THE WENCHES CRISIS RESPONSED racticePerfectTo best pre.docx

THE WENCHES CRISIS RESPONSE
D ractice
Perfect
To best prepare for a crisis, drill!
DIANE GAGE LOFGREN & JOHN NELSON
-f) [email protected]
^ [email protected]
B
y its very definition, a crisis is no
time to get on-the-job training.
It's a time of intense pressure
when systems are strained, weaknesses
are amplified and crucial decisions
must be made on the spot. A blown first
impression can leave a lasting mark—and
be difficult to correct. The best way to
handle a crisis is to be prepared for one,
and the best way to do that is to practice.
In other words, drill.
Crisis drills are a critical part of health
care communications success, especially
in the age of social media. Crises are
more frequent now because of the com-
plexity and increasing transparency of
today's environment, and the ramifica-
tions are instantly known in one contin-
uous news cycle. The Internet and social

media have created more moving parts
and accelerated the making or breaking
of reputations during a crisis.
During crisis drills, organizations con-
duct training to practice ways to protect
the brand whue informing the public in
the event of a crisis. Drills allow orga-
nizations to practice making decisions
and engaging stakeholders in response
to the unexpected. They help to critique
individuals and responses before there's
real reputational skin in the game so that
when the time comes, teams are prepared
to respond in real time. Hosting crisis
trainings is critically important, even for
the most veteran issues manager.
A Dnll That Produces
Results
To run a good simulation, leaders must
create a crisis scenario that includes
meaningful, challenging and realistic ele-
ments for the team to practice. In a recent
crisis drill. Kaiser Permanente designed
a scenario that was fictional but ground-
ed fuUy in reality, and it evolved and
escalated over time. Participants initially
were faced with what appeared to be a
medical error, but the crisis quickly grew
to include elements of medication abuse,
compliance failures, union concerns and
political sensitivity. This scenario was
played out over the course of 90 minutes
and was very carefully planned to

engage crisis communicators who share
accountability but work in nine
different states.
When the drill was over, a thorough
debrief was conducted. All participants
shared their learnings, which ranged
from social media eye-openers to re-
newed awareness around the speed that
information and misinformation travel.
Here are some proven processes to help
you and your organization plan an effec-
tive crisis drill:
1. Know your focus. The planning phase
is one of the most important parts of
a simulation. Before coming up with
a scenario, teams should decide on
the set of skills, structures or other
elements that they want to test. It's not
necessary to practice on all aspects of
a crisis. Setting up a scenario that is
overly broad, especially if the drill is
only an hour or two, is guaranteed to
make it too superficial. Conversely, a
training that is too narrowly focused,
requiring too deep a dive into one
issue or process, could fail to engage
all participants and could appear too
artificial. Most drills planned at Kaiser
Permanente last between 90 minutes
and a full day, and typically last less
than half a day.
2. Determine how to measure success.

Once a focus is decided, the next step
in designing a scenario is to decide
how the results will be measured.
What should participants walk away
with? Is it experience, education,
awareness or knowledge? While
training for the sake of gaining
experience is not a bad goal, consider
maximizing the investment of time
and effort by ensuring that specific
activities are tested and measured. Is
there a desire to practice and uncover
gaps in a team's timing or nimbleness,
or to offer an experience that tests the
quality of the organization's messaging
response? Should both timing and
12 MARKETING HEALTH SERVICESSPRING 2013
quality be measured? This helps
determine if the drill has met the goals
that you set out to achieve.
3. Teams should accept that not all
aspects of the drill will be realistic.
Make it as realistic as possible, but
remember that it's just a drill, so it
will not be perfect. Don't get bogged
down with logistics, but use the drill
as a learning experience. If there are
participants who are known to have
difficulty "suspending disbelief '̂ coach
them beforehand or involve them on
the team doing the role-playing, rather

than with those being trained.
4. The best drills are fun. Crises are
stressful—especially when it comes
to health care—so keep simulations
positive. Find ways to break the
tension by using humor. Comic relief
may be added where appropriate. For
example, those who are role-playing
(pretending to be bloggers, reporters
or politicians, say) may want to use
humor to emphasize a point. Take
opportunities to laugh while in the
middle of the drill. Also, allow people
to step back if they are getting too
stressed or upset.
5. Create a learning space where
• /
participants know that it's OK not
to be perfect. No one should feel as if
his or her career is on the line during
an exercise. Participants need to know
that it's OK to fail. In fact, a little
failure helps people remember not to
make those same mistakes when the
real thing happens. The goal should be
visibly focused on, and supportive of,
learning.
6. Determine how to use what is
learned to improve. Evaluate the drill
after it's complete. Things tend to pop

up that may not have occurred to the
team previously. Make sure to take
note of these items to discuss after the
drill is over and then come up with
what will be done differently next
t i m e . MHS
•«• DIANE GAGE LOFGREN is Chief communica-
tion officer and senior vice president of brand com-
munication, and JOHN NELSON is vice president of
brand communication at Kaiser Permanente.
frustrationi^fiiii
We know that the best ideas come from working
together and truly understanding what makes your
hospital different. We want to collaborate, not frustratf
Give Paul Pomerov a call, 800.848.1552, or email hirn
MARKETING HEALTH SERVICES
SPRING 2013 13
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SCI201 Unit 3 Discussion Board

Sample Table for Monitoring Energy Usage
When doing your 3-day review of your energy usage, remember
that you can use 3 days from the past week, rather than tracking
the upcoming 3 days. Most people use energy in the form of
electricity in their homes and gasoline for transportation, but
you might have a wood-burning fireplace or use natural gas or
liquid propane in your home as well. Below is a sample table
that you can use for this Discussion Board. Replace the sample
information with your own information. You may have energy
sources not listed in the sample table. If so, be sure to include
them. You should delete the instructions prior to uploading your
table, or just cut and paste the table in the Discussion Board
directly.
Electricity
Gasoline
Wood
Solar
Natural Gas
Day 1
Thursday
(2/5/2015)
Lights – 4 hours
Computers - 3 hours
TV – 8 hours
Heating – off and on for entire day at 73 F
Laundry - wash and dry
Drove to and from work (1.5 hours)
Solar panels heat water (10 hours of sunlight)
Cooking (1 hour)
Day 2
Friday
(2/6/2015)
Lights – 4 hours

Computers- 3 hours
TV – 8 hours
Drove to and from work and went to visit friends (2.5 hours)
Ran fireplace for 4 hours (2 logs)
Cooking (1 hour)
Day 3
Saturday
(2/7/2015)
Lights – 7 hours
Computers- 8 hours
TV – 12 hours
Ran errands and drove to visit family (3.5 hours)
Cooking (3 hours)
3- day cost estimate (optional)
Divide monthly bills (30-day cost) by 10 to get an average
$18.47
$19.00
Free – I cut these from my yard.
Free – our solar panels are paid off.
$3.58
Once you have prepared your chart, you can look for ways to
lessen your energy usage. Could you program your thermostat to
go down to 63 F while no one is in the house? Do you leave
TVs on all night? Does your TV have a timer to turn off
automatically? Could you carpool, or do some of your errands
on the way home from work so as to not have to make a separate
trip? Could you combine your laundry and do it 1 day, saving

electricity and water? Do you use incandescent light bulbs that
could be exchanged for florescent or LED bulbs?
Remember, this is just a sample chart to get you thinking. You
need to insert your household’s energy usage and customize this
table as needed.
Stacy L. Muffett-Willett is an associate profes-
sor of emergency management at the University
of Akron. Her background is in environmental
health and safety, technical education and
public administration. She is currently complet-
ing her doctoral work on educational leadership.
Willett has published research in several areas
including the response to Flight 93, and the
Alrosa nightclub shooting. She is a certified
hazardous materials technician for weapons of
mass destruction, and was an environmental
health and safety (EHS) as well as an Interna-
tional Organization for Standardization (ISO)
manager prior to joining academia.
Sharon D. Kruse is a professor in the
Department of Educational Foundations and
Leadership at the University of Akron. A national
expert on organisational change, Kruse primarily
works with school district reform efforts. Her
recent publications include ‘Decision Making for
Educational Leaders: Under-Examined Dimen-
sions and Issues’ (with Bob Johnson Jr., SUNY
Press) and ‘Building Strong School Cultures:
A Leader’s Guide to Change’ (with Karen
Seashore Louis; Corwin Publishing).

ABSTRACT
It is one thing to be a good leader, it is entirely
another to be a good crisis leader. Crisis leaders
face challenges distinctly different from normal
operations. Crisis management requires leaders
to employ knowledge and skills beyond those
required for day-to-day work. As crisis is not
a regular part of most work environments,
facing crisis situations requires leaders to be well
prepared for the unknown. This paper suggests
that high-quality crisis leadership relies on the
application of core leadership skills, targeted
training for the unfamiliar and responsiveness
when a crisis occurs.
Keywords: crisis, leadership, training
transfer, disaster exercise, emergency
management
INTRODUCTION
Through most of the 20th century,
analyses of leadership suggested that
leaders were responsible for ensuring
that the business of an organisation
was protected from disruption. Even
now, most examinations of organisational
leadership focus on what happens inside
any business or governmental agency.
Measures of successful leadership include
turning a profit, increasing awareness or
assuring for smooth operations in times of
uncertainty and strife.
Yet, when faced with preparing for
crisis situations, most organisational

leaders look outside the organisation for
guidance and training. The practice of
looking externally for education and
training is assumed to provide leaders
access to best practices, ensuring that
Crisis leadership: Past research and
future directions
Stacy L. Muffet-Willett and Sharon D. Kruse
Received (in revised form): 29th December, 2008
The University of Akron Department of Public Service
Technology, Polsky Building
161 Akron, OH 44325-4304, USA
Tel: �1 330 972 8317; E-mail: [email protected]
Journal of Business Continuity & Emergency Planning Volume
3 Number 3
Page 248
Journal of Business Continuity &
Emergency Planning
Vol. 3 No. 3, pp. 248–258
� Henry Stewart Publications,
1749-9216
focused on developing an understanding
of how tasks were assigned to workers and
the ways in which rewards were presented
or sanctions were applied. The idea
behind these studies was to identify how
effective leaders were able to motivate
followers to do their jobs well and, in
turn, to produce results valued by the

