MYANMAR-AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REPORTS 2017

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Myanmar Political Reform: A Slow But Steady Transformation
By Trevor Wilson
19 June 2017
The lack of a clear campaign agenda for Myanmar’s National League for Democracy in the 2015 elections
has slowed the subsequent reform process. But with […]
Achieving Lasting Political Reform in Myanmar
02 June 2017

At Glover Cottages on Tuesday 30 May 2017, our distinguished guest, Trevor Wilson, former Australian
ambassador to Myanmar (2000 – 2003), discussed the […]
Deafening Silence on Myanmar's Rohingya
By James T. Davies
19 February 2017
The UN Special Rapporteur to Myanmar, Yanghee Lee, has been visiting Rohingya refugee camps in
Bangladesh this week, gathering more evidence of recent […]
Reading Room: War and Peace in the Borderlands of Myanmar
By Trevor Wilson

06 February 2017
One of the puzzles of Myanmar’s political transition is the June 2011 collapse of the ceasefire that had been
in place since 1994 […]
Armed Forces and Democratisation in Myanmar
19 September 2016
Even after the November 2015 landslide electoral victory of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for
Democracy the armed forces of Myanmar (Burma) […]
Eyewitness to Early Reform in Myanmar

By Dr Andrew Selth
01 August 2016
Australia has a strong tradition of diplomatic memoirs. Many former ambassadors and other officials have
recorded their experiences and impressions of international events. […]
Child Security in Asia: The impact of armed conflict in Cambodia and Myanmar
By Dr Mhairi Cowden
17 July 2016
As Hillary Clinton graces the news daily during the presidential campaign, I am reminded of the words she
wrote […]

India-Myanmar Relations: Changing Contours
By Trevor Wilson
12 June 2016
The advertising for this publication promises “rare insights” into India-Myanmar relations and to a large
extent this is what it delivers. Rajiv Bhatia […]
Myanmar's Political Transition
By Nicholas Farrelly, Jacqueline Menager and Chit Win
12 May 2016

Since its independence in 1948, Myanmar has undergone a real evolution. From changing its name from
Burma, to its transition from military dictatorship, to its economic problems, Myanmar […]
Myanmar Foreign Policy under Aung San Suu Kyi
By Dr Andrew Selth
28 March 2016
Last November, the National League for Democracy won a landslide electoral victory in Myanmar. It formed
a new government this month. Conservative pundits […]

7/21/2017 Myanmar Political Reform: A Slow But Steady Transformation - Australian Institute of International Affairs - Australian Institute of International Affairs
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Australian Outlook
In this section
Myanmar Political Reform: A Slow But Steady Transformation
19 Jun 2017
By Trevor Wilson

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The lack of a clear campaign agenda for Myanmar’s National League for Democracy in the 2015
elections has slowed the subsequent reform process. But with some changes now underway, the
international community should remain patient.
Myanmar started on a road to fundamental political reform through a peaceful transfer of power in early
2016. The transfer was from the previous military-led regime to the National League for Democracy (NLD)
led by Aung San Suu Kyi, whose leading role in the new government has not been challenged.
More than a year late, Myanmar’s transition from military rule remains far from complete, but it has been
going in the right direction. Whether the transition will be to genuine democracy remains to be seen, but it
certainly involves fundamental political changes, some of which have yet to bed down. True changes in
cultural values are also uncertain, but these undoubtedly need longer to take root.
Myanmar is ruled through a power-sharing arrangement under the flawed, but widely accepted and
unamended, 2008 constitution. The army retains absolute authority in national security, internal security and
border affairs (including in Rakhine State, where the Rohingya crisis emerged). This has meant continued
oppression by the Myanmar Army, which is still fighting what it calls “insurgencies” in some areas. However,
Myanmar’s overall circumstances are probably better than ever before.
New reform legislation to sweep away ‘old ways’ has been limited in areas outside economic policy but has
included the restoration of freedom of assembly (allowing strikes and protests) and ending print media
censorship. Some changes to the structure of government have been implemented, but perhaps not enough.

The changes have created few opportunities for Myanmar’s young people, and there has been little real
progress on rule of law reforms. The judicial system remains corrupt, unfair and inefficient.
Consolidating political reform
The transfer of authority to Myanmar’s 14 states after 2011 remains incomplete and has not been
accompanied by the necessary funding, staff or expertise. Effective federal mechanisms have not yet been
prescribed or properly debated. They will need to be designed to fit Myanmar’s circumstances, but
insufficient discussion has occurred on suitable federal options for Myanmar and development gaps have not
closed. Attempts to promote economic reforms have been only partly effective; US economic sanctions were
not lifted until September 2016. Thus, international financial institutions have not been fully empowered to
assist Myanmar as part of a nationwide development strategy. Furthermore, the roles of former regime
business cronies are unclear, creating more uncertainty.
Lacking a clear policy direction has been a major problem for the NLD, which decided to avoid making
specific public commitments before the November 2015 elections. Notwithstanding the mandate delivered by
its convincing election victory, the central government has been slow to adopt new nationwide policies in
many areas. Finalising a national peace process became the political priority, quite correctly, but this was
always going to take a long time; differences among ethnic groups about power-sharing arrangements had
never been adequately settled. In addition, there were no clear proposals or guidelines for nationwide
judicial reforms.
Before its election victory, the NLD announced nothing on land reforms, although this now seems to be
underway. Nor did it lay out concrete policies regarding important areas such as climate change, control

over national resources or water management arrangements. As a result, there was generally more
uncertainty than necessary over government policies and priorities.
Managing popular expectations, domestically and internationally, has been a major challenge. Despite
domestic support for reforms, few detailed policies have been issued by the NLD government. This was
deliberate, but seems to have complicated matters and may delay reforms. Aung San Suu Kyi’s retention of
a veto over all policy development has now been identified as a problem. Still, international observers will
need to be patient; most reforms in Myanmar will need time to become embedded and adjusted to local
conditions.
Roles for the international community
Myanmar has been unusually receptive to international ideas and suggestions during its political transition.
But ultimately any choices and decisions must be made by the Myanmar people and their legitimate
representatives. Large donors, including the UN Development Programme, have already made multi-year
commitments to support reforms beyond the 2015 elections, despite some claims that donors were not
prepared to make such long-term commitments.
However, it is not for the United Nations to direct Myanmar’s adjustments to its political arrangements.
Regional politico-economic entities will play a large role, beyond normative changes, but most organisations
with possible roles (ASEAN above all) lack political strength and have had few regional successes. Myanmar
could direct more attention toward completing infrastructure links with the rest of Asia for both
socioeconomic and strategic reasons.

