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A Preliminary Conceptualization and Analysis on Automated
Static Analysis Tools for Vulnerability Detection in Android Apps
Giammaria Giordano, Fabio Palomba, Filomena Ferrucci
University of Salerno (Italy)

Software Engineering (SeSa) Lab

Department of Computer Science

giagiordano@unisa.it
GiammariaGiord1
https://broke31.github.io/giammaria-giordano/
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
18,22
17,72
16,8
15,96
14,91
14,2
Didascalia
https://www.statista.com/statistics/245501/multiple-mobile-device-ownership-worldwide/
Number of Mobile Devices Worldwide from 2020 to 2025 (in billions)
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
18,22
17,72
16,8
15,96
14,91
14,2
Didascalia
https://www.statista.com/statistics/245501/multiple-mobile-device-ownership-worldwide/
Number of Mobile Devices Worldwide from 2020 to 2025 (in billions)
80% of mobile devices are Android devices
Number of Mobile Devices Worldwide from 2020 to 2025 (in billions)
https://www.statista.com/statistics/245501/multiple-mobile-device-ownership-worldwide/
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
18,22
17,72
16,8
15,96
14,91
14,2
80% of mobile devices are Android devices
Current World Population 8 billions
Although the vastness of proposed tools, we noticed
a lack of empirical evaluation on the real capability
of these static analysis tools to detect vulnerabilities
RQ2 - What are the capabilities of existing automated
static analysis tools in terms of mobile app analyzability,
frequency of detection, and complementarity among
them?
RQ1 - What are the vulnerability types identi
fi
ed by
existing automated static analysis tools for mobile apps?
Research Questions
How did we address the RQs?
For the
fi
rst RQ, we manually extracted a taxonomy of risks
How did we address the RQs?
For the
fi
rst RQ, we manually extracted a taxonomy of risks
For the second RQ, we analyzed the tools from a
qualitative point of view by analyzing the frequencies
of risk detection and the complementarity among
them
Search Strategy
+6,500
Apps
Search Strategy
+6,500
Apps
AndroBugs
Trueseeing
Insider
Search Strategy
+6,500
Apps
Search Strategy
AndroBugs
Trueseeing
Insider
+6,500
Apps
Research
Question 1
Research
Question 2
Search Strategy
AndroBugs
Trueseeing
Insider
RQ2 - What are the capabilities of existing automated
static analysis tools in terms of mobile app analyzability,
frequency of detection, and complementarity among
them?
Research Questions
RQ1 - What are the vulnerability types identi
fi
ed by
existing automated static analysis tools for mobile apps?
Security-Related
Concerns
AUTHENT
ICATION
ACCESS
Insecure
Manifest
External
Resources
Improper
Access Control
Code
Tampering
Code
Obfuscation
Insecure Data Insu
ffi
cient
Cryptography
Other Privacy Permission
Privacy Concern
Clear Text
Storage of
sensitive
information
Expose sensitive
information to
Unauthorized
actors un
Sensitive
Information
Base64 String
Encryption
Cryptography
Constants
Detection
Cipher Might Be
Operating In ECB
Mode
Detected
O
ff
uscator
Lack of
Obfuscation
Hardcode
Certi
fi
cates
Remove
Android
Device Lock
by Rouge app
KeyStore
Insecure Mixed
Content mode
Detected Possible
IPV4 Address
SSL Security
Server-Side
Request Forgery
Insecure TLS
Lack of pinning
Use of clear text
HTTP
Insecure
Communication
Manipulable
Activity
Manifest
ContentProvider
Exported
Debuggable
Manipulable
Backups
WebView
Detected Format
String
Detected Library
Detected possible
FQDN
Detected path
component
Detected URL
Detected Logging
External storage
Accessing
Database
Manifest Dangerous
Protection Level of
Permission
Manifest Critical
Permission
Unnecessary
Permission
App Sandbox
Permission
Insecure File
Permission
Open Permission
Strandhogg
Bypass permission
Command
Security-Related
Concerns
AUTHENT
ICATION
ACCESS
Insecure
Manifest
External
Resources
Improper
Access Control
Code
Tampering
Code
Obfuscation
Insecure Data Insu
ffi
cient
Cryptography
Other Privacy Permission
Privacy Concern
Clear Text
Storage of
sensitive
information
Expose sensitive
information to
Unauthorized
actors un
Sensitive
Information
Base64 String
Encryption
Cryptography
Constants
Detection
Cipher Might Be
Operating In ECB
Mode
Detected
O
ff
uscator
Lack of
Obfuscation
Hardcode
Certi
fi
cates
Remove
Android
Device Lock
by Rouge app
KeyStore
Insecure Mixed
Content mode
Detected Possible
IPV4 Address
SSL Security
Server-Side
Request Forgery
Insecure TLS
Lack of pinning
Use of clear text
HTTP
Insecure
Communication
Manipulable
Activity
Manifest
ContentProvider
Exported
Debuggable
Manipulable
Backups
WebView
Detected Format
String
Detected Library
Detected possible
FQDN
Detected path
component
Detected URL
Detected Logging
External storage
Accessing
Database
Manifest Dangerous
Protection Level of
Permission
Manifest Critical
Permission
Unnecessary
Permission
App Sandbox
Permission
Insecure File
Permission
Open Permission
Strandhogg
Bypass permission
Command
AUTHENTICATION
ACCESS
Insecure Mixed
Content mode
Detected Possible
IPV4 Address
SSL Security
Server-Side Request
Forgery
Insecure TLS
Lack of pinning
Use of clear text HTTP
Insecure
Communication
Security-Related
Concerns
AUTHENT
ICATION
ACCESS
Insecure
Manifest
External
Resources
Improper
Access Control
Code
Tampering
Code
Obfuscation
Insecure Data Insu
ffi
cient
Cryptography
Other Privacy Permission
Privacy Concern
Clear Text
Storage of
sensitive
information
Expose sensitive
information to
Unauthorized
actors un
Sensitive
Information
Base64 String
Encryption
Cryptography
Constants
Detection
Cipher Might Be
Operating In ECB
Mode
Detected
O
ff
uscator
Lack of
Obfuscation
Hardcode
Certi
fi
cates
Remove
Android
Device Lock
by Rouge app
KeyStore
Insecure Mixed
Content mode
Detected Possible
IPV4 Address
SSL Security
Server-Side
Request Forgery
Insecure TLS
Lack of pinning
Use of clear text
HTTP
Insecure
Communication
Manipulable
Activity
Manifest
ContentProvider
Exported
Debuggable