organisation.2
A parallel avenue of research suggested
that transactions had little to do with
long-term organisational success and in-
stead focused on the tasks in which leaders
engaged workers. By focusing on the task,
rather than the leader’s behaviour, it was
thought that insight into workplace suc-
cess could be explained through develop-
ing an understanding of the kinds of tasks
that engaged and motivated workers. Re-
search suggested that tasks that engaged
workers in decision making instead of
repetitive or mundane efforts would be
more motivating in the long run.3
Such efforts became known as trans-
formational leadership. Transformational
leadership emphasised the emotions and
values held by workers. Leaders were
thought to transform organisations by
reforming existing practices from those
that provided direction and reward to
those that encouraged workers to be
engaged with more substantive aspects of
the organisation.
While these theories illustrate the dif-
ferentiating tasks of leaders, they focus
heavily on the actions of the leader them-
selves and, at least in part, rely on the
goodwill of the leader in the work set-
ting. Furthermore, these ideas did not
prove sufficiently robust to describe a
wide variety of work settings. In par-

ticular, they proved inadequate when ap-
plied to settings in which workers hold
considerable power and are relied upon to
carry out decisions such as when a crisis
occurs.
As a result, researchers turned to
when crisis strikes they will be prepared
and the business or agency will emerge
relatively unscathed. However, little is
known about the efficacy of external
training on leadership in crisis situations.
This paper seeks to explore some of these
ideas and offer crisis leaders and trainers in
crisis response practical insights for
creating better crisis leaders.
LEADERSHIP UNCOVERED
The 1940s witnessed the birth of research
into leadership, as it is currently defined.
At that time, researchers were seeking to
identify the physical traits leaders shared.1
Not surprisingly, these studies provided
little in the way of tangible results. As has
been well observed, traits such as height
offer little insight about whether a leader
will be successful. Disheartened that
high-quality leadership could not be
determined by easily identified factors,
researchers then turned to considering
what leaders did in the course of their
workday that inspired and motivated
others.

Specifically, in the new studies of
leadership, researchers wanted to uncover
how leaders worked with others and in
what ways they addressed and completed
their work tasks. By taking into account
the ways in which leaders worked within
an organisation it was hoped that more
might be learned about what leaders did
to attain success. By dividing research
into two areas, the first addressing the
behaviours of leaders and the second
focusing on the specific work tasks in
which leaders engaged, it was hoped to
better understand the complexities of
leadership.
When considering the behaviours
leaders employed in their work, research-
ers focused on the ways in which
transactions were made between leaders
and their subordinates. Attention was
Muffet-Willett and Kruse
Page 249
describing how leadership functions in
situations where individual organisational
members are called upon to act as part of
a team. Known as collaborative leadership,
these theories suggested that, when or-
ganisational members hold commonly
agreed beliefs about how situations might
be approached, they are more likely to

respond in ways that support an or-
ganisation’s values, even in the absence
of direction.4 In short, collaborative
leadership suggests that, as workers are
increasingly engaged in developing or-
ganisational direction and understand the
ways in which their own work supports
those beliefs and values, they are more
likely to respond appropriately in times of
stress or crisis. When collaborative leader-
ship is present, workers understand how
their job function fits into the organisa-
tional system and are more likely to work
towards shared goals.
Collaborative organisations are built
upon several foundational ideas including
trust, shared expertise and clear com-
munication structures.5–7 Trust enables
participants to act together more ef-
fectively and pursue shared objectives.
Shared expertise suggests that all members
of an organisation are equally able to
support each other by providing needed
skills and knowledge as situations arise.
True collaboration emphasises sharing
information and knowledge to establish
cross-functional synergy and create a
culture of contextually rich, trusting
dialogue.8 These deep discussions al-
low the team to develop integrated
joint solutions that lead to mutual ac-
countability for shared decisions and
outcomes.9,10
As the case below illustrates, when crisis

leaders collaborate with others by delegat-
ing tasks and by trusting the expertise of
others, the results can be impressive.
The day before an annual county fair
opened, local residents of a farming
community were busy setting up
displays and getting their animals ready
to show. A main attraction at the fair
had always been the antique steam
engine display. Tradition held that
several community members bring in
their antique farm equipment to the
fairgrounds to show visitors the kinds
of equipment used in the old com-
munity farming days.
As a point of pride, one steam tractor
operator decided to drive his newly
refurbished tractor to the fairgrounds,
rather than bringing it in on a flat bed
truck. The tractor was thought to be
in good working order. Yet, as the
operator backed the tractor in line at
the fairgrounds, it exploded. The ex-
plosion killed five people and injured
47 others. Clearly, the explosion caught
the community by surprise. However,
the event was handled smoothly and
expertly. The reason why is examined
below.
Two months prior to the event,
the county emergency manager had
held a meeting to practise a large

organisational response to a similar dis-
aster. He delegated response activities
to specific people and agencies depend-
ing on their expertise. For example, the
head of the area’s emergency medical
system (EMS) was delegated as the
patient transport officer for the dis-
aster event. Based on these understood
and delegated roles, fairground mem-
bers quickly began to divide into their
crisis management roles after the ex-
plosion. Each identified member took
responsibility for a specific task and
worked under the umbrella of the
emergency management agency. Chaos
quickly became order. In a little over
one hour, every casualty had been
treated and transported to a hospital.
The outcome of the event and suc-
Crisis leadership: Past research and future directions
Page 250
purpose of training is not to develop a
better individual (while that may be a
side-effect), but to increase organisational
efficiency.13 After all, if an organisation is
investing funds in employee train-
ing, organisational benefit is expected.
Moreover, it is expected that training will
be transferred to organisational perfor-
mance in predictable and uniform ways.

Given that the overarching purpose of
training is to improve the organisation, it
is surprising that few organisations track
the effectiveness of the training after it has
been conducted.14 Nor do they explore
the organisational factors that can aug-
ment the transfer of training back into the
organisation.15 Too often, organisations
blindly accept that people emerge ‘better’
from training without testing or inquiring
into the new skill set. Furthermore, it is
assumed that employees and leaders alike
will use the training upon their return to
the workplace.
As the following case illustrates, even
major corporations can find themselves
conducting training that is inconsistent
with overarching organisational goals,
thus wasting time and money.
A major communications corporation
decided to have a crisis-training event
in preparation for a possible global
communications failure on the eve of
the year 2000. The company was
fearful that computers would be unable
to recognise the ‘00’ in the year 2000.
Such a failure could have resulted in a
massive communications system shut-
down endangering security, phone and
internet services. The potential for
crisis weighed heavily. Based on the
possible threat to the communications
system, the company instituted disaster
training in preparation for the event.

After consulting the roster of leaders
in the organisation, key employees
were selected for the training event.
cess of the incident were directly re-
lated to the collaboration demonstrated
by those at the fairgrounds. Decisions
were made, key experts were em-
powered to take appropriate action,
and the community benefited.
Leadership theory continues to evolve. At
this juncture in the research, researchers
are still seeking to understand differences
in how leaders work with others and how
they complete their work. While theories
that posit a ‘great man’ have been largely
discredited, little is understood about how
some people are able to create organisa-
tional success and others fail. Transactional
leadership helps researchers to see that
some leadership behaviours include the
provision of rewards or sanctions.
Transformational leadership helps re-
searchers to understand how leaders can
capitalise on workers’ sense of connection
to the task and the organisation. Transfor-
mational leadership suggests that, by
focusing on organisational goals, leaders
can harness the energies of others in
pursuit of shared goals. By employing
collaborative models of leadership, or-
ganisations can further involve others in
leadership roles. As leadership theory

evolves, one theme is clear — leadership
rests on the expertise and knowledge of
members of the organisation.
TRAINING AND LEADERSHIP
As organisations work to develop
knowledge and expertise among their
members, many invest in employee
training programmes. The expectation is
that employees will emerge from the
training with improved leadership skills
that will, in turn, increase organisational
performance.11 Training is a planned
intervention designed to develop and
enhance the determinants of individual
job performance.12 However, the overall
Page 251
The training scenario began and tech-
nical questions were asked of the
participants. Halfway through the train-
ing event, the manager stopped the
training to take a break and introduce
those retiring prior to 2000. Surpris-
ingly, half of the employees involved in
the training were retiring or taking
early retirement to avoid the expected
crisis situation. Even more troubling
was the fact that replacement or
alternate employees were absent from
the training. Given the number of

retirements prior to the expected time
of the crisis, many were relieved that
the crisis never came to fruition.
However, had the team been called
upon to address a Y2K meltdown, the
training would not have been adequate
to address the crisis despite the time
and money invested.
As the above case illustrates, simply provid-
ing training is not enough. Instead, savvy
leaders must both select training that is
appropriate to the organisation and include
workers who are most likely to be affected
by emergency situations in training oppor-
tunities. While this may seem like a daunt-
ing task, there are many ways in which this
charge might be carried out.
KEY MODELS OF TRAINING
Training within any organisation must
include training that imparts current
organisational knowledge and skills for
senior and line managers. However,
training must also allow for new
knowledge and skills to be brought into
the organisation. Effective training,
whether it focuses on developing internal
knowledge or introduces new knowledge
from external sources, must be attentive
to the existing organisation as well as
potential crisis situations that threaten
organisational viability.
In an effort to address their internal
training needs, many organisations have

turned to executive coaching. Executive
coaching typically involves a paid external
consultant to formally ‘coach’ an execu-
tive through decision-making processes.
Executive coaching emphasises ongo-
ing executive development and creates
a safe place to foster and encourage
executives to take risk, develop and
ultimately change their organisational
behaviours.16,17
Executive coaching is done almost en-
tirely in real business time and focuses on
specific, real issues. This means that the
transition from training to the authen-
tic environment is minimised, and there
is a higher likelihood of timely train-
ing application.18 This feature is thought
to assist with the transfer of training
back into the organisation for organisa-
tional benefit. The development of flexi-
bility is yet another positive outcome of
coaching. Coaching can help managers
change and adapt more rapidly and ex-
plore a wide variety of approaches to a
problem when confronted with changing
circumstances.19
Executive coaching differs from formal
mentoring programmes. Mentoring pro-
grammes rely on the organisational
knowledge and skills of seasoned
employees to help less experienced
employees become more proficient at
their job. The mentor usually teaches the
protégé the organisational ropes.20 The