Looking ahead, reforming Myanmar’s institutions will be critical but difficult. It will take time to foster
domestic consensus, especially where sensitive political risks are involved. In Myanmar, institutions such as
the army, the parliament, the bureaucracy, the courts, educational institutions and the media need to be
more flexible, more responsive and more collegiate.
In Myanmar, different groups and interests need to become more cohesive, less competitive and more
collaborative. They need to develop a sense of ‘whole of country’. These tendencies are not necessarily
commonly found in Myanmar, but they can be learned. Techniques of greater inclusiveness, greater
responsiveness and greater mutual support need to be pursued more deliberately. Myanmar’s leaders need
to stop focussing on whether one group benefits more than others from any one policy.
Australian expertise is generally viewed positively and could be much more useful for Myanmar than it is
now, but that would require a greater aid commitment.
Ultimately, Myanmar needs bold political leadership and policies that gradually wind back the army’s
dominant role. The clear-cut election victory achieved in November 2015 by the NLD should be a sufficient
mandate.
Trevor Wilson is a visiting fellow in the Department of Political & Social Change at the Australian National
University.
This article is based on a presentation by Trevor Wilson to AIIA NSW in Sydney on 30 May 2017.
This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence and may be republished with attribution.

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7/21/2017 Achieving Lasting Political Reform in Myanmar - Australian Institute of International Affairs - Australian Institute of International Affairs
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Go back
Achieving Lasting Political Reform in Myanmar
Published 02 Jun 2017
At Glover Cottages on Tuesday 30 May 2017, our distinguished guest, Trevor Wilson, former Australian
ambassador to Myanmar (2000 – 2003), discussed the current political and economic situation in Myanmar
and the transition it has undergone in the last few years. He began his talk by discussing the country’s first
major step towards political transition, which occurred in November 2010 with the general election. Though
these were not ‘free and fair’ elections as the voting processes were inadequate and ballot boxes were
rigged, a two-house parliament was established for the first time in 40 years. From here, the second
noteworthy political step in Myanmar’s political transition occurred in April 2012 during by-elections, with an
easing-up of censorship restrictions and a greater participation by the country’s political parties.

Trevor noted that significant reforms still need to be properly consolidated before major progress is made.
These include the transfer of authority from the Army to state bodies, which must include more funding,
staff and expertise. And as US sanctions still applied to Myanmar up until September 2016, consolidation still
requires deep institutional changes to deliver more permanent reforms. Furthermore, although the
government was given a clear ‘mandate’ from the 2015 elections, Trevor notes that it still hesitates to adopt
nationwide policies in many areas. For example, the government is yet to produce a finalised national peace
process plan, nor proposals for nationwide judicial reforms or comprehensive land reforms. Trevor asserts
that there seems to be too much uncertainty over significant areas of policy that must be addressed.
Therefore, international observers must be patient with the country because reforms in Myanmar will require
time to take hold, due to the need for them to become embedded and adjusted to local conditions. With
regards to the international community, Trevor believes that the country is very receptive to ideas and

suggestions on its political transition, though any decisions must ultimately be made by the Myanmar people
and their representatives. From an international perspective, more attention should be directed towards the
completion of infrastructure links with the rest of Asia for both socio-economic and political reasons.
Trevor concluded the talk by suggesting that Myanmar still has a long way to go before its political and
economic transition is complete. And for this process to occur, the local people must become more flexible,
responsive and cohesive with one another. The outlook for Myanmar is more optimistic than it has been in
decades, so watch this space as the country continues to evolve.
Report by Phillip Alphonse

7/21/2017 Deafening Silence on Myanmar's Rohingya - Australian Institute of International Affairs - Australian Institute of International Affairs
http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/ao-blog-post/deafening-silence-on-myanmars-rohingya/ 1/8
Australian Outlook
In this section
Deafening Silence on Myanmar's Rohingya
19 Feb 2017
By James T. Davies
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The UN Special Rapporteur to Myanmar, Yanghee Lee, has been visiting Rohingya refugee camps in
Bangladesh this week, gathering more evidence of recent unprecedented violence against the Muslim
minority. However, ahead of Lee’s report to the UN Human Rights Council next month, sympathy
towards the Rohingya in Myanmar remains scarce.
It has been over three months since Myanmar’s military began its latest crackdown on the persecuted
Rohingya Muslim minority in western Myanmar. Since humanitarian agencies and media have been largely
barred from the conflict area, it has been easy for sceptics to deny alleged abuses by Myanmar’s military in
those areas. A new report released on 3 February by the UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human
Rights (OHCHR) makes these abuses much harder to deny. Based on interviews with refugees in
Bangladesh, the report found that crimes against humanity had likely been committed.
The recent crackdown followed a 9 October 2016 attack on police camps by an insurgency formed from the
Rohingya community. The band of some 300 men, armed with sticks, knives and a few firearms, killed
several police officers. They have since posted videos online, identifying themselves under the name
Harakah al-Yaqin, or “Faith Movement”. This was the first manifestation of violent Rohingya insurgency in
Rakhine State since the early 1990s. The military has responded brutally and disproportionally, in a collective
punishment of the entire Rohingya community. Senior UN officials suggest that over 1,000 people have been
killed. Some 70,000 refugees have arrived in Bangladesh, mostly women, children and the elderly. Refugees
report that men had been collected by the military and taken away. The families fear they have been killed.
Over half of the women interviewed by the OHCHR had experienced sexual violence, including children who
had been raped.