Manipulable
Backups
WebView
Detected Format
String
Detected Library
Detected possible
FQDN
Detected path
component
Detected URL
Detected Logging
External storage
Accessing
Database
Manifest Dangerous
Protection Level of
Permission
Manifest Critical
Permission
Unnecessary
Permission
App Sandbox
Permission
Insecure File
Permission
Open Permission
Strandhogg
Bypass permission
Command
Insecure Manifest
Manipulable Activity
Manifest
ContentProvider
Exported
Debuggable
Manipulable Backups
Security-Related
Concerns
AUTHENT
ICATION
ACCESS
Insecure
Manifest
External
Resources
Improper
Access Control
Code
Tampering
Code
Obfuscation
Insecure Data Insu
ffi
cient
Cryptography
Other Privacy Permission
Privacy Concern
Clear Text
Storage of
sensitive
information
Expose sensitive
information to
Unauthorized
actors un
Sensitive
Information
Base64 String
Encryption
Cryptography
Constants
Detection
Cipher Might Be
Operating In ECB
Mode
Detected
O
ff
uscator
Lack of
Obfuscation
Hardcode
Certi
fi
cates
Remove
Android
Device Lock
by Rouge app
KeyStore
Insecure Mixed
Content mode
Detected Possible
IPV4 Address
SSL Security
Server-Side
Request Forgery
Insecure TLS
Lack of pinning
Use of clear text
HTTP
Insecure
Communication
Manipulable
Activity
Manifest
ContentProvider
Exported
Debuggable
Manipulable
Backups
WebView
Detected Format
String
Detected Library
Detected possible
FQDN
Detected path
component
Detected URL
Detected Logging
External storage
Accessing
Database
Manifest Dangerous
Protection Level of
Permission
Manifest Critical
Permission
Unnecessary
Permission
App Sandbox
Permission
Insecure File
Permission
Open Permission
Strandhogg
Bypass permission
Command
External Resources
WebView
Detected Format String
Detected Library
Detected possible
FQDN
Detected path
component
Detected URL
Security-Related
Concerns
AUTHENT
ICATION
ACCESS
Insecure
Manifest
External
Resources
Improper
Access Control
Code
Tampering
Code
Obfuscation
Insecure Data Insu
ffi
cient
Cryptography
Other Privacy Permission
Privacy Concern
Clear Text
Storage of
sensitive
information
Expose sensitive
information to
Unauthorized
actors un
Sensitive
Information
Base64 String
Encryption
Cryptography
Constants
Detection
Cipher Might Be
Operating In ECB
Mode
Detected
O
ff
uscator
Lack of
Obfuscation
Hardcode
Certi
fi
cates
Remove
Android
Device Lock
by Rouge app
KeyStore
Insecure Mixed
Content mode
Detected Possible
IPV4 Address
SSL Security
Server-Side
Request Forgery
Insecure TLS
Lack of pinning
Use of clear text
HTTP
Insecure
Communication
Manipulable
Activity
Manifest
ContentProvider
Exported
Debuggable
Manipulable
Backups
WebView
Detected Format
String
Detected Library
Detected possible
FQDN
Detected path
component
Detected URL
Detected Logging
External storage
Accessing
Database
Manifest Dangerous
Protection Level of
Permission
Manifest Critical
Permission
Unnecessary
Permission
App Sandbox
Permission
Insecure File
Permission
Open Permission
Strandhogg
Bypass permission
Command
Improper Access
Control
Remove Android Device
Lock by Rouge app
KeyStore
Security-Related
Concerns
AUTHENT
ICATION
ACCESS
Insecure
Manifest
External
Resources
Improper
Access Control
Code
Tampering
Code
Obfuscation
Insecure Data
Insu
ffi
cient Cryptography Other Privacy Permission
Privacy Concern
Clear Text
Storage of
sensitive
information
Expose sensitive
information to
Unauthorized
actors un
Sensitive
Information
Base64 String
Encryption
Cryptography
Constants
Detection
Cipher Might Be
Operating In ECB
Mode
Detected
O
ff
uscator
Lack of
Obfuscation
Hardcode
Certi
fi
cates
Remove
Android
Device Lock
by Rouge app
KeyStore
Insecure Mixed
Content mode
Detected Possible
IPV4 Address
SSL Security
Server-Side
Request Forgery
Insecure TLS
Lack of pinning
Use of clear text
HTTP
Insecure
Communication
Manipulable
Activity
Manifest
ContentProvider
Exported
Debuggable
Manipulable
Backups
WebView
Detected Format
String
Detected Library
Detected possible
FQDN
Detected path
component
Detected URL
Detected Logging
External storage
Accessing
Database
Manifest Dangerous
Protection Level of
Permission
Manifest Critical
Permission
Unnecessary
Permission
App Sandbox
Permission
Insecure File
Permission
Open Permission
Strandhogg
Bypass permission
Command
Results indicate that these tools can be used to
support developers with the identi
fi
cation of 11 high-
level vulnerability categories and 41 low-level ones
Security-Related
Concerns
AUTHENT
ICATION
ACCESS
Insecure
Manifest
External
Resources
Improper
Access Control
Code
Tampering
Code
Obfuscation
Insecure Data
Insu
ffi
cient Cryptography Other Privacy Permission
Privacy Concern
Clear Text
Storage of
sensitive
information
Expose sensitive
information to
Unauthorized
actors un
Sensitive
Information
Base64 String
Encryption
Cryptography
Constants
Detection
Cipher Might Be
Operating In ECB
Mode
Detected
O
ff
uscator
Lack of
Obfuscation
Hardcode
Certi
fi
cates
Remove
Android
Device Lock
by Rouge app
KeyStore
Insecure Mixed
Content mode
Detected Possible
IPV4 Address
SSL Security
Server-Side
Request Forgery
Insecure TLS
Lack of pinning
Use of clear text
HTTP
Insecure
Communication
Manipulable
Activity
Manifest
ContentProvider
Exported
Debuggable
Manipulable
Backups
WebView
Detected Format
String
Detected Library
Detected possible
FQDN
Detected path
component
Detected URL
Detected Logging
External storage
Accessing
Database
Manifest Dangerous
Protection Level of
Permission
Manifest Critical
Permission
Unnecessary
Permission
App Sandbox
Permission
Insecure File
Permission
Open Permission
Strandhogg
Bypass permission
Command
Results indicate that these tools can be used to
support developers with the identi
fi
cation of 11 high-
level vulnerability categories and 41 low-level ones
Most of the vulnerabilities found refer to
Insecure Communication, Insecure Manifest,
External Resources and Privacy
Category Tools
Improper Platform Usage
Androbugs
Trueeseeing
Insecure Data Storage
Androbugs
Trueeseeing
Insecure Communication
Androbugs
Insider

