Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence1. Leadership in
Counter-
Terrorism
Dichotomy or
Congruence
A course prepared for the Institute
of Defense Studies (IDSS),
Nanyang University, Singapore, 1st
Digitally signed by ARUNA KULATUNGA Q. 2008
ARUNA
DN: cn=ARUNA KULATUNGA,
o=Comunicamos.eu, ou=AD,
email=aruna@mac.com, c=ES By
KULATUNGA
Reason: I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
Location: Murcia, Spain Aruna Kulatunga, MBA, MHRM (Monash University)
Date: 2008.06.24 19:01:52 +02'00'
Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ Senior Consultant - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.Eu
www.comunicamos.eu
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 1
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1150865
2. Course Outline
11:00 -
9:00 - 10:45 10:45-11:00 12:30-13:30 13:30-15:15 15:15-15:30 15:30-17:00 17:00-17:15
12:30
Course
Lessons
Introduction Lessons Concepts
Day Coffee Lunch from the Coffee Day's
/ Setting from the of
1 Break Break past. Break Discussion
Outcomes, past leadership
Cont.
expectations
Leadershi
p Styles /
Negotiati
Benchma
on and
rking
Communi
cation
profiling
Change
Bringing it
Management
Applying together -
Day / Coffee Lunch Breakout Coffee Day's
the Reinforcing
2 Communicat Break Break Activity Break Discussion
lessons the
ion &
outcomes
Negotiation
Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @
www.comunicamos.eu
2
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 2
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1150865
3. Introduction World
Country
Principles
Ideas
Beliefs
The Threat Signal
The threat level: its directed at you! Religion
Family
You
The why’s of gathering knowledge
Concepts of COIN, CT & linking with
leadership
Lessons from the past - lessons for the
future
What we take back - practical tool sets
for achieving self-efficacy in leadership
Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @
www.comunicamos.eu
3
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 3
4. Introduction
Setting the outcomes &
expectations
Benchmarking best practices in CT
How to relate the BM’s to leadership
traits, theories and knowledge
Difference between tactics & strategy
The leader & manager - a necessary
dichotomy
The essence of leadership - Managing
Change
Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @
www.comunicamos.eu
4
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 4
5. Introduction
Setting the outcomes &
expectations con-td.
Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @
www.comunicamos.eu
5
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 5
6. Unit delivery
From 11:00 - 12:30
Looking at history, learning from the
past
People, incidents, tactics & strategies
Malaya, Kenya & Vietnam, Successes
and failures
Eating Soup with a Knife...
Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @
www.comunicamos.eu
6
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 6
7. Leadership profiles
Lawrence of Arabia
Chairman Mao
Ernesto Guevara
Gerald Templer
David Galula
Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @
www.comunicamos.eu
7
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 7
8. Unit delivery
From 13:30 - 15:15 - Breakout Activity
Strategies and personalities - Lessons
from the past continued...
Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @
www.comunicamos.eu
8
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 8
9. Unit delivery
From 15:30 - 17:00
Concepts of Leadership
Theories and Styles
The Unexpected Leader
The Johari window
The three lenses of leadership
Who moved my cheese? Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @
www.comunicamos.eu
The Flight of the Buffalo 9
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 9
10. Unit delivery
Day 2 - 09:00-10:45
The difference between management
and leadership: legitimate power and
control vs. empowerment and change -
Jooste.K (2004)
What is Change?
Theories of Change Management
The two legs of Change -
Communication & Negotiation
Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @
More on empowerment... www.comunicamos.eu
10
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 10
11. Unit delivery
Day 2 - 11:00 - 12:30
Taking a look back at Day One’s
lessons from the past
Can we apply what we know in Day
Two, from concepts of leadership,
change management, communication
and negotiations, to these “incidents
from the past”?
What toolkits do we need to apply our
theories into practical realities?
Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @
Can we benchmark and identify best www.comunicamos.eu
practices in contextual leadership? 11
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 11
12. Unit delivery
Day 2 - 13:30 - 15-15
Realigning ourselves - lets take some
quizzes - what’s my leadership style &
how well do I communicate
Lessons on feedback
Double loop learning
A short introduction to knowledge
management and its importance to
leaders
Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @
Group activity - !to be decided! www.comunicamos.eu
12
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 12
13. Unit delivery
Day 2 - 15:30 - 17:00
Reinforcing the outcomes from group
activities
Bringing it together -
Organizations must rely on the
knowledge, skills, experience and
judgement of all its people..not a select
handful...