Operations such as these have occurred periodically, in 1978 and 1991-92 the military destroyed villages and
drove hundreds of thousands into Bangladesh. More recently in 2012, security forces committed abuses
against Muslim civilians during communal violence involving Rakhine Buddhists which displaced 140,000 and
sparked a regional refugee crisis.
Myanmar’s newly elected democratic leaders have been generally uninterested in the suffering and abuses
against this vulnerable population. Only after the release of the recent report did the government express
concern and stress the need for more information. Low levels of interest by the government reflect how the
Rohingya are perceived by the Myanmar public.
Ethnic and religious predispositions
The Muslim Rohingya number approximately one million and are commonly believed to be illegal
immigrants, concentrated in the northern townships of Rakhine State—bordering Bangladesh. They are
known as ‘Bengali’ in Myanmar; the state denies them recognition as a ‘national race’ and, by extension,
citizenship. Their opportunities for education, access to services and even freedom of travel between villages
have long been severely restricted. The Rohingya community, however, view themselves as Myanmar
people, claim deep roots in Rakhine state and speak Rakhine or Burmese languages.
In Myanmar today, there is doubtless prejudice and fear towards the Rohingya population particularly, and
Muslims generally. While there is no record of serious division between communities before colonisation,
Muslims did hold influential positions in the royal courts of the Burmese and Arakanese (Rakhine) kingdoms.
The 19th century King Mindon even fostered co-existence and constructed a hostel in Mecca for Burmese
Muslims completing the Hajj.

The earliest source of today’s sentiments can perhaps be traced to the colonial period, when many South
Asians migrated to Burma and dominated administrative, economic and social life. From the 1920s, the
nationalist movement took advantage of the discontent against immigrants to challenge British rule. A
rallying call of the movement became “to be Burmese is to be Buddhist”.
Despite tensions between Buddhists and new immigrants from South Asia, Indians in Myanmar reported
good relations with their neighbours after 1948. The discontent with religious minorities today has grown in
large part from government policy. The politicisation of religion and citizenship has been reinforced by
subsequent governments, deliberately or otherwise. When the military took power in 1962, all businesses
were nationalised forcing 300,000 people—most of them Indian—to leave the country. Muslims and other
minorities were prohibited from rising through the ranks of the military and bureaucracy. The rhetoric has
often been discriminatory. In 2009, Myanmar’s senior official in Hong Kong described the Rohingya as “as
ugly as ogres.”
Under the more recent quasi-civilian government of President U Thein Sein (2011-2016), the situation
deteriorated for Muslims. The political transition fostered a growing Buddhist nationalism and violence
against Muslims. This movement was implicitly—and sometimes explicitly—supported by the government.
After the 2012 violence in Rakhine state, the President proposed sending displaced Muslims to a third
country.
Stoking the flames
The military and nationalist movements have been effective at framing the Rohingya issue to reinforce
existing sentiments, cultivated by various administrations.

A notorious example of how these sentiments are kept alive today is U Wirathu, a leader of the Organisation
for the Protection of Race and Religion (MaBaTha)—the most well-known Buddhist nationalist organisation.
He has described Muslims as “mad dogs,” who “breed quickly,” are “very violent” and “eat their own kind”.
His Facebook page is constantly updated with details of “Muslim” atrocities, including murders and bomb
attacks but predominantly rape, which he claims is being used in an attack on Myanmar’s population. He
was endorsed by then President Thein Sein, and has a strong following of monks and laypeople who share
his views. In 2012, a group of 300 monks assembled at the Shwedagon Pagoda in Yangon to pray for the
victims in Rakhine. Homemade signs were seen amongst the crowd with slogans such as “defend Rakhine
State” and “kick out the Bengali terrorists”.
There is also an international aspect to the domestic sentiments and Myanmar Muslims have been accused
of having ties to terrorist organisations. As early as the 1978 crackdown on Rohingya, the government
alleged that it was responding to the threat of Muslim extremism, evoking existing fears. The Rohingya
community as a whole is treated as a threat, legitimating the crackdown and collective punishment.
The reaction of civil society and the public at large has largely been mute. While some are willing to criticise
divisive nationalism, most are fearful of putting their name to their criticism.
Complicit leadership
The lack of public interest in the Rohingya issue has given political leaders little incentive to prioritise the
problems in northern Rakhine State. To the disappointment of many of her supporters abroad, Nobel Peace
Prize Laureate and Myanmar State Counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi, has been largely silent on the latest
violence. When she has spoken, her statements have reinforced existing prejudice. In December, her office

rejected rape allegations as “fake rape”. There is no indication she intends to use her moral leadership to
relieve tensions in Rakhine.
Domestically, military and government elites have been successful in their framing of the recent Rakhine
violence. Historically, recurrent questions regarding the boundaries of the Myanmar nation-state and who
belongs within them have again been raised during the political transition. The division—bred over decades
—is again being harvested to support an exclusive imagining of Myanmar. There is now little space for
discussing solutions in Rakhine state and even less to gain from them for those in power. As evidence of
atrocities continues to mount, however, silence and inaction are increasingly suggesting complicity.
James T. Davies is a PhD candidate at UNSW ADFA. He recently undertook fieldwork in Myanmar related to
political change and communal violence.
This article is published under a Creative Commons Licence and may be republished with attribution.
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7/21/2017 Reading Room: War and Peace in the Borderlands of Myanmar - Australian Institute of International Affairs - Australian Institute of International Affairs
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Australian Outlook
In this section
Reading Room: War and Peace in the Borderlands of Myanmar
06 Feb 2017
Reviewed by Trevor Wilson