Trueeseeing
Insu
ffi
cient Authentication
Androbugs
Trueeseeing
Insu
ffi
cient Cryptography Trueseeing
Insecure Authorization 
Client Code Quality 
Code tampering Trueeseeing
Reverse Engineering 
Extraneous Functionality 
Key
fi
ndings of RQ1 - Vulnerabilities Identi
fi
ed by Tools
Category Tools
Improper Platform Usage
Androbugs
Trueeseeing
Insecure Data Storage
Androbugs
Trueeseeing
Insecure Communication
Androbugs
Insider

Trueeseeing
Insu
ffi
cient Authentication
Androbugs
Trueeseeing
Insu
ffi
cient Cryptography Trueseeing
Insecure Authorization 
Client Code Quality 
Code tampering Trueeseeing
Reverse Engineering 
Extraneous Functionality 
OWASP Mobile Top-10

2016
Key
fi
ndings of RQ1 - Vulnerabilities Identi
fi
ed by Tools
Key
fi
ndings of RQ1 - Vulnerabilities Identi
fi
ed by Tools
Category Tools
Improper Platform Usage
Androbugs
Trueeseeing
Insecure Data Storage
Androbugs
Trueeseeing
Insecure Communication
Androbugs
Insider

Trueeseeing
Insu
ffi
cient Authentication
Androbugs
Trueeseeing
Insu
ffi
cient Cryptography Trueseeing
Insecure Authorization 
Client Code Quality 
Code tampering Trueeseeing
Reverse Engineering 
Extraneous Functionality 
OWASP Mobile Top-10

2016
We found that these tools only partially cover the
top-10 risks by OWASP
RQ1 - What are the vulnerability types identi
fi
ed by
existing automated static analysis tools for mobile apps?
Research Questions
RQ2 - What are the capabilities of existing automated
static analysis tools in terms of mobile app analyzability,
frequency of detection, and complementarity among
them?
Androbugs
Trueeseeing
Insider
Number of failures
0 425 850 1275 1700
RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of
mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them?
Androbugs
Trueeseeing
Insider
Number of failures
0 425 850 1275 1700
Androbugs and Insider fails in 20% of the cases,
while, Trueseeing in 25% of the cases
RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of
mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them?
Androbugs
Trueeseeing
Insider
Number of failures
0 425 850 1275 1700
Androbugs and Insider fails in 20% of the cases,
while, Trueseeing in 25% of the cases
We found that these tools typically fail due to
miscon
fi
guration and wrong dependencies
usage
RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of
mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them?
WebView
SSL Security
Sensitive Information
External Storage
StrandHogg
Implicit Intent
Command
KeyStore
Hacker
Remove Android Device Lock
Frequency of Detection
0 4.000 8.000 12.000 16.000
RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of
mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them?
Androbugs
Developers require an external
webpage and a malicious user could
inject using JavaScript malicious
components inside the webpage
WebView
RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of
mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them?
Androbugs
WebView
SSL Security
Sensitive Information
External Storage
StrandHogg
Implicit Intent
Command
KeyStore
Hacker
Remove Android Device Lock
Frequency of Detection
0 4.000 8.000 12.000 16.000
In almost 50% of the cases, the tools identi
fi
ed ‘Web
View’ and ‘SSL Security’ vulnerabilities: these pertain to
the ‘External Resources’ and ‘Insecure Communication’
categories of the taxonomy
RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of
mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them?
Detect Logging
Detect URL
Detect Possible FQDN
Detect Library
Detect Format String
Cyptographic Constants
Detect Path Component
Open Permission
Detect Possible IPV4 Address
Manipulable Broadcast Reveiver
Frequency of Detection
0 150.000 300.000 450.000 600.000
RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of
mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them?
Trueeseeing
RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of
mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them?
if (verifyUsername(username) && verifyPassword(password)) {


loginOK();


logger.log(Level.INFO, "Username: " + username);


logger.log(Level.INFO, "Password: " + password);