Leadership is an enabler - not a barrier Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @
www.comunicamos.eu
13
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 13
14. Introduction
Setting the outcomes &
expectations con-td.
Take away a Toolkit for Leaders
Change Management
Communication
Negotiation
Concepts of permeability
Access, Trust, Confidentiality,
Consistency, Continuity
Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @
www.comunicamos.eu
14
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15. Introduction
Setting the outcomes &
expectations con-td.
Participation..Participation...Participati
on
Respect to all
No disturbances - mobile phones must
be off!
Questions and queries at any time
Enlightened debate & contribution Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @
www.comunicamos.eu
15
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 15
16. Lessons from
the past
Session II (11:00 - 12:30)
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com)
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 16
18. History of Guerilla warfare
Diminutive form of the Spanish word for war
“Guerra”
Derived from Spanish partidas actions against French
in 1808-14
First documented guerilla activity in a Hittite
parchment, 15 Century B.C.
Mao Tse Tung’s writings not much different to Sun
Tzu’s “Art of War” first written in 400 BC
Continuous evidence of guerilla warfare through out
history
Terrorism - a form of guerilla warfare with actions
targeting civilian life and property
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge., p.1
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19. History of Guerilla warfare...
All guerilla actions, insurgency, terrorism, small wars,
urban revolutions, have one constant, a single thread,
through out history
A degree of support from some sections of the
population who was willing to provide the
combatant refuge in time of need, provisions
and succor information
Johannes Most
Considered a pioneer of both modern urban
revolution and international terrorism -
Published a work on the systematic use of terror
by small groups of activists utilizing the most
modern technology available in 1884 (Beckett.p.15)
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge. p.1
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20. Thomas Edward Lawrence
Lawrence’s Six Fundamental Principles Of Insurgency
First, a successful guerrilla movement must have
an unassailable base.
Second, the guerrilla must have a technologically
sophisticated enemy.
Third, the enemy must be sufficiently weak in
numbers so as to be unable to occupy the
disputed territory in depth with a system of Schneider, James J.(2005) "T.E.Lawrence and the Mind
of the Insurgent." Army July.
interlocking fortified posts.
Fourth, the guerrilla must have at least the
passive support of the populace, if not its full
involvement.
Fifth, the irregular force must have the
fundamental qualities of speed, endurance,
presence and logistical independence.
Sixth, the irregular must be sufficiently advanced
in weaponry to strike at the enemy’s logistics and
signals vulnerabilities. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
Schneider, James J.(2005) "T.E.Lawrence and the Mind of the Insurgent." Army July: p 34.
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21. T.E. Lawrence...
Personal credibility and role remains controversial Propaganda
Does not desist from original guerilla theory “the greatest
espoused by Lawrence weapon in the
armory of a
Perceived the importance of popular support with modern
2% active support could achieve victory given the commander”
remaining 98% acquiesced or sympathized
Defined command as a function of - Algebraic -
biological - psychological (motivation, morale)
impetus
Followers include
Mao
Wingate
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge., p.19-20
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Tuesday, 24 June 2008 21
22. Orde Wingate...
Helped to train the Haganah
Enlisted Haganah help to run
clandestine attack groups to protect
oil pipeline from Iraq to Port of
Haifa
The Gideon Force
Chindits
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge. p.47
22
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23. Mao Tse Tung...
“The
richest
source of
power to
Born in Hunan Province wage war
lies in the
Son of a farmer who provided the son with a masses of
high school education people”
After a series of defeats relating to attacks on
Nationalists held cities, Mao changes direction
from an urban proletariat led revolution to rural
peasant led insurgency in 1930.
Shift in emphasis termed the “single most vital
decision” in the history of the CCP.