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One of the puzzles of Myanmar’s political transition is the June 2011 collapse of the ceasefire that had been
in place since 1994 in Kachin, in Myanmar’s far north bordering on China. When I travelled in Kachin state
midway through the ceasefire in 2001, local people were still relishing the chance to rebuild after years of
destructive war and to exercise some modest control over their lives and activities. Any optimism may have
been premature.
Mandy Sadan is probably the most accomplished scholar working on the Kachin in the UK; she draws on
exceptional anthropological and historical skills to understand and explain how ceasefire developments
affected Kachin aspirations. This edited collection brings together some of the most knowledgeable experts
on the various challenges that ethnic groups such as the Kachin face as they seek to modernise, develop
and enrich their locality. Sadan and Canadian academic Robert Anderson draw on their respective historical
and anthropological expertise to explain why the Kachin situation was so particular. They single out the gulf
between the political expectations of Yangon and the Kachin state capital Myitkyina and identify the gradual
loss of trust in the operation of the ceasefire as a primary reason for its ultimate demise.
Sadan and others correctly point to the legacy created by the lack of an adequate political framework in
which a ceasefire might “evolve and flourish”. Ethnic affairs expert Martin Smith describes Kachin political
initiatives under various regimes. British scholar Lee Jones analyses Myanmar’s political economy from a
state-building and geopolitical perspective, accurately noting how timber exports saved Myanmar from near
bankruptcy at a strategically critical time of transition from “insurgency to armed peace”. Resource
extraction scholar-activist Kevin Woods traces how Kachin state went through “military state-making on the

cheap” to achieve “commercialisation of counter-insurgency”, where resource concessions were offered
extensively in Kachin in areas such as logging, minerals and agribusiness. He makes a powerful argument
about the prevalence of corrupt practices in logging, but further corroborative research is needed to explain
this phenomenon more thoroughly.
The Kachin ceasefire is the only Myanmar ceasefire that directly engages China’s interests, which China has
been forced to manage more flexibly and sensitively than it might have done otherwise. More in-depth
analysis of evolving Chinese attitudes to the Kachin ceasefire would be interesting, even if different Chinese
actions would still not change outcomes. It is difficult to accept that China is driven primarily by strategic
competition with the United States. Given the formal role of the Myanmar state in supervising the jade
trade, one might have expected more elucidation in this publication of how Myanmar ‘managed’ China’s
economic interests in this trade.
Taiwan scholar Ho Ts’ui-p’ing’s chapter on ‘People’s Diplomacy and Borderland History through the Chinese
Jingpo Manau Zumko Festival’ contains new original research. While much of the people’s diplomacy she
describes occurred well before the Kachin ceasefire began, this two-way diplomacy reinforced cultural
equivalence between the Jingpaw (Kachin) communities in Myanmar and China. This possibly improved the
basis for better mutual understanding across borders, but Ho is not explicit about any other specific impact
on the ceasefire itself. Nor is it clear how the authorities on either side of the border sought to capitalise on
these apparently beneficial integrative developments.
The manifestations of Kachin ethno-nationalism warrant an in-depth analytical study of this kind. An
interesting chapter by Laur Kiik, a young Estonian scholar, provides insights into how Kachin ethno-
nationalism has been heavily influenced in recent years, sharing stories of transfers of resource concessions

aimed at weakening Kachin Christian economic power. While not much is known even today about the
thinking behind the military regime’s ceasefires of the 1990s, it seems fairly likely that they were
characterised by a great deal of tactical opportunism aimed at eventually weakening other participants.
Myanmar’s army is still more formidable on a tactical level rather than on a strategic level, although this may
be changing as the army effectively shares power with the elected National League for Democracy
government. Yet, many of the attributes of ethno-nationalism as it emerged in Kachin state, and is described
in such detail in this publication, may not be so different from some of Myanmar’s other ethnic issues.
Interestingly, no contributor finds much specific comfort in the prospects of the National League for
Democracy government coming up with solutions to the challenges that lie ahead for Myanmar. In this
publication, Oxford scholar Mathew Walton underlines the importance of the 2012 Karen ceasefire, but notes
that this arrangement has yet to translate into a full peace agreement. Walton seeks to address what
‘lessons might be learnt’ from the Kachin experiment in pursuit of national reconciliation, calling for all
relevant voices not to be silenced as they sometimes were in the past.
One hopes that further in-depth studies of conflicts on Myanmar’s borderlands may be forthcoming. Further
examination of the different forces at play on Myanmar’s border with Thailand would still be in order. A
study of pressures faced on Myanmar’s border with India would be less important, although also revealing.
War and Peace in the Borderlands of Myanmar: The Kachin Ceasefire, 1994-2011, edited by Mandy
Sadan. Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Studies in Asian Topics No 56. Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2016.

Trevor Wilson is a visiting fellow at the Department of Political & Social Change, Coral Bell School of Asia
Pacific Affairs, Australian National University.
The 2017 Myanmar Update will be held at The Australian National University on 17-18 February 2017. For
more information visit: http://myanmar.anu.edu.au/events/myanmarburma-update/2017-myanmar-update
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7/21/2017 Armed Forces and Democratisation in Myanmar - Australian Institute of International Affairs - Australian Institute of International Affairs
http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/global-wire/armed-forces-and-democratisation-in-myanmar/ 1/16
Published 19 Sep 2016
Even after the November 2015 landslide electoral victory of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for
Democracy the armed forces of Myanmar (Burma) continue to be the country’s most powerful
political institution. This is hardly surprising. The Burmese military—also known as the Tatmadaw—has
been the most influential political player since the country’s independence from Britain in 1948, and
outright ruled it from 1962 to 2011.It must be acknowledged, however, that the 2015 election itself was
the culmination of a deliberate—if extremely cautious and non-linear—liberalisation process, the regime
started over a decade earlier. Since the elections, Burmese military leaders have found ways to work
together with State Counsellor (and de facto government leader) Aung San Suu Kyi and her government.
The United States should recognise and encourage the Tatmadaw’s cooperative role and foster its
professionalization and speedy withdrawal from politics. The Pentagon—in close consultation with the State
Department and Myanmar’s civilian leadership—should intensify its thus far minimal engagement with the