mentor is usually at a higher organisa-
tional level than the protégé. In the best
situations, mentoring happens organically,
where a veteran leader befriends a new
leader and shares the organisation’s ‘ways
of doing things’ as well as offering support
for new learning.
When a mentoring relationship is suc-
cessful, both people benefit from the
relationship. Mentoring, like coaching, is
reliant on organisational context. Men-
Page 252
cost-effectiveness, convenience and prac-
tice; one of the most useful features is
feedback. Trainees usually receive im-
mediate feedback on the consequences
of their decisions. With constant and
timely feedback, trainees can assess the
immediate consequences of their decisions
and adapt immediately to change the
impact of their decisions.
Training exercises represent another
tool that utilises simulations or scenarios.
Useful at all levels of the organisation,
these exercises combine the use of
scenarios with interpersonal communica-
tion, cognitive and decision-making skills.
For example, an exercise-training scenario

at the Ford Corporation might involve a
plant fire in the castings building, a train
derailment on their supply line or another
event with the potential to affect produc-
tion. Participants can be assigned to
different tasks and responsibilities based on
their roles within the company. Personnel
can then coordinate and execute tasks as
the situation unfolds.25 A well-written
scenario should push the decision-making
abilities of those involved and also assist in
exposing deficiencies in capability, policy
or procedure.
Despite the usefulness of these train-
ing methods, there are some drawbacks
as well. When training to a scenario or
with a computerised simulation model,
damage statistics, costs and other simu-
lated information can be severely underes-
timated. It is also important to remember
these scenarios and simulations are deci-
sion-making tools and cannot provide the
same experiences that will happen during
authentic events.26 As the following case
illustrates, when crisis trainings are con-
ducted with a sense of realism and stress, the
individuals involved can develop a sense of
what a real crisis environment entails.
Bellaville, a small midwestern city, was
just beginning its disaster preparedness
tors and coaches can only work with
new employees on organisational issues
as they arise. In this way, they may

learn the day-to-day job requirements
but be poorly prepared for less frequent
events.
Executive coaching and mentoring are
the kinds of training that focus on
developing the skills of individuals and
usually focus on the transfer of existing
organisational knowledge. At times, how-
ever, every organisation needs to in-
troduce new ways of thinking and
functioning. Computer-based training and
simulations have been designed to support
learning in an economically-friendly en-
vironment while introducing complex
problems for analysis.21 Crichton and
Flin22 suggest computer-based and simula-
tion training may be used to improve
teamwork skills such as decision making,
situation awareness, leadership and coor-
dination. This method of training allows
participants to fine-tune these skills and
make decisions in a non-threatening
learning environment.
Computer-based training and simula-
tions can be used to assess training needs,
success of prior training, or the usefulness
of a manager’s model for decision making
in a particular situation. These methods
can act as a substitute for actual ex-
perience by using a set of scenarios
ranging in complexity and technicalities.23
They are also a useful resource as
a job performance predictor in terms

of benchmarking the trainee against
predetermined decisions and critical job
tasks.24 For example, if an organisation
was hiring for a certain position, it could
have the interviewee complete a com-
petency-based computer simulation to
evaluate how his or her organisational
decisions align with company goals and
strategies.
While the benefits of computer-based
training and simulation are evident in
Page 253
efforts. As part of this process, an
incident was developed for training.
The incident called for crisis response
teams to respond to a severe weather
system that had moved into the
Bellaville area. The scenario described
destruction to the downtown corridor.
Included were potential injuries to
students from a local elementary school
as well as tornado damage to the city’s
only hospital.
The scenario called for the fire chief
to become the incident commander.
Although the chief had previous crisis
experience, he had not yet participated
in the disaster training process. As the

incident unfolded, pertinent informa-
tion was relayed to the fire chief. The
data included a reported 23 students
injured in the school, three dead,
and an undetermined number who
remained trapped under debris. Fur-
thermore, the scenario suggested that
the hospital’s entire emergency room
was damaged so victims had to be
transported elsewhere for care.
As the training exercise unfolded, the
fire chief became visibly frustrated and
stressed. Although vital decisions were
needed from him, he began losing his
calm and making decisions without
taking into account the advice being
given to him by the team. The team
eventually became weary of operating
under the leadership of a commander
who was obviously ignoring them, and
decided to stop communicating infor-
mation to him.
At this juncture, the drill was paused
and the chief was reminded that he was
engaged in a training situation and that
the goal of the exercise was to prac-
tise necessary skills in the event a
real disaster might occur. When the
scenario was begun anew, the pace of
the incident was slowed and the chief
was mentored through the rest of the
situation. The chief learned a vital
lesson that day.

Prior to his involvement with the
training scenario, he thought he was
adequately prepared to handle a large
disaster event. As he became over-
whelmed by the stress and pressure,
however, he realised that he had ig-
nored vital information and defaulted
to autocratic decision making. In the
debriefing, he reflected upon his in-
ability to focus and listen to others
when making important crisis deci-
sions. As a result of the incident, he
reported feeling more confident that
should a real disaster occur he would
be better prepared. Furthermore, the
value of training became clear to the
new chief and he was quick to engage
in other scenarios as they were of-
fered.
As the above case highlights, it is
better to determine the skill level of
those involved in critical decision-making
processes before an actual event happens.
When disaster training is complex and
involves real stress and pressure, true
decision-making and leadership abilities
can come to light. While the fire chief
was capable of managing small emergency
events, he was not prepared to handle the
complexity of a large-scale incident.
When organisations take the time to
identify weaknesses through training, the
individual’s skills can be improved. It is
better to discover weaknesses during

training and simulation than in reality.
CRISIS LEADERSHIP
Given the disruption that crisis situations
cause to an organisation, concern for
capable leadership is well justified. In times
of crisis, leadership becomes an integral
cog of a successful organisational crisis
outcome. Strong effective leadership is
Page 254
As the following case study exemplifies,
decisions made under complex and stress-
ful contexts can have far-reaching or-
ganisational repercussions if detail and care
are not taken.
At 2.30am, a corporate emergency
manager was abruptly awakened by an
emergency call. An employee had been
involved in an accident, struck by a
drunk driver. The drunk driver had
rammed the back of the worker’s
vehicle, knocking it into a manhole pit
where two other employees were
working. Fortunately, the employees
had operated to safety code and
followed the standard procedures for
work area protection. Their manhole
ladder had held the vehicle up out of
the manhole so they could escape.

The emergency manager arrived at
the scene with two major concerns:
the safety of the employees and
whether they had followed proper
safety protocol. Once the emergency
manager substantiated the employees
were uninjured, he concentrated on
protecting his employees and or-
ganisation from a possible lawsuit.
He immediately began to ask ques-
tions about the incident. While he
imperative to organisational survival.27,28
However, organisational leaders adept at
handling day-to-day issues may not neces-
sarily prove to be as qualified and prepared
to manage crisis situations.
As depicted in Figure 1, crisis situa-
tions differ from normal organisational
operations in several ways. Unlike normal
conditions of organisational leadership, al-
though rare, crisis events can threaten the
viability of the organisation.29–32 The non-
routine nature of decision making within
crisis events can stress even the most
seasoned leader.
Furthermore, traditional leadership
theories have ignored environmental and
situational conditions. The assumption
was that good leadership transcended
context. The ability of a leader to adapt
to a changing and complex environment

is a key foundation of crisis leadership. All
too common are crisis leaders that
foreclose on options, cutting off or
ignoring points of information when
making vital decisions.33 This is
undesirable, especially as crisis decision
making requires an ability to think
quickly and rationally, and to act.34 The
consequence of muddled thinking or
ignoring key situational factors can result
in disaster.
Figure 1 Crisis
leadership
continuum
Page 255
Crisis situationsNormal
situations
Flexibility in
decision making
Decisions made
under close scrutiny
Increased levels of
stress
Protocols not
established
Understood

consequence and
action (follow
established
protocols)
Severe threat to
organisational viability
Complex decision
environment
Non-routine decisions
Routine decision
making
Familiar (non-
threatening)
environment
documented all necessary information,
he took pictures of the scene. The
manager was well aware of the impor-
tance of a thorough investigation and
the possible consequences of perform-
ing an inadequate job. If he missed
something, the company could have
faced costly lawsuits and the employees
could have lost their jobs.
Crisis leaders need to be flexible, adaptive
and prepared for tough decision-making
challenges whatever the cause or situa-
tional context. In turn, training models

must include features to ensure that crisis
leaders are well prepared for whatever
situations they encounter. Crisis leaders
should, by the time a real crisis arises, be
ready to meet the challenge and respond
with the same efficiency and care as
the corporate emergency manager in this
scenario did.
TRAINING EFFECTIVE CRISIS
LEADERS
When seeking to create effective crisis
leaders, organisations are best served by
remembering the following key ideas:
• Effective crisis leaders are not made in a
workshop: Leaders cannot expect to send
someone (or to attend) a crisis leader-
ship training or workshop and come out
a fully-prepared crisis leader. Trainees
must be willing and enthusiastic about
selected trainings. Supervisors need to
collaborate with the employee, support
the training and expect training to be
implemented into the organisation. If
the organisation holds no expectation
for the trainee to improve and apply
skills, they are not making the most of
the opportunity and the organisational
status will not change.
• Effective crisis leaders are used to being
pushed: Crisis training and scenarios
need to be realistic. While some may be
resistant to putting decision makers ‘on

the spot’, this is a far better alternative
than watching them fail in a real crisis
situation when the stakes are even
higher. While the individuals involved
in crisis management may need to be
mentored through the decision-making
process early in their careers, they need
to experience and become familiar with
operating under demanding conditions.
• Effective crisis leaders must be immersed in
a wide variety of issues within the com-
pany from an early stage: Those that
experience failure and adversity early in
their careers are more likely to advance
to a higher level of success compared
with those that experience only success.
Crisis leaders need to be challenged
early on to build the stamina to over-
come difficult situations. They need
to be able to push through adversity,
and make decisions under duress while
keeping an eye on organisational goals.
Diversifying the challenges early in a
leader’s career will better prepare the
individual to lead in the shifting en-
vironment of actual crisis.
• Effective crisis leaders listen: They listen
to those involved in the organisation
and in the crisis situation. They value
and take in information from others
involved in the organisation. Careful
listening can help leaders process infor-
mation under stress.