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.20
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Mao developed Clausewitz theory and utilised it on the ground. The same theory applies in CT. As much as the Terrorist uses the masses or his/her own purposes, by acknowledging and
identifying the power of the people, turn it against the Terrorist
24. Mao’s 3 Rules and 8 Remarks
Rules
All actions are subject to “The
Unity of
command Spirit”
Do not steal from the people between
Be neither selfish or unjust the
troops
Remarks and the
Replace the door when you leave people
the house
Roll up the bedding on which you
have slept
Be courteous
Be honest in your transactions
Return what you borrow
Replace what you break
Do not bathe in the presence of
women
Do not without authority search
those you arrest
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.22
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25. The fish swimming in the water... “To gain territory is
no cause for joy and to
lose territory is no
cause for sorrow. To
lose territory or cities
is of no importance.
Mao description of a revolutionary as relying on the The important thing
people for support - “Like a fish swimming in the is to think up ways of
water” destroying the
enemy” (Becket, 2005, p.73)
While the fish can be killed by polluting the water,
this is not a desirable course of action -Frank Kitson
Trading space for time, first enumerated by
Lawrence, leaving the Turks in Medina
“Politics is war without bloodshed. War is politics
with bloodshed” (Becket, 2005, p.73)
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.28
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26. Ho Chi Minh...
Nguyen Tat Thanh - (Ho Chi Minh)
Wrote a chapter on guerilla warfare
in a 1928 soviet guide to insurrection. http://encarta.msn.com/media_461526436_761558397_-1_1/Ho_Chi_Minh.html
(It was the only chapter on guerilla
warfare)
Controversial...but no dispute of his
influence over the 20th century
world events
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge. , p.60
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27. Viet Minh vs the French...
Widespread and systematic use of
terror by VM
Elimination of old administrative
structures
killing village elders and officials in
guerilla zones
LTTE in Sri Lanka eliminated
nearly 70% of elders, some of
whom nurtured the LTTE in its
early days
Repeated indiscriminate bombing of
civilian targets ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
Corbett, Robin, and Francis Toase.(1986)Guerilla Warfare - from 1939 to the Present Day. London: Orbis., p.50
27
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28. COIN in early USSR...
Mikhail Tukhachevsky
Executed later by Stalin, considered by
some to be a father of modern COIN
Stressed the need to take account local
values and culture
Emphasized on single point of control
over all aspects of the COIN response
Suggested pseudo-gangs
BUT, also was in favor of gulags, large
scale evictions, assumption of collective
guilt and collective punishments
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge., p.50
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29. Mistaken identities..
“True
power of
Antoine Henry Jomini the armies
rest in the
Prescribed annihilation of the enemy people and
force as best route to achieve victory their
Destruction of the enemy force on governmen
the field t”
Carl Von Clausewitz
Victory is when the political
objectives on which the war is being
fought are accomplished
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.18
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Tuesday, 24 June 2008 29
In most small wars and insurgencies, the Clausewitz principle has stood in favour of the insurgents, a point to remember.
Mau Mau is a classic example. Kenyatta - Kenya
Nagl states one person who leveraged Clausewitz was Mao Tse - Tung
30. Tache d'huile - Stain of oil
Concept developed first by Thomas Bugeaud in
French Algeria in 1840
Refined further by other Frenchmen in 1890 and in
1912
Extending French control more effectively
through a dual military - political strategy
Solider - administrators with a dual role
Systematically spreading influence
Conquest not by mighty blows, but as patch of
oil spreads
Reassuring local leaders France will uphold
traditional authority
Soldiers acting as administrators, farmers,
teachers, workshop managers...
Aim of assimilation rather than subjugation
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge. p.40-41
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32. David Galula - a personal war...
“ Outwardly treat
every civlian as a
friend; inwardly
Commanded troops for two years in Kabliya, East of consider him a rebel
Algiers till you have proof to
the contrary”
First hand experience serving as military attaché in
China at the beginning of Mao’s government and
subsequently in Hong Kong, observing Huk
insurgency in the Philippines, the Malayan
emergency and French efforts to maintain its empire
in Indochina
Need for doctrine - (disputed by Kitson and Nagl)
Recognition of FNL urban terrorist strategy as
’s
driven by force multiplication efforts of propaganda
- more effect in the cities
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
Galula, David. Pacification in Algeria :1956–1958. Santa Monica: Rand, 2006., (From Bruce Hoffmanʼs foreward to the new
edition (2006) p v-vii) 32
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 32
33. David Galula - a personal war...
Imperative of not alienating the local
population
Emphasis on policing rather than
military tactics to defeat insurrection
Fallacy of a decapitation strategy
Propaganda, propaganda, propaganda
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
Galula, David. Pacification in Algeria :1956–1958. Santa Monica: Rand, 2006., (From Bruce Hoffmanʼs foreward to the new
edition (2006) p v-vii) 33
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 33
34. The Philippines - 1898 Spanish
American War
USA’s most successful instance of
counterinsurgency theory and
practice
In addition to military measures
Propaganda
Cash
Bounties for surrendered
weapons
Comprehensive public works
program
Military measures included the
imprisonment, deportation and
“defeating” insurgents who
maintained antagonism against the ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.46
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35. British in Malaya...