Burmese army. At the same time, the United States must ensure that the government in Yangon retains
significant leverage to use against the army if necessary.
Background: The exceptionality of Burmese military rule
Even before General Ne Win mounted a coup d’état in 1962, the Burmese military enjoyed significant
political influence. The coup heralded one of the longest periods of uninterrupted military rule in modern
times. The Tatmadaw was officially in power until 2011, when it created a pseudo-civilian government—
virtually all of its members were former generals—that ruled the country until last November.
Although numerous Asian countries—and, in particular Southeast Asian ones like Indonesia, the Philippines,
and Thailand—experienced long stretches of military rule after World War II, the Burmese generals’
dictatorship was extraordinary in several ways. More than anything, a combination of five factors render the
Burmese version of military authoritarianism unique, and uniquely disastrous, in the annals of modern
praetorian rule.
The first of these factors is the sheer longevity of military rule in Myanmar. It makes an enormous difference
whether a repressive authoritarian regime is in power for seven years (say, the Colonels’ Greece [1967-
1974]), sixteen years (Pinochet’s Chile [1973-1990]) or fifty years, as in Burma. In Myanmar, entire
generations of people had known nothing but military rule. This prolonged reign permitted the Tadmadaw
exceptionally deep penetration of society, culture, and even religious life.
Second, unlike most military regimes elsewhere, the Tatmadaw wrested control of the national economy.
General Ne Win (1962-1988) embarked on a comprehensive program, “The Burmese Way to Socialism,” that

transformed one of the continent’s richest countries into one of its poorest. One of the many lamentable
milestones of this process was comprehensive nationalization in 1964 that caused an exodus of the middle
class, destroyed entrepreneurship, and started black markets; a veritable avalanche of decay that the
government could do nothing to reverse. Another damaging policy was the government’s demonetization in
1985 and 1987 of various denominations of the Burmese currency, the kyat, without advanced warning.
These measures wiped out whatever meager savings ordinary people might have had and were a
contributing cause of the 1988 uprising.
Enduring security threats is the third factor that explains the Tatmadaw’s uniquely long rule. Throughout its
post-independence history Myanmar has never been entirely at peace. In 1950 Chinese nationalist
(Kuomintang) forces fleeing from the People’s Liberation Army invaded Burma and did not withdraw until
1961. The main domestic dimension of the security threat has been the civil war between ethnic minorities
(Chins, Kachins, Karens, etc.) and the regime that has lasted with various participants and levels of intensity
to the present. Owing to military elites’ economic stakes—involvement in the illegal trade in drugs, gems,
lumber, etc.—they had a vested interest in the continuation of hostilities. Furthermore, the generals could
use the on-going conflict to further justify their claim to their rule.
The fourth feature that made Myanmar’s military regime exceptional was its comprehensive isolation of the
country from the outside world. Burma is situated between two Asian behemoths, India and China, with a
combined population of three billion people. Remaining independent and maintaining full sovereignty was
one of the main objectives of the ruling generals. The Tatmadaw often astutely maneuvered between the
opposing sides of the Cold War, drawing benefits whenever possible. The regime seemed remarkably
unconcerned about international respectability or whether the world had approved of them. The general

population was almost totally cut off from the outside world, so much so, that in this former British colony
few people, even among the elites, was allowed the opportunity to learn passable English.
Finally, the long and pervasive rule of the Tatmadaw was inadvertently facilitated by an extremely weak
political opposition. This weakness had two principal causes. First, the price of resistance was so high—
torture, long prison sentences, or death and persecution of the would-be activist’s family—that few people
dared to openly challenge the regime. Second, the opposition was deeply divided along several different
axes (urban vs. rural, elites vs. students vs. workers, Bamar [ethnic Burmese] vs. ethnic minorities, etc.) and
even in major upheavals such as the People Power Uprising of 1988, or the 2007 “Saffron Revolution”
protest leaders were unable to bridge the gaps between them. In sum, the opposition’s shortcomings helped
keep the military in power.
Liberalisation
On August 30, 2003 Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt announced Burma’s roadmap to democracy
(officially, the “Roadmap to Discipline-flourishing Democracy”). The stated objective of the seven-step plan
was to restore full democracy to the country. The steps involved reconvening the National Convention, an
often sham consultative process involving various ethnic, societal, and political constituencies; drafting a
new constitution to be adopted through a national referendum; holding free and fair elections, and building
a developed and democratic nation. Importantly, there was no indication how long the process was to take
and what societal groups were to work with the military in its implementation.
Why Than Shwe, the junta’s leader in 1992-2011, decided to liberalise remains a bit of a mystery. After all,
there was no robust opposition movement forcing his hand and no foreign power threatening the military’s