• Effective crisis leaders learn from others: One
does not need to wait for a crisis
situation to amend plans and proce-
dures. Effective crisis leaders are always
thinking and always proactive. While
crisis events are rare in individual or-
ganisations, they happen on a national
and global scale almost daily. Effec-
tive leaders read, study and constantly
amend and improve the workings of
their crisis management system.
• Effective crisis leaders make decisions: When
Page 256
leadership teams’, Consulting Psychology
Journal: Practice and Research, Vol. 52,
No. 1, pp. 36–48.
(7) Schrage, ref. 4, above.
(8) Rawlings, ref. 6, above.
(9) Schrage, ref. 4, above.
(10) Rawlings, ref. 6, above.
(11) Saks, A. and Belcourt, M. (2006) ‘An
investigation of training activities and
transfer of training in organizations’,
Human Resource Management, Vol. 45,
No. 4, pp. 629–648.

(12) Goldstein, I. (1980) ‘Training in work
organizations’, Annual Review of
Psychology, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 229–272.
(13) Bedingham, K. (1997) ‘Proving the
effectiveness of training’, Industrial and
Commercial Training, Vol. 29, No. 3,
pp. 81–91.
(14) Ibid.
(15) Hughey, A. and Mussnug, K. (1997)
‘Designing effective employee training
programs’, Training for Quality, Vol. 5,
No. 2, pp. 52–57.
(16) Bluckert, P. (2005) ‘Critical factors in
executive coaching — The coaching
relationship’, Industrial and Commercial
Training, Vol. 37, No. 7, pp. 336–340.
(17) Jones, R., Rafferty, A. and Griffin, M.
(2006) ‘The executive coaching trend:
Towards more flexible executives’,
Leadership and Organization Development
Journal, Vol. 27, No. 7, pp. 583–595.
(18) Ibid.
(19) Ibid.
(20) Gibson, J. W., Tesone, D. V. and
Buchalski, R. M. (2000) ‘The leader as
mentor’, Journal of Leadership and
Organizational Studies, Vol. 7, No. 3,
pp. 56–67.

(21) Hasebrook, J. (1999) ‘Web-based
training, performance and controlling’,
Journal of Network and Computer
Applications, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 51–64.
(22) Crichton, M. and Flin, R. (2001)
‘Training for emergency management:
Tactical decision games’, Journal of
Hazardous Materials, Vol. 88, Nos. 2–3,
pp. 255–266.
(23) Ibid.
everyone else is stepping back and un-
sure of the next move as the crisis is
escalating, effective crisis leaders step
forward. Crisis leaders have the ability
to make a decision on limited infor-
mation and carry it through to the
best of their ability. Competent decision
making in a time of uncertainty is
paramount.
Finally, training leaders to be prepared for
times of crisis is simply good business.
When capable leaders effectively manage
a crisis, the organisation suffers fewer
losses and is better able to bounce back
from difficulty. In the end, organisations
that handle crisis well are healthier than
those that do not. All it takes is a bit of
attention to doing it well.
REFERENCES
(1) Judge, T., Piccolo, R. and Ilies, R.

(2004) ‘The forgotten ones? The
validity of consideration and initiating
structure in leadership research’, Journal
of Applied Psychology, Vol. 89, No. 1,
pp. 36–51.
(2) Bass, B., Avolio, B., Jung, D. and
Berson, Y. (2003) ‘Predicting unit
performance by assessing
transformational and transactional
leadership’, Journal of Applied Psychology,
Vol. 88, No. 2, pp. 207–218.
(3) Bass, B. and Steidlmeier, P. (1999)
‘Ethics, character, and authentic
transformational leadership behaviour’,
Leadership Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2,
pp. 181–217.
(4) Schrage, M. (1990) ‘Shared Minds: The
New Technologies of Collaboration’,
Random House, New York.
(5) Rosenthal, C. (1998) ‘Determinants of
collaborative leadership: Civic
engagement, gender or organizational
norms?’, Political Research Quarterly, Vol.
51, No. 4, pp. 847–868.
(6) Rawlings, D. (2000) ‘Collaborative
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(24) Yusko, K. P. and Goldstein, H. W.
(1997) ‘Selecting and developing crisis
leaders using competency based
simulations’, Journal of Contingencies and
Crisis Management, Vol. 5, No. 4,
pp. 216–223.
(25) Haddow, J., Bullock, G. and Coppola,
D. (2008) ‘Introduction to Emergency
Management’, Elsevier Science,
Burlington, MA.
(26) French, S. and Niculae, C. (2005)
‘Believe in the model: Mishandle the
emergency’, Journal of Homeland Security
and Emergency Management, Vol. 2, No.
1, pp. 1–18.
(27) Boin, A. and t’ Hart, P. (2003) ‘Public
leadership in times of crisis: Mission
impossible?’, Public Administration
Review, Vol. 63, No. 5, pp. 544–553.
(28) ‘t Hart, P., Rosenthal, U. and Kouzmin,
A. (1993) ‘Crisis decision making: The
centralization thesis revisited’,
Administration and Society, Vol. 25,
No. 1, pp. 12–45.
(29) Cornell, D. and Sheras, P. (1998)
‘Common errors in school crisis
response: Learning from our mistakes’,
Psychology in Schools, Vol. 35, No. 3,
pp. 297–307.

(30) Fink, S. (1986) ‘Crisis Management:
Planning for the Inevitable’, Amacom,
New York.
(31) King, G. (2002) ‘Crisis management
and team effectiveness: A closer
examination’, Journal of Business Ethics,
Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 235–249.
(32) Pearson, C. and Clair, J. (1998)
‘Reframing crisis management’, The
Academy of Management Review, Vol. 23,
No. 1, pp. 59–76.
(33) Rosenthal, U. and ‘t Hart, P. (1991)
‘Experts and decision makers in crisis
situations’, Knowledge, Creation,
Diffusion, Utilization, Vol. 12, No. 4,
pp. 350–372.
(34) Weisaeth, L., Knudsen Jr., O. and
Tonnessen, A. (2002) ‘Technological
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Page 258

14 • COMMUNICATION WORLD • DECEMBER 2013
by Oliver S. Schmidt and Dianne L. Chase
W
hile every business crisis and corresponding set of
affected stakeholders are unique, there are some groups
with which organizations must communicate in order
to protect their reputation, brand equity and the bot-
tom line during times of crisis. A successful response to a
business crisis
demands making and communicating far-reaching and
emotionally dif-
ficult decisions while under pressure and perhaps lacking
complete or
fully accurate information. To overcome the communication
challenges
that crises present, management must enable effective
communication
with three key stakeholders: employees, reporters from
traditional news
media, and social media users.
crisis communication talking points
Make sure your crisis
response includes these
key stakeholders
Communicating
inside and out
CW_Dec2013_GTX_014-018_Feature1_ForRev.indd 14

11/7/13 2:28 PM
Internal matters
Employees especially are often
neglected during a business crisis, and
as a result, many companies alienate
their best advocates—the people who
are excellent workers and whose opin-
ions and attitudes have an impact out-
side the company, through their daily
conversations with friends and family,
as well as through their social media
interactions.
Your company’s crisis communica-
tion plan should definitely include
an employee communication com-
ponent. (If your organization doesn’t
have a stated crisis communication
plan already, then creating one should
be a priority.) Processes, responsibili-
ties, channels and recurring training
should be determined and a frame-
work established that encompasses
employee communication, including
the following:
• Make sure senior management
understands the importance of two-
way communication and incorporates
employee feedback in its decisions.
Employee feedback during a crisis helps

identify the value of messages, helps
keep tabs on rumors and false infor-
mation, highlights employee concerns,
and enhances trust. Even questions
that seem inconvenient or unimpor-
tant should be addressed in order to
keep people informed and their morale
up. Follow-up messages should take
employee opinions into account and
provide information about the steps
company leadership is taking.
• Communicate first with employees
about matters that affect them. Think
about it: Wouldn’t you want to know
from your own company about a situ-
ation that could affect your job?
Empower your employees with the
facts, and let them function as com-
munication allies, carrying specific
messages into the community.
• Designate company spokespersons
to address stakeholders with carefully
crafted messages. Then consider using
employees as informal communicators
in times of crisis with official mes-
saging that was developed for various
crisis scenarios. Familiarity with com-
Empower your
employees with the
facts, and let them

function as communi-
cation allies, carrying
specific messages
into the community.
Employee crisis communication tips
1. Recognize the need for frequent two-way communication.
2. Develop and implement a customized plan before a crisis
strikes.
3. Obtain senior management buy-in and ongoing support.
4. Seek and act upon employee feedback to enhance trust.
5. Communicate crisis-related news to employees first
whenever possible.
6. Ensure consistent and coherent internal message delivery.
7. Turn employees into valuable communication allies.
8. Enable continuous dialogue to minimize employee
uncertainty.
9. Employ proven communication channels.
10. Address employee questions and concerns thoroughly.
11/7/13 2:28 PM
munication channels helps prevent
and overcome employee uncertainty,
and encourages continuous and con-
structive dialogue.

Breaking news
Organizations that are unprepared
to work with traditional news media
during a crisis often experience intense
media scrutiny and negative coverage
that can easily lead to unfavorable
stakeholder perceptions and lasting
reputational and economic damage.
It is the media’s job to report crisis-
related news, illuminate relevant issues,
influence issue portrayal and propose
solutions. While journalists gener-
ally seek to report news in an objec-
tive, fact-based and balanced manner,
today’s media environment is highly
competitive, and reporters must gen-
erate relevant information fast in order
to meet deadlines and stay ahead of
the competition.
As you develop or update your cri-
sis communication plan, keep in mind
how you work with journalists and
other media representatives:
• Be ready when a journalist calls.
Because reporters may be unable to
wait until the company has gathered,
verified and officially communicated
crisis-related facts (What happened?
Where? When? Why? Who is affected?
What are the relevant concerns? What
is being done about it?), they may turn
to unofficial and less reliable sources.
Quickly coordinating the manage-
rial, operational and communication

response to a crisis is critical, but
only designated spokespersons should
address the media.
• Build long-term relationships with
relevant journalists. Mutual familiarity
and trust will increase the likelihood of
fact-based and non-sensational report-
ing if a crisis does occur.
• View media interviews and news
conferences as valuable opportunities
News media crisis communication tips
1. Understand the role of the traditional news media and how
they work.
2. Build long-term relationships with reporters long before a
crisis hits.
3. Identify and train company spokespersons on a recurring
basis.
4. Establish and follow a companywide media policy.
5. Get crisis-related facts out fast via carefully crafted
messages.
6. View media interviews as valuable opportunities to convey
key
messages.
7. Study reporters’ tendencies, previous stories and interview
techniques.
8. Continuously monitor news coverage and correct the record
as
necessary.