Background...
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
35
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36. Lt. Gen. Harold Briggs
Unusual grasp of the political nature
of insurgency and of measures
required to defeat it.
“In the early days we didn't grasp how Corbett, Robin, and Francis Toase.(1986)Guerilla
Warfare - from 1939 to the Present Day. London: Orbis.P.
56
important the support of the local
people was. It wasn’t until Briggs that
we understood that the CTs got all of
their support - food, supplies,
intelligence - from the local people” -
a veteran of the Malaya emergency.
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.71
36
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37. Harold Briggs...
Promoted cooperation between military, police and
civil arms of the government
Cooperation extended from the top to the bottom,
pervading across all hierarchies through a system of
integrated committees - Solving the problem of
pulling in opposite directions
Emphasized the importance of intelligence gathering
Used intelligence in targeted, intensive, but small-
scale operations
Concentrated full attention on fringe Chinese
villages, improving, consolidating and isolating the
villages from the CTs. - The draining the water process
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
Corbett, Robin, and Francis Toase.(1986)Guerilla Warfare - from 1939 to the Present Day. London: Orbis., p.56
37
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 37
38. Harold Briggs...
Flexibility of operations in the jungle
- key note
Battalion commanders being
reconciled to devolve leadership to
where it matters, NCO’s taking
responsibility to make decisions on
the spot
“New Villages” stopped the fish from
moving in the water and when the
CT came into replenish his supplies,
he ran the risk of being caught in the
shallows!
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.74 38
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 38
39. Lt. Col. Walter Walker..Malaya
Traveling light and knowing the land;
the coming of the Ferrets
The Jungle war fare school in the old
asylum...Determined personal
leadership...pushing the boundaries
of hierachy
“For training only” Flame throwing
cartridges - using available resources
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.
68-70
39
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Lawrence, Wingate, Calvert - unorthodox, eccentric?
Walker, Kitson, De La Billiere, - exceptional leaders
Paul, James, and Martin Spirit. "General Sir Peter De La Billiere". 2005. www.britains-smallwars.com. 16 Mar. 2007. <http://www.britains-smallwars.com/gulf/Billiere.html>.
40. Walter Walker...
Bypassing command hierarchies, going direct to the
top appealing for change(Other officers also similarly
oriented towards positive change - Walker not an
isolated case)
Walker’s superiors were generally available but not
quite open to analytical thinking: - the case of the
open top transport lorries
Different cultures in the field and at the HQ - Field
wants innovative techniques implemented - HQ
keeping records, looking for patterns and puzzling
over the results
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.
79-80 40
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 40
41. Walter Walker...
“It is ..(because) of
this handbook...we
got militant
Inviting feedback and implementing suggestions - communism in Malaya
Surrendered CTs used to evaluate units in operations by the throat” -
Templer (Nagl. p.98)
Operational innovations through learning from the
CTs - crossing streams walking backwards -
Purposefully leaving footprints
(Practices later abandoned in COIN
operations in Vietnam, VCs learnt quickly
to identify false trails by weight patterns)
Introduction of ATOM (The Conduct of Anti-
terrorist operations in Malaya) to codify and
indoctrinate COIN practices learnt through Jungle
School
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.97
41
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42. Oliver Lyttelton - Colonial
Secretary
“You cannot win the
war without the help
of the population and
you cannot get the
“Emergency is in essence a Police rather than a support of the
military task” population without at
least beginning to win
Creating and arming a Chinese home guard- the war”
propaganda starting from the school- “Children
coming back $om school convert the parents to our way of
thinking in the long term war of ideas, which we must win
if we are to see a peaceful country and one which can some
day be entrusted with self- government within the British
commonwealth”
Sets the end-game clearly in instructions to Templer:
- “Malaya should in due course become a fu'y self-
governing nation” (p. 88)
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.
