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Blackhat US 2014* 
* Now with bonus Defcon 22 content 
Presented by Michael Gorman, Lipika Kumar and Neil Rhine
BlackHat Vs Defcon
Blackhat
Defcon
Top talks 
● Keynote 
● How to wear your Password 
● Web and Mail Filtering 
● Hack all the Things 
● Deception in Cyber 
● Pivoting in Amazon Clouds 
● Call to arms a tale of weakness of current client side XSS filtering 
● Survey-of-Remote-Attack-Surfaces 
● Panel: API Security 
● Third Party Libraries and Dependencies 
● Security in CI 
● Memcached Injections
What happens if you abandon your car on the 
side of the road? 
- Someone else will eventually take 
ownership, why shouldn’t the same be true 
of software?
Keynote 
Dan Geer 
● Source code Liability 
● Resiliency 
● Software Abandonment 
● Bug Bounties 
● Convergence
How secure is the average password? 
- 8 bits of security, very quick to crack 
- biometric fingerprint is 30 bits of data, but 
even less of security due to similarities 
between people’s prints
Wear Your Password 
● Computational power 
● Increase authentication difficulty, but limit 
its use 
● A device to represent you
Do we have web and email filtering? 
- Yes and Yes 
Does it protect us from phishing?
Enumeration of Web/Mail Filter Policy 
● Using non existent emails you can learn a 
lot about email servers 
● Client side javascript can be used to test 
any number of policy options
In what ways can a system be compromised? 
- Physically (UART, EMMC readers) 
- Software Vulnerabilities (XSS, Command 
Injection)
Hack All the Things 
Three main vectors of attack generally used 
● Software Vulnerability (XSS, command 
injection) 
● Emmcs/Memory dumps 
● UART - onboard serial connection 
Don’t ever give physical access to anything!
What countries are the most practiced in 
deception? 
- China 
- Russia 
- Ukrain
Deception in Cyber 
● Strength in words, developing a lexicon 
● History of deception
Question Time 
Name some well known companies that are already on the cloud 
Amazon AT&T Google Microsoft Salesforce.com 
What are some security vulnerabilities with cloud based services? 
Losing security keys. Don’t share keys with anyone! even your provider 
Techniques on preventing attacks? 
split key encryptions. 
provider will give you the infrastructure but you are responsible for security 
knowing your application inside and out and not simply
Lessons 
Providers give you the infrastructure but you are 
responsible for making sure you dont lose your 
secrets! 
“The specific challenges differ for the three cloud delivery models, 
but in all cases the difficulties are created by the very nature of 
utility computing, which is based on resource sharing and resource 
virtualization and requires a different trust model than the ubiquitous 
user-centric model that has been the standard for a long time.”
Pivoting in Amazon Clouds 
● AWS credentials stored in meta-data servers 
for each instance server 
● IAM profile management strategies 
o divide up 
● code demo for nimbostratus 
o includes hacking into AWS for credentials 
o provides a sample environment AWS setup to hack
Question Time 
What is XSS? 
cross site scripting 
What are the different types of XSS attacks? 
reflected and stored 
What are some techniques to prevent XSS attacks? 
Regular-expression-based Approaches: NoScript Internet Explorer
Call to Arms XSS 
● basics of XSS: reflected and stored 
● Ways to prevent attacks: 
o Chrome XSS Auditor 
o libraries 
o choice of framework 
● Demo of hacking through Chrome XSS 
Auditor
Question Time 
What kinds of cars can be hacked? 
any car that relies on software to control parts 
of the car. “if you can write a web based exploit you can hack into a car!” quote from talk 
Define cyber physical attacks 
attacks that result in physical control of various aspects of the automobile
A Survey of Remote Automotive 
Attack Surfaces
A Survey of Remote Automotive 
Attack Surfaces 
Most hackable: 
1. 2014 Jeep Cherokee 
2. 2015 Cadillac Escalade 
3. 2014 Infiniti Q50 
Least hackable: 
1. 2014 Dodge Viper 
2. 2014 Audi A8 
3. 2014 Honda Accord
Demo Time! 
Attack against test env 
Bonus Question: 
What does CVSS stand for?
Third Party Library and Dependencies 
CVSS - Common 
Vulnerability Scoring 
System 
OpenSSL - Heartbleed 
Destroyed the idea of 
security for the average 
person
Question Time! 
Name two of the most common types of 
attacks 
⅔ - XSS, DDoS, SqlInjection 
Name the open source Linux Distro that helps 
you test vulnerabilities 
Kali Linux
Security in CI 
Can’t wait for something to happen 
Technologies that test for external 
dependency vulnerabilities - SensioLabs, 
OWASP 
Request for Security Minded people
Rugged Manifesto 
I am rugged and, more importantly, my code is rugged. 
I recognize that software has become a foundation of our modern world. 
I recognize the awesome responsibility that comes with this foundational role. 
I recognize that my code will be used in ways I cannot anticipate, in ways it was not designed, and for longer than it was ever 
intended. 