9. Follow up with reporters as promised even if no new
information
can be shared.
10. Provide recurring crisis communication training to crisis
response teams.
Don’t delay
following up with
reporters even
if new information
is not available or
cannot be shared.
11/7/13 2:28 PM
to convey key messages. The reporter
functions as a filter through which
your carefully crafted messages pass
before they reach various stake-
holders. In addition to recurring
on-camera media training, proper
interview preparation includes study-
ing the assigned reporter’s tendencies,
previous interviews and interview
techniques.

• Closely monitor news coverage,
especially during a crisis, so that any
false or incomplete information can
be identified and corrected right away.
Don’t delay following up with report-
ers even if new information is not
available or cannot be shared for legal
or other reasons. Keep a media inquiry
log to track inquiries (Who inquired?
Which outlet? When? Reason for call?
etc.) and to streamline processing and
follow-up.
Social gains
Simply put, no company today can
afford to ignore what is said online
and in social media about its business
practices, brands, performance, prod-
ucts and services, and that is even truer
during a crisis situation.
Employees, customers, competitors,
reporters and other stakeholders turn to
the Internet and social media to obtain,
publish and distribute crisis-related
information. As a result, uncensored
and potentially damaging content,
including audio and video clips, may
be published and syndicated across
borders in real time, and rumors and
false information may remain available
on the Internet indefinitely.
Be prepared to communicate and
engage with a broad range of stake-
holders by way of peer-to-peer con-
versation using various social media.

Determine what social media outlets
Because every
crisis is different,
management must
evaluate the crisis
response continuously
and make adjustments
as necessary.
Social media crisis communication tips
1. Establish, communicate and enforce a companywide social
media policy.
2. Continuously monitor online content and social media.
3. Determine what engaging stakeholders via social media
should accomplish.
4. Engage a broad range of stakeholders by way of peer-to-
peer
conversation.
5. Carefully listen to and act upon stakeholder feedback
provided
via social media.
6. Identify and connect with key online influencers.
7. Rebut false claims and accusations appearing in social

media.
8. Refrain from engaging in pointless debate with negative
social media posters.
9. Link your organization’s website and social media tools.
10. Evaluate your crisis response on social media and make
any
necessary adjustments.
11/7/13 2:28 PM
stakeholders are already using, and
which channels might be particularly
effective in reaching specific groups.
In addition, consider the following:
• Establish, communicate and enforce a
social media policy that clearly outlines
what employees are permitted to do
with social media while on company
time. Thorough Internet and social
media monitoring has to be conducted
around the clock as well, and should
include issue- and crisis-specific mon-
itoring, with the results shared within
the company.
• Listen and respond to stakeholder
comments and feedback provided via

social media, especially if the informa-
tion posted is incorrect and potentially
damaging. Identify and connect with
key online influencers who will share
your messages with a large number of
individual stakeholders.
• Address and correct any false claims
or accusations as soon as possible.
Make sure any content pertaining to
the crisis that is added by or on behalf
of the company is clearly identifiable
as such. Because every crisis is differ-
ent, management must evaluate the
crisis response continuously and make
adjustments as necessary.
about the authors
Oliver S. Schmidt is managing partner
of C4CS, which specializes in strategic
communication and crisis manage-
ment. Based in Pittsburgh, Pennsyl-
vania, Schmidt has worked with clients
in the Americas, Asia and Europe, and
has provided consulting and training
services to managers in more than
40 countries. Follow him on Twitter:
@C4CSinfo.
Dianne L. Chase is senior partner of
C4CS and head of the firm’s office in
Charlotte, North Carolina. Chase is
currently serving as chair of the board
for IABC’s Southern Region. Follow her
on Twitter: @C4CSinfo.

read more
Kellie Cummings, ABC,
discusses how responding
to citizens’ needs during
a devastating crisis, such
as Hurricane Sandy or the
2011 earthquake in Japan,
is an effort increasingly
shared by business and
government. She also offers
tips for how organizations
can prepare their stakehold-
ers for the next disaster.
11/7/13 2:28 PM
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Are Organizations Ready for Crisis?
A Managerial Scorecard
Anne H. Reilly
This exploratory study sought to develop and test a new
construct, "crisis readiness," and to examine the relation-
ship of organization size, prior experience with crisis,
and managers' job level with crisis readiness. A survey
methodology was used to measure managers' perceptions
of their organizations' levels of readiness for crisis. In
the sample of managers surveyed, the seventy.^nine
respondents reported on average slight agreement that
their organizations were ready for crisis, although they
disagreed on average that they were well-informed about
their organizations' crisis management repertoires. The
study found strong support for the hypothesis that in-
creasing size is associated with increasing crisis readiness,
and partial support for the hypotheses that prior experi-
ence with crisis and higher job levels are associated with
higher crisis readiness scores. The implications of these
results are discussed, together with some suggestions for
organizations concerned with increasing their readiness
for crisis.
AS THE BUSINESS environment gets
more complex, so do the crises ex-
perienced by organizations. The ex-
amples of Tylenol, Challenger, and
Bhopal illustrate that major crises not
only affect the organization involved,
Anne H. Reilly is a doctoral candidate in
the Department of Organization Behavior,
Kellogg Graduate School of Management,

Northwestern University, and a former
commercial banker. Her primary research
interests are organizational crisis, strategy,
and change. She is presently at work on
her dissertation, which focuses on strategic
preparation for better crisis management in
the banking industry.
The author gratefully acknowledges helpful
comments by Robert Duncan, Denise Rous-
seau, Larry Cummings, and Robert Dewar
on an earlier version of thispaper.
SPRING 1987
but also have significant repercussions
throughout the community, the in-
dustry, and sometimes the world.
Crisis management is becoming an
increasingly important issue as man-
agers seek ways to cope effectively
with these high-magnitude threaten-
ing events.
To date, most of the organizational
behavior research on crisis has focused
on case studies of specific crisis
events, frequently political crises (Her-
mann, 1972; Allison, 1971; Starbuck,
Greve & Hedberg, 1978). The study
described in this paper uses a different
unit of analysis. Instead of con-
centrating on particular events, this
study addresses the general issue of
crisis readiness in organizations. The

study surveys individual managers
about their perceptions of .their firms'
readiness for crises. Managers are
an important component of an or-
ganization's readiness for crisis be-
cause managers are critical actors in
any organizational change situation
(Tushman & Romanelli, 1985; Ham-
brick & Mason, 1984).
This empirical study had several
goals. First, .this study proposed a
new construct, "crisis readiness," and
conducted an initial empirical test of
the construct's validity. The concept
of crisis readiness merits examination
because of its implications for effective
crisis management: an organization
79
which is ready to cope with crisis
should be better able to manage it,
ceteris paribus, than an organization
which is not prepared. A survey in-
strument was developed to measure
perceived crisis readiness, and its
psychometric properties were assessed.
This instrument is a useful diagnostic
tool, enabling an organization to ex-
amine, from its managers' perspective,
the firm's ability to cope with tin-
expected threats. The instrument
identifies weak spots in the firm's

crisis management repertoire, and it
can sensitize the organization's mem-
bers to the possibility of crisis occur-
ring.
In addition, this study also sought
to explore the relationships between
certain key organizational character-
istics and perceived crisis readiness
rating. Data on these relationships
are useful in determining what factors
play a part in improving an organi-
zation's readiness for crisis. Testing
these hypotheses is also important for
purposes of integrating crisis readi-
ness into the existing organization
theory research. Finally, this study
represents exploratory research with
the goal of learning more about the
domain of organizational crisis. The
data generated from this study will
be useful in both theory-building and
future research, as it provides some
insights into managers' perceptions of
the general organizational crisis do-
main.
DEFINING ORGANIZATIONAL
CRISIS
A review of the organizational
crisis literature shows that crisis has
been defined in numerous ways, with
multiple criteria. According to Her-
mann's definition (1963, 1972), a
crisis is a situation incorporating three

conditions: (1) a threat to high
priority goals; (2) a restriction in the
amount of time available for response;
and (3) a surprise to decision makers
(1972:13). The managers inter-
viewed by Reilly (1986) suggested
that a situation represents an organi-
zational crisis if it manifests the fol-
lowing five attributes: high magnitude,
requires immediate attention, an ele-
ment of surprise, the need for taking
action, and is outside the organiza-
tion's control. Some researchers also
argue that an organizational crisis is
best viewed as a turning point (cf
Turner's "precipitating event" (1976);
Kanter's "galvanizing event" (1983)).
The definition of organizational
crisis used here draws from Milburn,
Schuler, and Watman's concept of
organizational crises as "situations in
which organizational survival is, and
is perceived to be, at stake" (1983):
1161). This definition implies ele-
ments of high magnitude, the need
for taking action, and the necessity
of a timely response. Specifically, the
survey instrument defined an organi-
zational crisis as a situation which
potentially threatens the existence of
the affected organization.
THE STRATEGY OF CRISIS
READINESS

