are true.”
SOCRATES: “Remember that I did not ask you to give me two
or three examples of piety, but to explain the general idea which
makes all pious things to be pious. Do you not recollect that
there was one idea which made the impious impious, and the
pious pious? ...Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then
I shall have a standard to which I may look, and by which I may
measure actions, whether yours or those of any one else, and
then I shall be able to say that such and such an action is pious,
such another impious.”
Euthyphro’s Second Response
EUTHYPHRO: Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and
impiety is that which is not dear to them.
Is the Second Response Better than the First Response?
SOCRATES: “Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given me

21. the sort of answer which I wanted. But whether what you say is
true or not I cannot as yet tell…”
Socrates’ Response
SOCRATES: “…the gods were admitted to have enmities and
hatreds and differences?... And what sort of difference creates
enmity and anger? Suppose for example that you and I … differ
about a number; do differences of this sort make us enemies and
set us at variance with one another? Do we not go at once to
arithmetic, and put an end to them by a sum? ... Or suppose that
we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly end the
differences by measuring?... And we end a controversy about
heavy and light by resorting to a weighing machine?... But what
differences are there which cannot be thus decided, and which
therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one another?
I dare say the answer does not occur to you at the moment, and
therefore I will suggest that these enmities arise when the
matters of difference are the just and unjust, good and evil,
honourable and dishonourable. Are not these the points about
which men differ, and about which when we are unable
satisfactorily to decide our differences, you and I and all of us
quarrel, when we do quarrel?... Does not every man love that
which he deems noble and just and good, and hate the opposite
of them?... But, as you say, people regard the same things, some
as just and others as unjust,—about these they dispute; and so
there arise wars and fightings among them…Then the same
things are hated by the gods and loved by the gods, and are both
hateful and dear to them?... Then…I remark with surprise that
you have not answered the question which I asked. For I
certainly did not ask you to tell me what action is both pious
and impious: but now it would seem that what is loved by the
gods is also hated by them. And therefore…in thus chastising
your father you may very likely be doing what is agreeable to
Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what is
acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Here, and there

22. may be other gods who have similar differences of opinion.”
Euthyphro’s Third Response
EUTHYPHRO: “But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods would
be agreed as to the propriety of punishing a murderer: there
would be no difference of opinion about that.”
Socrates’ Response
SOCRATES: “…they [humans] do not argue that the evil-doer
should not be punished, but they argue about the fact of who the
evil-doer is, and what he did and when? …And the gods are in
the same case, if as you assert they quarrel about just and
unjust, and some of them say while others deny that injustice is
done among them. For surely neither God nor man will ever
venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to be punished?”
Challenging
Euthyphro’s Dogmatism
SOCRATES: “…what proof have you that in the opinion of all
the gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is put in chains
by the master of the dead man, and dies because he is put in
chains before he who bound him can learn from the interpreters
of the gods what he ought to do with him, dies unjustly; and
that on behalf of such an one a son ought to proceed against his
father and accuse him of murder. How would you show that all
the gods absolutely agree in approving of his act? Prove to me
that they do, and I will applaud your wisdom as long as I live.”
Piety and the Gods

23. Euthyphro: “…what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the
opposite which they all hate, impious.”
Euthyphro’s Dilemma
SOCRATES: “…whether the pious or holy is beloved by the
gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the
gods.”
ANSWER (Socrates & Euthyphro): It is loved because it is
pious, not pious because it is loved.
Euthyphro’s Contradictory Claims
Euthyphro’s Initial Claim:
x is pious = x pleases the gods
Euthyphro’s Latest Claim:
x is pious ≠ x pleases the gods
Essence vs. Attribute
If (x is pious = x pleases the gods), then (pleasing to the gods =
essence of piety).