76-77 42
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 42
Converting Prabhakaranʼs children
UNP government in 2003 issues Passport to Charles Anthony,
http://origin.island.lk/2003/02/26/news09.html
43. Gerald Templer...
Suborned the fight against CTs to achieving nationhood,
merging the British objective with that of the local
population.
Uses symbolic language in the discourse of war
Shows resilience and personal courage- Travels to residence
in the bullet-ridden car in which his predecessor was
assassinated just days before on arrival in Malaya Corbet, 1986, p57-59
Cuts across hierarchies and involves younger civil servants
in the decision making process “The Malayan people
Starts at the bottom - first things first - make political can count on the
progress at local level powerful and
continuing assistance
Involves local leadership in taking responsibility for of His Majesty’s
directing the war effort government not only
Listens to and incorporates suggestions from Junior in the immediate task
officers - a secret ballot to collect information on CTs. of defeating the
terrorists, but in the
Physical Stamina- Tours the country unceasingly
longer term objective
©Aruna forging a United Comunicamos.eu
of Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT /
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
Malayan nation”
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.
88-89 43
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 43
discourse of war
symbols, legends, repetitive messages, the just war, futile war etc.
Secret Ballot - remedied the situation where householders were scared of giving information. Given the secret ballot was enforced, i.e., balloting was compulsory, there was no indication who
provided the information
44. Templer’s six laws...
Get the priorities right
Get the instructions right
Get the organization right
Get the right people into the
organization
Get the right spirit into the people
Leave them to get on with it
Dividing the intelligence functions - Director of
Intelligence to analyze and report - Special Branch to
collect and collate
Dividing responsibility efficiently
Energized the situation
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.
90-91 44
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 44
Incident of Templer’s boots (with Templar in them) suddenly standing on he
paperwork on top of a policeman’s desk.
45. Gerald Templer...
Entrusting responsibility to junior
officers and backing them up with
personal authority
Unconventional behavior - Issuing
orders from the bathtub (Orde
Wingate was also known for his
eccentric bath routines...)
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.
95-96 45
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 45
Wingate rarely bathed..prefered to scrub himself with a rubber brush...jungle warfare teaches soldiers to disguise body smell with
mud and leaves, never to use soap, enemy trackers use smell to identify spoor
46. Gerald Templer...
“Military Force
cannot change
opinion, it can only
Expanding “oil spots” of security - Standardized and
create a framework in
carried out throughout in an identical pattern
which economic
Use of pseudo Gangs- Mainly to trick CTs into reform and good
surrendering- CTs eliminated only if there were no government can take
other options effect”
Focussing on priorities - “To hell with drill, we want
them to handle weapons and lay ambushes”-
(Negative impact in today’s warfare -
untrained and undisciplined units -
operational nightmares)
Ability to coordinate all of the efforts - Social,
political, economical, civilian - police and military
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.98
-100 46
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 46
47. Gerald Templer...
Effective Feedback Loops in place..
Giving time to “Belly ache”
Subordinates offered substantiated
criticism
Suggestions incorporated
The final version is owned by all, but
had the personal authority of
Templer
Never being afraid of bad news
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.
104 47
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48. Hugh Green...
Providing a credible alternative -
Cash rewards and rehabilitation for
surrenders
Persuading the people that the
government is capable of providing
essential services and defeating the
CTs.
Using ex-CTs in the PsyWar effort
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.93
48
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Propaganda head.. (later DG/BBC)
49. British in Malaya...
Spirit of Innovation
No single doctrine - Freedom, and Wingate - Gideon
Force, Chingits
the necessity to create own answers Calvert -Malayan
Scouts
Recognition that situations differ and Walker-Ferrets
are dynamic
There is no right answer to all the
questions
Recognition that there is little
assistance from the center
Therefore, the need to adopt, make
do
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.
194-195 49
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 49
50. British in Malaya...
Implement locally
Feedback Loops
Monitor effectiveness
Open to suggestions from below Innovate
Change if necessary
Getting the decision making authority to
allow innovation, monitor effectiveness,
transmit new ideas with requirements that it
be followed throughout the organization Transmit globally Monitor continously
Organization is not global
Can be divisional
Rarely more than country
No risks to social standing of superior officer to
accept suggestion from junior
British organization culture, club, old school, etc,
helps ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.