Many researchers have noted that
an organizational crisis can serve as a
determinant of a firm's strategy, forc-
ing an abrupt change in a company's
strategic plans and orientation (Mintz-
berg and Waters' "imposed strategy,"
1985; Ouinn, 1977; Tichy, 1983).
Van de Ven and Hudson (1985), sug-
gest that crises may sometimes even be
necessary for an organization to reach
its action threshold for making needed
shifts in its strategic plan. As Pennings
notes, "it may be a crisis situation
that provokes a decision leading to a
change in the past strategy toward a
new direction in the future" (1985:
4 ) .
The view of organizational crisis
taken in this study adds a reciprocal
dimension to the relationship between
crisis and strategy. Not only does
crisis affect strategic outcomes, but
strategy affects crisis outcomes as
well. Like Hrebiniak and Joyce
(1985), this perspective proposes tiat
both environmental determinism (the
occurrence of threatening events) and
strategic actions (an organization's
crisis management repertoire) must
be studied in order to fully explain
the crisis outcome. An organization
which has strategically prepared for
potential crisis should be better able
to manage the threatening situation,

ceteris paribus, than an unprepared
counterpart.
Strategic preparation for crisis is
critical to effective crisis management
for numerous reasons. First, crisis
readiness strategies can improve the
environmental enactment process
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) through
making potential crises salient to the
firm (cf Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky,
1982). Identifying potential weak
spots in the organization's crisis man-
agement repertoire, such as informa-
tion dissemination or media relations,
can serve to counteract any illusion
of invulnerability (Janis & Mann,
1977) to crisis.
In addition, scholars and practi-
tioners alike have argued for the bene-
fits of rehearsing for crisis (cf Milburn
et al, 1983; Fink, 1986), as the mili-
tary does with its war games. Kiesler
and Sproull note that the process of
preparing may be as important as
the content: "The plan itself may
not work, but planning activities pro-
vide an opportunity for cognitive re-
hearsal of coping with high uncer-
tainty" (1982:563). Finally, crisis
readiness can serve as an important
means of building slack (Thompson,
1967; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978)
into the organizational system, slack

which can provide additional resources
at a time when resource availability
is critical. For example, if time and
managerial attention are assumed to
be crucial crisis management resources,
a crisis preparation plan can serve to
buffer the demands on those resources
during a crisis (Fink, 1986; Smart,
Thompson, and Vertinsky, 1978).
THE CRISIS READINESS
CONSTRUCT
The forms and natures of possible
organizational crises are infinite, and
bounded rationahty clearly prohibits
organizations and individuals from
developing specific contingency plans
for every conceivable crisis situation.
Crisis readiness is therefore defined
broadly here as the readiness to cope
with the uncertainty and change en-
gendered by a crisis. Crisis readiness
is an "umbrella strategy" (Mintzberg
and Waters, 1985): an umbrella of
crisis readiness general guidelines
which are appropriate for complex,
unpredictable, and uncontrollable en-
vironments (cf Mitroff, 1986).
The construct of crisis readiness is
proposed to have the six core com-
80 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF WORLD BUSINESS

ponents listed below. Each component
was operationalized in this study using
a separate subscale to assess managers'
perceptions of the particular dimen-
sion.
1. The organization's ability to re-
spond quickly to a crisis.
2. How informed the managers are
about the organization's crisis
management repertoire.
3. Managers' access to the organi-
zation's crisis management plans,
resources, and tools.
4. How adequate the firm's strate-
gic crisis planning is.
5. The organization's media man-
agement ability in a crisis.
6. The perceived likelihood of
crisis striking the organization.
Together, these components are pre-
dicted to denote how ready an organi-
zation is to deal with potential crises.
THE SIX FACETS OF CRISIS
READINESS
Organization's Quick Response
Ability

In general, an organization unable
to respond rapidly to a potential crisis
will be less ready to manage that
crisis effectively (cf Milburn et al.,
1983; Reilly, 1986). Most crises are
characterized by a sense of urgency;
a rapid response is therefore critical
in controlling the damage or avoiding
the losses engendered by the threaten-
ing situation. Response time in crisis
may be determined by numerous or-
ganizational characteristics or proced-
ures: e.g., its ability to make appro-
priate decisions quickly (cf Janis and
Mann, 1977; Kiesler & SprouU, 1982);
its flexibility (cf Harrigan, 1985); and
the level of organization members'
resistance to change (cf Staw, 1982;
Weick, 1982).
How Informed the Managers Are
If managers and other key em-
ployees know little about the resources
and tools allocated for crisis response,
they cannot be ready to deal with the
occurrence of unanticipated threats
(cf Turner, 1976). Their efforts to
respond to a crisis situation will be
short-circuited by the unavailability
of necessary information which can
be as basic as the home telephone
numbers of key managers or the
firm's legal counsel. Furthermore,

restrictions in communication and in-
formation dissemination processes, as
well as content, can also endanger an
organization's crisis readiness (Mirvis
and Marks, 1986; Staw, Sandelands &
Dutton, 1981).
Managers' Access to Crisis
Management Resources
An organization's readiness for
crisis depends as much on key per-
sonnel's access to its crisis manage-
ment repertoire as it does on their
level of infonnedness about that reper-
toire. Good decisions and knowledge
about crisis management plans are of
little use without effective deployment
of resources (cf Smart, Thompson
& Vertinsky, 1978). Organizational
structure (such as Kanter's integrative
versus segmentaUst organizations,
1983) may determine resource access,
as may power and politics. Managers
may vie for control over crisis man-
agement resources: "emergencies are
distinguishing for the actors involved
. . . Crises are occasions for managers
to demonstrate competence," accord-
ing to Kiesler & Sproull (1982:562).
The Adequacy of Strategic
Crisis Planning
This dimension aims to capture the
organization's overall focus on strat-

egically planning ahead specifically for
crisis. An organization with inade-
quate crisis planning may not be
attending to tiie abrupt shifts or ac-
cumulating problems in its environ-
ment (Turner's "failures of foresight,"
1976; Aldrich, 1979) which can pre-
cipitate a crisis. As Pfeffer and
Salancik (1978) note, if potential
crises are not salient to the organiza-
tion's selective perception mechanism,
and such "environmental changes are
consistently missed, the organization
will be unprepared to face ithreats to
survival" (1978:81). In addition,
a firm with inadequate crisis planning
is unlikely to have specific resources
allocated to crisis preparation—e.g.,
backup computer systems or a public
relations department, thus lowering its
readiness for potential crises.
Organisation's Media Management
Capabilities in Crisis
The fifth facet of crisis readiness
proposed in this study adds an ex-
ternal dimension to the crisis man-
agement repertoire. Efficient, rapid
internal operations may not be enough
to ensure effective crisis management;
the organization may also have to
interpret a major crisis event to its
environment. According to one ex-
ecutive interviewed by Business Week,
"If you aren't geared up and ready

to inform the public [about the crisis],
you will be judged guilty until proven
innocent." (12/23/85:75). Inmost
cases, the interpreter of the crisis will
probably be the media. Because the
potential consequences of mishandling
the media can be so high (cf Fink,
1986), media management ability is
proposed as an important component
of crisis readiness.
Managers' Perceived Likelihood of
Crisis Occurring
Assumptions of rational organiza-
tional behavior (cf Thompson, 1967)
would suggest that an organization
which perceives a high probability of
experiencing crisis would attempt to
deploy resources to prepare for such
an event, hence increasing its crisis
readiness. However, an organization
which is likely to be hit with a crisis
may not exhibit high levels of quick
response ability, informedness, access
to resources, media management cap-
abilities, and adequate crisis planning.
Even if an organization believes
that it is subject to potential crises,
it may not act on this attitude by
preparing for them. Perhaps the or-
ganization has fallen prey to an "illu-
sion of invulnerability" (Janis and
Mann, 1977) because of a sincere
belief that the firm can handle any-

thing the environment might throw at
it. Or the organization may play
ostrich, responding to a threatening
environment with unconfiicted inertia
(Janis, 1985; Janis and Mann,
1977) or threat-rigidity behavior
(Straw et al., 1981). Furthermore, the
perceptions of one manager may not
coincide with those of the organiza-
tion's dominant coalition (Thompson,
1967; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978): al-
though an astute individual manager
SPRING 1987 81
may perceive a high probability of
crisis striking his organization, the
rest of the organization may assign
zero probability to the occurrence of
crisis.
The first five components of the
crisis readiness construct are all ex-
pected to be positively related to an
orgatiization's "crisis readiness" as
well as positively related with each
other. However, because of the rea-
sons outlined above, the sixth pro-
posed component — perceived likeli-
hood of crisis occurring — and the
other five dimensions are predicted
to be unrelated. Thus,
Hypothesis la:

Managers' perceptions of quick
response ability, informedness,
resource access, adequate crisis
planning and media management
win all be positively and signi-
ficantly related with each other.
Hypothesis lb:
Managers' perceptions of the
likelihood of crisis occurring to
their orgatiizations will not be
related to the other five com-
ponents of crisis readiness.
THE RELATIONSHIP OF CRISIS
READINESS WITH OTHER
ORGANIZATIONAL VARUBLES
This study also sought to test some
hypotheses concerning the relationship
between certain key organizational
variables and perceived crisis readi-
ness. Three factors were proposed
as important independent variables in-
fluencing managers' perceptions of
their organizations' crisis readiness:
(1) the orgatiization's size; (2) the
company's prior experience with crisis
(two organizational-level variables);
and (3) the manager's job level (an
individual-level control variable). As
will be discussed below, prior research
yields conflicting predictions concern-
ing the direction of these variables'

effects on crisis readiness scores.
An aggregate measxure of crisis
readiness consisting of the sum of all
item scores on the six subscales was
used as the dependent variable in
testing this model. A low score on
this aggregate measure denotes a high
degree of perceived crisis readiness.
Organization's Size
The substantial research on the re-
lationship between organizational size
and various organizational outcomes
provides conflicting implications re-
garding the association between or-
gatiizational size and managers' evalu-
ations of crisis readiness. Size was
operationalized in this study as a five-
level continuous variable according to
the number of employees. The five
levels used were 1-25; 26-100; 101-
1000; 1001-10,000; and over 10,000
employees.
On the one hand, some research
suggests that increasing size may be
associated with decreasing crisis readi-
ness. Large organizations may suffer
from cumulative control loss (Wil-
liamson, 1975), which restricts their
cotnmunication and itiformation dis-
semination ability, while resource ac-
cess may become highly centralized
and restricted in large firms (cf