rule. Nonetheless, there are a number of clues. Unlike Ne Win, Than Shwe actually consulted with and
listened to some trusted advisers and ministers—especially Admiral Soe Thane, General Aung Min, and
Colonel Zaw Min (all retired)—who pushed for liberalization. Burma’s enduring international isolation and
archaic centrally planned economy accentuated its backwardness and poverty especially in sharp contrast
with the rapid economic growth of neighboring Thailand and China.
Western sanctions following the 1988 uprising and the junta’s refusal to honor the results of the relatively
free 1990 legislative elections—won resoundingly by the National League for Democracy (NLD)—limited the
business opportunities of Myanmar’s small entrepreneurial class composed almost exclusively of the generals
and their cronies. Aung San Suu Kyi, one of the NLD’s founders who received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991,
had become the focus of Western diplomatic, political, and media attention. Shunned by the West, the junta
reluctantly turned toward China, India, and Thailand for support and much needed economic assistance.
Still, China’s increasing international assertiveness worried the generals who were becoming overwhelmed
by Beijing’s political and military influence. For a post-colonial country that managed to safeguard its
sovereignty throughout the Cold War, becoming a de facto Chinese colony was a detestable prospect.
It is important to recognise that the junta’s conception of liberalisation was vague and did not include any
specific timetable let alone a sense that power would be turned over to an opposition that, in any case, was
not legalised until 2010. Throughout the 2000s, the junta faced multifaceted challenges that included the
2007 uprising—sparked by the unannounced five-fold increase in fuel prices—and Cylone Nargis in the
following year that cost nearly 140,000 lives and massive devastation that laid bare the regime’s spectacular
ineptness.

The regime succeeded in negotiating, one by one, cease-fire agreements with at least seventeen armed
ethnic groups that included granting different degrees of autonomy. A side benefit of these pacts was that
they allowed the junta to gain control over prized trade routes and made their wholesale export of the
country’s riches all the easier. The Tatmadaw began liberalise the economic system that went hand-in-hand
with its growing rent-seeking activities. The culture of impunity and the growing temptations boosted by
expanding opportunities greatly increased large-scale corruption, something that was unusual during Ne
Win’s rule.
In 2008, the generals wrote a constitution that was supposed to ensure their dominant political position for
the long-term, even after a democratisation process was to begin in earnest. The new basic law is a
veritable constitutional bunker for the Tatmadaw, tilting the playing field in its favour by limiting—though not
eliminating—the opposition’s prospects to form a government, name a president, and to amend the
constitution. Importantly, it also identifies protecting the constitution as one of the armed forces main
responsibilities.
The 2010 parliamentary vote, a heavily rigged affair, ended, unsurprisingly, in the massive victory of the
regime’s Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). Although some forty parties competed at the polls,
the NLD boycotted the bogus elections from which the junta barred international observers. By the end of
that year the junta, in a sense, ran out of steam, weary of economic sanctions, was aware of its loss of
societal legitimacy, and was ready to embark on more substantive political liberalisation. On November 13,
2010, Aung San Suu Kyi—widely known in Burma as “the Lady”—was released from house arrest where she
spent fifteen of the previous twenty-one years. In the following month, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton met her during a memorable visit to Myanmar that was a clear triumph for U.S. foreign policy.

In the 2012 by-elections the NLD won 43 of the 44 parliamentary seats it contested. Western governments
relaxed or lifted some economic sanctions and Myanmar’s isolation began to decrease. The economy had
begun to grow rapidly—by about 8 per cent annually—albeit from a dreadfully low base. The regime
legalised thousands of new local organisations that engaged in a wide array of cultural, educational, political,
and social activities. In addition, hundreds of NGOs from the United States, Europe, and Japan started to
work in Burma for causes ranging from democracy promotion to disaster relief. The media, too, became
much freer and the number of political prisoners diminished. Nonetheless, rights abuses and daily
humiliations by soldiers were still the fact of life in many out-of-the-way rural areas. And corruption
remained rampant: Transparency International rated Burma 147th out of 168 countries in its 2015 report.
Accepting Defeat, Working with the Government
November 8, 2015 will go down in Burmese history as the day democracy was finally given a chance of
taking root. Virtually everyone not in uniform predicted a big win for the NLD. But in order to be able to
form a government of its own “the Lady” needed a landslide given that the constitution assigned one
quarter of the legislative seats to the military’s representatives. Regime officials and Tatmadaw officers were
confident that the USDP would do well enough to prevent that from happening and the NLD would not
garner enough votes to gain a majority of the seats.
In the end, the NLD showed up all the skeptics and scored a massive win at the polls. It gained 135 seats
(60.26 per cent of all seats, and 80.35 per cent of the 168 it could compete for) in the 224-seat upper
house. The USDP obtained only 12 seats (5.36 per cent), just two more than the ethnic Arakan National
Party (10/4.46 per cent); the rest went to smaller ethnic parties, each obtaining 1-3 seats. The elections for
the 440-seat lower house yielded similar results: NLD 255 seats (57.95 per cent of all and 77.27 per cent of

those contested), USDP 30 seats (6.81 per cent), with ethnic parties dividing up the rest. The turnout was
high; slightly more than 80 per cent of the registered voters—more than 32 million people—cast their
ballots. At the same time, the USDP had suffered a humiliating defeat and had to realise that in a fair
contest it had no chance against the democratic opposition.
Prior to the elections pundits and ordinary people were openly wondering whether the generals would honor
the electoral results or reject them as they did a quarter century earlier. Nevertheless, President Thein Sein
and Commander-in-Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the two most powerful people in Burma,
continued to insist even after the votes were tallied that the results stood and the transition of power would
go ahead smoothly. And, to the surprise of many doubters, they kept their word. In late 2015 and early this
year Suu Kyi and her advisors conducted talks about the shape of the new government with the Tatmadaw
led by Min Aung Hlaing. The Tatmadaw played a neither accommodating nor disruptive role but continued to
stand by the constitution that heavily favored the armed forces.
One of the key issues the NLD unsuccessfully tried to find a way around was the constitutional provision that
prevented “the Lady” from becoming president. In the end Suu Kyi created the position of “State
Counselor,” something akin to prime minister, a post the junta abolished in 2011. She also took several
ministerships in the new cabinet: education, electric power and energy, foreign affairs, and minister of the
president’s office. Although she gave up the first two after a week, she retains the others, as well as the
presidency of her party.
She is, there is no doubt, the government’s de facto leader. Her position as foreign minister allows her to sit
on the powerful National Defense and Security Council. The NDSC oversees the armed forces and is
responsible for security and defense. Yet even in the new NLD-dominated regime, six of the 11 members of