195 50
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 50
51. Implement locally
Monitor effectiveness
Innovate
Change if necessary
Transmit globally Monitor continously
51
©Aruna Kulatunga
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 51
52. British in Malaya...
“The solution (to the
Malaya
Strategic and shared vision Emergency) ...is in the
hands of all of us, the
Briggs peoples of Malaya and
the governments
Putting the campaign in proper perspective which serve them” -
Templer (Nagl p.197)
Military component vis-à-vis political and
economic components
Templer / Lytellton
Continued to put into effect the Briggs plan
Shared vision
Templer insisting all subordinates share the
vision
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.
195-196 52
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 52
53. British in Malaya...
Use of strict doctrine discouraged
Each theater is different and needs
its own policy
Shaping the respond to local and
immediate need
Experience teaches what works and
what does not
Doctrine is only as basis for training
and equipping
Training to be up to date, effective
and extremely flexible- Troops
informed immediately of changes in
training ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.
204
53
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54. British in Malaya...
Difference between Westmoreland
and Templer
Templer makes Walter Walker write a
field manual based on local
experiences and tactics used
Westmoreland requests doctrine
from Washington
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.210 54
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 54
55. Thompson’s Five principles of
counterinsurgency
The government must have a clear political aim; to
establish and maintain a free, independent and
united country which is politically and economically
stable and viable.
The government must function in accordance with
the law
The government must have an overall plan
The government must give priority to defeating the
political subversion, not the guerilla
In the guerilla phase of an insurgency, a government
must secure its base areas first
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.29
55
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 55
Nagl states that what will determine the final outcome of COIN theory and practice is whether or not the national objective has been attained. Taking Thompsonʼs first principle as the ultimate
national objective, how many governments has been successful in applying COIN theory?
Thompson served in Malaya and Kenya, and is senior to Kitson
56. Fighting for the right reasons?
Clausewitz - War must always be
subordinate to the political goals for
which it is being fought
Analyze current conflicts based on
this percept
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.31
56
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Iraq -
Afghanistan
Indonesia
Eastern Timor
57. Intellectual Soldiers...
“The Defence of Duffer’s Drift” by
Maj. Gen. Ernest Swinton
An intellectual soldier in an un-
intellectual organization
The importance of thinking, reading,
writing and learning based on your
own experiences and passing it down
to the future generations.
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.37
57
Tuesday, 24 June 2008 57
Link it with learning organisation
58. Did the British fail in Ireland...
Lack of good police intelligence
- which is at the heart of
counterinsurgency and;
The nonexistence, from the
government side, of an “hearts &
minds” exercise, which the IRA was
abundantly involved in
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.40
58
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59. 250 Years of Learning...
John Adams (c.1818) - The Revolution was in the
Hearts and Minds of the people
Gerald Templar (c.1950) - The answer lies not in
pouring more troops to the jungle, but in hearts and
minds of the people
Marqués de Santa Cruz (Spain c. 1724-30) -
Cautioned against trying to alter the traditions and
customs of people under occupation, recommending
amnesties granted soon after ceasing hostilities (Becket,
2005, p.26)
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
Clutterbuck, Richard L.(1967)The Long Long War : The Emergency in Malaya 1948-1960. London: Cassell., p.3
59
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60. Situation in Vietnam from a US
perspective
End goal never clear - Were the
French genuine in devolving power
back to the Vietnamese post WWII?
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.118
60
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Nagl talks of French making empty promises
61. Vietnam from...
“I consider it a
Questions of credibility from the beginning - victory, we took the
General Paul Harkins - 1st Commander of the objective” - Gen.
Military Assistance Command (MAC-V) - Harkin in Ap Bac
Known to be liberal with the truth debacle
Admiral Harry Felt - CINC-PAC - Overly
optimistic
Killing the messenger -
Lt. Col. John Paul Vann
Col. Daniel Porter
Brig. Gen. Robert York
Honest review of Ap Bac battlefield debacle
dismissed by Harkin
York was not inside the chain of command at MAC-
V. Lack of authority may have led to York’s inability
to create an institutional consensus that change was
needed
©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu
(aruna@mtaconsult.com)
NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.134
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