}
Detect Logging
fi
le
Developers could accidentally write
sensitive information in a log file, and
an attacker could identify these
information to try an attack
Trueeseeing
Detect Logging
Detect URL
Detect Possible FQDN
Detect Library
Detect Format String
Cyptographic Constants
Detect Path Component
Open Permission
Detect Possible IPV4 Address
Manipulable Broadcast Reveiver
Frequency of Detection
0 150.000 300.000 450.000 600.000
Almost 39% of the vulnerabilities found by the tools
are connected to the use of logging
fi
les, which fall
under the ‘Insecure Data’ category
RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of
mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them?
Exposed to sensitive information
Clear text of sensitive information
Frequency of Detection
0 1.000 2.000 3.000 4.000
RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of
mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them?
Insider
RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of
mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them?
This vulnerability occurs when the developer does
not use protection mechanisms appropriately
when sharing or saving sensitive information
Exposed to sensitive information
Insider
Exposed to sensitive information
Clear text of sensitive information
Frequency of Detection
0 1.000 2.000 3.000 4.000
Almost 60% of the vulnerabilities found by the tools
are connected to the use of ‘Expose to sensitive
information’, which fall under the ’Privacy’ category
RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of
mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them?
Insider
Exposed to sensitive information
Clear text of sensitive information
Frequency of Detection
0 1.000 2.000 3.000 4.000
RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of
mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them?
Almost 60% of the vulnerabilities found by the tools
are connected to the use of ‘Expose to sensitive
information’, which fall under the ’Privacy’ category
Although according to the of
fi
cial documentation, the
tool can detect each vulnerability on the OWASP top 10.
We observed a partial mismatch between the
documentation and the real vulnerability detected
Insecure


Communication
Insecure Data
Privacy
Improper
Access
Control
External
Storage
Permission
Code
Obfuscator
Insufficient
Cryptography
Improper
Platform Use
Code
Tampering
AndroBugs Trueseeing
Insider
RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of
mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them?
Key
fi
ndings of RQ2 - Frequency
Di
ff
erent tools can detect di
ff
erent security-related
concerns with di
ff
erent frequencies
Key
fi
ndings of RQ2 - Frequency
Key
fi
ndings of RQ2 - Frequency
Di
ff
erent tools can detect di
ff
erent security-related
concerns with di
ff
erent frequencies
There are vulnerabilities almost never detected by these
tools (e.g., Improper Access Control)
Key
fi
ndings of RQ2 - Frequency
Di
ff
erent tools can detect di
ff
erent security-related
concerns with di
ff
erent frequencies
There are vulnerabilities almost never detected by these
tools (e.g., Improper Access Control)
A deeper analysis of the actual support provided by these
tools could be necessary
Key
fi
ndings of RQ2 - Complementarity
AndroBugs and Trueseeing can cover di
ff
erent
security-related problems, suggesting a sort of
complementarity between them

Key
fi
ndings of RQ2 - Complementarity
Key
fi
ndings of RQ2 - Complementarity
AndroBugs and Trueseeing can cover di
ff
erent
security-related problems, suggesting a sort of
complementarity between them

Insider can detect only a subset of vulnerabilities
also detected by Androbug and Trueseeing
Replication package
Scan me!
The results obtained indicate that:

















Replication package
Scan me!
Summing up
Replication package
Scan me!
Summing up
The results obtained indicate that:

The selected tools can detect 11 high-level
vulnerabilities categories and 41 low-level ones











Replication package
Scan me!
Summing up
The results obtained indicate that:

The selected tools can detect 11 high-level
vulnerabilities categories and 41 low-level ones

The selected tools only partially cover the top-10
risks by OWASP





Replication package
Scan me!
Summing up
The results obtained indicate that:

The selected tools can detect 11 high-level
vulnerabilities categories and 41 low-level ones

The selected tools only partially cover the top-10
risks by OWASP

Practitioners should combine multiple tools to
identify as many vulnerabilities as possible
Replication package
Scan me!
Summing up Future Works
The results obtained indicate that:

The selected tools can detect 11 high-level
vulnerabilities categories and 41 low-level ones

The selected tools only partially cover the top-10
risks by OWASP

Practitioners should combine multiple tools to
identify as many vulnerabilities as possible
Replication package
Scan me!
Summing up Future Works
The results obtained indicate that:

The selected tools can detect 11 high-level
vulnerabilities categories and 41 low-level ones

The selected tools only partially cover the top-10
risks by OWASP

Practitioners should combine multiple tools to
identify as many vulnerabilities as possible
Manual evaluation of the accuracy of selected static
analysis tools
Replication package
Scan me!
Summing up Future Works
The results obtained indicate that:

The selected tools can detect 11 high-level
vulnerabilities categories and 41 low-level ones

The selected tools only partially cover the top-10
risks by OWASP

Practitioners should combine multiple tools to
identify as many vulnerabilities as possible
Manual evaluation of the accuracy of selected static
analysis tools
Expand the study by including other tools (e.g., machine
learning tools)
Replication package
Scan me!
Summing up Future Works
Manual evaluation of the accuracy of selected static
analysis tools
Expand the study by including other tools (e.g., machine
learning tools)
Expand the dataset to include paid applications
The results obtained indicate that:

The selected tools can detect 11 high-level
vulnerabilities categories and 41 low-level ones

The selected tools only partially cover the top-10
risks by OWASP

Practitioners should combine multiple tools to
identify as many vulnerabilities as possible
giagiordano@unisa.it
GiammariaGiord1
https://broke31.github.io/
giammaria-giordano/
Scan me!
Backup slides
Selected tools
We selected tools based on four criteria:
Open-source and available on GitHub
Take an apk file as input
Perform a static analysis of the source code
Can be run using the command line
A large number of stars on GitHub
Detection of tools
AndroBugs: 52 categories includes: Permission Issues, Exposure of
Sensitive Information, and Insecure Communications
Trueeseeing: 7 types of security issues: Improper Platform Usage, Insecure
Data, Insecure Communications, Insufficient Cryptography, Client Code
Quality Issues, Code Tampering, and Reverse Engineering
Insider: The tool cover the OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities and support
multiple programming language like Java, Kotlin, Swift, .NET and others
Apk Selection
Only apps available on Google Play Store
Only apps with a minimum of 1000 installations
Only apps with application size more than 1MB
Risk vs vulnerability
Vulnerability refers to a weakness in your hardware, software. It’s a gap
through which a bad actor can gain access to your assets. In other words,
threats exploit vulnerabilities. 
Risk is a potential threat that can in some cases be exploited and become a
vulnerability

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A Preliminary Conceptualization and Analysis on Automated Static Analysis Tools for Vulnerability Detection in Android Apps