Kanter, 1983). Hannan and Freeman
(1977) argue that large organizations
are more likely than smaller ones to
exhibit structural inertia; hence, com-
pared to small firms, big companies
could be less able to respond quickly
to a crisis situation. Big companies
in the life cycle stage of bureaucratic
decline may respond to potential
crises with formally rather than sub-
stantively rational behavior programs
(cf Dewar & Walsh, 1985). In Star-
buck's (1983, 1985) terms, they may
act as bureaucratic action generators,
responding with an tmreflective, in-
appropriate approach to a potential
crisis.
In contrast, other research on size
imphes that larger orgatiizations may
be more ready to cope with crisis than
smaller firms. Because bigger organi-
zations tend to have more slack re-
sources (Katz & Kahn, 1966), they
may be more able to survive the en-
virotmient resource scarcity engender-
ed by a crisis than may a small un-
dercapitalized organization (Aldrich,
1979). Increasing size has been as-
sociated with an increasing number
of specialized functions and standard-
ized procedures (cf Pugh, Hickson,
Child & coUeagties, 1963, 1972,
1974); hence, big companies are
more likely to have specialized crisis
management teams and tools than

smaller organizations. Furthermore,
because of their larger resource pool
and specialized structure, bigger or-
ganizations will be more apt to have
specific boundary spatining activities
(Thompson, 1967; Pfeffer & Salanick,
1978), such as public affairs depart-
ments or economic and industry an-
alysts on staff. This focus on the
environment could increase crisis
readiness through improving the or-
ganization's quick response ability and
crisis preparation orientation.
Here, it is proposed that the bene-
fits of more resources, specialized
functions, and greater environmental
scanning will outweigh the disadvan-
tages of structural inertia and bureau-
cratic action generation in perceptiotis
of crisis readiness. Hence,
Hypothesis 2:
As organizational size increases,
crisis readiness scores increase.
Organisation's Prior Experience
with Crisis
As with the research on size, the
organizational theory literature has
some contradictory implications for
the relationship between prior experi-
ence with crisis and present level of
crisis readiness. A dummy variable

was used to operationalize past history
of crisis in this study.
Some research would suggest that
past experience with crisis may yield
some organization behavior which
makes the company less ready to cope
with future crises. For example, a
prior crisis may have strengthened de-
fensive routines (cf Argyris & Schon,
1978) or conflict, (cf Milburn et al.,
1983) within the organization, or en-
gendered the threat-rigidity effects
noted by Staw, Sandelands, and Dut-
ton (1981), all of which could lower
the firm's quick response ability as
well as restrict information dissemina-
tion and resource access. Further-
more, several researchers have argued
that organizational actions are char-
acterized by rigid tmderlying assump-
tions which are difficult to change (cf
Mitroff, 1984; Starbuck, 1985; Weick,
1982). Such assumptions (for ex-
ample, "money spent to prepare for
something which will probably never
occur is money wasted") may persist
despite strong historical evidence to
the contrary (e.g., poor performance
in prior crises), keeping the organiza-
tion's crisis readiness low.

However, other research provides the
opposite implications, suggesting that
organizations which have experienced
crisis in the past should exhibit
greater readiness for future crises.
Proponents of organizational learning
(cf Argyris & Schon, 1978) would
argue that an organization which has
been through a crisis should have
gained knowledge about how to re-
spond to future crises from the crisis
experience. For example, if the firm
mismanaged its media relations dur-
ing a prior crisis, the organization
would now be more knowledgeable
about dealing with the media. Vicar-
ious learning may also occur (cf
House & Singh, in press) from the
organization's industry competitors. If
the industry context is characterized
by recurring threats, the organization
may learn how best to cope with them
through both its own experience with
past coping behavior plus the observed
behavior of its industry competitors.
Furthermore, the sahence heuristic
(Kahneman et al., 1982) may affect
managers' evaluations of their or-
ganizations' crisis readiness. If the
company has had past experience with
an organizational crisis, especially re-
cent experience (cf Hambrick, 1981),
managers at all levels may be aware
of and informed about the firm's crisis
readiness repertoire.

The prediction made here is that
organizational leaming and salience
will outweigh threat-rigidity effects
and rigid assumptions in affecting
present crisis readiness levels. Thus,
Hypothesis 3:
An organization which has ex-
perienced a crisis in the past
will show a higher crisis readi-
ness score than an organization
which has not experienced a
crisis.
Manager's Job Level
Given the methodology of this
study, manager's job level was pro-
posed as an important individual-level
control variable because of its poten-
tial inflationary impact on organiza-
tional crisis readiness ratings. Studies
by Hambrick and his colleagues (cf
Hambrick, 1981; Hambrick & Mason,
1984) of the effects of top manage-
ment characteristics on organizational
outcomes have shown that job level
(along with other variables such as
age, education, and career experi-
ence) can affect an executive's per-
ceptions about his organization as a
whole. In this study, job level was
operationalized as a continuous vari-
able with six levels, ranging from (1)

owner/officer to (6) line or staff em-
ployee. The same coder assigned all
job level ratings in order to assure
consistency across levels.
Several reasons may explain why a
higher job level may be associated
with a higher rating of crisis readiness.
First, compared to lower level man-
agers, upper level managers tend to
have longer tenure with their firms,
and longer tenure has been related
to greater commitment (cf Salancik,
1977). Higher level executives who
are more commited to their firms may
tend to view their companies favor-
ably across the board; this halo effect
may spill over into the crisis readi-
ness rankings. Second, because of the
nature of their powerful positions and
their limited peer group, top execu-
tives may also be more prone than
middle or lower level managers to
the effects of illusion of control
(Langer, 1975) and group think
(Janis, 1985; Janis & Mann, 1977).
Upper level managers may thus be
more likely than lower level managers
to believe that they and their organi-
zation are ready to manage any crisis.
Finally, the salience heuristic (Kahne-
man et al., 1982; Kiesler & Sproull,
1982) may also play a part: the
higher an executive is in the organi-
zation, the more likely s/he is to
know about and have access to any

crisis readiness resources the com-
pany has in place.
This study attempts to control for
the predicted positive relationship be-
tween managerial position in the
hierarchy and the reported organiza-
tional crisis readiness ratings by in-
cluding job level as a control variable.
Thus,
Hypothesis 4:
The higher the job level, the
higher the crisis readiness score.
METHOD
Respondents
Seventy-nine individuals from sev-
enty different organizations located
primarily in the Midwest voluntarily
completed the survey instrument. A
wide range of industries and occupa-
tions was represented in the sample
(Kish's purposive sampling, 1965),
ranging from retail store manager,
newspaper editor, attorney, hotel pub-
lic relations executive, banker, pharm-
aceutical researcher, marketing con-
sultant, physician, academic admini-
strator, accountant, engineer, software
sales manager, to entrepreneur. All
respondents were employed full-time;
97% were coUege graduates. Their
career backgrounds were varied. Fifty-

two percent of the sample reported
job experience in sales, marketing, or
distribution at some point during their
careers; 44% had had experience in
general management; 32% had
worked in finance or accounting; 29%
in human resources or public rela-
tions; 27% had worked in production
and operations; 20% had job experi-
ence in engineering, design, or R & D;
and 10% reported experience in legal
work. The mean tenure in their
present position was 3 years, with a
range in tenure from a few months
to ten years. The respondents ranged
in age from 24 to 75, with a mean
age of 36.
Procedure
The survey instrument used in this
study was a four-page questionnaire.
For purposes of inducing a common
frame of reference, the cover letter
included the following definition of
organizational crisis: "A situation may
be considered a potential organiza-
tional crisis if it represents a significant
threat to the existence of the affected
organization." In addition, three ex-
amples of organizational crisis were
provided: Union Carbide's industrial
disaster at Bhopal, the Tylenol tamp-
erings, and a hypothetical small con-
struction company whose bookkeeper
embezzled the company funds and

fled to South America.
The first section of the survey in-
strument included twelve demographic
questions in three categories: organi-
SPRING 1987 83
zation (e.g., size, company's experi-
ence with crisis); job (e.g., occupa-
tion, tenure in position); and indi-
vidual (e.g., age, personal experience
with organizational crisis). The second
section of the survey consisted of
thirty items about organizational readi-
ness for crisis and six items about
specific crisis management tools and
procedures. The respondents were
asked to rate their level of agreement
or disagreement with items 1 through
24 using a five-point scale anchored
by 1 = Stron^y Agree and 5 =
Strongly Disagree. The remaining
twelve items also used five-point
scales, but the anchors were specific
to the questions asked (such as very
important to very unimportant, or
very accessible to very inaccessible).
The five-point response array was
judged adequate, as only 3 respond-
ents marked a few in-between values.
Two missing data values ("I don't
know" and "Not relevant") were
provided.

The crisis readiness items in the
survey instrument comprised six sub-
scales. Each scale originally con-
sisted of five items measuring the
respondents' perceptions of the six
proposed dimensions of crisis readi-
ness: quick response ability, informed-
ness, resource access, media manage-
ment ability, adequacy of crisis plan-
ning, and perceived likelihood of
crisis. One outlier item each was
eventually removed from the access,
media management, and likelihood
subscales.
RESULTS
Measures and Indices
Table 1 lists the mean values for
the instrument's six scales. As shown,
the respondents indicated strongest
agreement with the likelihood of a
crisis occurring to their respective or-
ganizations (mean response = 1.82).
The mean responses for the ability
to respond quickly, access to crisis
management resources, media man-
agement readiness, and crisis planning
scales were on the agreement side of
the scale ratings, with the mean values
relatively close to the neutral mid-
point anchor. And in general, the
respondents considered themselves

somewhat ill-informed about their or-
ganizations' crisis management reper-
toires (mean response ^ 3.16). The
reliability indices were calculated by
SPSS-X using Cronbach's alpha pro-
cedure (SPSS, Inc., 1986). As Table
1 shows, the reliabilities of these ex-
ploratory scales were good, particular-
ly the scale reliabilities for crisis
planning, informedness, and quick
response ability.
Intercorrelations
One of the goals of this exploratory
research was to examine the construct
validity of the crisis readiness concept,
testing how the proposed subscales
related to each other (Ghiselli et al.,
1981). Table 2 summarizes the in-
tercorrelations among the six proposed
dimensions of crisis readiness. The
table shows strong support for both
Hypotheses la and lb. As predicted,
quick response, informedness, access,
crisis planning, and media manage-
ment were all positively and signi-
ficantly correlated with each other,
and there was no statistically signi-
ficant relationship between perceived
likelihood and the other five dimen-
sions of crisis readiness.
Factor Analysis