I recognize that my code will be attacked by talented and persistent adversaries who threaten our physical, economic, and 
national security. 
I recognize these things - and I choose to be rugged. 
I am rugged because I refuse to be a source of vulnerability or weakness. 
I am rugged because I assure my code will support its mission. 
I am rugged because my code can face these challenges and persist in spite of them. 
I am rugged, not because it is easy, but because it is necessary and I am up for the challenge.
Start Doing... 
● hackweek projects that involve hacking and prevention 
improvements 
● considering possible security breaches when looking at 
teammates pull requests 
● security lunch and learns 
● capture the flag 
● Monthly Security Hacking sessions (front end, back 
end)
Stop Doing... 
Waiting for a problem to arise 
Trusting security to other people 
What do you see wrong?
Thoughts Provoked by Talks at the 
Conference 
We are responsible for our security even if we 
are using third party services
Links to Blackhat Material 
List of Blackhat Talks 
2014 Slides, Whitepapers and Source Code 
Call to arms XSS Whitepaper 
Call to arms XSS Slides 
Pivoting in Amazon Clouds Whitepaper 
Pivoting in Amazon Clouds Slides 
Survey of Remote Attack Surfaces
Thank You

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Blackhat 2014 Conference and Defcon 22

  • 1. Blackhat US 2014* * Now with bonus Defcon 22 content Presented by Michael Gorman, Lipika Kumar and Neil Rhine
  • 5. Top talks ● Keynote ● How to wear your Password ● Web and Mail Filtering ● Hack all the Things ● Deception in Cyber ● Pivoting in Amazon Clouds ● Call to arms a tale of weakness of current client side XSS filtering ● Survey-of-Remote-Attack-Surfaces ● Panel: API Security ● Third Party Libraries and Dependencies ● Security in CI ● Memcached Injections
  • 6. What happens if you abandon your car on the side of the road? - Someone else will eventually take ownership, why shouldn’t the same be true of software?
  • 7. Keynote Dan Geer ● Source code Liability ● Resiliency ● Software Abandonment ● Bug Bounties ● Convergence
  • 8. How secure is the average password? - 8 bits of security, very quick to crack - biometric fingerprint is 30 bits of data, but even less of security due to similarities between people’s prints
  • 9. Wear Your Password ● Computational power ● Increase authentication difficulty, but limit its use ● A device to represent you
  • 10. Do we have web and email filtering? - Yes and Yes Does it protect us from phishing?
  • 11. Enumeration of Web/Mail Filter Policy ● Using non existent emails you can learn a lot about email servers ● Client side javascript can be used to test any number of policy options
  • 12. In what ways can a system be compromised? - Physically (UART, EMMC readers) - Software Vulnerabilities (XSS, Command Injection)
  • 13. Hack All the Things Three main vectors of attack generally used ● Software Vulnerability (XSS, command injection) ● Emmcs/Memory dumps ● UART - onboard serial connection Don’t ever give physical access to anything!
  • 14. What countries are the most practiced in deception? - China - Russia - Ukrain
  • 15. Deception in Cyber ● Strength in words, developing a lexicon ● History of deception
  • 16. Question Time Name some well known companies that are already on the cloud Amazon AT&T Google Microsoft Salesforce.com What are some security vulnerabilities with cloud based services? Losing security keys. Don’t share keys with anyone! even your provider Techniques on preventing attacks? split key encryptions. provider will give you the infrastructure but you are responsible for security knowing your application inside and out and not simply
  • 17. Lessons Providers give you the infrastructure but you are responsible for making sure you dont lose your secrets! “The specific challenges differ for the three cloud delivery models, but in all cases the difficulties are created by the very nature of utility computing, which is based on resource sharing and resource virtualization and requires a different trust model than the ubiquitous user-centric model that has been the standard for a long time.”
  • 18. Pivoting in Amazon Clouds ● AWS credentials stored in meta-data servers for each instance server ● IAM profile management strategies o divide up ● code demo for nimbostratus o includes hacking into AWS for credentials o provides a sample environment AWS setup to hack
  • 19. Question Time What is XSS? cross site scripting What are the different types of XSS attacks? reflected and stored What are some techniques to prevent XSS attacks? Regular-expression-based Approaches: NoScript Internet Explorer
  • 20. Call to Arms XSS ● basics of XSS: reflected and stored ● Ways to prevent attacks: o Chrome XSS Auditor o libraries o choice of framework ● Demo of hacking through Chrome XSS Auditor
  • 21. Question Time What kinds of cars can be hacked? any car that relies on software to control parts of the car. “if you can write a web based exploit you can hack into a car!” quote from talk Define cyber physical attacks attacks that result in physical control of various aspects of the automobile
  • 22. A Survey of Remote Automotive Attack Surfaces
  • 23. A Survey of Remote Automotive Attack Surfaces Most hackable: 1. 2014 Jeep Cherokee 2. 2015 Cadillac Escalade 3. 2014 Infiniti Q50 Least hackable: 1. 2014 Dodge Viper 2. 2014 Audi A8 3. 2014 Honda Accord
  • 24. Demo Time! Attack against test env Bonus Question: What does CVSS stand for?