  • 1. A Preliminary Conceptualization and Analysis on Automated Static Analysis Tools for Vulnerability Detection in Android Apps Giammaria Giordano, Fabio Palomba, Filomena Ferrucci University of Salerno (Italy)
 Software Engineering (SeSa) Lab
 Department of Computer Science
 giagiordano@unisa.it GiammariaGiord1 https://broke31.github.io/giammaria-giordano/
  • 2. 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 18,22 17,72 16,8 15,96 14,91 14,2 Didascalia https://www.statista.com/statistics/245501/multiple-mobile-device-ownership-worldwide/ Number of Mobile Devices Worldwide from 2020 to 2025 (in billions)
  • 3. 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 18,22 17,72 16,8 15,96 14,91 14,2 Didascalia https://www.statista.com/statistics/245501/multiple-mobile-device-ownership-worldwide/ Number of Mobile Devices Worldwide from 2020 to 2025 (in billions) 80% of mobile devices are Android devices
  • 4. Number of Mobile Devices Worldwide from 2020 to 2025 (in billions) https://www.statista.com/statistics/245501/multiple-mobile-device-ownership-worldwide/ 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 18,22 17,72 16,8 15,96 14,91 14,2 80% of mobile devices are Android devices Current World Population 8 billions
  • 5.
  • 6. Although the vastness of proposed tools, we noticed a lack of empirical evaluation on the real capability of these static analysis tools to detect vulnerabilities
  • 7. RQ2 - What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them? RQ1 - What are the vulnerability types identi fi ed by existing automated static analysis tools for mobile apps? Research Questions
  • 8. How did we address the RQs? For the fi rst RQ, we manually extracted a taxonomy of risks
  • 9. How did we address the RQs? For the fi rst RQ, we manually extracted a taxonomy of risks For the second RQ, we analyzed the tools from a qualitative point of view by analyzing the frequencies of risk detection and the complementarity among them
  • 14. +6,500 Apps Research Question 1 Research Question 2 Search Strategy AndroBugs Trueseeing Insider
  • 15. RQ2 - What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them? Research Questions RQ1 - What are the vulnerability types identi fi ed by existing automated static analysis tools for mobile apps?
  • 16. Security-Related Concerns AUTHENT ICATION ACCESS Insecure Manifest External Resources Improper Access Control Code Tampering Code Obfuscation Insecure Data Insu ffi cient Cryptography Other Privacy Permission Privacy Concern Clear Text Storage of sensitive information Expose sensitive information to Unauthorized actors un Sensitive Information Base64 String Encryption Cryptography Constants Detection Cipher Might Be Operating In ECB Mode Detected O ff uscator Lack of Obfuscation Hardcode Certi fi cates Remove Android Device Lock by Rouge app KeyStore Insecure Mixed Content mode Detected Possible IPV4 Address SSL Security Server-Side Request Forgery Insecure TLS Lack of pinning Use of clear text HTTP Insecure Communication Manipulable Activity Manifest ContentProvider Exported Debuggable Manipulable Backups WebView Detected Format String Detected Library Detected possible FQDN Detected path component Detected URL Detected Logging External storage Accessing Database Manifest Dangerous Protection Level of Permission Manifest Critical Permission Unnecessary Permission App Sandbox Permission Insecure File Permission Open Permission Strandhogg Bypass permission Command
  • 17. Security-Related Concerns AUTHENT ICATION ACCESS Insecure Manifest External Resources Improper Access Control Code Tampering Code Obfuscation Insecure Data Insu ffi cient Cryptography Other Privacy Permission Privacy Concern Clear Text Storage of sensitive information Expose sensitive information to Unauthorized actors un Sensitive Information Base64 String Encryption Cryptography Constants Detection Cipher Might Be Operating In ECB Mode Detected O ff uscator Lack of Obfuscation Hardcode Certi fi cates Remove Android Device Lock by Rouge app KeyStore Insecure Mixed Content mode Detected Possible IPV4 Address SSL Security Server-Side Request Forgery Insecure TLS Lack of pinning Use of clear text HTTP Insecure Communication Manipulable Activity Manifest ContentProvider Exported Debuggable Manipulable Backups WebView Detected Format String Detected Library Detected possible FQDN Detected path component Detected URL Detected Logging External storage Accessing Database Manifest Dangerous Protection Level of Permission Manifest Critical Permission Unnecessary Permission App Sandbox Permission Insecure File Permission Open Permission Strandhogg Bypass permission Command AUTHENTICATION ACCESS Insecure Mixed Content mode Detected Possible IPV4 Address SSL Security Server-Side Request Forgery Insecure TLS Lack of pinning Use of clear text HTTP Insecure Communication
  • 18. Security-Related Concerns AUTHENT ICATION ACCESS Insecure Manifest External Resources Improper Access Control Code Tampering Code Obfuscation Insecure Data Insu ffi cient Cryptography Other Privacy Permission Privacy Concern Clear Text Storage of sensitive information Expose sensitive information to Unauthorized actors un Sensitive Information Base64 String Encryption Cryptography Constants Detection Cipher Might Be Operating In ECB Mode Detected O ff uscator Lack of Obfuscation Hardcode Certi fi cates Remove Android Device Lock by Rouge app KeyStore Insecure Mixed Content mode Detected Possible IPV4 Address SSL Security Server-Side Request Forgery Insecure TLS Lack of pinning Use of clear text HTTP Insecure Communication Manipulable Activity Manifest ContentProvider Exported Debuggable Manipulable Backups WebView Detected Format String Detected Library Detected possible FQDN Detected path component Detected URL Detected Logging External storage Accessing Database Manifest Dangerous Protection Level of Permission Manifest Critical Permission Unnecessary Permission App Sandbox Permission Insecure File Permission Open Permission Strandhogg Bypass permission Command Insecure Manifest Manipulable Activity Manifest ContentProvider Exported Debuggable Manipulable Backups
  • 19. Security-Related Concerns AUTHENT ICATION ACCESS Insecure Manifest External Resources Improper Access Control Code Tampering Code Obfuscation Insecure Data Insu ffi cient Cryptography Other Privacy Permission Privacy Concern Clear Text Storage of sensitive information Expose sensitive information to Unauthorized actors un Sensitive Information Base64 String Encryption Cryptography Constants Detection Cipher Might Be Operating In ECB Mode Detected O ff uscator Lack of Obfuscation Hardcode Certi fi cates Remove Android Device Lock by Rouge app KeyStore Insecure Mixed Content mode Detected Possible IPV4 Address SSL Security Server-Side Request Forgery Insecure TLS Lack of pinning Use of clear text HTTP Insecure Communication Manipulable Activity Manifest ContentProvider Exported Debuggable Manipulable Backups WebView Detected Format String Detected Library Detected possible FQDN Detected path component Detected URL Detected Logging External storage Accessing Database Manifest Dangerous Protection Level of Permission Manifest Critical Permission Unnecessary Permission App Sandbox Permission Insecure File Permission Open Permission Strandhogg Bypass permission Command External Resources WebView Detected Format String Detected Library Detected possible FQDN Detected path component Detected URL
  • 20. Security-Related Concerns AUTHENT ICATION ACCESS Insecure Manifest External Resources Improper Access Control Code Tampering Code Obfuscation Insecure Data Insu ffi cient Cryptography Other Privacy Permission Privacy Concern Clear Text Storage of sensitive information Expose sensitive information to Unauthorized actors un Sensitive Information Base64 String Encryption Cryptography Constants Detection Cipher Might Be Operating In ECB Mode Detected O ff uscator Lack of Obfuscation Hardcode Certi fi cates Remove Android Device Lock by Rouge app KeyStore Insecure Mixed Content mode Detected Possible IPV4 Address SSL Security Server-Side Request Forgery Insecure TLS Lack of pinning Use of clear text HTTP Insecure Communication Manipulable Activity Manifest ContentProvider Exported Debuggable Manipulable Backups WebView Detected Format String Detected Library Detected possible FQDN Detected path component Detected URL Detected Logging External storage Accessing Database Manifest Dangerous Protection Level of Permission Manifest Critical Permission Unnecessary Permission App Sandbox Permission Insecure File Permission Open Permission Strandhogg Bypass permission Command Improper Access Control Remove Android Device Lock by Rouge app KeyStore
  • 21. Security-Related Concerns AUTHENT ICATION ACCESS Insecure Manifest External Resources Improper Access Control Code Tampering Code Obfuscation Insecure Data Insu ffi cient Cryptography Other Privacy Permission Privacy Concern Clear Text Storage of sensitive information Expose sensitive information to Unauthorized actors un Sensitive Information Base64 String Encryption Cryptography Constants Detection Cipher Might Be Operating In ECB Mode Detected O ff uscator Lack of Obfuscation Hardcode Certi fi cates Remove Android Device Lock by Rouge app KeyStore Insecure Mixed Content mode Detected Possible IPV4 Address SSL Security Server-Side Request Forgery Insecure TLS Lack of pinning Use of clear text HTTP Insecure Communication Manipulable Activity Manifest ContentProvider Exported Debuggable Manipulable Backups WebView Detected Format String Detected Library Detected possible FQDN Detected path component Detected URL Detected Logging External storage Accessing Database Manifest Dangerous Protection Level of Permission Manifest Critical Permission Unnecessary Permission App Sandbox Permission Insecure File Permission Open Permission Strandhogg Bypass permission Command Results indicate that these tools can be used to support developers with the identi fi cation of 11 high- level vulnerability categories and 41 low-level ones