The survey items were factor an-
alyzed in order to identify the com-
mon dimensions of perceived crisis
readiness underlying the measures.
The SPSS-X principal analysis pro-
cedure with a varimax rotation was
used (cf. Comrey, 1973). With 27
items, and using the "little jiffy" tech-
nique (Comrey, 1973), the factor
analysis yielded three factors. Given
that the crisis readiness construct pro-
posed six dimensions, the principal
analysis procedure was rerun with
four, five, and six factors. But the
three-factor structure remained clean-
est. These factors explained 53.2%
of the common variance in perceived
TABLE 1
Scale Means
Scale
Quick Response
Informed
Access to Resources
Crisis Planning
Media Management
Likelihood

and Cronbach's
No. Items
5
5
4
5
4
4
Alpha Reliability Coefficients
Mean*
2.66
3.16
2.61
2.69
2.54
1.82
Reliability
Coefficient
.858

.891
.772
.896
.744
.713
* On a five-point scale, with 1 = Strongly Agree
TABLE 2
Quickness
Informed
Access
Crisis Planning
Media
Likelihood
Scale
Inforined
. 7 4 * '
Intercorrelations
Access

. 6 2 * *
.77**
Planning
. 8 7 * *
. 8 8 * *
. 6 7 * *
Media
.28*
. 5 2 * *
.41 * *
. 3 9 * *
Liicely
.05
.09
.05
.02
-.04
** p < .01

* p < .05
(two-tailed tests) n = 79
84 CoLUMBLA. JOURNAL OF WORLD BUSINESS
crisis readiness. Table 3 presents the
results of this factor analysis. The
first factor generated explained 40.5%
of the common variance. As shown,
it appeared to be a general factor
comprising high factor loading on all
five Planning items, all five Quick
Response items, all five Informed
items, and all four Access items. The
four Media Management items loaded
together on Factor 2, while the third
factor was comprised of the four
Likelihood items.
Regression Analysis
This study also explored the rela-
tionship of crisis readiness ratings
with several organizational character-
istics. Table 4 summarizes the results
of the multiple regression analyses.
As shown. Hypothesis 2 was sup-
ported, as increasing organization size
was significantly related (P < .02)
to higher evaluations of crisis readi-
ness. The results showed partial sup-
port for Hypotheses 3 and 4, with
beta coefficients in the predicted di-

rection but not statistically significant.
As proposed by Hypothesis 3, a com-
pany which had experienced crisis in
the past was associated with a higher
level of current crisis readiness. Table
4 also shows that the higher the job
level, the higher the crisis readiness
score, as predicted by Hypothesis 4.
As discussed above, perceived
likelihood of crisis was predicted to
exhibit a different response pattern
than the other components of crisis
relationship; thus, this component re-
ceived special attention in the an-
alysis. First, size, experience with
crisis, and job level were regressed on
an aggregate crisis readiness score
which excluded the likelihood items,
but the same pattem of results was
observed. These three independent
variables were then regressed on the
likelihood subscale alone. In this
analysis, past experience with crisis
was shown to be a statistically signi-
ficant predictor of crisis likelihood
scores.
Managers working for an organi-
zation which had undergone a crisis
in the past rated their organizations
as more likely to experience crisis
than managers working for an organi-
zation which had never experienced
crisis. The other two independent

variables had a minimum effect on
these results.
DISCUSSION
Construct Validity
As discussed above, factor an-
alysis of the survey item pool yielded
TABLE 3
Item
Factor Analysis of Crisis Readiness Items
Dimension Communality FACTORS 1 2
35
33
21
14
2
22
15
31
13

1
17
11
8
12
5
6
32
7
19
9
34
4
10
36
3
16
%

%
TABLE
Planning
Quickness
Planning
Planning
Quickness
Informed
Quickness
Informed
Quickness
Planning
Informed
Informed
Planning
Access
Informed
Access

Access
Quickness
Media Management
Media Management
Media Management
Media Management
Likelihood
Likelihood
Likelihood
Likelihood
Variance Explained
Variance Cumulative
4
.82
.72
.71
.72
.67

.73
.63
.65
.57
.56
.66
.70
.44
.58
.44
.42
.39
.23
.77
.55
.24
.26
.73

.37
.31
.26
.86
.84
.84
.83
.82
.80
.76
.75
.74
.73
.71
.68
.66
.63
.59

.55
.55
.48
40.5
40.5
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS
Variable
Aggregate Crisis Readiness Score
Size
Past Experience
Job Level
• T h e
Beta
-.279
-.105
.172
lower the score, the higher the crisis readiness
P

.02
n.s.
n.s.
.49
.61
.71
.47
.47
6.8
47.3
R2
.08
.84
.61
.55
.50
5.9
53.2

n = 79
SPRING 1987 85
a three-factor structure explaining a
total of 53.2% of the common vari-
ance. Although this study proposed
six facets of crisis readiness, this
three-component factor structure may
be explained if crisis readiness is con-
ceptualized as comprising both in-
ternal and external elements. Factor
1 was a general factor loading on aU
the Quick Response, Resource Access,
Informedness, and Crisis Planning
items. This pattern may imply that
an organization's crisis readiness may
include a four-facet concept compris-
ing the firm's internal functionings.
Perhaps these dimensions are per-
ceived as too similar or too. closely
related for managers to distinguish
among them: e.g., quick response
ability may be determined by level of
informedness, resource access, and
adequate crisis planning. This poten-
tial explanation is strengthened by
the statistically significant intercorrela-
tions among the four subscales; as
Table 2 shows, no intercorrelation is
less than .62.
The remaining two scales broke out
cleanly in the factor analysis. All

four media management items loaded
together on the second factor; all four
likelihood items loaded onto Factor 3.
These two dimensions reflect an ex-
ternal dimension of crisis readiness:
the ability to interpret environmental
demands (perceived likelihood) and
the ability to communicate with the
environment (through media manage-
ment) . Therefore, among this sample
of managers, an organization was per-
ceived as ready for crisis if its internal
house was in order—as reflected in
the Quick Response, Informedness,
Access, and Planning dimensions—
and if its external activities were
under control—Media Relations and
Crisis Likelihood Assessment.
The subscales themselves showed
good reliability, as Table 1 illustrates,
and they exhibited the predicted pat-
tern of interrelationships. Table 2
indicates support for Hypothesis la
and convergent validity (Cook &
Campbell, 1979), with the first five
dimensions positively correlated with
one another (P < .05); in fact, nine
of the ten intercorrelations were signi-
ficant at the P < .001 level. In addi-
tion. Table 2 showed that, as Hypo-
thesis lb predicted, there was no
statistically significant relationship be-
tween an individual's expectation of
crisis occurring and his rating of any

dimension of his organization's readi-
ness for crisis. The results of both
the scale intercorrelations and the
factor analysis show clearly that man-
agers can and do distinguish between
assessing the probability or organiza-,
tional crisis and assessing the level of
organizational preparation for it.
Relationships with Other
Variables
As shown in Table 4 above, the
results of the multiple regression an-
alyses provided strong support for
Hypothesis 2, concerning the positive
relationship between organizational
size and perceived crisis readiness;
partial support for Hypothesis 3,
which predicted that a company
which had experienced crisis in the
past would be more ready for crisis
at present; and partial support for
Hypothesis 4 concerning the role of
job level as a control variable in the
equations.
The link between organizational
size and crisis readiness found in this
study is a strong one supported by
both the regression and the correla-
tional analyses. No sigiiificant rela-
tionship was found between size and
past history with crisis, or size and
likelihood of future crisis. Hence,
among this sample of managers, large

organizations are not perceived to be
more subject to crises; they are per-
ceived to be more prepared for them.
Furthermore, the correlation between
size and job level was not significant,
so the observed relationship between
size and perceived crisis readiness is
unlikely to be a sampling artifact due
to job level of respondent.
The fact that Hypotheses 3 and 4
received support in direction but not
in significance may be a function of
this study's methodology. For ex-
ample, managers whose organizations
have experienced crisis may rate their
organizations more harshly in terms
of their present crisis readiness be-
cause they remember the problems
and mismanagement during past crises.
Managers in companies who have not
experienced crisis may therefore be
rating their organizations' crisis readi-
ness from a different baseline (Ghis-
elli et al., 1981). Job level may not
have emerged as a statistically signi-
ficant predictor of crisis readiness
evaluations because of this survey's
sampling plan. The manager re-
spondents differed across levels as
well as across organizations, and they
were expected to differ in their knowl-
edge of their firms' crisis management
repertoires.

IMPLICATIONS AND
CONCLUSIONS
Crisis readiness data generated from
managers' perceptions of their organi-
zation is important. This data is use-
ful at the level of the single organiza-
tion for measuring the managers'
knowledge of the organization's crisis
readiness procedures and plans, or
assessing their access to crisis man-
agement resources. This survey can
be used to identify weak spots in an
organization's crisis management rep-
ertoire (e.g., media relations or com-
munication networks), thus highlight-:
ing potential difficulties in crisis man-
agement plan formulation or imple-
mentation. In addition, managers'
perceptions about their organization's
crisis readiness can be compared with
the firm's public stance on crisis man-
agement planning, as one means of
contrasting desired crisis readiness
with actual crisis readiness.
Furthermore, the results of this
study have some broader implications
for those firms concerned with in-
creasing their readiness for crisis. Ac-
cording to this sample of managers,
there is a strong likelihood that their
firms may experience a crisis in the
future. This high probability assess-
ment implies that crisis management
merits the attention of a rational or-

ganization (Thompson, 1967). How-
ever, despite these managers' overall
opinion that crisis is a likely con-
tingency for their firms, this sample
of managers reported only slight
agreement that their organizations
were ready for crisis. This gap be-
tween high likelihood and low readi-
ness suggests that prudent organiza-
tions should: (1) reassess their as-
sumption about the likelihood of crisis
occurring, and (2) move to increase
their readiness for crisis.
The dimensions of crisis readiness
proposed in this study can provide a
useful framework for accomplishing
these objectives. The first step is
diagnosing the particular weak points.
According to the study's results, while
quick response ability, resource access,
crisis planning, and media manage-
ment ability are generally adequate,
managers did perceive substantial
room for improvement in these areas.
Furthermore, this study revealed that
organizational communication pro-
cesses are clear candidates for in-
creased attention in most firms. The
manager respondents reported on
average that they were not well-

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