the NDSC come from the military—they are appointed by the Commander-in-Chief—a stark reminder that it
is still largely in control.
On March 15, members of the bicameral legislature elected Htin Kyaw, a long-time Suu Kyi confidante, as
president. His is a mostly ceremonial office. The legislature also elected two vice presidents: Henry Van Thio,
selected by the NLD, and Myint Swe, nominated by the military-appointed delegation. The former is a
member of the Chin ethnic minority and is a Christian (notable in a state that is about 90 per cent Buddhist).
Myint Swe is a retired lieutenant general and a hard-liner: as the feared chief of military security affairs, he
oversaw the repression of the 2007 uprising and was known for his brutal treatment of dissidents. He has
recently been the focus of corruption charges and remains on the U.S. sanctions list. Myint Swe is known to
be close to Than Shwe who is widely assumed to have maintained an influential role behind the scenes.
Perhaps the most important task for the NLD has been to develop an effective working relationship with the
military. Unless the party can persuade at least some of the military-appointed legislators, the NLD will be
unable to amend the constitution to allow Suu Kyi to become president or to relax the stipulation requiring a
75 per cent approval to change the basic law.
Most important, although the Tatmadaw’s control of the defense and border affairs ministries does not
particularly constrain the NLD at this point in the transition process, its hold over the ministry of home affairs
seriously restricts the NLD’s authority. This body oversees not only the entire police and security apparatus
but also the General Administration Department (GAD). The GAD is the country’s administrative heart,
staffing every regional and state-level government and managing thousands of districts and townships.

Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing has not sabotaged the transition process thus far but there is every
reason to believe that he will continue to appoint individuals loyal to the Tatmadaw. He turns 60—the
military retirement age—this year, but the army recently announced that it would extend his term in office
by another five years because of the transition and his close involvement in an ongoing peace process with
ethnic militias. For now, the Tatmadaw does not appear interested in giving up any more of its political
influence than it already has by allowing the election results to stand. Nevertheless, the top brass has
gradually developed a cooperative atmosphere with the new government since it took office, and has been
receptive to and appreciative of the non-confrontational approach “the Lady” and her government so wisely
adopted.
The NLD’s governing role notwithstanding, the structure of the state is still very much the same with a
politically dominant military whose powers and “guiding role” are guaranteed by the 2008 Constitution.
Nevertheless, in the last six months, in particular, there have been several indications the Tatmadaw’s
behavioral norms may have begun to change. Several examples illustrate this point.
In the past, military officers and even ordinary soldiers routinely got away with all kinds of crimes committed
against the regular population. These included not just the institutional-scale theft or confiscation with little
or no compensation of hundreds of thousands of acres of farmland, but also violent crimes, such as rape
and murder. The victims seldom dared to complain and if they did, they often found out that they were
worse off than if they had not. In recent months, however, the Tatmadaw held accountable a number of its
members for their criminal deeds and publicised their prosecution. This is a major departure from the past.
For decades—and especially during the rapid expansion of the armed forces during the 1990s and 2000s—
the regime required village and town leaders to fill recruitment quotas. The army leadership employed

various coercive measures that included the deceptive conscription, forced enlisting, or outright kidnapping
of thousands of children as young as fifteen. Western governments and NGOs were vocal critics of this
practice for many years and there is evidence that in the past couple of years it has been drastically reduced
and, perhaps, entirely eliminated.
Until about a year ago, military leaders seldom if ever submitted to unscripted interviews or explained their
policies and actions to genuine interlocutors. This, too, has changed as Tatmadaw elites have seemingly
realized that it was to their benefit to respond to queries, outline their positions, grant interviews, hold press
conferences, and communicate with the media and through them with the citizenry during the current
period of democratic transition.
Perhaps most importantly, after decades of fighting, the military has become more willing to resolve the
conflict with ethnic armed organisations (EAOs). Already in October 2015, President Thein Sein convened a
major convention of the National Ceasefire Agreement, which was signed by eight and ended fighting in
many parts of the country. That effort ultimately failed because a number of the EAOs—including some of
the largest and most influential groups, such as the Kachin Independence Organisation and the United Wa
State Army, the latter is reportedly composed of 30,000 armed men—refused to satisfy the regime’s
preconditions of participation and would not give up their weapons and renounce resistance. By late summer
2016, however, the Tatmadaw had softened its position making the symbolic but important gesture of
encouraging the hold-out EAOs to participate in the peace process even if they only “committed” to disarm.
At the four-day Union Peace Conference (August 31–September 3, 2016) hundreds of representatives of
ethnic minorities, EAOs, the government, political parties, and the military met together for the first time
since independence, although some groups still stayed away. At the meeting, Senior General Min Aung

Hlaing urged the participants to abide by the controversial “six principles for peace,” outlined by then-
President Thein Sein in 2011, one of which included the demand that EAOs adhere to the constitution which,
as noted above, preserves key roles for the Tatmadaw. That said, Min Aung Hlaing, and the top brass in
general, have adopted an increasingly pragmatic point approach toward the ethnic peace process—which
“the Lady” has identified as her top priority—well aware that the army also stands to gain from ethnic peace.
Why should the United States increase military engagement?
Min Aung Hlaing has repeatedly stated that his goal was to build a professional military that could stand
shoulder-to-shoulder with the other armies of the region’s states. At present, the Tatmadaw is a large force,
keeping 406,000 people in uniform, but its equipment is overwhelmingly obsolete, many of its facilities are
decaying, its soldiers are poorly trained and, by all accounts, have low morale. The military has long
depended on Chinese training and arms, but army leaders would like to break out of their isolation and
participate in regional exercises and conferences—but their opportunities have been limited. In particular,
Tatmadaw elites, like those of other developing countries such as neighboring Bangladesh, would like to
take part in international peacekeeping operations, which provide officers and soldiers with important
professional experiences as well as financial benefits. (At present only four Burmese soldiers are
participating in United Nations activities [two each in Liberia and Sudan]).
Not surprisingly given its size, proximity, and economic and military power, China has been the most
important foreign player in Myanmar. For many years the Chinese have armed and provided sanctuary when
necessary to numerous ethnic armed groups, some of them predominantly ethnic Chinese, in Burma’s
northern frontier. During Suu Kyi’s August 2016 state visit to Beijing there were indications that Chinese