  • 22. Security-Related Concerns AUTHENT ICATION ACCESS Insecure Manifest External Resources Improper Access Control Code Tampering Code Obfuscation Insecure Data Insu ffi cient Cryptography Other Privacy Permission Privacy Concern Clear Text Storage of sensitive information Expose sensitive information to Unauthorized actors un Sensitive Information Base64 String Encryption Cryptography Constants Detection Cipher Might Be Operating In ECB Mode Detected O ff uscator Lack of Obfuscation Hardcode Certi fi cates Remove Android Device Lock by Rouge app KeyStore Insecure Mixed Content mode Detected Possible IPV4 Address SSL Security Server-Side Request Forgery Insecure TLS Lack of pinning Use of clear text HTTP Insecure Communication Manipulable Activity Manifest ContentProvider Exported Debuggable Manipulable Backups WebView Detected Format String Detected Library Detected possible FQDN Detected path component Detected URL Detected Logging External storage Accessing Database Manifest Dangerous Protection Level of Permission Manifest Critical Permission Unnecessary Permission App Sandbox Permission Insecure File Permission Open Permission Strandhogg Bypass permission Command Results indicate that these tools can be used to support developers with the identi fi cation of 11 high- level vulnerability categories and 41 low-level ones Most of the vulnerabilities found refer to Insecure Communication, Insecure Manifest, External Resources and Privacy
  • 23. Category Tools Improper Platform Usage Androbugs Trueeseeing Insecure Data Storage Androbugs Trueeseeing Insecure Communication Androbugs Insider
 Trueeseeing Insu ffi cient Authentication Androbugs Trueeseeing Insu ffi cient Cryptography Trueseeing Insecure Authorization Client Code Quality Code tampering Trueeseeing Reverse Engineering Extraneous Functionality Key fi ndings of RQ1 - Vulnerabilities Identi fi ed by Tools
  • 24. Category Tools Improper Platform Usage Androbugs Trueeseeing Insecure Data Storage Androbugs Trueeseeing Insecure Communication Androbugs Insider
 Trueeseeing Insu ffi cient Authentication Androbugs Trueeseeing Insu ffi cient Cryptography Trueseeing Insecure Authorization Client Code Quality Code tampering Trueeseeing Reverse Engineering Extraneous Functionality OWASP Mobile Top-10
 2016 Key fi ndings of RQ1 - Vulnerabilities Identi fi ed by Tools
  • 25. Key fi ndings of RQ1 - Vulnerabilities Identi fi ed by Tools Category Tools Improper Platform Usage Androbugs Trueeseeing Insecure Data Storage Androbugs Trueeseeing Insecure Communication Androbugs Insider
 Trueeseeing Insu ffi cient Authentication Androbugs Trueeseeing Insu ffi cient Cryptography Trueseeing Insecure Authorization Client Code Quality Code tampering Trueeseeing Reverse Engineering Extraneous Functionality OWASP Mobile Top-10
 2016 We found that these tools only partially cover the top-10 risks by OWASP
  • 26. RQ1 - What are the vulnerability types identi fi ed by existing automated static analysis tools for mobile apps? Research Questions RQ2 - What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them?
  • 27. Androbugs Trueeseeing Insider Number of failures 0 425 850 1275 1700 RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them?
  • 28. Androbugs Trueeseeing Insider Number of failures 0 425 850 1275 1700 Androbugs and Insider fails in 20% of the cases, while, Trueseeing in 25% of the cases RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them?
  • 29. Androbugs Trueeseeing Insider Number of failures 0 425 850 1275 1700 Androbugs and Insider fails in 20% of the cases, while, Trueseeing in 25% of the cases We found that these tools typically fail due to miscon fi guration and wrong dependencies usage RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them?
  • 30. WebView SSL Security Sensitive Information External Storage StrandHogg Implicit Intent Command KeyStore Hacker Remove Android Device Lock Frequency of Detection 0 4.000 8.000 12.000 16.000 RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them? Androbugs
  • 31. Developers require an external webpage and a malicious user could inject using JavaScript malicious components inside the webpage WebView RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them?
  • 32. Androbugs WebView SSL Security Sensitive Information External Storage StrandHogg Implicit Intent Command KeyStore Hacker Remove Android Device Lock Frequency of Detection 0 4.000 8.000 12.000 16.000 In almost 50% of the cases, the tools identi fi ed ‘Web View’ and ‘SSL Security’ vulnerabilities: these pertain to the ‘External Resources’ and ‘Insecure Communication’ categories of the taxonomy RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them?
  • 33. Detect Logging Detect URL Detect Possible FQDN Detect Library Detect Format String Cyptographic Constants Detect Path Component Open Permission Detect Possible IPV4 Address Manipulable Broadcast Reveiver Frequency of Detection 0 150.000 300.000 450.000 600.000 RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them? Trueeseeing
  • 34. RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them? if (verifyUsername(username) && verifyPassword(password)) { loginOK(); logger.log(Level.INFO, "Username: " + username); logger.log(Level.INFO, "Password: " + password); } Detect Logging fi le Developers could accidentally write sensitive information in a log file, and an attacker could identify these information to try an attack
  • 35. Trueeseeing Detect Logging Detect URL Detect Possible FQDN Detect Library Detect Format String Cyptographic Constants Detect Path Component Open Permission Detect Possible IPV4 Address Manipulable Broadcast Reveiver Frequency of Detection 0 150.000 300.000 450.000 600.000 Almost 39% of the vulnerabilities found by the tools are connected to the use of logging fi les, which fall under the ‘Insecure Data’ category RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them?
  • 36. Exposed to sensitive information Clear text of sensitive information Frequency of Detection 0 1.000 2.000 3.000 4.000 RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them? Insider
  • 37. RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them? This vulnerability occurs when the developer does not use protection mechanisms appropriately when sharing or saving sensitive information Exposed to sensitive information
  • 38. Insider Exposed to sensitive information Clear text of sensitive information Frequency of Detection 0 1.000 2.000 3.000 4.000 Almost 60% of the vulnerabilities found by the tools are connected to the use of ‘Expose to sensitive information’, which fall under the ’Privacy’ category RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them?
  • 39. Insider Exposed to sensitive information Clear text of sensitive information Frequency of Detection 0 1.000 2.000 3.000 4.000 RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them? Almost 60% of the vulnerabilities found by the tools are connected to the use of ‘Expose to sensitive information’, which fall under the ’Privacy’ category Although according to the of fi cial documentation, the tool can detect each vulnerability on the OWASP top 10. We observed a partial mismatch between the documentation and the real vulnerability detected
  • 40. Insecure 
 Communication Insecure Data Privacy Improper Access Control External Storage Permission Code Obfuscator Insufficient Cryptography Improper Platform Use Code Tampering AndroBugs Trueseeing Insider RQ2: What are the capabilities of existing automated static analysis tools in terms of mobile app analyzability, frequency of detection, and complementarity among them?
  • 41. Key fi ndings of RQ2 - Frequency
  • 42. Di ff erent tools can detect di ff erent security-related concerns with di ff erent frequencies Key fi ndings of RQ2 - Frequency
  • 43. Key fi ndings of RQ2 - Frequency Di ff erent tools can detect di ff erent security-related concerns with di ff erent frequencies There are vulnerabilities almost never detected by these tools (e.g., Improper Access Control)
  • 44. Key fi ndings of RQ2 - Frequency Di ff erent tools can detect di ff erent security-related concerns with di ff erent frequencies There are vulnerabilities almost never detected by these tools (e.g., Improper Access Control) A deeper analysis of the actual support provided by these tools could be necessary
  • 45. Key fi ndings of RQ2 - Complementarity
  • 46. AndroBugs and Trueseeing can cover di ff erent security-related problems, suggesting a sort of complementarity between them
 Key fi ndings of RQ2 - Complementarity
  • 47. Key fi ndings of RQ2 - Complementarity AndroBugs and Trueseeing can cover di ff erent security-related problems, suggesting a sort of complementarity between them
 Insider can detect only a subset of vulnerabilities also detected by Androbug and Trueseeing
  • 49. The results obtained indicate that:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Replication package Scan me! Summing up
  • 50. Replication package Scan me! Summing up The results obtained indicate that:
 The selected tools can detect 11 high-level vulnerabilities categories and 41 low-level ones
 