24. If (x is pious ≠ x pleases the gods), then (pleasing to the gods =
mere attribute of x).
Essence of Piety?
P1. If (x is pious ≠ x pleases the gods), then (pleasing to the
gods = mere attribute of x).
P2. If (pleasing to the gods = mere attribute of x), then we still
do not know the essence of piety.
P3. x is pious ≠ x pleases the gods.
C. Therefore, we still do not know the essence of piety.
Justice and Piety
Which of the following is true according to Socrates?
All things that are just are pious.
All things that are pious are just and only some things that are
just are pious.
If (a), then justice is a part of piety.
If (b), then piety is a part of justice.
Answer: b
What part of justice is piety?
Euthyphro on Two Parts of Justice:
part of justice that attends to the gods
vs.
part of justice that attends to humans
Euthyphro’s Answer:

25. part of justice that attends to the gods
Piety as the
Art of Attending to the Gods
Asking the Gods (Praying)
Giving to the Gods (Sacrificing)
In other words, for Euthyphro, piety is that which is pleasing to
the gods.
Socrates’ Concluding Remarks
“What is Piety?” as an Unanswered Question
Challenging Euthyphro’s Dogmatism
Socrates’ Implicit Defense of Himself
Aporia: From Perplexity to Perplexity
Morality & Religion
Is Morality Dependent on or Independent of Religion?
Questions

26. Why was it important for Socrates, considering his own time, to
address the issue on the relationship between morality and
religion?
Why is it still important for us to address the same issue today?
Morality as
Independent of Religion
Religion
Morality
Peter Singer on
Godless Morality
“…over millions of years we have evolved a moral faculty that
generates intuitions about right and wrong.”
See web-based moral sense test involving 1,500 subjects.
Louise M. Antony,
“Good Minus God”
“…it is a more pious position to hold that morality is
independent of the existence of God. If the term “good” is not
just an empty epithet that we attach to the Creator, who or
whatever that turns out to be, then it must be that the facts
about what is good are independent of the other facts about
God. If “good” is to have normative force, it must be
something that we can understand independently of what is
commanded by a powerful omnipresent being…You do not lose
morality by giving up God; neither do you necessarily find it by
finding Him.”

27. Morality as
Dependent on Religion
MORALITY
RELIGION
1. Religion as Moral Motivation
For some people, religion provides the ultimate justification for
why we should be moral.
Fear of God
Afterlife
Problems:
Religiosity does not necessarily make one a better person.
Such kind of moral motivation appears to be morally
reprehensible.
2. God as Moral Lawgiver
“If God is dead, then everything is permitted.”
Dostoevsky’s The Brothers
Karamazov
P1. Objective moral norms either come from God or humans.
P2. Humans, as morally fallible beings, cannot be the source of
moral norms.
C. Therefore, objective moral norms must come from God.
Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence

28. “And can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we
have removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of
the people that these liberties are the gift of God?”
“Notes on the State of Virginia” (1782)
Divine Command Theory
Moral Good
=
God’s Will or What God Commands
Problem with DCT:
P1. Either God has the best possible reasons for forbidding act x
or God has no reasons for forbidding x.
P2. If God has no reasons for forbidding x, then God’s decision
to forbid x is arbitrary.
P3. If God’s decision to forbid x is arbitrary, then God’s
decision to forbid x must be deeply problematic.
P4. If God has the best possible reasons for forbidding x, then
God’s will or command is not the reason for the rightness or
wrongness of x.
P5. If God’s will or command is not the reason for the rightness
or wrongness of x, then DCT is false.
C. Either DCT is deeply problematic or DCT is false.
Another Problem with DCT
P1. If DCT is true, then a morally perfect God can command us

29. to perform an act that we can consider to be obviously immoral.
P2. But a morally perfect God cannot command us to perform
such an act.
C. Therefore, DCT is false.
3. God as the
Infallible Moral Guide
If God is omniscient, then God must know every single detail of
the moral law.
If God is omnibenevolent and omniscient, then God will
command us to perform acts that fulfill the demands of the
moral law and infallibly guide us to a deeper understanding of
the moral law.