officials—whose country would benefit from legal cross-border commerce that the on-going armed conflict
has stunted—were willing to persuade some of these groups to enter the peace process.
They managed to convince some, but all three ethnic groups that would not renounce armed resistance and
therefore were prevented from attending the conference—the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army,
the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and the Arakan Army—had ties to China. Notwithstanding Beijing’s
decades-long support of Myanmar’s junta, Chinese involvement in Burma’s ethnic conflict and Beijing’s
condescending treatment of Yangon as its junior partner hint at the reasons why Tatmadaw elites, to put it
politely, are not overly fond of their colleagues north of the border.
Until recently, Western democracies and Japan have had very limited interaction with Myanmar’s armed
forces. More recently, ties between the Tatmadaw and democratic states have increased, but these links are
still very rudimentary. A number of NGOs like the Japanese Nippon Foundation have held workshops for
Tatmadaw officers in Japan focusing on democratic civil-military relations and exposed them to military life
in a democratic state. The Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC) in Yangon—funded by Norwegian, European Union,
Japanese, and UN agencies—aspires to provide technical support and promote and facilitate dialogue for the
peace process. Some of these organisations are doing useful work although a number of experts have
claimed that others, including the MPC, do more harm than good owing to their lacking understanding of the
complex historical and political background of armed non-state ethnic minorities. In recent years a number
of Western and Asian armies have started to develop relationships with their Burmese counterpart. Shared
activities have included exchange programs, training exercises, and medium- and high-level visits to foster
professionalisation and enhance international contacts.

The United States has done comparatively little military-to-military engagement with the Tatmadaw. There
are several important reasons, perhaps most importantly the reluctance to become involved in a U.S.-
Myanmar military relationship by some U.S. generals, congressional leaders, and diplomats and by some
leading circles of the Burmese military whose top elites are often divided on important issues. Washington’s
past reluctance to get involved in military-to-military activities was perfectly reasonable given that the
Obama Administration decided early on to take its cues from Aung San Suu Kyi. The U.S. position was, and
continues to be, that our key allies in the country are “the Lady” and her government who best understand
the intricate nature of domestic political issues.
In June 2012, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced at a meeting of Asian defence leaders that
the Obama Administration was open to improving military ties with the Tatmadaw if democratic reforms
continued and human rights conditions improved. In fact, prior to the U.S. imposition of sanctions on Burma
in the early 1990s when military links were frozen, the two armies cooperated on drug eradication efforts
and some Tatmadaw officers even studied in the United States under the International Military Education
and Training Program (IMET).
Despite the continuation of the democratisation process and the recent change of government, since
Panetta’s statement there has been very limited interaction between U.S. and Burmese military personnel
that included some dialogue on civil-military relations in democracies, military justice, and other basic issues.
The Tatmadaw leadership’s acceptance of the election results, their recent modifications in behaviour, and
their general willingness to collaborate with Aung San Suu Kyi’s government is certainly not sufficient reason
to throw caution to the wind and engage in a full-bore cooperation. The United States should continue to
listen to “the Lady’s” advice with regard to the armed forces. That said, given other democratic states’

attention to the Burmese military and China’s long-standing involvement in Myanmar’s military development,
it may well be time for Washington to initiate, cautiously to be sure, military-to-military relations with
Yangon.
The United States can draw on its proven and ample capacity and decades of experience to assist in the
professionalisation and democratisation of the Tatmadaw. American military colleges and academies are well
equipped to train and advise Burmese armed forces personnel on key issues, such as the rule of law, civilian
control over the military balanced between the executive and legislative branches, military withdrawal from
politics, transparency in budgeting, eschewing involvement in business and commercial ventures, etc. The
participation of Tatmadaw officers in the IMET program could be renewed and the very limited scope of
current programs expanded. Whatever the particulars, raising the level of American military-to-military
engagement with Myanmar ought to be seriously considered. At the same time, this engagement must be
leveraged and kept easily reversible. In other words, empowering the Tatmadaw in some inappropriate way
must be avoided.
America has been a steadfast supporter of Myanmar’s democratization process since it began in late 2010.
Both President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton made historic visits to Yangon. Just as importantly, the
United States has sent ambassadors to Myanmar—Derek Mitchell from 2012 to 2016, and now Scot Marciel
—who are deeply knowledgeable about the country, Southeast Asia, and democratic transitions from military
rule more generally, indicating that Washington takes Myanmar seriously. In a nation that tends to be at
best cautious of foreigners’ intentions, the United States is generally held in high regard, in sharp contrast to
the suspicious attitudes toward China and India that prevail throughout Myanmar.

The United States should not miss this opportunity. Myanmar occupies a strategic location in Southeast Asia,
and its need for political support, developmental aid—everything from infrastructure improvement to
educational programs—and targeted investment is acute. There are few societies where democracy
promotion efforts could find more fertile ground or where they would be more gratefully accepted.
Ultimately, advancing military-to-military engagement may well enhance, promote, and deepen the
professionalism and democratic outlook of Myanmar’s officer corps and accelerate their withdrawal from
politics.
By Zoltan Barany
This article was originally published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies on 13 September.
It is republished with permission.

MYANMAR-AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REPORTS 2017

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