 
 
 
 

  • 51. Replication package Scan me! Summing up The results obtained indicate that:
 The selected tools can detect 11 high-level vulnerabilities categories and 41 low-level ones
 The selected tools only partially cover the top-10 risks by OWASP
 
 

  • 52. Replication package Scan me! Summing up The results obtained indicate that:
 The selected tools can detect 11 high-level vulnerabilities categories and 41 low-level ones
 The selected tools only partially cover the top-10 risks by OWASP
 Practitioners should combine multiple tools to identify as many vulnerabilities as possible
  • 53. Replication package Scan me! Summing up Future Works The results obtained indicate that:
 The selected tools can detect 11 high-level vulnerabilities categories and 41 low-level ones
 The selected tools only partially cover the top-10 risks by OWASP
 Practitioners should combine multiple tools to identify as many vulnerabilities as possible
  • 54. Replication package Scan me! Summing up Future Works The results obtained indicate that:
 The selected tools can detect 11 high-level vulnerabilities categories and 41 low-level ones
 The selected tools only partially cover the top-10 risks by OWASP
 Practitioners should combine multiple tools to identify as many vulnerabilities as possible Manual evaluation of the accuracy of selected static analysis tools
  • 55. Replication package Scan me! Summing up Future Works The results obtained indicate that:
 The selected tools can detect 11 high-level vulnerabilities categories and 41 low-level ones
 The selected tools only partially cover the top-10 risks by OWASP
 Practitioners should combine multiple tools to identify as many vulnerabilities as possible Manual evaluation of the accuracy of selected static analysis tools Expand the study by including other tools (e.g., machine learning tools)
  • 56. Replication package Scan me! Summing up Future Works Manual evaluation of the accuracy of selected static analysis tools Expand the study by including other tools (e.g., machine learning tools) Expand the dataset to include paid applications The results obtained indicate that:
 The selected tools can detect 11 high-level vulnerabilities categories and 41 low-level ones
 The selected tools only partially cover the top-10 risks by OWASP
 Practitioners should combine multiple tools to identify as many vulnerabilities as possible
  • 59. Selected tools We selected tools based on four criteria: Open-source and available on GitHub Take an apk file as input Perform a static analysis of the source code Can be run using the command line A large number of stars on GitHub
  • 60. Detection of tools AndroBugs: 52 categories includes: Permission Issues, Exposure of Sensitive Information, and Insecure Communications Trueeseeing: 7 types of security issues: Improper Platform Usage, Insecure Data, Insecure Communications, Insufficient Cryptography, Client Code Quality Issues, Code Tampering, and Reverse Engineering Insider: The tool cover the OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities and support multiple programming language like Java, Kotlin, Swift, .NET and others
  • 61. Apk Selection Only apps available on Google Play Store Only apps with a minimum of 1000 installations Only apps with application size more than 1MB
  • 62. Risk vs vulnerability Vulnerability refers to a weakness in your hardware, software. It’s a gap through which a bad actor can gain access to your assets. In other words, threats exploit vulnerabilities.  Risk is a potential threat that can in some cases be exploited and become a vulnerability