  • 25. Third Party Library and Dependencies CVSS - Common Vulnerability Scoring System OpenSSL - Heartbleed Destroyed the idea of security for the average person
  • 26. Question Time! Name two of the most common types of attacks ⅔ - XSS, DDoS, SqlInjection Name the open source Linux Distro that helps you test vulnerabilities Kali Linux
  • 27. Security in CI Can’t wait for something to happen Technologies that test for external dependency vulnerabilities - SensioLabs, OWASP Request for Security Minded people
  • 28. Rugged Manifesto I am rugged and, more importantly, my code is rugged. I recognize that software has become a foundation of our modern world. I recognize the awesome responsibility that comes with this foundational role. I recognize that my code will be used in ways I cannot anticipate, in ways it was not designed, and for longer than it was ever intended. I recognize that my code will be attacked by talented and persistent adversaries who threaten our physical, economic, and national security. I recognize these things - and I choose to be rugged. I am rugged because I refuse to be a source of vulnerability or weakness. I am rugged because I assure my code will support its mission. I am rugged because my code can face these challenges and persist in spite of them. I am rugged, not because it is easy, but because it is necessary and I am up for the challenge.
  • 29. Start Doing... ● hackweek projects that involve hacking and prevention improvements ● considering possible security breaches when looking at teammates pull requests ● security lunch and learns ● capture the flag ● Monthly Security Hacking sessions (front end, back end)
  • 30. Stop Doing... Waiting for a problem to arise Trusting security to other people What do you see wrong?
  • 31. Thoughts Provoked by Talks at the Conference We are responsible for our security even if we are using third party services
  • 32. Links to Blackhat Material List of Blackhat Talks 2014 Slides, Whitepapers and Source Code Call to arms XSS Whitepaper Call to arms XSS Slides Pivoting in Amazon Clouds Whitepaper Pivoting in Amazon Clouds Slides Survey of Remote Attack Surfaces

Editor's Notes

  1. Amazon AT&T Google Microsoft Salesforce.com The water hole attack is a 3-step process. First, the attacker does some reconnaissance and research on its target, in which they find trusted websites often visited by employees of the target company. Second, attackers insert an exploit into the trusted sites. Finally, when your employees visit the trusted site, the exploit takes advantage of their system vulnerabilities. The solution? Vulnerability shielding: update and patch all software regularly to limit possible access points. What are some security vulnerabilities with cloud based services? Losing security keys. Don’t share keys with anyone! even your provider Techniques on preventing attacks! y What are some security vulnerabilities with cloud based services?
  2. What is XSS Cross site scripting What are the different types of XSS attacks Reflected XSS denotes all non-persistent XSS issues, which occur when the web application blindly echos parts of the HTTP request in the respec- tive HTTP response’s HTML. In order to successfully exploit a reflected XSS vulnerability, the adversary has to trick the victim into sending a fabricated HTTP request. This can be done by, for instance, sending the victim a malicious link, or including a hidden Iframe into an attacker controlled page. Stored XSS refers to all XSS vulnerabilities, where the adversary is able to permanently inject the malicious script in the vulnerable application’s storage. This way every user that accesses the poisoned web page receives the injected script without further actions by the adversary. DOM Based XSS (AKA Type-0) As defined by Amit Klein, who published the first article about this issue[1], DOM Based XSS is a form of XSS where the entire tainted data flow from source to sink takes place in the browser, i.e., the source of the data is in the DOM, the sink is also in the DOM, and the data flow never leaves the browser. For example, the source (where malicious data is read) could be the URL of the page (e.g., document.location.href), or it could be an element of the HTML, and the sink is a sensitive method call that causes the execution of the malicious data (e.g., document.write)." Techniques to prevent XSS attacks: Regular-expression-based Approaches: NoScript Internet Explorer
  3. Reflected XSS denotes all non-persistent XSS issues, which occur when the web application blindly echos parts of the HTTP request in the respec- tive HTTP response’s HTML. In order to successfully exploit a reflected XSS vulnerability, the adversary has to trick the victim into sending a fabricated HTTP request. This can be done by, for instance, sending the victim a malicious link, or including a hidden Iframe into an attacker controlled page. Stored XSS refers to all XSS vulnerabilities, where the adversary is able to permanently inject the malicious script in the vulnerable application’s storage. This way every user that accesses the poisoned web page receives the injected script without further actions by the adversary.
  4. “if you can write a web based exploit you can hack into a car!” quote from talk attacks that result in physical control of various aspects of the automobile
  5. “if you can write a web based exploit you can hack into a car!” quote from talk attacks that result in physical control of various aspects of the automobile
  6. “if you can write a web based exploit you can hack into a car!” quote from talk attacks that result in physical control of various aspects of the automobile
  7. Have everyone repeat the “Rugged Manifesto”. It is important for everyone to say it outloud.